A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FOLIA OECONOMICA 182, 2004
A nna K rajewska
IM P A C T O F T H E S H A D O W E C O N O M Y O N IN C O M E D IF F E R E N T IA T IO N IN T R A N S IT IO N C O U N T R IE S
O ne o f the essential phenom ena that accom pany the process o f econom ic transform ation in post-com m unist countries is rapid grow th in the size o f the grey econom y in econom y as a whole. A lthough it is difficult to define the issue precisely, how ever, generally speaking it is an econom ic activity run outside the state registration and regulation, that is, not covered with taxation. T his includes both legal activities that are not subject to taxation and illegal operations, such as crim inal activities.
T here are a lot o f term s that are used to name the phenom enon. They are as follows: grey econom y, black econom y, underground econom y, subterranean, second econom y, shadow , inform al, irregular, hidden, occult, parallel econom y. All o f them may be found in w orldw ide publications what m eans that the problem is perm anent and exists in each econom y (K rajew ska 1998, p. 89). D ifferences refer to scale and forms of the phenom enon. It is estim ated, that in the years 20 00-2001 level o f output produced in the underground econom y in the O EC D countries accounted for 19.7% o f G D P and that 15.3% o f population in w orking age was em ployed there (Schneider 2000). Size o f the grey econom y was relatively the low est in Sw itzerland, Japan, the N etherlands, Germ any, France and G reat B ritain (below 10% o f GDP). In the European Union countries, the shadow econom y is the most developed in Spain (25% o f G DP) and in G reece (30% ) (H erer, Sadowski 1996, p. 32).
In transition countries the shadow econom y developed already in the prelim inary stage o f transform ation process, am ounting to 23.4% o f G D P in the Central and Eastern E urope countries and to 32.9% in the form er Soviet Union countries. On the turn o f 2000 and 2001 the size o f the grey econom y in the countries o f C entral and Eastern Europe increased to 29.2% , w hile in the form er Soviet Union countries to 44.8% , in some countries (A zerbeijan, K azakhstan) exceeding even 60% o f G D P (see Tab. 1).
Table 1. The size o f the shadow econom y in transition countries
1 ransition countries
Size o f the shadow econom y (as % o f GDP) Employment in the shadow econom y (as % o f working age population) Average 1 990 -1 9 9 3 Average 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 1 Central and Eastern European Countries
Bulgaria 27.1 36.4 30.4 Croatia 24.6 32.4 2 7 .4 Czech Republic 13.1 18.4 12.6 Hungary 22.3 24.4 20.9 M acedonia 35.6 45.1 35.1 Poland 22.3 27.4 20.9 Slovakia 15.1 18.3 16.3 Slovenia 22.9 26.7 2 1 .6
Average in Central and Eastern European Countries
23.4 2 9 .2 23.3
Former Soviet Union Countries
Armenia 40.1 45.3 40.3 Azerbaijan 45.1 60.1 50.7 Belarus 35.6 47.1 40.9 Estonia 34.3 39.1 33.4 Georgia 45.1 66.1 53.2 Kazakhstan 31.9 4 2 .2 33.6 Kyrgyzstan 35.2 39.4 29.4 Latvia 25.7 39.6 29.6 Lithuania 26.0 29.4 20.3 M oldavia 29.3 44 1 35.1 Ukraine 29.4 51.2 4 1 .2 Uzbekistan 22.1 33.4 33.2
A verage in Former S oviet U nion 32.9 44.8 37.1
S o u r c e : Schneider 2000.
T here are som e causes o f rapid developm ent o f the shadow econom y in transition countries:
1) high tax burdens that determ ine legal and physical persons to avoid taxation (in theory the argum ent is often explained with the use o f the Laffer curve);
2) high social insurance contributions stim ulating private em ployers, especially sm all ones to illegal em ploym ent (Ikiz 2 0 0 0 )';
1 For exam ple in Bulgaria a typical situation in small and medium enterprises is as follow s: social contributions and taxes are paid on the basis o f the minimum w age, w hile the remaining part o f w age is paid unofficially. In 1999 the private sector produced about 65.3% o f G DP and em ployed 63.3% o f total em ploym ent, and insurance firms received on ly 50% o f due contributions.
3) weak and ineffective system o f tax adm inistration-low exaction o f taxes, low sanctions for avoiding taxes (not com parable with advantages), inefficient execution o f penalties;
4) excessively bureaucratic, tim e-consum ing adm inistrative and legal regulations stim ulating activities in the underground econom y;
5) ineffective, corrupt governm ent institutions and existence o f ties between political parties and business that favour illegal econom ic activity;
6) weak banking system which often allow s the financial sources for econom ic activity to com e from illegal activities;
7) high unem ploym ent rate and ineffective system o f social security conducive to illegal em ploym ent;
8) low level o f national incom e and big share o f natural econom y (especially in rural regions and sm all towns);
9) geographical location o f som e countries (international com m unication routes) favouring big, illegal transactions and border trade on a sm aller scale (the so-called ants trading w ith alcohol and cigarettes).
T he econom ic literature (Ikiz 2000) points at the follow ing negative aspects o f high share o f the grey econom y:
1) basic econom ic indicators such as level and dynam ics o f G D P, inflation, em ploym ent are distorted - the governm ent does not posses reliable fundam ents for rational econom ic policy;
2) unfair com petition in relation to legally acting entities that have higher costs due to paying taxes and social insurance contributions;
3) higher budget deficit due to lower tax contributions;
4) higher interest rate, as in the conditions o f low tax exaction the alternative forms o f financing public spending are state bonds. G row ing supply o f bonds is accom panied by higher interest rates that increase dem and for the bonds;
5) w eak social security system as illegal w orkers do not pay social contributions;
6) negative social valuation o f the governm ent is not favourable for im plem entation o f the reform s increasing efficiency o f econom ic policy.
M entioned above argum ents on disadvantages o f the underground econom y live out o f account one essential issue: deepening incom e differentiation and its social and econom ic consequences. The paper will especially focus on this aspect o f the grey econom y.
H ow ever, in order to avoid one-sided picture o f the shadow econom y, one should point at som e positive aspects o f its existence. E specially, the shadow econom y contributes to (Ikiz 2000):
1) stim ulation o f econom ic grow th due to lack o f formal lim its concerning production level;
2) increase o f em ploym ent which im proves situation on the official labour market;
3) grow th in incom es o f population what stim ulates dem and;
4) w eakening or delay the social discontent resulting from low rate o f econom ic grow th, high unem ploym ent, etc.
It should be underlined, however, that positive aspects o f the shadow econom y act effectively only in a short run. D issem ination o f the grey econom y may cause intensification o f strong negative effects in a long run.
In literature o f seventies and eighties on developed econom ies the argum ents may be found that high taxes and high social transfers may increase the size of the grey econom y. On one hand, there exist strong spurs for avoiding taxes, and high unem ploym ent benefits incline to keep the status o f the unem ployed, on the other. Finally, high taxes and transfers lead to m ore equal distribution of incom es. H ow ever, it was also pointed that this may take place at the cost of growth o f the size o f shadow econom y (Feige 1979; Frey, Pom m erehne 1984). A hypothesis was even form ulated that w elfare slate finds itself in extrem ely frustrating situation, as redistributing effects o f tax policy lead to lover budget revenues, and this in turn threatens the existence o f a w elfare state concept (Streit 1984, pp. 109-119).
It is worth to m ention that in transition countries a direction o f relationships between taxes, social inequality and size of the shadow econom y is different than in developed m arket econom ies.
C entrally planned econom y was characteristic o f low differentiation o f incom es. It was criticised for lack o f spurs for stim ulating initiative, im plem entation o f innovations and taking risky activities, w hich are driving forces o f m arket econom y. It was assum ed then that grow ing differentiation o f incom es would result in higher dynam ics o f the econom y through stim ulation o f entrepreneurship, increase in labour productivity, im plem entation o f technical and organisational progress.
Since the beginning o f transition process the shadow econom y has been grow ing rapidly, and the sam e refers to differentiation o f incom es. Am erican econom ists’ em pirical research points at strong correlation (0.76) (R osser, Rosser, Ahm ed 2000) betw een the size o f shadow econom y and the level o f incom e differentiation m easured with the use of Gini coefficient, as well as strong correlation (0.705) (R osser, Rosser, Ahm ed 2000) betw een changes in size o f the grey econom y and changes o f Gini coefficient. T he researchers also tried to find ties betw een the size o f shadow econom y and different variables in 18 transition countries. Synthetic results o f the investigation are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. The size o f the shadow econom y and other basic data on transition countries Countries SE Д SE Gini Д Gini Drop in production Max.
inflation WEk Dem.
Taxation labour capital Belarus 15.0 - 0 .4 0.248 0.014 39.3 1,994.0 37 50 71 99.2 Bulgaria 29.4 6.7 0 .340 0 .110 27.4 338.8 73 83 57 93.5 Czech Rep. 17.2 11. 2 0.239 0.035 21.4 52.1 90 92 69 85.2 Estonia 24.6 5.7 0.392 0.127 34.9 946.7 90 75 49 74.9 Georgia 62.2 37.7 0 .560 0 .270 74.9 8,273.5 37 33 - -Hungary 28.1 1.1 0.243 0.02 18.3 34.6 87 92 73 81.0 Kazakhstan 306 13.6 0.328 0.053 51.2 2,5 6 6 .6 40 25 62 9 8 .6 Kyrgyzstan 39.2 16.3 0.553 0.293 50.6 1,365.6 77 58 58 96.7 Latvia 32.6 19.8 0.2 7 0 0.018 52.0 958.2 80 75 55 80.0 Lithuania 30.2 18.9 0.348 0 .100 61.1 1,162.6 83 83 53 9 4 .7 M oldavia 36.8 18.7 0 .3 6 0 0. 111 60.6 2 ,1 9 8 .4 57 50 37 9 7 .2 Poland 15.8 0.1 0 .3 1 0 0.045 17.8 6 39.6 87 83 62 84.0 Romania 16.9 - 5 .4 0.278 0.048 26.4 295.5 73 58 57 94.2 Russia 38.5 23.8 0 .4 4 6 0.1 8 6 48.3 2,5 1 0 .4 67 58 55 97.8 Slovakia 15.4 9.4 0.2 0 0 0.0 25.1 58.3 87 75 68 87.6 Slovenia 25.0 - 1 .7 0.251 0 .036 16.8 246.7 83 92 63 92 .6 Ukraine 41.8 25.5 0 .330 0.098 52.1 10,155.0 27 58 63 99.3 Uzbekistan 9.8 - 1 .6 0 .330 0.038 15.6 1,232.8 43 25 45 97.8 Explanations:
SE - size o f the shadow econom y as % o f G DP in 1994
Д SE - change in size o f the shadow econom y betw een 1989 and 1994 (in %)
Gini - Gini coefficien t in 1994. The coefficient is between 0 and 1; the higher the value o f the coefficient, the more unequal incom e distribution
Д Gini - changes in Gini coefficient between 1989 and 1994
Drop in production - cumulated drop in the level o f output between 1989 and 1994 Max. inflation - m aximum annuall inflation after 1989 (in %)
WEk - econ om ic liberty (liberalisation) coefficient - contained between 0 and 100; the higher the coefficient the higher level o f libaralisation
Dem. - dem ocracy o f the system coefficient - contained between 0 and 100; the higher the coefficient the higher level o f democracy
Labour taxation - effective marginal labour taxation rate (in %)
Capital taxation - effective marginal capital incom es taxation rate (in %)
S o u r c e: J. B. Rosser, M. V. Rosser, 2001.
A nalysed countries may be divided into several groups taking into account the size o f the shadow econom y and other econom ic and social variables.
The first group consists o f Czech R epublic, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary. D rop in production connected with transition shock was relatively low er there, dem ocratic processes are the most advanced, and m acroeconom ic stability is sustained. T he size o f the grey econom y is relatively insignificant; from about 15% (Slovakia, Poland) to 25% (Slovenia) and 28% (H ungary). At the sam e tim e differentiation o f incom es is low in the analysed countries (Gini coefficient accounts for from 0.31 in Poland to 0.2 in Slovenia). Effective
marginal rate o f labour taxation is am ongst the highest in transition econom ies, while taxation o f capital is relatively low.
R ussia, U kraine, M oldavia and G eorgia create a group clearly different from mentioned above C entral and Eastern European countries. Drop in production was very deep there at the prelim inary stage o f transition. T he grey econom y was developed, econom ic system was unstable, distribution o f incom es more unequal and higher marginal taxation o f capital (but with low er rate o f labour taxation).
B ulgaria and R om ania have been transform ing their econom ies with a delay. Size o f the shadow econom y is sim ilar to that in rem aining E uropean p ost com m unist countries. In Rom ania the share o f the grey econom y was closer to that observed in Poland, but differentiation o f incom es was not so high. In B ulgaria relatively larger size o f the grey econom y was accom panied by higher income differentiation. L abour and capital tax burdens were close to those existing in rem aining transition econom ies o f Central and E astern Europe.
Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) set up the next group of countries. Progress in econom ic transition process as well as dem ocratisation of social and political life there was com parable with that o f C entral and Eastern European countries. H ow ever, the shadow econom y is bigger there and income differentiation has been grow ing quickly. T here also exist som e differences betw een m entioned countries. In Estonia the size o f the shadow econom y was the low est (24.6% ), but incom e differentiation was the highest (Gini coefficient accounted for 0.392). In Latvia income differentiation was low er (0.270), but the share o f the grey econom y am ounted to 32.6% o f GDP. M oreover, the countries introduced a tax reform based on proportional taxation o f physical and legal persons and the same PIT and CIT rates (besides Lithuania). Effective marginal rate o f labour taxation was significantly low er than effective m arginal rate of capital taxation.
In the C entral A sia countries a situation was differentiated. For exam ple in K yrgyzstan, w here transform ation process was evaluated as highly advanced, the share of the shadow econom y in GDP was high (39.2% ) as well as income differentiation (Gini coefficient o f 0.553). In U zbekistan, w here progress in liberalisation and dem ocratisation was evaluated significantly lower, the size of the grey econom y was insignificant (9.8% o f G D P) while differentiation of incom es was sim ilar to that existing in the Central European countries.
T he case o f B elarus is totally exceptional and untypical. Small size o f the shadow econom y and relatively equal distribution o f incom es accom pany undem ocratic and unreform ed econom ic system.
The W orld Bank em pirical research concerning differentiation o f incom es in different regions o f the world (Tab. 3) proves rapid grow in inequalities (m easured with the use o f Gini coefficient) in transition econom ies.
Table 3. Gini coefficients in some regions o f the world
R egions and countries Years
Latin America 1990 1999 Argentina 0.501 0 .542 Brazil 0 .627 0 .6 4 0 Bolivia 0.538 0 .5 8 6 Chile 0 .5 5 4 0 .5 5 9 (2000) M exico 0 .536 0 .539
Caucasus and Central Asia Countries 1987-1990 1996-1999 Armenia 0.27 0.59 Georgia 0.29 0.43 Kyrgyzstan 0.31 0.47 Kazakhstan 0.30 0.35 Tajikistan 0.28 0.47 Turkmenistan 0.28 0.45 CIS Countries 1987-1990 1996-1999 Russia 0.26 0.47 Ukraine 0.24 0.33 M oldavia 0.27 0.42
Central Europe and Baltic Countries 1987-1990 1996-1999 Czech Republic 0.19 0.25 Hungary 0.21 0.25 Slovenia 0.22 0.25 Poland 0.28 0.33 Lithuania 0.23 0.3 4 Latvia 0.24 0.32 Estonia 0.24 0.37
European Union Countries Average in 1980 Average in 1990
Sweden 0 .2 0 0.23 Belgium 0 .2 6 0.27 The Netherlands 0.24 0.25 France 0.28 0.28 Germany 0.27 0.28 Italy 0.31 0.35 Great Britain 0.29 0.31
Non-European OECD Countries
USA 0.34 0 .3 4
Canada 0.29 0.29
Australia 0.31 0.31
S o u r c e : The W orld Bank 2000, OECD 2001, ECLAC 2 002, cited from: S. G olinow ska, 2002.
In transition countries there is a growth in both incom e inequalities and activities the in shadow economy. However, defining the direction o f relationships is not an easy task. On one hand, developm ent o f the grey econom y leads to higher social differentiation, as:
1) econom ic entities do not pay taxes and social contributions so they have higher disposable incom es;
2) thanks to illegal activity and corruption a part o f the society grows richer quickly, how ever often at the cost of grow ing im poverishm ent o f the others;
3) low er budget revenues result in lower social paym ents and do not reduce disproportion o f incom es;
4) in term s o f high unem ploym ent the w orkers’ pow er is w eaker (especially those em ployed in the shadow econom y), as they accept w orse w orking standard and low er wages.
On the other hand, one should lake into account occurrence o f a kind of feedback. Income inequalities, especially in connection with lack o f m acroeconom ic stability favour developm ent o f the grey econom y. Low social transfers and high unem ploym ent make illegal em ploym ent easy, what turns into further im poverishm ent and pauperisation of the society.
D eepening unacceptable social inequalities leads to serious econom ic and social co nseq uences (G olinow ska 2002, p. 29). T hey are especially: poverty and social ex clusion, pressure on grow th in social paym ents cau sin g the increase in taxes and con tribu tions, lim ited p o ssib ilities o f d evelopm ent of hum an capital and c itiz e n ’s society, grow th o f aggressive b eh avio ur and crim inality, as well as occurrence o f group social co n flicts leading to reduction o f stability o f d evelopm ent and w ithdraw al the foreign capital (G olinow ska 2002, pp. 3 0 -3 1 ).
In literature evaluating the progress o f econom ic reform s in transition countries an attention is usually paid to threatens connected w ith rapid developm ent o f the shadow econom y, especially in a context o f negative im pact on the level o f budget revenues and danger o f deepening budget deficit (Johnson, K aufm ann, Shleifer 1997). R elationship betw een the level o f tax rates and developm ent o f entrepreneurship is pointed at, and low ering tax burdens in transition countries is postulated (M itra, Stern 2002). H ow ever, R ossers’ investigation indicates that impact o f tax burdens on the size o f the shadow econom y is not so obvious as it is usually suggested.
Baltic S ta tes’ experiences do not prove the next myth. Progressive personal incom e taxation is often treated as essential factor stim ulating developm ent of the grey econom y. A dvocates o f proportional tax bank on increase o f budget revenues and reduction o f the shadow econom y. H ow ever, in Baltic States budget revenues are relatively low and the shadow econom y and incom e inequalities higher that for exam ple in the W ysehrad G roup countries, where taxes are progressive (K rajew ska, Krajewski 2003, pp. 171-182).
On the turn o f eighties and nineties the so-called W ashington C onsensus becam e a trial o f creation a fram ew ork for the role o f the state in the economy. The W orld Bank, the International M onetary Fund and other influential international institutions traced out a direction o f econom ic policy leading to breakdow n the stagnation and acceleration o f econom ic grow th. T he key areas constituted privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation o f trade, restrictive fiscal policy, tax reform (w idening tax basis and low ering tax rates) and creation the conditions for free inflow o f direct foreign investm ents (W illiam son 1993).
E xperiences from the second h alf o f nineties such as global fin ancial crisis, drop in the rate o f econom ic grow th, deepenin g technological gap and w idening incom e differen tiatio n betw een rich and p oor cou n tries create a need for d ifferen t view at the W ashington C onsensus instrum ents. T he role o f legal and institutional system , com petition, ex pend itu res on edu cation and science and fair distrib u tio n in stim ulation o f econom ic grow th is m ore and m ore clearly seen. A ch aracteristic thing is that leading international organisations, enriched w ith exp erien ces from transition econom ies, are p recu rso rs o f new thinking and are not afraid o f serious changes in th eir opinions that previously becam e fundam ents o f the W ashington C o n sen sus (K ołodko 1999, pp. 119-140). It is w orth to cite views o f the W orld B ank and the IM F concerning d istrib u tio n o f incom es. In “W orld D ev elop m ent R ep ort 1996” the authors un derline that “definition o f social consensus w ill be a key facto r for succeeding transfo rm ation in a long run, as com parativ e analyses in differen t coun tries prove that societies with high property-incom e in equ alities are as a rule less stable in political and social aspects; they are also ch aracteristic o f low er rate o f investm ents and grow th” (K olodko 1999, p. 133) M ichel C om dessus, a c h ie f o f the International M onetary Fund, has a sim ilar opinion: “At the m om ent w e know that bigger cake is not enough. T he way o f its d istribution is the sam e im portant as dynam ics o f d evelopm ent (K ow alik 2002, p. 129)” .
A ccording to J. E. S tiglitz, in developing cou ntries privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation are not enough for en su ring long-term grow th o f the econom y. A consensus on the reform s is necessary. R eform s should not be adapted from outside, as they do not guarantee success. Institution al changes are im portant, but redistribution o f incom es is im portant as well (S tig litz 2001, p. 2).
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Anna Krajewska
W P Ł Y W SZ A R E J STR EFY NA Z R Ó Ż N IC O W A N IE D O C H O D Ó W W T R A N SF O R M U JĄ C Y C H SIĘ G O S P O D A R K A C H
We wszystkich transformujących się gospodarkach szybko rośnie udział szarej strefy w gospodarce. R ośnie także zróżnicow anie dochodów. Trudno jednak określić kierunek zależności m iędzy tymi zjawiskami. Z jednej strony, rozwój szarej strefy gospodarki prowadzi do wzrostu zróżnicow ania dochod ów , z drugiej jednak nierówności dochodow e, zw łaszcza powiązane z brakiem stabilizacji, sprzyjają rozwojow i szarej strefy. N isk i poziom św iadczeń socjalnych i w ysokie bezrobocie sprzyjają wzrostowi zatrudnienia w szarej gospodarce, co z kolei pogłębia nierów ności i prowadzi do pauperyzacji społeczeństwa.
Szara strefa jest w literaturze z reguły analizowana z punktu w idzenia uszczuplania dochod ów budżetow ych (z powodu unikania podatków). W artykule nacisk jest natomiast p ołożony na sp ołeczn e konsekw encje rozwoju szarej strefy oraz zagrożenia dla kontynuacji prorynkowych reform w transformujących się gospodarkach.
