Hans W. Ophoff
The Differentiation between
"Normal" and Extraordinary High
and Low Self-disclosure on the
Background of Their Regulative
Function for Self-Coherence
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Psychologica 1, 125-139
F O LIA PSY C H O L O G IC A 1, 1997
H A N S-W . O P H O F F Gissen U niversity G erm any
THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN „NORM AL”
AND EXTRAORDINARY HIGH AND LOW SELF-DISCLOSURE ON THE BACKGROUND OF THEIR REGULATIVE
FUNCTION FOR SELF-COHERENCE
A theoretical concept on self-disclosure (SD) discussed elsewhere in detail (O phoff 1989) shall be sketched here briefly in order to give the fram e for a pilot-study determ ined to check its empirical testability and fruitfulness o f the concept.
H o rm u th and A rcher (1986) critically p o in ted o u t the „O ne-sided phenom enon orientation and the relative absence o f theory” (p. 141, au th o r’s translation) in SD-research.
F o r this reason a possible conceptual fram ew ork on the basis o f self- -research is suggested, which may be sufficiently inclusive as well as sufficiently specific and predicative.
A lthough up to now the self continues to be a working hypothesis which is n o t considered as final (Higgins and Bargh 1987), it should be w orth the attem pt to examine the rather trivial possibility w hether or n o t SD-research could base its diverse partial concepts, single questions, ope rationalizations etc. on structures and functions o f the „ s e lf’ (after all the „ s e lf’ gives the label to this field o f research). The aim is to overcome its status as a pragmatic, perhaps useful collection o f seemingly related questions, results, and theoretical sprinklings.
F rom the great abundance o f structural differentiations concerning the self (M arkus and W u rf 1987) we have extracted two widely consensual distinctions concerning the m ode o f experiencing aspects o f the self. F o u r substructures or „poles” o f the self are deducible from them.
One distinction can be m ade between those kinds o f self-relevant experiences directly accessible to the individual him self and those subject to social m ediation (see G reenw ald and Breckler 1985, Filip and Frey 1987, M arkus and W u rf 1987).
A second distinction is th at between relatively enduring, generalized, or integreted characteristics o f the self on the one hand, which evidently guarantee the identity and continuity o f personal experience and behavior. On the other h and transitory, concrete, and observable actualizations subordinate to the form er and m ore or less com patible with these (Filip and Frey 1987). Precisely, these are the differentiations outlined in a statem ent by M arkus und W u rf (1987): „Both self-perceptions and others’ reactions thus constitute feedback to the self-system. This feedback m ay be either congruent or incongruent with current or desired self images” (p. 326).
The two structural distinctions result in a two-dim ensional m odel o f self-structure. It is formal, as it is applicable to every feature or characteristic o f the self.
This base model should be com prehended only as an exemplary, heuristic possibility. N um erous simplifications m ust still be tolerated until its „fruit fulness” has gained empirical support and the m odel can be elaborated: e.g. isolated exam ination o f the self characteristics; „others” implied as hom ogeneous; simplified separation o f „ego” and „alter” , which w ould
E G O -PE R C E PT (the individual perceives i.e. th a t at this m om ent he is helping someone)
E G O -C O N C EPT (the individual considers him self a helpful person)
Ego-percept:
A L T E R -PE R C E PT (the individual presumes i.e. others perceive th at at this m om ent he is helping someone)
A LT E R -C O N C E PT (the individual presumes
others consider him a helpful person)
Ego-concept:
Alter-percept:
Alter-concept:
the individual’s concrete, direct perception o f his own behavior (or other manifestations); i.e. to perceive how one solves an item in an intelligence test or to perceive how healthy one looks at the m om ent.
the individual’s relatively stable, generalized cognitive representa tion o f one characteristic o f his self, i.e. to consider oneself to be intelligent or to be in the best of health.
a concrete perception o f one’s own behavior (or other m anifesta tion) as m ade available to the individual by others; i.e. presu m ing others observe one has solved an intelligence test item, or others seem to find th a t one looks healthy at the m om ent. a relatively stable, generalized cognitive representation of a cha racteristic o f the individual’s self according to w hat others seem to see in him; i.e. to presum e th a t others consider oneself to be an intelligent person or to be in the best o f health.
otherwise be unnecessarily complicated, for example by symbolic-interactional concepts such as „internal audience” or „internal reference grou p” (see Baum eister 1982, Tetlock 1985) and m any more.
Concerning the functional, dynam ic aspect o f the self, which we call self system, an optim al congruity between all four poles could be assum ed to be the simplest definition o f its coherency. In case o f intolerable incongruity between at least two o f the poles, a regulative process is postulated for the purpose o f restoring sufficient congruity.
Form ally our conceptual fram e m ost resembles a conception presented by Higgins, Klein, and Straum ann (1985): The authors differentiate am ong (partly other) dom ains o f the self as well. Discrepancies (incongruities) am ong these are supposed to elicit em otional states. However, the authors stick to the area o f em otions and neither deal with the cognitive and behavioral consequences o f the discrepancies in general n o r with SD in particular.
These, however, are central topics o f our model. W ithin the postulated regulative process, three functional areas are differentiated and serve as an heuristic guideline (see G reenw ald and Pratkanis 1984):
1. Em otions which signalize the th reat or fact o f congruity loss and which prevent further enhancem ent o f incongruence (i.e. coming to a „stan dstill” when feeling asham ed). As presteps to thinking (see Scherer 1985, Gehm 1987) they initiate cognitive measures for coping with the incongruity.
2. Cognitive procedures th a t either represent cognitive coping strategies (i.e. self-serving biases, discrim ination o f others; see Filip and Frey 1987, p. 37) or prepare reparative actions (i.e. SD-decisions).
3. Actions for the purpose o f incongruity-reduction. In connection with social com parison processes, Filip and Frey (1987) e.g. nam e adaptatio n to reference persons or influencing them (p. 33) as two forms o f discrepancy- -reduction. (In this p artial process the prim ary functional location o f SD is postulated).
These broadly form ulated areas now have to be specified with regard to the process and the role played by SD.
D isturbances o f the selfs coherence, i.e. incongruities whithin the self system represent the starting point.
1. A t least in certain cases these incongruities can be experienced so strongly, th at intensive em otions set in. There is some theory as well as empirical evidence th a t feelings o f shame and the like are o f special relevance to self-regulation (see, for example, Lynd 1961; Lewis 1971; Izard 1972, 1977; Z im bardo 1974). Their central function can be outlined in Iza rd ’s (1972) words: „In some situations shame and shyness m ay serve as frontrunners, m otivating the individual to cover and withfraw the extended or exposed self before m ore serious threat elicits the very toxic em otion o f fear” (p. 392).
Accordingly, we w ould expect th at less or no SD will occur (what we call non-self-disclosure, N SD ) in this phase o f the process.
2. Subsequent (or m ore complex interdependent) cognitive processing ensues under the protection o f the defensive stabilizing function o f such emotions, which prevent an enhancement o f incongruity. Cognitive operations alone m ay be sufficient in m aking incongruities m ore tolerable. Nonetheless, w hether this suffices or not, SD /N SD decisions as well as other behavioral decisions are unavoidably a p a rt o f cognitive processing.
3. Accordingly, SD /N SD behavior and other supplem entary or com p lem entary behaviors serving self-regulation will occur.
O ur conceptual frame suggests th a t SD has is prim ary functional location in the third process com ponent and is planned, together with other cognitive coping-strategies, in the second one.
N SD , as im p ortan t as SD, is postulated to occur with strong, acute, m aybe dangerous incoherence o f the self. It is defined for the present as a degree o f SD which is lower than usual for the individual in relation to the situation, adressee, topic, etc.
One o f the m ain functional tasks o f SD is supposed to be the validation or reassurem ent o f the self-system, especially o f the ego-concept-pole; further the prevention o f incongruity-emergence from external conditions; and n o t a t least, in the case o f existing intolerable incongruities, the re- or new balancing o f the self-structure.
Referring to the first and second task a form o f SD is dem anded, which we call „norm ative SD ” . This is, in contrast to the „regulative S D ” (which has been regarded up to this) o f an intensity and form th at is in the range and under the control o f social norm s and expectations. I.e., it is o f typical am ount and type for the individual and adapted to the situation, adressee, etc. Its function is m ainly to avoid the emergence o f incogruities in a rather consolidated, integer self-system and thus m ake „regulative S D /N S D ” unnecessary.
An initial pilot study, along with a second one dealing with a somewhat different question, should test the empirical fruitfulness and testability o f the m odel, especially o f the following theoretical assum ptions: A functional distinction was m ade between „norm ative” and „regulative” SD /N SD . The „norm ative” SD /N SD should preserve the status quo o f a relatively integer, coherent self-system. This means its type and extent are prim arily determined by external factors such as the situation, the adressee o f SD, etc. It is controlled by social norm s and expectations and serves to prevent incon gruences. „R egulative” SD /N SD , on the other hand, either exceeds or stays below the „no rm al” m easure and is prim arily triggered from within by an unacceptable pro p ortio n o f incongruity in the self-system. By m eans o f a process o f regulation, an attem pt is m ade to reduce this incongruity:
N SD as transitory withdraw al, a kind o f „standstill” for the purpose o f limiting dam age and preventing m ore disregulation o f the self-system before its regulation can be planned and carried out.
SD along with other measures, serves this regulation, for example, by pursuing a discussion for cathartic purposes, by trying to influence others, etc. Accordingly, the questions posed by the pilot study are:
a) do different levels o f SD /N SD correspond with incongruences o f different quantity, and quality (poles) in the self-structure?
b) are these different levels o f SD /N SD (and possibly incongruences) associated with specifics o f the regulative process: with different degrees o f fam iliarity to the addressee(s) o f SD, different degrees o f involvement concerning the topics, with the significance o f the SD and its modifying effect on the inner balance o f the individual, etc.?
In accordance with the pilot character o f the study, a self-exploratory procedure was first used to examine the field m ore closely. A sample or 21 psychology students from Giessen between the age o f 19 and 30 years, o f which 8 were male, received the following tasks in a repeated measures design:
1. Firstly they were asked to recall one situation each from the recent p ast in which they dis-closed a „n orm al” am ount o f inform ation, „very m uch” , and „very little or n o ” inform ation on themselves (in each case as com pared to w hat each subject considered to correspond with his own specific nature and habits) to project themselves into th at situation again and then give a w ritten description o f it.
2. Then SD h ad to answer four questions referring to incongruities between the postulated substructures „ego-concept” , „ego-percept” , „alter- -concept” , and „alter-percept” (a prerequisite in the moel, a dependent variable in the experiment) corresponding to the varying degrees of SD /N SD.
Finally, six questions which addressed aspects o f the postulated regulative process (in the m odel the conceptual fram e for the functions o f SD /N SD , dependent variables in the experiment) as they are listed under topic b. above, h ad to be answered.
H Y P O T H E S E S
1. In the case o f „n orm al” SD (as opposed to „m uch” and ,,little/no” SD), it is expected:
1.1. T h a t the incongruences experienced in the self-system are o f a lesser degree;
1.2. T hat less inner necessity and intensity prevail concerning the regulative process. This m eans that:
- the factors th at trigger SD are a m ore external nature, - the topics are less taken to heart,
- the addressee(s) o f SD is less familiar,
- SD is less im po rtant for the own inner state o f well-being and has less effect on the state o f inner balance.
2. In the case o f „m uch” or „little/п о ” SD (for which the abbrevia tion „N S D ” will be used in the following), on the other hand, it can be expected:
2.1. T h a t incongruities in the self-system are larger under „m uch” SD (at least a t the onset o f a SD -situation, during the course o f which the incongruities m ay be reduced);
2.2. That, with respect to the regulative process referring to the self-system, m ore inner necessity and intensity are prevalent.
2.2.1. Concerning „m uch SD ” , this implies the opposite o f the statements listed under 1.2 (internal triggering, topics o f m ore concern, etc.).
2.2.2. Regarding N SD , the param eters relevant to the regulative process are som ew hat different, partly because o f their different functional location during the regulative process, and partly because the same questions (as in SD), require a „transform ed” or quasi „inverse” answer in the case o f N SD (see below):
- the factors evoking N SD likewise are internal while a t the same time the triggers for SD will be o f a m ore external nature. (Since the subject is m otivated n o t to disclose himself, only external triggers can cause him to disclose to a small extent.);
- the topics which he does n o t disclose are those o f personal concern; therefore, th at inform ation which he does disclose, SD, will be o f less personal im portance;
- the term non-disclosure (NSD), in a m ore specific sense, implies th at one’s addressee is a fam iliar person to the extent th at the degree o f SD really can rem ain below a „n orm al” level. Disclosing nothing a t all or only a little to strangers w ould therefore be „norm al” SD-behavior. A t best, it could be called N SD in a purely descriptive sense. This results in a rather am biguous hypothesis: According to how the subjects have understood the treatm ent „describe a situation with »little/no« SD ” , they will either - in the trivial case - respond th a t they were n o t fam iliar with their addressee or, adhering to the m ore confined definition o f N SD , they will report a quite close relationship;
- under the N SD condition, th at which remains unspoken is im portant for the inner state o f well-being. On the other hand, th at which is spoken and inquired will therefore represent less im po rtan t conversation;
- the latter will also little effect upon inner balance, since N SD actual ly serves the purpose o f preventing incongruities from increasing by way of w ithdraw al and „standstill” . Therefore it cannot at the same time help reduce incongruence.
A m ore detailed explanation is needed to determ ine why the hypotheses pertaining to the condition „m uch” SD differ from those pertaining to „little/п о ” SD (both in contrast to „n orm al” SD). On the one hand, N SD (operationalized as „little/п о ” SD) has a different location and m anner o f functioning in the postulated process o f regulation (see above): It is a possible first step preventing only an increasing o f dysregulation. On the other hand, due to o f the com parability o f conditions, the same questions are asked under „m uch” SD and „little/п о ” SD, questions referring to SD, namely, b u t n o t to N SD . Therefore under the N SD -condition they have a quasi inverse answer-logic (see p. 10, results on hypothesis 2.2.2): The inform ation they provide on N SD remains covert and can only be deduced from overt inform ation ab o ut SD. The latter is com plem entary to N SD and therefore closer to „norm al” SD, from which, however, it differs functionally. An example should explicate these som ew hat com plicated relations:
If the disclosure-conversation under the N SD -condition turns out to be insignificant and w ithout im portant consequences for the inner b alan ce/unbalance, then this w ould conform to the assum ption o f the model. Specifically non-disclosure is im portant for a defensive „standstill” and for preventing a further increase o f incongruence, whereas th a t which is spoken and disclosed m ust be unim p ortan t and can therefore have no consequences for the regulation o f the inner balance. If, on the other hand, the same results appear under the „no rm al” SD -condition, then this corresponds with the expectation: when a state o f relatively undisturbed self-coherence prevails, a m oderate form o f SD will be practiced (i.e. a conversation o f little significance with few consequences for the inner balance). The aim is ju st to m eet the disclosure-norm s and expectations appropriate to the situation and partn er involved and in order n o t to let incongruences arise as a result o f norm violation.
RESU LTS
Inferential statistics were conducted for the three dependent groups with the Friedm an-Test. Paired com parisons were tested with the t-Test for dependent samples.
F o r the latter, the given A-values are underestim ated since the po int in question is m ultiple com parisons. A correction, however, does n o t seem necessary as m ost o f these values lie far below A = .05, and a t least in the case o f ep-ap, a one-sided test could have been conducted, th a t w ould halve A.
On Hypothesis 1.1 and 2.1:
As expected, with „norm al S D ” the incongruences are smaller in all four pole com binations than with „little/п о ” SD, b u t significant only in the case o f ep-ap. On the other hand, the differences between „norm al SD ” and „m uch S D ” are small and in one case, ac-ec, tend tow ards greater incongruence with „norm al S D ” .
This unexpected absence o f differentiation seems to suggest a m e thodological „exhaustion” : In the investigation, it was neglected to refer the questions sufficiently specific to the onset o f SD, especially in the case of „m uch S D ” . Consequently, this could have led to incongruence reduction and the leveling o f existing differences. The subjects probably preferred to report on the later, m ore regulated state, as it was the m ore pleasant one. Two results speak in favor o f such a process:
1. The greatest incongruence occurred in the ego-alter-concept comparison (ec-ac) under „little/п о ” SD as well as „n orm al” SD, this as opposed to „m uch” SD, which in this com bination o f poles does n o t differ from the rem aining com binations. In contrast to the treatm ent „little/по SD ” , „m uch SD ” shows significantly less incongruity in all four cases, a trend also observed when com pared to „norm al SD ” .
A t first glance the considerable incongruences found in the ac-ec com pari son do conform to the model in as far as with regard to these poles, which are defined as stable over time, there is little possibility o f reducing the experienced incongruity on a purely cognitive basis, e.g. attributing it to the special situation, to chance or unsystematic error. Accordingly, only with „much SD ” (within the context o f the instructions that were time-related bu t n o t adequate ly specified) existed the far-reaching possibility o f going beyond cognitive processing and o f pursuing incongruence reduction by SD. N o t only does the given possibility speak in favor o f this, b u t also the indicators for regulation (questions 5-9) suggest th at this has actually been realized (increased involve m ent with the topics, increased im portance o f the conversation for the inner well-being, m ore change o f inner balance, conversation partners who are m ore familiar, and m ore internal triggering factors).
2. U nder the treatm ent „m uch SD ” as com pared to the other two treatm ents, the variance is reduced in all 8 pairs, especially in the ec-ac com parison (not tested statistically).
It can hardly be a ceiling effect, since the ratings can all be found in the m iddle section o f the response scale. It herefore seems plausible th at
the variance could have become restricted as follows: W ithin the treatm ent „m uch S D ” , and only here, did those subjects showing especially great incongruities have the chance to reduce these with the help o f extensive SD. F o r those subjects having less incongruities to begin with, this was neither necessary n o r even possible to the same extent. Consequently, variance was decreased.
On Hypothesis 1.1 and 2.2:
All five o f the „regulation-indicators” belonging to these hypotheses received different responses in the expected m anner. In the case o f „m uch” SD as opposed to „n o rm al” SD:
- the triggering factors are o f a m ore internal character, - the topics provoke m ore personal involvement,
- the addressees are m ore fam iliar
- the conversation is m ore im portant to the inner state o f wellbeing, - the conversation has greater effect upon inner balance.
On Hypothesis 2.2.2:
A t first glance, ratings for the treatm ent „little/по S D ” are similar to those fo r „ n o rm a l S D ” . T hey alto g eth er differ significantly from „m uch S D ” . This does include one m ajor exception: Fam iliarity with the SD -partner is rated as average, ju st as under „m uch S D ” , whereas under „n orm al S D ” the p a rtn e r was rated as „less fam iliar” on the average. This circumstance, along with the peculiarities o f the questions explained in hypothesis 2.2.2 concerning their m eaning and responses when they were presented under the treatm ent „little/по S D ” , justifies speaking o f a far reaching verification o f the hypotheses which were p o stulated for this treatm en t (the concluded assum ptions and at the same tim e the postulates from the m odel concerning N SD are n o ted in parentheses):
- SD (as it occurred, and as it was adressed by te questions) was m ore likely to be evoked by external factors (just because by internal factors defensive N SD was preferred);
- the topics which were actually disclosed accordingly contained less involvement than under „m uch S D ” (due to the fact th at those topics close and corresponding to inner determ ination are precisely those which were n o t disclosed b u t rather avoided);
- the conversation was less im po rtant to the inner state (because it was only a substitute for or an attem pt to elude the im portant, undisclosed inform ation);
- therefore the conversation had less effect upon the inner balance (because the attitude was a defensive one and did n o t adm it SD with cathartic, persuasive, or other regulative effects).
T a b l e 1 M eans, Standard-D éviations and Significance-Levels for the 5 Step Incongruity-Ratings for Questions Referring to Aspects of SD in the Regulative Process and for Sureness in the Ratings
Q uestion
Treatm ents Significance-levels norm al SD m uch SD little/no SD Fried-m an-T Ä = T-Test Ä = n = norm al m = m uch In = little/no 1. ep -ap X 2,38 2,33 3,00 0,13 0,034 n S D /ln S D s 1,32 1,11 1,26 2. ap -a c X 2,29 2,62 2,81 0,39 s 1,19 1,16 1,21 3. ec-ac X 2,81 2,33 3,14 0,02 0,10 nSD /m SD s 1,03 .73 1,11 0,005 m S D /ln S D 4. ec-ep X 2,29 2,14 2,43 0,56 s 1,23 1,20 1,36 5. Involvem ent X 3,14 1,38 2,57 0,0001 0,0001 nSD /m SD in topics 0,0001 m S D /ln S D (1 = very much) s 1,28 .50 1,25 0,13 n S D /ln S D 6. Im portance X 3,29 1,57 3,29 0,0001 0,0001 nSD /m SD o f talk 0,0001 m S D /ln S D (1 = very imp.) s 1,10 .75 1,19 7. Triggering X 2,33 3,76 2,33 0,0003 0,0001 nSD /m SD factors 0,0001 m S D /ln S D (1 = completely s .97 1,00 1,11 internal, 5 = compl. external) 8. Consequences X 2,14 3,19 2,10 0,008 0,002 nSD /m SD o f talk 0,001 m S D /ln S D (1 = no cons.) s 1,01 1,03 1,00 9. Fam iliarity X 4,05 3,05 3,00 0,01 0,002 nSD /m SD o f the other 0,001 n S D /ln S D (1 = very high) s 0,59 1,16 1,38 10. Sureness in the X 2,05 1,95 2,33 0,59 0,13 m S D /ln S D ratings (1 = very sure) s 0,67 0,50 0,97
- A t the same time, contrary to „norm al SD ” and equivalent to „m uch SD ” , the addressee was m ore familiar. (T hat is why N SD in the restrictive sense could even be adressed to him. It was N SD especially for this addressee which he needed in order to keep his com posure and guard against further revealm ent and „disregulation” o f the selfs shaken balance).
Once again it should be pointed out th at this „interp retation ” o f the answers became necessary as a result o f the following dilemma: On the one hand, in order to have com parable conditions over all treatm ents, the same questions h ad to be posed. On the other hand, these questions related
to SD could n o t directly be applied to the accom panying circumstances o f N SD. Therefore, these h ad to be partially concluded, thus allowing a com parison with the assum ptions o f the model.
One objection m ust still be taken into consideration: The fact th at sureness in the ratings was estimated to be somewhat greater and m ore hom ogenous (descriptive) under the condition „m uch” SD could give reason to assume th a t stereotyped ratings m ight have been reported here. M ore specifically, it is possible th at subjects thought th at the condition „m uch” SD autom atically m eant involvement in topics, fam iliarity o f the addressee, internal triggering factors, etc. This was n o t controlled for, b u t even if this objection proved true, subjects w ould still have ascribed a function to SD similar to the one postulated in the model. A nd it can be presum ed th at this would have a self-fulfilling effect by means o f its cognitive representation, n o t ony in the experimental situation.
The results obtained with the m ore explorative and less stringent m ethods o f a pilot study show that, on the whole, the exemplary assum ptions introduced by the model are no t falsified and do deserve further investigation.
M ethodological shortcomings became evident, especially the insufficient specification o f a tem poral reference point for the question (especially under „m uch” SD).
Since the definition o f „little/п о ” SD also lacked specificity, it was left to the subjects to choose between a harmless, social norm-fulfilling form of N SD with a less intim ate conversation p artner or N SD in the restricted sense with a m ore fam iliar person. Results do speak m ore in favor o f the occurrence o f the latter: The fam iliarity o f the conversation p artner was rated the same as with „m uch” SD and higher than with „norm al” SD.
It should be noted, th at the present investigation provided a relatively conservative, impeded m odel test, the type o f which we could call cor relational: Incongruities o f self-structure together with characteristics o f the regulative process (e.g. familiarity with the addressee) might provide a sufficient b u t n o t necessary and exclusive condition for SD /N SD and its changes, and did n o t preclude other influencing factors. Thus the variation o f incongruities and regulative characteristics correspondent to the variation o f SD /N SD m ight have to override potential other determ inants of SD /N SD , and did so in agreement with the m odel-assum ptions.
A m ore implicative m odel test requires the reverse procedure, namely experimental conditions in which the incongruities have to be m anipulated and SD /N SD together with other com ponents o f the regulative process are dependent variables.
As an example for this sort o f procedure ano ther pilot study (see O phoff 1989) should be m entioned here a t least in terms o f its m ain features and results.
This study posed the following general question: do the regulative mechanisms pertaining to the self-system (with their em otional, cognitive, and behavioral com ponents) differ, depending on which com bination o f poles (ego-concept/ego-percept vs. ego-concept/alter-percept) is affected by incongruence and how pronouced (more vs. less) this incongruence is? A nd m ore specifically: U nder the given conditions (independent variables) do the pro portio n o f shame and shame-like em otions in particular, the absolute degree o f SD and N SD decisions and their relation to each other, does finally SD /N SD behavior (dependent variables) differ?
A quasi-experim ental, field-related procedure was chosen with a 2 x 2 factorial design: Follow ing a given example, the subjects h ad to describe four personally experienced situations in which incongruences whithin the self- -system occurred between the poles mentioned above and in the two intensities. (O f course, the instructions were n o t form ulated in terms o f the model). The descriptions were content analysed (ratings) and supplem ented by systematic questions (5-step ratings).
Two random ized samples o f 17 and 23 psychology students, male and female, were included. Each group w orked a t one o f the two qualities o f incongruence, with perm uted intensity o f incongruity. In accordance with the basic model, a num ber o f hypotheses were tested which can only be summ arized here:
1. U nder the influence o f m ore intensive incongruity (m.i.i. vs. 1. (ess) i.i.) the postulated partial functions o f the regulative process are activated m ore strongly: m ore intensive emotions, especially shame and related feelings; m ore cognitive processing, especially m ore SD-decisions, which are considered m ore essential; m ore SD -behavior or a t least a m ore unequal distribution o f N SD vs. SD; the latter being m ore likely when faced with a person closer to oneself.
2. Concerning ego-concept vs. alter-percept-incongruity (e-a-i), as com pared to ego-con-cept vs. ego-percept-incongruity (e-e-i), the following is predicted: Increased occurrence o f alter-di-rected em otions (i.e. anger instead o f shame), responsibility and causes attributed rather to others than to oneself; a relative redistribution o f decisive reasons favoring SD instead o f N SD, (because, as a result o f alter participating in the incongruence publicity already prevails and perfect N SD is no longer possible); accordingly, SD, in proportion, is found m ore often in behavior than N SD . SD will have m ore o f an offensive function directed outw ards tow ards persons less close on one han d and greater in num ber on the other. The reason for the latter is: A lready one alter m ay be sufficient to com pensate for an e-e-i. A t least one additional addressee is required for revalidation o f the ego-concept, where alter is the reasons for the incongruence and is only held in balance by a first addressee.
The results largely verify the hypotheses. In some aspects, they are prolific in generating hypotheses for later investigation and p o in t out m ethodological precautions to be taken in the future.
The regulation process subsequent to the inferred qualities and intensities o f incongruence was divided into the following subareas:
1. Em otions:
1.1. In the abundance o f accom panying and resulting em otions (8 out o f 12 alternatives and a rest-category were m arked), as was expected, shame, embarrassment, painfulness were predom in-ant; b ut to about the same degree anger, annoyance, aggressiveness as well. Significant treatm ent differences, however, could n o t be identified.
1.2. An unexpected, b u t nonetheless heuristically interesting result was the following detail: There was one exception to the trivial finding th at all em otions were rated to be m ore intensive during the original situation th an a t the tim e o f their inquiry: „E m b arrassm en t” was rated m ore frequently and higher in rank under e -a -i with regard to the time o f survey. U nder the supplem entary assum ption th at it is a kind o f SD when „confessing” an incongruence to the researcher during the inquiry, the explanation becomes obvious th a t this cu rren t e - a - i incongruence specifically potentiates the depicted one. A lthough an artefact o f the experimental technique this outcom e can be interpreted as conform ing with the m odel in a very specific way.
2. Cognitive Processing:
2.1. According to the outcom e expected, m ore coping thoughts arose under m.i.i. than under l.i.i..
2.2. As expected, pure cognitive coping obviously is n o t sufficient under m.i.i. SD decisions become necessary, and - such are the findings - far m ore SD-decisional thougts occur than under l.i.i. (in the case o f intensive affect sometimes they seem to be „skipped over” : for example statements such as „I couldn’t th in k .” , „I h ad to talk ab o u t it.”).
2.3. O f the coping thoughts, self-justifications and accusations predom i nated under all treatm ents. U nder the qualitative condition th at an alter was involved in the incongruity (a-a-i), coping directed at the alter in the form of an accusation occurred about twice as often as under the ego-internal incongruity (e-e-i).
2.4. The quality o f the incongruity also determines the direction o f the SD-decisional thoughts: W ith e-e-i the num ber o f thoughts against SD predom inate; with e-a-i an approxim ate equal distribution prevails. This conform s to the plausible expectation that, if possible, the attem pt will be m ade to regulate ego-internal incongruences m ore economically w ithout SD
(which is full o f risks). If however an alter plays a p a rt in the incongruence, then it has already become „public” , and the consideration o f ego-internal coping therefore becomes m ore unlikely.
3. Behavior:
3.1. C orresponding with 2.4, N SD was predom inant under e-e-i, while SD predom inated under e-a-i (mainly in the case o f l.i.i., however). I f the incongruence is particularly distinct (m.i.i.), the tendency to turn tow ard SD as a means o f regulation is altogether stronger (and this is m ore persistent under e-a-i).
3.2. U nder m.i.i. SD tended to be directed a t addresses th at were closer. This also corresponds with the principles o f economizing (more com m on presuppositions) and risk prevention (bene-volence and intim acy are m ore likely).
3.3. W ith e-a-i the num ber o f SD-addresses was alm ost double th at under e-e-i. This n o t only falls in line with economizing and risk prevention. Even m ore specifically, it evokes the question w hether or n o t different functions o f SD take effect here: U nder m.i.i. and e-e-i, its m ain function seems to be an exchange with a confidant, under e-a-i, it m ay prim arily serve social-influence and validation (see hypothesis 2).
3.4. U nder m.i.i. m ore socially relevant characteristics are reported as contents o f incongruity, under l.i.i. m ore achievement-oriented attributes. This needs further exam ination and explanation.
M E T H O D CH ECK
1. The inter-rater-objectivity regarding the categories o f content analysis (ratings) was
ab out 80%; regarding the form alized inquiry it was nearly perfect. 2. The subjective certainty o f the ratings on a five-point scale was rated on the average as
alm ost „fairly certain” (3.7 o f m axinun 5).
3. It can be regarded as a treatm ent check th at the intim acy o f the experiences described
was judged to be greater under m.i.i. than under l.i.i.; likewise th at in the descriptions
o f m.i.i. stronger quantifyers emerged (i.e. „I am very am bitious.” ): Very distinctive
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Hans-W. Ophoff
REGULACYJNE FUNKCJE SAMOUJAWNIANIA W KONTEKŚCIE ZACHOWANIA SPÓJNOŚCI OBRAZU SIEBIE
Regulacyjna funkcja sam oujawniania w kontekście spójności obrazu siebie jest podstawowym problem em tego artykułu. Z ałożono, iż różnica pomiędzy norm anlym i odbiegającym od norm y poziom em sam oujaw niania wpływa n a postrzeganie spójności obrazu siebie przez jednostki. W eryfikacji p oddano dwie grupy hipotez. R ezultaty b ad ań w znacznym stopniu potwierdziły hipotezy. Ponadto umożliwiły postawienie nowych problemów badawczych i wykazały poprawność metodoligiczną podejm owanych badań.
