PL ISSN 1233-5835
B ożen a K lim czak*
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The concept o f sustainable development in connection with environmental ethics points to the need for a change of the individualistic paradigm of neoclassical econom ics. The author presents the main ethical theories: utilitarianism, K ant’s ethics, personalistic ethics and Jonas’s ethics of responsibility from the point of applying to the problems of hum an interaction with the environment. It points to the need for the enriching of the paradigm o f neoclassical economics with responsibility.
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Thinking about the future o f the hum an community, w hich is the essence of the sustainable development concept, does not fit the neoclassical concept o f the enterprising man. Enterprise is traditionally considered by econom ics as part of the individualistic paradigm, according to which choices are m ade depending on personal benefits, identified with utilitarian values. S acrificing one’s interests for social interests is contem plated exclusively in terms o f relinquishing short term benefits in exchange for long-term benefits, never, how ever, exceeding the horizon o f one generation. Econom ic models consider the consequences of choices m ade by the enterprising man without taking into account their transgenerational effects, and the so-called long term con sists o f short terms in which the actions of the enterprising man take place. The lack of a transgenerational perspective is also visible in the absence of constraints on individual choices other than those that can be valued by the m arket mechanism. The concept of sustainable developm ent points to the need for a change or at least a m odification of the individualistic paradigm of neoclassical economics. This paper aim s to present the ethical aspects of sustainable developm ent which may suggest a direction of the m odification of neoclassical economics that would not be destructive to individualism in making econom ic choices, but which w ould enrich it with responsibility for making choices and action. Therefore, the paper will first deal with the options and lim itations of traditional ethics and then will go on to describe the contem porary directions in ethical reflection regarding man’s attitude tow ards the environm ent.
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2. IS THERE A NEED FOR NEW ETHICS?
P h ilo so p h ers, representatives o f other disciplines o f learning , politicians and other p erson s concerned about the ecological crisis d ra w attention to the limitations o f traditional ethics resulting from individualism and anthropo- centrism (Jonas 1996). Traditional ethics focuses on the question o f how people should b eh av e towards other people. The answ ers to this question are variously ju stifie d , but different system s o f traditio nal ethics share an interest in m an and the prem ise th at m an’s duties ca n n o t be derived from being. E v er since D. Hume m ade out a case for “no o u g h t from is” (H um e 1963), b ein g has been regarded as free from values and thus incapable o f constituting a basis for determ ining w hat is morally good and what is m an’s duty. N ot alw ays has traditional ethics sought a ju s tific a tio n for m an’s obligations in man himself, but nev er in his being. It m ay be assum ed then that this k in d o f ethics is anth ropocentric only in the sen se that man is the subject o f choices, actions, and m oral reflection. T ra d itio n al ethics is, how ever, no t fully anthropocentric in the sense of m aking m an the source o f moral v alues. In fact, it is perso nalitic, because the p erso n is the subject o f m orality. A nxiety about the lim itations o f traditional eth ics m ust have other reasons. T hey were noticed by H. Jonas (Jonas 1996), who apart from anth ro pocentrism pointed to tw o o th er important lim itatio n s o f traditional ethics:
1) the lack of interest in the nonhum an world; not only in the objective aspect in the relation to man, but also in the subjective aspect, i.e. in the relation of man to that world;
2) the lack o f a temporal and spatial perspective with regard to associating particular actions with moral values; according to Jonas, all principles and norms o f traditional ethics do not take into account the tem poral and spatial dim ension or the cumulativeness o f the consequences of m an ’s actions.
Jonas ex p lain s these lim itations by reference to th e cu rren tly occurring change in the nature of human ac tiv ity consisting in the fact that techne has ceased to be a m eans applied by peo p le o f necessity w ith a view to achieving close, w ell-d efin ed objectives, and has become an aim in itself, m an’s conceited d esire to have m axim um control over th in g s and constantly grow ing p o ssessions. This ex p lan atio n inclines one to c o n sid e r seriously the w idely-held opinion that the causes fo r the ecological crisis should be sought in the Judaeo-C hristian tradition, according to which n atu re was created as G od’s gift to m an. The com m and from Genesis: “re p o p u la te the earth and subdue it” (The Living Bible 1990, G enesis 9:7) is cited as ev iden ce o f G o d ’s perm ission fo r man to exploit natu re in any m anner he sees fit. This tradition
is ju x ta p o se d with the ancient G re ek concept of tim e le ss and everlasting nature, ac co rd in g to which m an is part o f nature and m u st be at peace with it (M eyer-A bich 1984). C onsequently, representatives o f ecological ethics propose th a t the anthropocentrism o f traditional e th ic s be replaced with p hysio cen trism , and individualism with holism.
W e are faced with the q u estio n , then, w hether tradition al ethics is incapable o f solving the p roblem o f m an’s o bligation s to the environm ent and w h e th e r there is a need fo r new , n o n-anth rop ocen tric ethics. B efore attem ptin g an answ er to the ab o v e questions, let us c o n sid e r the issue of m an’s c o n tro l over nature co n tain ed in G od’s com m and to subdue the Earth. M an’s techno lo g ical control o v er nature cannot be id e n tifie d with violence, as has b een done by the F ran k fu rt school (H orkheim er, A dorno 1969). T he d estruction o f nature is co nnected with the E n lig h ten m en t notion of m an ’s attitude to nature consisting in its instrum ental u tiliza tio n . T he originator o f this attitu d e was F. Bacon, w ho claim ed that man c o u ld use nature for his own p u rp o se s. Subsequently D escartes postulated th at m an, using science and tech n o lo g y , should becom e “the lord and m aster o f n atu re” (S chafer 1995). D u rin g the industrial revolu tion the narrow b o rd e r betw een control over n atu re , which does not d estro y it but adapts it to su it m an’s needs, and violence ag ain st nature, co n sistin g in a radical instru m en talizatio n of nature and its co n seq u en t destruction, w as crossed. It is this ch a n g e in the character o f m an ’s actio n s that is em phasized by Jonas. A ttem pts to find in it traces of an in flu en c e of the Judaeo-C hristian tradition is then an exaggeration.
H o w ev er, the clarification o f the m isunderstandings regarding m an ’s control o v er nature is not eq u iv ale n t to claim ing th at th ere is no need for new eth ic s, as both control over and violence again st nature are an th ro p o cen tric in character. It m ust be determ ined w hether traditional, ethical sy stem s may be applied to justify m an’s o b lig a tio n s tow ards nature. To this end we will discuss th ree sam ple ethical system s: utilitarianism , K ant’s eth ics, and Catholic p ersonalism .
U tilitarian ism , as the ethics o f consequences, ad v o c ates considering the effects o f hum an actions. A lthough the originator o f utilitarianism , J. B entham , was not aw are of how m uch d estruction of nature w o u ld be caused by man, in the interpretation of his moral principle that “an action is right if it prom otes the g re a te st good of the greatest num ber of peop le” (B en th am 1958) he took into a c c o u n t the duration o f d esirable and u n d esira b le consequences. In econom ic practice and theory his principle o f utility h as been trivialized to the “h ere and now” . D estru ctio n o f the en v iro n m e n t is perceived as a c cep tab le if it constitutes a le sse r evil; for in stan ce, the use of pesticides increases crop yields and thus does more good than h arm to more people o f
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the p resen t generation. In his fe lic ific calculus B entham p o stulates that not only the p re sen t but also future consequences should be tak en into account. From the perspective of the influence o f to d ay ’s action s upon the enviro nm ent in the future his sy stem does not require any reinterpretation, although its application may be d ifficu lt as it calls fo r sacrifice for the benefit o f fu tu re generations. S acrificin g the present g e n e ra tio n ’s interests for the g enerations to com e can n o t be justified by o n e ’s own long-term benefit as w as suggested by D. H um e and J.S. M ill. U tilitarian ism does not answ er the question why future g e n e ratio n s’ interests sh o u ld be considered if they have no influence on the situ atio n o f the present gen eratio n .
K an t’s eth ics, as the ethics o f duty, does not focus on th e consequences of hum an ac tio n s but on their u n d erly in g reasons. An actio n is m orally good if it derives from a good intention, irrespective of its co n seq u en ces. The aspect of intention is im portant when assessin g environm ental dam ag e, as it m akes it possib le to distinguish negligible and unintentional d am ag e from serious and d elib erate. The application o f the p raeter intentio nem principle to side effects en a b le s actions to be ev alu ated as morally good or bad. H ow ever, looking fo r intentions may be an unreliable criterion o f evaluation in the case o f action s that can affect future generations, as aw areness o f transgen eratio n al obligations is d ifficu lt to achieve.
K an t’s eth ics is ’’anth ro p o cen tric” not only becau se o f the subject o f moral ch o ice s, but also due to such choices being ce n tre d on man. The second form u latio n of the categorical im perative reading: “ act in such a way as to treat hum anity always as an end, and never m erely as a m eans” (Kant 1971) co n c en trate s on man, w hose worth requires th at each action should in tentionally reflect respect fo r people. K ant’s im p erativ e may be extended w ithout any special problem s to encom pass not only p eo p le directly affected by our ac tio n s, but all people w ho may be influenced by them indirectly, even if th ey are distant in tim e o r space. Jonas (1 9 9 6 ) reform ulated the im perative as follows: “act only in such a way th at th e effects of your actions m ay be reconciled with the continued existence o f genuine human life” and “ in your present-day ch o ices among the o b jects o f your will, take into ac co u n t m an ’s future in teg rity ” . Thus, in his fo rm u latio n s he includes not only inten tio n s but also the consequences of m an ’s ac tio n s in the infinite future. Jo n as claim s that his version o f the categorical im perativ e requires a different ju stific atio n for m oral ch o ices than K ant’s in ten tio n ality . H ow ever, it is p o ssib le to restrict o neself to the formal criteria p ro p o sed by Kant: a given rule should become a u n iversally binding law if it may be applied w ithout ex cep tio n s and be accep ted by all people. T h e necessary condition for J o n a s ’s form ulations to b eco m e a moral law is the u n iv ersal consent to
com ply w ith them and the univ ersal understanding that environm ental dam age endangers the existence o f hum ans.
P ersonalistic ethics invokes a transcendent justification for respect for the human being, but the justification is not necessary to d erive from the concept o f the hum an being, entitled to freedom s and rights indispensable to life in dignity, duties not only to living people but also to future generations. Deriving ethical duties from human rights leads to the question w hether claim s of nature itself should not be acknowledged not because of man’s distant welfare but because of natu re’s rights. Such an attitude is represented by som e proponents o f ecological ethics (Regan 1983; T aylor 1986). However, it must be taken into account that nature understood as separate from man is not a subject. T he relationship between man and nature is asymmetrical: m an sets up objectives and achieves them through control over nature. The fact that nature constitutes a means for people does not have to deprive it of dignity; it happens only when nature is subdued and destroyed. Respecting nature does not require that rights should be assigned to it, but that the dignity of human beings, considered in the context o f nature as a common good shared by the w hole humanity, should be respected. The notion of a com m on good must be reform ulated to take into account transgenerational solidarity. Consequently, we have an ethics of the present applied to a form of longer-lasting life. Such application is not easy as is attested by the controversies surrounding the protection o f life in the womb.
A lth o u g h the ethical system s discussed above are “anthrop ocen tric” in Jo n a s’s sense, this feature d o es not prevent them from form ulating m oral p o stu lates regarding m an’s d u ties to the environm ent. U tilitarianism show s the need to assess the conseq u en ces of human a c tio n s, the ethics of K ant em p h asiz es the im portance o f intentions of actions in relatio n to others, and p erso n alistic ethics presents com m unal duties en su in g from the rights o f the hum an being. These recom m endations of trad itio n al ethics cannot be o v erestim ated in the face o f new problem s connected with m an’s vio len ce against n atu re. However, such recom m endations need to be reform ulated or ju stifie d m ore profoundly due to their “short-sig h ted n ess” . It does not seem that to this end nature should be m ade the centre o r th e subject of ethical reflectio n and that new eth ics, environm ental eth ic s, should be created. H ow ever, a deeper justificatio n o f why man should in fin itely extend the tim e horizon o f his moral choices is required.
An attem pt at such a justification is made by Jonas. H is justification differs from the justifications given by traditional ethical system s, which refer to human reason and feelings or to an external authority, as it is ontological in nature. M oral good is, according to Jonas, ontologically rooted in the teleological structure of being. In contrast to representatives o f traditional ethics,
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who, follow ing Hume, did not derive moral duties from being, Jonas claims that the being o f humanity is a value that should be protected. O n this premise he bases his argum ent that people have no right to com m it suicide; his notion of man causes him to formulate the im perative “humanity m ust exist” . In other words, the value of the ontological concept of man constitutes a justification for people’s duties towards future generations.
Jo n a s’s im perative has already entered the ethical ca n o n o f reflections on m an’s d u ties to the environm ent. H ere it has been ju x ta p o s e d with selected traditional ethical systems to show that the basis for d eterm in in g such duties in all eth ical system s have an a p rio ri character, u nless th ey are religious in nature. It is clear in Jonas’s eth ics that the assum ption that being has a teleological character calls for relig io u s premises.
3. M A N ’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIONS AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
T ra d itio n al systems of ethics deal with ju stify in g choices from the p ersp ective o f moral good, i.e. they consider the problem : “ w hat should one do?” T hey do not deal with situations of m oral ev il, which require addressing the question: “what should som eone w hose actio n resulted in evil do?” S o lv in g this problem req u ires a shift to m aterial facts which have a concrete m oral value. It is thus a problem of m an’s resp on sibility for his actions. ‘ It m ust be em phasized that classical so lu tio n s regarding the avoidance o f negative external environm ental effects re fe r to punishm ent (p ollu ter-pays principle) or in centives (P igou’s tax), and so they concern bearing responsibility or calling a person to account fo r an action. They are solutions in w hich the agent c a u sin g environm ental d am ag e rem ains passive in the sense that he does not becom e the subject o f any resp on sible action. The d ifferen tiatio n between a p assiv e and an active attitu d e to responsibility for the environm ent is of fundam ental im portance to the sustainable developm ent concept. A passive attitude means an in cre ase in institutional restrictions im posed on actions in th e form of proh ib itio ns, orders, standards, penalties, etc., which are perceived as lim itations o f freed o m if the rationale behind th e ir introduction is not understood. F urtherm ore, to d a y ’s ecological crisis o ffers challenges in which finding the polluter or asc rib in g blame and im posing obligation to repair the dam age is not im p o rtan t (B irnbacher 1995); w hat counts is m aking p eo p le assum e an activ e attitud e involving responsible conduct. The questions to answ er are: “w ho is resp onsible?” and “what d oes responsibility for the environm ent consist in ? ” D eterm ining who is re sp o n sib le for environm ental dam age is both easy and difficult. It is easy,
b ecau se responsibility rests w ith all people who by th e ir choices and actions exert a d estructiv e influence on nature and who sim ultaneo usly m eet the fo llo w in g conditions: they are free to choose and th ey are aw are o f the co n seq u en ces of their ch o ices on the basis o f th e objective state o f kn o w led g e at a given m om ent. Such people are not only m anufacturers, but also con sum ers, investors, scientists, inven to rs, entrepreneurs and p o liticia n s. Som e of them do not have a direct im p act on the environm ent, e.g. in v esto rs, although th eir sovereign decision s affect m an ufacturers’ actions. D eterm ining who is responsible for the env iro n m en t is difficu lt because it is difficult to estab lish how resp o n sib ility is distributed. T he opinion o f Jonas and other representatives of en v iro n m en tal ethics - that the trad itio n al practice of asso c ia tin g an action with a p artic u la r agent is not ad equ ate to new ethical pro b lem s regarding the eco lo g ic al crisis - seem s leg itim ate. As a consequence o f the lack of a direct co nn ection betw een the c o n su m e rs’ desire to increase consum ption and the th rea t to the existence o f future generations, nobody assum es responsibility. It is essential to specify the n a tu re o f responsible actio n s. How difficult it is is dem onstrated by the exam ple o f the “environm ental” m anagem ent con cep t (S tead 1996).
T h e “ environm ental” m anagem ent concept is b ase d on the assum ption that the pursuit of environm en tal sustainability sh o u ld be profitable to b u sin esses. Therefore, it is p ro posed that m anagers sh ou ld be m ade sensitiv e to the value of sustainability by means of five instrum ental values: w ho len ess, posterity, sm allness, quality, and co m m u n ity . T hese values should b e incorporated into an enterp rise’s strategy in such a way so as to acquire, at the same tim e, eco n o m ic values and the sustainab ility value. In o ther w ords, these values form a filter by means o f w h ich m anagers d isco v er strateg ic opportunities and th reats to their plans as reg ard s environm ental factors. F o r exam ple, two environm entally sen sitiv e co m p etitiv e strategies are proposed:
1) a strategy of product differentiation by m ean s o f environm entally friendly product features,
2) a strategy of cost reduction by means o f en v iro nm entally friend ly actions.
T he argum ents for such strategies are as follow s: the environm ent is a fu n d am en tal value, but it ca n n o t be protected at the c o st o f econom ic values. T h erefo re, m anagers should take into account the env iron m ental effects o f their actions to the extent dem anded from th em by their “g re e n ” stak eh o ld ers, provided that such practice does n o t pose a threat to p ro fitab ility .
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It has to b e stressed that such an “ethics pays” attitu d e has nothing to do with care ab o u t the environm ent. M an a g ers’ “care” abo ut th e environm ent is a result o f th eir interest in profits and the pressure e x e rted by stakeholders and not o f their conscious self-im p o sed restrictions on operations. The values and strategies recom m ended to managers regard actio n s close to the agent. It is d ifficult to im agine a com petitive strategy b ased on the slogan “M anu facturin g for future g en e ratio n s” . In the light o f th e environm ental m anagem ent concept it is prim arily consum ers, inv esto rs, politicians, and scientists (th at is the people w hose accountability is not d irect) that should be responsible for the environm ent.
As far as the content of respon sibility is concerned, eth ics suggests that people’s im agination should be stirred and skills in asse ssin g risks connected with the use o f new technologies should be acquired. It is w orthw hile to point out tw o criteria. One criterion suggested by Jonas is th e “ heuristics of fear” c o n sistin g o f adopting an attitude of fear o f the distant and u np redictable consequences o f contem porary actions. T he criterion forces people to pay more attention to the risks involved than to im m ediate profits. It does not fit into the environm ental m anagem ent co n cep t, which is based on the im m ed iate profit-m aking criterion.
Sim ilar to the heuristics o f fear is the “ veil o f ig n o ran c e” criterion proposed by J. Rawls (1972). It tells people facing a ch o ice to im agine that they do not know their position in the future; they do not kn o w w hether they will be talen ted or not, healthy or ill, rich or poor etc. It is p ossible to direct o ne’s im ag in ation to one’s children and grandchildren, and then to consider whether o n e ’s actions of today w ill constitute a sufficient prem ise for the existence o f future generations.
A nother criterion, indicated by D. C ollingridge (19 80 ), is based on the assum ption that there are no fau ltless technologies; thus, the use o f new technologies should be based on the principle of the re v ersib ility o f their effects, w hich means that it is necessary to adopt a p essim istic attitude to technical p ossibilities and to take into account the u n certain ty o f forecasting, and so, as w ith Jo n as’s criterion, to stir fearful im agination.
The two criteria are mentioned here for two reasons. Firstly, the European ethics o f responsibility for the environm ent is not widely recognized in the USA, w here a strongly pragmatic application trend o f business and environm ental ethics predominates. Secondly, the content o f accountability for the environm ent to future generations may be received positively only if it is sufficiently justified as to why the present generation’s activities should be restricted and directed in such a way that the environm ent may serve future generations. T he lack of sufficient justification is a feature characteristic not
only o f traditional ethics but also o f environmental responsibility ethics. The most convincing justification, although not appealing to everyone, is religious. This position is supported by the content of the principle o f responsibility for natural resources, known as the principle of stew ardship. According to this principle, natural resources were entrusted to humanity by God (Genesis 9:7). Therefore, irrespective of property rights, in a never-ending process all people are obliged to manage the resources they were entrusted w ith in the interests of all hum anity. The principle of stew ardship refers not only to businesspeople, but to all who utilize the Earth’s resources. It imposes on all users the obligation to conserve resources: for instance, consumers have to cut down on their consum ption (Stackhouse 1995). The principle o f stew ardship may be connected with the responsibility criteria proposed by Jonas and Collingridge. It is also w orth noting that the principle provides a justification for the obligations imposed on owners of resources formulated in Art. 14 o f the German C onstitution: “Eigentum verpflichtet...” .
4. FINAL REMARKS
The P olish philosopher T. K otarbiński wrote: “philosophers bid up the price to get a scarcely bearable trophy” . The application of the responsible action concept, w hether derived from consequentialist or deontological premises, rooted in religion or anthropocentrism , might make developm ent sustainable on one condition: all agents must be responsible in the sense discussed above. This condition is unsatisfiable. People differ in their mental capacity and moral standards, and so sustainable developm ent does not pose the threat of a new totalitarianism if it is not treated as a utopia. On the grounds of realism in thinking about human possibilities and limitations one has to “bid up the price” with full consciousness that the trophy will be “scarcely bearable” . With this realization in mind, I have not postulated a change o f the paradigm of econom ics, as one can talk about ethically responsible action only if the agent is free to m ake choices.
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