The circumstances leading to US successful negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Paris (1783)

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Viktor Syrvatka

The circumstances leading to US successful negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Paris

(1783)

[praca studencka]

Katowice, 2020

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The circumstances leading to US successful negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Paris (1783)

The purpose of this essay is to examine the Treaty of Paris (1783) and analyze the circumstances leading to the treaty. In the first part of the essay the emphasis is put on following a logical chain of diplomatic events that culminated in the Treaty of Paris (1783) providing standpoints of the choices and decisions of the belligerent countries involved in war with Great Britain, as well as members of the Armed Neutrality, who weren’t at war with Britain, but were against it, and finally Great Britain itself. In the second part of the essay the focus is shifted on to the Treaty of Paris (1783) itself, its contents and significance. The essay provides a historical and rational argumentation answering the question of why US negotiations, preliminary articles and the Treaty of Paris itself were so favourable for the US ending the American Revolutionary War and resulting in the recognition of United States as a free state, in spite of the fact that Britain was much more powerful than US and unwilling to grant US independence.

France, looking for its own interest, was aware that allying with and recognizing US would benefit France in the war against the sea empire and would weaken it, because there was “the unquestionable interest of France that the British continental colonies should be independent”.¹ France and United States entered in a symbiotic relationship signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance in 1778. The French-American alliance largely benefitted both countries. France benefited from the alliance with and the recognition of the United States, and its separation from Great Britain:

1 Trescot, W. The Diplomacy of the Revolution: An Historical Study, (Carlisle, MA: Applewood Books, 2009), p. 18

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“...it stripped England of so much territorial extent and so large a commercial monopoly, deprived her of ports of supply and points of concentration for future conquests, and developed by the independence of the colonies a marine inheriting her own enterprise and stimulated into rival activity.²

Being at war with the “mother-state”, it was of outmost importance for the United States to get support and recognition of other countries and establish trade with them because Great Britain was still too powerful for the United Stance to stand a chance against in the American Revolutionary War as Bancroft emphasizes, “In point of commercial wealth, industry, and adventurous enterprise, England at the time had no equal; in pride of nationality, no rival but France […]”.³ John Adams urges Franklin in their correspondence to establish foreign relations with European countries saying it is their duty “[…] to send ministers to every great court in Europe, especially the maritime courts, to propose an acknowledgment of the independence of America and treaties of amity and commerce […]”.⁴ There wasn’t a better and more obvious ally choice to start with than France, powerful enemy and rival of Britain.

Spain entered the war a year later in 1779 as a French ally on very favourable terms stemming from France’s major concession to Spain after waging war against Britain without first obtaining the formal consent of the Spanish court and, as a result, France foisted not only on itself but unaware United States as well the burden of fighting the war until Gibraltar was attached to Spain, which resulted in United States becoming a hostage of the war, since United States making a separate piece with Great Britain would be considered a breach of the Franco-American Treaty.⁵ In the following year Holland declared war against Britain and, therefore, Britain found itself at war with four countries at the same time. France and Spain

2 Trescot, The Diplomacy of the Revolution: An Historical Study, p. 55

3 George Bancroft, History of the United States, From the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 10, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company), 1874, p. 36

5 T. A. Bailey, A diplomatic history of the American people, ( Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 38

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were pursuing their own interests. US heavily relied on French aid and military force, and as much as France helped United States to gain independence, it tried to manipulate the United States, while Spain was hostile towards the United States from the very beginning without any intention to recognize it. Bailey mentions that Congress in desperation resorted to making an offer to drop their claims on the Mississippi river navigation in exchange for the Spanish recognition and alliance, but luckily for them the Spanish court turned down their offer.⁶ The reason for such a hostile treatment was that Spain itself was intimidated by a fast development and an enormous territorial, political and economic potential of the United States:

Of all the European powers, Spain was the most consistently and perseveringly hostile to the United States. With a true instinct she saw in their success the quickening example which was to break down the barriers of her own colonial system; and her dread of their coming influence shaped her policy during their struggle. She was ·willing to encourage them so far as to exhaust the resources of Great Britain by one campaign more. ⁷

US was perceived more as a tool of weakening Great Britain rather than an equal war- partner. The European powers involved in the war tried to weaken all-mighty and controlling British power and claim or reclaim territories around the world even in North America, and weren’t much concerned with treating United States as equal as Perkins mentions,

On the whole, however, the North American war was almost a slideshow as far as the European contestants were concerned. The war ignited by France’s decision to aid the American rebels became, for all the European powers, a struggle to reorder their own continent and, indeed the world. ⁸

The timing couldn’t probably have been better for US to claim independence from the British Empire. Britain was involved in four wars against four different countries and was facing hostile and opposing member-countries of the Armed Neutrality. The Armed

6 Bailey, A diplomatic history of the American people, p.39

7 Bancroft, History of the United States, From the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 10, p. 158

8 B. Perkins et al., The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The Creation of a Republican empire, 1776-1865, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 32

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Neutrality comprised some navy countries who tried to legalize international sea law regulations and guidelines, and undermine the British Navy sea policy which they found unfair and dictatorial. Therefore, Britain found itself in an extremely misfortunate position with her attention and power divided among a large number of issues. Hadn’t Britain been in such desperate straits at that time, the upshot of the American Revolutionary War might have been completely different. Britain was trying to make piece as quickly as possible because

“for the first time since 1690 her naval supremacy in the English Channel was jeopardized, and she was faced with the grim prospect of invasion”, and “that her financial condition was such that piece was ‘absolutely necessary’”.⁹ American colonies had excellent conditions for development and commerce, therefore they were perceived as a potential strong rival. As much as Britain had no intention of letting the latter happen, the circumstances were not in its favour, and Britain was certainly not in the position to afford such a scenario.

Even though France and Spain were enemies of Britain just as US, they did not see US as an equal state but as a tool of achieving their personal goals:

Vergennes, who was disturbed by his ill success at delivering Gibraltar, felt under strong obligations to support the demands of Spain for the area between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River – a region which the Americans regarded as marked out for them by Providence.¹⁰

In other words, Vergennes, knowing that he can’t possibly deliver Gibraltar to Spain, started looking for other ways of how to satisfy the interests of Spain now at the cost of American interests and territory. Vergennes was going to secretly offer the area between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River to Spain in exchange of his failed promise to deliver Gibraltar. Of course, France was not going to consider US interests. Vergennes was aware

9 Bailey, A diplomatic history of the American people, p.39-43

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that “[a] weak United States could be made to serve French interests in America; a powerful United States might prove headstrong”.¹¹

The American diplomats are to be given credit for their discerning eye. Had they followed their ally’s lead, the map of US might be very different now. John Jay, having learnt about a very probable treachery, took the matter in his own hands and resorted to breaching the American-French treaty by secretly opening peace negotiations with Britain without the knowledge or consent of the French.¹² Bailey also states that is arguable whether the treaty was breached or not, because US didn’t make a separate peace with Britain but only established preliminary agreements which “were specifically not to take effect until France had come to terms with England”.¹³ Therefore, technically speaking a breach of the treaty did not take place. However, as has been mentioned earlier, Britain found itself in terrible straits longing for ending the war as fast as possible. The preliminary agreements made with Britain were very generous and extremely favourable for US:

[…]since the Americans were clearly going to accept Britain’s generous concessions, separate peace or no separate peace, the French were forced to go along with them or risk a costly rupture with their ally.¹⁴

What it means is that the preliminary agreements were not theoretically but practically a separate peace because US was not going to turn down the concessions of England, the latter made France follow US lead. Moreover, France benefited from the Americans’ actions because Spain wouldn’t be able to conquer Gibraltar:

[…] France was finding it impossible to deliver Gibraltar to Spain, and Vergennes was faced with the intolerable prospect of fighting indefinitely to discharge his claims. America’s threatened defection, which would

12 Bailey, A diplomatic history of the American people, p.44-45

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obviously strengthen Britain, would put pressure on Spain to make peace and accept something less than Gibraltar.¹⁵

The Treaty of Paris was signed on September 3, 1983 in Paris. As far as the American-British part of the treaty is concerned, the Americans were much satisfied with their achievement:

The only three essential points in their demands -independence, the boundaries, and the fisheries -had been obtained in their fullest extent; and they presented themselves to the world with an admitted nationality, a vast and continuous territory, and undiminished commercial capabilities. ¹⁶

The US government agreed that the debts should be paid back to British merchants, and obliged to recommend the states to restore the property taken from the Loyalists during the war, however, the latter was just a formality.¹⁷

There were many factors that contributed to US successful negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Paris (1783). Britain was deprived of European support, and found itself at war with four different countries and against hostile members of the Armed Neutrality. US alliance with European powers against Britain contributed largely to the American success. However, credit is to be given to the American diplomats who were not gullible but extremely cautious and careful in their actions. Their leadership and ingenuity couldn’t be overestimated in forming US as a country on the international level.

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Bibliography

Bailey T. A., A diplomatic history of the American people, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice-Hall, 1980

Bancroft George, History of the United States, From the Discovery of the American Continent, Vol. 10. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1874

Perkins B., et al., The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The Creation of a Republican empire, 1776-1865. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993

Trescot, W. The Diplomacy of the Revolution: An Historical Study. Carlisle, MA:

Applewood Books, 2009