A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FO LIA LIN G U IST IC A 36, 1997
PA R T II. TH EO RETICAL A N D APPLIED ISSUES
A lina K w iatkow ska
G E S T A L T P R IN C IP L E S IN L IN G U IS T IC S
1. IN TRO D U C TIO N
T h e tw o studies th a t follow have been m o tiv a te d by the w ork d o n e w ithin th e so-called “cognitive linguistics” paradigm (as represented by th e research o f such linguists as L ang acker, L akoff, T alm y an d others). T his tren d in m o d ern linguistics is experientialist in n a tu re , in th a t it lays em phasis o n th e sp eakers’ in teractio n w ith their physical en v iro n m en t an d o n th e close ties betw een p erception an d language. Som e o f th o se linguists seem to be evading the q u estio n o f the extent o f this closeness. I ten d to o p t fo r the strongest possible hypothesis - th e direct o p p o site o f th e linguistic determ inism p o stu lated by W h o r f [1956]: I believe th a t linguistic coding is determ ined by the hu m an perceptual system . A s h u m an percep tio n is visually oriented, the pro p erties o f language are largely d eterm in ed by th e n a tu re o f the visual process. T herefo re I strongly believe linguists should becom e m o re interested in th e o rg an izatio n o f visual percep tio n , as this could pro v id e them w ith som e valuable insights a b o u t th e s tru c tu re o f language.
O ne th eo ry o f visual p erception th a t has h ad great im p act on su bsequ en t research was the G e sta lt m ovem ent, w hose m em bers arg ued th a t p erceptual processes are d ynam ic ra th e r th a n passive, an d th a t th e p ercep tu al w orld is o rganized in to p a tte rn s o f c o n fig u ra tio n s ra th e r th a n a m o sa ic o f sensations. A lth o u g h these claim s were m ad e a t th e beginning o f th e centu ry, m an y o f the p h en o m en a which the G estaltists uncovered are still being researched and p resent som e o f the m a jo r challenges to p erceptual theory.
2. G ESTA LT PE R C E P T IO N IN V ISIO N
G e sta lt psychologists [ K ö h l e r 1929, 1940, 1947; K o f f k a 1935; W e r t h e i m e r 1923/38] d em o n strate d an d explored th e im p o rtan ce o f p ercep tu al o rg an izatio n , insisting [after v o n E h r e n f e l s 1890] th a t “ th e w hole is m o re th a n the sum o f its p a rts ” . T h e final percept is alw ays m o re th a n th e sim ple co m b in a tio n o f th e sensory elem ents; it has a n a d d itio n a l p ro p e rty w hich von Ehrenfels nam ed G e sta ltq u a litä t (fo rm -qu ality ). T h e h o listic p ercep tio n resu lts from in te rre la tio n s in th e phy sical stim u lu s p a tte rn acco rd in g to som e o rg an izatio n al principles. In the fo rm u latio n o f W e r t h e i m e r :
The way in which parts are seen, in which subwholes emerge, in which grouping occurs, is n o t an arbitrary piecemeal...summ ation of elements, but is a process in which characteristics o f the whole play a m ajor determ ining role. [1938: 135]:
In direct co n tra st to constructivist theorists, w ho argu ed th a t th e p ercept was assem bled by first analyzing the individual details o f the a rra y and th en synthesizing th e overall p a tte rn , the G estaltists held th a t the p rim ary p erceptual im pression was alw ays holistic: th e nervous system is designed to ex tra ct th e gestalt first; it gets aro u n d to th e d etails later. T h is claim was tested experim entally m u ch later in a series o f experim ents carried o u t by N a v o n [1977, 1991]. H is findings suggest th a t global features o f objects are indeed perceived m o re readily th a n local features; he conclud es th a t p erceptual processing proceeds from global stru ctu rin g to w ard s finer d isc rim in atio n (the G lo b al Precedence hypothesis). G lob al precedence m ay be m o tiv a te d biologically. T h e global stru ctu re o f stim uli ten d s to be m ore u niqu e, an d th u s m o re suggestive o f th e iden tity o f the stim u lu s th a n local features. T herefore, w hen there is only sufficient tim e for a p artia l percep tual analysis, it m ay be m o re valuable if one first o b tain s in fo rm a tio n a b o u t th e general stru ctu re o f an object, so th a t it ca n be identified and perceived w ith m inim al delay. Seeing a long th in m oving shap e in th e grass, m o st people instinctively tak e som e definite actio n im m ediately ra th e r th a n sto o p to tak e a n o th e r look to determ ine w hether the sh ap e is really a sn ake and w heth er it is the harm less kind o r otherw ise.
T h e p rin cip les by w hich g ro u p s o f stim uli o rg an ize them selves in percep tio n in to gestalts were first discussed by W e r t h e i m e r [1923], w ho called them “ the laws o f g ro u p in g ” . Several o f th e m o st im p o rta n t ones are the laws o f proxim ity, sim ilarity, “ co m m o n fa te ” , co n tin u ity , con nec- tednesss, closure, and sym m etry. T h e organized w holes tend to stan d o u t as figures ag a in st the less well defined g ro u n d s (cf below). T h e G e sta lt th eo rists observed a general tendency o f percep tio n to “ p re fe r” sim ple,
sym m etrical and closed shapes, i.e. “ good figures” ; they suggested an underly ing “ law o f P rä g n a n z ” (o r “ th e m inim um p rin cip le” ) w hich holds basically th a t a “ g o o d ” percept will have the sim plest o rg a n iz atio n possible in given stim ulus co n d itio n s [cf. K o f f k a 1935: 110].
G e sta ltian researchers also n o ted the fact th a t vision is ch aracterized by p erceptual constancy: th e perceived gestalt stays in v aria n t u n d er vario u s tra n sfo rm a tio n s o f the stim ulus. A n object does n o t ch an ge percep tu ally as its brightness, size, o r location varies w ithin reaso nab le lim its. P eople tend to see objects as the sam e size irrespective o f distance; shapes d o n o t change w hen seen from new positions; colors rem ain th e sam e in differen t illum inations. T h e G estaltists suggested th a t these p h en o m en a are d u e to th e fact th a t stim uli are n o t isolated, b u t always located in a con tex t, w hich they likened to a field o f forces or d ynam ic tensions. T h e ra tio s betw een stim uli in co n tex t rem ain co n stan t, an d so e.g. p ap e r will alw ays a p p e a r w hite an d coal black no m a tte r w h at the level o f illu m in atio n , because it will alw ays reflect relatively m o re light th a n coal.
R esearch on p a tte rn p erception [cf. J u o l a 1979] h as show n th a t the co n tex t in w hich an object is viewed affects the speed o f its perceptio n. P eople find objects m uch m o re rapidly in fam iliar scenes th a n in ones w hose co m p o n en ts are arrang ed u n n atu rally . P resum ably, this is du e to the use o f sto re d in fo rm a tio n a b o u t how o bjects an d th e ir en v iro n m e n ts n o rm ally relate to one an o th er.
T h e G estaltists [e.g. K ö h l e r 1940] described visual p ercep tio n as being realized th ro u g h a series o f interactions betw een percepts, w hich con tin uo usly m odify already established co n fig u ratio n s in th e visual field. A cco rd in g to A r n h e i m [1986: 7]:
Every detail o f inform ation about the representational content o f a picture n o t only adds to w hat we know but changes w hat we see. It is psychologically false to assume th a t nothing is seen but what stim ulates the retinae o f the eyes.
3. AUD ITORY AND C O N C EPTU A L GESTA LTS
M an y researchers have argued for the relevance to linguistics o f th ose G e sta lt psychology findings.
A s has been repeatedly p ointed o u t by various linguists, w ords, phrases, an d sentences are m o re th a n a sum o f their parts: their m ean in g d oes n o t d epend only on its co m ponents, b u t o n an overall stru ctu re . U n d e rsta n d in g a visual im age involves discerning the m eaning o f the w hole in term s o f the re la tio n o f its p arts; sim ilarly, w hen we read or h ea r a sentence, we
arrive a t its m eaning by m ak in g sense o f th e w ords as they relate to each o th er, in a p a rtic u la r speech situation.
It follow s from the G e sta lt position th a t it should be possible to replace the original p a rts o f a w hole w ith o th er p a rts while still m a n ag in g to retain the q u ality o f th e gestalt. T his is obviously tru e o f th e linguistic system , w ith its p o ten tial o f selection from a set o f p arad ig m atically related units w hile still preserving the g ram m atical constru ctio n .
L inguistic co n stru ctio n s m ay be analyzable into p a rts in m o re th a n one w ay, w ith d ifferent pro p erties in the fo regrou nd on each analysis. O n the o th e r h a n d , they m ay be seen as p arts o f larger gestalts o f vario u s kinds (sy n ta c tic , se m a n tic , p ra g m a tic ) w ith w h ich th ey m a y h a v e d iffe rin g relationships.
A spo ken w ord is a perceptual gestalt. In listening we register th e overall p a tte rn and ignore the finer details. H o c k c t t [1987: 41] claim s th a t one situ atio n in w hich this is evident is w hen we are being in tro d u ced to som eone a t a noisy party: the in tro d u c e r’s w ords are clear until the stra n g e r’s nam e is u ttered , b u t w ith th a t nam e, we suddenly discover th a t th e noise-level is higher th a n we h ad realized. P resum ably, we are able to recognize th e gestalt o f a fam iliar and expccted w o rd /p h rase again st a noise level th a t w ould ren d er unrecognizable the details, b u t this is n o t possible in the case o f an u npredictable novel u tterance.
T h e sim ilarities betw een visual perception and speech p ercep tio n are reflected in the sim ilarity o f the m odels designed to a c co u n t fo r a u d ito ry and visual p attern recognition. M odels o f bo th kinds postulate th a t perceptual in p u t activates m em ory in fo rm atio n (a co n cep tu al gestalt), w hich is th en used to an ticip ate o th e r p erceptual events. O ne such m o del o f speech p ercep tio n is the analysis-by-synthesis m odel p ro p o sed by N e i s s e r [1967]; it is sim ilar to G r e g o r y ’ s [1974] theory o f visual perceptio n, in which the observer appro x im ates the correct percept successively, by m ean s o f h ypothesis testing (startin g w ith the m o st general hypothesis).
T h e influence o f overall stru ctu re o n speech perception w as d em o n strated in a classical experim ent by W a r r e n a nd W a r r e n [1970]. T hey presented th eir subjects w ith one o f the follow ing sentences (the asterisk indicates a deleted p o rtio n o f the sentence):
(1) It was fo u n d th a t the *eel was on the table. (2) It was fo u n d th a t the *eel was on th e shoe. (3) It was fo u n d th a t the *eel w as on th e axle. (4) It was found th a t the *eel was on the orange.
Subjects listening to sentence 1 tended to h ea r th e "‘eel as m eal, in sentence 2 it w as heard as heel, in sentence 3 as wheel, in sentence 4 as peel. T h o se observ atio n s su p p o rt the G e sta lt thesis o f th e tend ency o f the p ercep tu al system to a tte n d first to gestalts.
S im ilar to p -d o w n effects are also observed o n o th e r levels o f linguistic o rg a n izatio n . F o r exam ple, w ords are u n d ersto o d faster w hen p resen ted in intelligible sentences; w hen isolated from con tex t they becom e h a rd e r to identify. W ord perception, in tu rn , influences the way syllables and phonem es are heard. O ne illu stra tio n is the p honem ic re sto ratio n effect observed in a n o th e r ex p erim en t by W a r r e n a nd W a r r e n [1970]: th eir subjects tended to perceptually “ fill in ” m issing so und s in a speech stream . A s reg ard s this tendency fo r closure, con sider also such p h en o m en a as o u r being able to follow a conv ersatio n while listening attentively only p a rt o f the tim e, o r reading th ro u g h a novel rap id ly while n o t atte n d in g to every w ord. W e are able to fill in th e m issing p a rts o f the m essage in m u ch the sam e w ay th a t p artly obscured visual objects are perceived accurately by filling in m issing detail.
I have rem arked above th a t “ good figures” in p ercep tio n are com p act, reg u lar, efficient and sim ple form s; th e G e sta ltian “m inim u m p rin cip le” h o ld s th a t, all things being equal, the preferred o rg a n iz atio n o f the percept will be th e sim plest one th a t the circum stances perm it. T h is brings to m ind G r i c e ’ s [1965] C o o p erativ e P rinciple, the general p ra g m a tic principle g overning all con versational interactions:
M ake your contribution such as is required, at the stage a t which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction o f the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
O f the fo u r co n versational m axim s th a t follow from this general pri- ciple, th e M axim o f Q u a n tity and th e M axim o f M a n n e r p u t p a rtic u la r stress o n the “ goodness” o f form . A n u ttera n ce should be n eith er m o re n o r less info rm ativ e th a n is required, it should be clear, brief, an d o r derly - th a t is, the sim plest possible in a given situ atio n a l con tex t. A n d , o f course, such an u tteran ce m u st “ fit” the co n tex t (M axim o f R elev a n ce), i.e. th e h ea rer m u st perceive it as p a r t o f a larger w hole so as to fully discern its m eaning. “ G o o d ” u tterances pro d u ced if we a d h e re to the m axim s (actually, n a tu ra l laws o f o rg an izatio n ) m a k e fo r th e m a x i m ally efficient conversation.
L ike visual objects, w ords are characterized by p ercep tu al con stan cy: a spoken w ord does n o t change perceptually if the loudness, d u ra tio n , or relative pitch p o sitio n is changed. J a k o b s o n [1971] claim ed th a t the sam e essentially relational and topological properties th a t characterize phonological invariance m ay be observed in sem antics. H e posited in v aria n ts o f m ean in g - general as o p p o sed to c o n te x tu a l m ean in g . T h e in v a ria n t sem an tic co m m on d e n o m in a to r o f a form w ould be th a t p ro p e rty o r set o f pro pertiess w hich rem ain c o n sta n t th ro u g h o u t all the specific co n tex tu al ap p lica tio n s o f the form .
A sim ilar distin ctio n was cap tu red by O s g o o d ’ s [1980] Em ic P rinciple. O s g o o d po in ts o u t th a t in b o th perceiving and co m p reh en d in g “ we usually h ave situ atio n s w here percepts are variable b u t th eir significances are c o n s ta n t” [1980: 212]. Physically different ph on es “ co nv erg e” u p o n a co m m on phonem e; and sim ilarly fo r m o rp h s/m o rp h em es and sem es/ /sem em es.
T h e co ncept o f gestalt has been ad o p ted by cognitive linguists, w ho have used it to m ak e very b ro ad claim s a b o u t co n cep tu al o rg a n iz atio n . L a k o f f [1977: 246] m ain tain s th a t “ th o u g h t, perception , the em o tio n s, cognitive processing, m o to r activity, and language are all organized in term s o f ... g estalts” , som e o f w hose p ro perties he describes as follows:
- G estalts are a t once holistic and analyzable. They have parts, but the wholes are not reducible to the parts. They have additional properties by virtue o f being wholes, and the p arts may take on additional significance by virtue o f being within those wholes. [...]
- G estalts may bear external relations to other gestalts. They may be viewed as instances o f other gestalts or m apped onto other gestalts in some other way. [...]
- G estalts m ay be embedded inside other gestalts and m ay take on new properties as a result o f such embeddings. [...]
- G estalts are structures th a t are used in processing, either language processing, thought processing, perceptual processing, m otor activity, or whatever. [...]
L a k o f f ’ s [1982] IC M s (“ idealized cognitive m o d els” ) have m a n y o f the p ro p e rtie s described above.
J o h n s o n [1987] uses a sim ilar concept o f “ experiential gestalts” (he calls them alternatively “ im ag e-schem ata” ), which are “ co h e ren t, m e aningful, unified wholes w ithin o u r experience and co gn ition; they ge n e ra te coherence for, establish unity w ithin, and co n stra in o u r netw o rk o f m e an in g ” [1987: 41]. T h e very definite, highly stru ctu re d im age-sche- m a tic gestalts are “ experientially basic” , m eaning fu l, rep eatab le p a tte rn s w hich give o rd e r to o u r p ercep tio n s, u n d e rs ta n d in g , an d a c tio n s. E x p eriential basicness is a relative m a tte r; Jo h n so n claim s it d ep en ds on “ b a c k g ro u n d know ledge, m o tiv a tio n s, interests, values, an d p rev io u s ex periences” [1987: 62].
W e m ig h t also p o in t o u t the gestalt-like character o f basic-level categories, as described by R osch and h er co llab o rato rs. R o s c h et a l. [1976] have fo u n d th a t th e the m em bers o f basic-level categories have sim ilarly perceived overall shapes, an d the entire category can be represented by a single m ental image. B e r l i n et a l. [1974] have also suggested th a t the fundam ental d e te rm in a n t o f the basic level is the perception o f the overall p art-w h o le co n fig u ratio n , i.e. gestalt perception.
C o ncep tu al gestalt stru ctu res obviously p redeterm in e an d give shap e to linguistic utterances.
4. FIGURE-GROUND DISTINCTION IN PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE
T h e very essence o f visual perception is to find, quickly an d effortlessly, a certain object am on g a vast n u m b er o f u n im p o rta n t ones, i.e. to sep a rate it from its general environm ent. As the G e sta lt psychologists have p ointed o u t, w henever we perceive, we distinguish betw een th e figure in a field o f view an d th e g ro u n d a g a in st w hich it is seen. T h is b asic p ercep tu al p h en o m en o n was explored by K ö h l e r [1940] and K o f f k a [1935]. T h ey observed th a t figures tend to be m o re com plete and co h eren t, better-defined and rem em bered th a n the ground, w hich is seen as less d istin ct, is less atten d ed to an d m o re easily fo rg o tten . T h e figurai area tend s to a p p e a r denser and brighter th an the ground, consistent with hierarchical organization. T hese p ercep tu al processes are in stru m en tal in creating fictional space, i.e. the p ercep t o f a distance in d e p th betw een the tw o regions: th e figure ap p ears to stan d o u t from the ground, which seems to be floating behind it.
In an effort to find the factors th a t determ ine which pieces o f inform atio n will be perceived as figure and which will become the ground, the psychologists o f the G estalt school form ulated their “ principles” o f perceptual o rg an izatio n [ W e r t h e i m e r 1923, K ö h l e r 1929; K o f f k a 1935]. A m o n g the m o st im p o rta n t ones fo r vision are:
P ro x im ity and sim ilarity. E lem ents th a t are close to g e th e r an d are sim ilar in brightness, color, and shape tend to form connected clusters th a t becom e figures.
Closure. B ounded regions an d closed form s are perceived m o re often as figure th a n areas w ith op en co n to u rs. I f a visual p a tte rn is incom plete, th ere is a stro n g p erceptual tendency to fill in any existing gaps.
Area. T h e sm aller a closed region o f a visual cluster, the m o re it ap p e ars to be a figure; an d obviously the larger th e area o f a region is, the m o re it tends to be seen as the g roun d. F o r exam ple, we see th e cu p o n the table, and n o t the table u n d er the cu p [cf. E r t e l 1974].
S ym m etry. T h e m o re sym m etrical a closed region is, the m o re likely it is to a p p e a r as figure.
G ood continuity o r “co m m on fa te ” . A p erceptu al o rg a n iz atio n th a t will m inim ize changes o r interruptions in the contours o f the perceived constituents will be seen as figure. O ne exam ple m ay be the skyline o f a city a t night. In three-dim ension al space, m an y sp o n tan eo u s and dynam ic o rg a n iz atio n s are based on co m m o n m ovem ent. O bjects w hich m ove to g eth er, such as a flock o f birds, tend to be seen as a unit. [cf. J u l e s z a nd H i r s c h 1972: 297].
I here is a stro n g perceptual tendency to perceive th e figure as a good fo rm , i.e. to re g ro u p visual variables or “m isin te rp re t” the actu al d a ta so
th a t they w ould co rresp o n d m o re to geom etric p attern s possessing a stro n g in tern a l stru ctu re [cf. K ö h l e r 1940: 134-5].
V isual fig u re/g ro u n d d istinction has analogies in a u d ito ry p ercep tio n . A n au d ito ry figure is a single event o f b rief d u ra tio n o r a cluster o f events, w hich stand s o u t from its gro u n d - th e ongoing acco m p an im en t w hich is o ften n o t even noticed. I f we tra n sla te space in to tim e (and the co n cep tu al sp atializatio n o f tim e is co m m on in h u m an th in kin g, as has recently been p o in ted o u t by e.g. L a k o f f and J o h n s o n 1980, am o n g o th ers), th e principles fo r the fo rm a tio n o f au d ito ry figures parallel th o se o f th e visual m o d ality . T h u s, as J u l e s z and H i r s c h [1972: 300-305] p o in t o u t, the im p o rta n t facto rs determ in ing the fo rm a tio n o f au d ito ry figures are:
P ro xim ity. S ounds th a t are close to g eth er in tim e ten d to be grou ped in to clusters. In speech, seg m entation and the iden tification o f syllables, w ords, an d tunes results p a rtly from the tem p o ral p ro xim ity o f intrasy llab ic elem ents.
A rea. In au d ito ry perception, area tran slates as length o r d u ra tio n . T h e sh o rte r the relative d u ra tio n o f an au d ito ry event, th en , the easier it is to perceive it as a figure. A rifle sh o t stan d s o u t clearly from its back g ro u n d . W e m ig h t in this connection n o te the fact th a t exclam atio ns an d co m m an d s - em otionally charged lingustic utteran ces - are u sually re la ti vely sh o rt, presum ably so as to d ra w even m o re atte n tio n to them selves as figures.
Closure. Julesz and H irsch claim th a t au d ito ry p ercep tio n lacks real closed figures, w hich they ascribe to th e u n id irectio nality o f tim e. Still, we m ig h t p o in t o u t the stro n g tendency to fill in an y existing gaps in th e p a tte rn e d stream o f sound: the so-called p h on etic re sto ra tio n effect. In an experim ent by W a r r e n and W a r r e n [1970], tw enty subjects w ere presented w ith a re co rd in g o f th e sentence: The sta te governors m e t w ith their respective legislatures convening in the capital city., a 0.12 sec p o rtio n o f w hich (indicated by the asterisk) h ad been rem oved an d replaced w ith th e sound o f a cough. T h e experim enters fo u n d th a t the subjects claim ed th a t th ere was no m issing sound.
S ym m etry. R epetition is easily perceived in a u d ito ry p attern s, and so are th e vario u s kinds o f parallelism .
G ood continuity. In the frequency-tim e d o m ain th ere exist good a u d ito ry analo gs fo r this principle. W e m ig h t m en tio n here in to n a tio n c o n to u rs and m elo dy th a t persist over tim e. T hese factors m ay play a p a r t in the so-called “ c o c k ta il p a rty effect” : o u r a b ility to a b s tra c t th e voice o f a p a rtic u la r speaker from the back g ro u n d noise o f m an y o th e r people talk in g a t the sam e tim e. C h e r r y [1953] w ho first studied th is effect, fo u n d th a t this ability involves m ak in g use o f physical differences am o n g th e au d ito ry m essages in o rd e r to select the one o f interest; these physical
differences can include differences in pitch, tim b re, voice in ten sity, an d in the locatio n o f the speaker.
T h e figure/ground distinction is connected w ith the p erceptual m echanism o f th e focusing o f atte n tio n on som e p a rts o f the visual o r au ral field, either because they are relevant in th e co n tex t o f o u r p resent activities and in te n tio n s, o r because they conflict w ith ex p e ctatio n s by being novel, in co n g ru o u s and intense.
F ocused visual a tte n tio n has often been com p ared to a spo tligh t: it lets us see objects w ithin a relatively sm all area very clearly, b u t there is very lim ited processing o f the visual stim uli falling outsid e o f its beam . Sim ilar o bservations can be m ad e fo r the focused atten tio n in th e au d ito ry m od ality. Ih c r e is generally alm ost no processing o f u n atten d e d stim uli. C h e r r y [1953] carried o u t experim ents in w hich one au d ito ry m essage h ad to be shadow ed (repeated back o u t lo u d ) at the sam e tim e as a n o th e r m essage w as played to the o th er ear. Very little in fo rm atio n seem ed to be extracted from th e second o r n o n atten d e d m essage, and listeners seldom noticed w hen th a t m essage w as spoken in a foreign language.
A s in th e case o f an adjustable light beam , visual atte n tio n can cover larger or sm aller area, d epending on the n a tu re o f th e task [cf. L a B e r g e
1983]. C a m p b e l l a n d R o b s o n [1968] have suggested th a t atte n tio n m ay be shifted betw een the o u tp u ts from variously sized spatial filters. A nd so, a t a p arty one m ay switch atte n tio n from the ap p reciatio n o f th e textu re o f a la d y ’s dress (high spatial frequency in fo rm atio n ) to th e m o re general outlines o f h er ap p earan ce (low spatial frequency in fo rm atio n ). T h e ir idea was su p p o rted by the finding th a t there are su b stru ctu res in the visual cortex th a t selectively respond to lim ited ranges o f spatial frequency. T hese p ercep tu al p h en o m en a are reflected in language, w here the area o f focused a tte n tio n m ay be m ark ed gram m atically th ro u g h th e placem ent o f the fo re g ro u n d e d N P a t th e head o f th e larg e r n o m in al c o n s tru c tio n (in English, placing it first) as in a crow d o f people/the people in the crowd', the difference in the level o f specificity (o r “ re so lu tio n ” ) betw een these tw o im ages is also reflected in the predicates o f those n om in al co n stru c tio n s (tvav vs. were).
T h e p ercep tu al o rg an izatio n o f a visual scene obviously determ ines the form o f the verbal ac co u n t a sp eak er is going to p ro d u c e a b o u t th a t scene. W h a t we choose as th e basis o f a linguistic u ttera n ce is usually th e figure.
I he form o f the u ttera n ce is also shaped by a n u m b er o f G e sta lt principles like th e ones m entioned above. It has been fo u n d , e.g., th a t th e sm aller o f tw o objects is preferred in the subject p o sitio n [ O s g o o d 1971]. O sgood has show n his subjects sim ple situ atio n s and asked them to describe them ; they p roduced sentences such as e.g.
(5) T h e ball is rolling across the table.
In this case, the them atized N P represents an object th a t is n o t only sm all, b u t also m oving, and the object in the locative p h rase is larg er and statio n ary . G iven th a t m oving objects are perceptually m o re salient in a visual scene, this o rg an izatio n o f th e sentence is n a tu ra l and p red ictab le.
R ecently, the concepts o f figure an d groun d have received atte n tio n from linguists o f the cognitive o rien ta tio n . T a l m y [1983: 232] p ro p o ses to give them the follow ing p a rtic u la r characterization :
T he Figure is a moving or conceptually movable object whose site, path, or orientation is conceived as a variable the particular value o f which is the salient issue. T he G round is a reference object (itself having a stationary setting within a reference fram e) with respect to which the Figure’s site, path, or orientation receives characterization.
O th e r linguists w ho have called on these concepts, th eir co n cep tu al synonym s fo reg ro u n d an d b ack g ro u n d , o r th e m o re general “ degrees o f salience” , include H o p p e r [1979], H o p p e r a nd T h o m p s o n [1980, 1984], W a l l a c e [1982], L a к o f f [1987]. L a n g a c k e r ’ s [1987] “ tra je c to r” is also q u ite co m p arab le to T alm y ’s F igure, while his “ la n d m a rk ” co m pares w ith T a lm y ’s G ro u n d .
T a l m y observes [1983: 234] th a t the characteristics o f th e physical m a k e u p o f objects in a scene relevant fo r the division in to figure and gro u n d are q u alitativ e o r “ to p o lo g ic al” ; they are e.g. th e stru c tu ra l type o f th e o b jects, th e ir d eg ree o f su b d iv isio n , b o u n d a ry c o n d itio n s an d sym m etry vs. distinguishability o f p arts. W e m ay n o te th a t these are all G e sta lt-ty p e p ro perties. M etric p ro perties, such as p a rtic u la r size, length, distance, o r angle, as well as m o re su bstantive pro p erties like tex tu re, or m ateria l, are n o t atten d ed to (and are no t gram m atically m ark ed ).
T h e n atu ra l p erceptual tendency to them atize the figure is responsible fo r o u r p erception o f even non-physical entities and events in term s o f th e fig u re /g ro u n d o rg anization. T h u s, n o te e.g. the assym etry o f Talmy"s ideas resemble K o ffk a ’s ideas w here K o ffk a ’s ideas, clearly earlier o n th e scene, act as a reference object g ro u n d ) fo r th e them atized N P , despite the “ sym m etric” predicate.
Since tim e, as a rule, gets m etap h o rically spatialized, th e fig u re /g ro u n d o rg a n iz atio n o f objects in space n atu ra lly generalizes to th e relative lo catio n o f events in tim e.
T a l m y [1978: 632] gives th e categories o f figure an d g ro u n d in tem p o ra l events th e follow ing characterization:
The tem poral site o f the Figure event is considered as a variable whose particular value receives characterization with respect to a G round event, considered as a reference-point set in a tem poral reference-frame (usually, the one-dimensional time-line).
H e goes on to discuss the sem antic roles in com plex sentences expressing tem p o ral a n d /o r causal relations an d observes th a t th ere is a (possibly universal) tendency to tre a t the earlier one o f any tw o events in tem p o ral sequence as reference p o in t, o r g ro u n d , an d th e la te r event as th e figure. T h e u n m a rk e d linguistic expression o f this re la tio n sh ip is a co m p lex sentence w here th e earlier event is in the su b o rd in ate clause, and the la te r one in the m ain clause.
Sim ilarly, th e unm ark ed linguistic expression o f the causal re latio n sh ip betw een any tw o events is a com plex sentence w here th e causing event (the g ro u n d ) is in the su b o rd in ate clause and th e resulting event (the figure) is in the m ain clause. T alm y speculates tentatively on deeper reason s fo r tho se tendencies. H e suggests th a t they are due to th e cognitive ch a rac te ristic o f m ak in g the earlier cognized event a basis fo r assessing the later o n e (p. 641); yet elsew here he also m en tio n s th e G e sta lt-ty p e facto rs (“ A larger, tem p o ra lly -c o n ta in in g event acts as G ro u n d ...w ith respect to a co n tain ed event as F ig u re ” ) (p. 640).
T h e division into fo reg ro u n d an d b ac k g ro u n d generalizes o n to the m o re a b stra c t p h en o m en a observed a t higher levels o f linguistic o rg a n iz atio n . H o p p e r [1979] po in ts o u t th a t in n arrativ e discourse, there is an ov ert d istin ctio n betw een the language which relates th e m a in events and the languag e o f the p a rts o f the discourse co n tain in g su p p o rtiv e m ateria l. T h e events o f the story line are sequenced chronologically, an d each is seen as a w hole w hose com pletion is a necessary prerequisite to a sub seq u en t event. W ithin each discrete episode the subject rem ains the sam e; the episodes cen ter o n h u m an topics an d dynam ic, kinetic events ind isp ensab le to the narrativ e. T h e situ atio n s o r happenin gs in the b ac k g ro u n d m ay be sim ul tan eo u s o r ov erlapping w ith the m ain events. Subjects ch an g e frequ ently an d clauses tend to have m ark e d p ra g m a tic stru ctu re , w ith focus o n subject, in stru m en t, sentence adverbial, o r the direct o bject alone. E piso des co n tain a variety o f topics and describe states or situations necessary for understanding m otives, attitu d e s, etc. [cf. H o p p e r 1979: 216].
F o re g ro u n d in g m ay be m ark ed in the tense/aspect system o f th e verb (perfective fo r fo reg ro u n d , im perfective fo r b ac k g ro u n d ) o r by th e use o f the “ voice” system - the active/passive distinctio n. H o p p e r observes th a t m o st tense m ark e rs ca n be expected to functio n in b ac k g ro u n d only, e.g. pluperfect, rem o te-p ast, future-perfect, fu tu re, etc. T his is so because d etails su p p o rtin g the n a rra tiv e d o n o t have to be c o n tem p o ran eo u s w ith it b u t m ay be p a rt o f the prehisto ry o r the supposed consequences o f th e n a rra te d event, o r m ay suggest contin g en t b u t unrealized events. In fo reg ro u n d , by c o n tra st, ten se-ind ication is only needed to pro v id e a co n v en tio n al lo catio n o f th e successive events o f th e n a rra tiv e o n th e tim e axis. In m a n y languages, this tense is the one know n as “ p re te rite” o r sim ple p ast.
W a l l a c e [1982] sim ilarly argues th a t verbal categories such as im- prefectivity, p a st tense, fu tu re tense, intran sitivity, and the m od alities o f h y potheticality, negation, p o ten tiality , and d o u b t are g ro u n d -lik e in th a t they are sim ilar to the characteristics o f p ercep tu al g ro u n d : u n fo rm e d , diffuse, co n tin u o u s, below, behind, etc. C onversely, categories such as perfectivity, present tense, transitivity, and th e m o dalities o f reality, actu ality an d certain ty are figure-like in th a t they are sim ilar to the ch aracteristics o f p erceptual figure: discrete, local, b o u n d ed , above, in fro n t, etc. W allace claim s th a t figure and g ro u n d have relevan ce to n o m in a l ca te g o ries, s u b o rd in a tio n , and larger discourse concerns as well.
T h e interplay betw een fo reg ro u n d and b ack g ro u n d also fu n ctio n s ae st hetically w ithin the visual a rts and literatu re. In tra d itio n a l E u ro p e a n p aintings show ing a g ro u p o f figures o r a single p o rtra y ed perso n , th ere is usually a clear distinction betw een those stru ctu re -b ea rin g objects and th eir su rro u n d in g environm ent. T h e extrinsic space is reduced to a n eu tra l g ro u n d an d m ay therefore be entirely ignored. In c o n tra st, in som e m o re m o d ern paintings, there is an increasing tendency to o bliterate the distin ction betw een th e fo reg ro u n d and the b ac k g ro u n d , and to m ak e th e viewer p u t m o re perceptual effort into identifying subw holes and set th em ag a in st one a n o th e r.
In the process o f literary in terp re tatio n , the re ad er m u st co n tin u ally reco n stru ct th e relatio n sh ip betw een the tw o aspects o f the scene. A u th o rs m ay set o u t m a rk s in the text th a t will guide th e re ad er in to a p a rtic u la r directio n o f in te rp re ta tio n , i.e. m ak e him discern a p a rtic u la r figure. T h e tw o m ain devices o f fo reg ro u n d in g seen as com p lem en tary forces by literary scholars are deviation (choices m ad e o utside the p erm itted range o f p o ten tial selections) and parallelism (a p a tte rn o f equivalences a n d /o r c o n tra sts th a t are superim posed on the no rm al p attern s o f language o rg an izatio n ).
5. AM BIGUOUS FIGURES
T h e G e sta lt psychologists drew a tte n tio n to the p h en o m en o n o f fig u re /g ro u n d reversal, an d m o re generally, o f am bigu ou s figures. In vision, the im ages w hich do n o t provide the eyc-brain system w ith en ou gh in fo rm atio n to disting uish betw een figure an d ground m ay be experienced as equivocal o r reversible. O ne exam ple o f such a figure is the y in/yan g icon. U ntil we m a k e an e ith e r/o r decision as to w hich p a rt o f the im age is to be d o m in a n t, form in g the figure, and which is to be su b o rd in ate, form in g th e g ro u n d , th ere is an oscillation betw een th e tw o altern atives, as th e eye rep eatedly shifts from one a re a to the o ther.
T h o se phen o m en a illustrate the im portance o f in terp retatio n , o r to p-do w n processes in perception. In th e case o f such w ell-know n am b ig u o u s figures as R u b in ’s fam ous faces/goblet illusion, o r the N ecker cube, w hose orientation is u n sta b le an d w hich is seen som etim es w ith one v ertex n e a re st th e o n lo o k er, som etim es w ith a n o th e r, th e physical stim ulus itself d oes n o t change: the sam e p a tte rn o f c o n to u rs, lines an d angles strikes the eye. Y et th e p a tte rn m ay have tw o o r m o re q u ite distin ct in terp re tatio n s.
C l a r k , C a r p e n t e r a nd J u s t [1973] see this situ atio n as typical; they claim th a t “ It w ould seem im possible to find a p ercep tu al experience th a t could n o t be in terp reted in altern ativ e w ays” (p. 313). In deed, the objects we perceive, as they are glimpsed w ith m o m en tary glances, are usually am biguous an d incom plete as fa r as usable stim ulus in fo rm a tio n is concerned , since they are p artly hidden from sight. Y et, as w as p o inted o u t by N e i s s e r [1967: 61]:
[...] perception is n o t ju st a process of passive registration in which an external stimulus gives rise to a corresponding internal representation in an autom atic and invariable way. W hat is perceived on a given occasion depends n o t only on the pattern o f stim ulation at the sensory receptors but also on the preceding context and on the expectancies and states o f m otivation and attention o f the perceiver.
Ju st as m o st nonlinguistic signs are poten tially am ibig uo us, i.e. polyse- m o u s, so to o are m o st w ords in language. L ike visuai am biguity, linguistic am bigu ity m ay also be looked a t as involving con fusion betw een figure an d gro u n d . C o m m o n to such form s in b o th visual an d verbal m o d es is th a t either o ne o r a n o th e r figure is seen bu t n o t b o th sim ultaneously. T h e significance o f the elem ents o f b o th pictures and sentences d epend s on th e stru c tu ra l o rg a n iz atio n th a t is d o m in a n t a t the m o m en t. A s w as m e n tioned above, an im p o rta n t role is played here by co n tex tu al facto rs. T h e influence o f co n te x t is ev id en t w hen we co n sid er th e fa c t th a t sp e a k ers/h e are rs are n o t ordin arily aw are o f am biguities in th eir ow n u tte ra n ces, o r in the speech o f o th ers [cf. C a r r o l l , B e v e r and P o l l a c k
1981: 370].
L anguage also shares w ith perception the ability to m ak e a su d d en discovery o f a “ h id d e n ” figure. W hen an initially concealed visual im age is perceived, it seems to “ p o p o u t” from the b ack g ro u n d . T h e d ifferen tiation o f figure and gro u n d changes a m eaningless array o f blob s to a m eanin gful scene. O nce recognized, the percept is highly resisan t to re o rg an iza tio n . L inguistic discoveries o f hidden figures m ay occur e.g. in jok es. A puzzling last line suddenly falls into place as we “catch the m ean in g ” o f the jo k e, afte r we have m entally recom bined the elem ents o f the previously received in fo rm a tio n to arrive a t a m eaningful o rganizatio n.
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Alina K w iatkow ska
Z A SA D Y PSY C H O LO G II PO STACI W JĘZY K O ZN A W STW IE
A u to rk a zw raca uwagę na to, że główne zasady psychologii postaci, form ułow ane pierw otnie w celu wyjaśnienia mechanizmów percepcji wizualnej, odnoszą się również do m echanizmów językowych na różnych poziom ach. Ogólna zasada prym atu całości - „postaci” nad częścią, fakt, że postać nie d a się sprowadzić jedynie d o sumy jej elementów, jest również jed n ą z głównych zasad języka. Podział pola postrzegania na figurę i tło, ja k i bardziej szczegółowe praw a determ inujące ten podział (np. tendencja zamknięcia całości) znajduje odzwierciedlenie lub analogię w wielu konstrukcjach językowych. Sugeruje to, że język jest związany z percepcją w izualną bardziej niż przyznawały to tradycyjne teorie językoznawcze.
