Humanistic philosophy of science and its main epistemological problem

Bogusław Maryniak

Humanistic philosophy of science

and its main epistemological problem

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica nr 9, 89-96

A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S

F O L IA P H I L O S O P H I C A 9. 1993

Bogusław M a ry n io k

H U M A N IS T IC P H IL O S O P H Y O F S C IE N C E A N D IT S M A IN E P IS T E M O L O G IC A L P R O B L E M

B efore I s ta r t to p re sen t m y a p p ro a c h to th e m a in p o in t o f th e p a p er. I w o u ld like to m e n tio n a lin g u istic p ro b le m w h ich , in m y o p in io n , is n o t u n essen tial. In th e E nglish lan g u ag e p h ilo so p h ic al tra d itio n the p h ilo so p h y o f science is b ased o n th e a n alilic al p h ilo so p h y a n d th e d iv isio n betw een science a n d h u m a n itie s o r th e A rts. In th is p h ilo so p h ic a l tra d itio n science is u n d e rs to o d as a stu d y o f n a tu re a n d th e b e h a v io u r o f n a tu ra l th in g s likew ise th é k n o w led g e a b o u t th em th a t w e o b ta in th ro u g h o b s e rv a tio n a n d ex­ p erim en ts. In o p p o s itio n to science, th e h u m a n itie s a re u n d e rs to o d as the su b jec t o f stu d y c o n ce rn e d w ith h u m a n b eings, th e ir ideas, a ctio n a n d re la tio n sh ip s betw een th em . In m y o p in io n , the d iv isio n in to science a n d th e h u m a n itie s h as o n ly a p ra c tic al sence on ly . T h e c rite ria o f this m a in div isio n co u ld be u sefu l fro m th e a n a litic a l p o in t o f view . T h e y d iv id e a ttitu d e s w hich a re stric t a n d b ased on o b s e rv a tio n o r e x p erim e n ts c o n n e c te d w ith n a tu re fro n t d ifferen t a n d o fte n irra tio n a l o r irre g u la r h u m a n a ctiv ities w hich in m o s t o f th e cases h av e n o th in g to d o w ith a n y k in d o f tru th .

M y c o n v ic tio n is th a t a c c o rd in g to m o d e rn a n d c o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo so p h y th is div isio n is ra th e r useless, b e ca u se even th o u g h it b u ild s so m e b o rd e rs , it sk ip s th e m a in ep istem o lo g ical p ro b le m o f p h ilo so p h y , m e n tio n fo r in sta n ce by D e sc a rte s, K a n t a n d H u sserl. T h e real p ro b le m is h o w to b u ild the subject w hich is a d e q u a te to the reality a n d w hich will k n o w so m e th in g a b o u t th e reality . In o th e r w o rd s, th e q u e stio n is h o w th e c o g n itio n is possible.

In co n se q u e n ce I h av e to reject th e d iv isio n a n d jo in th o se b o th sides in the h u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science. T h e h u m a n is tic p h ilo s o p h y o f science is a p h ilo so p h ic a l reflectio n c o n n e c te d w ith b o th science a n d h u m a n itie s (o r th e A rts). T h e div isio n is n o t im p o r ta n t, w h en y o u th in k a b o u t th e e p istem o lo g ical

9 0 B o g u s ła w M a r y n ia k

p ro b le m o f rela tio n s b etw een th e su b ject a n d the o b je c t w hich is based on the h u m a n u n d e rs ta n d in g o f reality.

B efore I p re sen t m y m a in to p ic. I w o u ld like to sh o w th e so u rces o f the h u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science a n d its m o st im p o r ta n t theses. 1 c o n sid e r it q u ite relev an t, b ecau se it is to som e e x te n t orig in al. T h e h u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science, w hich I a m try in g to b u ild , rises a g a in st tra d itio n a l, scientism ical id eal o f the p h ilo so p h y o f science. Its m a in in sp ira tio n a re n o n o rth o d o x ph ilo so p h ies o f science b u ilt by T h o m a s S. K u h n . Paul F e y e ra b en d , E d m u n d H u sserl a n d S te fa n A m s te r d a m s k i1. I tre a t K u h n , F e y e ra b e n d a n d A m s te r­ d a m sk i as fo llow ers o f tra d itio n a l, scien tism ical a ttitu d e in the so called p h ilo so p h y o f science ..w itn essin g the c risis" w hich h a p p e n e d in th is p h ilo so p ­ hy. O n th e o th e r h a n d H u sserl a n d so m e o f his allies a n d stu d e n ts a re the c ritics o f the scientism . T h e ir criticism , I su p p o se , tack les m an y im p o rta n t elem ents. A po sitiv e in sp ira tio n to m y h u m a n is tic p h ilo so p h y o f science is c o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo so p h ic al h erm en eu tics, re p re sen te d by M a r tin H eid eg g er a n d H a n s-G e o rg G a d a m e r.

C o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo so p h y o f science h as been g o in g th ro u g h a crisis. T h e first p e rso n w h o m e n tio n it w as H u ss e rl2. H e said th a t we c a n n o t sp eak a b o u t th e crisis o f som e p a rtic u la r b ra n c h es o f science w hen we c an easily a n d clearly see th e ir success. A c co rd in g to H u sserl, th e crisis o f science m ean s th a t its scientific c h a ra c te r, u n d e rs to o d as a w h o le m a n n e r in w hich it e stab lish ed its tru e g o al a n d w o rk e d o u t its m e th o d is b ein g q u e stio n e d . F ro m th e H u sse rl's p o in t o f view th e p ro b le m o f p a rtic u la r b ra n c h e s o f science resolves itse lf in to a rid d le o f su b jectiv ity o f th e w h o a p p re h e n d s . T h is is related w ith a rid d le o f a to p ic a n d a m e th o d o f a p sy ch o lo g y . T h e sec o u n d h a lf o f th e n in e te en th c e n tu ry w as the tim e o f a big im p o rta n c e o f sciences a n d the p ro s p e rity w hich th e m a n ow ed th em . A lo n g w ith it th e re w as a c h an g e in the p ro b le m ran g e, very im p o r ta n t fo r th e h u m a n ity . Sciences, w hich a re in te re sted in facts only, c re ate p o ep le o f facts on ly . A c c o rd in g to H u sserl, th e c ru elity a n d tra g e d y o f th e F irst W o rld W a r m a d e th e p ro b le m s o f th e h u m a n ity im p o r ta n t again. A g ain som e fu n d a m e n ta l p h ilo so p h ic a l q u e stio n rela tin g to the sense o f the w o rld , ra tio n a lity a n d freed o m w ere ask ed . T h e o b jectiv e, factu al sciences (b o th stric t a n d the H u m a n itie s) c a n n o t give a n y an sw er. B efore, in H u sse rl's o p in io n , it w as n o t alw ay s like th a t. In th e a n cien t G re e k society th e m o st im p o rta n t th in g w as „ th e p h ilo so p h ic a l fo rm o f e x isten ce" (D a se in fo rm ) w hich w as free e d u c a tio n fro m a su b ject its w h o le life a n d ru les o f th e p u re reaso n . T h e o re tic a l p h ilo s o p h y w as th e basic p ro b le m . Such p h ilo so p h y m a d e free n o t

1 C o m p a re : B. T u с h a ń s к a . R o z w ó j p o z n a n ia j a k o p r o v e s s p o łe c z n y , W a rs z a w a 1982; W . M e j b a i i m . A. Ż u r o w s k a . W s tę p d o m e to d o lo g ii n a u k e m p ir y c z n y c h , K r a k ó w 1985.

2 C o m p a re : E. H u s s e r l . K r y z y s n a u k eu ro p e jsk ich a tra n scen d e n ta ln a fe n o m e n o lo g ia . „ S tu d ia F ilo z o fic z n e ” 1976. n r 9. p. 9 3 -1 2 1 .

on ly a p h ilo s o p h e r b u t a n y b o d y w h o w as p h ilo so p h ic aly e d u ca te d . T h is th e o re tic al a u to n o m y w as fo llo w ed by p ra c tic a l a u to n o m y . T h e m a n . w h o b u ilt h im se lf in tu itiv ely o n his re a so n w as the ideal o f a n tiq u ity a n d th e R en a issa n c e . Such a m an b u ilt also the w o rld w hich su rro u n d e d him . H e b u ilt the political an d social ex istan ce o f T h e M a n k in d w hich he e d u ce d fro m th e free re a so n , from th e in tu itio n o f a u n iv ersal p h ilo so p h y .

T h e p o sitiv istic p h ilo so p h y o f science „ c u t d o w n th e h ead o f the p h ilo s o p h y " rejecting the q u e stio n s a b o u t th e essence o f the ra tio n a lity , th e ex istan ce o f G o d , th e sense o f the w o rld o r th e im m o rality . In ste ad it a ssu m ed a d o g m a tic p h e n o m e n alism . T h a n k s to it. positiv ism b eco m e a p a r t o f th e old, a n cien t, p h ilo so p h ic al a n d m c ta p h isic a l c o n c e p tio n o f science. It is a p a rt o f this co n ce p tio n b ecau se o th e r, irra tio n a l (so called irra tio n a l) p a r ts o f th e c o n ce p tio n w ere rejected by p o sitiv ism . N ew p h ilo s o p h y o f science, b a se d o n the E n lig h te n m e n t's ideal o f th e h u m a n ity p a id a special a tte n tio n to m e th o d o lo g y a n d efficiency. It h a d u n d e n ia b ly so m e success b u t science becom e a d o m a in o f p ro fessio n al a n d e x p e rt scien tists, w h o w ere fa r aw ay fro m the p h ilo so p h y a n d its q u e stio n s.

A m sterdam ski·’ refers to the H u sse rl’s tra d itio n s o f th e p h ilo s o p h y o f science criticism . H e p re sen ts tw o a lte rn a tiv e ideals o f science a n d th e co n flict betw een th em . A m sterd am sk i is try in g to p re sen t b o th o f th e m in d isc­ rim in ately . F ro m his p o in t o f view the co n flic t o f th ese id eals is u n so lv ab le o n a p h ilo so p h ic al g ro u n d b ecau se w hen we assu m e, th a t we place o urselves o u tsid e the system w hich we e x am in e a n d w h ich we b elo n g to w'e a re u n a b le to reach the w hole k n o w leg e a b o u t it. O n th e o th e r h a n d , i f w e ag ree th a t we a re a p a rt o f the system w hich w e ex am in e fro m th e inside, w e a re n o t ab le to reach an o b jectiv e k n o w led g e a b o u t it. In c o n se q u e n ce , in A m s te rd a m sk i’s o p p in io n , o u r ch o ices a rc c o n d itio n e d b y th e v alu es th e re a liz atio n o f w hich is ex pected fro m o u r know ledge.

T h e c o n flict o f these ideals o f k n o w le d g e is a lso u n so lv ab le o n a m e t­ h o d o lo g ic a l g ro u n d . T h e a c c e p ta n c e o f th e ideals o f k n o w led g e ex clu d es a n a cc e p ta n ce o f so m e m é th o d o lo g ie al prin cip les. F o r th e first ideal o f th e k n o w led g e the m o st im p o r ta n t is p sy ch o lo g ica l, lin g u istic o r h isto ric a l (c u ltu ral in g lo b a l) u n d e rs ta n d in g o f the w o rld in w hich m a n lives an d acts. F o r the seco n d ideal th e m o st im p o r ta n t is e x p a n d in g te c h n o lo g ica l ■ p o ­ ssibilities w hich are , in A m s te rd a m sk i's o p in io n , ta k in g c o n tro l o f th e w o rld: b o th p eo p le a n d n a tu re . C o n te m p o ra ry , so called , science is a resu lt o f th e re a liz atio n o f th e second ideal. It d o e s n o t m ean th a t it is th e on ly po ssib le ideal o f th e k n o w led g e. T h is ideal c o u ld be critisized to o . A m ste rd a m sk i th in k s th a t o n th e b asis o f th e ideal, w hich jo in s co g n itiv e a n d tech n ical fu n c tio n o f th e k n o w led g e it c an be acc e p te d a n d re g a rd e d as ra tio n a l o n ly w hen we accep t

92 B o g u s ła w M a ry n ia k

th e m eth o d o lo g ic a l rules w h ich e n ab le its o p e ra tio n a l usage. T h e a cc e p ta n ce o f th is ideal is n o t a necessity o f'th e re a so n b u t th e ch o ise m a d e by th e E u ro p e a n c u ltu re . T h e ch o ice co u ld be a cc e p te d o r rejected , b u t th e ideal s h o u ld n o t be tre a te d as a n e te rn a l. It's an alisis a n d criticism is o n e ot' the ta sk s o f the p h ilo so p h y o f science. A m sterd am sk i in his a n alise s gives a d istinctivele ra c io n a l bases fo r a p lu ra listic p h ilo so p h y o f science. T o c re ate th e bases is the m o st im p o rta n t g o al w hen y o u w a n t to build the p h ilo so p h y o f science, w hich is n o t b a se d on a scientism .

A n o th e r, really very in te re stin g criticism o f the scientism w as c arrie d o u t by Leszek K o ła k o w sk i4. H is criticism is a n effect o f th e w id en ed c o n ce p t o f positiv ism in clu d in g in it, fo r in sta n ce , p ra g m a tism a n d c o n v en tio n alism . K o ła k o w sk i th in k s, th a t w idely u n d e rs to o d p o sitiv ism co u ld be c h arac te riz e d by such fo u r principles:

1. T h e p rin cip le o f p h e n o m e n alism states th a t th ere is n o real difference betw een the essence a n d the p h e n o m e n o n .

2. T h e p rin c ip le o f n o m in a lism fo rb id es the s u p p o sitio n th a t th e k n o w le d ­ ge h as, in real, e q iv a len ts d ifferen t fro m in d iv id u a l, c o n crete objects.

3. T h e prin cip le o f rejectio n o f c o g n itiv e v alu e o f e v a lu a tio n an d stan -d a riz a tio n .

4. T h e prin cip le o f belief in a fu n d a m e n ta l u n ity o f know ledge. A lto u g h I d o n o t w a n t to re p e a t K o la k o w sk i's e x p la n a tio n o f these p rin cip les. 1 w o u ld like to p o in t o u t th a t such a p h ilo so p h ic al c o n c e p tio n leads to a special kind o f „ id e o lo g y o f scien ce" (id eo lo g y o f th e scientism ). T h is ideo lo g y b u ilds m o n u m e n ts fo r science, p u ts it in th e m o st im p o r ta n t place, a n d accep ts all fo u r prin cip les. T h e scientism rejects the p ro b le m s linked w ith the m elap h isics an d the th e o ry o f c o g n itio n . It resu lts fro m the first tw o prin cip les. T h e a cc e p ta n ce o f p h e n o m e n alism a n d the n o m in alism elim in ates tra d itio n a l, p h ilo so p h ic al p ro b lem s. T h e th ird p rin cip le th ro w s o u t ethics, a esth etics a n d religion. T h e se discip lin es a n d th e ir p ro b le m s a re n o t in te re stin g fo r scie n tism ’s co n fesso rs. In th e ir field o f in terest lies th e science fo r w hich the m o st im p o rta n t p a tte rn is physics, a scietific m e th o d a n d its im p ro v em e n t. Because o f this, he is especialy in te re sted in the m e th o d o lo g y a n d the th e o ry o f lan g u ag e. T h e scientism b u ild s o n ly o n e m odel o f science. I t d o cs n o t p e rm it any a lte rn a tiv e . A p a rt fro m th a t, scien tism excludes m a n 's every d ay life from p h ilo so p h y .

Scientism can also be c h a ra c te riz e d by five m y th s 5. T h is c h a ra c te ris tic is v ery useful a n d it sh o w s som e im p o r ta n t fea tu re s o f scientism , w'hich are im p o rta n t fro m th e p o in t o f view o f to d a y c u ltu re a n d civilization.

4 C o m p a re : L. K o ł a k o w s k i . F ilo z o fia p o z y ty w is ty c z n a , W a rs z a w a 1966. p. 9 18.

H u m a n is tic P h ilo s o p h y o ľ S cien ce

1. T h e re is o n ly o ne k in d οΓ tru th fu l k n o w led g e it is th e k n o w led g e rccivcd by m e th o d s o f science. T h e k n o w led g e is w h at c an be ex p ressed m ath e m atica lly . It can also be fo rm alize d a n d it w as m e n tio n e d by m ct- h o d o lo g ic a ly rig o ro u s experience. It m e a n s, th a t science is th e o n ly so u rce o f co g n itio n .

2. T h e o n ly th in g , w hich is w o rth c o g n itio n a n d e x a m in a tio n is w h at can be ex am in ed a cc o rd in g to scientific fu n d a tio n s . B ecause o f this, m an y p h e n o m e n a are o u t o f the d o m a in o f scientific in te re sts. R ea lity is „ m e c h a n i­ c a l'' a n d „ a n a litic a l" a n d it is p o ssib le to e x p lain th e reality by re d u c tio n . 3. T h e kno w led g e, b o th in th e s p h ere o f its d elivery (te a c h in g a n d learn in g ) a n d o b ta in in g (rese arch in g a n d in v e stig atio n s) sh o u ld be split in to se p a ra te elem en ts o r segm ents. T h is is w hy th e o n ly w ay to im p ro v e k n o w led g e is sp ecializatio n . O n ly the n a rro w the sp ecia liz atio n c an g u a ra n te e th a t you ..k n o w so m e th in g ” in y o u r field.

4. O n ly the e x p erts have a q u a lific a tio n fo r u n d e rta k in g d ecisio n s in the sp h eres o f eco n o m ic, social a n d p o litic a l life, b ecau se th ey k n o w w h a t is right an d w h a t is w ro n g o r w h a t is g o o d a n d w h a t is b ad .

It is very easy to see th a t the first tw o m y th s a re very n e a r to the fo u r prin cip les o f p o sitiv ism . Besides, th e th re e n ex t say q u ite a lot a b o u t the ideological asp e c ts o f scientism like a b e lie f in scientific a n d tech n o lo g ical p ro g ress a n d sp ec ia liz atio n w hich will lead u s to th e tr u t h a n d h ap p in ess. Is th e p ro g ra m m e o f scientism s a tisfa c to ry ? It is h a rd to a n sw e r th is q u e stio n un cq iv o cally . It is c erta in , th a t scien tism fo rce d o n a n a rro w ly u n d e rs to o d p ra c tic e a n d efficiency. F ro m th e p h ilo so p h ic a l p o in t o f view it co u ld be useful if we ag ree th a t the n o tio n „ p h ilo s o p h y o f scien ce” a n d m e th o d o lo g y are sy n o n y m o u s.

T h is so lu tio n is n o t sa tisfa c to ry fo r m e. 1 fo u n d so m e allies in th e field o f c o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo so p h y o f science. S o m e o f th e m h av e b een a lre a d y m e n tio n e d . In ste ad o f m a k in g frien d s a m o n g th em a n d d e v elo p in g th e ir tra d itio n . I ten d to lo o k fo r c o m p a n io n sh ip a m o n g p h ilo s o p h e rs w h o cre ate c o n te m p o ra ry h erm en eu tics. T h ey w ere a n d still a re „ d is a p p in te d ” . b u t they n o tice som e o th e r im p o r ta n t fe a tu re s o f th e d o d a y p h ilo s o p h y o f science. F o r in stan ce, W ilhelm D ilth e y s h o o k the b e lie f in th e u n ity o f th e w ays o f co g n itio n in d ifferen t sciences. T h is b e lie f w as c o m m o n to th e p o sitiv ism o f the n in e te en th a n d tw e n te en th c en tu rie s. H e id eg g e r p o in ts o u t, th a t even in scientism rejecting m e ta p h isic s it is p o ssib le to fin d so m e rcaly im p o r ta n t m e ta p h isic a l a ss u m p tio n s. T h o se a ss u m p tio n a re q u ite o fte n u n c o n cio u s. If you w a n t to find a m e ta p h isic a l a ss u m p tio n , y o u h av e to ask in a p h ilo s o p ­ h i c a l im p o r ta n t w ay. G a d a m c r m e n tio n e d , th a t m o d e rn science a n d scien ­ tism , n a rro w e d d o w n a n d im p o v e rish e d th e o ld , a n c ie n t c o n c e p tio n o f science. C o n te m p o ra ry h e rm e n e u tics d o e s n o t w a n t to give th is c o n c e p tio n up.

9 4 B o g u s ła w M a r y n ia k

In my o p in io n , th e p re s e n ta tio n a n d the criticism o f scien tism m en tio n ed a b o v e e n ab le m e to fo rm u la te so m e p o s tu la te s o f th e h u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science. T h e h u m a n iste p h ilo so p h y o f science d o e s n o d en y th a t scientism a n d po sitiv ism h av e som e ach iv cm cn ts. It d o es n o t w a n t to ta k e a n in terest in m e th o d o lo g ic a l o r logical p ro b le m s w hich a re n o t, ho w ev er, rejected o r c o n sid e re d as no n sen se. It tak es a p lu ra listic s ta n d k eep in g to le ra n c e fo r som e o th e rs v iew p o in ts a n d a t the sam e tim e e n d e a v o u rs to reach th e ir basis. I try to p re sen t m a in p o s tu la te s o f th e h u m a n is tic p h ilo so p h y o f science in th ree p o in ts.

1. T h e a cc e p ta n ce o f the fact o f eq ality o f d ifferen t ep istem o lo g ical and o n to lo g ic a l th eo ries. A p o ssib ility o f b u ild in g th e h u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science m ean s, o f c o u rse, th a t I have to ch o o se o n e o f th e p h ilo so p h ic al o rie n ta tio n a n d so m e o n th o lo g ic a l a n d e p istem o lo g ica l belives. T h e chosen view is fav o red on ly becau se it is m y ow n a c k n o w le d g e m e n t. It lead s to the rejectio n o f th e belief th a t the p rin c ip le o f p h e n o m e n alism a n d n o m in alism s ta n d in th e science as a b so lu te . H u m a n istic p h ilo s o p h y o f science d o e s n o t reject th e m co m p letely . It ju s t p o in ts o u t th a t science c a n give so m e exam ples o f th e o c cu ran c e o f th ese p rin cip les a n d so m e ex am p les in w hich these prin cip les d o n o t o ccu re. H u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science accep ts a m u lti­ plicity o f c o g n itiv e w ays w hich c an lead to scientific c o g n itio n .

2. T h e a cc e p ta n ce o f the c o g n itiv e v alu e o f e v a lu a tio n . It accep ts the im p o rta n c e o f relig io n , m eta p h isic s. a rts a n d eth ic s, a n d c o n n ec te d w ith these p ro b le m s fo r science. It c an be s u p p o se d th a t th e ir rejectio n is artificial a n d it c a n lead to so m e falsificatio n s. B ecause o f th a t, h u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science d o es n o t w a n t to av o id a n y p ro b le m s, c o n n e c te d w ith th e h u m a n b ein g -in -w o rld .

3. T h e rejectio n o f the b e lie f in „ w o u n d e rfu l" po ssib ilities o f science, especialy n a rro w e d to th e stric t science. T h e b e lie f in „ w o u n d c rfu l" cognitive p o ssib ilities o f science c a n n o t be re ta in e d w hen we a g ree th a t a b so lu te tru th an d k n o w led g e is im p o ssib le. T h e k n o w led g e, w hich is a m o m e n t betw een e v ery th in g , w h a t I g ain d u rin g le a rn in g a n d w h a t I lose d u rin g fo rg ettin g can nev er be an y a b so lu te value. It h a s th e on ly sense as a know led g e-fo r-m y self. T h e social v alu e o f science c a n n o t a lso be tre a te d ab so lu tely b ecau se it has a h isto ric a l sense on ly . F ro m th e p o in t o f view o f th e h u m a n istic p h ilo so p h y o f science so cial valu es a re relativ e in a h isto ric a l a n d lin g u istic sense.

P o s tu la te s w hich w ere p re sen te d a b o v e h av e te m p o ra ry c h a r a c te r on ly , a n d I will c e rta in ly c h an g e th em a lo n g w ith fu r th e r d e lim in a tio n o f the Field o f a p ro p o se d reflectio n . H o w ev e r I su p p o se , th a t th e p ro p o s e d d ire c tio n o f a p h ilo so p h ic al reflectio n is very a ttra c tiv e b ecau se it w a n ts to say so m eth in g a b o u t science, w ith o u t rejectin g th e tra d ic io n a l, p h ilo so p h ic a l q u e stio n s. O ne o f these is th e p ro b le m o f o n to lo g is a tio n a n d d e o n to lo g is a tio n o f c o g n itio n w hich is. in m y o p in io n , th e m a in ep istem o lo g ica l p ro b le m o f th e p h ilo so p h y

9 5

o ľ science. In m y c o n c e p tio n o ľ o n to lo g is a tio n o ľ co g n itio n I try to follow H e id eg g e r”. H cid eg g erian o n to lo g is a tio n o ľ c o g n itio n is b a se d o n th e fact, th a t b ein g o f h eid eg g crian D asein is a lw ay s b ein g -in -a-w o rld . It is p e cu liar to being D asein th a t it m eets w h a t th e re is. D a se in c a n B e-in -w o rld d o in g so m eth in g , b u ild in g so m eth in g , living so m ew h ere, b ein g in te re sted in so m eth in g , h a v in g s o m e th in g to d o w ith s o m e th in g etc. In all th o se c h an g in g w ays o f bc- in g -in -w o rld D asein is a n x io u s a b o u t s o m e th in g as m u ch as it is. F o r H eidegger, D asein has to be a n x io u s, a n d even w hen m a n sp ea k s, th a t he is jo y fu l, his jo y is a d ifferen t k in d o f an x iety . T h e o b je c tific a tio n o f th e w o rld , co n n ec te d w ith th e div isio n o f he w h o a p p re h e n d s fro m w h a t is a p p re h e n d e d h as n o sense. A c co rd in g to H eid eg g er, w hen we say th a t we m eet in o u r c o g n itio n a n o b ject, it assu m es o u r b e in g -in -w o rld full o f a n ex ity a b o u t th e o b ject w hich we a p p re h e n d .

T h e co g n itio n c a n n o t be q u alified as a sen su al influ en ce o f th e w o rld o n a su b jec t o r as so m eth in g w hich is po ssib le th a n k s to th e c o m m o n o rig in o f th e w o rld a n d the su b ject. T h e c o g n itio n is a w ay o f b ein g co n cio u s: be- in g -in -w o rld is b eing c o n cio u s th a t it is. All th e e ffo rts to se p a ra te th e being (a n d th e th e o ry o f c o g n itio n ) fro m th e w o rld (o n to lo g y ) leads to a d isto rtio n . H o w d o e s it h a p p en th a t the w o rld a p p e a rs? It is b ecau se we a lw ay s a re in som e re la tio n to it. „ B e in g ” (ev e ry th in g w h a t d o es ex ist) a p p e a rs as a to o l i.e. so m eth in g I am a n x io u s a b o u t. F o r in sta n ce a ty p e w rite r is n o t a ty p e w rite r a t all b u t th e ty p e w rite r th a t 1 a m so m eh o w a n x io u s a b o u t, b ecau se I am ty p in g a w o rk e n title d H u m a n istic ph ilo so p h y o f science am ! its m a in epistem ological

problem . T h e a n x iety gets th e to o l fro m th e h id in g -p lace, it e x p o ses the to o l.

W ith o u t the a n x ie ty th e w o rld w o u ld n o t be ex p o sed a n d D asein w o u ld be ab sen t.

T h is s h o rt ex am p le sh o w s h o w I w a n t to b u ild m y new p h ilo so p h y o f science. It is ju s t a n e x am p le, b u t I su p p o se th a t it co u ld h elp to find o u t w here 1 sec th e m o st im p o rta n t, fro m th e e p istcm o lo g ica l p o in t o f view , p ro b lem o f c o n te m p o ra ry th e o ry o f c o g n itio n , in c lu d e d in the p h ilo so p h y o f science. D e p a r tm e n t o f P h ilo s o p h y Ł ó d ź U n iv e rs ity P o la n d 6 C o m p a re : K . M i c h a l s k i . H e id e g g e r i f i lo z o f i a w sp ó łc zesn a , W a rs z a w a 1978. p . 5 3 -6 3 : В. T u c h a ň s к a . P r o b le m p o z n a n ia j a k o p y ta n ie o n to lo g ie z n e , ..S tu d ia F ilo z o fic z n e " 1985. n r 7. p. 29; M . H e i d e g g e r . B y c ie і cza.s, t r a n s l a te d b y В. B a ra n . K r a k ó w 1985. p . 10 9-122.

96 B o g u s ł a w M a r y n i a k

B o g u sła w M a r y n ia k

H U M A N I S T Y C Z N A H L O Z O R A N A U K I l J E J G Ł Ó W N Y P R O B L E M E P I S T E M O L O G I C Z N Y

P re z e n to w a n y a r ty k u ł s ta n o w i p ró b ę w ła s n e g o p o d e jś c ia d o filo zo fii n a u k i. A u t o r w y s tę p u je p rz e c iw k o tra d y c y jn e m u , s c je n ty z u ją c e im i s ta n o w is k u w tej d y s c y p lin ie filo zo fic zn ej. N e g a ty w n y m o d n ie s ie n ie m d la p ra c y są ta k ż e n ie o rto d o k s y jn e filo zo fie n a u k i, b u d o w a n e p rz e z K u h n a . 1 -e y era h en d a i A m s te rd a m s k ie g o o r a z n ie k tó r e a s p e k ty fe n o m e n o lo g ii t ra n s c e n d e n ta ln e j H u s s e rla . P o z y ty w n y m ź r ó d łe m p r e z e n to w a n e g o a r ty k u ł u je s t w s p ó łc z e s n a h e r m e n e u ty k a filo zo fic zn a. A u t o r p ró b u je ta k ż e p rz e d s ta w ić w s tę p n e tez y w ła s n e j, tzw . h u m a n is ty c z n e j filo zo fii n a u k i o ra z p re z e n tu je je j g łó w n y p ro b le m e p is te m o lo g ic z n y . z w ią z a n y z d e o n to lo g iz a c ją i o n to lo g iz a c ją p o z n a n ia .