The two-membered syllogism

ARNOLD

KUNST

The

two

-

membered

sylloglsm

I)iscussion

in

Ind ian litgraturg

of

tlre

formal

structuro of &

syilogism

is

notwithstandiog

its

purely acadomie

appearance one

of

thg rnost important

mean

of insight into Indian methods

of thinking

and of litorary oxpre ion,

It

has resultod

in

a

fairly

strict, division

of

logico-philosophical

activities

particularly in mediaeval

Buddhism

into

two categorios,

that of the

purely mgnta]. oporation ęhalpctłlc-i, cl,?ia,c{łttł.7tnoukcł), and that

of

verbal ex-pression (śabda, uac&łtc7ttłl,ctka). The verbal statomont

is

only

a

re-production

of

the

mgntal oporation which

is

by

its

nature un-oxprossible (abltilapa.-a,pod,ha). The utteranco

is

a matter of a mere physical effort, the proce s of cognition having boen accomplishod

in

tho sen uou

or

mental 'sphoro' of the person,

io

tho form of plratgaA:5a

or

unełrnarla ro poctively.

Tlre communicativo

value of the

word is to

be cleared of all

mgntal llper

tructttrg.

It

is to

bg an adequato means of cogni-tion

in

that the porson instructed gains from verbal

communica-tion

a

mtrch as lre would do

by

direct, contaot wit}r the object

of

thg communication: the name, boing a, perfect roplica

of

the

object,

is

to

rou

e

irr the

listenor's montaI

and

psychological constitution

a similar

reaction to that roused" by the object itsolf. Honce tlre furrdamental distinctiorr between the (sadrth,a-) anurltd,rłct,

and

its podagogically formulated

offs}root, the 7tardł"tha-anound,na

01, sd,dfuag? Q 1'i.

i)

_Cf.

_{Dharmottara's comm.entary on l{ydgabiłodu,}

_p.

_18, 4:

pard,rthdnurndruałil, śabdat,noakałn, sud,ł"thd,łtłtlltdnań tu jńd,lodtmakarn, and ib., p. 37, 18-20, whore the subjgct of communicatirg know-ledge

for

instructivg ptlrpo es

is

discussgd.

)of

ilTIce hod,s airly

yin

rrely I ex-n, re_ , 1111-ft1.ere shed

nof

dof

lgni- tica-ljoct the 3ical iself. ń,na od,na }, 4: bana, "ow-n.)_{a

Althorrgh

Stcilorbatsky

says2)

that

tho

division

into

,;r 7 rthtł- and qłtlł,arthct-ałlatrltttrca

is

traceablo irr the Yaiśesika

sy-s:en,

I

cannot find much

proof

for

that

statement rrnless

Fra-:es:al]iida

_,*

is also incirrded

in tire scheme. But

Praśastap6da's and,

_i:er

oill

Sankararniśra's division

into

tłvo cate6lories

is

undoubt-=jlr- infiuencgd

by

Buddhist logicians

and

is

tlrus of Buddhist,

::igin.

I

should t}rerefore

ratlrer

abide

by Stchorba,tsky's

-rginal" idea,

a

oxprossed somo years beforo3),

that

,..,tltis sty}e

-s

in

perfoct agreement

with

the Ruddhist, t}roory of the word

li

o/t.a). Introducod mtrc}r later into literaturo

it

is unquestionably

_j BttCdhist originua;.

Faddegon's

remarkb)

that

utho

distinc-j,:,l

_rnade

_{by PraśastapEda}

_{ancl Dignaga botwoon} sudrtk{Iłttł,neeuza

ł.l.,i _{1lcn"artled,ltulłldna}

is

merehr

a

combination

of

tho doctrine

:n:ght

in

tlre Vaiśesika and Ńyuyodarśanas

(

losos

its

substanco,

:

iye accept

Stcherbatsky's

and

Barrdlg's

contontions that

itaśastapada

wa

later than Dignaga. Śarika,ramiśr&' t}pcłskal,u,

r:

_ch. cortainl;r was not written beforo the early XYII*" century,

::_loę,s tho then generally accopted

rulg

that arnnl,tc7}tu?}L

is

dai-i,iiłałn&}

A

very romarkable t}ring

is

that

t}re

ame division is *ade

_in

_{the short, treatise l{gayauatara}

_{by Siddhasena}

_Divakata,

-, -

i

Jaina

logician,

who

wa

_probably

junior

_{contemporary of}

-,:gnEga

or flourished soon

aftor him?).

Tlris

would moan that tlre concopts of suqrtłlu and pclr"cłrtlta

:=l- on

fertilo

grotrnd,

which,

thouglr psyc}rologicaliy prepared

j:r

_{tlrg distinction, nogded Dignaga's gonius}

_to

_{submit, thom to}

:r,-,Der definitions and formulations. Tho psyc}rological disposition : _.r tlre reception

of t}rese

concepbs

in

the Nyaya-Yaiśesika

y

-:Etrts

w&

to bo found

in

the interprotatiou.

of

the

saailcallluka-3,fr,-1"t,lakĘa which

has

also been clrallenged

by

Dignega'

thesis

')

Błłddhi,st Logic

II

(Leningrad .1930), _p.

4i

1l.

') Lg

Musóon, Nouv. Sór., vol.

V,

1904.

ł

_i

_{The. translation}

_is

_milre.

')

Tlt,e Vaiśesika Sgsteno, Amsterdam 1918,

p.

323.

61 _(ipaskara

_to

_Vaośesika

_Siltra

_{g, 9, 2,}

')

J a c o b

i's

uggestion

in

his

rłofu"oderction

to

Saulctl"clicc&-bsło

that Siddha

ena lived

in

the. 7'h century and. knew

Dhar-mkirti

has been super eded,

by

S u a 1

i,

rntrodłrciorle, p. 38, and Ę"

Tidyabhn

asal

r,ndian Logic,

p.

l74,

7+ AĘNOLD KUNST

1)?"ctt!/{łA",§arr kc.łlpcłłłtlpoQh&i}t.

But

erren tire }lgd,yasrttrus) dofine

percCIption as inexpre.sible ia,uua,}Jrłcleśya), non-contradictory

{auga-bhicd,ri) and determined (ugauusdga-dt,lnałta

_-

sdtuiltcłlpcłka (?))" At-though thg attribute

of being

indetormined

unless wo

try

to

force

upon

t}re notiorr

of inexprossibility the meaning

of

inde-terrnination is

a,pparently missing, i}ro NglTtyasfttrals definition might

be

roconcilecl

witlr Yatsyayana's

corrcept,

of

the rł,iraikal-paka- and sauikalpaku-,pt"cłł3ltłkscł, w}rich

,v&

brought

laier to

its

fuller

significanco

by

Yacaspati Miśra. Btrt

this is

j ust, the point.

Yecaspati l\fiśra,

who

discusses

the

problem

in

detaiX

in

the NEdgaad,rtt,ikatdt7l6rgattkdg)

i*, as

it

were, overw}relmed

by

the

flood of logical and metaphysical objectiorrs pourod upon him by the Buddhists, and irr

his diplomatic retreat admits

the psycho-logical shortcomings

of

saai7,:ałpatucł, but, maintains

it &

logical nece sity.

He

realizes t}rat t,he Buddhists

did well

to embody all

the components

of

the

satlik.ctlpaka,-pratplaŁ:sa

in

the

u,rłnł,rneina, TIdyotakara (p.

40)

also

defends

this

point by

includirrg rnil,?ltll in the ź,nd,ł"igas and thus complying with the dnctri,gasan?,e,ilcarpatuAla')

of the

perception.

rn

this way he

avoided oncroaching llpon the

mental sphere and. compromised

by

leaving

percoption ,

to

the

sphere

of sonsuous

cogniza}lce.

It is

to

bo remombgred that p&?,artlfi,rułmd,na

mean

a,n in-feronco

_for

another person

a

well

a

by anothor per on. In, this

wey either

species

is

to

}re considergd at,

t}re

ame time

in

its subjective and

its

objective aspoct

a

far

&

its

epistemological fuuction

is

concornod. The speaker, i. e. the subject

of

communi-cation, i* the souree of cognition

for the

listoner;

the

subject-matter

of

the

proof

is

imprinted

on the former's mind

in

the form of an image'Ou). The listener, however, who is the .para,rthuaf the pard,rtlod,ntłłndncł,

is

also t}ro subject

of

cognition

for

whom

the spoakers word (śabda)

is

an incgntive to the menta} rocon-struction (samd,ropa)

of the

empirical

phenomenon c0}1v

yed

to

-- r)ti,,ł.

.

n) _Parbicular}y

₉₁

_ff.:

_{cf. also}

Stc}rorbat*ky,

_Burtd,hist

Logic II,

p. 276 ff.

'o)

The

definition

in

l{tlagasil,tra, T,

l,

1: i,łłdriga-ewtVła-sanni-karsa-utpannariu jńd,nam (Ługlapadeśgar}o _auglabkicdri

aua,ua,sdua-d,tma-kańt, pratgakęauo.

Cf.

also R u b e n, I{yd,Easttra, p. 2,

t0 a)

Cf.

_{}f,anoratha's commentary}

to

_{Pramdn&rjeb,ttiku IT, ].}

\,

uu) defines

iory

{aaga-ba (?))" A}-wo

try

to

g

of

inde-l definition

te rłr,raiVtal-later

to its

r, the poi,nt. bain

in

the red.

by

the L]on him by he

psycho-t

as logical embody all

)

urł,corniima^

|ing

rneuOav ikargatuauo)

g

upon the tion .

to

the

ean

an in-;oI!.

In

this time

in

i"ts ltemological

f

communi-ire

subject-nind"

in

the 7sard,rthu of

for whom

ntaX rocon-crrveyed to

:,

Brłri,d,hist trtha-sann,i- zsd,ga-d,trna-2"

THE: TWG-MaMBERED SY!,LI)GI M 7b

him orr}y

by

llam.e. 'Ihe

first

aspect does not offer any particu-Xar

difficulty

a

long

as

it

is

accepted

a

qlra,,łttdnA, i,. e.

a

a, re_

cognized

mean of

communicatiog the inferrod knowledge. The

second aspeci,, however,

raises

ome othor doubts beside that, of

its recognitiOn

&

p,rurrrar"ła"

It

torrches

upon

the

moro

gonera}

problom

which

is of

the, utrnost importance, especially fol,

Buddhisnr

of

the validity

of

speech

and the

pclssibility of

teaching

or

learning b;l

mean

of words 11).

_As

_{the acceptance or}

refutation

of this

value

of

th;

word.

is

tlre acceptanco

or

refuta-rion

of

tsuddhism

a

a

valid doctrine, no wondor that,

the

Burl-dhist philosophors discrrssoó

at

such

great

length

this

crucial

,1uestion. _{The subject}

wa

_found

_{particularly appealing}

_by

the

ijnanavadins 12).

Tho gradua} reduction

of tire mombors (aaugaaa)

in

a

yl-hgism, whatover metaplrysicaI or ontological roasons (some adop-Eed

er

post} there may bu,

is

marked by an urrdoubted tendoncy

Eo

simplify and

formalize

the syllogism so

a

to eschew a) any

nsychologi.cal glement

in

the formulation

and

b) any repetition

puna,rl)&carłcc) of itoms t}rat anotherimember may

expre

or

implic-itly

contain.

So the

five

momber

of the pre - Siddhasena

ten-membered. syllogism have been abandonod evon

by

the Jainists,

r

they containod elements such

a

doubt, desire

to know,

dis-pelling doubt etc.13). There remain the five standardized member

")

Arr interesting discrrssiorl on the subject,

wili

be founcl

:n the Tattuasańgralro,

IĄ63-

1 4tj7.

'2) Cf" Dharmakirti's Prar,rud,rłaud,ł"tłi,Ir,a and Manorathą's

com-rnentary (R. Sankrtyeyana's edition

in JBORS Ir,

p. 4).

'rt

may

ne correct that l{Ed,gabindu

in

its

discussion

on

the

,pratgak a

Tas followiog the Sautrantika view on the rnatter (cf. MallavEdin's

}-gd.yabindu!T,ka{ippa?1,

p. 19,

10

irr

Stcherbat,sky's

edition, r]so Stcherbatsky, I}uddłl,ist Logic IT, p. 35 ]]., and I) a

s

G u p t a,

J

Eistor,11

of rnddałł

PVtilosoploy r, p. 1ó1 il.), but the Vijnanavada

view

in

DharmakTrtius expositiorr

of

the

imprint

of

the externa}"

object, on the human mind, and the possibitity of it,s conrreyance

m anothor

per on

is

obvious. M.allavadin's romark

,,sacOtrd,ratźkm-sata-ałausd,reqła-d,cd,ruery,&

eem

to

refer

to

Dignaga

(dcdrya) a

the originator

of D}rarmakirti's

concept.

")

rnformation on those mombers

is

given

by

Vatsyfr,yanan

}-yagabha§ua

1,1,32.Cf.

also

Vidyabhtr

a4er

rndi,an Logic,

tr

121, and A_. _B.

K

e i t

h,

rndiare I-,o,1sic and Atomi,sffil p. 86. rttik,u

?6

sjlch as p?,ulijńd (thesis, proposition),

lłetu, (argrrrnent), drę{dnta (irrstance, rulo), uctua,?uflgct (application) and ni,gclrteu?tcł (conclusion), łvhic}r actrrally t}ro Btrddhists werCI th o

first

to

ai;tack

a

systo-nnatically doubtftrl. A.n exhaustivo account,

of

all

tlre vicissitudes

of

tlre syllogism

in

India

i.,

of

col1r

o,

i*possiŁ,le

in

tlris

short outlino, and would requiro

a separate monograph.

Iivorr

in single

ptrrilosophical schools opinion on thg number of members

in

a

syl-logism

varied.

As

an illustration of

this

treatisos

by

Dign6ga,

Dharmakirti,

Śarrturaksita,

Ratnakirti etc.

may

be" montioned,.

But also

within

othor schools opinions seem to have variod. And o accordirg to Yaradaraja's Tał"kilccłł"ak5d, the ilIimarysa syllogism consisted

of

three members (pratijńd,, heteą dr1.taltta). Sapkara, ho-wover, analysing Gau,{,apddalfi,rtkd TI,

_Ł

finds there the yłratdjńd,,

ltetu, d71ldruta, h,etil,pance,ua and lńgcttltc0??ct,; the kał"ilici

in

question

d oes not mention

explicitly

the names

of the

mgrnber., nor

is it

obviorrsly formulated

in

the

spirit

of the

ort}rodox logical rulos,

ąnc1 therefore Śankara's analysis srrggests that }re }rimself

is

in-clined to maintain the old

Nyaya

principle

of

a

five-membered syliogism.

In

his

l{gd,g1anouklocł and Pranąary,ascl,rncacctł,aa,

Dignega

eom to havo ontered on logical concepts, thg

ground

for

r,vhich had łlegn propared boforo }rim. So little

is

known

of the

problem of

proof beforg Dignaga that

only a few g1lo

es attompting

to

re-corrstruct t}lo

train

of t}rought m8.5r be volrturod.

The only

mem-ber

of

a syllogisrri

that,

with very

few

oxcoptions, has nevor beerr questioned,

is

the loetu.

For various

rea,

on

the qlł"atijńd, as welI

a

drs{clłńa, up(łna,ua and łti,gurłta,?L& woro submitted

to

cri-ticism and rgvision.

The

decision

to

purgo tlro vorbal instruction

of ali rodundant elements

1ed

to

t}re exclusion from

a

syllogism

of all

thoso members the functions of which woro supersoded by tire frrnction

of

anot}rer member.

Thus

nigałłtułłu lvont, which (accorcling

to

some) was a more repotition of pratiłflą and thus 3{,1-1ą7x*ro worrt, which

was only a

pedagogical indication

of

the cltialities

of the correct

hetrt.

It

was apparently }Tagarjuna who

first

noticod the redundanc,o

of

thoso membors, and gave

a

sti-nruirłs

to

a thorough

revision of the veriral instrtrction.

If wo

can roi;, oJ} information from uncertain C}rinose sotlrco . Yasubandhu tłsed, two types

of syllogism consisting

of

threo arrd

fivo

:l

THE T\1'O -}iEIIBERED YLLOGIS}{ 77

brrs

respecŁivei;r 1a).

As

wiltr ba soen

later, when

ParŚr,adet,a's

iew

on tire two-membered

syllogism

is

discussed,

a

new itena

Ere ps

into

tho

proces of

_"inference for anothor<(: Strict

co-ope-rati,_ln

of

the person

to be instructeC

is

required.

Thg functio}l,s

ńat

were

to

bg discharged by the re pective, and now 1}o longer

nłrbally expressod, membgrs

of

tlre syliogisrn, were

to

be

per-formed

in

t}rg mind

of

the listenor. On the other hand,

it is

t}re

prractica1 purposo

of

tlre syllogism ancl not,

its

rigidly

acaciomic

mructrrre tlrat

is

to be borne

in mind.

by the speaker at, the tinre

uf instruction r ó),

In this way

the Br"łddhist

logicians

havo _t}re

merit clf

freeing

the sy}iogism frorn

its

provorbial

rigidity

anc{

fo'rn

its

purely academic ptrrport,

in

spite

of

tlre faet that they

mposed on

it

even stricter formalization than

it

had before.

Thore

wa

a

good deal of argum.ent, followiog tho abolition

af the utpa,?ua,u#, and rcigulrttŁ?L{ł;

it wa

a

surprise, howover, w]ren

ńe

Budclhists questione,C" tłre arithority

of

tiie pratijńa,,

donorrnc-,g it a

une

sential

and

strporfluous.

This

contention roused w.ote

ts

from the

mightiest roprosontativos

of

the

Naiyayikas, TCśesikas and

the

syncretist schools. Tlre

rnain

objection wa :

f;e a syllogism (or as wo

might

put

it, in

an impiication

'lf

(a) p

fun (n)g'a

in

'(n)p then (*)q''u),

(u)p(-

ll,etu) must, ftrlfil the

m.dition

of pr,łkpadl,t,ar,nt,cttaa, 1. g. must, bo

a

recognized (siddha} pedication

for

both functors

in

(a) q. In other words both

state-rents

uthe mountain

is

smokyu

_{and "the}

mountain

is

fiery" '*)

Cf.

Vi,dyabhil a!&l

rndi,an Log,ic,

p.

269.

Cf.

also

:

_; .l_,, d l e, F,ragrnerlts frono Digłłaga,

p.

27, 1}.

'u) Of. Kamalaśila's commentary on Santaraksita's

Anurnilłta-l,;lV/:sa l43ó:

ulf

you

ay to a soldier (tib. g?0&,g. rdai

-

shepherd)

Tr _, does not

know the

usago

of

the

a?Laa,E|augati,reka ,wh.ere

:*:;e

is

smoke t}rere

is

fireu thorr

}ro

will

tealtza t}re sallcłk5ct,

r.,- l, uipak7a though

you

stated" only thus much and no more; }re

T:

also, not knowing other torms, come

to

the correct

conclus-:

that

there

is

fire

irr this particular place. Questiolo: w]ren

::.:

do yotl ńse the term sapaiya otc.? Ałisoaer:

rn

a formal and

:-e _,retical analysis (śd,stra)".

'o)

According

to

Chinose

ourcos

it

was Yasubandhu who

i

[rr]-Qf,

of

the last two mombers, which would be

a

roasonab}y .fi: - 11g argument against acceptiog

his authorship

of the

Tcłrka-ł.; strł,rł rvhere

five

membors are maintained; cf. 'I u c c

i,

Pre-Diń-,t| 7:,l Budłlłłist Terts _a,}?,

Iogic

frouo Clai,lr,ese Sources, p.

IX.

l, l. 1 n lS te .; )l tS i-n x-y h tO i_ ,n t11

}

-7s ARNO"[,D KUN T

mll

t

be

both

eparately aird jointly eorrect.

On the

otłrer hand,

this

statement (a)

p

is riot

true rrnless

(o)

q

is

true arrci t}rns .the

correctness

of the

Vt.etał

is

rrerifiod"

by

t}ro staternent

of

tłre r)r0,-tijńalY}.

If

the pretojńd,

is

_łone thCIro

is

1]o instance to verify the correctness of the laełu, viz. its palłgcłtłlłarłrłataa, and"

o the

whole

syllogism

is

invalicl and

is

no

proof

at

a11. Furthorruloro,

it

is

silly

to provo

something withoub informiog

your

audience what

you

aro going

io

prove.

The

statement

'if

(r}

l,

then (n) q'

or

(if

you liko)

'if

not (ł)

p

then not (r) q' (-- sd,Chcl,r,łvł,,u{I- an,d uaddłłar?łulla-d7g{d,rotas) is a]so an instance for verification of the ll,etał provided

a, sapakqa and not, uipakęcł (homogeileous and not, }reterogenoous) oxample with (a) is substituted for (r). And so when in the dyrs{anta

a term

homogoneous

with (ai

is

substituted

lor

(_*)

in

either (r) p

or (a)q, t}re dr1ld,nta must

givo a true

statemerrt;

if

a, term he-torogeneou from (") is strbstltutod

for

(*)

in eithor (u)p

at (r}q,

the cly.s{d,nta must

give a

false

statement. Brrt sinco sapakga or uipakĘa, ate the linking elements between tho pratijńd, and dyp{dnta,

the pratiińd, must be thore 18_1.

Dignaga's opinion on this point, is giverr i.n the Ngd,gapranseśa

il}ore clearly than

in

any

other work, The controver

y a

to

the

")

rn both

my

Probleyłła and Oue,rłooked Tupe of Inference

{BSOS 1942)

I

tried to prove tlrat an Indian syllogism cannot be

analyzed satisfactorily

by AristoŁe]ian

mothod.s becauso no

inc]u-sion of name

is intended

to

be proveci, but only facts stated in gentonce

. I

therefore subsbitute here (o)p

for

_"thg mountain is

smokyu, and (") q

for

,tlre

mounŁain

is

fiery.,"

By

(") is meant that the fact proved refers to

this

(and no othor) particular moun-tain. (r) indicates any possible object that, could rep}aco >mountainn providod

it

is

predicable by

p

or

q. 'Whenever re}ations between the major, middle and minor terms are

to be

ostablished,

I

shall u o tho Sanskrit equivalent for the torm,

a

an rndian syllogism

is

not

a sentence-calculus

par

ercellencet but its anticipation only. 'u) Strange

a

it

may seem to a Wostorn logician, this wa

a

generally obsorved rulo

in

Indian logic.

It

is

important, how* rrer, to keep

in

mind thąb an rndian

syllogism

construed

in

the form

of implication

does not ontirely covor

our

postulatos

of

an

implication, because the condition for any statement _"if.

p

then q..

in

India

is the causal relationship between the protasis

and apo-dosis. There are,

though,

omo oxceptions even hore, but

lack

of

79 |(łpra,aeśu

1

to

the |nf'erence a,nnot be fo inc]u-lbated in rntain is is meant, ,t moun-ountain" between ,

I

shall yllogism on only. bhis wa t,

howe-t

in

the )s

of

&n then llu

nd

epo-lack

of

ulthorshiB

of this excollent and

lucid treatisg

is not quite

settled;

-.,be _{wording of the definitions would howover a,dvocato the} accop-Tencg of Śankarasvamin's authorship. But whoover tlre actrral author

Ta-q, the

work is

rrndoubtedly

inspirod by

l}ignega's doctri}le .

Dn

p. 110

of

his

Bełddlai.st Logic, voj..

II,

St,

e]rerbatsky

ays

;,hat uDignfiga

in

his reform has dropped. thesis, conclrrsion eic.,..

Ttough truo in its main outline this staternont requires solne mo-fification especially

in regard to

tho ontiro abolition of tlre thesis

by

Dignaga.

Ancl the folIowiog

may

bo concluded from

the

10-gical works of Dignaga, which aro known to us wholly or in

frag-ments, yiz.

ihe

l{yd,yamu7tha, Pramfr,nasa???ałcccł,gtl^ (I{or must the

yagapraueśakarika be left unmentioned).

F'irst

of all, Dignaga'

criticism

of

the 2lrat,łjńd,

a

defined

sy

thg Naiyayikas (sadhyanirdeśab pratdjń,a)

which

Dignaga

cor-rccts

by

adding

eualg)

in

the

P.

_^9., strosses the

fallacy in

the

#aternerłt

of

thg proposition and. t}ro con ectrtivo logico-formal :allacios, but roplaces pratijńa by pok§a. The shifting of this torm

i

of

considorablo importanco

in

so

far

a it

remolres the

diffic-ą]ty

of

stating the

thesis

boforo

it

has actually been proved by

l

recognizgd hetu and drg{d,ruta. Since,

a

the Naiyayikas

saIl

the

watijfr,d, has thg valuo

of

an informativo enunciation

of

what is

!o be pruvod,

it

is

no membgr

of

the proof, as provirrg and not,

rnticipating

is

tho task

of a

syl.logism.

Puk1a

is a

momber of &e proof and not merely a, doclaration

of

it.

Thus ndganła,?ea, is

nnoce ary,

for glaksa

fulfils

those two

function

that wore

pre-riously incorrectly

assignod

to

thg pratdińa and

its

affirmation

,rithin

_{the proof) niganla,na, Thus,}

_{it wa not}

_{o much}

_the

om-ployment of the pratijńd, that Dignega took excoption to, but the

liaiyayikas' inconsistency botwoen the definition, and the applica-}ion of. the pratijńd,. Yet, there i*, no doubt,

a

great deal

of

con-fusion

in

Dignaga'

concopt

of pakga.

From

l)harmakirtis

critic-hm it,

eppear

that Dignega considered glakgaaaca,na, (not pakga)

E

as(idharła2o:, that i*, & functor whose statement

in

the proof ilit not contribute to the correctness of thg proof. The threo-aspect

rrgument (trir-upahetu)

wa

quite sufficiont for that purpo e. Yot,

Cf. also

Stchorbat

ky,

Buddhi,st Logic Prarnapaud,,rttika

IY,

2ó and

IY,

16 ff.

1,)

,o)

il,

p, 155 n. 1" THE T,W0-MEMBERI]D SYLLOGI M

80

*].y

did

Dignaga

go

throug}r

ail

the

trouble

of

defirring the

7lctkgcł and" discrrss

it

o

broacll}r?

_-

asks l)harmakirti 21).

The an wer is _{"!ł{nm!/t-łrtłzetue} '}li sadłeyolłter [t,sa,r,fi??aoleag*,, i.e. (adciing lVIanoratha's explanatory notes to the lcd,ri,ha) the

d"escrip-tion

of the

,pdk,sa

is

given,

for

the stateinont,

of the

pcłksa has the capacity

of

makirrg clear t]re sribject-matter of the proof and

also of

removiog

any obscrrrity

a

to the

fact, which

is

to

be

proyeC". T}re całołl"lcłfcqeńałn (viz. sd,dn3ąano) in the next ling makes

it

clear

tliat one

otrght to knołł. accordiog to what si,dt{,fzd,łatu,,,i". e.

terrots of

a particular

school

of

t}rought, t}re proof is formutrated. Coming back to the l{yayapraueśa,

let tls

add

to the

above de-scriptiorr the clefinitiorr

of

si.łńharoa a given by thg Nuallwraóeśa.

In tho lattor no abolition

of tho pak,gauacft,nct ts

r

commended }rut. on the contrary, tho 10th ?łd,g"o4ct

say

artif;yah śabda

iti

pcłksaua-c{l,??,{ł,0?2... etary1 et)(.t t,rago 'atugaad,

itg

rłcyałate. In thg light of these oxcerpbs t}re followirrg re-establishment of Dignaga's view on the trvo-memŁ,ered syllogism sesms

to

be possi[ilo:

Thg rrniversal proposition

in the

dręld,nta _"tf (r)

p

tlren _lr) 8,

and (") p

(:

łłetu,) (then (") q

(-

sd,rZłoga)")

is

sufficiont and its

ep-plication to the

(o) 11

is

jrrst,

a

mattor

of

redundant

expre

ion.

Its omission

or inclusion

d oes not affect the validity of the

.oyl-logism.

rt is

a

matter

of purely

mental operation, wlrich,

if

yoll are dealing wit}r rea onable

and

logically

trained people, need not be pressod home.

It

is just an omission and not

a deficiency

in & syllogisrn,

a

l)harmakirti ironically

remarks

_"),

alluding to

the 1 aiyayikas and their definition of a defective syllogism (ngil,na1

in

Nydyasil,trcł, ó,

2,

12,

Tho

best

explanation

of

the

matter is

given

in

Śarrturaksita's Ałl,tl.łltdnapctrT,ksd (see supra), whoro

it

is said

that

in acadomic discussions where

one

can nover be too accurate, tlro w}role schoiasiic equipmont,

is

to be procisely applieĄ but

in

everyday-lifo one need not be punctilious

or

professorial

This

statemont

by Śaoturaksita

is

not

to

be undorostimated in

view of tlre fact,

that

in his days of scholastic disputes and

hair-splitting subtleties

a correct verbal formulation

wa,

decisive for the opponent's victory

or

defeat.

An

adoquato and

brilliant

exposition

of

Dignaga's col}Go}rt

")

Pramctnaua,rttika

IY,

23.

,_q, 1

Łhe

1cr

'Ę, or t}re _7łcłk5tł

is

given

_{by the} eommerrtators of t}ie }VEugrłpru,ues(t, ',}n Śalikarasvamin's definiti.on of the sdrlhąrłcł being ,Elrłlłgilńitlrłutt -,t,lfti sfrdłłułttŁłł?,1 Haribhadra commonts ttrat ,puksrtdio is a bahuvrIhi, *nd substi.tł ites u, jlt1,|altsittt

for

{iłti. il}ris ingonious interpreta,tion,

irowever

far

from tire author's intention it, ma,}.

b*,

otfers por_

hap,s the

best

solutiorr

to

tho problom

of the

ryłłłkgłł. Iłrom it, it,

:ollows

that tlre

,pa/z:!rł _{ma} rrot be oxpro}

_sed

_brrt

_is

_{impiiełi b3.}

3e

he tu, and rł7g{fr,,łłtrł,

arld a,ll

vorifications,

8 is

uggested k;v

Parśvadeva's comm*ntar;r, a.re

to be porforrnecl rnentally b;- łhe

L.lrłces

of

ttr}{trt{tłtł. T}rus lvo lrave another ca e of the rerlrrction ;; two memLlers of a syilogism to mere psycłrologicla] furrctiorrs, arrcl io.e ciearing of tlre t,elł)a,l irrsŁ,ruction from t}rose o1lel,atrorls w}ric}l a,re

hJ be perfortneci

in

tjrg rnind

only.

Bot}r qłukgeu and u,łxt,tb&,glu,7 a-q

ln,a

be realized, ero accepted

by

Parśvadeva, but their frrrrction

l,]]t t]rose

of

silerlt co- oneration betweerr the instructcrr arrci the ltrsorr instructed.

To

corrclłide, Tye rnig}rt

ay t}rat

in

spit,e

of tlle groat

va_

-:iy

of lris

t}reories anci opinions, the mediaoval tsuddhist

logi-t;a!], iras rrot givołr

a final forrnula

f or the corrstruction

of

&

.y1-*rgisnr.

}'et the

d iscussiorrs

are

rrrarked

by a

cloar

telldenav

mgards simplification and f'ormalization of the syllogism.

I{ever-abeless rofinornerrt arł"cl suictlet3, irr the a,pproac}r to thg problems

&ł, tlre one }iand, and

tile

constant, vigilanoe aga,inst

a potontial

&pponent, o]1 t}re ot}rer harrd, wsro more

of

a, handicap than ax]

r.jvantago to a Buddhist philosopher. Not oven Dignega or

-Dhar-nakirti or

Śarłtaraksita achieved

a

solution

which

would enable

ube reader

to

pirr do,wn t}ro problem

finally.

I)harmakirti

is

pre-prred to abandorr the dq1lfrnta on the ground that inductive

knorł.-kig"

which leads

to

the realization"

of

cgrtain general relations

Dlr good fol, an inforence for ouesolt; but, in instrrrcting others the

irrjuctive universal proposition suffices

to lead

to singrrlar

con-Cr:^*ions. Immediately, lrowever,

this

subtle thinker corrects this

w,,

rigid

theory

by

adding thaŁ

a

drg.tanta, though

not

e

e

I-ŃJr;. _might serrre as

a

good cril,orion for the veraeity of the

uni-u.,ersal propo itiorr 23). (B"v tl7g!(iłatcł,

is

of

cour

e

meal:t here the !";

_Cf.

_{Nga37ałl"irgd,łl, 12Ą} ,where _{t}ie tlrpt|iu,tu}

- _{from the universal proposition.} O;ienta}istvczny XV.

is

t,reat,od .qepfr-s :}erj. _lft) q, d its ap-pression.

the

yl-,

if

you

[.,

noed lficiency rding Ło (nua,na) ratter is )ro

it

is be too appliedo essorial. rated in rd hair-sive for concept

8? AtiNoLD KuFiST

exanr1)le only, wit}rout, the universal proposition). Śarrturaksita, who generally supports in his vie,ws l)ignaga rat}rer than Dharmakirti,

is willing

to

accept the view tlrat t}ro proposition (7lakga)

i,

stl-porfluou _{, but insists} 0n cłł,g!d,łl,ta, being maintained 2a).

For Śarrturaksita

the

1lrattjńd,

is

also an

outsider,

a

moro oxhc,rtation (pratijńa

_-

abVtgał?2!jńa\26)

to

formulato

a proof,

but

is

rrot 8, m.ombor

of

a syllogism.

The prima fac,ie metaphysical roa

on

whiclr,

a

*'a mattor of fact, aro re,ćluced

to no

moro than logico-formal ones, mako Rat-nakara rojoct t}re dr$td,ruta

in

his

Antaragdpti,Ecrma,rthana26). }Ie

ay

(p. 104;:

In

the dygld,ltta you gra p the concomitanco

of

elo-monts tŁiat are containod

in

ib (i.".

in the

d7g!dnta); in t}re pahga, howevor, you gra

p the concomitance indicated

by the łoetu. And

this

(conconritance)

is based on gonorality

for

it

ummarizes

eve-rythirrg

(i.o. all the genoral relationships between the h,etu and

tho prodication

of

the probandum).

The function

of

this

gonora-trity is

to

be rgalized and applied

to the subject

of the

proban-du.nr.

by

means of iuforonco,

In

the further

part of his

treatiso,

Ratnakara

um

up

the

function

of

aTI inferonce

and,

at

the

amo

time,

presonts the

difficulty

in

applying the

drpldnta,

in its

isolated, cope,

to

the probandum.

He

eo

no

nocessity

of

using ono completo implica-tion (dr.stanta

here,-

universal proposition)

to

provo another (vtz.

sddh3,1a).

He

eom

to be noar to anticipation

of

the simple truth,

,which

_is

_o

_obvious

_{from our}

_point

_of

_{viow, namoly, that once} the gonoral relationship

is

established

a a

result

of

inductive roa, oniog, the sd,dh,ga and the drp.tdnta a,ro morely two differont

inference

based on thg same general relationship. The fact is, that

it

is

a more

matter

of

choice

what ono substitutes

for

(u)

in

(,w)

p,

whethgr it, is drgld,nta

or

sddltya.

In

tho

irnplication

tf

(r)

p

then (ł)

q' it,

makes

no

differenee whether one substitutes

for

(n) thg kitchen range or t}re mountain. This idea is intimated

in Dharnakirti's

concopt of. cłrslClnta, on which he oventually com-'n) Anurndnaparl,h7d,

1432-3

and Kamalaśila's commontary.

A

roforence

to the

Pramd,ryasa,?nuccau&

IY,

1

is also

made. 'o) rbiden.

ho :ti, Lr-)ro lut of ,a,t-I{e l1o-}Sal "nd ve-r,nd. lf&- an-the the tho Lca-vLZ. ,rth, nce bive :ont ; is, (ł) r

'if

ntos lted om-ary. IL4-83

nrorniso,J, eccoptiog, whero

noco

dry,

twcl substitutes

for (r)

in

,_

lle

syilogi

m, Exactly

the

ame

view

is to

be

found

in

the

-Łl tar,ry7d,ptosarnał"thcłn& whore

the

inner

concomitance without

ir;,ru,retłł

is

a,Cmissible

for probanda

like

kganikatua which

forn

1 class irr themselve

_l

but

a

d7p{anta may be usod,

for probanda

rhi,;Li havo

a class

of

sapałtga,

6i