"The person" in the Holy Trinity

Czesław Bartnik, Norbert Karava

"The person" in the Holy Trinity

Collectanea Theologica 53/Fasciculus specialis, 17-30

C ollectan ea T h eologica 53 (1983) fasc. sp ecialis

CZESŁAW BARTNIK, LUBLIN

„THE PERSON” IN THE HOLY TRINITY

In th e h isto ry of th o u g h t, term s an d co n cep ts h a v e th e ir ow n p ro p e r h isto ries. T h eo lo g ical term s an d co n cep ts a re no e x cep tio n to this ru le and of g re a t im p o rta n c e is th e fact th a t th e ir m eanin gs u n d e rg o change. It is for th is re a so n th a t a th eo lo g ical d o c trin e on th e H oly T rin ity is n o t v iab le w ith o u t m o d ern izin g th e te rm and con cep t „person ". T he d e v e lo p m en t an d e x p a n sio n of th is co ncep t lead s to th e fu rth e r p ro g re ss of trin ito lo g y .

The Stages of D evelopm ent of a T h eology of the Person

In re a c h in g to w a rd s a th e o lo g y of th e p erso n , C h ristian th o u g h t has p a sse d th ro u g h five sta g e s of d ev elo p m en t. W e p ro p o se to co n sid er th e s e sta g e s in a p e rsp e c tiv e of th e sem an tic sources of th e id ea of th e p e rso n fu n ctio n in g in th e v a rio u s epochs of th e h isto ry of trin ito lo g y .

a) T h e first so u rc e w as to be found in classical ph ilo so p h y flo w erin g in th e c u ltu ra l h e rita g e of G reece an d Rome. T his p h i­ lo so p h y u n d e rsto o d th e p e rs o n as a so rt of scen ic ro le (cf. th e c lassical d ra m a tu rg ic a l m ask) an d la te r, for th e m ost p a rt u n d e r th e in flu en ce of C h ristian ity , as a ra tio n a l in d iv id u u m d istin g u ish ed from th e m o re g e n e ra l c a te g o ry of th e sp ecies anim al rationale. It w as in th is sp irit th a t B oethius d efin ed th e p e rso n as an in d iv id u al s u b sta n c e of th e ra tio n a l n a tu re (rationalis n atu ra e in d iv id u a su b ­ stantia).

b) T he g re a t trin ito lo g ic a l d isp u tes of th e e a rly C h u rc h w ere to becom e one of th e m ost im p o rta n t sem asio log ical so u rc e s of th e co n cep t „perso n ". In th e s e d isp u tes th e p e rso n fu n ctio n ed as a m eans of in d iv idualizin g and in sta n tia tin g th e a b s tra c t and g e n e ­ ra l c a te g o ry „ra tio n a l n a tu re ". Thus, em p h asis w as p lac e d on a „th reefold in d iv id u alizatio n " in God. T h e asp ec t of th e p e rso n 's d istin ctn e ss w as em p h asized e v e n b y St. T hom as A q u in as, w ho defined th e p e rs o n as aliquod d istin ctu m su b sisten s in natura in te lle c tu a li1. T h e P e rso n s of th e H o ly T rin ity w e re a b o v e all p e rso n ific atio n s of th e o n e a n d th e sam e in te llig en t Being.

c) P a tristic ch risto lo g y w as a no less im p o rta n t so u rc e of th e

1 Com. Jn I Sent. d. 23, q. I, a. 3; De Potentia 9,4. 2 C o lle cta n e a T h eo lo g ica

co ncep t „perso n". H ere, th e con cep t „p erso n " a ro se m ain ly out of a te n d e n c y to „rescue" th e u n ity of C h rist as God and m an. H y p o sta sis ab o ve all m ean t th e u n ity of a com m on m y stical and d iv in e su b je c t of tw o se p e ra te n a tu re s an d th e ir re sp e c tiv e ope­ ra tio n s (su b sisten tia , supp o situ m ). Y et th e ch risto lo g ic a l co n cep t of th e p e rso n w as at odds w ith th e trin ito lo g ic a l co ncept, at lea st in a c e rta in sense. For ch risto lo g y , th e p e rso n w as th e su b je c t w hich u n ite d n a tu re s; h e n c e it w as th e k e y p rin cip le of u n ity (unitas in pluritate). For trin ito lo g y th e o p p o site w as tru e ; th e p e rso n w as a m eans of ach iev in g a p lu ra lity of su je c ts (not substances!) in one re a lity (p lu iita s in u n ita te ).

d) In m o d ern th o u g h t d atin g from D escartes, th e p e rso n ceased to fu n ctio n as a scen ic ro le o r an o n to lo g ical c a te g o ry and w as red u c e d to co n scio u sn ess, to an ,,Ι-su b ejct" and in tim e to a c e n te r of a c tiv ity (co n scien tia sui, ego, c en tru m actionis). This open ed th e w a y to a p sy ch o log ical, m o ralistic and a c tiv ity -o rie n te d u n d e rsta n d in g of th e p erson.

e) In th e c o n te m p o ra ry h um an istic disciplines (psychology, ped ag o g y , m o rality , a n th ro p o lo g y , sociology, etc.) th e u n d e rsta n d in g of th e p e rso n is v e ry v a rie d , a lth o u g h it p lay s th e ro le of an a n th ro ­ p olog ical fu n ctio n of one so rt or an o th er. C o n c re te ly , th e te rm „person " im plies m an y th in g s: a c e rta in g ro u p of p sy ch ic c h a ra c te ­ ristics, c h a ra c te r, p sy ch ic stru c tu re , th e w o rld of th e su b ject, th e self, specified m odels of b e h a v io u r or a c tiv ity , th e p sy ch ic e x p re ss­ ion of th e gro u p , etc. T h ese u n d e rsta n d in g s of th e p e rso n s h a rp ly d iv erg e from th e p h ilo so p h ical-th eo lo g ical tra d itio n and w ith o u t tak in g c e rta in c o rre c tiv e m easu res, th e ir a ttitu d e to w a rd s co ntem ­ p o ra ry th e o lo g y can b e th e s o u rc e of m an y m isu n d erstan d in g s. Y et in sp ite of th is, th e c o n te m p o ra ry sciences a re d isc o v e rin g in th e p e rso n th e s tru c tu re of a c e rta in w h o le and a re now less ap t to lock a w ay th e e v e r ex p a n d in g rich n ess of p e rso n h o o d in th e ir re sp e c tiv e n a rro w c o rrid o rs of th o u g h t, m eth od and su b je c t-m atter.

Towards a N ew T h eology of „the Person"

W h ile stu d y in g th e h isto ry of th o u g h t ab o u t th e p e rs o n w e n o te s e v e ra l rev o lu tio n s. T he first rev o lu tio n , sem an tic in n a tu re , o c c u r­ red a t th e d aw n of C h ristian ity , w h en th e p a g a n „scenic ro le " w as rep la ce d b y a co n cep t of th e m y ste ry of bein g , a d iv in e m ission and a p a rtic u la r and u n iq u e u n io n of m an w ith God. T he n e x t r e ­ v o lu tio n o c c u rre d in th e e a rly M iddle A ges, w h en m an cam e to be u n d e rsto o d as a su b je c t full of m y ste ry , th e m ost nob le e a rth ly b ein g ex istin g in itself an d for itself, w h o se p e rso n h o o d w as in com m unicable and w h o se bein g w as „au to -teleo lo g icał", i.e. in th e re a l sen se of th e w o rd com pos sui. Y et a n o th e r re v o lu tio n of

„ T H E P E R S O N " IN T H E H O L Y TR IN IT Y ₁₉

h um an th o u g h t ab o u t th e p e rso n to o k p lac e re a c h in g in to m o d ern tim es; in ste a d of a su b je c t-su b sta n c e , th e p e rso n b e g an to b e u n d e r­ sto o d as a c e n te r of co n scio u sn ess, a p sy ch e, a w o rld of th e su b ­ jec tiv e . T oday, th e fo u rth re v o lu tio n h a s b eg u n , a re v o lu tio n w hich I h o p e w ill b e a s o rt of sy n th e sis, a sy n th e sis of th e p e rs o n as a scen ic ro le d e te rm in e d b y h isto ry on th e o ne h a n d and on th e o th er, as a v e sse l of g race; as a ra tio n a l su b sta n c e — o b jec tiv e b ein g an d a b ein g of th e w o rld of th e su b je c tiv e ; as a w o rld of th e in te lle c t an d as a w o rld of th e w ill an d em otions. T hus, in h isto ry w e se e a c e rta in te n d e n c y a w a y from le ita s and th e o b jec tiv e to ­ w a rd s a m o re in te rio r a n d sp iritu a l dim ension. T he tid e of th o u g h t h as ebb ed a w a y from th e sh o re s of p e rso n ific atio n to th e d ep th s of p erso n h o o d .

P re se n tly , th e con cep t of th e p e rso n is becom ing th e m ain p ro b lem of h u m an th o u g h t in g en eral. T he p e rso n is com m only c o n sid e red to be a su b sisten c e of th e h ig h est ord er. T h e p e rso n is a se lf-su b sisten t b ein g w h ich in a c e rta in se n se im plies freedom and c re a tiv ity . „P erso n al" e x iste n ce is u n iq u e b e c a u se it arises o n ly w h en th e u ltim a te d e g re e of th e „su b je c tific a tio n ” of bein g is ach iev ed ; th u s, it p o sesses in itse lf th e d e e p est im m anence w h ich allow s it to tra n s c e n d th e w o rld. T h e p e rso n is u n d e rsto o d as a b ein g of th e m o st in tim a te u n ity b o th in h e reflex iv e an d a ctiv e se n se of th e w o rd , i.e. b o th as b e in g a u n ity as w ell as unifying. T h e bein g of th e p e rso n is c h a ra c te riz e d b y a c e rta in w h o len ess and in d iv isib ility ; its c o n ta in s w ith in itself in alie n a b le rig h ts and u n re p e a ta b le con ten ts; th e p e rso n 's e x iste n c e is in a p e rp e tu a l s ta te of d ev elo p m en t, e sp ec ially w ith re sp e c t to th e in te rio r dim ension; th e p e rs o n does n o t te n d to iso la te itself from th e re s t of re a lity b ut on th e c o n tra ry , in a c e rta in se n se in th e v e ry c e n te r of rea lity , for alon g w ith its in n erm o st p ro p e rty of d istin ctn ess, it seem s to re tu r n to a p o in t of u n io n w ith all o th e r beings, esp ec ially in te lli­ gent beings. S p eaking in term s of a sy n th e sis, th e p e rso n is th e h ig h est form of th e rea liz a tio n an d a u to -re a liz a tio n of b ein g to ­ w a rd s „som eon en ess", i.e. to w a rd s p e rs o n a l id e n tity (e n s p e rso ­ nale). T his is m ost p ro p e rly an d p rim a rily tru e of th e D ivin e Being and s e c o n d a rily an d a n a lo g ica lly tru e of h u m an being.

In God, th e p e rs o n h as a full, p ro p e r an d a b so lu te m eanin g , w hile in m a n p e rso n h o o d o b tain s o n ly a p a rtia l, an alo g o u s an d su b o rd in a te m ean ing . T h e h u m an p e rs o n is a u n iq u e „w ho" e n jo y ­ ing an in d e p e n d e n t su b sisten c e in th e fo rm al and s u b sta n tiv e se n se of th e w ord. T his „w ho" is sp iritu a l-m ate ria l, in te llig en t and free, in itia lly rea liz e d an d y e t in th e p ro ce ss of re a liz a tio n b o th w ith in itself as w ell as in so c ie ty w ith o th ers; it e x p re sse s itself in a life of th e in te rio r as w ell as in e x te rio rly -o rie n te d a c tiv itie s an d p o ­ ten tia litie s. F in ally , th e h u m an finds its fulfillm ent a n d fin a lity w ith th e u n c re a te d P erson . In a w o rd , th e p e rs o n is b o th m an a s rea liz e d

or accom p lished a n d m an in th e p ro ce ss of re a liz a tio n to w a rd s p e rso n a l id e n tity , to w a rd s th e fo rm atio n of a c e rta in „w ho".

In c o n n e ctio n w ith th e la te s t sem an tic re v o lu tio n going on a b o u t th e te rm „ p erso n " th e re a re c e rta in th eo lo g ia n s w h o h a v e so u g h t to d e a c tiv a te a n d /o r re p la c e th e te rm „perso n " in th e o ­ logical c o m m e n ta ry on th e m y ste ry of th e H o ly T rin ity : K. B arth 2, C. H. D odd3, K. R a h n e r4 a n d o th ers. K. B arth, a C a lv in ist th e o lo ­ gian, av o id s th e te rm „ p erso n " an d sp e ak s o n ly of th re e „w ays" of th e D ivine B eing (S e in sw e ise ): th e w a y of th e F a th er, th e w ay of th e Son a n d th e w a y of th e Spirit. T he F a th e r p ro n o u n ce s th e W o rd , th e Son c o n stitu te s th e W o rd as p ro n o u n c e d a n d th e H oly S p irit is th e m ean in g of th e W ord. C. H. Dodd, a n A n glican , w ould re p la c e th e te rm „p erso n " w ith bib lical te rm „nam e". K. R ahner, a C atho lic th eo lo g ia n , is of th e opinion th a t th e u n iv e rs a l C h u rc h — n o t som e in d iv id u al th e o lo g ia n — co uld re sig n from th e u se of th e te rm „p erso n " and ad o p t o th ers; th e s e term s w o u ld co n n o te v a ­ rio u s m odes of a u to co m m u n icatio n an d su b sisten c e in th e D ivine Being.

M an y o th e r C ath o lic th eo lo g ia n s5 a re co n v in c e d th a t th is te rm is irre p la c e a b le an d th a t a ttem p ts to d isc a rd it a re to b e reje cte d . It seem s, h o w e v e r, th a t it is p o ssib le to re c o n c ile th e s e opinions. T hose w ho a d v o c a te a c h an g e in term in o lo g y c o rre c tly p e rc e iv e an d rig h tly d ra w a tte n tio n to th e n ew lig h t fallin g on our u n d e r­ sta n d in g of p e rso n h o o d as a re s u lt of th e c o n te m p o ra ry sem antic re v o lu tio n ta k in g p lac e a ro u n d th is term . H o w ev er, th e y a re u n a b le to find a b e tte r term . T h o se w ho a re a g a in st th is c h a n g e se n se th e g re a t v a lu e of th e te rm „perso n " b u t a re n o t ab le to a p p re c ia te th e d e p th of th e re v o lu tio n w h ich p o stu la te s a n ew th e o lo g y of th e p erso n . It is for th is re a s o n th a t I am of th e o p in io n th a t th e te rm itself sh o u ld b e m ain ta in e d w ith, h o w e v e r, a c e rta in r e v a ­ lu a tio n of som e of its m ean in g s, a p ro ce ss w h ich in its ow n rig h t w ou ld c o n trib u te to th e fu rth e r d e v elo p m en t of trin ito lo g y .

2 Dogmatik, I, 1, ed. 5, Zürich 1947. 3 The G ospel of John, London 1955.

4 M y s teriu m salutis, II, E insiedeln 1967, p. 317 if.

5 Cf. С. B o y e r , L’Im mage d e la Trinité, s y n t h è s e de la pe n sé e augn&tinjen-

ne, Gregorianum 27(1946) pp. 173— 199, 333—352; B. L o n e r g a n , De Deo Trino,

ed. 2, Romae 1964; O. G o n z a l e z , Mister io trinitario y exis te ncia humana, Madrid 1965; J. D a n i é l o u , La Trinité et le m y s t è r e de l'existence, Bruges 1968; B, d e M a r g e r i e , La Trinité chrétienne dans l'histoire, Paris 1975, i d e m ,

Réflexions sur la Trinité „é conomique et immanente", Esprit et V ie 90(1980) pp.

177— 184, 209— 218; L. B. P o r t e r , On K e e p in g "persons" in the Trinity. A Lin­

guistic A p p ro a ch to Trinitarian Thought, T heological Studies 41(1980) pp. 530-—

„T H E P E R S O N ” IN T H E H O L Y T R IN IT Y ₂₁

Towards the Fullness of the Person

T h e c o n te m p o ra ry u n d e rsta n d in g of th e p e rs o n as a plerom a of „w ho ness' d raw s m uch of its in sp ira tio n an d m a te ria l from th e c o n te m p o ra ry sc ie n c es an d d e p a rts from th e classical p sy ch o lo g i­ cal-p h iloso p h ical tra d itio n . W e re c a ll th a t St. Basil th e G reat, St. G re g o ry N azian zen u s, St. J o h n D am ascen e an d e sp e c ia lly SS. A u g u ­ stin e and T hom as A q u in as c re a te d a specific p sy c h o lo g ic al trin ito ­ lo g y w h o se m ain e lem en ts w e re co n cep ts su c h as: soul, p sy ch e , in te lle c t, w ill, m em ory. Each of th e P e rso n s of th e T rin ity w as a sso c ia te d w ith one of th e s e elem en ts, e.g. th e F a th e r — m em ory, m ind, in te lle c t; th e Son — w o rd , th o u g h t, tru th ; th e H o ly Spirit — w ill, love, freedom . T his p sy ch o lo g ism w h ich m ig h tily n a rro w e d th e co n cep t of th e p e rso n b ecam e esp ec ially a p p a re n t in th e th e o ­ logical d o c trin e of th e p ro ce ssio n s of th e D ivine P e rso n s in God; th e P e rso n of th e Son w as co n ceiv ed in th e w om b of th e P a te rn a l in te lle c t an d th e H o ly Sp irit w as sp ira te d in th e a c tiv ity of th e di­ v ine w ill6.

A g a in st th is so rt of trin ito lo g y it is n e c e s s a ry to p o sit th re e basic o b jectio n s:

a) In th is m o del th e F a th er, Son an d th e H o ly Spirit a re not full p e rso n s in th e c o n te m p o ra ry u n d e rsta n d in g of th e w ord. T h ey a re o n ly a b s tra c t re la tio n s of d iv in ity , viz. p erso n a e dram atis d i­ vin itatis.

b) E ach of th e D ivine P erso n s is p re s e n te d in term s of a c e rta in th e o lo g ic a l red u ctio n ; th e F a th e r is on ly m em ory, so ul or being; th e Son is o n ly th o u g h t, th e H o ly S p irit is id en tified on ly w ith th e will. F rom th is p o in t of v ie w one of th e P e rso n s c a n n o t p o ssess th e rem ain in g fe a tu re s of p e rso n h o o d specifically found in th e o th er tw o P erso n s. T hus, th e F a th e r as F a th e r w o u ld b e d e p riv e d of tru th and love, th e Son as Son could n o t e n jo y th e facu lties of love and th e p rin c ip le of b e in g ond th e H o ly Sp irit as H o ly S pirit w ould be w ith o u t b ein g a n d in tellect. In th e long ru n , o n ly th e su m -to tal of th e th re e P e rso n s w o u ld y ield a D ivine P e rso n in th e fullness of its re a lity . T h e p rin c ip le of a p p ro p ra tio n u n fo rtu n a te ly do es not ex p la in m u ch ab o u t th e T rin ity lo o k in g ad intra.

c) T h e co n cep t h e re criticized is b a sed up o n an in a d e q u a te a n c ie n t a n th ro p o lo g y w h ic h p a sse s o v e r a v e ry im p o rta n t elem en t of p e rso n h o o d : e x iste n c e — a c tiv ity — h u m an acts. In tru th , this a n th ro p o lo g y do es n o t ta k e into a c c o u n t th e e x te rio r a n d in te rio r se lf-re a liza tio n of th e p erso n .

6 Cf. E. B a i l l e u x , Personnalism e de saint Thomas en théologie trinitaire, R evue Thom iste 61(1961) pp. 25— 42; G. F о 1 с h, Personalid ade Psicologica e Mi-

sterio Trinilario, Liturgia e V ida 20(1973) pp. 2— 28; Y. С ο n g a r, Je crois en l'Esprit Saint, Paris 1980.

In a c co rd a n ce w ith c o n te m p o ra ry an th ro p o lo g y e a ch P erso n of th e H o ly T rin ity — F a th er, Son an d H o ly S pirit — m ust in d i­ v id u a lly p o ssess being, e x isten ce, in te lle c t an d w ill, all in th e sam e m ea n in g a n d all e x p re ssin g th em se lv e s in a c tiv ity . W e w ou ld find no p e rso n h o o d in th e T rin ity at all if bein g , in tellect, w ill and self- -re a liz atio n co u ld n o t b e e q u a lly p re d ic a te d of all th re e p e rso n a l su b jects. K. R a h n e r c o n ten d s th a t in th e T rin ity th e re is bu t one m ind, o n e co n scio u sn ess, o n e w ill, o ne freed om and one c e n te r of a c tiv ity b e c au se th e s e elem en ts c o n stitu te th e n a tu re of God w h ich is one an d th e sam e. A c co rd in g to th is d o c trin e h o w ev er, th e th re e P erso n s a rise th a n k s to th e d iv in e n a tu re (n atura g e n e ­ rans personas) a n d a re th e p e rso n a l su b e jc ts of th e d iv in e n a tu re . In m y op in io n h o w ev er, su ch a co n cep t of th e D ivine P e rso n w ould im ply an em p ty h y p o sta sis an d in v ie w of su ch an e v e n tu a lity w e w o uld b e faced n o t o n ly w ith th e o p tio n of elim in atin g th e term ,,p e rso n " from trin ito lo g y b u t w ith th e v e ry n e c e ssity of doing so. T h e elem en ts b elo n g in g p ro p e rly to p e rso n h o o d w o uld sim ply be p re d ic a te d of th e d iv in e n a tu re an d n o t of th e D ivine P erso ns. D ivine P e rso n h o o d w ould d ep e n d so lely u p o n p a rtic ip a tio n in th e d iv in e n a tu re , i.e. a s h a rin g in th e d iv in e e sse n c e and w ou ld im ply a n „em pty" su b je c t (in c o n tra s t to a „p erso n al" sub ject), d e p riv e d of a re a l th re e -fo ld ego. M ost im p o rtan tly , th e D ivine P e rso n w o uld be som eth ing se c o n d a ry w ith resp e c t to an an ony m o us, u n p e rso n a l being. Y et on th e c o n tra ry , it seem s th a t th e D ivine P e rso n is m o re „prim itive" th a n its n a tu re and th a t it c a n n o t b e se p e ra te d from its ow n ex isten ce, in te lle c t an d in d iv id u al c e n te r (an in d iv id u al c e n te r w h ich is n e v e rth e le ss a sh a re d center) of activ ity .

If e a c h of th e P erso n s of th e H o ly T rin ity is to b e a g e n u in e p e rso n , it m u st e x p re ss itself in all th e elem en ts p ro p e r to p erso n s: su b sisten ce, m ind, w ill an d activ ity . W h ile on th e o ne h a n d e ach of th e D ivine P erso n s is id en tic a l w ith th e d iv in e essence, w e sh o u ld sp e a k of e a ch of th em as su b sisting , loving, and acting. T he re d u c tio n of th e p e rso n to u n d e rsta n d in g -in te lle c t w as possible o n ly for G re e k a n th ro p o lo g y and it w as in th is tra d itio n th a t B oethius d e c la re d th a t th e p e rso n is a „ ra tio n a l su b stan ce". E x isten ­ ce, w ill, freedo m an d a c tiv ity w e re sim ply p a sse d by.

E arlier, w e to u c h e d on th e p ro b lem of th e p rio rity of n a tu re for p e rso n h o o d in God; is th e d iv in e n a tu re a n te c e n d e n t o r th e D ivine Person? It seem s th a t acco rd in g to G reek tra d itio n , n a tu re w as co n ceiv ed to be a n te c e d e n t an d m o re o v e r th a t th is w as o ne of th e conclusions follow ing from m o no th eism 7. It w as on ly a fte r­ w a rd s th a t w e n o te a tte m p ts to „ju stify " a th ree-fo ld p lu ality of p e rso n s, for th e m ost p a rt as an an sw er to th e a c c u sa tio n of p o ly ­ theism . It w as in th is sp irit th a t G re g o ry of N y ssa and H ila ry of

,ΤΗ Ε P E R S O N " IN TH E H O L Y T R IN IT Y ₂₃

P o itiers e x p re ssly ta u g h t th a t th e d iv in e n a tu re e n jo y e d p rim acy before th e D ivine P erso n s, a n d th a t th e d iv in e n a tu re „b e g ets” and sp ira te s th e P ersons. Of late, th e p rim a cy of u n ity in God w as em ph asized in th e th o u g h t of T e ilh a rd de C h ard in ; for him u n ity w as th e p rin c ip le c h a ra c te ristic of d iv in ity b e c au se in God w e m eet w ith an e te rn a l p ro ce ss of d e v e lo p m en t from th ree-fo ld n ess to w a rd s u n ity 8. It w as v e ry o ften th e c a se th a t in o rd e r to e v a d e a ccu satio n s of trith e ism th eo lo g ia n s em phasized u n ity in God b y a c ce n tin g the p rim a cy of n a tu re .

It seem s, h o w ev er, th a t in th e sp irit of p e rso n a lism w e can re v e rs e th is o rd e r of th in g s; th e p e rso n an d th e s tru c tu re of person - hood a re p rim a ry an d n a tu re as a p rin c ip le of b ein g an d a c tiv ity is se co n d a ry . T he v e ry e x p re ssio n „the p e rso n a l G od” is m islead in g insofar as it e x c essiv ely su g g ests an d em phasizes n a tu re . God is not so m u ch a „p erso n al n a tu re " as m u ch as th e „P ersons of G od”. It w ould be b e tte r to sa y „God in th e form of P erso n s" or „the tri­ p e rso n a l God". T he w o rd „God" in com m on lan g u a g e is im p ro p e rly asso c ia te d w ith n a tu re or bein g as o ccu p y in g a p o sitio n of p rim acy to th e d e trim e n t of p erso n h o o d . T h e re a lity of God is in re v e rse ; „God" m ean s m o st of all „P erso n s": F a th er, Son and H o ly Spirit, ta k e n in d iv id u ally or as a T rin ity . T h e D ivine P erso n s th em selv es v in d ic a te th e u n ity of d iv in ity and th e d iv in e n a tu re b e c a u se no re a l differen ce arises b e tw e en th em an d th e d iv in e n a tu re . T he p e r­ son is p rim a ry ; its essen ce, n a tu re an d bein g a re so m eth in g se co n d a ­ ry. If th u s w e a re to sp e a k of an e te rn a l p ro cess in God, th is w ill be a p ro cess from P e rso n to w a rd s P e rso n th ro u g h n a tu re . H ere, w e find no p rim a cy of num b er, u n ity or triu n e n e ss b e c au se w ith r e ­ sp ect to God th e s e c a te g o rie s a re em pty. T he o rd er of th e m y ste ry itself e n jo y s p rim a cy an d th is m y ste ry co n tain s th e m y ste ry of th e D ivine P e rso n q u a perso n .

T h e fo u n d atio n of p e rso n h o o d is to b e found in th e p o ten tia l an d ach iev ed fact of an in finite re a liz a tio n and p e rfe c tio n of being an d o n ly s e c o n d a rily in th e a b ility of „raisin g u p ” a n o th e r p e rso n or „self-d isco v ery " in o th er p erso n s. In th e H o ly T rin ity th is p ro cess of P e rso n to P e rso n goes on v ia n a tu re -e sse n ce . In th e F a th e r as a P rincipium sin e p rincip io is fou n d th e first re a liz a tio n of e ssen ce am ong th e D ivine P erso ns. T h e P e rso n of th e Son is b e g o tte n and th us, H e p o ssesses th e d iv in e esse n c e a s b eg o tten ; His P e rso n is „ p a te rn o tro p ic ", i.e. of its in te rio r id e n tity ten d in g to w a rd s the F ath er. T he P erso n of th e H oly S pirit p o ssesses th e sam e d iv in e esse n c e a s sp ira te d by th e P erso n s of th e F a th e r and th e Son. T h e b e g o tte n P erso n is a co nd itio n of th e F a th e r's s ta tu s as a Di­ v in e P e rso n an d th e sp ira te d P e rso n as a m u tu a l term in u s fulfills th e p e rso n a l an d ontic co m m u n ity in d iv in ity . A s a resu lt, none

of th e P erso n s of th e T rin ity w ou ld b e ab le to be itself w ith ou t th e rem ain in g tw o and w ith o u t th e id e n tity of n atu re.

The Basic A ntinom y of the Person

In C h ristia n th e o lo g y w e o b se rv e a c e rta in a n tin o m y re p e a te d ly m ak in g its a p p e a ra n c e in th e co n cep t of th e p e rso n : solitas — com m unita s, singularitas — u n iversa lita s, unicita s — pluralitas. C lassical th o u g h t w as fond of co n ceiv in g re a lity in term s of u n i­ v e r s a l — hen ce, it w as p ro n e to v ie w th e h u m an rac e , so ciety and th e n a tu re of G od as so m eth in g u n iv e rsa l, n e c e s s a ry and „ re ­ p e a tin g " (a c irc u la r, n o t lin e a r p a th of evo lu tion ). T h e h um an p e rs o n w as v iew e d as b ein g in a c e rta in o p p o sitio n to w a rd s th is g e n e ra lity .

T he c h a ra c te ristic s u sed to d e scrib e th e p e rso n in classical th o u g h t b e tra y this te n d e n c y : in d ivid u a , singula, sola, unica, in ­ com m unicabilis, irrepetibilis, etc. It is im p o rta n t to rem em b er th a t classical th o u g h t c o n sid e red th e se c h a ra c te ristic s to b e of a low er o rd e r of p e rfe c tio n th a n th e a b s tra c t u n iv ersa ls. O n th e o n e hand, C h ristia n ity p re s e rv e d th is so rt of th o u g h t an d y e t on th e o th er, it sim u lta n e o u sly p ro m o ted th e re v a lo riz a tio n of th e in v id u a lity of th e h u m an ontos. C h ristia n d o c trin e h eld th a t th e h u m an soul, ind iv id u al, u n re p e a ta b le , d istin ct an d u n iq u e w as en do w ed w ith th e h ig h est of all c re a te d v alu es. T h ese id eas found a p lace in th e d o c trin e of th e H o ly T rin ity , w h e re in th e p e rs o n fu n ctio n ed as m e­ ta p h y sic a l c o u n te rp o in t to th e m elo d y of th e u n iv e rs a lity of th e com m on th e s a u ru s of d iv in e a ttrib u te s w h ich w e re u n d e rsto o d as belonging to th e d iv in e e sse n c e -n a tu re . A s a re s u lt of th is for m an y c e n tu rie s th e e sse n tia l c h a ra c te ristic of th e p e rso n w as conceived as its d istin ctn ess, in d iv id u ality an d „lonley" su b sisten ce. In a c c o r­ d a n c e w ith th is, th e o lo g y so u g h t to d e m o n stra te th e „ d istin c tn ess” of e a ch of th e P erso n s of th e H o ly T rin ity in o rd er to d istin g u ish th e D ivine P erso n s from th e d iv in e n a tu re . T h e tre a tm e n t of th e p e rso n as a s o rt of m ety p h isic al „sep e ra te n e ss" in s p ite of its co n­ v e n ie n c e in th e d og m atic tra c t on th e T rin ity p ro v e d to be cum ­ b erso m e for th eo lo g y in g e n e ra l; th e p e rso n u n d e rsto o d p rim a rily as an ind iv id u u m w as a t odds w ith th e „socialness" of being. In c o n seq u en ce, p e rso n a lism w o u ld ra p id ly h a v e d e c ay e d into a so rt of ind iv id u alism (cf. J. B. M etz). T hus, th e T rin ity w o uld h a v e had to be in te rp re te d as a tria d of in div id u als a d m itte d ly b ou nd b y one com m on n a tu re , y e t so bo u n d „a g ain st” th e in te rio r s tru c tu re of th e ir perso n h o o d .

Being h e irs to th e th e o rie s of W . S tern , E. M ou nier, P. T e ilh a rd de C h a rd in and o th ers, w e a re p re s e n tly w itn essin g a d e p a rtu re from th e p ra c tic e of asso c ia tin g th e p e rso n w ith d istin ctn ess, singu- larism an d so lita rity . T h e p e rs o n b y no m ean s exclu des su b sisten ce

„ T H E P E R S O N " IN T H E H O L Y TR IN IT Y ₂₅

in a com m on, so cial an d u n iv e rsa l fram ew o rk , re g a rd le ss of w h e th e r th is be a su b sisten c e as o n to s or a su b sisten c e as nous. T h e p e rso n n o t on ly does n o t elim in ate or ex clu d e „so cial1' su b ­ sisten ce, b u t assum es it, builds u p o n it, fulfills it an d b estow s up o n it a p e rso n a l nam e. T he s tru c tu re of th e p e rso n p o s tu ­ late s „the o th er", p e rso n an d o th e r beings. T he p e rso n itself is th e u n e x p e cte d so lu tio n to th e a n tin o m y „ u n ity — p lu ra lity ”. T h e s tru c tu re of th e p e rso n qualifies an d c h an g es being, from b ein g in th e se n se of „in itself" (substance) to b ein g „for": b e in g for self as a p e rso n , b e in g for som e one else as a p e rso n and b ein g for e v e ry o n e as a so c ie ty of p erso n s. T h an k s to th e a p p e a ra n c e of p e r­ sons, all re a lity c eases to be an on y m o u s an d its d ep th s a re endo w ed w ith, a n ew s tru c tu re w h ich o rie n ts r e a lity to w a rd s th e p erso n . T he p e rso n is n e v e r m e re ly an ele m en t of re a lity , a role, a function o r a n in stru m en t. It c o n stitu te s a n e w dim ension an d se n se of re a lity . T h e p e rso n is th e „salv atio n " of being. T h e p e rs o n as a p h e n o m e n o n arise s a t th e c ro ss-c u rre n ts of a w o n d e rfu l m e ta ­ p h y sic a l dialectic; th e p e rs o n ach iev es su b sisten ce w h e n b y v irtu e of its in te rio r in d iv isib lity and im m u n ity from d isso lu tio n into m o re g e n e ra l c a te g o rie s of re a lity it „con q u ers" th e v e ry e p ic e n te r of being; y e t on th e o th e r hand, th is v e ry sam e in d iv id u al su b sisten ce ta k e s p lac e th a n k s to its c h a ra c te ris tic of ex istin g in re la tio n to o th e r p e rso n s an d all re a lity . T hus, th e in d iv id u al p e rso n exists w h en it o pens its in te rio r u n to o th e r p erso n s. C o n v e rsely , h um an so c ie ty becom es a g en u in e so c ie ty w h en it se rv e s p erso n s, helpin g th em to becom e fu lly th em selv es.

T oday, th e A u g u stin ia n d o c trin e th a t th e P e rso n in th e H o ly T rin ity is a su b sta n tia l re la tio n is app lied in th eo lo g ic a l d isc o u rse in a so m ew h at d ifferen t m an n er. T o d a y w e add th a t th e p e rso n is n e v e r a d im inu itio n or e v e n less so a n eg atio n of a n o th e r p e rso n or e x tra -p e rso n a l rea lity . O n th e c o n tra ry , th e v e ry n u c le u s of th e p e rs o n ro ta te s on an axis of a p o sitiv e re la tio n to ­ w a rd s being: to w a rd s th e p e rso n , to w a rd s p e rso n s, to w a rd s th e so c ie ty of p e rso n s a n a to w a rd s re a lity as a w hole. T o d a y w e add th a t th e p e rs o n is th e c ro w n in g g lo ry an d ra iso n d 'ê tre of all being. If th e p e rso n „ a rra n g e s" a ll re a lity a n d o th er p e rso n s to w a rd s itself, it do es so n ot o u t of egoism o r ap o th eo sis b u t in acco rd an ce w ith th e c re a tiv e act of G od an d th e s tru c tu re of a c e rta in o n to ­ logical axiology. In all hum ility, th e p e rso n is th e u ltim a te co n cen ­ tra tio n an d p lero m ificatio n of b ein g an d th e c e n te r of th e com m u­ nio n of all things.

H ence, th e D ivine P erso n s of th e H oly T rin ity a re su b sta n tia l re la tio n s su b sistin g in an e te rn a l tan d e m „to w ard s" e a ch o th er. In th e sh a d o w of th e s e re la tio n s as it w e re w e o b se rv e th e „re­ latio n al" c h a ra c te r of th e c re a te d p e rso n w h ich is not so m uch an

im age of th e d iv in e n a tu re as m uch as an im age th e P e rso n in God. T h e P erso n of th e F a th e r is co m p letely for th e P e rso n of th e Son a n d th e Son, for th e F ather. T o g eth er, th e y a re for th e H o ly Spirit, w ho H im self is for th e F a th e r and th e Son. E ach P erso n c o n stitu tes an „1" in God and to g e th e r, th e y a re th e d iv in e „W e". T h e tr in ita ­ r ia n dialectic is th e epito m e of m y ste ry ; p e rso n h o o d to ta lly p asses o v e r into com m u n ity and com m unity, to ta lly into in d iv id u ality . The p rin c ip le of th is „passing o v e r" is found in o ne an d th e sam e n a ­ tu re , i.e. th e d iv in e essence.

Existence in the Trinity

In d ealin g w ith th e H oly T rin ity , it b eh o o v es us to in tro d u c e th e T hom istic c a te g o ry of e x iste n ce (e x iste ie , esse). Up to th e p re ­ se n t, th e T rin ity w as co n sid ered in c a te g o rie s of essen ce: th e m odel of th e p erso n , rela tio n , n a tu re , essence, etc. T h eo lo g y co n ceived God in term s of s tru c tu re s, co n cep ts, in te lle c tu a l co n stru c tio n s and p o ten tia lities, p a ssin g o v e r e x iste n c e in all its dim ensions. In term s of th is e sse n tia listic fra m ew o rk of th o u g h t, th eo lo g ic a l d isco u rse on th e T rin ity is in d ifferen t to th e fact of w h e th e r th e T rin ity a c tu a lly e x iste d or w h e th e r it w as m e re ly th e c re a tio n of relig iou s im agination. A s a ru le, th e P erso n s an d th e d iv in e n a tu re w e re tre a te d as p u re m en ta l co n stru c tio n s, co n cep ts and p ro d u cts of faith and theo lo g y . If it is tru e th a t th e d iv in e n a tu re w as co n ceiv ed m o re „ re a listic a lly " th a n th e D ivine P erso n s, th is w as not n a tu re as e x iste n t b u t n a tu re as th e re a lity of d iv in e a c tiv ity ad in tia an d ad extra. E v en St. T hom as A q u in as w ho u n d e rsto o d God as su b si­ stin g e x iste n ce itself (Ipsum Esse Subsistens) asso c ia te d ex iste n ce (esse) r a th e r w ith th e d iv in e n a tu re an d not w ith th e P erso ns. All the m ore so la te r th eo lo g ia n s on th e w h o le u n d e rsto o d th e d iv in e e sse in an e sse n tia listic m an n e r: as in fin ity (F. Suarez), as C oinci­ dentia O pp o sito ru m (N icholas of Cues), as Ens S u m m e P erfectu m (D escartes), as th e fu lln ess of being (K. R ahner), and as th e p e rso ­ n al m onad, th e O m ega (P. T e ilh a rd de C hardin) to m en tio n but a few.

Is e x iste n ce to be a ttrib u te d on ly to th e d iv in e n a tu re or a re w e to a ttrib u te it to th e D ivine P erso n s as well? N a tu ra lly , w e u n d e rs ta n d e x iste n c e as som eth in g m o re th a n a m e re p re d ic a te in d icatin g th e fac tu al an d re a l e x iste n ce of a thin g. E xisten ce is b o th th e u n d efin ab le re a ln e ss of b eing an d itself a re a lity ; hence, it is a p u re „fact" as w ell as th e „existin g " of th in g s in th e m ost p ro p e r se n se of th e w or. Even if ex iste n ce does n ot im ply th e d e e ­ p e st c o n ten ts of b ein g w h ich w e a ttrib u te to essen ce, it c a n n o t be d istilled out of th e s tru c tu re of being. In a w ord , e x iste n ce can n o t be „shallow ed ou t" to th e lev e l of p u re fa c tu a lity b e c au se it p o ssesses its ow n n u m ero u s dim en sio n s an d dep th. In God, e x iste n ce

„ T H E P E R S O N " IN T H E H O L Y T R IN IT Y ₂₇

can n o t b e so m eth ing re a lly an d s u b sta n tia lly d istin ct from e ith e r th e d iv in e e sse n c e or th e D ivine P erson s. In th e sp irit of e x iste n tial T hom ism w e sa y th a t in God e x iste n ce is esse n c e and th a t th e esse n c e of God is ,,to be". For th is rea so n , w h en w e sp e ak of e x iste n ce in God our th o u g h t does n ot c a p tu re th e re a lity of ex i­ ste n c e as it is in G od b u t is confined to co n sid e rin g asp ects of e x i­ ste n c e w h ich a lth o u g h h a v in g a fo u n d atio n in th e re a lity of God n e v e rth e le ss a re not su b sisten t in God, as such.

T h e re is no d o ubt th a t e x iste n c e m u st b e a sso c ia te d w ith th e d iv in e n a tu re , i.e. th e d iv in e essence. E xistence b elon gs to God in v irtu e of th e v e ry n a tu re of th e S u p rem e Being H im self. The d iv in e e x iste n c e flow s from th e fullness of th e d iv in e being. B esides this, th e d iv in e n a tu re ,,m ust" p o ssess th e fullness of e x iste n ce in so far as it is th e p rin c ip le of d iv in e a c tiv ity ad e x tra as is esp ec ially tru e of th e a c tiv ité s of c re a tio n an d salv atio n . C re a tio n m ean s th a t G od allow s o th e r essen ces h a v in g th e ir fo u n d atio n in th e d iv ine e sse n c e to p a rtic ip a te in d iv in e e x isten ce, i.e. H e allow s th em to ex ist as c re a te d . S alvation , w hich is th e fulfillm ent of c re a tio n , its n e c e s s a ry p o stu la te an d its o n to log ical co n clusion m ean s th e am pli­ ficatio n of c re a te d e x iste n ce and th e a d v a n ce m en t of in tellig en t beings to th e sta tu s of p e rso n a l e x iste n ce in th e H oly T rin ity . The d iv in e ex iste n ce , id en tic a l w ith th e d iv in e n a tu re , is th e fo u n d atio n for th e ev er-u n fo ld in g d iv in e p ro v id e n c e, th e econ om y of c re a tio n and sa lv a tio n an d in co n seq u e n c e th e a u to re a liz a tio n a l a c tiv ity of c re a tu re s. T h e d iv in e ex isten ce, th e re fo re , is e x iste n ce in itself as w ell as a c re a tiv e an d so te rio lo g ic a l ex isten ce.

D ivine e x iste n ce o u g h t to be u n d e rsto o d as fused w ith d ivin e perso n h o o d . T h re e rea so n s ju stify th is claim:

1) C re a tio n b e a rs th e tra c e s (v e stig ia ) n o t on ly of th e d ivin e n a tu re b u t of th e D ivine P erso n s as w ell. E ven if a trin ita ria n p ic tu re of th e u n iv e rs e w as n o t app lied to th e c re a te d w orld, it suffices th a t w e accep t it in th e sp h e re of sa lv a tio n as in th e case of th e trin ito lo g ic a l eco no m y of s a lv a tio n (K. R ahner).

2) P erso n s w ho w ould not p o ssess th e ir „ow n" e x iste n ce at lea st v irtu a lly (virtualitêr) d istin ct from n a tu re w ould n o t b e real. T h ey w ou ld o n ly be a rtificial con cep tio n s or m odels of perso n s or e m p ty m odes of n a tu re (modalism).

3) Fin ally, e x iste n ce in an u n c re a te d P e rso n is id entified w ith it. A n u n c re a te d P e rso n w ould n o t b e itself if it w e re n o t id en tical w ith ex isten ce. T h e u n c re a te d P e rso n is sim ply qualified b y a rea l self-sub sisten ce. In v iew of th e s e rea so n s, re a l ex iste n ce of n e c essity im p lying a n im m o rtal e x iste n ce co n stitu te s an e sse n tia l s tru c tu ra l elem en t of th e c re a te d perso n.

Esse Personale

In 1215, th e F o u rth L a tera n C ouncil (not a c cep ted b y all th e o ­ logians as an ecu m en ical council) ta u g h t th a t th e D ivine P erso ns (taken to g e th e r or se p era te ly ) a re id en tic a l w ith th e d iv in e essen ce. T hus, th e e sse n c e of God is id e n tic a l w ith th e P e rso n of th e F a th er in so far as th e F a th e r b eg ets th e Son, w ith th e P e rso n of th e Son in so far as H e is b e g o tte n b y th e F a th e r an d w ith th e P e rso n of th e H oly Spirit in so far as H e p ro ce e d s from th e F a th e r an d th e Son. T his does n o t m ea n th a t th e F a th er, Son an d th e H o ly Spirit a re th re e p a rtic ip a n ts in a d iv in e n a tu re d istin ct from T h em selv es b ut r a th e r th a t e a ch of th em in th e ir to ta lity is th e sam e n a tu re . If this w e re n o t tru e , God w ould n o t be triu n e b u t q u a d ru p le x : F ath er, Son, H o ly Spirit an d d iv in e n a tu re . T h e d istin ctio n b e tw e e n th e D ivine P e rso n an d th e d iv in e n a tu re is an in te lle c tu a l d istinctio n, not a re a l one, alb eit h a v in g its ju stifica tio n in r e 9.

If w e w e re to a ccep t th e ab ov e-m en tio n ed p rim a cy of n a tu re , it w o u ld b e n e c e ssa ry to also a ccep t th e th e sis th a t th e d iv in e n a ­ tu re b eg ets an d com m u n icates e x iste n ce to th e D ivine P erso ns. Yet it seem s th a t in th e te a c h in g of L ateran IV th e p rim a cy of th e D ivine P erso n s com es in to p lay . A m ong th e D ivine P erso n s th e P e rso n of th e F a th e r e n jo y s a n d w ields p rim a cy b e c a u se it is H e of w hom it is said io n s et origo to tiu s d ivin ita tis. This is also e v i­ d e n t in th e te a c h in g of m an y e a ste rn th eo lo g ian s. In th e w a k e of this tru th is n e c e s s a ry to s a y th a t e x iste n ce b elo ng s to th e F ath er sine principio. W e m ig h t allo w o u rse lv e s to sa y th a t h e re , in th e d e p th of th e F a th e r's P e rso n m o st p ro p e rly e x iste n c e is id en tical w ith th e D ivine Person ; it co n stitu te s th a t trin ito lo g ic a l Esse p er­ sona le a n d E xistere Personae et in Persona. Esse D iv in u m th e re fo re occu rs n o t o n ly as esse n aturae b u t m ost of all as e sse personale and e sse personalia.

P e rso n a l ex iste n ce is n o t in re a lity d istin ct from th e ex iste n ce of n a tu re (e x iste re in natura) ju st as th e e sse n c e of th e D ivine P e rso n is no t s u b sta n tia lly d istin g u ish ed from th e d iv in e n a tu re - -essence. H e re St. A n selm 's fam ous p rin c ip le is applied: O m nia su n t u n u m ubi n o n o bvia t relationis oppositio. T hus, th e o n e and Ihe sam e com m on e x iste n ce in and of th e T rin ity „com m ences” in th e P e rso n of th e F a th er, w hom th e F a th ers of th e C h u rc h fittin g ly nam ed P rincipium sin e princip io an d „Being". F u rth e r, th e e te rn a l b e g e ttin g of th e Son is th e a c t of g ra n tin g H im filial e x iste n ce and th e s p ira tio n of th e H o ly S p irit is a so rt of tw o -w a y rea liz a tio n or a tim eless affirm atio n of th e e x iste n ce of th e P erso n s of th e

9 B. d e M a r g e r i e , La Trinité chrétienne, p. 195 ff; cf. Sw. A u g u s t y n , O T ró jc y Św iętej, trans. M. S t o k o w s k a , Poznań 1963.

29 F a th e r an d th e Son. T hus, w e h a v e Esse Paternale Esse Filiale and Esse P io c ed e n s (or те-spiratum ). T h e e x iste n ce of th e F a th e r is b eg ettin g ; th e e x iste n c e of th e Son is th e re a liz a tio n of b eg ettin g and th e e x iste n c e of th e S pirit is th e e te rn a l re c e p tio n of th e realizin g sp ira tio n . W h ile Esse N a tu ra e is id en tic a l in e a c h P erson, it rem a in s re la tio n a l an d on th e p la n e of d iv in e p e rso n h o o d it is specific and p e rtin e n t to th e g iv e n D ivine P erson . In God, th e c o n stitu tiv e ele m en t of d iv in e p e rso n h o o d is n o t o n ly th e s tru c tu re of its re la tio n s v iew ed from th e p e rsp e c tiv e of esse n c e b u t r e ­ latio n s of e x isten ce. T h a n k s to a n in te rn a l re la tio n of th e div ine e x iste n ce to triu n e p e rso n ificatio n , in G od th e re ex sts b eg ettin g e x iste n ce , b e g o tte n e x iste n c e an d an e x iste n ce w h ic h affirm s the first tw o e x isten ces. A b so lu te ly sp eak in g , w ith o u t th e s e re la tio n s e x iste n c e is o n e an d th e sam e.

It c an b e said th a t in th e T rin ity th e re a re th re e „I's" an d not on ly th re e m od es of one a n d th e sam e e x isten ce, w h ic h am ounts to p e rso n a listic m odalism . In God, th e re re a lly a re „ th ree ex isting O nes" (T res realiter E xisten tes). C o n seq u en tly , this m eans th a t th e re a re th re e p e rso n ific atio n s of o n e an d th e sam e A c tu s Purus, i.e. th re e p e rso n ific atio n s of th e sam e a c tiv ity , act an d existen ce. In a c co rd a n ce w ith th is, e a ch P e rso n c re a te s in v irtu e of an indy- v id u a lly p o ssesse d d iv in e ex iste n ce : C reator G enitor, C reator G e­ n itus an d C reator P rocedens (St. T hom as A quinas). T h e se w o n d e r­ ful p e rso n a l-e x iste n tia l re la tio n s ta k e p lac e ad intra as w ell. The th re e D ivine P erso n s to g e th e r a n d s e p e ra te ly ex ist th ro u g h one and th e sam e e x iste n c e b u t re la tio n a lly e a c h of th em is its ow n p e rso n a l ex isten ce. E xistence, th e re fo re , is re la tio n a l. T h e T rin ity is n ot glu ed to g e th e r out of th re e c o n stru c ts, p o te n tia litie s or m o­ des of o u r p e rc e p tio n . In th e T rin ity w e find th re e p e rs o n a l realities. This rem ind s us of K. B arth 's th e sis th a t e a c h of th e D ivine P erso ns p o ssesses r e la tiv e su b sistere as w e ll as u n u m p ro prium su b siste re 10. If e a c h of th e D ivine P erso n s w o u ld n o t p o ssess its o w n resp e c tiv e e sse perso n a le an d e x iste re in persona, o u r trin ito lo g y w o u ld be o n ly s c rip tu ra listic a n d n o t real, if th is w e re th e case, one P e rso n w ould n o t b e able to a d re ss th e o th er, p ro n o u n cin g th e w o rd „You". M an w ou ld n o t be able to call th e F a th er, Son or th e H o ly Spirit „You". T h e F a th e r a n d th e Son or e v e n all th re e P erso n s w ould not be able to sa y „W e" and m an, for his p a rt w ould n o t be able to call th e m „You" or „T hey". A ll p e rso n a l ad d ress w ith resp e c t to the P erso n s of th e H o ly T rin ity w o u ld be re d u c e d to a m ere m a tte r of lan g u ag e, w ith o u t an o b je c tiv e c o u n te rp a rt in e sse n tia l­ istic trin ito lo g y an d re a lity 11.

10 D ogm atik I, I pp. 381ff.

11 It seem s that in the Trinity there is no "They" (e.g. Father and Son) be­ cause of an interior-personal m ode of ex isten ce.

O nce it w as a th eo lo g ic a l d ictum th a t G od ad intra w as triu n e an d one ad extra. T o d a y w e m u st re d re s s th is th esis in th e se n se th a t God is b o th trip e rs o n a l an d one, sim u lta n e o u sly ad intra an d ad extra. This holds tru e n o t o n ly in th e econ o m y of c re a tio n b u t in th e econom y of s a lv a tio n as w ell. Both in th e u n c re a te d d iv in e u n iv e rs e as w ell as in th e c re a te d e m a n a tin g u n iv e rse God e x p re sse s H im self as th re e -fo ld an d as a p e rfe c tly sim ple sin g u ­ larity . E xisten ce is th e c e n tra l point of th e axis w h o se end s lea d e ith e r to a th re e fo ld p lu ra lity or to a sin g u la r u n ity . W e d e a l h e re n ot w ith a m a tte r of q u a n tity or nu m b er w ith re sp e c t to th e D ivine P erso n s bu t w ith th e q u e stio n of th e m o d e of th e ir ex isten ce. In this se n se w e re tu rn to th e old p a tristic adagium : tres su bsisten tia e (h y p o sta se is) con su b sta n tia les in una ea d em q u e substantia. S uch is th e h e rita g e left b y St. Basil th e G reat, R ufin an d St. H ila ry of P oitiers. This allow s us to a p p ro x im ate th e te rm person a and pro- sopo n to th e term s h y p o sta sis an d su b sisten tia in a n ecum enical fashion.

In fine, th e e x iste n tia l con cep tio n of th e trin ito lo g ic a l dogm a assum es m o re of th e c h a ra c te ristic s p ro p e r to th e m y ste ry . M o re ­ over, it ch am pions th e p rim a c y of a g e n u in e „p erson alism " o v e r „n atu ralism ". A b o v e all, th e D ivine P erso n s a re God: th a t God is t r i ­ p e rso n a l is a m a tte r of s e c o n d a ry im p o rtan ce. T he d iv in e n a tu re does n ot e x h a u st th e r e a lity of th e D ivine P ersons, w h o a re ind eed th e cro w n in g g lo ry of th e m y ste ry of God.

T ran sla ted by: N o rb e rt K arava, C apuchin