Tom asz Milej
H abilitated Doctor, D AAD long-term lecturer at the Tanzanian-G erm an C entre for East African Studies (TG C L), U niversity D ar es Salaam, Tanzania
T he „ su b stan ce o f th e rig h ts ” o f th e U n io n citizen sh ip
in th e re c e n t case law o f th e E C J
— p o te n tia l a n d lim its o f th e co n cep t
T h e case o f
Ruiz Zambrano
T he term „substance o f th e rights c o n ferred by v irtu e o f th e ir status as citizens o f th e U n io n “ was used by th e E C J for th e first tim e in 2011 in th e case o f R u i z Z a m b r a n o .1 T he ju d g m e n t was based o n th e follow ing facts2: T h e couple R u i z Z a m b r a n o ap p lie d for asylum in B elgium . B o th spouses h a d C o lo m b ia n citizenship. T he request was rejected, b u t th e couple was n o t d e p o rte d for th e tim e being. D e sp ite o f his im m ig ra tio n status n o t b ein g clarified a n d w ith o u t residence p erm it, th e h u s b a n d k e p t o n w o rk in g in B elgium . D u rin g th is tim e , his w ife gave b irth to tw o c h ild ren w h o acq u ired B elgian n a tio n a lity by jus soli prin cip le. T h eir n a tio n a lity was a so-called s u b stitu te nationality, w h ich th e ch ild ren o b ta in e d d u e to th e fact th a t th e ir p aren ts h a d failed to apply for C o lo m b ia n citizenship at th e C o lo m b ia n Em bassy. W h e n th e h u s b a n d becam e u n em p lo y e d , th e c o m p e te n t Belgian a u th o ritie s refused to g ra n t h im u n e m p lo y m e n t benefits: Even if h e h a d actually p a id th e u n e m p lo y m e n t c o n trib u tio n s regularly, h e h a d reached th e relevant n u m b e r o f w o rk in g days o n ly in v io latio n o f th e provisions o f th e Belgian N a tio n a lity C o d e - so th e reasoning. T he h u sb a n d app ealed against this decision, arg u in g th a t h e was e n title d to th e rig h t o f residence directly by v irtu e o f th e E C T reaty because he was th e fath er o f u n d erag e citizens o f th e U n io n . Since th e existence o f such a rig h t o f residence e n title d h im au to m atically to u n e m
1 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011], No. 42. 2 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011], No. 14 ff.
p lo y m e n t benefits, th e c o m p e te n t B elgian la b o u r c o u rt m ad e th e m a tte r th e subject o f a q u estio n referred to th e E C J.
T he C o u rt h e ld th a t th e m in o r ch ild ren o f R u i z Z a m b r a n o w o u ld be d e p riv ed o f th e benefits o f th e su b stan ce o f th e rights co n ferred by v irtu e o f th e ir status as citizens o f th e U n io n as lo n g as th e ir fath er d id n o t receive a residence a n d w o rk p e rm it.3 Since h e g ra n te d m a in te n a n c e to his ch ild ren , th e ch ild ren w o u ld be co m p elled to leave th e te rrito ry o f th e U n io n in order to a cco m p an y th e ir fath er to his h o m e country.
I f th e su b stan ce o f th e rights is d en ied , th e U n io n law applies - th is is th e m ain legal sta te m e n t o f th e ju d g m e n t. T his creates a n ew elem en t o f U n io n citizenship a n d opens its scope o f ap p lic atio n to cases, w h ic h are in d e p e n d e n t from an y cross-border elem ent. It also includes a n e w feature o f E u ro p e an citizenship: T he status o f citizen o f th e U n io n m akes it possible to invoke E u ro p ean U n io n law, w ith o u t th e relevant facts h av in g a cross-border elem en t.4
T h e n e w fu n c tio n o f U nion c itiz e n s h ip
T he verbalisation o f this n ew feature o f E u ro p e a n citizenship by th e E C J is seen as an epic event o f in te g ra tio n politics - as here is a q u o te - a „daw n o f a n ew U n io n ”.5
T he reason for this can be seen in th e fact th a t for a certain g ro u p o f cases th e m o b ility d o g m a is ab a n d o n e d , a d o g m a w h ich states th a t E U law is rele v a n t on ly if th e U n io n citizen’s freedom o f m o v em e n t is exercised.6 F rom n o w o n , th e E U law is relevant even in p u rely d o m estic situ atio n s. T h e U n io n law p ro tects th e in d iv id u al against his ow n state a n d th a t on ly d u e to th e fact th a t he o r she is a U n io n citizen.7
3 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011], No. 44.
4 See also K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, Ruiz Zambrano — Die Entwicklung des Kernbereichs der Unionsbürgerschaft, “Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht” (NVwZ) 2001, p. 2009; A. Mo- hay, D. Muhvic, The legal nature o f the E U citizenship: perspectives from international and E U law, [in:] Contemporary Legal Challenges: E U — Hungary — Croatia, ed. T. Drinoczi, M. Zupan, Z. Ercsey, M. Vinkovic, Pecs-Osijek 2012, p. 72 f.; D Kochenov, The essence o f E U citizenship emerging from the last ten years o f academic debate: Beyond the cherry blossoms and the moon?, ICLQ 2013, p. 111 ff.
5 Ibidem, p. 134.
6 Regarding the development of the case law see D. Kochenov, R. Plender, E U Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery o f the Treaty Text, E.L. Rev. 2012, p. 375 ff.
7 In the Case Grzelczyk the ECJ formulated the much cited formula that the Union citizenship is destined to „be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided“. See Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001], No. 31.
T he m o b ility d o g m a was lin k e d to th e original co n cep t o f th e m ark et citizen, as it was p u t fo rw ard in th e 60s a n d 70s. A cco rd in g to th is concept, th e E u ro p ea n C o m m u n ity law ch a n g ed th e legal status o f foreign citizens o f o th e r E C M e m b e r States in any E C M e m b e r State to th e e x ten t req u ired for th e p u rp o ses o f E C in te g ra tio n .8 A n d since these pu rp o ses w ere lim ite d on th e ec o n o m ic in te g ra tio n - it was a b o u t th e creatio n o f a c o m m o n m ark et - o n e used th e te rm „m ark et citizens“. In this sense, th e m ark et citizens in th e E C M e m b e r States w ere „ n o t as foreign as o th e r foreigners“.9 H ow ever, th is change in status o n ly h a d a fu n ctio n al character, lin k e d to th e E C a im s.10
O v er tim e, th e d o g m a o f m o b ility as a criterio n o f ap p licab ility o f U n io n law has lost its tangibility. T h e fu n ctio n a l linkage o f E u ro p e a n in te g ra tio n to th e realisation o f th e c o m m o n m ark et was a b a n d o n ed . T he c u rre n t catalogue o f in te g ra tio n objectives, w h ich is defin ed in A rticle 3 T E U - this will be discussed later on - is far m o re com prehensive, as it also includes th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f a catalogue o f values codified in A rticle 2 T E U . By this, th e E u ro p e a n in te g ra tio n goes b ey o n d its original p u rp o se. It is n o t an y m o re ju st a m a tte r o f d eveloping in te rn a tio n a l c o o p e ratio n in E u ro p e after th e h o rro rs o f W o rld W ar II. Insofar, th e p ro m o tio n o f m o b ility o f citizens in a variety o f fo rm s11, w h ic h has fo u n d expression in th e E u ro p ean fu n d a m e n ta l freedom s, has effectively p ro v ed to be a fittin g in stru m e n t. N ow , th ere is m o re at stake. It is a b o u t b u ild in g a c o m m u n ity th a t is based o n certain values12, w ith o u t necessarily b ein g u n d e rs to o d as on e state („n o n -state p o lity “) .13 It is th e re fore n o t su rp risin g th a t th e E C J asks itself, w h e th e r th is in te g ra tio n can be achieved, if th e app licab ility o f E U law rem ains d e p e n d e n t o n cross-border m o v em en t.
8 H.P. Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tübingen 1972, p. 252. This development is part ly conceived as a gradual overcoming of the traditional aliens laws approach, which has its roots in police laws of the 19th century, by the European immigration law, created to promote the free movement of Europeans. See J. Bergmann, Abschied vom deutschen Ausländerrecht? — Europarechtliche Provokationen, ZAR 2013, p. 321; similar from a British perspective J. Shaw, N. Miller, M. Fletcher, Getting to grips with E U citizenship: Understanding the friction between
U K immigration law and E U free movement law, Edinburgh 2013, p. 36. 9 H.P. Ipsen, op. cit., p. 252.
10 Ibidem, p. 251.
11 See N. Nic Shuibhne, The resilience o f E U market citizenship, CMLR 2010, p. 1608. 12 According to Chr. Callies, the „structural features of a liberal constitutional state“ are embod
ied in the values and integration objectives of the TEU. See Ch. Callies, Die neue Europäis che Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon. Ein Überblick über die Reformen unter Berücksichti gung ihrer Implikationen fü r das deutsche Recht, Tübingen 2010, p. 87. See also D. Kochenov,
R. Plender, op. cit., p. 383.
13 Regarding the concept of „non-state polity“ see N. Nic Shuibhne, op. cit., p. 1600 ff., where upon the author does not think that the concept of the market citizen is antiquated. See also D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 127.
C o n seq u en tly , th e U n io n citizenship in tro d u c e d by th e M a a stric h t Treaty is m o re th a n ju st a m ark et citizenship. T h e E u ro p ean U n io n citizenship led accordingly to a m u c h d eeper change in th e legal status o f foreigners th a n a p u re m a rk et citizenship. T h e original p a rad ig m , th a t th e effect o f U n io n citizenship was lim ite d to m ajo r or m in o r corrections o f n a tio n a l provisions o f im m ig ra tio n law o f o ne M e m b e r State regarding citizens o f o th e r M em b er States, was u p h e ld on ly as lo n g as th e ap p licab ility o f U n io n law was lin k ed to th e c rite rio n o f m obility.
Since th e ju d g m e n t in th e case o f R u i z Z a m b r a n o , this p arad ig m has been u n d e rm in e d . H ow ever, it h a d been u n d e r challenge for som e tim e anyw ay.14 T h at was th e case n o t on ly because o f th e p ro fo u n d changes, w h ich th e status o f E U citizens h a d u n d e rg o n e by U n io n law, b u t also because o f th e fact th a t th e re q u ire m e n t o f a cross-border elem e n t is in te rp re te d very widely.
T he cross-border req u ire m en t is fulfilled even if a B rit - as in th e case C a r p e n te r15 — is selling advertising spaces from th e U K in B ritish new spapers for advertisers from o th e r M e m b er States, such as from G erm any. It is obvious th a t G e rm a n im m ig ratio n law is n o t affected by this. In th e case o f G arcia Avello, even a de facto su rren d er o f th e criterion o f a cross-border elem ent can be observed.16 W h e th e r th e Belgian p ro h ib itio n o f a ch ild to be n am ed according to th e Spanish cu sto m o f a d o u b le n am e has a negative effect o n th e m o b ility o f this c h ild if it has th e desire to m ove to Spain is only speculation. D u e to th e c o n tin u o u s w eakening o f th e criterion o f „cross-border facts“ le gal certain ty is negatively affected: It is n o w difficult to ap p reh en d , w h eth er a situ atio n has a cross-border natu re. T h e cross-border elem ent o f a case — an d therefore also th e applicability o f E U law — d epends th u s o n co n tin g en cies.17
Since th e case o f R u i z Z a m b r a n o, in cases, in w h ich th e su b stan ce o f th e status o f a U n io n citizenship is d e n ie d to an E U citizen, th e im m ig ra tio n law aspect o f U n io n citizenship has v a n ish ed n o t on ly d e fa c to, b u t also as a m a tte r o f prin cip le.
T h e c o n te n t o f th e s u b s ta n c e o f th e r ig h ts a c co rd in g
to p r e v io u s case la w o f th e E C J
T he en tire p o st-R u iz Z a m b r a n o case law, in w h ic h th e co n cep t o f th e su b sta n ce o f th e rights o f th e E U citizen was relevant, is related to th e rig h t o f resi 14 See K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2008; D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit.., p. 375 f. 15 See Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2001], No. 14 and 37. This case is cited by the case Ruiz Zam
brano by Advocate General Sharpston, see A.G. Sharpston, 30.09.2010, No. 73. 16 See Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003].
d ence for th o se th ird -c o u n try n atio n als w h o are fam ily m em b ers o f a U n io n citizen. T h e conseq u en ce o f all th is case law is th a t th e actual en jo y m e n t o f th e su b stan ce o f th e rights resu ltin g from U n io n citizenship can th e n be c o n sidered d en ied , if th e U n io n citizen is d e f a c t o co m p e lled to leave th e te rrito ry o f th e U n io n . O f th e seven previously d ecid e d cases, th e C o u rt has affirm ed th a t c o n d itio n on ly in o n e case - in th e case o f R u i z Z a m b r a n o.18 Since th e ju d g m e n t in th e case D ereci th e C o u rt em phasizes th a t it is for th e n atio n al co u rts to d e te rm in e th e existence o f these c o n d itio n s.19 In th e case o f O . a n d S., th e C o u rt requires th e existence o f a relatio n sh ip o f d e p e n d en cy betw een th e citizens o f th e U n io n a n d th e th ird c o u n try n atio n a l, w h o derives his rig h t o f residence from th e U n io n citizen status o f th e U n io n citizen.20 In th e sam e decision, th e C o u rt n o tes th a t th e p rinciples, w h ich have been establi sh ed in th e case o f R u i z Z a m b r a n o , apply o n ly u n d e r „exceptional circ u m stances“.21 It sh o u ld be a d d e d th a t a case like R u i z Z a m b r a n o will n o t occur frequently, as n a tu ra lisa tio n u n d e r th e jus soli p rin c ip le has been restricted th ro u g h a reform o f im m ig ra tio n law, for exam ple in B elgium a n d Ireland, in response to th e E C J case law.22
As epochal as th e fu n c tio n o f th e co n cep t o f „substance o f th e rights o f a U n io n citizen “, as m eagre, if n o t m arginal, is its n o rm ativ e co n te n t. It is a p arad o x th a t an ap p ro a ch th a t p o o r in su b stan ce is regarded as on e o f th e m o st im p o rta n t dev elo p m en ts in th e E C J ’s case law.
T he co n ce p t was subject to a lo t o f criticism . It is p u t in to q u estio n by refer rin g to th e derivative ch aracter o f U n io n citizenship. T he U n io n citizenship said to be a iu s tr a c tu m ; deriv in g from th e n a tio n a l citizenship. T herefore - acco rd in g to th e critics - it is n o t correct to derive rights from th e U n io n citizenship, if these rights are n o t expressly assigned to th e U n io n citizens in o th e r provisions o f th e fo u n d in g treaties. U n io n citizenship is said to be k in d
18 The following decisions ware based on the approach developed in Ruiz Zambrano: Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011]; Case C-256/11 Dereci [2011]; Cases C-356/11, C-357/11 O. and S. [2011]; Case C-40/11 Lida [2012]; Case C-87/12 Ymerga [2013] and Case C-86/12 Alokpa [2013].
19 Case C-256/11 Dereci [2011], No. 74.
20 Cases C-356/11, C-357/11 O. and S. [2011], No. 56. 21 Cases C-356/11, C-357/11 O. and S. [2011], No. 55.
22 See S. Corneloup, Citoynnete europeenne: la Cour de justice apporte une nouvelle pierre a son edifice, Rec. Dalloz 2011, p. 1325 et seq.
o f an u m b re lla te rm th a t gives a n a m e to th e rights, w h ich have been co n fer red o n th e citizens o f th e M e m b e r States anyway.23
T his a rg u m e n t is n o t co n v in cin g .24 It is correct th a t th e possession o f a n a tio n al citizenship is a p rereq u isite for th e acq u isitio n o f U n io n citizenship. H ow ever, th e logical co n clu sio n th a t th e acq u isitio n o f th e citizenship lim its th e p o te n tia l o f U n io n citizenship, needs fu rth e r ju stificatio n . T he w o rd in g o f th e T reaty is n o t a valid a rg u m e n t. A cco rd in g to A rticle 20 T F E U U n io n citizenship shall be a d d itio n a l to a n d n o t replace n a tio n a l citizenship. This fo rm u la tio n suggests th a t E u ro p ean citizenship is has an a u to n o m o u s character. T his is even tru er, since earlier w ordings o f th e c o n tra c t h e ld th a t citizenship o f th e U n io n w as o n ly c o m p le m e n tin g n a tio n a l citizenship.25 T he U n io n citizenship appears as an a u to n o m o u s co n cep t, if ap p ro a c h e d form th e historical perspective. It stan d s for a p olitical p ro g ra m m e o f a E u ro p e o f th e citizens targ e ted as early as in th e 60s. T h e p ro g ra m m e d id n o t only in clu d e th e extension o f th e rig h t o f residence, b u t also th e social equalisation o f E U citizens a n d n atio n als as well as th e g u aran tee o f p olitical rig h ts.26 It is h a rd to im agine th a t th is p ro g ra m m e was officially realised in 1 9 9 2 w ith th e in clu sio n o f citizenship in th e texts o f th e treaty a n d th a t it was on ly a b o u t giving a n am e to th e different elem ents scattered in th e different parts o f th e treaty. In co n trast, A rticle 2 5 T F E U links th e re p o rtin g o n th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f rules co n n e c te d to U n io n citizenship to th e fu rth e r d ev elo p m en t o f th e U n io n . T h e M a a stric h t T reaty was certainly n o t th e final step w ith in th e p ro g ram o f th e „E u ro p e o f citizens“; it ra th e r m a rk e d a b e g in n in g o f its new phase. W h a t E u ro p e o f citizens m eans, has to be defin ed continuously. In any
23 See the similar position of S. Haack, Staatsangehörigkeit — Unionsbürgerschaft — Völkerre chtssubjektivität, [in:] J. Isensee, P. Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band X: Deutschland in der Staatengemeinschaft, 3. Aufl., Heidelberg 2012, No. 28—29, see also K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2011.
24 Against it also D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 106 („ius tractum nature does not mean ius tractum essence“).
25 To what extent this change in the wording plays a crucial role is controversial. As here Nette sheim, Der „Kernbereich“ der Unionsbürgerschaft — vom Schutz der Mobilität zur Gewährleistung eines Lebensumfelds, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2011, p. 1036 f.; sceptical S. Haack, op. cit., No. 24. 26 See also older literature: H. Bülck, Der Europabürger, [in:] Staatsrecht — Europarecht — Völker recht. Festschrift fü r Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer zu 75. Geburtstag am 28. M ärz 1981, ed. I. von Münch, Berlin—New York 1981, p. 809-810; S. Magiera, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft a u f dem Wege zu einem Europa der Bürger, “Die öffentliche Verwaltung” (DÖV) 1987, p. 222. The nationals of the Member States should therefore be seen not only as an „economic function carrier“, but as persons with all the rights and obligations making up a democratic society which the Member States are based upon (S. Magiera, op. cit., p. 231); see now also M. Nette sheim, op. cit., p. 1032.
case, th e E u ro p e a n citizenship is an in n o v a tio n , w h ich I in te n d e d as a b oost to th e d e v elo p m en t o f th e E u ro p e a n U n io n .27
F rom th e perspective o f co m p arativ e law, it can also n o t be co n firm ed th a t th e m ere coexistence o f tw o citizenships - th e o ne o f th e M e m b e r State a n d th e u n io n citizenship - precludes th a t th e la tte r c o n stitu tes a separate „substance o f th e rights” . T h u s, A rt. 37 o f th e Swiss Federal C o n s titu tio n defines a Swiss citizen as som eo n e, w h o has th e rig h t o f citizenship o f a Swiss c o m m u n e a n d a Swiss c a n to n . Also, th e citizenship o f th e N o r th G e rm a n C o n fe d e ra tio n was co n ferre d to a p erso n via his o r h e r affiliation to a M e m ber State o f th e C o n fe d e ra tio n . A n d since b o th S w itzerland a n d th e N o rth G e rm a n C o n fe d e ra tio n 28 w ere, respectively still are, sovereign subjects o f in te rn a tio n a l law, it c a n n o t be said th a t th e ir citizenships c a n n o t c o n stitu te a su b stan ce o f th e rights.
T his a rg u m e n t is, however, also th e m ain difficulty arising o u t o f th e new case law o f th e E C J: T he E u ro p e a n U n io n is n o t sovereign.29 T he sovereignty still rem ains w ith th e M e m b e r States. T h e E C J does n o t have th e po w er to confer th e a ttrib u te o f sta te h o o d u p o n th e E U . I f th e E C J deviates rights from th e citizenship o f a non-sovereign entity, does it th e n act u ltr a vires?
T his can be explained if o ne co n cep tu ally separates th e citizenship from th e nationality. Such a sep aratio n is n o t o n ly possible in legal th e o ry 30, it is also p ractice in several states. In B ritish law31, for exam ple, n a tio n a lity m eans an a ttrib u tio n o f a p erso n to a state w ith in th e m e a n in g o f th e p u b lic in te rn a tio n al law. In co n trast, B ritish law know s five categories o f p ersons to w h ich different citizenship rights are g ra n te d .32 C itiz en sh ip is th u s seen as a label for a p artic u la r set o f rights to w h ich th e possession o f th e n a tio n a lity serves 27 It was recognized early, that the introduction of EU citizenship substantially changes regarding
the legal status of the Union. See S. Hobe, Die Unionsbürgerschaft nach dem Vertrag von Maas tricht. A u f dem Weg zu einem europäischen Bundesstaat?, “Der Staat” 1993, p. 264.
28 See M. Kotulla, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. Vom Alten Reich bis Weimar (1495 bis 1934), Berlin-Heidelberg 2008, p. 1932.
29 However, it should be noted that the concept of sovereignty as an explanatory model of the relationship between the Union and the Member States has been controversially discussed already for some period of time. See J. Kokott, Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes: Konsequenzen von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung, “Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer” (VVDStL) Vol. 63 (2003), p. 7 et seq. and the following discussion, p. 71 et seq.
30 In detail Chr. Schönberger, Unionsbürger. Europas föderales Bürgerrecht in vergleichender Sicht, Tübingen 2005, p. 22 et seq.; G.-R. de Groot, Nationality Law, [in:] Elgar Encyclopedia o f Comparative Law, ed. J.M. Smits, Cheltenham-Northampton p. 477; A. Mohay, D. Muhvic, op. cit., p. 157.
31 G.-R. de Groot, op. cit., p. 477.
32 See British Nationality Act von 1981, Part I, British Citizenship, available under www.legisla- tion.gov.uk.
as co n d itio n . H ow ever, th e citizenship represents an a u to n o m o u s concept, w h ic h needs to be d istin g u ish ed from th e n a tio n a lity a n d th e q u estio n o f sovereignty. H e n c e , th e U n io n citizenship o f itself has th e capacity to confer rights. In c o n trast to th e B ritish categorisation o f civil rights, U n io n citi zenship can be acq u ired o n th e basis o f different n atio n alities, w hereas th e B ritish n a tio n a lity c o n stitu tes several citizenships.
T he lived U n io n law em erges in a dialogue betw een th e M e m b e r States a n d th e E C J. T he fo rm er agree o n abstract a n d general in te rn a tio n a l treaty provisions. T he C o u r t’s task is to solve practical legal issues, w h ich are su b m itte d to it. In d o in g so, it fills th e provisions agreed u p o n by th e states w ith tan g ib le co n te n t. B o th th e free m o v e m e n t o f th e citizens o f th e U n io n a n d th e U n io n citizenship itse lf fo u n d th e ir legal basis in th e M a a stric h t Treaty. By A rticle 8 a o f th e E C Treaty, every citizen o f th e U n io n has been g ran ted th e rig h t to m ove freely w ith in th e te rrito ry o f th e M e m b e r States a n d reside th erein . Five years later, in th e case M a rtin e z Sala, th e E C J filled th e w o rd in g o f th a t provision w ith life a n d fo u n d th a t th e free m o v em e n t o f E U citizens exists solely by v irtu e o f E U citizenship;33 th e em ergence o f th e rig h t to free d o m o f m o v e m e n t does th erefo re n o t d e p e n d o n th e ec o n o m ic activity o f th e U n io n citizen.34
W h ile in th e case o f M a rtin e z Sala, it w as th e in te n tio n o f th e C o u rt to em phasize th e n ew w o rd in g o f th e E C T reaty or to affirm it by ju d g m e n t,35 it n o w seem s to be a m a tte r o f re in te rp re tin g th e citizenship o f th e U n io n in th e lig h t o f th e n ew legal n a tu re o f th e E u ro p ean U n io n . T he characteristics o f th e E U ’s ch a n g in g legal character are to be fo u n d in A rticle 2 a n d A rticle 6 T F E U . T he E u ro p ean U n io n is based o n a set o f values, in w h ich th e rule o f law a n d th e p ro te c tio n o f h u m a n rights are m e n tio n e d . A lso, th e legal p o si tio n o f th e in d iv id u al is su b stan tially stre n g th e n e d , w h ic h becom es m anifest in th e e m b e d m e n t o f th e C h a rte r o f F u n d a m e n ta l R ig h ts in th e Treaty.
T he presence o f a cross-border e lem en t is at n o p o in t explicitly m e n tio n e d in th e E U p rim a ry law as a c o n d itio n for th e app licab ility o f U n io n law.36
33 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala [1998], No. 61-63.
34 Since civil rights have no absolute character and can be subject to limitations (see the wording of Art. 21 Abs. 1 TFEU, also P. Kubicki, Die subjektivrechtliche Komponente der Unionsbürg erschaft, Zeitschrift Europarecht (EuR) 2006, p. 496; S. Haack, op. cit., No. 31, it is not im possible to differentiate in the area of residence law taking into account the economic activity of the Union citizen and his property. Such differentiations are also prescribed in secondary legislation, see Art. 7 of the Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004, ABl. EU 2004 L 158/77). See also P.M. Huber, Unionsbürgerschaft, EuR 2013, p. 648; also A. Mohay, D. Muhvic, op. cit., p. 167-168 and p. 170.
35 See also D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit., p. 373 et seq. 36 Emphatically D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit., p. 377.
It is an e lem en t o f th e case law o f th e E C J, w h ich was elab o rated in order to p ay d u e regard to th e ch aracter o f th e E U as a u n io n o f states aim in g at c o m p le tio n o f in tern a l m ark et a n d p ro m o tio n o f in te rn a tio n a l co o p eratio n . I f its legal ch aracter o f th e E U changes, it is n o t su rp risin g th a t th e c o n d itio n o f ap p licatio n o f U n io n law — th e existence o f a cross-border elem en t — is also p u t to th e test. A n d since th e E U by th e L isbon R eform Treaty has been clear ly co n v erte d tow ards a polity, it is difficult to ju stify th e n eed for a cross-bor d er ele m en t if th e core set o f citizenship rights is affected.
T he n ew ap p ro ach in th e case o f R u i z Z a m b r a n o is to be u n d e rsto o d p re cisely in th is sense. H ow ever, a n d at th is p o in t th e c ritiq u e o f th e ju d g m e n t is en tirely ju stified 37 — th e E C J has n o t ad eq u ately explained its n ew approach.
O u tlo o k
W ith a view to fu rth e r d ev e lo p m en t, th e q u e stio n arises w h e th e r th e citi zenship in evitably leads to th e em ergence o f a new E u ro p e a n sovereign p e ople, a n d a n ew E u ro p ean state. D o th e decisions o n th e U n io n citizenship p rovoke a „ b u rstin g o f a dam ” or do th e y — as it is seen by som e voices in th e literatu re — c o n stitu te an u n sto p p a b le legal d ev elo p m en t, o r even a revo lu tio n 38, w h ich is in c o m p a tib le w ith o u r legal system? Since th e q u estio n o f citizenship can be sep arated from th e issue o f sovereignty — as seen above — th e discussions a b o u t th e case R u i z Z a m b r a n o sh o u ld n o t be d ram atised a n d sh o u ld n o t be regarded th ro u g h th e prism o f federalism , as so m e voices d o .39 It is tru e th a t th e re are som e exam ples in history, in w h ich th e estab lish m en t o f a su p ra n a tio n a l in d ig en ats has led to stateh o o d . H ere, th e N o r th G e rm a n C o n fe d e ra tio n is an exam ple.40 O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e re is th e exam ple o f th e Socialist Federal R ep u b lic o f Yugoslavia, in w h ich th e coexistence o f tw o citizenships — th a t o f th e R epublics a n d th a t o f th e F ed eratio n 41 — u ltim a tely led to th e dem ise o f th e latter. A historical d eterm in ism c a n n o t be seen. 37 See K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2013.
38 See S. Haack, op. cit., No. 36.
39 See K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit., p. 2011; S. Haack, op. cit., No. 23, No. 36, but also D. Kochenov, op. cit., No. 4, p. 98.
40 Hereto in detail S. Hobe, op. cit., p. 252 ff.
41 See the Nationality Act of Yugoslavia from 1976, Sluzbeni list SFJR 58/1976. The dual cit izenship was considered in the Yugoslav constitutional law doctrine as an expression of the federal state principle, see S. Popovic, Upravno pravo, 10th edition, Belgrade 1980, p. 325. Under international law, relevant was only the citizenship of the Federation. The loss and the acquisition of the citizenship were regulated by a federal law. The citizenship laws of the mem ber states (the so-called Socialist Republics) referred in this regard to federal legislation, see S. D. Jovanovic, Drzavljanstvo Socialisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Belgrade 1977, p. 32—33.
Also, a rev o lu tio n in th e field o f fu n d a m e n ta l rig h t p ro te c tio n is n o t to be expected. T he a ssu m p tio n th a t th e E C J will ex ten d th e n o tio n „the substance o f th e rights o f a U n io n citizen” to a general clause is to o far-fetched. R evolu tio n a ry d ev elo p m en ts are n o t to be feared, as th e p ersonal scope o f m o st fu n d a m e n ta l rights does n o t d e p e n d o n th e possession o f a certain nationality. T he core o f th e rights w o u ld be o f im p o rta n c e especially in th e range o f those fu n d a m e n ta l rights, w h ic h in stitu te influence o f th e in d iv id u al o n th e exer cise o f official a u th o rity .42 M a n y o f th e m have been codified in th e E u ro p e an C h a rte r o f F u n d a m e n ta l R ights u n d e r th e T itle V („civil rig h ts“).
Just as little it is to be feared th a t A rticle 51 o f th e C h a rte r o f F u n d a m e n ta l R ights will be u n d e rm in e d . U n d e r th is provision, th e C h a rte r is applicable „only in th e case o f en fo rcem en t o f U n io n law “. T he scope o f this ph rase is h ig h ly controversial.43 A t first glance, th e n ew case law o f th e E C J o n th e „substance o f th e rights o f a U n io n citizen “ is an an tith esis to th e cited reg u lation: w hereas o n th e o n e h a n d , A rticle 51 o f th e C h a rte r presupposes th e ap p licab ility o f U n io n law or even its en fo rcem en t, o n th e o th e r h a n d , th e in terferen ce in th e core o f th e rights o f a citizen o f th e U n io n is conceived as a trigger o f th e app licab ility o f U n io n law.
It has to be a d m itte d th a t th e com plex, m ulti-level system o f p ro te c tio n o f fu n d a m e n ta l rights w ith in th e E U c o u ld be fu rth e r com p licated . H o w e ver, co n flictin g in te rp re ta tio n s can be avoided entirely. It m u st first be b o rn e in m in d th a t A rticle 51 applies on ly to m a tters governed by th e C h a rte r o f F u n d a m e n ta l R ights.44 Parallel to th e C h a rter, th e u n w ritte n fu n d a m e n ta l rights developed as general p rinciples o f U n io n law by th e E C J c o n tin u e to exist. This parallelism is explicitly sta te d in p rim a ry E u ro p e a n law, in A rt. 6 para. 3 T E U .
T he ru lin g in R u i z Z a m b r a n o c o u ld be conceived as a sta rtin g p o in t for yet an o th er, th ird level o f fu n d a m e n ta l rights p ro te c tio n . It w o u ld in clu d e those fu n d a m e n ta l rights, w h ic h c o n stitu te th e core o f th e rights o f a E U citizen. As c o m p a re d to th e C h a rte r a n d to th e general p rinciples, th is th ird level w o
42 On this issue from the perspective of German constitutional law see P.M. Huber, Unionsbürg erschaft, EuR 2013, p. 650 ff.
43 See J. Meyer, S. Magiera, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden 2011, Art. 51, No. 30-30a. For recent case law see Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson [2013] and the critique of the German constitutional Court and academics in Germany see D. Thym, Die Reichweite der EU-Grundrechte-Charta — Z u viel Grundrechtsschutz?, NVwZ 2013, p. 889 et seq.
44 This question is controversial, see W. Weiß, Grundrechtsschutz durch den EuGH: Tendenzen seit Lissabon, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 2013, p. 288. A different inter pretation would not be compatible with the wording of Art. 51 of the Charta („The provisions of this Charter are addressed to ...“).
u ld be, o f course, d e p ic ted by a w id e p ersonal scope o f th e rights conferred: o n ly th e status o f a citizen o f th e U n io n w o u ld activate th e p ro te c tio n u n d e r U n io n law. B ut even in th is respect, it sh o u ld be n o te d th a t th e th ird -c o u n try n atio n als w o u ld enjoy at best o n ly derivative p ro te c tio n . M oreover, th e level o f m aterial p ro te c tio n g ra n te d o n th e basis o f th e R u i z Z a m b r a n o ru lin g c o u ld n o t be c o m p are d to th e level o f p ro te c tio n g ra n te d by th e C h a rta a n d th e general principles. Even th e choice o f w ords - „the su b stan ce o f th e ri g h ts“ - illustrates this. C urrently, on ly th e rig h t n o t to be co m p elled to leave th e te rrito ry o f th e U n io n , has been accep ted as b elo n g in g to th is substance. It is u n lik ely th a t th e C o u rt will display p artic u la r a m b itio n s to ex ten d th e area o f th e „substance o f rights”. T he E C J as „ m o to r o f in te g ra tio n “ sh o u ld n o t w o rk as a m b itio u sly in th e area o f citizenship as it does in o th e r fields o f law.45 In th is regard, th e tra d itio n a l m ark et- or m o b ility - o rie n te d ap p ro ach is m o re efficient th a n th e n e w o n e based o n citizenship. T he rig h t o f residence o f a spouse o f a U n io n citizen w h o has exercised th e freedom o f m o v em en t - ju st to lo o k at th e cases o f C a rp e n te r a n d M e to ck 46- has a b ro ad er scope th a n th e rig h t o f residence based o n a U n io n citizenship o f a p erso n w ho stays in his h o m e country, as it can be seen in th e case o f M cC arth y , w h ich is th e citizenship ap p ro a ch ju d g e m e n t.47 So far, th e E C J show s th a t different n a tio n a l regulations can be to le ra te d m o re easily in respect o f „th e substance o f th e rig h ts“ th a n in th e presence o f th e cross-border elem ent. In fact, th e fu n c tio n in g o f th e U n io n as a legal c o m m u n ity does in th e case o f a purely n a tio n a l issue n o t d e p e n d to th e sam e ex ten t o n th e u n ifo rm ity o f th e ap p li ca tio n a n d th e in te rp re ta tio n o f U n io n law as it does in th e case o f th e use o f freedom o f m o v em en t. T herefore an im p o rta n t a rg u m e n t48 for th e d y n am ic d ev elo p m e n t o f U n io n law by E C J does n o t apply.
T he rig h t o f residence o f fam ily m em b ers o f a U n io n citizen is also co n si d ered a classic exam ple o f th e so-called „reverse d isc rim in a tio n “, w h ich exists w h en citizens o f o th e r E U M e m b e r States are b e tte r o ffc o m p a re d to residents for reasons o f U n io n law. T herefore, th e q u e stio n arises w h e th e r th e co n cep t o f „th e su b stan ce o f th e rights o f a U n io n citizen “ defused th e p ro b le m o f reverse d iscrim in atio n . A t first glance, th e p o te n tia l o f th e n ew ap p ro ach can n o t be neglected.49 Since a possible v io latio n o f „th e su b stan ce o f th e rig h ts“
45 For a different opinion see S. Haack, op. cit., No. 23, 34. 46 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2001]; Case C-127/08 Metock [2008]. 47 Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2009].
48 Regarding the reasons for the dynamic interpretation see R. Bieber, A. Epiney, M. Haag, Die Europäische Union, 10. Aufl., Baden-Baden 2013, § 9, No. 5.
49 The ruling of Ruiz Zambrano is interpreted as a prohibition of the discrimination of own nationals by J. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 318. See also A. Mohay, D. Muhvic, op. cit., p. 171 f.
is n o t lim ite d to th e crossing o f a frontier, th e su b stan ce o f th e rights can be affected by p u rely in tern al situ atio n s w ith in o ne M e m b e r State. H e n c e th e status o f a n a tio n a l can be affected w ith o u t h im leaving his h o m e c o u n try if h e considers h im se lf disad v an tag ed c o m p ared to a E U im m ig ra n t.50 This situ a tio n is o f co n cern w ith regard to th e equal tre a tm e n t c o m m a n d m e n ts c o n ta in e d in th e c o n stitu tio n s o f th e M e m b e r States.
T he c o n stitu tio n a l p ro b lem im p o sed by E u ro p ean U n io n law d iscrim in a tio n is n o t solved by th e new ju d g m e n t, b u t at best relocated. Even if o ne were to assum e th a t E u ro p ean citizenship d e m an d s equal tre a tm e n t o f all E U citi zens a n d th u s also p ro h ib its reverse d iscrim in atio n , this does n o t apply to all residents, b u t o n ly for th o se w h o possess th e citizenship o f th e U n io n . Thus, a n o th e r co n stitu tio n al p ro b lem w o u ld o pen up: th e p ro b lem o f disadvantage o f residents w ith o u t citizenship o f th e U n io n in relation to E U citizens. For exam ple, according to th e G e rm a n co n stitu tio n , th e possession o f a certain n a tio n ality alone does n o t justify a different tre a tm e n t o f foreigners — except from a few exceptions pro v id ed by th e c o n stitu tio n itself. D ifferentiations n eed to be m easured according to th e general p rin cip le o f equality, w h ich is codified in A rt. 3 para. 1 o f th e G e rm a n Basic Law.51 F u rth erm o re , n o t all dif ferentiations betw een citizens o f th e U n io n w o u ld be covered, b u t only those falling u n d e r th e area o f “substance th e rights”. T h e concept o f “th e substance o f rights” w o u ld be th a n o f no use for G e rm a n brew eries th a t do n o t w an t to brew according to th e G e rm a n p u rity law 52 — an o th e r classic exam ple o f n a tio nal d iscrim in atio n — even if th e brew er is a citizen o f th e U n io n . W h e th e r th e R u i z Z a m b r a n o ru lin g applies to th e case o f d o m estic legal persons suffering from a less favourable tre a tm e n t in relation to legal persons from o th e r E U co u n tries is d o u b tfu l, given th a t th e w o rd in g o f th e provisions o n citizenship relate to n a tu ral persons only; th e extent to w h ich a co rresp o n d in g application o f th e Z a m b r a n o app ro ach is possible, rem ains unclear.53
50 A.G. Sharpston requested a clarification by the ECJ in the case of Ruiz Zambrano, see A.G. Sharpston 30.09.2010, No. 143—144.
51 See T. Milej, Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Unterscheidung nach dem Merkmal der Staatsangehörig keit im Bereich der gewährenden Staatstätigkeit, NVwZ 2013, p. 689.
52 As a result of a free movement of goods, beer fabricated in violation of medieval German purity law in the EU member States other than Germany may be sold on the German market, whereas such beer fabricated in Germany may not.
53 There are some TFEU provisions, which confer certain rights expressis verbis to both citizens of the Union as well as legal persons, such as Article 228 TFEU, which codifies the right to refer a complaint to the European Citizens’ Rights Ombudsman. It can this be concluded that legal persons can enjoy certain civil rights only if this is expressly so provided in the Treaty. For an application of civil rights to legal persons see Ch. Callies, M. Ruffert, W. Kluth, EUV/AEUV, 4th edition, München 2011, Art. 20, No. 10. Sceptical J. Schwarze, U. Becker, A. Hatje, J. Schoo, EU-Kommentar, 3th edition, Baden-Baden 2012, Art. 20 AEUV, No. 11.
C o n c lu sio n
T he fu n d a m e n ta l p ro b le m o f th e n ew ap p ro ach o f th e E C J is th e vagueness o f th e co n c ep t o f th e „substance o f th e rig h ts“ o f a U n io n citizen .54 W e leave th e fam iliar a n d w e do n o t k n o w w here to h e a d for. W e w a n t m o re th a n just a m ark et citizen, b u t w e do n o t k n o w exactly w h at depicts a citizen o f th e U n io n . W e do n o t even k n o w in w h ic h area to search for a d e fin itio n o f th e su b stan ce o f E u ro p e a n citizenship. T he e n u m e ra tio n o f civil rights o f th e U n io n in A rticle 20 et seq T F E U is o p en a n d to be developed. T he ex ten sive catalogue o f values a n d objectives o f in te g ra tio n , w h ich can be fo u n d in A rt. 2 a n d 3 T E U , does h ard ly give an y g u idance, as som e o f th e values a n d objectives are m u tu a lly exclusive. T he sam e is tru e for th e ab stract ideas in v o k ed in th e literatu re, such as equality or freed o m 55 or - h ere is a q u o te - „views a b o u t life in ju st (m aybe even good) c o n d itio n s“.56 H ow ever, th e new ap p ro ach o f th e E C J does n o t au to m atica lly lead to a su p ra n a tio n a l state. It is ra th e r a m o d erate change o f law a n d a c o n trib u tio n o f th e C o u rt to a closer U n io n o f th e peoples o f E u ro p e , w h ic h th e p ream bles o f th e fo u n d in g T re aties have repeatedly since 1951 declared as th e aim o f E u ro p ean in teg ratio n . It is a sm all step w ith great sym bolic pow er. It show s th a t th e C o u rt u n d e r stan d s th e E u ro p ean U n io n n o t on ly as a m ark et b u t also as a polity.
Streszczenie
Istota p ra w obyw atelstw a U nii w najn ow szym orzeczn ictw ie TSUE - potencjał i o g ran ic ze n ia
Orzecznictwo T SU E kontynuujące linię orzeczniczą rozpoczętą wyrokiem w sprawie Ruiz Z am brano stało się przyczynkiem do dyskusji o rozszerzeniu zakresu prawa poby tu w U E dla krewnych obywateli U nii. Orzecznictwo to nasuwa jednak także pytania bardziej zasadniczej natury: D o jakiego stopnia obywatel U nii jest kimś więcej, aniżeli tylko uczestnikiem W spólnego Rynku? Czy sama koncepcja obywatelstwa U nii może stanowić źródło, z którego da się wywieść niepisane prawa? Czy koncepcja ta stanowi rozszerzenie zakresu ochrony praw podstawowych, czy może także sprzeczne z traktata m i rozszerzenie kom petencji UE? O raz wreszcie, jakie wnioski da się n a podstawie tego orzecznictwa wyciągnąć co do charakteru praw nego samej Unii? Niniejszy tekst stanowi próbę odpowiedzi n a te pytania.
Słowa kluczowe: obywatelstwo U nii, prawo pobytu, elem ent transgraniczny, podm io towy zakres stosowania traktatów, istota praw obywatela U nii
54 This point ofview is shared by both supporters (D. Kochenov, R. Plender, op. cit., p. 390-391; D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 122) and critics (see K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, op. cit, p. 2013) of the new approach.
55 See D. Kochenov, op. cit., p. 132. 56 M. Nettesheim, op. cit., p. 1032.
