Troubles in the heart of the EU – Political crisis in Belgium

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Troubles in the heart of the EU –

Political crisis in Belgium

Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej nr 5, 63-73

2011

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Nr

5

ROCZNIK INTEGRACJIEUROPEJSKIEJ

₂₀₁₁

JEROEN VAN DEN BOSCH

Leuven

Troubles

in

the

heart

of the

EU

-

Political

crisis

in

Belgium

Thisarticle looksfor the causes of theBelgian crisisin itshistory, political reforms and identity changes. It further analyzes what might be the consequences of these changes for Belgium and Europe.

When Belgium became independent in 1830, its political situationwas not compli

catedatall. After the Congress of Vienna in1815 some of the territories of what isnow the kingdom ofBelgiumwere added to the Netherlandsas a buffer-zoneagainstfuture

Frenchimperial ambitions.The anti-French and anti-catholic policies of the Dutch uni

fiedthe Francophoneelites of Flanders and Wallonia. Theirreactionsparkedthe Bel

gianRevolution,whichwas eventually accepted by the international community.The new governmentsetup a constitutionalmonarchy in whichthe king defacto wasa con

tracted manager. The constitution foresaw a unitary,consociationaldemocratic system

with a parliament and senate. They chose Duke Leopold of the Saksen-Coburg dynasty as first king of theBelgians, andBrussels asthe new capital. Despitethe fact that the new government legitimizedits existence on its multicultural nature, thelanguage of

the administration, courts and armyremained French.

From itsbeginning, Belgium has beena multi-ethnicalcountry. In Flanders, inthe north,livedthe Flemings who spoke different Dutchdialects (there was no standard ized Dutch in 1830); in thesouthlivedthe Walloons, of whichmost spokeFrench by then (but also Walloon, aRomanic language likeNorman). Inthe MiddleAges, Flan

ders was a very rich region, with manyimportant trading cities like Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Brussels and Antwerp. However in the 19th century theeconomical center layin Wallonia,whichwould become the firstindustrialized region on the European conti nent.In comparison Flanders wasa poor, underdeveloped and peripheral region at the moment of Belgium’s independence1.

1 L. de Winter, P. Baudewyns,Belgium: ‘‘Towards the Breakdown ofa Nation-State in the Heart

of Europe?”, “Nationalismand Ethnic Politics”2009, vol. 15, p. 282.

2 J. Bone, TheSocial Map: Cohesion, Conflict and National Identity, “Nationalism and Ethnic

Politics” 2006, vol. 12,p. 364-366.

Belgium emerged ina timewhere European monarchic dynastiesslowly lost their

grip on theirvast territoriesand where a risingbourgeoisie,heavily inspiredby French

idealssuch asliberté, égalité and fraternité, filled in this political space.With industri alization and expanding capitalistenterprises, the new elite sought toreplace aristo

cratic power and itsinstitutionswith a society based on their liberal democratic values and beliefs. Leopold I hadverylittlepower compared withthe Dutchking or the Ger man emperor. Withthis new regime also came anenhanced appealfor collective iden

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for that itbased it’s (threatened) identityon bothethnicgroups (Flemish and Walloon).

Deeply catholic, rural Flanders and Francophone, secular, liberal Wallonia foundeach other facing the threat of the Dutchdominance. Identityis always more salientwhen the group is threatened. Thisunion againstthe Dutch indirectly createdanother group iden tity: aBelgian one, which was culturally based on the identityof theFrancophoneelite, but included the lowerstatusFlemishgroup.

Regarding the theoretical framework ofthis article itis important todifferentiate be tween the psychological concept of (individual identity) withthe conception of social or political (group) identity. Despite the fact thatboth forms areused in overlapping disciplines of identitystudies,this study focuses on group identity. Individual or per

sonal identityis linkedwithontological security3: Every human needstofind a balance between his individualself and thegrouphe/she belongs to. Therefore the individual

constructs different identifications within his/her identity. These identifications are

formedthrough socialization and enablehumanstoreduce the complexityof the world andbehave accordinglyindifferent social situations.One canbe afather, ason, anem ployer, a citizen ofa certain regionorcity, a national of a certain country, a European,

etc.allat the same time. But one cannot have different identities. Theseidentifications

can beascribed(constructedby others) or acquired (by experience).They exist atdif

ferent levels and often overlap. They allowhumans to feel unique and nourish their

need to belong. Every identification contains aset of common (group) values, behav

ioral prescriptions,shared identity characteristics and an emotionaltie withthe target

group. Not allidentifications can be equallystrong atthe same time; depending of the

situation some are more salient than others. Sinceboth groups and individuals change over time,they arealso dynamicinnature and reconstructedevery time4.

3 A.Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity,Cambridge PolityPress, 1991, p. 35-69.

4 J. Bone, TheSocial Map: Cohesion, Conflict and National Identity, “Nationalism and Ethnic

Politics” 2006, vol. 12,p. 347-359.

5 Ibidem, p. 359-370.

6 M.A.Hogg, D. J. Terry, SocialIdentity andSelf-Categorization Processes in Organizational Contexts,“TheAcademyof ManagementReview” 2000, vol. 25, no 1, p. 123-124.

Group identity is the commondenominator ofall individual identifications linked to

a specific group.Likewise they are dynamic and evolve over time. Unlike smaller so cial identities, regional or nationalidentities prove tobevery resilient overtime; since

they canlegitimize and keep a grouptogether not only basing themselves on common values and characteristics, but also on common historyand sometimes even a specific language5. A good way to describe a social identityis to filterit downto prototypes. These cover the stereotypical attributes of groups in ideal-types. Typicallythey are not

achecklist, but rather fuzzy sets of concepts that capturethe context-dependent features

of group membership. Prototypes embody all attributes that characterize groups (in

cluding beliefs,attitudes, feels and behaviors) and distinguish them from other groups6.

When describing both regional identities in 1830, bothgroups were antagonized, but

notpoliticized yet, against each other: The Flemings and Francophone elitewere di vided on socio-economical level, cultural prestige, linguistic and religious axis. The

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RIE5’11 Troubles in the heart ofthe EU - Political crisisin Belgium 65 Flanderswas a rich region, but nowhas no hope ofobtaining this status again. They

looked upatthe Francophone elitewith envy andrealized that assimilationmight im

prove their social position. Theelite’sidentity was superior:they looked down on the

Flemish and Walloon languages and dismissed them asincapable of transmittingEn lightenment ideals andas impediments to economic development7. Both identities were

weak at that time, and Belgian identity, which coveredboth ethnic groups,ruled. For

the Flemings and poor Walloons it had more prestige than their regionalidentity. For

the elite, it was thegroup theygoverned, and howthe ‘nation’ differentiateditselffrom

France andtheNetherlands.

7 B. Ceuppens,Allochtons, Colonizers, andScroungers:ExclusionaryPopulism inBelgium,

“African Studies Review” 2006, vol. 49, no 2, p. 154.

8 Ibidem, p. 153.

9 L. Huddy, Context and Meaningin Social Identity Theory: A Response to Oakes,“PoliticalPsy chology” 2002,vol. 23, no 4, p.826.

10 L. de Winter, P. Baudewyns,Belgium: ‘‘Towards the Breakdown ofa Nation-State in the Heart

of Europe?”, “Nationalism andEthnic Politics”2009,vol. 15, p. 283.

11 L. Hooghe, Hollowing the center,in:Federalism andterritorial cleavages, eds U.Amoretti; N. Bermeo, The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress,Baltimore, 2004.

Alreadytenyears after the independence, Flemishopposition againsttheFranco phone domination wasvoicedthrough demand for linguistic autonomy.The Flemish movementwas bom. The Dutch-speaking lower-middle-classpatriots in the more pop

ulous Flanders discovered that French was needed forprofessional advancement. If theywanted the loyalty of thelocal population they felt thatthe state should recognize

Dutch asan officiallanguage8. Already in 1840the Flemish dialects were standardized withthe Dutchof the Netherlands.This notion of group identity, with low status and

a sense of system blame werecentral to the development ofpolitical action9. Although there were no political claims until World WarI, different cultural groupsand associa

tions promoted Dutch. Someofthese organizations linked up with the national Catholic

party to get more leverage onpolitics. TheFrancophonereligious elite did not stop the

Flemishlower clergy for co-opting these claims,aslongastheywerekeeping the flock

catholic and stopped socialistideas from spreading10.

The urban-based Flemish movement did not have territorial claims yet.But the es calation from cultural demands to politicalwas a natural reaction to the intransigence of theFrancophone elite. The firstlanguage laws wereadopted in thelate 19th century.

Asymmetrical bilingualism was imposed on Flanders toaccommodatethe movement. The rest of Belgium remained unilingual. The legislation was limitedand most re

maineddeadletter. The most important changewasthe Equalizationact of 1898: the boost ofDutch as an official language ofBelgiumon equal footing with French11.

Political claims were bom inthe trenches ofWorldWar I. The Flemishsoldiersreal ized that their troops often met withan untimelydeath because theFrench-speakingof

ficers were not able to translate their orders. This enmity was magnified by class

differences. In 1919 introductionof universalmale suffrage led to the creation asystem of “verzuiling” (pillarization), in whichthethree main parties (Catholics, Liberals and Socialists) weredivided over two overlapping cleavages. Historically these three pil

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Catholic and provincial towns withdomestic industries were Liberal12. The first post war elections also brought forth the first genuine Flemish nationalist party of the

Frontpartij (Frontparty), which caught 5.2% of the Flemishvote.It radicalized during

the 1920’s due to thegovernment’s unwillingness to grant more culturalautonomy to Flanders. This caused some moderateFlemish nationaliststo leavethepartyand pro

mote their interestin the traditionalpolitical families13.

13 L. De Winter;P. Baudewyns, Belgium:‘‘Towards theBreakdown of a Nation-State in the Heart

of Europe?”, “Nationalismand Ethnic Politics”2009, vol. 15, p. 283. 14 Ibidem, p.284.

After a long stretch of elite opposition against Flemish culturalautonomy,the regime fi

nallygave in with a newlawin1932, which proclaimed Dutch as the only official language

of Flanders. The Frontpartij is finally absorbed by anew nationalist party in 1933. The

Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV, Flemish National Union) was an umbrellafor all from

Flemish moderate nationalists to fascists. Different fractions were kept in line by theau thoritarian leader,Staf de Clercq. At the outbreak of WorldWar II, the democraticelements

wereoverruledand the partycollaborated withthe Nazis in the hope to realizetheir ideal of

Dietsland (Dutchland): the creation of the independent state of Flanders and the Nether

lands.The VNV kept losingsupport duringthe war, but still discredited the whole Flemish

movement. The party was banned after thewar and its leaders trialed.Immediately in the postwarperiod, Flemish interests wereonly promoted through thetraditional parties14.

The Flemish collaboration stained the movement as a whole, while Degrelle in the southmostly discredited the Walloon catholic right. The French-speaking referred to

the Flemishnationalists as les Flamands-Boches (Boche being a pejorative term for German). The king-question, right after the war also polarized both communities.

A referendum was organized to measure popularsupport for theking’s continuation of office after accusations ofcollaboration. Two-third majority was not obtained, but

Flanders got theupperhand with theiryes-vote because of theirdemographic majority position.This led to a serious political crisis,and violent manifestations in theFranco phone communities,whohad overly voted for theking’s abdication. Finally the issue

was resolved by Leopold Ill’sremoval infavor of hisson Boudewijn. From this mo ment on Francophone identity would be defined against the anti-democraticother: the Flemings who wantedto imposetheir authoritarian policies by forcing legislation upon the French-speaking Belgians withtheir majority.ThisFrancophonefear woulddeeply

shapethe transitionfrom a unitary to a federalstatemodel.

In the beginning of the 1960’s tensionsbetweenthetwo ethnic groups touched high

peaks once more. Manifestations andpolitical crisis resulted in a series ofnew lan guage laws. Thesuccesses of the Flemishmovement also initiated a countermovement in the Francophone community. These reforms were the foundations for all further

(state) reformsandallthe seeds of today’s political crisis canbetraced backto the way

howthe elite accommodated Flemishculturaldemands. In 1963 the language border

was fixed and four linguistic zones were established:Dutch-speaking Flanders minus

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asmallGermanophone comer neartheGerman border15. This wasananswer to the old Flemish fear forthe Frenchification of Brussels. Sincethe end of the 19th century, the

capitalbecame increasinglydominated by the Francophone elite and migrants from

Wallonia.Sincethelanguageborderwas not fixed with the law of 1932,a 10-year lan guage censusdecided which districts were added towhatlanguagezone. The Frenchi fication of Flemish territory and distrust about the outcome of earlier censuses,

increased demands to settle the border foronce and for all.

15 Thesesocalled “Oostkantons”, concentrated around the cities of Eupen and Malmedy, weread

ded toBelgium afterWorld War I.

17 Ibidem, p. 155.

The historic unwillingness of the Belgian elite to impose abilingual regime on the

whole territory of Belgiumin fear oflosing jobs in public administration to bilingual Flemings, finally put Belgianon acertainpath regarding language rights. The compro

mise of1963clearly chose for an interpretationof languageas aterritorialright and not

anindividualone. The Flemish‘ Territorialiteitsprincipe’on behalf of the socially dis advantaged was chosen over the Francophone ‘Principe de personnalité ’ on behalf of

thesocially dominant16. From now on thefixed linguisticborders would transform into real identity borders for both ethnic groups;thereby deeply ingraining thetworegional identities,characterized by language, on territorial terms. In turn theevolutionfrom in

dividual to collective linguistic rights of Flemingswas also a result of theregime’s un willingness to stop the Frenchificationof bilingual Flanders before 1932. Thenew

policyeffectively extinguished the lasts cores of Francophone residents incitieslike

Ghent orAntwerp, shifting the problem solely to Brussels, which kept frenchifying due to theinflux ofFrench-speaking migrants, mostly from Morocco and Algiers. Thepro

vision of facilities17 (language rights)to the French-speaking minority in the Flemish

municipalities aroundBrussels wouldreemerge later and polarizeboth communities

once more.

Between 1966 and 1968 escalation of a linguistic turf conflict profoundly changed

Flemish identity, while the changing economic situationin the 1960’s triggered a

re-gionalist turn in Wallonia and an identity schism withinthe Francophone community.

In 1966 in the Flemish city Leuven,student protest escalatedinto mass manifestations,

finally leading to the fall of the government and the first state reformin1970. The issue

was the lack ofspace for thepostwarbaby-boom generation at the Catholic University of Leuven. The Catholic, Francophone university council and staff opposed the de

mands todutchify theuniversity and whenanobjectivecasewasmade to link thecity

administration of Leuvento Brussels thelong-lasting tensions exploded. Mass student

protests, supported by Flemish politicians and the population escalatedinto violent

demonstrations, and atthe heightof the protests Leuven was technically anoccupied city. The whole affair initiated an anti-clerical and anti-French turn, which spread through Flanders. Under theslogan “Leuven Vlaams- Walen Buiten” (“Leuven Flem ish - WalloonsOut”) theprotest movement appealed to the government to protectthe rights of theethnicFlemings in the city againstthesepolicies.Inthe end the University

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was split in a Dutch and French part. The French partwas moved to acampus just

across thelanguage border, nowcalled Louvain-la-Neuve (New Leuven).

The declineof the Walloon economyand the riseof the Flanders,tipped the balance to thenorth. Flandershadbeen able to attract new industries and manysmall and medium

businesses,while the Walloon industrybased on steal and coal stagnated.With thean

nouncedreform of thefederal governmentin which thenumber ofFlemishand Walloons

wouldbeequal, Wallonia feared that itsnew economicpolicy wouldbe dictatedbyFlem

ings.They were also distrustful towards the influence of Brussels infederal politics. Both issuesstimulated Walloon demands for politicalregional autonomy. So in 1970 following

the crisis,the new state reform restoredthe balance betweenthe ethnic communities on

the one hand, but embedded new anti-majority mechanisms along with it. For instance,

the Francophone minority at federal levelcanblockmotions with a specialalarm-bell procedure regarding communitarian issues. The “Cultuurgemeenschappen” (culture communities)aretakenup in the amendments and on request of Wallonia, Belgium be came divided in two regionswithyetunspecified socio-economiccompetences18.

18 Deredactie.be (20.10.2011):

http://www.deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/politiek/111004_over-zichtstaatshervormingen.

In reaction to the Flemish movement’s successes, Francophone identity became threatened andthey started up their own nationalisticpolitical parties. Theseparties were not created in Wallonia, but in Flandersand Brussels,wheretheFrench-speaking

community wasmost anxious about increased Flemish influence.So in the 1960-1970’s the partyscene underwent deep changes, with new nationalistic or regionalist parties like: The Volkspartij (VP,People’s party) protecting Flemish interests; RetouràLiège (RàL, Return to Liège), a radical Francophone party opposing theswitch of the munici pality of Voerenfrom the Walloon province Liège to Flanders; The Front Démocratique des Francophones (FDF, Francophone Democratic Front) in Brussels, defending

French-speaking majorityin Brusselsand trying to keepthecapitalaway from Flemish

influence; and finallythe Rassemblement Wallon(RW, WalloonRally) defending re gional interestof Wallonia with a popular-agrarianprogram. Three of those would

become main contenders for the traditional‘national’ parties and catalyzethe disinte grationof the unitaryparty system. InFlanders theVP,with a nationalist, social and Catholic program,took away votes fromthe Catholic party. In Brusselsthe FDF chal lenged theLiberals,whoweretraditionally the biggest party in the capital. InWallonia RW conquered terrain atthecost of the PartiSocialiste (PS, Socialist Party). The re gional and nationalistic programs ofthese newparties took abigbite out the electorate of the traditional parties. Communitarianissues started dividingthe traditional fami lies,until they split oneby one. When thelast one split atthe endof 1970’stherewas no

national party left todefendBelgianinterests.

Thenatural consequence of these trends was clearlyvisible in thefollowing statere

forms of 1980, 1988-89, 1993 and 2001-2002.The ethnic identity conflict based on

territory andBelgium’s longconsociational traditionof accommodation increasingly hollowed out the center. The parties oneither side carved up the center, handing over

those central policies that matter most to the competing groups; or installedmutual

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area). This alteredthe center’sbalanceof power by interlocking the actors withaddi tional anti-majoritanmeasures in every reform. By buying offdisaffected groups, con flicts could also be settled, often at a high cost19. This unlocking, or allocating of

resourcesmanipulated the relationbetween group andcenter. In essence every state re

form in timeled to aneven more hollow center, whichagain leadtoa necessity to take upthe new reality in the constitution20.

19 L. Hooghe, Hollowing the center, in: Federalism andterritorial cleavages, eds U.Amoretti, N. Bermeo, The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress,Baltimore, 2004.

20 Ibidem.

21 Deredactie.be (20.10.2011):

http://www.deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/politiek/111004_over-zichtstaatshervormingen.

22 ChristenDemocraten & Vlaams: Christian Democrats& Flemish.

A very short overview of thedifferent state reformsconfirmsthestatements above. In 1980theculturecommunities gained more authority, and the“Gewesten” (Regions) werecreatedtoregionalize socio-economic issues like labor, economy, environment

and spatial planning. Both Communities and Regions got an executive branch and

a council. TheFlemish Community andRegion, which overlap geographically, decided

to merge theminone executive andone council. Moreover the “Arbitragehof ’ (Consti tutional court)was erectedto judge if conflict arises betweenRegions orCommunities.

Already in1988-1989 theCommunities became completely responsible foreducation, anda third Regionwas created: theBrussels Capital Region.A new financing law regu lates the allocated budgets of communities and regions vis-à-vis the federal level, which collects the taxes. 4 yearlater, Belgium was baptizedagain as a federal state, with extended competences (fiscal policy) and direct elections for the Regions. In 2001-2002 theyreshuffled thehierarchy of thesystem: From now on the Regions con

trol and govern provincialand municipal levels. For instancetheFlemishgovernment

can now appoint mayors in the municipals around Brussels. On demand of the Francophonesociety,the budgets for theCommunities were raised. Finally theConsti tutional courtis now competent to declare laws null andvoid when conflicts arise21.

Until the 1970’s Belgium has been praised as a prime example of a unitary, consociational state, afterwardsit becamea textbook case-study of the evolution from

aunitarytoa federal model. The worlddid not seemto understand how such a political crisiscould occur in such astable democracy asBelgium. Thisarticle will explain that the crisis was in line of a long path dependency of system erosion.Remarkable was the stubbornness of both camps,which can beexplained by lookingat identity. Thecauses

of the crisisall havetheir roots in the historic systemic changes, which interlocked the two alienatedgroups in such away,that the core issues that bind themtogether, arethe ones they cannot compromiseon.

Whenin2007 after 8years,theCD&V22(ChristianDemocrats) in alliancewiththe

N-VA (New Flemish Alliance, nationalists)won the elections with the promise of split ting Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV), the electoral district of Halle andVilvoorde near Brussels, and announced anew state reform the troubles started. TheFrenchparties were definitelynotdemanding a new reform and likewise didnot wantto be humiliated in front of theirvoters by aunilateralsplit of the electoral district. With the alarm bell

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procedure they postponed the issue with almost a year, andby blocking the negotiations

for months theywereable to convincethe CD&V to drop theirnationalistic partnerin exchange fortheir state reform. Sincetimewasticking,theCD&V and French Social ists decided to create a new governmentfirst and delegate the state reform toa newly set upcommission. Distrust rose,the commission turnedinto a talking shop andplug was notpulled out of thetroubledgovernment until April 2010 becauseof the economical

crisis of2008.

Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde is acomplicated and highly symbolic issue. Halle-Vil-voordeisanelectoralzonenexttoBrussels,whichfinds itself part of twooverlapping Regions (the Flemish and Brussels Capital region)since the state reform of 1980. The regiontechnicallybelongsto Flanders, butthe French-speaking inhabitantsenjoy dis tinct minority rights,that allow them to vote onpolitical lists in Brussels.In 2002 a new

electoral law was introduced that reshaped the electoral districts to the size of prov inces,but it couldnot finda solution for BHV.Thereforethe law was declared unconsti tutional in 2003 by the constitutional court, which did not propose a solution.Whenthe

issue was put on the table by the CD&V-N-VA alliance after the 2007 elections, the

identity differences became more clear than ever.

From the Flemish point of view, BHV is the incarnation of the old fear of Frenchification of Flanders. They claimthat the rights which have been granted the

French-speakingin BHV were a temporarymeasureto help them integrate in Flanders. Sincethe municipalities lie in Flanders, a simple majority suffices tosplit itand move

on, nocompromiseneededwiththe French-speaking. All obstructions that havebeen used, e.g.the alarm bellprocedure, invocationof minority rights; or demands to create

a corridor between Brussels and Wallonia, are perceived asmaliciousattemptsto un

derminethe sovereignty of Flanders,allowed by the undemocraticfederal system.By law, Flemingslivingin Wallonia cannot call upon these minorityrights. The starting point ofthis attitude is the belief that thearea’s belongingto Flanders, will beeternally monolingual. This logic is somewhat flawed, but it is supported by the constitution whichlinks language to groups and territorial rights and not to individuals. The resis tance of the French-speaking23 in those area’s to speak Dutch and integrate, brings back

images ofa French elite who looks down on the Flemings, their language andculture24.

23 Theseare mostly rich peoplefromBrussels,who workthere, but prefer nottolive inthe capital,

toavoid the big-city problems or other reasons.

24 B. Ceuppens,Allochtons, Colonizers, and Scroungers: Exclusionary Populism in Belgium,

“African Studies Review” 2006, vol. 49, no 2, p. 156. 25 Ibidem, p. 156.

The Francophone side of thisissue is completely opposite: Most French-speaking

insist upontheirright to speak Frenchthroughout the country andbelieve that state in

stitutions ina multilingualBelgium should allow them to doso25. Theyfeel harassed by Flemish attempts to force Dutch upon their group, especiallyin a unilateral way like

withBHV. For them,atthose times,Flanders shows its undemocratic,authoritarian (for some even fascist) nature. It is truethat there is no French-speaking equivalent of Vlaams Belang (VB, the xenophobic separatist radical right party), but this does not

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was known to get the protest votes againstthe traditional parties.Wallonia, where trust

in the(federal) government iseven lower as in Flanders,does not have a party like that.

Besides the feelings ofmoral superiority,therewould also beanelectoralloss in BHV got split:The FDF (Francophone Democratic Front, in alliance withthe FrenchLib erals, MR), always defending the rights on the French-speakinginand around Brussels, can count on many voters among the French minority in BHV. If theregion wouldget split theywould losealotof votes.

The elections of June 2010then produced aspectacular victory for N-VA atthe cost of all otherFlemishparties. In Wallonia theoutcome was similar tothe one of2007, de

spitetheshift of the PS to the first place. Distrustwas alreadyhigh before theelections,

andwithN-VA as the biggest party of Belgium,a stronger Flemish frontemergedatthe

negotiating table. All messengers from the king who tried to clear the field, failed; and

all proposals were dismissedby one side or the other. The issues dividing the two groups were: Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde,the appointment of threeFrancophone mayors,

the state reform and extra money for Brussels. The mayors’issue, was a typical turfwar between Flemish authority and Francophonerights:ThreeFrench-speakingmayorsin

municipalities around Brussels were electeddemocratically, but the procedure was

done in Frenchandnot in Dutch.In response the Flemish authorities didnot appointthe mayors, causing a huge row.One side accused that themayors didnot respect thelan guage requirements (bylaw),the others were outragedthat the Flemish region refused

the outcome of a democratic election.

Finally, the state reform isnot so much acommunitarianissue as it polarizes the

deep socio-economiccleavages of both sides. While after the 2002 state reform, a pur

ple-green government (Liberals, Socialists andGreens frombothgroups) avoided or bought off all communitarianissues, the newly elected Flemish rightin2007 wasmore

than eager to reformsome corefederal issueslike pensions, distribution of unemploy ment payments, migration, etc. For Walloonpoliticians, especially the Socialists (PS) this wouldbe electoral suicide. Besidesthis, Wallonia and Brussels profit fromthe even distribution of budgets for Communities and Regions, since taxes areafederal issue.

Witha richerFlanders, Walloniaand Brusselsget more, than they collect.These “trans

fers”(transactions)have been a popular election mantra for rightist Flemish parties; of

ten framingthe Walloons as lazy unemployed, who profitfromthe system, provided by theirclientelistic parties. Despite these realproblems,thesepoliticiansbluntlydismiss other socio-economic factors like the problems ofmigration and decliningkey eco

nomic sectors.

Above werementioned manyexamples of how regional identities erodedthe Bel

gian (national) identity, but this trend has been supported by global political and eco

nomicchanges too: The institutionalization of Europe at levels below thenation-state, the creationofregional structuralfunds,theconsultativeCommittee of the Regions re porting to the EuropeanCommission,new rules related to partnerships and subsidiarity,

and the developmentof transnational networks of local authorities26. Regarding eco nomical globalization,the combined effects ofdeindustrialization, increased mobility

26 P. Le Gales,European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance, Oxford University Press,

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ofcapital global flows, lessened trade barriers, etc. have taken away some prime re

sponsibilities from nation-states and tossed them in the hand of collective deci

sion-making on supra-national level27 28.

27 H. V.Savitch,P. Kantor, Cities inthe international Marketplace: The Political Economy of

UrbanDevelopment in North America and Western Europe,Princeton University Press, 2002.

28 K.Opp, Decline of theNation State?How the EuropeanUnion Creates Nationaland Sub-Na tionalIdentifications,“Social Forces”, vol. 84,no2,December2005, p.653-680.

29 Interview withB. DeWever in “DerSpiegel”(25.10.2011): http://www.spiegel.de/intematio-nal/europe/0,1518,734735-2,00 .html.

30 Forinstance the creation of the newallianceof Wallo-Brux in April 2010, orthe decision to change the “WalloonRegion” with “Wallonia”in officialtexts and communication, are indicators that in reaction to the political crisis, athreatened Francophone identity is reframing itself.

AsK.Opp pointed out in this article Decline of the NationState'>№ thestrengthening

of regional identity is not a zero-sum game with national and European identity. A stronger association withEuropean values and norms, leadsto higher levels of na tional and regional identity. The political reforms inBelgium might havehollowed out

the center,while the two identity groups becamestronger and more antagonistic, but this has not harmed the European identityso far. Belgians tend to beproud Europeans, realizingthat as a small WesternEuropeancountry,theycanonly benefitfrom an inter national framework of governance tocope with those national policy areas, forwhich

the Belgianstateis toosmall. So while theregions dug awayat Belgium frombelow, the EU has successfully taken over some primordial sovereignty aspects of the state. At

thesame time,the EUrecognized theregions, andintegrated themin the broader Euro pean framework ofglobalized economy and politics.

TheN-VA for instance is nota Eurosceptic party, it demands more autonomy for

Flanderswith theaim tocreate aconfederal Belgian state, or anindependent Flanders,

but in themean time it quietly waits until the national level evaporates29. Even now after 500 days of crisis, thetraditionalparties succeeded in finding a compromisewithout the

N-VA. Intraditional Belgian style, it is a compromise in which the center isagaina bitmore

hollow,with more (fiscal) autonomyfor the regions,asplitBHV,enhanced minorityrights

for Francophonesliving in Flanders and Flemings living in Wallonia, a newstatus for the

three mayors, etc. What elsetheywill come up with and how the government will look like,

only time willtell, butknowing that this statereform,thesixth, has no cohesive elements,

and thatWallonia and Brusselsare actively constructingtheir identity30, thenextdemands

for further reformare already in themake. Especially if the EU’s enhanced control on fi nances tocope withthecrisis, forces regions to adaptmore socio-economic regulations, Flanders might find some new arguments to demand autonomy.

Summary

Troubles intheheart ofthe EU - Political crisis in Belgium

This article looks forthe causes ofthe Belgianpolitical crisis in its history,political reforms