KazimierzBaran
Jagiellonian University, Cracow
The Constitutional Uniąueness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century
The aim of
thistext
istoprovide
abriefsurvey of a
seriesof
constitutional features thatwere
characteristicof
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth(often
referredto as
Respublicaor,
inPolish,
Rzeczpospolita),a unique organism „which once - to
use thewordsof
NormanDavies
- roamedthe plains of
Eastern Europę”1.
1 Norman Davies, God’s Playground, A History of Poland, Oxford 1981, vol. I, 371. Norman Davies provides a series of interesting remarks on the uniąueness of the Republic constitutional- ism. Interesting discussion of this problem may be also found in Wenceslas J. Wagner, ed., Pol
ish Law throughout the Ages: 1000 Years of Legał Thought in Poland, Stanford, CA 1970; Jacek Jędruch, Constitutions, Elections and Legislatures of Poland, 1493-1993. A Guide to Their History, foreword by Norman Davies, New York 1998. See also Stanisław Płaza, Changes in the Political System of the Polish Commonwealth after Extinction of the Jagiellonian Dynasty, Acta Poloniae Historica 52 (1985), and also Kazimierz Baran, Procedurę in Polish-Lithuanian Parliaments from the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, Parliaments, Estates and Representation 22 (2002), 57-69.
2 By 1582 the territory of the Commonwealth amounted to about 815.000 sq km to reach almost 990.000 sq km in the first half of the 17'h century, cf. The Historical Atlas of Poland, War
szawa - Wrocław 1981, 14, 16.
Although
the Republicof
the noblessurvived until the
endof
theeighteenth
century,the consolidationof
itsspecificconstitutionalcharacteristicshad taken place
betweenthemid-fifteenthand the
endof
thesixteenthcentury. At that
timePoland,
already
unitedwith Lithuania
firstby personal and
laterby
constitutionalunion, madę
up one of
thelargest
politicalorganisms
inEuropę2.
Withinits
boundariestherewas muchof
whatis
present dayUkrainę,
Byelorussia,Lithuania,
Latvia etc. From theethnic
pointof
viewtheCommonwealths territory
varied considerably. Apart from thePoles
andLithuanians
itwas possible to
distinguish among itsinhabitants
theEastern Slavs,
atthat time referred
toas theRuthenes
(in factthe
easternpart basi-
cally
spokeRuthenian),Latvians, a considerable proportion of
Jews,butalsotherep-
resentatives of smaller
minorities likeArmenians,Tatars
oreven
Scots. Among theRuthenians
andLithuanians
theupper
stratawereeasilypolonized.Generallyspeak-
ing,
across theentire
Commonwealth, the upperstrata amounted
toa
considerable98 Kazimierz Baran
particie
of
thetotal
population.Indeed,
the noblesmadę up some 8 percent of
the entirepopulation rising
to10
percentin
theeighteenthcentury.
This wasa remark-
ably highpercentage by
theEuropeanstandards of
thetime3 4 .
3 The Commonwealth had the largest European proportion of the nobles in Europę, several times as many as in other countries. Only Spain and Hungary could come close to it in that respect.
On details see Davies, op. cit., vol. I, 215, see also 228.
4 In old Poland-Lithuania statutes were traditionally called Konstytucje (Constitutions). Hence the formal name of Nihil Novi is the Nihil Novi Constitution.
5 The Nihil Novi law of 1505 proclaimed: “Because common laws and public ordinances affect not one, but all people in common, therefore, at this Sejm of Radom, with all the judges, council
lors, barons, and territorial deputies assembled together, we have reasonably moved and, further, adopted, the following equitable resolution: that, because such might become a detriment and in- jury to the State, an injury and misfortune of whatever sort to the private individual, and make for change in regard to public right and liberty, henceforth, and in futurę times in perpetuity, no new laws shall be madę by us or our successors, without the consent of the councilors and territorial deputies (Jędruch, op. cit., 418)”.
In addition, as we
shall see, the nobilityenjoyed considerable rights. Above all,
thenobles were successfullyprotected by
their Habeas Corpusagainst
arbitrary ar- restand detention by the State agencies, and,
thanksto
theirpoliticalprivileges,had a
largeshareinthegovernmentof
thecountry.
The first striking
featureof the Commonwealth
wasits democratic model of
gov- ernment. Unlikeother
Europeancountriesthat from
theend of
theMiddleAgesbe-
ganto
evolve constitutionally towards absolutism, Poland-Lithuaniadriftedtoward nobledemocracy.
Aseries of
privilegesgranted to
the szlachta (the nobility) in the forteenth,butmostly in
thefifteenthcenturylaid
foundationsfor
akind of civil
soci- etythat
thenoblescould form vis-a-vis the
monarch.Equipped withvariouspoliticalrights and
well represented in the bicameralparliamentreferred to as
the sejm, the szlachtacould convert the King into an
organthat
wassubject
tolaw.
Lex wassupe
rior to Rex and
notviceversa.The
fundamentalprinciple of nobility
s constitutionalism thatremarkably
facili- tatedthesubsequenttendency towardsa republican
formof goverment
inthenoble- men’sCommonwealthwas that of the
separationof powers.
It wasformulatedas early as
1505,inthe Statute
laterreferredtoas Nihil
Novi\ and adopted by thesejm
heldin Radom. The statute
preventedthe
King fromexercising unlimited legislative
power.He promised that he
would notadoptanythingnew which might affect the liberties of his
noblesubjects without obtaining the consent of
the councillors (senators) of theupper
houseand
theszlachtas representatives sitting
inthelowerhouse5
.As a result of
theNihil Novi
formulathe business of the King was
toimplement law
but not toproduce
it. Ofcourse, while
implementing it, the Kingcould adopt various
executivedecrees, edicts, or
other measuresof that
kind.They
could not howeveraffect
thegenerallyappliedlibertiesthathis noble citizens
enjoyed.Furtherconstitutional
developments
in the Commonwealthadded precision to
the depictionof the
figuręof the
monarch as someone whois
subjectedto law. On
The
Constitutional Uniąueness
ofthe Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth...99
theextinction of
theJagiellondynasty the
szlachtaformulatedin 1573akind of a
Billof
Rightsof the
Respublica utriusque gentis (poi. Rzeczpospolita ObojgaNarodów).Thedocument boręthename
of
theHenrician Artides6
sińcethe
firstking elected
accordingtothenew constitutionalsystem
wasHenri de
Valoisof
theFrench royal family. Accordingto theHenrician Artides
thethrone became
fullyelectiveand
themonarch
wasexpressly forbidden
toleave
itto his
son.The election was of
theviritim type
whichmeantthat
allindividuals of
noblerankhadthe righttoparticipate init.And
in
factthey
didunlesspreventedfromdoingso by everyday reasons.
Oldpaint- ings
thatdepict the royal election show amass rally of the
nobilityin an
immense fieldpackedwitharrivingindividuals.
6 Jakub Sawicki, ed., Wybór tekstów źródłowych z historii państwa i prawa polskiego, Warsza
wa 1952, vol. I, part 1,151-157.
7 Ibidem, 155.
It
isalsoworthwhile
tonotę that
everyone whowasof noble
statuswas
eligible, although in practicemost
Polish-Lithuanianmonarchs who
were laterelected
re-cruited themselves
fromthe Europeanrulingfamilies,
likethose of the House of
Vasa fromSweden orPrincipalities of
Saxonyor
Transylvania.Nevertheless,
ahandful
of Polish magnatescould
alsobe found
amongthem,
like MichałKorybut
Wiśniowiecki, JanSobieski,
StanisławLeszczyński
or the lastKing of
the Rzeczpospolita,Stanisław August
Poniatowski. Whatdeserves particular emphasis
is theimpeachment proce
durę
that the
HenricianArtides
providedfor,therebyexpresslymaking
themonarch
subjectto law.From that time on,
if the Kingviolatedthe
fundamentallawsof
theCommonwealth he
releasedhis subjects from
thedutyof obedience
tohimself7,
theHenrician
ArtidesLatin
formulaonthat point
beingde non praestanda oboedientia.If this
happened the mass of the nobles, while
materializingtheirius resistendi could,
accordingto the deeplyrooted
modus procedendi,organize an armed
leaguecalleda
konfederacja (confederacy)and takematters into
theirown hands. A similar
routine appliedduring
interregnaorifanenemy invaded
thecountry
whentheregular state
agenciesceasedto
operate.The
confederaciesformed to
opposean
invaderwereob-viously
thoseorganized
tosupport
themonarch and
notto
eliminatehim. However, a
confederacyhostile to the
King,which
blamedhimfor
theinfringement of
thelaw,
wasreferred to as a
rokosz. Thatway or
another,they
wereexponential of
the self--governmental
tendencies characteristicof
thepolitical system prevalent
inthe old-
-timePolish-Lithuanian state.
Whenviewedfrom
the perspective of the instruments that
limitedhis
preroga- tive,themonarch of
Poland-Lithuaniacouldbe
calleda president for life rather
thana monarch
inthesense of
theword between
theRenaissance and the Enlightenment.
Ifapplying
modern
standards,one
mightsaythat his
positionwas
closetothatof
thepresent
daypresident of the
UnitedStates.
Likethe
latter, theKing of
Rzeczpospolita was also exduded from the legislature, had toobserve the
fundamentalliberties
of the citizensof
thecountry to avoid
beingimpeached for
theirviolation,butwas left
relativelyfree in pursuing foreign policy,
providedthat he
hadsufficientfunds for
the100 KazimierzBaran
purpose.
Usually he
did nothave
themand he had
to askparliament for the money.
Thisprovided
the bicameral
sejm with thechance
toallocate the funds that
itvotedfor
specificpurposes,
thereby in fact controlling the executiveagencies
also in thesphere of foreign policy.
The confederacy
wasnot theonly
componentof the Commonwealths Structure which
provided itwith a self-governmental character. The dietine
(poi. sejmik)or
thelocal assembly of the
nobility ineach of
approximatelyseventy
provincesof
the Commonwealth wasa highly self-governmental
instrument.The
interregna,which
attheend of the sixteenth
centuryadded
up to severalyears,
facilitatedthe growingindependence of
the sejmik. Intheabsenceof
themonarch,the
local gentryindeed took
businessinto
theirown
hands,while the
respective ziemie (terrae)or
Palati-nates (poi. województwa
- these beingthetypical
namesof the
Republicsprovinces)
combinedto
forma
confederacydesigned
toelecta new
King.Oneway
oranother,the high standing
assumedby
the sejmik onsuch
occasionsstrengthened
thesense of sovereignty
amongthe noble
citizensof
therespective provinces. The
sejmikdid
indeed seetheimplementation of
directdemocracysińce, as in the case of
thefree electionof
themonarch,
everyoneof
noblerankcould participate
inits
sessionsun- less
preventedfrom doingso by everyday reasons
suchas
distance,disease,
farming businessormerelylackof
interestinpublicaffairs.
The
numericalstrength of the nobility
meantthat
tensof
thousandscouldtum up
insome
provinces,butinpractice
several hundredwouldforma typical sejmik meet-
ingwhen urgent matters
wereto be debated (the largest
recordedsessionamounting
to1
200individuals)8
.In slackperiods less
thanone
hundredwould
attend.The
ses sions
were far fromchaotic. The
debatesfollowed
a routinehonedover generations.
This
induded
varioussystems of voting and vote
counting, including the so-called kreskowanie,as
wellas
the officialregistration of the
sejmikresolutions
in thegród Courtorgród chancery.
8 Stanisław Płaza, Sejmiki i zajazdy szlacheckie województwa sieradzkiego. Ustrój i funkcjono
wanie (1572-1632), vol. I, Warszawa - Kraków 1987. Many of the following remarks on the sejmik are based on Płazas monograph as well as on the exhaustive study of the sejmiks by Wojciech Kriegseisen, Sejmiki Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVIIIXVIII wieku Warszawa, 1991; cf. also Baran, op. cit., 57-66. The large number of participants in sejmiki caused many sessions to be held outdoors, sometimes in a cemetery or in an open field.
The
self-governmental climate,prevalent
in the Commonwealth, accountedfor the
lackof
intricatebureaucratic
machinery characteristicof
thestates that developed
towards absolutemonarchies.
Thislack of a
substantialcentralbureaucracyproved
providentialfor the prosperity of
theminorities
which,asaresult, enjoyed consider-
ablefreedom and
wereallowedto
abideby
theircustomsin
theirinternal affairs.
TheJewish
minoritywas
especiallyautonomous
inthis regard.
CecilRoth
wrote:Nothing was morę characteristic of Polish Jewish life than the remarkable degree of self- government which it evolved. In 1551, Sigismund Augustus, the last king of the home of Jagiełło, issued an edict permitting the Jews of his realm to elect their Chief Rabbi and
The Constitutional Uniqueness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth... 101
lawful judges, answerable only to the king, with authority to exercise jurisdiction in all maters concerning Jewish law. This measure has rightly been described as the Magna Charta of Jewish self-government in Poland, for it set the seal of the royal approval upon the natural urge of the Jew of past ages to rule himself according to this traditional juris- prudence9.
9 Cecil Roth, A History of the Jews, Schocken Books, New York 1970, 269.
10 As regards finances only the total amount of the tax imposed upon the Jews was negotiated each year between the Jewish representatives and Polish Minister of Finance, while its distribu
tion was left in the hands of Jewish authorities, cf. Andrzej Bryk, Jewish Autonomy in the Polish- -Lithuanian Commonwealth from the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, Archiwum Iuridicum Cracoviense 21 (1988), 51-69.
11 Roth, op. cit., 270-271. Morę details on the Jewish diaspora in the Respublica may be found in Jews in Poland by Chimen Abramsky, Maciej Jachimczyk, Anthony Polonsky, Blackwell ed., Oxford 1986, as well as in Bryk, op. cit., 51-69; see also Jędruch, op. cit., 141-144.
12 For morę details see Bryk, op. cit., 64-66.
Thus the
self-governmental tradition of the
Commonwealthallowed the
Jewsto arriveat a
degreeof
autonomyunattainable
elsewhere.They
wentas
faras
forming theirown
Jewish Parliament or the Council referred toas
the Vaad.The Vaad
ob- viouslycould not adopt lawsthat would be
generallybinding
oneverybody
in the Rzeczpospolita butitcould
successfully dealwith internal
Jewishmatterssuchas rab-
binicaleducation,
charityorthe distribution of
theJewishpolltax10 11
.In
his discussion of
theJewish
Council,Cecil
Rothemphasized:
The Council, at its prime, was virtually the Parliament of Polish Jewry, with authority nearly as absolute as that of any legislature. Plenary meetings were held each year, not only at the Spring Fair at Lublin, but also at that in the early summer at Jaroslav, in Galicia.
During the sessions of the Polish Diet at Warsaw, the Council would send an agent, or Shtadlan, generally a persona grata at court, to watch over Jewish interests. Internally, its authority was absolute. Besides apportioning taxation it would assist in enforcing royal edicts; it passed sumptuary laws, to enforce moderation in dress and social life; did all that lay in its power to prevent undue competition; it supervised education; it acted as a court of appeal, and decided on matters which were in dispute between one congrega- tion and another. All the Council s regulations, however trivial, could be enforced, if the necessity arose, by the power of excommunication, which was backed up by the authority of the State. Nowhere, sińce the decay of the Jewish center in Palestine, had a morę com- plete approach to autonomy existed“.
Thanks
tohaving
thiskind of
their ownintricate self-governmental
bodiesthe Jewishpeoplecould
forma
successfullobby
preventinganyanti-Jewishlegislation
at thelocal as
wellascentrallevels
12.
It
hasalready beenemphasized that one of
thedistinctive features of the
Respub- lica, theone that
accountedfor the democratic mechanism of its Structure, was
theextraordinary legał
statusof its noble
citizens.The latter
were successfullyprotected
102
Kazimierz
Baranagainst
the
arbitrary reachof State
power. Thisdegree of independence enjoyed
by thenobleswas due
toaseriesof
privilegesthatthenobleshad
obtainedcommencing
with theKoszycePactof
1374.The most prominent among these privileges were
those which,likethat of Czerwieńsk of
1422 orthat of
Jedlniaand Cracow
of1430-1433, conferred
ontheupper
stratumof
theRzeczpospolitatherights
whichmight easily
be identifiedwithmodern
humanrights.
ThusCzerwieńsk privilege
protectedtheprop- erty
ofthenobles from
beingconfiscated without due
processof law,
while Jedlniaand
Cracowexpanded thedue-process-oflaw reąuirement
to the casesof arresting or detaining
anobleman13
.13 From that time on, a nobleman could be immediately arrested only in drastic cases such as highway robbery, kidnapping women, arson etc., and, when arrested, he had to be promptly brought before the Court and tried. His preliminary detention could not therefore turn into an im- prisonment ad infinitum. It was designed only to secure his appearance in the Court; cf. Jędruch, op. cit., 417-418; Baran, op. cit., 59.
14 Jędruch, op. cit., 134.
Another noteworthyliberty
of
thenobles
wastheir freedom of
conscience.That
was granted tothem through
the resolutionof
WarsawConfederacy
of1573
andsubsequently
incorporatedinto
theHenrician Articles
which,as
has alreadybeen said, functioned as
theCommonwealths Bill of
Rights.The text of the Confederation proclaimed:
As in our Commonwealth there exists great dissidence in the cause of Christian religion, to prevent the growth of any harmful sedition, such as can be clearly seen in other realms, we promise in our names, and in the name of our successors in perpetuity and bound by oath on faith, honour and conscience, that we who differ in religion will keep peace among ourselves and for reason of different faith and religious practice will not shed blood, nor penalize by confiscation of wealth or good name, prison or exile, and we will not help any authority or office in such undertakings: instead, should anyone try to shed blood claiming an exalted cause, we shall all be responsible for preventing it, even if it were attempted under the pretext of a decree, or a court decision14.
Nobless
ofallChristian denominations, as
wereputon the same footingthe rest oftheir
noble brethren.However, further developments madę
the entireproblem of
religioustoleration in
the Republic moręcomplex. The Union of Brest
of1596 en-
courageda
certain proportionof Orthodox Christians
to form the “Uniate”
(Greek Catholic) Churchwhich
acknowledgedthesupremacy of the Apostolic
Seein Romę.This led to
a few decades of discrimination
againstthosewho remainedloyal to the traditionalOrthodox Church.
Yetinthe
1630s KingWładysław IVVasa
yieldedto
thereality that he encountered
on succeedingtothethrone of
theCommonwealth.
Finding
a remarkable number of
thosewho
practised thetraditional
beliefs in theeastern
partof his country, he
helpedpersuade
the sejm tolegalize
afresh the Or- thodoxChurchwithin
theboundariesof Poland-Lithuania. Religious
tolerationwas thus restored. However,throughout
theseventeenth and early
eighteenth centuryThe
Constitutional Uniąueness
ofthe
Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth...103 it
was not easyto maintain the high standardof this
toleration,particularly, when
during thewars against Protestant
Sweden in the 1650s Swedish armiesdevastated
the country and profaned Catholic churches. Despitethisbitter experience the for
mal
discrimination of non-Catholics
inthe sense of
preventingthemfrom sittingin parliament was
onlya
short-livedepisode between
the 1730sand
1760s. One way oranother, theformal
declarationof religious toleration in
1573preventedreligiouscivil
wars frombreaking
out in the Commonwealth. True,the religious
toleration waslimited
toChristian denominations.
Yetin
fact itspronouncement
alsohadan impacton
thestatus of non-Christian
creeds.The
Jews, boundto
Judaism, and theTatars professing Islam, could practise they creeds unharassed15.
15 Morę details on the religious questions of the Commonwealth may be found in Davies, op. cit., see his chapter on Antemurale, vol. I, 197.
In
thecontext of
theirprivileges,
thelarge share of the nobles
inthegovernmentof their country
shouldonce again be
emphasized.The direct democracy
realizedthrough
thesejmiki, the
fuli legislativepower
vested inthe bicameral
sejm and the viritim electionof
themonarch,
were the foremost political rightsof
thenobility.
These rights
consolidated the popular conviction
among thenobles that
their willcould
notbe ignored
whenever major decisions on legislativemeasures
or on theforeign policy of
thecountry
werebeingtaken.
The republican
upperclass was
alsocharacterizedby the egalitarian
spiritperme- ating their
ranks.According toproverb
coined atthat
time: “Szlachcicna zagrodzie
równy wojewodzie”which could be
translated as:even
thepoorest
noble(having
onlya few
acresof
land)was equal
toa
palatine(a senator of
thefirstrank). The say- ing expressed the
ideathat irrespective of
yourwealth,
as longas you
werea
noble,and particularly,
ifyou
werea possessionatus(and youcouldbe one even
ifyou leased
landinstead of owning
it),you enjoyed all
theprivilegesof your class.
One morę question
that
requires comment in thecontext of
theunique
status ofPolish-Lithuanian nobles
isa
distinct featureof
theculture with which this
classidentified
themselves.The
culturein question was
thecultureof
Latinitas.The devel-
opmentof
thelatterhad something to do with
the sixteenthandseventeenth-centu-ry
religiousexperience of the
Commonwealth.The
sixteenth centurywas
thetime
when many nobles,particularly those prominent
inthe
sejm,accepted Calvinism.
It was
thegrowingnumber of
non-Catholicsthroughout the sixteenth
century thataccounted for
theaforementioned
tendencyto
promotereligious toleration
inorder to
avoidreligiouswars. Yet, from the end of
thesixteenth century,
andthenthrough
out the seventeenth
century,many of
theCommonwealths
Protestantsbegantodrop
their
reformedfaith,therebyreturning
tothecreed of
theirancestors.The reasons for
thisweremany butthe tendency
seemedtoa
largeextentto
bedue to the
particularfaithfulness with
whichtheprinciples of
thesixteenth-century
Councilof Trent were
adoptedand implemented
inPoland-Lithuania.
Theseprinciples
weredesigned
todo
away
withallthe
negativeaspectsof the life of Catholic Church which had
provoked104 KazimierzBaran
theReformation.
And
indeed,an
improvement inthe
morał andintellectuallevel of
Catholic clergywas
soonevident.
Thismadę
themcapable of effective pastorał
care.The
ex-Protestantsusedto
statesometimes
intheirmemoirsthat they
weresurprisedat
the decisionsof
theirfathers
who atone time
departedfrom Catholicism.Anad-
ditionalargument that
promotedthe
climateof re-conversion
couldparadoxically be created by
theextent of religious toleration
itself. Sincetoleration
prevailedinthe Commonwealthas early
asthe 1560s(at
thattime
thesejm adopted
thestatute which
forbadethe starostowie toexecute
thedecisionsof
ecclesiasticalCourts),
theRepublic
beganto
attractthefaithfulof various sects into
whichProtestantism
wassoonsplit.The sects
alsoinduded
theAntitrinitarianswhopromptly
foundthemselves in
sharpconflict
withthe Calvinists.
Thedisgusting
ąuarrelsand
brawlson
religious pointsthat followed
thedisputes between
theProtestantsof various
shadesalsoreached
the sejm andplagued some of its
sessions.Suchdevelopments worked as a discouraging
factorvis-a-vis
those whostill
contemplated whether to chooseareformedreligion orstay with
theold creed.
Observingthe scene
from adistance, the
Catholicclergy could condude:
“bellum hereticorum pax
estEcdesiae”
.In
the meantime
theJesuits,invited
intotheCommonwealth inthe 1560s,began todevelop a
netof Jesuit colleges which
-by the
standardsof
thetime - offered quite attractive,
Latin-oriented,humanistic education. The nobles
whoattendedthese
col leges
learnedtospeak
fluentLatin,studiedOvid, Virgil and
Horace,and wereableto quotewhole
fragmentsof
theirworks by heart.
This happenedatthe time
when the teachingof this
ancientlanguage
began todedine
amongProtestants sińcethis
wasthe language of
theApostolic
Seeand
layhumanism16.
16 Cf. Jerzy Axer, „Latinitas” jako składnik polskiej tożsamości kulturowej, in: Agnieszka Ra- bińska, ed„ Tradycje antyczne w kulturze europejskiej - perspektywa polska, Warszawa 1995.
17 Daniel Defoe is quoted by Davies, op. cit., vol. I, 236-237.
Thus
the mass of nobles spoke fluent
Latin and were well acquaintedwith
the cultureof
antiquity.Ifthe
needarosethey
couldeasily
switchfromtheirnative Polish
or Ruthenianto
the languageof Populus
Romanus. ThiswaswhatsurprisedDaniel
Defoewho, while discussing
the specificfeaturesof Polish
nobility, emphasized:A man who can speak Latin may travel from one end of Poland to another as familiarly as if he was born in the country. Bless us! What would a gentleman do that was to travel through England and could speak nothing but Latin... I must lament his condition17.
While returning
howeverto
theaforementioned
JesuitColleges,we must say
thatthe instruction which the
youngnobles received in
them tendedto
forma certain
specificframe of mind.
Thanksto this instruction the
nobleswere attracted
to the virtuesthat
atone time excelled
amongtheinhabitants of
republicanRomę,
includ- inghonour, courage,
chivalry,love of the
Patria,etc.When
implantedintotherealityof
theseventeenth-century Poland-Lithuania,
thesevirtues
calledfor
thedefence
of Christianity.The
noblesbelieved
thatthepoliticalStructurein
whichtheylivedmadęThe
Constitutional
Uniąuenessof the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
..105 up
the Antemurale or thebastion
situatedat the very outskirts of civilized
world.Historical developments ensured that
theyrepeatedly had to face
challengesthreat-
ening their civilizationandthey repeatedly
wereforced
toassume the
taskof
rescuing Europa Christiana.It was
withinthatlinę of
thinkingthatin1683JanSobieskiunder- took
the challengeof
rescuingVienna
besiegedby an immense Ottoman army. And
although he,as thecommander in chief of
allthe Christian
forces,was
not the onlyruler
at thebesiegedcapital of
theHabsburgs,itisagreed among historians that
thecharge of his
heavycavalryonthe Turkish camp
wasthe
turningpoint in
thebattle.
While
summing
up thediscussion of the
nobilitys ethos,we
may alsoobserve
thatthe Latinitasculturewas only one of the
factors that accountedfor the attach-
mentof
thenoble milieu to
thevalues of
republicanismof
Romęof
antiquity.Ofsim- ilar importance was
thefactthattheliberties and democratic
devicesasfound in the
Statemachinery of
Res PublicaPolonorum indeedseemed
tomake the
lattera
new embodimentof
Res Publica Romanorum. The antique ideasof
theextinct ancient
Re public
whosecitizens enjoyed considerable civic rights and
whodistinguishedthem-
selvesby high
public spirit, attachmentto
Patriaand elevated
morals, weresome- thing that the Commonwealths
nobles could invokein
orderto
consolidatetheir own
specificidentity. In
addition, intheirneighbouringEuropean
environmentthey couldnotdetectanythingwhatmight
resemblethat
kindof
profounddemocracy in which
theythemselves
hada
share.Therefore
their tendency toseek
theirrootsin
theancient past
wasentirelynatural18
.18 Axer, op. cit., 74. It is also interesting to find how, as a result of the dedication of Polish Ba- roque culture to Latinitas, Latin dynamically entered the Polish language. While in the 16th century only 1 in every 600 words in Polish was of Latin derivation, in the first part of the 17th century the proportion grew to 1 in every 15 words; cf. Aleksander Wojciech Mikołajczak, Łacina w kulturze polskiej, Wrocław 1998, 171. In memoirs, political speeches or letters, Latin phrases overlapped with Polish lines. The popular diary of the Polish squire of the time fully confirms this (cf. Cathe- rine S. Leach, ed., Memoirs of the Polish Baroque, The Writing of Jan Chryzostom Pasek, a Squire of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London 1976).
” Płaza, op. cit., 154-155; Baran, op. cit., 61.
The discussion of the
distinctfeatures of
thenoble Commonwealths
constitu-tionalism cannot ignore one device that is repeatedly analyzed at
lengthby the histo
rians,
theliberum veto.Unfortunately
thediscussion of
thisinstrument is burdened withmanyexaggerations
orsimplifications. It
seemsrightthereforebrieflytogiveanaccount of its functioning in
thelight of
recentresearch. The point
isthat
fromthe beginningof the existence of
Polish Parliamentslower house, itsdebates
were gov-erned by
theprincipleof unanimous consent.
Yet,at
thetimewhenthenobility were
distinguishedby
high politicalmorals,specifically
throughoutthesixteenth and
earlyseventeenth century,
the needfor unanimous consent was
not strictly interpreted.There functioned effective mechanisms,
likethat of
the“
dispersed-lower-house”de-
vicethatsuccessfullypreventedthis body
frombeingparalyzed by
thelack of
una- nimity19. For
allpractical reasons
it may be arguedthat for
almosta
centuryand
106 Kazimierz
Baran
a halfthe
Polish-Lithuanian parliament
worked smoothly.It was therefbre
only in themid-seventeenth century, in
the climateof falling political morals
and incessant wars,mostlyof
adefensivenaturę,that
theCommonwealthhadtowagę, that the
firstsymptoms of constitutional
deteriorationwereobservable. The absurd interpretation of
unanimousconsent
reachedits zenith
and the liberum veto orindividual
nega- tive votewas
actuallyimplemented to
prevent thesuccessful condusionof
thesejm debates.Slowly
itbecame
possiblefor one individual to break off
theparliamentary
session irrevocably.Because of
this, between 1573 and 1763about
one thirdof
the sejms provedineffective20
.20 For morę details see Juliusz Bardach, Bogusław Leśnodorski, Michał Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego, Warszawa 1993, 216-225, 223; Jędruch, op. cit., 117, 151; Baran, op. cit., 68-69.
21 Baran, op. cit., 69.
Itwas therefore
only in
thefirst part of
theeighteenth centurythat
thefirst
ten- denciestoreform the Commonwealths constitution
wereobservable. For
sometime
however,the efforts of
thereformers were
crippledby
theattitude of
greatpowersthat
wouldlaterpartition Poland-Lithuania.
Particularly Russia, starting from Peter the Greats reign, controlled the internal policy of the Commonwealth under her protectorate. Nevertheless, the persistent reformers man- aged to achieve partial success from time to time. They did it mostly through resorting to the already discussed idea of confederacy, the armed league of the noble citizens of the Republic who could take affairs into their hands when things seemed to slip away from state control. For the sejm debates the slogan of confederacy was particularly providential.
It allowed for the convening of a parliament whose session could not be interrupted by liberum veto. Instead, majority vote was binding. It was thanks to one such sejm that the well-known Constitution of 3 May 1791 was adopted. It eventually introduced majority vote as the basie principle of parliamentary debate. Among outstanding devices adopted by this Constitution was also the vote of no confidence. This was the first time that this device was expressly introduced in any continental constitution. What is also worthy of notę in its provisions was the shaping of the image of the king on the British pattern (the king who ‘can do no wrong’ sińce all his executive acts required endorsement by the ap- propriate minister)21.
While ending
thisbrief survey of
theCommonwealths
constitutionalups and downs
itmay
be interestingto
resortto what
CzesławMiłosz
putin
anutshellwhile depicting
theimage of the
Commonwealth inthe
eradiscussed
in thepresent con-tribution. He
wrote:Whatever may be said about the organism that borę the title of Rzeczpospolita and boast- ed an elected king at its head, the evils inherent in it should not be judged by our stan- dards, but rather by comparison with neighboring states of the same epoch. A greater contrast is hard to imagine: On the one hand, a chaotically ruled agglomerate, a sort of coral reef formed from the adhesion of a myriad of tiny particles, on the other, the
The Constitutional
Uniąuenessof
thePolish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
.. 107 centralized domain of the czars, where the ruler was omnipotent, temporal and spiritual power were one, conspiracy and pałace murders were basie political tools. In the former, a climate of relaxation prevailed: habeas corpus, tumultuous sessions of the parliament, an absence of regicide, corruption and traffic in votes, anarchist leanings on the part of indi- viduals and groups and even whole regions. The peasants were exploited and politically they did not count (as they did not count anywhere then), but class democracy was a fact.A plurality of groups battling for their own interests contended for power: magnates who flattered the hordes of petty noblemen; a monarch whose powers were so limited that he frequently had to humble himself to get credit for the army; towns’ intent on preserving what was left of their medieval privileges; and, finally, the Church and her religious or- ders, which answered to no one but Romę. In the parliament, any deputy who declared cLiberum veto!> could break off a session irrevocably - a law, unique in Europę, which implied that to pass laws a rarely attainable unanimity was necessary, and that freedom of opinion carried the seeds of its own destruction. Meanwhile, Russian diplomats looked on, stroking their beards, at first from a distance; but later, when their moves were backed up by a strong military force, they found the use of pressure or money to buy off parties or individual deputies a simple matter. Their success proved to be complete22.
22 Czesław Miłosz, Native Realm, Oxford 1981, 17-18.
Streszczenie
Ustrojowa osobliwość Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVI-XVIII wieku
Artykuł analizuje te elementy ustroju dawnej Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej, które ujawniają niezwykłość jej konstytucyjnego kształtu. W przeciwieństwie do wielu państw europejskich, dryfujących w tym czasie ku absolutyzmowi, szesnastowieczna Rzeczpospolita utrwalała mo
del demokracji szlacheckiej z podziałem władz (ostatecznie zadeklarowanym w konstytucji nihil novi z 1505 r.) i monarchą o statusie zbliżonym do nowoczesnego prezydenta. Podobnie jak ten ostatni, także i król Polski mógł być - zgodnie z artykułami henrykowskimi - pod
dany oskarżeniu analogicznemu do dzisiejszego impeachmentu w razie naruszenia przezeń prawa.
Z kolei nabyte przez szlachtę jeszcze w wieku XV rozliczne przywileje czyniły z tej grupy społecznej rodzaj społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, zdolnego oprzeć się arbitralnym zakusom władzy wykonawczej. Dzięki wolnościom obywatelskim gwarantowanym przez przywileje, zwłaszcza warecki (1422) i jedlnieńsko-krakowski (1430-1433) - szlachcic nie mógł być po
zbawiony ani majątku, ani wolności osobistej bez zastosowania doń procedur przewidzianych przez prawo. Od czasu zaś konfederacji warszawskiej (1572) oraz artykułów henrykowskich (1573) - cieszył się wolnością religijną. Przywilej nieszawski (1454) z kolei gwarantował mu autentyczny udział w sprawowaniu władzy państwowej. Przywileje te ograniczone były co prawda do stanu nobilitas, lecz Rzeczpospolita posiadała wówczas najliczniejszą szlachtę w Europie; duży więc segment społeczeństwa miał - jak na standardy tamtych czasów - po
czucie współrządzenia państwem.
Artykuł akcentuje elementy samorządności w mechanizmie ustrojowym Republiki szla
checkiej (elekcja viritim, zmaterializowanie demokracji bezpośredniej w funkcjonowaniu sej
108 Kazimierz
Baran
miku szlacheckiego). Omawia także dezintegrację ustrojową państwa szlacheckiego, rysującą się coraz wyraźniej między połową XVII a połową XVIII wieku.
W końcowej analizie siedemnastowiecznych prób wydźwignięcia Rzeczypospolitej z ma
razmu ustrojowego akcent położono na te osiągnięcia Konstytucji 3 maja 1791 roku, które przyciągać mogą szczególną uwagę zachodnioeuropejskiego historyka. Konstytucja ta bo
wiem na wzór brytyjskiej określiła króla jako tego, „who can do no wrong”, gdyż każdy jego akt wykonawczy wymaga kontrasygnaty ministra. Nadto zaś stworzyła ona pierwszy w Euro
pie kontynentalnej prototyp wotum nieufności („[...] gdyby większość dwóch trzecich części wotów sekretnych obydwóch izb złączonych na sejmie ministra [...] odmiany żądała, Król natychmiast na jego miejsce innego nominować powinien”).
Na marginesie rozważań poświęconych osobliwości ustrojowej dawnej Rzeczypospolitej zwrócono też pewną uwagę na kulturę typu Latinitas, jaka kształtowała „the frame of mind”
ówczesnej szlachty. Wychowana w sprawnie funkcjonujących kolegiach jezuickich, szlachta ta nader biegle posługiwała się łaciną. Znała też znakomicie kulturę antyku. Połączona z war
tościami chrześcijańskimi, ta ostatnia pozwalała w dramatycznych momentach odwoływać się co światlejszym przedstawicielom uprzywilejowanego stanu do takich cnót jak odwaga, honor, obrona chrześcijaństwa, oddanie sprawom ojczyzny itp. Wartości te legły niewątpliwie także u podstaw wiktorii wiedeńskiej z 1683 roku czy konfederacji barskiej (1768-1772), bę
dącej rodzajem pierwszej narodowej insurekcji.