Natural dynamics of common-pool resources in experimental research - current state and prospects

(1)

Publishing House of Wrocław University of Economics Wrocław 2016

Quality of Life.

Human and Ecosystem Well-being

PRACE NAUKOWE

Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu

RESEARCH PAPERS

of Wrocław University of Economics

(2)

Copy-editing:RafałGalos Layout:BarbaraŁopusiewicz Proof-reading:BarbaraŁopusiewicz Typesetting:AdamDębski Coverdesign:BeataDębska Informationonsubmittingandreviewingpapersisavailableonwebsites: www.pracenaukowe.ue.wroc.pl www.wydawnictwo.ue.wroc.pl ThepublicationisdistributedundertheCreativeCommonsAttribution3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoderivsCCBY-NC-ND © CopyrightbyWrocławUniversityofEconomics Wrocław2016 ISSN 1899-3192 e-ISSN 2392-0041 ISBN 978-83-7695-590-2 Theoriginalversion:printed PublicationmaybeorderedinPublishingHouse WydawnictwoUniwersytetuEkonomicznegoweWrocławiu ul.Komandorska118/120,53-345Wrocław tel./fax713680602;e-mail:econbook@ue.wroc.pl www.ksiegarnia.ue.wroc.pl Drukioprawa:TOTEM

(3)

Introduction

OnSeptember21-22,2015,6thInternationalScientificConference“QualityofLife 2015.HumanandEcosystemsWell-being”washeldinWrocław. Theconferencewasapartofthecycleoftheconferencesonthetopicofquality oflifethathavebeenorganizedbytheDepartmentofStatistics(WrocławUniversity ofEconomics)since1999.Theaimofthecycleistoparticipateinthestillrising alloverthewordwaveofscientificstudiesonqualityoflife:ethicalbackground anddefinitionsofqualityoflife,investigating(howtomeasureit),presentingthe resultsofdifferencesofqualityoflifeovertimeandspace,itsinterdependences with natural environment, mathematical methods useful for the methodology ofmeasuringqualityoflifeandfinally–possiblemethodsofimprovingit.The conferencesaremeanttointegratethePolishscientificcommunitydoingresearch onthesetopicsaswellastomakecontactswithforeignscientists.

ThisyearourhonoraryguestwasProfessorFilomenaMaggino,pastPresident of International Society for Quality-of-Life Studies (ISQOLS), who presented aplenarylecture. Wehostedabout30participants,amongthemscientistsfromSpain,Romania, ItalyandJapan.Wehad24lecturesonsuchavarietyoftopicsascarbonfootprint andmathematicalpropertiesofsomeestimators.Thecommonbackgroundofall ofthemwastobettercomprehend,measureandpossiblytoimprovethequalityof humans’life. Thepresentvolumecontainstheextendedversionsofsomeselectedlectures presented during the conference. We wish to thank all of the participants of the conference for co-creating very inspiring character of this meeting, stimulating productivediscussionsandresultinginsomepotentiallyfruitfulcooperationover new research problems. We wish also to thank the authors for their prolonged cooperationinpreparingthisvolume,thereviewersfortheirhardworkandformany valuable,althoughanonymous,suggestionsthathelpedsomeofustoimprovetheir works.

Finally, we wish to thank the members of the Editorial Office of Wrocław University of Economics for their hard work while preparing the edition of this volume,continuouskindnessandhelpfulnessexceedingtheirdutiesofthejob.

(5)

PRACE NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU EKONOMICZNEGO WE WROCŁAWIU RESEARCH PAPERS OF WROCŁAW UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS nr 435 ● 2016 Quality of Life. Human and Ecosystem Well-being ISSN 1899-3192

e-ISSN 2392-0041

Michał Pająk

WrocławUniversityofEconomics e-mail:michal.pajak@ue.wroc.pl

NATURAL DYNAMICS OF COMMON-POOL

RESOURCES IN EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH −

CURRENT STATE AND PROSPECTS

NATURALNA DYNAMIKA WSPÓLNYCH ZASOBÓW

W BADANIACH EKSPERYMENTALNYCH –

OBECNE BADANIA I PERSPEKTYWY

DOI:10.15611/pn.2016.435.10 Summary:Sustainableuseofnaturalresourcesisakeyfactorforsurvivalofmanysmall communitiesaroundtheworld.Itcreatesproblemcalled‘thetragedyofthecommons’,asit isassumedthatpeopledrivenbytheirpersonalgainswilltendtooverusetheresourceleading toitsdepletion.Thisidealedtocreationofvariousexperimentaldesignsthatintroducedthis characteristics,butwerestatic,astheydidnotrepresentprocessofitsnaturalregeneration.In thesametimedynamicsofthiskindofresourcessuchasfisheriesorforestsarecriticalelement intherationaldecisionmaking.Differencebetweenlong-termsustainableuseandshort-time profits followed by poverty cannot be easily represented in static models.Therefore new designswerecreatedaimedatcapturingnaturaldynamicsofsuchresources.Theyrepresent varioustypesofecosystemsandwereusedindifferentcountriesandcontexts.Thesedesigns arenewadditiontothefieldofexperimentaleconomics.Therearemanyquestionsabouttheir validityinthefieldandgametheoreticalcharacteristics.Neverthelessthesequestionscreate newareasforfurtherinvestigationandresearch. Keywords:tragedyofthecommons,naturalresources,ecosystems,experimentaleconomy, gametheory.

Streszczenie: Zrównoważone wykorzystanie zasobów naturalnych jest czynnikiem

kluczowym dla przetrwania wielu niewielkich społeczności na całym świecie. Wiąże się ono z problemem „tragedii wspólnych dóbr”, w którym zakłada się, że ludzie, dążąc do indywidualnych korzyści, będą nadmiernie wykorzystywać zasób, prowadząc do jego zniszczenia. Takie ujęcie problemu zaowocowało stworzeniem różnorodnych procedur eksperymentalnych,którezawierałyopisanydylemat,alemiałycharakterstatyczny,ponieważ nie uwzględniały procesu naturalnej regeneracji zasobu. Dynamika zasobów takich jak łowiskaczylasyjestistotnymelementemwprocesiepodejmowaniadecyzji.Niestetymodele statyczneniesąwstanieodwzorowaćróżnicypomiędzyjegodługotrwałym,zrównoważonym wykorzystaniemamaksymalizacjąkrótkoterminowychzysków,prowadzącądoutratyźródła dochodu.Dlategoteżzostałyopracowanenoweproceduryeksperymentalne,którychcelem

(6)

Naturaldynamicsofcommon-poolresourcesinexperimentalresearch−currentstate… 153 jestprzedstawianiedynamikitakichzasobów.Reprezentująoneróżnetypyekosystemóworaz zostaływykorzystanewróżnychpaństwachikontekstach.Tegotypuprocedurysąnowym dodatkiemdoobszaruekonomiieksperymentalnej.Istniejewielepytańodnośnieichtrafności orazcharakterystykopisywanychprzezteorięgier.Zagadnieniatetworząnoweobszarydla dalszychanalizorazbadań.

Słowa kluczowe: tragedia wspólnych dóbr, zasoby naturalne, ekosystemy, ekonomia

eksperymentalna,teoriagier.

1. Common-pool resources

In literature common-pool resource (CPR) is defined as a type of good that is subtractableanditiscostlytoexcludepotentialusersfromusingit.Thismeansthat ifoneoftheusersutilizesit,theseunitsoftheresourcearenolongeravailablefor others.Whatismore,thispersonorgroupofpeoplewillbeabletousethisgood evenwhenacommunityorhigherauthoritiesdonotallowit[Ostrometal.1994]. SustainableuseofCPRsisakeyfactorensuringthelong-timeeconomicprosperity of many communities. This problem is not restricted to survival of small, rural communitiesthataredependentonforests,pasturesorlakefisheries.Problemswith managementofCPRsareexperiencedinasimilarwayindevelopedcountrieswhen itcomestowaterpumpingortheuseofgeothermalenergy[Ostrometal.1994].The sameissuesoccuratalargerscale.Forexamplein2011globalfisheryproductionin marinewaterswasestimatedto82.6milliontonnes[FAO2014].Itrepresentsan importantpartofglobaleconomyandworldwidefoodsupply.Furthermoreitcanbe arguedthatevenEarth’satmosphereshouldbetreatedasacommon-poolresource [Stonichetal.2002].Thisperspectiveshowsthattheimportanceofinvestigation intohowtheyaremanagedcannotbeunderestimated. Thisarticleisaimedatpresentingcurrentexperimentalresearchinthisarea. Itconcentratesonsituationswherethereisasmallgroupofclearlydefinedusers. Furthermore itfocuseson renewable resources that can regenerate in reasonable time,presentinghowthisregenerationcanbeintroducedintoexperimentaldesigns. Assuchdynamicsarerelativelynewadditiontothefield,bothopportunitiesand problemstheycreatearepresentedindetailinthelastpartofthearticle.

2. Typical CPR experiments

Thedesignoftypicalexperimentsintheareaofcommon-poolresourcesmanagement washeavilyinfluencedbytheideaof“tragedyofthecommons”.Itwaspoetical description of the situation described by Garett Hardin [1968]. In his article he presentedahypotheticalpasturewhichisusedbymultipleherdsmen.Eachofthem wantstomaximizehisownprofits.Ifheaddsoneanimaltohisflockhegetsfull proceeds from it while all costs from overgrazing are shared equally among all

(7)

154 MichałPająk

users. Therefore it is rational for all herdsmen to do so. Hardin argued that this inevitablyleadstooverharvestinganddepletionoftheresource.Hencethe“tragedy” –ifindividualsarerationaltheyarenotabletopreservethepastureandthisfatethat cannotbeavoided. Therearemanyexperimentaldesignsaimedatinvestigatingthisproblem.All ofthemarestylizedversionsofcommonpasturedescribedbyHardin.Atypical exampleofsuchadesignwaspresentedbyOstrometal.[1994].Inthisexperiment participantscaninvesttokenstheyaregiveninoneoftwomarkets.Firstonegivesa playera“safe”payoffproportionaltotheinvestment.Thelatterhasthecharacteristics ofthecommon-poolresourceasdescribedbyHardin.Thepayoffofparticipanti(π_i) fromhisinvestment(x_i)intheCPRcanbecalculatedfromthefollowingequation: π_i

( )

x =bx ax x_i− _i(Σ _i) .2 (1) Inthiscase∑x_iisthesumoftokensinvestedbyallplayersintheCPRwhilea and barepositivevaluesthatareparametersoftheproductionfunction.Itshowsthat participant’sprofitisproportionaltohisuseofcommon-poolresource(bx_i).Costs, asinpasturedescribedbyHardin,dependondecisionsmadebyallusers(ax_i(∑x_i)2_). Participant’sincomeinoneiterationoftheexperimentiscalculatedasasumof payoffsfrombothmarkets. Inthisdesigntheresourcedoesnotchangethroughoutthewholeprocedure.The samesetofdecisionsmadebyplayersalwaysyieldsthesameoutcomeregardlessof theiractionsinpreviousiteration.Ostrometal.[1994,p.12]explainedthisproblem inthecontextofresourcedynamics:“One-shotgamesortimeindependentrepeated gamesareadequaterepresentationwhenthenaturalreplacementrateisatleastas greatascurrentandforeseeablewithdrawalratessothattheCPRisabletomaintain itself. Thistypeofdesignisaimedatansweringthequestionhowpeoplebehavewhen theyhavetochoosebetweenindividualandgrouprationalityinthecontextdescribed byHardin[Cardenasetal.2013].Thedynamicnatureofnaturalresourcessuchas fisheriesorforestsisomitted.Experimentsarecreatedtoanalyzehoweconomicand socialfactorsaffectthedecisionsoftheparticipantsfacedwiththisdilemma.They try,forexample,toanswerquestionsifculturaldifferences[Carpenter,Cardenas 2011]orpaymentsforecosystemservices(PES)andcommunication[Midleretal. 2015]influenceindividualandgroupoutcomes.Themodelitselfdoesnotmatch the exact nature of CPR but represents the core dilemma behind its use. These investigationsareimportant,buttheycannotanswerthequestionsifandhowthe dynamicnatureofnaturalresourcesinfluencethedecisionsoftheparticipants.

(8)

Naturaldynamicsofcommon-poolresourcesinexperimentalresearch−currentstate… 155

3. Dynamics of natural resources

Renewable natural resources like fisheries or forests regenerate over time. The dynamicsofsuchecosystemsarecomplexandtheirbehavioris,inmanycases,hard topredict[Schefferetal.1993;Hirotaetal.2011].Inrealitythisweighsheavilyupon decisionsmadeinnaturalresourcemanagement.Nevertheless,formanyyears,even thesimplestdynamicsofCPRswerenotintroducedintoexperimentalresearch.As it was presented before, models were “static” as they did not change over time regardlessofparticipants’decisions.

The process of natural regeneration can be modelled with the “dynamic” representationsoftheresource.Aconceptofthesemodelsissimple.Whenpresented indiscretetimestepstheyshouldadheretothefollowing,abstract,model:

St+1=t S H

(

t,

)

. (2)

Thestateoftheresource(S)intimestept +1dependsbothonstateinprevious round and harvest done by the users (H). The dynamics of the CPR are hidden withinthetransitionfunction(t)whichdependsoncharacteristicsofthemodeled ecosystem. The nature of the resource state, harvesting effort and the transition functionarenotdefined.Thissimple,abstract,descriptioncanbeusedtomodel complex ecosystems as well as representations behind simple games with few possiblestatesoftheCPR.

Adding natural dynamics to the model can introduce new concepts into the experiment.Firstofthemisastablestate–itrepresentsthecasewhenthestateof theresourcedoesnotchangebetweentimesteps.Inrealitysuchasituationhappens iftheactionorinactionofusersdoesnotaffecttheCPRoritisabletoreturnto its previous state. Furthermore there is social optimum. It is defined as a set of harvestingdecisionsthatmaximizesthegrouppayofffromtheresourceusewithin giventime[Cardenasetal.2013].Asitreferstothegroupoutcomeasawholeit doesnotguaranteetheequalshareoftheincomeamongparticipants.Last,butnot theleast,thereisthemyopicNashequilibrium.Itisdefinedasasetofharvesting decisionsthatmaximizesplayers’individualpayoffineachoneoftimesteps[del PilarMoreno-Sánchez,Maldonado2010].Allthesecharacteristicsarenotpresent in“static”,iterateddesignsthatareusuallyusedinCPRresearch.Still,insimple models,theseconceptscanbeunderstoodbypotentialparticipantsintheresearch. Therefore,duringtheexperiment,theycanmakeinformeddecisions abouttheir resourceuse.

4. Fishery Game

Cardenasetal.introducedsimplemodelrepresentationofthefisheryinoneoftheir experiments[Cardenasetal.2013].Inthisdesigntheresourcecanbeinoneoftwo

(9)

156 MichałPająk states,highorlow,thatrepresenttheavailabilityoffishstock.Inbothcaseseach playercanrestrainhimselffromusingtheresourceordecidehowhighorlowfishing effortcanbe.Individualpayoffinoneiterationoftheexperimentdependsbothon stateoftheresourceandplayer’sdecisionaspresentedinTable1. Table 1. Payoffsin“AFisheryGame”designedbyCardenasetal.[2013].Payoffsreceivedby participantsdependontheindividualharvestingeffortandstateoftheresource.Thevalueconnected witheffortisusedtocalculateparticipant’ssumofdecisions Resource Individualeffort

None(0) Low(1) High(2)

High(H) 0 7 8 Low(L1,L2) 0 2 3 Source:ownwork. Totalgroupfishingeffortaffectsthestateoftheresource.Whentheavailability offishishighandparticipants’sumofdecisionsisatleast5thefisherygoesinto lowstate.Itispossibleforresourcetorecover,butthetotalfishingefforthastobe atmost1fortwosubsequentiterations.Thestatesandtransitionsoftheresourceare depictedinFigure1.Ineveryiterationoftheexperimentallparticipantshaveaccess totwofisheriesthatarenotconnectedbutsharethesamepatternofbehavior.

H

L1

L2

E < 5 E ≥ 5 E ≤ 1 E ≤ 1 E > 1 E > 1 Figure 1. Graphrepresentingpossiblestatesofresourcein“AFisheryGame”designedbyCardenas etal.[2013].Valuesofrepresentthetotalfishingeffortthatleadstothetransitionintonextstate Source:ownwork. EventhoughthismodeloftheCPRisverysimpleitcontainsthemainfeatures of the dynamic representations that were mentioned before. When fishery is in

(10)

Naturaldynamicsofcommon-poolresourcesinexperimentalresearch−currentstate… 157 highstateandtotalgroupeffortdoesnotexceed5,itremainsinstablestate.Social optimummeanskeepingtheresourceinthisstateforthemostoftheexperiment.It representsthesustainableuseoftheCPR.Still,inthelastiterationoftheexperiment, participantsshouldmaximizetheirefforttogetthemostfromthefishery.Onthe otherhandmyopicNashequilibriumleadstothedepletionoftheCPRinthefirst iteration.Intheendifallparticipantsfollowthisdecisionpatternitresultsinlower totalpayoffthroughouttheexperimentcomparedtosocialoptimum. ThegamewasusedbyCardenasetal.inThailandandBolivia,whereitwas checkedhowsimpleinstitutionsandmonitoringsystemaffectsdecisionsregarding the use of CPRs [Cardenas et al. 2013]. Furthermore the design was adapted by Prediger et al. [2011] to investigate how cultural differences between communal farmersinNamibiaandSouthAfricainfluencetheirdecisions.Inthiscasethebasic dynamicsofthemodelremainedintactbutfisherieswerechangedintograzingareas. OtheruseofthisdesignwereexperimentsconductedbydelPilarMoreno-Sanchez andMaldonado[2010]intheColombianCaribbean.Treatmentusedinthisresearch concentratedagainonhowinstitutionalarrangementsaffecttheoutcomesofgroups usingCPRs.Itintroducedacomplexmodeloftheresourcewithnon-linearpayoff andregenerationfunctions.Still,forthesimplicity,intheexperimentalresearchit wasreducedintorepresentationwithtwopossiblestatesofCPRandpayoffmatrix similartotheoriginalversionofthedesign.

5. Forestry Game

OtherdesigncreatedbyCardenasetal.[2013]is“ForestryGame”.Itrepresents forestconsistingof100treesthataredividedinto10rows.Ineachroundplayers haveanopportunitytodecidehowmanyofthemtheywanttocut.Theirpayoffis proportionaltoaharvestingdecisionandthesetreesareremovedfromtheforest. Afterthatthereisaregenerationphase.Onenewtreeisaddedtotheforestforevery rowthatwasleftintact.Eventhoughthedescriptionofthedynamicsissimplerthan in“FisheryGame”thesystemitselfismuchmorecomplex.Inthiscaseineach iterationtheCPRcanbeinoneof101differentstatesthatrepresentthesizeofthe forest. Socialoptimumforthisdesignmeansthattheforestshouldbeusedinsustainable wayforatleastsomepartoftheexperiment.Itmeanskeepingitinthestablestate thatwillenabletheCPRtoregenerateintoitsmaximalsize.AspresentedinFigure2, whentheexperimentlastsfor10iterations,afterthefifthroundaforestuseshould increase. This relates to the definition of social optimum − a set of harvesting decisions that maximizes the group payoff from the resource within given time. Ifplayersknowthedurationoftheexperimenttheyshouldincreasetheirprofitby increasingtheharvestinawaythattheywillcutdowntheforestcompletelyinthe lastroundofexperiment.Whenanumberofiterationsincreasesthesustainableuse oftheresourceshouldlastlonger.Ontheotherhand,myopicNashequilibriumleads

(11)

158 MichałPająk tothedepletionoftheresourcebysixthround.Inthiscasethereisnorowof10trees presentintheforest.Itmeansthat,byregenerationrule,itwillremaininthisstate tilltheendoftheexperiment.Nonewtreeswillbeaddedtotheforest–theCPR havebeencompletelydepleted. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Fo re st a t t he e nd o f t he ro un d

Social optimum Myopic Nash equilibirum

Figure 2. SocialoptimumandmyopicNashequilibriumin“ForestryGame” Source:ownwork. IntheoriginaldesigncreatedbyCardenasetal.[2013]participantsfromThailand andColombiawereabletousesimpleinstitutionsandmonitoringmechanisms.It wascheckedhowtheyhadaffectedtheirmanagementofthecommonforest.Similar designwasalsoreproducedbySlavíkováetal.[2011]intheCzechRepublic,Slovakia andintroducedbyMagnuszewskietal.[2014]inBoliviaandUganda.Inthelast case there were no restriction on the communication during the experiment and participantscouldcreatetheirowninstitutions,performmonitoringandsanction othermembersofthecommunity.Furthermorethe“ForestryGame”wasusedby Ghateetal.[2013]asabasefortheirresearchconductedinIndia.Firsttheexperiments used original design with communication and no-communication treatments. In othersforestresourceswereseparatedintotimber,fodderandfuelwood.Eachtype haditsownsizeandhadregenerationrateof10%asintheoriginaldesign.Stillall oftheseforestresourcesshouldsumupto100units.

6. Spatial design

Janssenetal.[2008]intheirdesignintroducednotonlydynamicsoftheCPRbut also its spatial distribution. This experiment was conducted using computer

(12)

Naturaldynamicsofcommon-poolresourcesinexperimentalresearch−currentstate… 159 simulation.Itrepresentedagridwith20x50cellsthatwaspartiallyfilledwithtokens representingtheresource,asshowninFigure3.Thesimulationtookplaceinreal-timeandplayersusedtheiravatartoharvesttheresourceinrealtime. Figure 3. GraphicalrepresentationoftheresourceinexperimentbyJansenetal.[2008]. Greentokensrepresenttheresource,yellowtokenistheavataroftheplayer

Regeneration happens in fixed moments during the experiment. Therefore it isdoneindiscretetimestepsasopposedtothereal-timeharvestingdecisionsby participants.Inthistypeoftheexperimentregenerationisstochasticanddepends onthelocationwithinthegamearea.Thiscreatesadditionalcomplexityconnected withsimulatingnaturalresourcesthatwasabsentindesignspresentedbefore.In thisexperimentregenerationruledeterminestheprobabilityofanewunitofCPR appearingonemptyspacecattimestept.Itisdefinedbytheequation: p t r n t N c

( )

= c − ( 1_{) .} ₍₃₎ Suchaprobability(p_c)dependsonregenerationparameter(r)andthenumberof neighboringcellscontainingresourcetokeninprevioustimestep(n_c)dividedbythe totalnumberofneighboringcells(N).

This design was used to explore how property arrangements such as private propertyoropenaccessaffectedtheoutcomesofthegroupandstateoftheresource. Therewereseveralresearchactivitiesthatusedthisdesignbutnoneofthemwas performedinthefieldwithrealresourceusers[Janssenetal.2008;Janssenetal. 2010;Janssen,Ostrom2008].

7. Issues and prospects – discussion

Threebasicexperimentaldesignsthathavealreadybeenpresentedinthisarticle introducevariousapproachesatmodellingdynamicCPR.Allofthemarerelatively

(13)

160 MichałPająk

recentandinnovativeinthisfieldofresearch.Cardenasetal.[2013]evendescribe themas“newwave”ofexperimentaldesigns.Astheyarenewadditiontothefield they can generate controversies. At the same time they present completely new opportunities.

Firstofall,anecologistmayarguethatthesemodelsofCPRbearonlylittle or even no resemblance to real-life ecosystems. From their perspective they are notsimplebutsimplistic.Theylackmanybasicfeaturespossessedbysystems.In thedesignspresentedinthisarticletheresourceisdiscreteandhomogenous.Its spatialdistributionistakenintoaccountinonlyoneoftheseexperiments.Inreality fisheriesorforestsarecomplexecosystemsthatarehometovariousanimaland plant populations that interact with each other. Heterogeneity, feedbacks within the system and spatial distribution is a key factor to understand their behavior. FurthermorethenatureofpossiblehumaninterventionsintotheCPRsandtheir potentialresultsaddsevenmorecomplexitytothisproblem.Theseaspectsarekey factorsinresourcemanagementand,inpresenteddesigns,areaddressedinaversion thatmaybeviewedasoversimplified. Thereforeitiscrucialtoincorporateatleastsomeofthesecharacteristicswhen creatingnewdesigns.Itmaygivearesearcherinsightintotheinteractionsbetween human communities and natural resources systems. Addressing this complexity innewdesignsisanopportunity,butitalsocreatesadditionalproblems.Firstly, the main feature of the experiments should be simplicity. “Fishery Game” and “ForestryGame”aredesignedtobeassimpleaspossible.Itisduetothefactthat theywereconductedintheruralsocietiesofCPRusers.Morecomplicateddesign withadvancedmechanicsmaybemorerealisticbutitcanbetoocomplexforthe participantstounderstand.Iftheycannotpredicthowtheiractionsaffectstateand behaviorofthemodeltheycannotmakeinformeddecisionsthatcanbebasedon furtheranalysis. Anotherproblemcomesdirectlyfromthedynamicnatureofpresenteddesigns. As it was mentioned before, decision environment changes over time due to the decisionsofparticipantsandnaturalprocessesreproducedinthemodel.Therange ofpossibleactionsandtheirconsequencesmaybedifferentineachiterationofthe experiment.Itcreatesaquestionhowpeoplereacttosuchchanges.Forexample wecanassumethatparticipantscandospecificactionswhentheyarefacedwith thescarcityoftheresource.Itcanbetheorizedthattheycanlowertheirdecision to let the CPR regenerate. Alternatively they can increase harvest to secure for themselvesatleastsomeofthepayoffassumingthatotherswillfollowthemyopic Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately experiments that have been presented in this articledonotaddresssuchquestions.Whenstatisticalanalysisisapplied,itisbased onsimpletoolsusingmeanpayoffsintwotreatmentgroupsastheirinput.Thisgives informationwhichgroupwasabletoearnmorefromtheCPR.Basingonmodels’ characteristics,itcanbetranslatedtoinformationwhichgroupwasabletosustain itlonger,butdoesnotgiveanyinformationaboutharvestingdynamics.Multiple

(14)

Naturaldynamicsofcommon-poolresourcesinexperimentalresearch−currentstate… 161 decisionpatterns,drivenbyvariousrationales,canyieldthesamefinalresultand theywillbeundistinguishable.Introducingdesignsandstatisticalmethodsthatcan helpinvestigatethisproblemisanecessarystepinthisareaofresearch. Last,butnottheleast,thekeytounderstandthedynamiccontextofdecision patternsintheseexperimentscanbegametheory.Itstoolsandmethodsarewell established in economy as a way of analyzing actions undertaken by rational individuals. Experiments presented in this article use concepts based on game theorysuchassocialoptimumandmyopicNashequilibrium.Regrettablypresented designsrepresentonlyasuperficialanalysisofthissubject.Agoodexampleofthis problemis“ForestryGame”wherebothofthesedecisionpatternswerecalculated (seeFigure2).Firstofallthesetofactionsthatislabelledassocialoptimumis onlyoneofpossiblesequencesthatfulfillitsdefinition.Thisisduetothediscrete natureoftheresourceandregenerationrule.Therefore,inthisandsimilardesigns, researchersshouldpresentsocialoptimaratherthanothers.Furthermorethereis animportantquestionofmyopiaofNashequilibrium.In“ForestryGame”,inone iteration, Nash equilibrium is indeed harvesting maximum possible number of resource.However,itmaynotbethecaseforthegameasawhole.Inthepresented experimentaldesignstherewasnoattemptatcalculatingNashequilibriumforthe duration of the experiment. This can be interpreted as the approximation of the discountfactor.Followingthisargumentpeopleconcentrateontheircurrentpayoff anddonotthinkaboutthefutureincomefromtheCPR.Itmaybethecase,but itishardtoarguethatprospectprofitsdonotcountatall.Whatismore,thereis alsoaproblemwiththecomplexityofcalculatingNashequilibriumforthewhole game.Thisexceedscurrentandforeseencomputationalcapabilitiesofcomputers. Calculatingitrequiresdevelopingoradaptingexistingapproximationmethodsthat areusedin“static”games.Itstillrequiresresearchandjointeffortbymathematicians andeconomists. Summingup,experimentalgameswithdynamicrepresentationoftheresource give researchers an opportunity for more detailed insight into decision making processoftheCPRusers.Currentresearchisbasedonsimplemodelsandisthefirst steptoestablishsuchgamesasvalidareaofscientificexploration.Theystillrequire furtheranalysistoanswermethodologicalissuesthatemergefromthesedesigns.

References

Cardenas J.C., Janssen M., Bousquet F., 2013, Dynamics of rules and resources: three new field

experiments on water, forests and fisheries,[in:]Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment,ListJ.,PriceM.(eds.),EdwardElgarPublishing,Cheltenham,pp.319-345.

CarpenterJ.,CardenasJ.C.,2011,An intercultural examination of cooperation in the commons,Journal ofConflictResolution,no.55 (4),pp.632-651.

(15)

162 MichałPająk del Pilar Moreno-Sánchez R., Maldonado J.H., 2010, Evaluating the role of co-management in

improving governance of marine protected areas: An experimental approach in the Colombian Caribbean,EcologicalEconomics,no.69 (12),pp.2557-2567.

FAO,2014,The state of world fisheries and aquaculture,http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf(access 10.10.2015).

Ghate R., Ghate S., Ostrom E., 2013, Can communities plan, grow and sustainably harvest from

forests?,EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,no.48 (8),pp.59-67.

HardinG.,1968,The tragedy of the commons,Science,no.162(3859),pp.1243-1248.

HirotaM.,HolmgrenM.,VanNesE.H.,SchefferM.,2011,Global resilience of tropical forest and

savanna to critical transitions,Science,no.334 (6053),pp.232-235.

JanssenM.A.,GoldstoneR.L.,MenczerF.,OstromE.,2008,Effect of rule choice in dynamic interactive

spatial commons,InternationalJournaloftheCommons,no.2(2),pp.288-312.

JanssenM.A.,HolahanR.,LeeA.,OstromE.,2010,Lab experiments for the study of social-ecological

systems,Science,no.328 (5978),pp.613-617.

JanssenM.A.,OstromE.,2008,TURFS in the lab: institutional innovation in real-time dynamic spatial

commons,RationalityandSociety,no.20 (4),pp.371-397.

Magnuszewski P., Stefanska J., Andersson K., Salk C., Pajak M., Wright G., Chazdon R.L., Lopez M., Ostasiewicz K., Sendzimir J., 2014, A gaming activity to study the emergence of

adaptive governance arrangements for tropical forest ecosystems,presentationon:Workshopon

theOstromWorkshop5.

MidlerE.,PascualU.,DruckerA.G.,NarlochU.,SotoJ.L.,2015,Unraveling the effects of payments

for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action, Ecological Economics, no. 120,

pp.394-405.

OstromE.,GardnerR.,WalkerJ.,1994,Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources,Universityof MichiganPress.

Prediger S., Vollan B., Frölich M., 2011, The impact of culture and ecology on cooperation in a

common-pool resource experiment,EcologicalEconomics,no.70 (9),pp.1599-1608.

SchefferM.,HosperS.H.,MeijerM.L.,MossB.,JeppesenE.,1993,Alternative equilibria in shallow

lakes,TrendsinEcology&Evolution,no.8(8),pp.275-279.

SlavíkováL.,KováčbU.,Kluvánková-OravskáT.,MalýaV.,2011,Sustainable forest management as

experimental study from the Czech and Slovak Republics,Prognosticképráce,no.3

(4),pp.337--355.

StonichS.,SternP.C.,DolsakN.,DietzT.,OstromE.,WeberE.U.(eds.),2002,The Drama of the