Karol Sacewicz
Concepts of the Political and Military
Position of the Polish Underground
State in Response to the Red Army’s
Invasion of the Eastern Territories of
the Second Republic oh Poland
(1943-1944) - a Broad Outline
Echa Przeszłości 12, 173-188Karol Sacewicz
CONCEPTS OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
POSITION OF THE POLISH UNDERGROUND STATE
IN RESPONSE TO THE RED ARMY’S INVASION
OF THE EASTERN TERRITORIES OF THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF POLAND (1943-1944)
- A BROAD OUTLINE
During World War II, the main aim of the Polish President, the Polish Government in Exile, the Polish Armed Forces in Exile and the Polish Army in occupied Poland was to regain full sovereignty, independence and territo rial integrity of the Polish state. The achievement of th a t goal was deter mined not only by the defeat of the Third Reich bu t also by the policies exercised by the USSR, one of aggressors who dismembered the Second Republic of Poland in September 1939 and later joined the G reat Coalition. During the war, Soviet policies addressing Poland’s quest for independence posed the greatest legal challenge for the Polish Government in Exile and its home divisions. The W estern Allies approached the political aspects of th a t struggle with a vast degree of ambiguity.
The complexity of the problem in Polish foreign policy resulted from the fact th a t upon Germany’s invasion of Russia on 22 Ju n e 1941, the Soviet Union automatically broke off its close alliance with Hitler, becoming the key member of the anti-Germ an camp. In the years th a t followed, the Soviet army engaged the German (and not only) forces in a series of battles th a t inflicted a devastating blow on the m ilitary and economic potential of the Third Reich and its allies. The Red Army’s continued success gave impetus to the Soviet Union’s expansive, imperial foreign policy. The Soviets launched aggressive propaganda campaigns which underm ined Poland’s right to sover eignty and territorial integrity in the E astern Borderlands1. Those measures 1 W. M a te rs k i., Z e rw a n ie sto su n k ó w po lsko -so w ieckich in: H isto ria d yp lo m a cji p o lsk ie j, ed. W. M ichow icz, vol. 5: 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , W a rsz a w a 1999, pp. 3 1 9 -3 8 7 ; idem , N a widecie. I I R zeczp o
weakened Poland’s efforts to protect its rights in the east. The W estern Allies turned a blind eye on Poland’s struggle in fear of severing their relations with Moscow2, especially since they failed to open a second theater of w ar3.
The vast disproportions in Poland’s and the USSR’s m ilitary and eco nomic potential detracted from the government-in-exile’s significance in the Allied camp. Owing to B ritish and American w ar strategies, President Racz- kiewicz and the successive prime m inisters (Sikorski and Mikołajczyk) found their efforts to protect Polish sovereignty in the eastern territories not only difficult but, in the contemporary m ilitary reality, completely impossible and futile. The W estern Allies’ attitudes towards the Polish problem were best illustrated during the breakthrough period in Polish-Soviet relations in April 1943 when the Germans had discovered a mass grave of Polish officers murdered by the NKVD in 1940 in Smolensk4.
The USSR’s decision to break off diplomatic relations was a powerful blow for the Polish authorities and their struggle to secure Polish rights in the E astern Borderlands. This problem took on a new significance in the face of suspicions th a t the Soviet army would be the first to enter the territory of the Nazi-occupied Poland. In the second half of 1943, Polish-Soviet relations did not focus entirely on the E astern Borderlands, bu t they also addressed rudim entary issues, namely Poland’s independence which, despite Poland’s efforts on the anti-German front, became highly debatable in the face of Russia’s increasingly b latan t imperial ambitions.
The Red Army’s advance towards Poland’s pre-war borders was one of the key problems facing the Polish Government in Exile and, above all, its factions in the occupied country. The Polish underground movement, in par ticular the Polish Underground State, became divided over the m atter a t the tu rn of 1943 and 1944. The differences concerned the structure of the con spiracy movement which was to be preserved in the face of the encroaching troops of “our allies’ ally”.
2 J . T eb in k a J ., P o lity k a b ry ty jsk a wobec p ro b le m u g ra n ic y p o lsk o -ra d zie c k ie j 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , W a rsz a w a 1998, p a ssim ; M. H a ła s , Goście czy in tr u z i? R z ą d p o ls k i n a u c h o d źstw ie. W rzesień
1939 - lipiec 1943, W a rsz a w a 1996, p a ssim .
3 A ccording to th e W e s te rn A llies, th e r e w a s a t h r e a t o f a re p e a te d sc e n a rio from 1918 w h e n R u s s ia a n d G e rm a n y h a d sig n e d a p eace tre a ty . I n th e a b se n ce of A nglo-S axon a rm ie s on th e c o n tin e n t, th e W e s te rn A llies w e re p a r tic u la r ly c a u tio u s n o t to g e n e ra te te n s io n in th e ir r e la tio n s w ith R u ssia .
4 Z b r o d n ia k a ty ń s k a w św ie tle d o k u m e n tó w , ed. J . M ackiew icz, L o n d y n 1982, p. 85; W. M a te rs k i, Z e rw a n ie sto su n kó w ..., p. 374; id em , N a w idecie..., p. 701; E. D u ra cz y ń sk i, R z ą d
P o lski n a u c h o d źstw ie 1 9 3 9-1945. O rganizacja, p e rso n a lia , p o lity k a , W a rsz a w a 1993, p. 222;
cf: P r a w d z iw a h isto ria P olaków . Ilu stro w a n e w y p isy źró d ło w e 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , ed. D. B a liszew sk i, A.K. K u n e rt, vol. 2: 1 9 4 3 -1 9 4 4 , W a rsz a w a 1999, p. 1005; A n d rzej K. K u n e rt a n d D a riu sz B a lisz e w sk i su g g e st th e d a te o f 11 A p ril 1943; for m ore in fo rm a tio n o n th e d isco v ery o f th e m a s s g rav e, re fe r to: A. P a u l, K a ty ń . S ta lin o w s k a m a s a k r a i t r y u m f p r a w d y , W a rsz a w a 2003, pp. 1 9 7 -2 0 9 .
The strategy to be adopted in the event of a Soviet invasion was one of the key points of a national uprising plan developed by the 3rd Division of the General Command of the Union of Armed Struggle (KG ZWZ) and the Commander-in-Chiefs H eadquarters. In the initial uprising plan, “Opera tions Report No. 54”, forwarded to London on 5 February 1941, KG ZWZ accounted for the th rea t to insurgent operations th a t could be posed by the second occupant, USSR, on the anti-Nazi front5. A defense strategy account ing for the Red Army’s hostility towards the insurgents had been developed before the Soviet-German w ar in a completely different political reality. The Soviet occupation of Poland’s Eastern Borderlands plunged the USSR and the Second Republic of Poland into a state of war, and the Red Army’s potential advance was perceived as the greatest th rea t to Polish m ilitary efforts and quest for independence both from the political and the m ilitary perspective. After 22 June 1941, Polish territory was occupied by only one aggressor, and the signing of the Sikorski-M ayski agreem ent completely changed the initial concept of the anti-Germ an uprising in Poland6. The USSR’s attitude to the m ilitary and political strategies of the Polish Underground State was an im portant consideration in the decision-making process both for the Govern m ent in Exile and its domestic divisions. Despite the fact th a t Poland and the Soviet Union had established official diplomatic relations, th a t a Polish army was being organized in the USSR and th a t both countries were mem bers of the same political and m ilitary camp, by 1942, the command of the Polish Army in exile7 and a t home feared the m ilitary and political conse quences of the Red Army’s invasion of Poland. On 22 June 1942, General 5 M. N ey-K rw aw icz, K oncepcje p o w s ta n ia p o w szech n eg o n a zie m ia c h p o ls k ic h in: O peracja
“B u r z a ” i P o w sta n ie W a rsza w sk ie 1944, ed. K. K om orow ski, W a rsz a w a 2004, pp. 6 8 -7 1 ; idem , K oncepcje w a lk i i p o w s ta n ia in: A r m ia K rajow a. S zk ic e z d ziejó w S i ł Z b ro jn y c h P olskiego P a ń s t w a P o d ziem n eg o , ed. K. K om orow ski, W a rsz a w a 1999, pp. 2 0 7 -2 1 2 ; see also: id em , Koncepcje w a l k i A r m i i K r a jo w e j in : W ła d z e R P n a o b c z y ź n ie p o d c z a s I I w o jn y ś w ia to w e j, ed.
Z. B łaż y ń sk i, L o n d y n 1994, pp. 5 2 7 -5 3 3 .
6 I n “P e rs o n a l a n d classified in s tru c tio n s for th e n a tio n a l c o m m a n d e r” of 8 M a rc h 1942", C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ief g e n e ra l S ik o rsk i a r g u e d t h a t th e p o ss ib ility of a P o lish -S o v iet tr e a ty sh o u ld be ta k e n in to a cc o u n t in o p e ra tio n p la n s ; A r m ia K ra jo w a w d o k u m e n ta c h 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , vol. 2: V I 1941 - I V 1943, W ro cła w -W a rsz aw a-K ra k ó w 1990, p. 202.
7 I n h is in s tru c tio n s a d d re s s e d to G e n e ra l R ow ecki (“R a k o ń ”, “K a lin a ”, “G ro t”), G e n e ra l S ik o rsk i n o ted t h a t th e S oviet arm y, p re s s u re d b y G e rm a n forces, could la u n c h a c o u n te ra tta c k a lre a d y in 1942. A s th e r e s u lt “G e rm a n y w o u ld be d e fea te d , a n d th e R u s s ia n a rm y w o u n d e n te r G e rm a n te rrito ry , p a r tia lly th ro u g h P o la n d ”. S ik o rsk i e m p h a siz e d t h a t if th e e n v isio n e d s itu a tio n w ere to ta k e place, “w e w o u ld b e u n a b le to a ctiv ely c o u n te ra c t th e R u s s ia n tro o p s e n te rin g P o la n d in p u r s u it of th e w ith d ra w in g G e rm a n arm y. T he S ta te a n d th e P o lish A rm ed F o rc es a t H om e could b e effectively r e in s ta te d only if R u s s ia w ere to a c t in good w ill to fu lfill th e u n d e r ta k e n o b lig a tio n s [...]”. G e n e ra l S ik o rsk i o b serv ed t h a t a n ti-R u s s ia n c am p a ig n s could be co m p letely in co m p reh e n sib le for th e W e s te rn A llies; th ere fo re, th e y could be su b je cted to a cu te criticism , a n d th e y could b e u s e d b y th e S o v iets a s a p re te x t to “b r e a k off th e a g re e m e n t a n d occupy o u r C ountry. T h is could le a d to u n n e c e s s a ry b lo o d sh ed ”. N o n e th e le s s, “w e sh o u ld be fully p re p a re d w h e n th e B olsheviks e n cro ach in to o u r te rrito ry ”, a rg u e d S ikorski, a n d th e P olish A rm ed F orces a t H om e w ould sta g e a m ilita ry a tta c k a g a in s t G e rm a n troops; ib id e m , p. 203.
Rowecki, Commander of the Home Army, forwarded “Report No. 132. Poland’s position on Russia and our options in the eastern territories”8 to the Com mander-in-Chief. The report listed issues th a t had a decisive impact on Polish operation plans in the Soviet front. General Rowecki wrote th a t “Russia al ways has been and always will be our enemy”9. In “Instructions 1111/42”, Rowecki recommended the observance of the provisions of the Sikorski- Mayski agreem ent in the Polish army’s operation plans, and referred to the agreem ent as “a tool in the battle against Germany. The agreem ent was not a m anifestation of the Poles’ and the Bolsheviks’ free will, but it was im posed on both parties by the German invasion of Russia”10. Rowecki thus implied th a t political guarantees would not offer real protection to Polish interests in the event of the Red Army’s advance. In the “Kalina” report, he analyzed three hypothetical case scenarios in the eastern front, he described their impact on the planned uprising and the ensuing th rea t from the Soviet armed forces. As regards the most pessimistic third variant which envisaged the Soviet army’s victory over German forces and the USSR’s advance into Europe in the footsteps of withdrawing Nazi troops, General Rowecki was of the opinion th at an armed struggle should not be initiated against the Germans. He argued th at the German occupation would be swiftly replaced by Soviet mili tary control. The following recommendations were formulated in the “Kalina” report: protecting state administration by appointing the Government Dele gate for Poland, his cabinet and public security agencies (National Security Corps /PKB/ and Internal Affairs Departm ent /DSW/), keeping the Polish army in exile and refraining from exposing the Home Army11. The possibility of armed retaliation against Soviet aggression could not be ruled out12.
Although the USSR was listed in the “allies”13 section of the successive uprising plan detailed in “O rientation report No. 154”, developed by the
8 Ib id em , pp. 2 7 3 -2 7 8 . 9 Ib id em , p. 273. 10 Ib id em , p. 274.
11 A ccording to G e n e ra l Row ecki “T he H om e A rm y w ould e m e rg e fro m h id in g o n ly w h e n w e h a v e a su fficien t g u a r a n te e t h a t M oscow w ill b e loyal, a n d t h a t it w ill n o t h in d e r o u r efforts to re s to r e a n in d e p e n d e n t P o lis h R e p u b lic ”. T h e S o v ie ts w e re e x p e c te d to p ro v id e su c h a g u a r a n te e a s th e r e s u lt of th e e ffo rts u n d e r ta k e n b y th e P o lish G o v e rn m e n t in E x ile on th e in te r n a tio n a l a r e n a w ith th e fu ll in v o lv e m en t of th e W e s te rn A llies; ib id em , p. 275.
12 A ccording to th e G e n e ra l C o m m an d of th e H om e A rm y, a n a rm e d r e ta lia tio n w a s p a r t o f th e th ir d o p tio n d u rin g th e a n ti-G e rm a n risin g . W h e n faced w ith th e t h r e a t o f b e in g d is a rm e d by th e a p p ro a c h in g S oviet tro o p s, th e P o lish A rm e d F o rce s a t H om e sta tio n e d in th e in s u r g e n t b a s e (th e “re d o u b t”) w ould ta k e m ilita r y a c tio n to sh a k e th e conscience of th e W est a n d give a c le a r a n s w e r to B r ita in ’s a n d th e U S A ’s p o sitio n o n th e P o lish -S o v ie t conflict. R ow ecki d id n o t s u p p o rt th is sc e n ario b e ca u se it w ould im p ly P o la n d ’s d e fea t, n e v e rth e le ss “e v en if w e a r e in for a h o p e le ss fig h t, w e c a n ’t give it u p o n a cc o u n t o f o u r re sp o n s ib ility to th e f u tu re g e n e ra tio n s ”; ib id em , p. 277.
13 R ow ecki w ro te: “R u ss ia . I c o n sid er it to b e a n a lly o n ly for fo rm al re aso n s , a n d I d eeply b eliev e t h a t R u s s ia w ill d e m o n s tra te a h o stile a ttitu d e to P o la n d a s soon a s it h a s re g a in e d its s tr e n g th [...]”; ib id em , p. 332.
General Command of the Home Army on 8 September 1942, the author of the “K alina” report dem onstrated a highly cautious, if not pessimistic, ap proach to the Soviet invasion of Poland. General Rowecki was of the opinion th a t the Red Army’s advance into Poland would ultimately end in yet another occupation which the country would not be able to resist effectively. According to the Home Army commander, the Polish Armed Forces should rem ain a part of the conspiracy movement, and their existence could be communicated to the public only upon the commander-in-chief’s explicit orders14.
As the eastern front advanced towards Poland’s pre-war borders, the Soviet th rea t became a predom inant topic of debate in the underground movement’s plans to stage an anti-German uprising15. In radiogram m essa ges forwarded in 1943, General Rowecki proposed to replace the plans detailed in reports No. 54 and 154 with a series of local uprisings. Leaving aside the m ilitary considerations, in particular the combat potential of the Polish Armed Forces on the German front, the purpose of an armed struggle was to manifest the “Polishness” of the E astern Borderlands. In the face of USSR’s increasingly b rutal territorial claims1 6, this concept became a crucial motiva tor underlying the Polish m ilitary effort. The local uprising concept proposed by General Rowecki was approved by the Commander-in-Chief who wrote in a telegram of 25 March 1943 th a t in the event of the Red Army’s invasion, only the civilian adm inistration should be revealed, whereas Home Army troops exposed during m ilitary struggle against the Germans should be “withdraw n deeper into the country to prevent their destruction”17.
The USSR’s decision to break off diplomatic ties with Poland was a clear sign of the Soviets’ true intentions towards Poland, in particular on the eve of the Red Army’s invasion of Poland’s eastern territories. On 25 April 1943, the former Soviet ally became the “our allies’ ally”, and this fact had a significant bearing on emergency scenarios developed by the Polish author ities. The Polish government had to swiftly develop clear guidelines for facing the Soviet army and preserving Poland’s sovereignty. This urgent need was communicated by General Rowecki18 in his telegram s to the
Com-14 Ib id em , p. 333.
15 A ccording to G e n e ra l R ow ecki’s re p o rt o f 26 F e b ru a ry 1943, th e o u tb r e a k o f th e u p r is in g sh o u ld be c o o rd in a te d w ith “th e e n c ro a c h m e n t of th e R u s s ia n arm y, r a th e r t h a n th e col lap s e of G e rm a n y ”; ib id em , p. 423; see also: M. N ey- K rw aw icz, K oncepcje p o w s ta n ia ..., p. 78; id em , K oncepcje w a l k i . , p. 216; idem , K oncepcje w a lk i A r m ii K r a j o w e j ., pp. 5 4 0 -5 4 1 .
16 Ref. W. M a te rs k i, N a w id ec ie..., pp. 6 8 5 -7 0 0 .
17 A r m ia K ra jo w a w d o k u m e n t a c h . , vol. 2, pp. 4 8 5 -4 8 6 .
18 I n th e te le g ra m of 19 J u n e 1943, h e w ro te: “W h e re a s I a m fu lly a w a re t h a t o u r Soviet policy is w ro u g h t w ith p ro b lem s, I fin d it difficult to k e e p tr a c k of th e s u d d e n a n d u n e x p ec te d tw is ts in p o litical re la tio n s . In th e u n d e rg ro u n d w orld, ev ery ch an g e of o rd e rs is e x tre m e ly d ifficu lt to ex ecu te , a n d w h e n it com es to th e e a s te r n b o rd e rlin e s - it is p ra c tic a lly im possible. [...]. I c a n c o m m a n d th e a rm y to a d o p t on ly one a ttitu d e to w a rd s th e R u s s ia n s a t a tim e ”;
A r m ia K ra jo w a w d o k u m e n ta c h 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , vol. 3: I V 1943 - V I I 1944, W ro cław -W a rsz aw a-
-K ra k ó w 1990, p. 29. A ccording to “K a lin a ”, a d e fen siv e p o sitio n d efin ed in a cohesive a n d logical m a n n e r w o u ld la y th e fo u n d a tio n s for a f u r th e r p la n o f a c tio n w h ic h w ould be c o n siste n t w ith th e o p e ra tio n s on th e a n ti-G e rm a n fro n t; ib id em , p. 32.
mander-in-Chief. Based on the former Soviet policy addressing Poland, Rowecki argued th a t Poland should adopt “an active and defensive stance, therefore, a generally hostile stance” towards the USSR1 9.
The General Command of the Home Army became clearly divided over the Polish-Russian issue in 1943, in particular in the second h alf of the year. The General Commander of the Polish Army, General Komorowski - Bór, Chief of Staff General Pełczyński and Colonel Irenek - Osmecki upheld their uncompromising positions regarding Soviet territorial claims. They were clearly opposed by o th er Home Army officers, am ong th em G eneral Stanisław Tatar (“Erazm ”), head of the 3r d Division of General Command, and lieutenant colonel M arian Drobik (“Dzięcioł”), head of the 2n d Division of General Command2 0, who argued th a t in consequence of Soviet victory in the eastern front, the Red Army would invade Poland already in the winter of 1943/1944. They claimed th a t Poland’s fate would be decided by the USSR, and any attem pts to resist the Soviets would be sheer madness, a futile struggle aimed a t saving Poland’s honor th a t would ultim ately lead to the downfall of the Polish Underground S tate2 1. They advocated a flexible tactic towards the USSR th a t would be based on a rational analysis of Poland’s resources in 1943 and 1944 and its ability to win the political and m ilitary conflict with the Soviets. The results of the analysis left no room for hope - every confrontation with the USSR would end in a devastating defeat of Poland. General Tatar and Lieutenant Colonel Drobik suggested in two sepa rate reports th a t urgent attem pts should made to reach agreem ent with the Kremlin, even at the expense of the E astern Borderlines2 2. In their opi nion, the proposed solution was Poland’s only chance of establishing its own 19 Ib id em , pp. 30, 31. G e n e ra l R ow ecki a rg u e d t h a t d e p ic tin g th e S o v iets a s a llie s to th e P o lish in d ep e n d en c e m o v em e n t w a s a b ig m is ta k e w h ic h u n d e rm in e d th e P o lish a rm y ’s m o rale a n d d is in te g ra te d social u n ity ; ib id em , p. 30.
20 W. B u łh a k , R a p o r t szefa O d d z ia łu I I K G A K p p łk . d yp l. M a r ia n a D ro b ik a “B ieżą ca
p o lity k a p o ls k a a rzeczyw istość” i sp ra w a jeg o a reszto w a n ia (lis to p a d -g r u d zień 1943) in: W yw iad i K o n tr w y w ia d A r m ii K rajow ej, ed. W. B u łh a k , W a rsz a w a 2008, pp. 15, 2 3 -4 7 .
21 D ro b ik w a s o f th e o p in io n t h a t c o n tin u e d p a s s iv ity w ith o u t a n y e ffo rts to re a c h a b ro a d e r com prom ise w ith th e U S S R w a s s h e e r m a d n e s s t h a t w a s d e p riv e d o f a n y logic; ref.
P o ko n a n i w obozie zw ycięzców - o sp ra w ie p o ls k ie j w la ta c h I I w ojny św ia to w ej z M a r k ie m K a zim ie rze m K a m iń s k im i T a d e u szem K isie le w sk im ro z m a w ia ją W ła d ysła w B u łh a k i B a rb a ra P o la k , “B iu le ty n IP N ” 2005, No. 5 -6 (5 2 -5 3 ), p. 40; see also: W. B u łh a k , op. c it., p. 27;
Z.S. S iem aszk o , D z ia ła ln o ść g e n er a ła T a ta ra 1 9 4 3 -1 9 4 9 , L u b lin 2004, p. 24
22 Z. S. S iem aszk o , op. cit., p. 24, J . S te p ie ń , L ie u te n a n t C olonel M a ria n D ro b ik ’s m em o ra n d u m of N o v em b er 1943 a d v o c a tin g c h a n g e s in P o la n d ’s policy to w a rd s th e U S SR , “Teki A rc h iw aln e ”, n ew se ries, 2001, vol. 6 (28), pp. 1 7 3 -1 9 8 ; T h e a u th o r s of th e m e m o ra n d u m , in p a r tic u la r D robik, su b scrib e d to W in s to n C h u rc h ill’s o p in io n t h a t th e P o lish -S o v iet conflict could be p e rm a n e n tly p acified b y s a tis fy in g th e U S S R ’s te r r ito ria l claim s. M. K. K a m iń s k i a rg u e d t h a t th is lin e of th o u g h t offered no g u a r a n te e t h a t R u s s ia w o u ld a cc ep t P o lish in d e p e n d ence a f te r th e w ar. T h e a u th o r s o f th e m e m o ra n d u m seem ed to d is re g a rd th e id e a lis tic fo u n d a tio n s o f Soviet e x p a n s io n ism . F o r th e U S SR , th e a n n e x a tio n of P o la n d ’s e a s te r n te r r ito rie s w as n o t th e u ltim a te goal. F o r c ritic a l r e m a r k s to D ro b ik ’s m e m o ra n d u m , re fe r to: W. B u łh a k , op. cit., pp. 3 9 -4 0 .
overnment and rescuing everything else th a t could be saved. Generals Ko morowski and Pełczyński23 were openly resentful of the concept and, conse quently, the proposal was rejected by the General Command. Drobik24 was arrested by the Gestapo on 8 December 1943, and T atar25 was dispatched to London on 14/15 April 1944 as p a rt of operation “Bridge 1”, therefore, the contents of their reports did not influence the Home Army’s official position on Soviet claims.
The Polish Underground S tate’s action plan in the event of a Soviet invasion was based on a set of instructions forwarded by the Council of M inisters to the Home Army commander and the Government Delegate at Home on 26 October 194326. Three case scenarios were analyzed: 1) rein statem ent of diplomatic relations between the government of the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars, 2) continued absence of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations, 3) conclusion of a separate agreement between the USSR and the Third Reich. According to the first, most optimis tic variant, underground adm inistration would officially take command over Polish territories, and the reinstated Polish Armed Forces at Home would rem ain a p art of the conspiracy. Should the Red Army attem pt to incorporate Polish territories into the Soviet Union, Poland would file an official com plaint on the United Nations forum27, and the Home Army would restrict its operations to self-defense measures. In the event of the second scenario, the Polish government announced th a t “the m atter would be brought to the attention of the United Nations in an official protest against the violation of Polish sovereignty - Soviet troops invaded Poland w ithout consulting the Polish government. In its communiqué, the Polish government would also renounce any cooperation with the Soviets”28. The national authorities should rem ain underground, and the armed forces would act in self-defense in the event of Soviet repression. In the third variant, the government advocated the scenario th a t had already taken place before 22 June 1941 - civilian and m ilitary authorities should go even deeper underground, lim it ing themselves to the “most necessary acts of self-defense”29.
In the face of the Red Army’s im m inent advance into Poland’s eastern territories, Home Army soldiers in eastern districts had to be provided with instructions for responding to Soviet regular and partisan troops. The com m anders of Home Army districts were given the following orders under Instructions No. 1300, issued on 20 November 1943 for Operation Storm:
23 W. B aliń sk i, C złow iek w cieniu. T a d eu sz P ełczyński. Z a rys biografii, K rak ó w 1994, p. 84.
24 R efer to: B u łh a k , op. cit., p. 47.
25 Z.S. S iem aszk o , op. cit., p. 34.
26 P r a w d z iw a ..., vol. 2, pp. 1332-1334; see also: A r m ia K ra jo w a w d o k u m e n ta c h ..., vol. 3, pp. 1 8 2 -1 8 5 .
27 Ib id em , p. 1333.
28 Ib id em , p. 1334.
“1) Soviet partisan troops entering Polish territory should not be prevented from engaging in m ilitary combat with the Germans. Direct engagement with the Soviet enemy should be avoided. Polish troops th a t had already entered into a conflict with the enemy and, therefore, would be unable to repair their relations with the Soviets should be relocated. Our operations will be limited strictly to self-defense”30. Polish soldiers were advised to play host to the advancing Soviet troops, obstruct any attem pts a t incorporating Home Army units into Berling’s army and obey only the orders and direc tives given by legal Polish authorities.
The th rea t of the Red Army’s regular troops crossing Poland’s pre-war borders gave rise to yet another dilemma, namely the choice of strategy addressing Soviet partisan units th a t had already made their way to Po- land31. Home Army commanders fully recognized the problem. In a series of telegram s sent in October 1943, General Komorowski, Home Army com mander, informed the Commander-in-Chief of a series of attacks staged by the Soviet partisans32. The problem was not solved in 1943. Komorowski was faced with the difficult task of protecting national interests and, a t the same time, controlling anti-Soviet attitudes among his soldiers. In order No. 126 of 12 Janu ary 194433, Komorowski argued th a t in view of the logic of war, Poland was unable to deny the USSR the right to fight against Germany on Polish territory, therefore, no such attem pts would be made by the Polish government. W hereas Poland sanctioned the Soviet p artisan s’ struggle against the German army and adm inistration, it would not tolerate any political efforts aimed against the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the Republic of Poland. In this regard, General Komorowski instructed his troops to resist any such attem pts by acting in self-defense.
During the occupation, the attitude towards the Soviets was a frequent topic of debate in various press titles associated with the conspiracy move ment. In 1943, with the eastern front approaching Polish territory and the continued absence of diplomatic relations with Russia, this issue was widely discussed by underground publications. Those articles were an im portant awareness-building tool which prepared soldiers and members of the con
30 Ib id em , p. 1373.
31 Zob. K. Sacew icz, C e n tr a ln a p r a s a P o ls ki P o d zie m n e j wobec k o m u n is tó w p o ls k ic h (19 3 9
1945), W arsz a w a 2009, pp. 135-168; id em , O b ra z so w ieckich a k cji d y w er sy jn y ch w o k u p o w a n ej Polsce (1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 3 ) n a la m a c h “B iu le ty n u In fo rm a c y jn e g o ”, “E c h a P rz e szło ści” 2003, vol. 4,
pp. 1 2 7 -1 5 1 ; P u ła w s k i A., S o w iec ki p a r ty z a n t - p o ls k i p ro b le m , “P a m ię ć i S p ra w ied liw o ść” 2006, No. 1(9), pp. 2 1 7 -2 5 4 .
32 A r m ia K ra jo w a w d o k u m e n ta c h ..., vol. 3, p. 154.
33 AAN, 203/I-2, Ż ołnierze Sił Z brojnych w K ra ju , 12 J a n u a r y 1944, col. 4 8 -4 8 a (also A IP N , 0397/251, vol. 2, col. 3 4 4 -3 4 5 ); re fe r to: “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ”, 3 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 5(212) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3: P r z e d r u k ro c zn ik a 1944. K o n sp ira cja , “P rz e g lą d H istoryczno-W ojskow y” 2003, sp ecial iss u e No. 3(200), pp. 1 7 9 3 -1 7 9 6 ; P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, p p . 1 4 4 9 -1 4 5 1 ; T a d e u s z B ó r -K o m o r o w s k i w r e la c ja c h i d o k u m e n ta c h , ed . A .K . K u n e r t, W a rsz a w a 2000, pp. 1 2 0 -1 2 2 .
spiracy movement for the possibility of a Soviet invasion. They featured recommendations, guidelines, instructions and analyses of future Polish-So viet relations. Above all, those publications attem pted to answer the follow ing question: which political and m ilitary force was approaching Polish bor ders? Biuletyn Informacyjny, the flagship publication of the Information and Propaganda B ureau of the General Command of the Home Army (BIP KG AK), attem pted to provide the answ er already in November 1943. Its article stated th a t the Red Army was the m ilitary force of an imperial state “which is not an army of friends or a liberation army for Poland”34. The authors emphasized the USSR’s aggressive claims to Polish territory, its attem pts to disintegrate the Polish political scene by creating pro-Soviet initiatives, such as the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) and Berling’s army “which enabled Russia to engulf the rem aining Polish territories through Sovietization”35. In conclusion, the authors wrote th a t “[...] Poland’s historic aggressor, Russia, is approaching the Polish border without much display of good will, fighting our deadly enemy, Germany, on its way [...]. Our nation will be forced to take one of the most im portant political exams in its history”36.
As p art of national preparations for the arrival of Soviet troops, efforts were made to m anifest the Polish roots of the E astern Borderlands. This goal was to be achieved through the revolutionary ardor of Polish civilian author ities during Operation Storm and displays of national spirit in the local community. In official communication of 15 November 1943, the Government Delegate a t Home instructed local residents not to panic and to rem ain in their respective territories to protect Polish property and support the nation al authorities. Members of the local community were also told to act “with dignity and politeness” in the face of the encroaching Soviet arm y37. In addition to the orders instructing Polish people to give uncompromising support to the Government in Exile and to preserve national unity38, the
34 F r o n t w s c h o d n i - u g r a n ic P o ls k i, “B iu le ty n I n fo rm a c y jn y ”, 18 N o v e m b e r 1943, No. 46(201) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 2: P r z e d r u k ro c zn ikó w 1 9 4 2 -1 9 4 3 , “P rz e g lą d H istoryczno-W ojskow y” 2002, sp ec ia l issu e No. 2(195), p. 1598.
35 Ib id em , p. 1598.
36 Ibidem .
37 W s k a za n ia d la o b y w a teli z ie m kreso w ych , “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ”, 25 N o v em b er 1943, No. 47(202) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 2, p. 1611. A n u n d e rg ro u n d p u b lic a tio n o f th e P o lish S o cialist P a r ty - F ree d o m , E q u a lity , In d e p e n d e n c e (W RN) a lso issu e d a n a p p e a l to th e P o lish c itize n s in h a b itin g e a s te r n te rrito rie s , in s tr u c tin g th e m to s ta y p u t a n d r e fr a in from pan ic. T h e a u th o r s of th e a p p e a l w ro te: “We w ill show th e R ed A rm y t h a t th e s e te r r ito rie s a re o u r h o m e w h e re w e h a v e s e t o u r roots, t h a t w e a re s till c itize n s of th e R epublic of P o la n d . We w ill d e m a n d re s p e c t for o u r rig h ts , in c lu d in g th e r ig h t to s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n , w ith in th e fra m e w o rk la id do w n b y th e P o lish n a tio n a l a u th o r itie s ”; Jeżeli w kro czy a r m ia ro syjska , “R o botnik w W alce”, 21 N o v em b er 1943, No. 6.
38 R efer to: O w łaściw ą postaw ę, “A jencja A.”, 10 D ecem ber 1943, No. 12; Jeżeli w kroczy arm ii
rosyjska, “R obotnik w w alce”, 21 N ovem ber 1943, No. 6. W R N w rote: “[...] loyal to o u r a u th o ritie s
a n d th e P olish Republic u n til th e end, w e w ill d e m a n d t h a t th e encroaching R u ss ia n a rm y fully resp ects ou r rig h ts to self-d eterm in atio n ”. See also: P rzed k re sem drogi, “B iu lety n In fo rm a c y jn y ”,
m anifestations of Polish identity in the E astern Borderlands were a key element in political and social preparations for the Soviet invasion. The authorities appealed to the public not to give in to hostile propaganda, to rem ain calm and to steady their nerves when the moment finally arrived39.
The Red Army crossed the eastern border of the Second Republic of Poland on the night of 3 to 4 Jan u ary 194440. The Polish territory was invaded by the m ilitary forces of “our allies’ ally”, a hostile power which did not m aintain formal diplomatic relations with Poland. In the face of the Soviet offensive, the underground authorities were forced to develop detailed propaganda instructions as well as an official political and m ilitary position. W hereas the Home Army required an in-depth interpretation of the provi sions of instructions No. 1300, the political elites were confronted with a serious organizational challenge in the process of responding to a tangible Soviet threat.
In Jan u ary 1944, the General Command’s Information and Propaganda B ureau issued propaganda guidelines, signed by Colonel Rzepacki, th a t were a reflection of the Home Army’s position on the Soviet invasion. The follow ing statem ent was made: “Poland desires good neighbor relations and coope ration with Russia on term s th a t do not hinder our country. It was not Poland’s decision to break off its diplomatic relations with Russia. If our diplomatic ties are reinstated, we are ready to collaborate with the Russian army on Polish territory. We demand th a t Russia respects our independence and territorial integrity and ceases to intervene in our internal affairs”41. 6 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 1(208); T h e G o v e rn m e n t D e leg a te ’s Office for H om e w ro te: “T h e P o lish g o v e rn m e n t r e p re s e n ts th e P o lish S ta te a n d th e P o lish n a tio n en g ag e d in a n a rm e d s tru g g le in th e co u n try . [...] M a x im u m u n ity sym bolizes m ax im u m dem ocracy”; J ed e n je s t tylko p o lski ośrodek
w ładzy, “K raj. Agencja Inform acyjna IP ”, 4 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 1(18). T hese ap p ea ls took on a special
sig n ifican ce n o t only in th e face of th e a p p ro a c h in g e a s te r n fro n t b u t also th e h e ig h te n e d a c tiv ity of th e c o m m u n ist u n d e rg ro u n d ; See also: K. Sacew icz, C e n tr a ln a p r a s a . , p. 293-.
39 N o w o ro czn e w sk a z a n ia , “B iu le ty n Inform acyjny. Z F r o n tu W alki P o d z iem n e j”, 30 D e cem b er 1943, s u p p le m e n t to “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ” No. 52(207) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, p. 1731. T h e a p p e a ls w e re c o n tin u e d in 1944, re fe r to: O św ia d c zen ie, “A g en cja P ra s o w a ”, 20 A p ril 1944, No. 16 (209).
40 M .K. K a m iń s k i, D yp lo m a cja p o ls k a wobec d y k ta tu m o ca rstw (lipiec 1943 - lu ty 1944) in:
H isto ria d yp lo m a cji p o lsk ie j, ed. W. M ichow icz, vol. 5: 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , W a rsz a w a 1999, p. 467; re fe r
to: W ojska sow ieckie w g ra n ic a c h P o lski, “W R N ”, 14 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 1(132); P o w a g a sy tu a cji, “P rz e g lą d ”, 21 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 16; P rzekroczenie g ra n ic y P o ls ki p r z e z w o jsk a sow ieckie, “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ”, 13 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(209) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 1 7 5 9 -1 7 6 0 . M e m b ers of th e P o lish u n d e rg ro u n d a rg u e d t h a t th e e n c ro a c h m e n t o f th e R ed A rm y in to P o lish te r r ito ry fu elled th e c o m m u n ist p ro p a g a n d a . T h ey w a rn e d th e p u b lic of th e p ro p a g a n d a ’s n e g a tiv e co n seq u en ces. R efer to: Taniec sza leń có w , “P o la k ”, 2 M a rch 1944, No. 4; AAN, 206/2, P olacy! R o b o tn icy! C hłopi polscy!, J u ly 1944, col. 4 -4 a .
41 AAN, 2 0 3 /Ju ly -1 , W ytyczne p ro p a g an d o w e No. 1/44, J a n u a r y 1944, col. 5; zob. też AAN, 203/V II-1, W sk a zó w k i do p r o w a d z e n ia ro zm ó w z A r m ią C zerw oną, 1944, col. 1 2 -1 5 ; P olskie
“P a ń stw o P o d zie m n e ” w o b lic zu o fen syw y S o w ietó w , “B iu le ty n In fo rm a c y jn y ”, 4 M ay 1944,
No. 18(225) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, p. 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 9 ; O w o ln ą P olskę, “W olność R obot n icz a ”, 21 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 4(6).
The Red Army invasion spurred a debate in the political community. The People’s P arty (SL) advocated a polite stance to the Soviets w ithout surren dering the key goals of Poland’s eastern policy42. In the absence of Polish- Soviet diplomatic relations, the following recommendations were formulated: “a) resist forced or voluntary conscription to the Soviet army and Berling’s units by all means available, b) refrain from taking up employment in the Soviet political adm inistration or the Soviet police, c) refrain from participat ing in election campaigns held by the Soviet authorities, d) go deeper under ground in the event of a Soviet occupation - the Polish Workers’ P arty is better versed in the conspiracy movement th an the Gestapo”43.
In its public appeal, entitled “Citizens” (Obywatele), the Convention of Independence Organizations claimed: “Our country is invaded by Russian troops, the army of our second eternal enemy”44. This was a clear signal th a t Poles should adopt the same attitude towards the Red Army th a t they had exercised with regard to Wehrmacht forces, or at least a very cautious ap proach.
The same stance was adopted by the command of the National Armed Forces (NSZ) which wrote in “General instructions No. 3” of 15 Jan uary 1944: “In addition to its claims covering h alf of Poland’s territory, the USSR relies on the Polish Workers’ P arty and the People’s Army to carry out a revolutionary communist campaign aimed against the entire Polish nation. [...]. In line with the NSZ’s statem ent claiming th a t ‘Poland’s eastern borders established by the Treaty of Riga are not debatable’, I hereby announce th a t the National Armed Forces will fight to restore Poland’s eastern territories. The following guidelines and orders are hereby issued: 1) Soviet forces on Polish territory shall have enemy status. 2) In view of the situation in the
42 “P o ls k a L u d o w a”, a p re s s p u b lic a tio n o f th e “R och” P eo p le’s A lliance, w rote: “We firm ly c laim P o la n d ’s e a s te r n b o rd e r a s d e fin e d b y th e T re a ty o f R ig a in 1921”; P o ls k a a R osja, “P o lsk a L u d o w a”, J a n u a r y 1944, No. 1 (42).
43 AAN, 200/2, C irc u la r l e tte r No. 6: Do z arz ąd ó w w ojew ódzkich i pow iatow ych, M a rch 1944, col. 2 7 -2 8 .
44 A s c ite d b y W. C hojn ack i, B ib lio g ra fia z w a r ty c h i u lo tn y c h d r u k ó w k o n sp ira cyjn ych
w y d a n y c h p o d o k u p a cją n iem ie c k ą w la ta c h 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , W arsz a w a 2005, p. 461. A lre a d y in A p ril
1943, a s im ila r p o sitio n to w a rd s th e S oviet a rm y w a s a d o p te d b y th e “B lok” A n ti-C o m m u n ist A lliance, y e t a n o th e r rig h t-w in g m o v em e n t in th e P o lish U n d e rg ro u n d S ta te , h e a d e d b y H e n ry k G la ss. G la ss a d d re s s e d a “M e m o ra n d u m on th e d a n g e rs o f a c o m m u n ist re v o lu tio n in P o la n d ” to th e k e y d e cisio n -m ak e rs. H e w ro te: “P o la n d h a s n o t one, b u t tw o d e a d ly en em ies: th e N a z i G e rm a n y a n d th e S oviet R u ss ia , 2) th e G e rm a n -R u s s ia n w a r a n d th e g r a d u a l d e te rio ra tio n of b o th m ilita ry p o w e rs s ig n ific a n tly b e n e fits th e in te r e s ts o f th e P o lish S ta te a n d n a tio n [...] 4) P o la n d m a y n o t a id e ith e r p a r ty in th is w a r ”. A n e v a lu a tio n o f th e c o m m u n ist u n d e r g ro u n d , b a s e d on M e m o ria l w sp ra w ie n ieb ezp iec zeń stw a rew olucji k o m u n is ty c z n e j w Polsce (A pril 1943), ed. K. Sacew icz, “P a m ię ć i S p ra w ied liw o ść” 2009, No. 1(14), p. 413. T he “B lok” A llian ce re g a rd e d th e S o v iet offensive in th e e a s te r n fro n t a s a m e a s u re s u p p o rtin g th e a c h ie v e m e n t o f M oscow ’s im p e ria lis tic a m b itio n s . Ref. “B lo k ” H e n r y k a G la ssa wobec za g ro żen ia
so w iecko -ko m u n istyc zn eg o n a p o d sta w ie “P la n u C ” (p a źd z ie rn ik 1943 r.), ed. K. Sacew icz, “E c h a
international arena and the need to unite all enemy forces in the battle against the German occupant, [...] any conflict with regular Soviet troops should be avoided [...]. 3). In view of the Polish government’s instructions of 27 October 1943, indicating th a t any collaboration with Soviet troops would be allowed only after the reinstatem ent of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations, any attem pts at cooperating with the Soviet m ilitary forces will be regarded as a breach of national interests and treason. 4) The efforts to restore diplo matic relations with the USSR and the achievement of this goal will not put an end to our struggle against the spread of communism and the establish m ent of Bolshevik agencies on Polish territory”45.
The National Armed Forces’ guidelines differed significantly from the instructions formulated in the report entitled “The independence movement and the Soviet invasion”, developed by the Information and Propaganda B ureau of the Home Army’s General Command on 16 February 194446. The report postulated th a t the absence of anti-Germ an measures would support the “Soviet game”, and Poland “would be liberated from German rule by Bolsheviks and their Polish agencies”47. The above could shift the public’s support away from the Polish government and towards the communists. The adm inistrative authorities48 were to emerge from hiding upon the Soviet invasion, although in the face of an anti-Polish campaign staged by the Ukrainians, they would not make their presence known in areas where the Polish community had been decimated and where agreem ent could not be reached with the national minorities. It was postulated th a t partisan forces which h ad exposed them selves during anti-G erm an operations should emerge from the underground. The need for a second conspiracy movement “comprising members of political and m ilitary elites, with a uniform struc ture throughout the entire territory”49 was advocated in the event of a civil war, Soviet m ilitary intervention and “persistent police control which takes place in a formally independent state”50. The author of the report concluded
45 “N S Z ”, 23 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 2; see also: Wróg, “N S Z ”, 5 A p ril 1944, No. 3; A. Raw icz [J. Lilpop], O co w a lczą N a ro d o w e S iły Z b r o jn e ?, W a rsz a w a 1943 in: N a ro d o w e S iły Z brojne.
D o k u m e n ty , s tr u k tu r y , p e rso n a lia , ed. L. Z ebrow ski, vol. 1, W arsz a w a 1994, p. 92.
46 AAN, 203/V II-38, R u c h niepodległościow y wobec w k ro c ze n ia w o jsk sow ieckich, 16 F e b r u a r y 1944, col. 7 -9
47 Ib id em , col. 8.
48 T h e r e p o rt p ro v id ed for o th e r a c tiv itie s a im in g to in flu en ce th e P o le s’ a ttitu d e s to w a rd s th e S oviets in P o lish te rr ito rie s s itu a te d e a s t a n d w e s t o f th e C u rz o n lin e. I ts a u th o r s e n v isag e d a lo n g -te rm o ccu p a tio n o f th e E a s te r n B o rd e rla n d s, a n d a s h o rte r p e rio d o f fo reig n co n tro l in c e n tr a l P o la n d . T h e y b eliev ed t h a t A nglo-S axon su p p o rt w o u ld p re v e n t th e S o v ie tiz a tio n of P o la n d . T h e e x iste n ce o f econom ic r e la tio n s b e tw e e n th e U S S R a n d th e W e s te rn A llies w ould e n ab le th e l a t t e r to e x e rt p o litica l p re s s u re on M oscow; ib id em , col. 7.
49 Ib id em . S ta r tin g in th e fall o f 1943, a se c re t o rg a n iz a tio n u n d e r th e c ry p to n y m “N IE ” w a s dev elo p ed u n d e r th e o rd e rs o f th e H om e A rm y ’s c o m m a n d e r to sa fe g u a rd P o lish in te r e s ts in th e e v e n t o f a S oviet in v as io n ; see also: A. C h m ie larz , E p ilo g A r m ii K ra jo w ej in: A r m ia
K rajow a. S zk ic e z ..., pp. 3 2 3 -3 2 8 .
th a t the failure to initiate an anti-German rising and the escalation of Polish- Soviet hostilities would be a serious mistake. Poland vested high hopes in the support of the Anglo-Saxon countries, but according to the author, only a British and American intervention could bring positive results51. The report em pha sized th a t unless those powers interfered in the immediate future “any hopes of a post-war intervention would be completely futile”52.
Soviet m ilitary encroachment in the footsteps of withdrawing German forces brought diplomatic consequences th a t had been detailed in the govern m ent’s instructions of 26 October 1943. On 5 Jan u ary 1944, the Polish go vernm ent printed a statem ent in the London-based dailies Dziennik Polski and Dziennik Żołnierza53. The British authorities intervened, and the state m ent was largely toned down in the p art relating to Poland’s territorial integrity and its position towards the USSR. The published postulates were also a p a rt of Prime M inister Mikołajczyk’s radio speech broadcast in Poland, and they were distributed in underground press and on leaflets54.
The Soviet authorities gave a clearly negative answer. The message broadcast on 11 Jan uary by the TASS news agency dispelled all illusions55.
51 T h e P o lish a u th o r itie s w e re a d v is ed to a d o p t th e W e s te rn A llies’ p o litica l positio n .
52 AAN, 203/V II-38, R u c h n iepodległościow y wobec w k ro czen ia w o jsk so w ie ck ich , 16 F e b r u a r y 1944, col. 9.
53 O czeku jem y u s z a n o w a n ia p r a w R z p lite j i j e j obyw ateli. O św ia d czen ie R z ą d u R P G dy
a r m ia czerw ona w k ra c za n a zie m ie p o lsk ie , “D z ie n n ik P o lsk i i D z ie n n ik Ż o łn ie rza ”, 6 J a n u a r y
1944, No. 4 in: P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, p. 1433. I t e m p h a siz e d th e c o n s titu tio n a l le g a lity of th e P o lish g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e w illin g n e ss to r e in s ta te in te r n a tio n a l r e la tio n s t h a t h a d b e e n se v e re d in A p ril 1943, on co n d itio n t h a t th e U S S R show ed re s p e c t for th e r ig h ts a n d in te r e s ts of P o la n d a n d its c itizen s. R e p o rts on th e p rim e m in is te r ’s o p e ra tio n s in th e occupied P o la n d w e re d e liv e re d b y “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ”; see also: O św ia d czen ie p re m ie ra do kra ju , “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ”, 13 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(209) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 1 7 5 5-1756.
54 T h e s ta te m e n t re ad : “H a v in g re g a rd to P o la n d ’s u n c o n d itio n a l r ig h t to in d ep e n d en c e , th e d e c la ra tio n s a n d o b lig a tio n s u n d e r ta k e n b y o u r a llies , w e d e m a n d t h a t th e r ig h ts a n d in te r e s ts of th e P o lish R epublic, its s ta te a u th o r itie s a n d c itize n s be re sp e c te d in ev ery w a r a n d e v ery p o litical s itu a tio n in th e in te r n a tio n a l a re n a . We d e m a n d fu ll reco g n itio n a n d re s p e c t for o u r r ig h ts ”; P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, p. 1437; O św ia d c zen ie p r e m ie ra d o K ra ju , “B iu le ty n In fo rm a cyjny”, 13 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(209) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 1 7 5 5 -1 7 5 9 . T he g o v e rn m e n t’s p o sitio n w a s fu lly a p p ro v ed b y th e H om e P o litic al R e p re s e n ta tio n (K RP), th e G o v e rn m e n t D e leg a te for P o la n d a n d th e C ouncil o f N a tio n a l U n ity ; ib id em , pp. 1 4 3 8 -1 4 3 9 ;
A r m ia K ra jo w a w d o k u m e n ta c h ..., vol. 3, p. 247.
55 P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, p. 1446. T he P o lish W o rk ers’ P a r ty a r g u e d t h a t th e “c o n te n ts a n d form o f th e g o v e rn m e n t’s s ta te m e n t is in k e e p in g w ith th e tr a d itio n a l, a n ti-S o v ie t p ro p a g an -
d a ”;K o n iu n ktu ra ln e ła m a ń c e, “P rz e g lą d T y g o d n ia”, 13 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(51) in: P u b lic ysty ka . k o n s p ir a c y jn a P P R 1 9 4 2 -1 9 4 5 . W ybór a r ty k u łó w , ed . A. P r z y g o ń s k i, vol. 3: 1 9 4 4 -1 9 4 5 ,
W arszaw a 1967, pp. 4 2 -4 5 . “Głos W arszaw y ”, a n o th e r co m m u n ist n ew sp ap er, w a s of th e o pinion t h a t th e Soviet p o sitio n “d e m o n s tra te d th e U S S R ’s u n d e r s ta n d in g [... ] t h a t th e P o lish p ro b lem sh o u ld be solved in th e s p ir it o f h is to ric a l ju s tic e , a n d t h a t th is p ro cess m a y n o t be d is ru p te d by a g ro u p o f sc h e m e rs a n d ra b b le -ro u s e rs ”. W y tk n ię ta d roga, “G łos W arszaw y ”, 18 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 6(98) in: P u b lic y s ty ka ..., vol. 3, p. 4 9 -5 1 ; see also: B a n k r u c i b rn ą d a lej, “T ry b u n a W olności”, 15 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 48 in: ib id em , pp. 4 7 -4 8 .
The USSR refused to acknowledge Polish borders established by the Treaty of Riga, and acting on the decision of the People’s Assemblies of Western U kraine and Western Belarus, it claimed every right to annex Poland’s eastern territories. The Soviets argued th a t the Polish government’s negli gence of the nation’s problems and desires had led to a crisis in the two countries’ m utual relations. On 14 January, the Polish government issued a tempered statem ent in response to Soviet accusations, requesting the Al lies’ direct intervention with the Soviet authorities56. In a statem ent of
17 January, the Kremlin officially criticized all Polish initiatives57.
The Soviets’ position evoked much criticism in underground press pub lished both in Poland58 and abroad59, thus further consolidating the nation around the Government in Exile and its home divisions. According to the journalists, Moscow’s reactions exposed the real goals and qualities of the Soviet state60. Some reporters hoped th a t the Western Allies would no longer tu rn a blind eye on Poland’s dilemma in the face of the USSR’s increasingly imperialistic policies61.
In response to the Soviet statem ent, on 20 Jan u ary 1944, the Council of National Unity and the Government Delegate for Poland sent a telegram to Prime M inister Mikołajczyk whose contents were published in underground press62. In the weeks th a t followed, the USSR’s growing animosity towards the Polish government, in particular its claims to Poland’s eastern territo ries, evoked a powerful response from the underground community which 56 Ibidem , p. 1456; M.K. K am iń sk i, op. cit., p. 473; O dp o w ied ź rz ą d u polskiego, “B iu lety n In fo rm acy jn y ”, 20 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 3(210) in: “B iu le ty n In fo rm a c yjn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 1768-1769.
57 M .K. K a m iń s k i, op. cit., p. 473; P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, pp. 1 4 6 5 -1 4 6 6 ; R o sja o d m a w ia
ro zm ó w z R z ą d e m P o ls k im , “B iu le ty n Inform acyjny. Z F r o n tu W alki P o d ziem n ej”, 13 J a n u a r y
1944, su p p le m e n t to “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ” No. 2(209) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 1770- 1771. T h e “A n ty k ” su b d iv isio n o f th e In fo rm a tio n a n d P r o p a g a n d a B u re a u o f th e H om e A rm y’s G e n era l C om m and re fe rre d to Soviet diplom atic tactics as “double-dealing a n d o u trag e o u s”;
Czy dojdzie do p o ro zu m ien ia z Rosją, “W olność R obotnicza”, 18 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(8). A c o m p lete
ly d iffe re n t view w a s offered b y th e p re s s of P o lish W o rk ers’ P a rty , ref. D w a ośw ia d -czen ia , “P rz e g lą d T y g o d n ia”, 20 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 3(52) in: P u b lic ys ty ka ..., vol. 3, pp. 5 2 -5 4 .
58 Ref. N ie będzie Targow icy, “W R N ”, 14 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 1(132); S ta n o w is k o rz ą d u
sow ieckiego wobec P o lski, “P rz e z w a lk ę do z w y cięstw a”, 20 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(98). S p ó r p o lsk o - ro syjski, “G łos L u d u ”, 21 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2.
59 Ref. P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, pp. 1 4 4 6 -1 4 4 7 .
60 Ref. M o sk w a bez m a s k i, “R o b o tn ik w W alce”, 23 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(10); Z d e m a s k o w a
nie p o lity k i M o sk w y , “R o b o tn ik w W alce”, 23 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(10); C zy d o jd zie do p o ro z u m ie n ia z R o sją , “W olność R o b o tn icza”, 18 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(8); Z aborczość bez oslonek, “R o b o tn ik
w W alce”, 19 M a rch 1944, No. 5(13).
61 Ref. Z d e m a s k o w a n ie p o lity k i M o sk w y , “R o b o tn ik w w alce”, 23 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(10);
P o lska a R o sja , “P o ls k a L u d o w a”, J a n u a r y 1944, No. 1(42); N a s z e sta n o w isk o , “R zeczpospolita
P o ls k a ”, 6 M a rch 1944, No. 3(75); D z iś i J u tr o , “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ”, 27 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 4(211) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3., p. 1179.
62 S. D zięciołow ski, P a r la m e n t P o lski P o d zie m n e j 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 , W arsz a w a 2004, pp. 49, 1 8 1 -1 8 2 ; see also: “R zec zp o sp o lita P o ls k a ”, 7 F e b ru a ry 1944, No. 2(74); “B iu le ty n In fo rm a cyjny”, 24 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 8(215) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, p. 1837.
was not limited to official approval for the Council of M inister’s policies63. The roots of the Polish-Soviet conflict were widely discussed in government64 and party press65. Those reports had a purely informative purpose, b u t by spreading the awareness th a t Poland was threatened by the loss of its te rri tory to its eastern neighbor, they built support for the preservation of Polish integrity, and they shaped social attitudes towards the Red Army. They also came as a response to underground communist publications which supported Western U kraine’s and W estern Belarus’ rights to self-determination, i.e. the annexation of those territories to the USSR66. Members of the independence movement could not rem ain a passive witness to those claims67.
The Polish underground was fully aware of Russia’s imperialistic ambi tions. In 1943 and in early 1944, members of the conspiracy movement knew th a t Poland was not about to be liberated from German occupation by an allied army in the name of building an independent, sovereign and territori ally integral Polish state, but th a t the intervention served Soviet m ilitary goals. Despite this awareness, the independence movement was not united
63 Ref. P o d zie m n e P a ń stw o P o lskie w okół je d n o lity c h w ła d z - zjednoczone sp o łeczeń stw o , “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ”, 13 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(209) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 17 5 3 -1 7 5 5 ; “B iu le ty n Inform acyjny. Z F r o n tu W alki P o d z iem n e j”, 3 F e b r u a ry 1944, su p p le m e n t to “B iu le ty n In fo rm ac y jn y ” No. 5(212) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 1 8 0 3 -1 8 0 5 ;
P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, pp. 1 4 5 4 -1 4 5 5 . T he a p p e a l of th e P o lish U n d e rg ro u n d S ta te re a d s: “T h is
a p p e a l is a su m m o n s a n d a n ord er. Sum m ons: i f the C o u n try is d isciplin ed and united in so lid arity, w e w ill overco m e the g re a te st o b stacles, an d w e w ill fin d su fficien t stren gth to fend o ff the enem y, [...] O rder: [...] Poles h ave to overcom e the existin g divisions. Th ose w h o disobey the call fo r u n ity an d so lid a rity a re not only m ad - they are crim in als!”
64 Ref. K r a j wobec roszczeń sow ieckich. K r a j stoi n a s ta n o w is k u n ien a r u sza ln o śc i w sc h o d
n ie j g ra n ic y R zeczyp o sp o litej, u sta lo n ej w tra k ta c ie r y s k im , “R zeczp o sp o lita P o ls k a ”, 10 M arch
1944, sp ecial s u p p le m e n t in: P ra w d ziw a ..., vol. 2, pp. 1 5 1 1-1512; Po lin ii g ra b ie ży z 1939 r., “K raj. A g en cja In fo rm ac y jn a I P ”, 15 M a rch 1944, No. 11(28); P o lska a S o w iety , “B iu le ty n In fo r m acy jn y ”, 16 M a rch 1944, No. 11(218) in: “B iu le ty n In fo r m a c y jn y ”, p a r t 3, pp. 1 3 8 3 -1 3 8 4 ; ref. W. C hojnacki, op. cit., p. 125.
65 Ref. R osyjskie a p e ty ty n a P o lsk ę [su p p le m e n t] “W R N ”, 25 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 4(135);
C u rzo n - R ib b e n tro p - M ołotow , “W R N ”, 24 M a rch 1944, No. 6(137); P o ra c h u n k i dziejow e,
“D ro g a”, 10 M ay 1944, No. 5; W sch o d n ie g ra n ic e, “D ro g a ”, 10 M ay 1944, No. 5; AAN, 203/V II- 19, L in ia C u rz o n a to lin ia 3 ro zb io ru , col. 7.
66 Ref. P ro b lem g ra n ic p o lsk ic h , “G łos W arsza w y ”, 4 J a n u a r y 1944, No. 2(94) in: P u b lic y
sty ka ..., vol. 3, pp. 3 5 -3 7 ; P ro b lem g ra n ic w sc h o d n ich , “P rz e g lą d T y godnia”, 6 J a n u a r y 1944,
No. 1(50) in: ib id em , pp. 3 7 -3 9 ; N a r ó d p o ls k i a S o w iety , “G łos W arszaw y ”, 8 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 12(104) in: ib id em , pp. 7 6 -7 9 ; C zy P o lska etn o g ra ficzn a , “T ry b u n a W olności”, 20 F e b ru a ry 1944, No. 50 in: ib id em , pp. 9 1 -9 3 .
67 T h e S o c ialists of W R N w ro te: “We a r e ex p o sin g S oviet lies a b o u t P o la n d ’s r ig h t to self d e te rm in a tio n e v ery ste p o f th e way. We h a v e to oppose th e S oviet p ro p a g a n d a t h a t is b e in g s p re a d b y th e P o lish W o rk ers’ P a rty . M illio n s o f P o lish c itize n s w ill u n ite in p ro te s t a g a in s t Soviet ag g ressio n . I f w e d o n ’t w illfu lly su ccu m b to R u ss ia , it w ill n e v e r b re a k th e s p ir it of th e P o lish n a tio n , a n d th e d e m o c ratic w o rld h e a d e d b y o u r a llie s w ill force R u s s ia to give u p its t e r r ito r ia l a p p e tite ”; R osyjskie a p e ty ty n a P o lsk ę ” [su p p le m e n t] “W R N ” , 25 F e b r u a ry 1944, No. 4(135).
in its attitudes towards the Soviet army. While some factions postulated th a t the USSR was an enemy ju st like the Nazis, others argued th a t the although the Soviets dem onstrated a hostile and aggressive attitude towards Poland, they were “our allies’ ally”. Regardless of the dominant option, Poland was unable to m aintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevent the an nexation of its E astern Borderlines and the Sovietization of social and politi cal life, in particular in the face of the Western Allies’ negligence and the helplessness. Despite the brutality of the Nazi occupation, the Soviet army was greeted by the Polish Underground State with much reluctance and m istrust, if not open hostility. Many initiatives undertaken by Poland’s pup pet communist authorities, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, were torpedoed by the conspiracy movement and its propaganda, bringing humiliation to communist organizations in Poland68.
