How does the Mind exist? Conversation on Cognitive Science

FORUM PHILOSOPHICUM Facultas Philosophica Ignatianum Cracovia - Kraköw, 9: 2004, 265-266

HOW DOES THE MIND EXIST?

T o r u n , December 17, 2003

O r g a n i z e r : Institute of the Theory of Knowledge a n d the Theory of Science of the D e p a r t m e n t of P h i l o s o p h y of the N i c o l a u s Copernicus U n i v e r s i t y i n T o r u n

Patronage: P o l i s h C o g n i t i v e Society

One of the reasons f o r o r g a n i z i n g the above-mentioned conversation was the p u b l i c a t i o n of U r s z u l a Zeglen's book Philosophy of Mind ([Filozofia umyslu] T o r u n , 2003). U r s z u l a Zeglen i s a profesor of philosophy at the N i c o l a u s Copernicus U n i v e r s i t y .

T h e one-day conversation h a d three parts a n d each p a r t consisted of two speeches. A f t e r each speech there w a s a short b u t v e r y active dis-cussion on the respective topics.

I n the first part. Prof. S t a n i s l a w J u d y c k i (Catholic U n i v e r s i t y of L u b l i n ) presented i n h i s speech: „ T h e P r o b l e m of M i n d - B o d y Identity" a n overview of the arguments „for a n d against" the type-type i d e n t i t y theory of m i n d represented b y U l l i n T . Place, J a c k J . C . S m a r t a n d H e r b e r t F e i g l . T h e arguments „for" are based: on p h y s i c a l i s m , on the f u n c t i o n i n g of our conceptual structure, on analogy to inter-theoretical reduction a n d on e m p i r i c a l or q u a s i - e m p i r i c a l reasons. T h e arguments „ a g a i n s t " are based first of a l l on the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of „ i d e n t i t y " , used i n extensional concepts. D r . Robert Poczobut ( U n i v e r s i t y of B i a l y s t o k ) spoke on the subject: „ T h e F u n c t i o n a l M o d e l of Reduction a n d E m e r -gence". A s a n i n t r o d u c t i o n he gave a n overview of (i) the ontology of m i n d (as a problem t h a t belongs to the philosophical domain) a n d (ii) the theories of emergence. T h e f u n c t i o n a l model of reduction - founded on J a e g w o n K i m ' s conception presented i n h i s book: Mind in a Physical

World (1998) - h a s to d i s t i n g u i s h between the reduction of the causal

states a n d the reduction of the phenomenal states (the influence of the environments should be t a k e n into consideration.)

I n the second part, M a g . B a r t l o m i e j Ö w i ^ t c z a k (Nicolaus Copernicus U n i v e r s i t y ) spoke on the subject: „ E x t e r n a l i s m a n d the P r o b l e m of

266 Jözef Bremer

L o c a l i s a t i o n of the M i n d " . T h e states of m i n d are representational a n d the questions are: s h o u l d such states be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a content, w i t h a bearer of content or w i t h a bearer a n d content? E x t e r n a l i s t could not i d e n t i f y the states of the m i n d w i t h content or w i t h the bearer. P r o f . Z b y s l a w M u s z y n s k i ( U n i v e r s i t y of M a r i a S k l o d o w s k a - C u r i e i n L u b l i n ) spoke on the subject: „ T h e conception of extended m i n d " . M u s z y n s k i presented a c r i t i c a l exegesis of the article w r i t t e n by A n d y C l a r k a n d D a v i d C h a l m e r s , The Extended Mind (1999) i n w h i c h the autors - i n contrast to H i l a r y P u t n a m ' s argument on the „ T w i n E a r t h " - give a k i n d of e x t e r n a l i s m based on the active role of environment i n d r i v i n g cognitive processes. One of the questions discussed was a „ p r o t e s i s " of the m i n d - as f a r the u s i n g of a notebook could be u s e f u l f o r that.

I n the t h i r d part, prof. Robert P i l a t (Institute of P h i l o s o p h y a n d Sociology of the P o l i s h A c a d e m y of Sciences, W a r s a w ) presented the essence of the model of conceptual spaces according to P e t e r G ä r d e n f o r s (see h i s book: The Conceptual Spaces, 2000). G ä r d e n f o r s calls h i s m o d e l to e x p l a i n cognition the „ c o n c e p t u a l spaces": a lot of our r e a s o n i n g is done b y calculation - the analogy of a distance between two sides of perception. W e say t h a t things are s i m i l a r i f they are geometrically (Euclid) closer on some points of d i m e n s i o n a l scales. It is possible to define concepts as domains i n conceptual spaces. T h e question i s : I n w h i c h sense is the theory proposed b y G ä r d e n f o r s a n e m p i r i c a l theory a n d w h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l cosequences follow f r o m it? M a g . M a r c i n M i l k o w s k i ( U n i v e r s i t y of W a r s a w ) presented the subject: „ H e t e r o f e n o -menology a n d the Q u e s t i o n of Introspection". H e was concerned w i t h D a n i e l Dennett's concept of heterofenomenology (see: Consciousness

Explained, 1991) a n d w i t h the concept of introspection. One of M i l k o w

-ski's thesis was: i f m e n t a l properties are accessible, they m u s t be e m p i r i c a l l y accessible.

D u r i n g the conversation was also presented the f i r s t n u m b e r of the philosophical j o u r n a l „ F e n o m e n o l o g i a " (1/2003), p u b l i s h e d b y the Polish

Fenomenological Society, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences a n d the Publishing House of the Humaniora Foundation,

O n e of the m a i n i d e a of the conversation w a s to provide a f o r u m for discussion of the b o d y - m i n d problems a n d problems of consciousness. T h i s goal was f u U f i l e d : the conversation provided a n opportunity for scholars a n d post-graduate students f r o m different U n i v e r s i t i e s of P o l a n d to exchange t h e i r proposed solutions to some of the above-m e n t i o n e d topics. T h e h i g h level of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the undergraduate students a n d graduate students has to be emphasized. Some of the students were v e r y engaged i n the t e c h n i c a l carrying-out of the whole conversation.