Robert Traba

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Robert Traba

T w o D i m e n s i o n s o f H i s t o r y : A n O p e n i n g S k e t c h 1

D O I :i 0 .l 8 3 l 8 / t d . 2 0 l 6 .e n . 1 .4

“National traditions [...] eternal, handed down from one gen eration to the next, som etim es prophetic in nature; they are, in large part, a freer and truer expression of national sentim ents than attained facts and w ritten history.”

Cezary Biernacki, Encyklopedia Olgerbranda (1867)2

“Tradition is the illusion of perm anence”

From Woody Allen’s film, Deconstructing Harry (1997)

O pening

Loo kin g b ack at the tw o -d e ca d e h isto ry o f the Polish Second R epublic (19 19 -19 3 9 ), w e are able to describe an era o f great hope and transform ation. Looking back at the last quarter-centu ry o f post-com m un ist transform ation (1989 - present) - that is, at the h istory o f the Third R e public - w e are choked b y the p ro x im ity o f events, by a surplus o f em otion , and b y p artisan political conflict.

In effect, w e are n o t d escribing a tran sform ative epoch;

1 The article w a s also published a s a ch a p te r o f th e book Robert Traba, The Past in th e P re s en t The Construction o f Polish History (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2015).

Robert Traba - historian, Professor a t the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy o f Sciences. He is the Director of the Center for Historical Research o f the Polish Academ y of Sciences in Berlin since 2006, Co-Chairman of the Polish-German Textbook Committee, and Editor o f the journal Borussia.

He concentrates in his research on the topics o f cultural change and collective memory.

2 From Janusz Tazbir, "Tradycja i rw an ie ciąg łości," in Przyszłość tradycji, ed. S ła w Krzem ień-O jak (B iałystok: Libra, 2008), 22.

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M E M O R Y , I D E N T I T Y A N D P O L i T i C S O F M E M O R Y ROBERT TRABA T W O D I M E N S I O N S O F HISTO RY..

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rather, w e are entangling h istory w ith politics. This is, on the one hand, the inevitable consequence o f the u n ity o f space and tim e, in w hich the author/

h isto rian is - w h eth er he likes it or n o t - an actor in the th eater o f public events. O n the other hand, it is the result o f a continuing in sen sitivity am ong Poles to the m odern ization o f the historian's craft; if em braced, such m o d ernization would allow us to build a n ew research instrum entarium , by w hich w e could, in turn, gain som e distance from still “h o t” events. Or is it sim ply a fact that the historian's research in strum entariu m is doom ed to fail w hen describ in g recen t phen om en a, in w h ich “h isto ry ” is n o t so m uch an a c a dem ic discipline as it is one o f the m ain actors (subjects) in current political disputes?

I do n ot intend to provide sim ple an sw ers to such questions, in p a rt b e cause I do not have sim ple answ ers. In any case, now that the boom in the so- called “new politics o f the p ast” [polityka historyczna] in Poland from the years 2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 7 h as passed, it is w orth return ing to the topic in order to prevent us from once again falling into the trap w here politics appropriates history.

A sid e from that threat, one o f the clear m erits o f the “n ew politics o f the p ast”

is the fact th at - in the public debate - the question o f w h a t p lace h isto ry

“should and should not take” in the social discourse has b een given increased w eight. U ntil recently, the subject w as either treated m arginally, or w a s p o litely avoided as som ething not quite w orthy o f serious discussion, and this is because Poles, general speaking, oppose using history for political purposes in light of our experiences w ith how the com m unists m anipulated it for decades.

Paw eł Śpiew ak sum m arized the debate over history in the first decade o f the Third Republic by w ritin g that - against the background o f the “dispute over Poland” - issues o f id en tity (w ith h istory as the foundation) w ere so pro m i

nent that it w as not so m uch intense as it w a s “obsessive.”3

Several issues - the conflict over form er President Lech W ałęsa's biography (not just its political aspects); ongoing disputes about the foundation m yth o f the Third Republic; the continuing “historical in itiation” o f the Fourth R e public (today, through the back door); and finally, the return to irrationality in the debate “w ith ” and “about” the G erm ans and the Russians - indicate that w e are still at the center o f n o t so m uch a dispute am ong h istorians, but an ideological struggle that reflects a question that Polish historian Jerzy Jedlicki once posed: w hat kind o f civilization do Poles need? N arrow ing dow n Profes

sor Jedlicki's question, I w ould ask today: w hat history, and w h at m em ory, do Poles need?

3 Mainly, th e d eb ate revolved around th e H olocaust, an ti-Sem itism and n ationalism : P aw eł Śpiew ak, "W yjaśnienie z am ia st w stę p u ,” in S p ó r o Polskę 19 8 9 -9 9 , ed . P aw eł Śpiew ak (W arszaw a: PWN, 2000), 15.

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Sociologist M arek Czyżewski, in an analysis from the y e a r 2006 (that is, at the height o f the dispute over the “politics of the past,” or - to use another term - the “politics o f m em ory”), distinguished tw o axes in that public debate: eccentrism versus ethnocentrism , and social criticism versus m oralism .4 W hile eccentrism (understood as program m atic avoidance o f prejudice against oth

ers) and social criticism (understood as behavior explaining problem s b y ob - jective circum stances) are - according to C zyżew ski - ch aracteristic o f the discourse carried out in the “historiography o f the Third Republic,” ethnocen

trism and m oralism are at the core of the historical m essage o f those dem and

ing the establishm ent of a Fourth Republic. Czyżewski defined ethnocentrism not as n ational chauvinism , but as a “return to respect for so -called com m on sen se” - that is, for the principle that each ethnic group is ostensibly guided by the requirem ents o f group loyalty and, hence, a “m easure o f un derstan d

in g ” for one's ow n tran sg re ssio n s and a “m easu re o f in crim in a tio n ” for the tran sgression s o f others. M oralism is the application o f the sam e m odel on an in tern al foundation, sign ifyin g - as it does - a d ivision b etw een a “h is tory o f sham e” (e.g. com m unist rule in Poland) and a “heroic h istory o f glo ry”

(heroic feats).

I w ould argue that the categories em ployed in the “discourses o f the Third and Fourth R epu blics” are relevant in relation to w ider ideological divisions in Poland at the begin n in g o f the tw e n ty -first century. It is justified to co n clude that the dynam ics and philosophy of the dispute have led to a hardening o f argum entative strategies. Instead o f polyphony in the public sphere, and in stead o f m eth od ological-con ceptual diversity in the academ ic sphere, an attem pt at political exclusion and self-en n o b lem en t h as been put on stage, all o f w hich has been fostered by - to em ploy a concept used by the A m erican sociologist A n selm L. Strauss - a shortage o f “aren as” for dispute - that is, for exam ple, o f those public m edia that w ould m ake possible a direct, m atter-of- fact confrontation am ong adversaries. Today, that role is still b eing played by the Catholic w eek ly m agazine Tygodnik Powszechny and, to a lesser extent, by Przegląd Polityczny. To a certain degree, it has also been played by publications put out b y one o f the m ain players in the “discourse o f the Fourth Republic,”

n am ely the Instytut Pam ięci N arodow ej [The Institute o f N ational R em em brance, IPN], from w hich the above-cited C zyżew ski article com es. The use of antagonistic discourses [“The Third Republic versus the Fourth Republic”] is deceptive w h en defining historiographical debate. W hile I - as a participant

4 M arek C zyżew ski, "D eb ata na te m a t Jed w ab n e g o oraz spór o 'politykę h istoryczną' z punktu w idzenia analizy dyskursu publiczn ego,” in P a m ięć i polityka historyczna.

D oświadczenia Polski i je j sąsiadów , ed. Sław o m ir M. N ow inow ski, Jan Pom orski and Rafał Stobiecki (Łódź: In stytu t Pam ięci N arodow ej, 2008), 135-139.

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in these debates in the public sphere - w ould w ith ou t h esitation categorize m y se lf as a represen tative o f the “discourse o f the T hird Republic,” I w ould argue that Poles - in the academ ic sphere - need to carry out an extensive search for new, m ore accurate categories to define variou s tren ds in Polish historiography.

D im ension O ne: H istory a s Politikum , or On th e N eed to Choose

1. "C on stru ction " and Choice

The tw o epigraphs w ith w hich I began th is w ork are divided vertically by 130 ye ars and horizontally b y tran satlan tic space. B ut it seem s to m e th at even today, despite the passage o f tim e and the great distance involved, th ey make up the qualitative fram ew ork, indeed the axiological fram ew ork, o f the Polish (not only) public debate about tradition, m em ory and history. I consider both, for different reasons, to be b road indicators o f this debate.

Biernacki's definition o f national traditions, typical o f the era in w hich the ideology of nation-states w as being created, tries to convince us - using other w ords - o f the existence of the “soul of a nation,” o f the perpetuity of tradition, w hich is “a m ore free and true expression of national sentim ents than attained facts and w ritten history.” In effect, this is a call for the creation o f a national m yth, and for th at m yth to be p asse d on from one gen eratio n to the next.

By chance, Biernacki reveals for us the tw o dim ensions o f the “real” function o f h isto rical fact id en tified over the last hundred ye a rs b y th ose w ork in g in cultural sociology, and a bit later by those in m odern historiography: as a sp e

cific event, and as an idea or im age, w hich - because it gives m eaning to our thoughts and attitudes - b ecom es itse lf a real, social fact. A t the beginn ing o f the tw entieth century, the Polish sociologist Florian Znaniecki defined and developed this duality o f fact into a hum anistic indicator.5 In the 1970s, French historian Pierre N ora introduced into the study o f h istory the concept o f “h is tory o f the second degree,” or that w h ich h appens in our m inds and defines our in d ividu al and collective identity. The dom inance o f h isto rical m yth in the public space is characteristic o f each national ideology.

H arry Block, the m ain character o f W oody A llen 's Deconstructing Harry, is a neurotic w riter from M anh attan w ith a com plex p sych ology and a Jew ish fam ily background . He rejects trad itio n entirely. In an arg u m en t w ith his h alf-sister, an orthodox, fan atical Jew ess w ith a w eak n ess for the perverse, he declares that “trad itio n is an illusion.” In the in dividu al dim ension, in an

5 Florian Znaniecki, W spółczesne n arody (W arszaw a: PWN, 1990); Florian Znaniecki, Nauki o kulturze, trans. Jerzy Szacki, w ith introduction Jan Szczepań sk i (W arszaw a: PWN, 1992).

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attem pt to build a distinct identity, m any people try to free them selves from the fam ily b allast; som e actu ally m an age to m ake such a b reak. B ut in the collective dim ension, the m echanism for an abrupt “break w ith trad itio n ” is an illusion, and w h en it does happen, it is w ith the help o f authoritarian (to

talitarian) state structures.

Anthony G iddens, a tow ering figure in m odern sociology, form ulated con

cisely the quintessence o f w hat occupies the space m arked out b y these two epigraphs:

M ost nations refer to historical myths, and those myths are based neither on the past, nor on a reconstruction of that past. The creation of nations is the extraction of those values w hich m ay be useful now. [...] The past can be constructed from various points o f view. N ations u sually shape their sense of identity b y focusing on certain issues and ignoring others.6

I m ake only b rief m ention o f this p assage because, in a previous book, I wrote extensively on the theory o f the construction o f collective m em ory,7 and w ith this in m ind, I w ould like to highlight m y b asic thesis, w hich is that identity, m em ory, tradition, and finally the study o f h isto ry its e lf (m ore on this a bit later), are - in fact - constructions. Let m e add that m y approach has nothing to do w ith yield in g to outdated fash ion s in the W estern social scien ces and hum anities; rather, it is about in specting - in the processes by w hich nations are created - both the trad itio n ally lo ad -b e a rin g elem ents o f trad itio n and language, and the roles played b y choice and random ness in the form ation of nations, in the perception of the nation as an im agined community, w hich was created both through a conscious selection o f shared sym bols and characters, and through a consensus am ong the elites w ho selected them .

In the last few years, disputes in Poland over history's place in the public sphere have apparently calm ed; it is som etim es said that w e have ended our fascin ation w ith the “n e w p olitics o f the p ast” only to fall into a vacuum , in w hich the “discourse of the Fourth Republic” drifts along the m argins. But this is only apparently true. I believe that w e find ourselves in a dangerous stage o f transition, in w hich id eological-n ation al interpretations o f history, p o liti

cally prom oted at the beginning o f the tw en ty-first century, are strengthening and spreading. B asil K erski reflected accurately on th is phenom enon in his recen t b ook HomernaPlacuPoczdamskim (2008, H om er at Potsdam er Platz).

6 "Historia i jej rekonstrukcje,” [Teresa Stylińska talks w ith A n th ony Giddens] Tygodnik Powszechny, 46 (2006). Su p p le m en t: "H istoria w Tygodniku,” ed. W ojciech Pięciak, 7 R obert Traba, Historia - p rzestrzeń dialogu (W arszaw a: ISP PAN, 2006).

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His vie w s are particularly in terestin g in that, in ligh t o f h is ow n biography, th ey are rooted w ith varyin g degrees in four cultures (Polish, G erm an, Iraqi and Jew ish ). The selection and con struction o f h is ow n s e lf-id e n tity is an inherent part o f his life-experien ce and personality.

Self-critical debates on the subject of identity have in fact not yet ended, though I have the im pression today that m any people, feeling a certain level of fatigue and exhaustion, yearn for a clear vision of history, for posi

tive m yths. Critics o f self-critical patriotism and intercultural dialogue are currently experiencing their heyday. One could clearly feel this cli

m ate in the cam paign leading up to the m ost recent parliam entary and presidential elections [2005], in w hich a central role w as played b y the issue of corruption and socio-political issues, but also in w hich com pet

ing visions of history and different concepts of the Polish nation and its relationship to neighboring countries becam e im portant elements in the political stru ggle.[...] Today's critics of the culture of self-critical patri

otism are connected b y an old-fashioned view of international politics as a D arw inian struggle of nations; it is a perspective that excludes the existence of pluralistic societies.

It is alarm ing that critics o f self-critical patriotism are found not only am ong form er com m unist activists or extrem e n ationalists, but also am ong you n g, lib eral-co n se rv ative in te lle ctu als.[...] O nly answ ers to critical questions about the h istory o f Poland can form the b asis for a new national strategy - a strategy with chances of success.8

“C on fron tation al-n ation al” view s are prom oted and reinforced above all by decision-m akers (not all o f w h om are historians) at the IPN and b y its p o li

tics-orien ted educational strategy. A nother large Polish in stitution o f public education, the M useum o f Polish H istory (w hich concentrates its activities m ore on public h isto ry events like exhibitions than on a deepened sense of the h isto rical record) accepts this state o f affairs b y avoiding con troversial debates that could foster n ew perspectives.

The IPN's activity is a history in itself. In 1999, the act to establish the in stitute cam e into force. Various hopes w ere tied to the institute at its creation.

It w as built on the b asis o f the decades-old G lów n a K om isja Badania Z brod ni przeciw ko N arodow i Polskiem u [M ain C o m m ision for the R eserach into Crim es A gainst the Polish Nation], w hich investigated and prosecuted crimes

8 From Basil Kerski, "Sa m o k ry ty cz n y patriotyzm i kultura dialogu,” in Basil Kerski, H om er na placu Poczdam skim . Szkice p olsko -n iem ieckie (Lublin: UM CS, 2008), 26 0 -2 6 2 .

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from the Secon d W orld W ar (until 19 9 0 , it w a s called the G łó w n a K om isja Badania Zbrodni H itlerow skich, or the M ain C om m ission for R esearch into H itlerite C rim es). The IPN inherited the Com m ission's archives, its excellent library, and several of its prosecutors. In the 1990s, the M ain C om m ission took up the investigation and prosecution of Stalinist crim es. The eventual transfer o f such responsibilities to the IPN w as natural.

The IPN w as originally intended to solve problem s related to the archives o f in telligen ce se rv ice s o f the co m m u n ist Polska R zeczp osp o lita Ludow a (People's Republic of Poland, PRL) by taking their contents out o f the hands of free Poland's intelligence agencies, and thus elim inating the tem ptation to use the d ocum ent “fo ld ers” (in Polish: teczki) as a to o l in w id er political gam es.

M uch m ore than that, politicians w ere not to have access to these records. The archives w ere supposed to be the subject o f research for h istorians, the goal being to gain knowledge about the PRL, about the m echanism s used to govern com m u nist Poland, and about the Polish people's struggle for freedom and their repression. It w as about gain in g an un derstanding o f the past in all its various dim ensions. For this purpose, the Biuro Edukacji Publicznej [Public Education Office] w as established w ithin the IPN, w here dozens o f historians w ith outstanding capabilities found em ploym ent; recruitm ent focused m ainly on graduates from distinguished Polish universities.

The act establishing the IPN w a s to b ring redress to victim s o f the com m u n ist system and to people w ho h ad stru ggled again st it in the n am e o f lib e rty and an in d ep en d en t Poland. T he catego ry o f “aggrieved ” w a s thus in trod u ced - th at is, a p e rso n w h o h ad b e e n th e su b ject o f su rveillan ce and rep ression . For several y e a rs, the IPN issu e d certificates to th o se a g grieved, w h ich gave th em the privilege to access records collected again st them and to obtain copies. The act w as also to serve to stigm atize the Urząd Bezpieczeństw a [Office o f Public Security, UB], w h ich had b een responsible for rep ression directed again st Polish citizens, along w ith its successor, the Służba Bezpieczeństw a [Security Service, SB].The key institution w ith in the IPN w as its presid ent, w h ose m ethod o f appoin tm en t and pow ers w ere set in such a w ay that he w ould not be susceptible to pressure from p oliticians, including heads o f governm ent; he w ould also not be subject to pressure from the in telligen ce services, in clu ding th ose estab lish ed after 19 8 9 . A p p o in t

m en t to the p osition o f presid en t w as a com plicated procedure, givin g him a p o w erfu l p o sitio n w ith in state organs. The 11-m e m b e r IPN C oun cil w as intended to be a pluralistic body; nine o f its m em bers w ere appointed b y the Sejm (Polish parliam ent) from am ong candidates subm itted b y the various p olitical p arties. The K rajow a R ad a S ąd o w n ictw a [N ational C oun cil o f the Ju d iciary o f Poland] appoin ted tw o m em bers, w ho w ere to be approved by the Sejm .

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A t le a st th is w as the theory. A fter a short p eriod w h en an open form ula w as b eing shaped under the presid en cy o f Leon K ieres (2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 5 ), actual practice succum bed to the pressures o f politicians and historians w ith clear n ation al-con servative view s:

Prosecutors, firm ly convinced of their own exceptionality and fenced off by their official duties, avoided contact w ith historians, who in turn were struck b y the prosecutors' stiffness and w eak knowledge of the past.9 The archive (which contains docum ents that w ould stretch to around 90 kilom eters) has a closed structure guided b y b ew ildering procedures. These p ro cedures have led to m a ssive slo w d o w n s in resp o n d in g to req u ests for access to files. The IPN w a s fo rm ed around three separate organizational structures, w h ich are un ited only b y the p erso n o f the P resident: The C h ief C om m ission, the archive, and the Public Education Office. Contacts betw een them are form alistic and rather w eak.10

A ccording to Andrzej Friszke (who w as a m em ber o f the IPN C ouncil for six years), after Janusz K urtyka took office as Presid en t and Jan Ż a ry n took over the Public Education O ffice in 2 0 0 5 and early 200 6, there fo llow ed an era o f politicization and “political exclusion.” The prelude cam e in 2004, w hen journalist B ronisław W ildstein published the nam es o f UB and SB “secret col

laborators” (the so-called “W ildstein list”).” In this n ew era, the m eaning and content o f the term s “n atio n ” and “com m u nity o f m em o ry” w ere o ff-lim its to public debate, as i f th e y represen ted in violable values, as i f to challenge them w ould be dangerous. U nder the very nam e (and along w ith that nam e, the practices) o f the IPN, tasks related to the “n ation al p olitics o f m em o ry”

w ere - un fortunately - m erged w ith the m issio n o f in dependent academ ic research. In the public m ind, there could be only one m essage flow ing from the institute's nam e: m e m o r y and h i s t o r y a s a s c i e n c e a r e o n e . The problem is that nothing could be further from the truth, and nothing could be m ore m isleading. W hat the IPN's m essage presents, in fact, is the danger that Polish history w ill be g ro ssly over-sim plified.

9 Andrzej Friszke, "jak h arto w a ł się radykalizm Kurtyki,” Gazeta Wyborcza, April 7, 2009, 18

10 This sectio n on th e IPN is based prim arily on jan Żaryn, "P rzykryw anie praw dy k łam stw e m ,” Rzeczpospolita, April 29, 2009; Andrzej Friszke, "Kto kogo w yklu cza?,” Gazeta Wyborcza, M ay 4, 2009; P a m ięć i Spraw iedliw ość, 1 (2005); s e e also sta te m e n ts by Friszke in "IPN robi z historii tabloid,” Polska the Times, April 6, 2009, and "Jak h artow a ł się rad

ykalizm Kurtyki,” Gazeta Wyborcza, April 7, 2009; for th e official IPN resp o n se to Friszke's a ccu satio n s, s e e "Kom unikaty, O dpowiedzi na zarzu ty prof. Andrzeja Friszkego,” Andrzej A rseniak, IPN p re ss sp o kesm an (April 9, 2009), on th e official IPN w e b site.

11 Friszke '"jak h a rto w a ł się radykalizm Kurtyki."

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Due to political pressure applied by the governing nation al-populist coa

lition o f 2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 7 led b y Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, or “L a w and Justice,”

under Lech and Jaro sław K aczyński), m o ral-po litical criteria o f pu rity w ere introduced into IPN activities:

The so-called ideology of “moral intensification” corresponded w ell with the change of personnel. The President [Lech Kaczyński] w as a supporter of broad lustration and de-com m unization. Close ties [between the IPN and] the new parliam entary coalition developed quickly, as illustrated by changes made to the act by which the IPN had been created. The Institute took over the functions o f lustration, w h ich then dom inated its activi

ties. The status o f “aggrieved” w as deleted, w hich inevitably shifted the em phasis from relief for victim s toward an interest in [investigating] the intelligence agents.12

A n ew and central actor on the stage in the dispute over the politics o f m em o ry (or, u sin g the G e rm an term , Erinnerungspolitik) w a s b o rn in late 2008, n am e ly the M u seu m o f the Seco n d W orld W ar, w h ich is to op en its doors in 2 0 14 . A n d soon, a P o lish -G erm a n h isto ry textb oo k w ill be com pleted, a p ro ject coordin ated b y the Join t P o lish -G erm a n T extbook C o m m issio n (JP -G T C ; Polsko-N iem iecka K om isja Podręcznikowa, or D eutsch-polnische Schulbuchkom m ission).

2. "C on stru ction " in a M useum

The line o f confrontation today crosses through the visio n o f the M useum of the Secon d W orld W ar and the selection o f central, com m on p olitical h o li

days that w ou ld rep resen t - in the collective m em o ry o f Poles - the end o f

“real socialism ” and the beginning o f the p o st-19 8 9 dem ocratic developm ent.

Politicians are present in debates about history in a new way, w hich is sign ifi

cant. Bogdan Zdrojew ski, the Polish M in ister o f Culture and N ational H erit

age (2 0 0 7 -2 0 14 ), sum m arized his attitude tow ard the “politics o f m em o ry”

as follow s:

12 Ibid. An editorial note in th e periodical G laukopis illu strates th e kind o f language used by som e IPN h istorians: ”We live in an a g e in w hich m oral relativism is a tta ck in g various sp h e res o f our life. The historical scie n c e s have not rem ained fre e o f th is sco u rge. [...] Few peop le realize th a t auth o rs o f such publications, e g g h e a d s [w yksztatciuchy] sh ap ed in th e stiflin g atm o sp h e re o f th e PRL kolkhoz, p ath etic plagiarists and pro po n en ts o f d e co n stru c tiv ist theory. [...] However, their rotting sten ch po ison s th e m inds o f peop le e v e ry w h e re w h e re a tte m p ts to purify th e A ca d em y o f th e g h o sts o f th e p a st have failed...”

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For tw enty years w e have w itnessed a dispute w hich has weakened au

thority and distorted the im age of Polish history in our eyes and in the eyes of the world. Who is satisfied by this dispute over the p o l i t i c s o f t h e p a s t or, ify o u will, the politics of m em ory? [...] W hat is dominant here is the instrum ental treatm ent of history, the propensity to appropri

ate the right to dates, events or characters ... One thing that strikes me is a lack of hum ility am ong politicians issuing unequivocal m oral ju d g

ments, who elevate som e to the altar, and sentence others to damnation.

For values and sym bols to function, neither our anointm ent nor regula

tion o f rights is n eed ed .[...] Our m ission is to protect and cherish the national m em ory and sym bols associated w ith it, and to learn how to tell the history o f Poland in a language that is m odern and attractive. Let us finally be understood b y Europe and the w orld!13

To be sure, Zdrojew ski's statem ent includes a central (governm ental) d e

term ination to create a politics o f m em ory, but the fact is that it also includes a spirit o f openness and a rejection o f the in strum en talisation o f h isto ry by current politics. Though it em ploys such term s as “nation al p ride” and “n a tional policy,” w hich continue the language o f the “n ew politics o f the past” (at least on the surface), and though it lacks sufficient em ph asis on polyphony in the m ain stream narrative and support for m in ority discourses, the state

m ent has neither the tone o f exclusion, nor o f program m atic indoctrination from above.

B y con trast, th e “p o litics o f m e m o ry ” from the y e a rs 2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 7 w a s burd en ed b y o n e-sid ed n ess.™ A t its h e art w a s the b e lie f th at p lu ralism in the m e m o ry n arrative is a th reat n o t only to the state, b u t also to the Pol

ish n ation , u n d ersto o d in exclu sive te rm s (as a kin d o f h yp ostasis),'15 all o f w h ich is on ly one step short o f d efining “other v ie w s ” as a “th reat to the

13 Bogdan Zdrojew ski, "D ajm y Polakom być dum nym i ze sw ojej historii,” Gazeta Wyborcza, N ovem ber 14, 2008.

14 Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski a rg u es a gain st this interpretation in "Polityka pam ięci m a se n s,”

Gazeta Wyborcza, O ctob er 2, 2008. In his m a tte r-o f-fa ct d e fen se o f th e "n ew politics of th e p a st” stra te g y from th e y e a rs 2005-2007, Ujazdowski - a fo rm er m inister o f culture - ign ores o n e im p o rtan t a sp e c t: th e a tm o sp h e re o f p ressu re and com m an d asso ciated w ith th e im plem en tation o f a single m odel o f "rem em b erin g h istory” to th e exclusion of any other; P aw eł M achcew icz, "Dw a m ity tw ó rcó w polityki h istorycznej w IV RP,” Gazeta Wyborcza, A u g u st 29, 2008.

15 S e e Adam Kom orowski, "Trumny w zap rzęgu ,” N ow e Książki 12 (2008): 3 1 - 3 2 . This is a re

view o f a book by Lech Nijakowski, Polska polityka p am ięci. Esej socjologiczny (W arszawa:

W ydaw nictw a A kadem ickie i Profesjonalne, 2008).

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raison d'Etat,” a “betrayal o f nation al interests,” a “danger o f loss o f national identity.”

Echoes o f such view s can be found in statem en ts m ade by certain jo u r

nalists and historians in reaction to the in itial concept o f the M useum o f the Second World War.™ The authors of this concept, Paw eł M achcew icz and Piotr M ajew ski, decided to move aw ay from the traditional, national narrative, a fact that caused alarm am ong those w ho feared that the m useum could threaten a value that rem ains untouchable for a large part o f Polish society, a value that places the experience o f the Polish nation at the epicenter o f thinking about Europe, in deed the w orld. B ut the facts are quite the opposite: M achcew icz and Maj ewski have not negated this value at all; indeed, they have tried to em phasize the Polish contribution to the h istory o f the Second W orld War. It is just that th ey w ant to do this through com parative discourse; th eir intent is to p resen t the h isto ry o f Poland in the con text o f parallel events in Europe and the broader w orld. Even m ore surprising th an the above reactions have been allegations appearing in som e m ed ia about the purported anti-Polish nature, and p oorly conceived universality, o f the project. B ut the fact is that a com parative approach w ill allow the m useum to present “Polish suffering and m artyrd om ” w ith ou t relativizin g them . M achcew icz and M ajew ski e x press their intentions in a rational w ay:

We w ill not convince tourists from London, or from Vienna, to accept our argum ent - som ething about which [Polish journalist] Piotr Sem ka is so concerned - by creating another exposition exclusively on the martyrdom of the Polish nation or to the glory of Polish arms. Students from Germany, Holland and France w ill come to see the museum in Gdańsk, and they will take som ething perm anent from the experience, only w hen Polish issues are united for them with European issues, known b y them through their school, cinema, and television.”

16 S e e, for exam ple, Piotr Sem ka, "D ziw aczny po m y sł na m uzeum II w o jn y św ia to w e j,” R zec

zpospolita, O ctob er 28, 2008; "Polska w y ją tk o w o ść [C ezary G m yz talks w ith Jan Żaryn],”

Rzeczpospolita, N ovem b er 4, 2008; C ezary Gm yz, Piotr Sem ka, "Przypom n ijm y św iatu polską historię,” Rzeczpospolita, N ovem b er 3, 2008.

17 Piotr M ajew ski, P aw eł M achcew icz, fra g m en ts o f th e "Zarys koncepcji program ow ej m uzeum II w o jn y św ia to w e j,” ["Outline o f th e program co n ce p t o f th e M useum o f the Secon d World W ar”], Rzeczpospolita, O ctob er 31, 2008. For a full record o f th e first d iscu s

sion regarding th e m u seu m , s e e "Wojna i jej m uzeum ,” P rzegląd Polityczny 9 1- 9 2 (2008):

4 6 -6 5 . For v o ice s suppo rtin g M ach cew icz and M ajew ski's ideas, s e e exp an sive articles in G azeta W yborcza by, am on g oth ers, Anna W olff-P ow ęska, Jerzy Kochanow ski, Grzegorz M otyka and Dariusz Libionka.

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None o f m y com m ents so far m eans that the M useum 's concept should not be criticized. Indeed, it m u st be criticized, b ecau se it should fu lfill n ot only its p rim a ry m issio n , w h ich is to b uild a fram ew ork for a m o d ern m useum exhibition; it should also serve as a vehicle for alternative m ethods o f co n ducting public dialogue about history. From m y personal experience w ith the project, it seem s that the m useum 's initial program -concept points too weakly to a concrete narrator and does n o t ad equately define its audience groups.

The presentation o f the h istory o f W orld W ar II in the European context does not have to m ean seeking a universal, default narrator. The facility w as estab - lished in Gdańsk, in Poland, and its visitors w ill be predom inantly Poles. Both the authors o f the concept and th eir critics have repeatedly referred to a fo r

eign audience, but the profile o f this audience is unclear, since tourists from London, B erlin and Lw ów have different perspectives and expectations that cannot be reconciled in one m useum . Tourists visit m useum s in foreign coun

tries to becom e acquainted w ith the local v ie w o f history, even i f the topic is a global phenom enon. For this reason, the m useum should show the w ar from the Polish perspective, though w ithout pathos, w ithout tryin g to consolidate national or patriotic thinking by highlighting Polish m artyrdom . A m useum aim ed at Polish so ciety has a greater chance o f offerin g an understandable n arrative ab out W orld W ar II, and w ou ld be m ore legible th a n an exh ib i

tio n th at trie s to sen d a u n iv ersal m essage w ith as m an y top ics covered as possible.

Since a m useum narrative m ust focus on essential topics, the guiding n o tion here could be “Polish fortunes,” and the greatest challenge involves how to b uild a m eta-n arrativ e directed at a Polish audience th at is, at the sam e tim e, affective for “other” audiences as w ell. From the program it is clear that the authors have seriously considered this question. However, th ey have not yet found a clear answer.

The h istory o f W orld War II should also be presented m ore from the p e r

spective o f individual experiences. This is no great discovery; such p ersp ec

tives are used effectively in m ajor m useum s and historical exhibitions around the w orld w ithout losin g the w ider context. A t this point, there is no reference in the m useum 's design p lans to provide a gu id e-b o o k or catalogue - h ig h lighting, for exam ple, “w itn esses to history” - that w ould lead visitors through the exposition. Eyew itness narratives to h istory help the visitor id en tify w ith the fate o f variou s groups. The fate o f an in dividu al Pole can be understood even by the foreign visitor, and can bring him /her closer to the w artim e Polish experience. In this way, it can be show n h ow hum an stories are entangled, in the larger dim en sion o f the tragedy, w ith a d iversity o f fates. Stories o f heroic in d ivid u als can, in a n atu ral w ay, be about som eone from D anzig, b u t also som eone from Silesia, w ho as a volksdeutscher fought in the W ehrm acht and

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later on the Polish side at M onte C assino. O f course, the fate o f Polish Jews m ust be included. A s the tragedy of a large part o f p re-w ar Polish society, their fate should be p art o f the narrative o f the w ar as w ell. The presence o f Jew ish issues in other m useum s - at Auschw itz, at Yad Vashem , or in the M useum of the H istory o f Polish Jew s in W arsaw - does not m ean that the M useum o f the Second W orld W ar cannot em bed this topic into a com prehensive picture of the tragedy o f war.18 T hese are all open questions. The w ay Paw eł M achcewicz and Piotr M ajew ski are leading the discussion indicates that w e are dealing w ith a n ew quality o f historical debate. I w ould like to see this becom e a p e r

m anent standard in the shaping o f policy tow ards history.

This b rie f d iscussion about the M useum o f the Second W orld W ar signals a clearly broader, perm anent part o f the debate on the politics o f m em ory, one that is represented by the question: w hat function should it play in the w ider European discourse?™ The dilem m a, sim ply put, boils dow n to tw o altern a

tives: to g lo rify history, or to present it critically. Surprisingly, the top icality o f this dilem m a rem inds m e o f the correspondence b etw een tw o prom inent Polish w riters, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz and K onstanty A . Jeleński, from the year 19 57. Iw aszkiew icz criticized an article th at C z e sław M iło sz h ad published in Preuves, v ie w in g it as an attack on Polish literature. In respon se, Jeleński w rote:

M ilosz's article, in m y opinion, gives foreigners the key to understand

ing Polish literature. [...] Oddly, people (writers) who w rite “negatively”

about their own nation bring the greatest prestige not only to their own literature, but to their ow n people. W ho in the W est today w ould know about the vitality of Rom anian literature - if not for Cioran and Ionesco bad-m outhing their countrymen?

Does it seem to you that, as “am bassadors of France,” it is Sartre, M auriac and Genet - or Romains, Duhamel and Guéhenno - who contribute most to the prestige of France?20

To this day, I rem em ber the sugar-coated, fabricated achievem ents o f the PRL, and o f Poland in general, that accom panied m y schooling in the 1970s.

18 In part, th e s e co n sid eratio n s are based on d iscu ssion s th a t took place in a doctoral se m i

nar a t th e C enter for Historical Research (CBH PAN) in Berlin, 15 D ecem b er 2008.

19 Three publications, am on g oth ers, put out by th e Fundacja S tefa n a B atorego are devoted to th is topic: P a m ięć i polityka zagraniczna (2000), Jaka Polska? Czyja Polska? Diagnozy i dyskusje (2006) and P a m ięć jako przedm iot w ład zy (2008).

20 ” Nie gardź nami, em igracjo. Listy Iw aszkiew icza i Jeleń skiego ,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Jan uary 1 0 - 1 1 , 2009.

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“We w ere a pow er, w e w ere great, w e w ere heroic, w e w ere victim s and ro m antic w arriors at the sam e tim e.” A s a youngster, I sw allow ed it all w hole, not know ing how m any o f the “greats” had been removed, for political reasons, from the gallery o f “national saints.” Later I distanced m yself from this pro pa

ganda to the point w here I com pletely rejected the Sienkiew iczean m odel of the h eroic Pole. But strangely, m any o f Poland's g reatest “opponents o f com m unism ” speak today in the sam e appropriating, m onophonic language. Déjà vu? No, not really. Despite everything, w e now live in a dem ocratic system that protects against m onopolization of thought, though the m echanism and basic idea rem ain m uch the sam e, a fact w hich has been expounded upon - in the context o f the Polish “politics o f m em ory” - b y the W arsaw h istorian M aciej Janowski.21 Drago Jancar, the Slovenian prose w riter and playw right, dubbed this phenom enon “the philosophy o f the province,” and described it b ased on the exam ple o f today's Slovenia:

For the philosophy of the province, w hat is especially characteristic is the fact that its w orld is the only world, and that w orld alone is interesting.

Once this condition is met, a w ide range of possible conspiracy theories, connections, and examples of perfidious defamation and slander develop.

Above all, no one represents a sufficiently large value, and his w orks are not worth much, because one need not call anything by name. The deeper the province, the less valuable is anything created locally, in the eyes of its people; the m ore people are petty, the more serious are the conflicts and quarrels.22

3. "C on stru ction " in School

The Polish-G erm an history textbook project, w hich w as started in M ay 2008, is another test o f h o w the “politics o f m em ory” is created. From the very b e ginning, the b ilateral nature o f the project im posed a n e w form o f coopera

tio n on the parties involved. A t the sam e tim e, the fact th at the project w as initiated b y the Polish and G erm an governm ents h as raised concerns about the borders o f independence betw een scholarship and politics. The JP-G T C is expectin g support from both governm ents and does n o t foresee political pressure com ing from them . But if such pressures w ere to appear, the project w ould m ake no sense. The structure o f the project calls for the form ation of

21 M aciej Janow ski, "Polityka h istoryczna: M iędzy edukacją historyczn ą a pro pagan d ą,”

P am ięć i polityka historyczna, 22 9 -2 4 5 .

22 Drago Jancar, "Filozofia prow incji,” G azeta Wyborcza, Jan uary 3 - 4 , 2009.

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a Governing Board: on the Polish side, there are representatives o f the M in istries o f Education, Culture and Foreign A ffa irs; on the G erm an side, re p resen tatives o f the C onference o f the M in iste rs o f E du cation and Cultural A ffairs o f the Länder (Ständige Konferenz der Kultusm inister der Länder), the Brandenburg M in ister o f Education, and the M in ister o f Foreign A ffairs. The Polish and G erm an JP -G T C chairm en are also m em bers o f the board. A t this p oin t in tim e, there is a thick line separatin g p olitics from specific projects.

The Governing Board defines the space in w hich a project operates, secures fi

nancial resources, and supports the introduction o f the textbook into schools.

O ther w orks are m anaged b y the C ouncil o f E xperts, w h ich determ ines the substantive criteria. Its m em bers are scholars and educators appointed by the JP-G TC . The Council decides w hat issues should be addressed in the textbook, and selects the authors.

A s the project is im plem ented, I do not fear argum ents over the in terpre

tation o f any h istorical event. A m uch greater problem w ill com e as a result o f d ifferin g ed u cation al trad itio n s. B ut th is is p re cise ly w h ere the project p resents great opportunity. From con frontation (taken constructively) w ill em erge not som e sort o f artificial, politically correct “com m on denom inator”

o f h isto rical p ro cesses, but a true com m on narrative. C ertainly, the d e fin i

tio n o f con troversial events w ill not be easy. But I can im agine th at m odern teaching techniques offer creative possibilities for the description of historical phenom ena that cannot be found even in the b est journalism and m ost popu

lar history books. The dichotom y in our historical experiences is an excellent point to exploit. Poles and G erm an s have variou sly defined events, tw o d if

ferent lived experiences, and - through that didactic elem en t th at inspires questions - w e can show “both sides.” We can say: “T h ey un derstand it that way, and w e un derstan d it this way.” Is it alw ays the case th at only one side is right?

W hen w e talk about our ow n history, H enryk Sienkiew icz's “K ali form ula”

often appears: “If K ali steal a cow, it is good; if som eone steal cow from Kali, it is w rong.” In another context: “We conquered, w e w ere larger and stronger, and th at is good. W hen w e w ere attacked, w e o f course defended ourselves, and the conquerors w ere bad.” B ut the p oin t here is th at w e have a chance to w id en our perspective. The G erm an cultural sociologist W olf Lepenies, one o f the finest representatives o f European sociology o f culture, discussed this issue in an address p raisin g the F ren ch -G erm an textbook. Interpreting the value o f the F ran co -G e rm an w ork, he stated th at the real challenge - not on ly for Poland and G erm any, b u t also for Europe - is the P o lish -G erm a n textbook, precisely because once G erm an y receives Poland and its h istorical experience, it w ill receive much of the rest o f Eastern Europe as well; today, the Eastern European historical experiences are practically absent in the Germ an

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discourse. We have a chance to put into general circulation an exceptionally interesting narrative on such topics as asym m etrical processes o f nation d e

velopm ent and the Second W orld War. The Polish experience has taken place on the periphery; w e are not the center. But w e b ring to the table an entirely different perspective on history. The G erm an and Soviet occupations - to take ju st tw o exam ples - function often b eyon d the im agin ation o f our w estern neighbors. W ith this in m ind, the role o f the textbook gains greater universal potential, as a general E uropean experience.

If one com pares the task th at authors o f the F re n ch -G e rm a n textbook faced w ith the task facing authors o f the Polish -G erm an textbook, th en one could say th at w e h ave b ad luck; from the very start, each project h ad a d if

ferent potential, a fact th at stem s from the v e ry nature o f the ro les played by France and G erm an y in European history. Both countries w ere (and are) m ajor centers o f European politics. G erm an and French h istorians are aware that this fact raises difficulties, and - w ith varyin g degrees o f success - they have avoided telling the story from the perspective o f G erm any or France. The

“plus and m in u s” th at I see con frontin g Polish and G erm an authors stem s from the fact that, through m o st o f history, G e rm a n and Polish ro les have been asym m etrical: the center - G erm an y; and the periphery - Poland. This reality applies especially to the nineteenth century, w h en the Polish state did not exist at all, and G erm any w as rising to the rank o f great power. That having been said, w e define the term “periphery” neutrally; it does not have to be the case that the center and periph ery are “som ething b etter or w orse.” Indeed, a n ew catalogue o f questions m ust be created, the result o f w hich w ill be the kind o f textbook th at reflects certain w id er ph en om en a and pro cesses, not just the politics o f those at the center o f power. 23

4. The "Construction" of Cultural Memory and Individual Identity I w ould like to return to the in itial m etaphor regarding the con struction o f m em ory, to the argum ent that the com m unity o f a m odern nation is a c o n s t r u c t i o n . Although such a term sounds technical in everyday use, the idea is that n ation al elites create certain signs, sym bols and annual rituals (a n niversaries), w hich th ey then seek to introduce into general circulation, and around w h ich th ey try to build a sense o f com m unal cohesion. W ith th is in m ind, w e can say that ann iversaries are “invented,” though at the sam e tim e it is im portant that the people feel an em otional connection w ith such dates

23 S e e "D w ie tradycje, jeden podręcznik, z R obertem Trabą, p rzew o dn iczącym W spólnej P olsko-N iem ieckiej Komisji Podręcznikow ej rozm aw ia Bogdan Borucki,” in M ówią Wieki, 10/08 (586): 41.

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that are fixed, over tim e, through system atic celebration. I know o f no country that has not tried to m obilize its society around ann iversaries - that is, w ith a positive m essage, a values system , o f w hich the ann iversary is a fragm ent.

It is a natural form o f com m unication w ith in the comm unity, w hich needs an indicative sign for one to be able to say, “I am a Pole, because . . . ” (here, you can insert the sym bolic dates and events that allow us to understand one another, and to border ourselves o ff from the external “other”) . The anniversary is part o f the “foundational m yth ” for any society that w ants to establish a sense o f itse lf as com munity.

Take, for exam ple, the m onum ent and h ow it functions: it is built to com m em orate som eone or som ething, to in itiate som ething around itself, and th en to ritualize a sym b o lic a n n iv ersa ry th at is im p o rtan t for the nation.

But a m onum ent lives only so long as political m anifestations are ritualized around it, as long as it com m unicates an idea. So m etim es - and this is a p parent in our im m ediate surroundings - a m onum ent “dies,” becom ing little m ore th an a dead elem en t on the lan d scape, to w h ich collective em otion s are no longer tied.

It is quite natural that certain anniversaries are created b ased on current day n eed s. W hen collective m e m o ry is “w ritten ,” it is the reflection n o t o f any record o f events from the past but o f a particular set o f political and s o cial circum stances. From the great reservoir o f events, such as battles, those th at are, at an y p articu lar m om ent, m o st com m u nicative to the public are a m atter o f selection. Parenthetically, I m ight add that, in Poland today, a n niversaries are not m ass events. A s national holidays, they are w id ely view ed sim p ly as days o ff w ork; social p articipation in th eir ob servance is m o d e r

ate, w ith the reaso n for th is relative apath y p erh ap s b ein g th eir sch em atic form . To w h a t exten t d oes th at fo rm correspon d to people's re a l e x p e c ta tio n s? Is it p ossib le th at the Polish people's m oderate so cia l com m itm en t to n ational ann iversaries reflects their attitude tow ard state holidays in ge n eral, and/or to the fact that these holidays are celebrated largely from the top dow n?

Controversy over the “selection o f an ann iversary” is inevitable, given that anniversaries are often, if not always, forged in the context o f political dispute;

decisions com e dow n to choosing one interpretation o f h istory over another.

Such a process h appens in a variety o f dim ensions. In the case o f the French R evolution, it took the form o f a collision o f tw o w o rld view s. In G erm an y after the fall o f the Berlin Wall, there w as a long and intense debate about the appropriate national holiday before the date w as finally set at 3 October - that is, the date the form er E ast G erm an y w a s attached to the Federal Republic;

the holiday w as given the nam e “Tag der D eutschen Einheit” (Day o f G erm an Unity).Earlier, tw o dates had b een in the running: 3 October and 9 November.

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The latter date, as it turned out, is connected to too m any ann iversaries and con tain s e n orm ou s p o ten tial for con troversy: it w a s on 9 N ovem ber that the B erlin W all fell in 19 8 9 , b u t other im p o rtan t events are also asso ciated w ith 9 Novem ber, including a pogrom in the Third Reich (in 19 38 , so-called Kristallnacht); Hitler's failed coup (1923); and the outbreak o f the leftist revo

lution and the announcem ent o f the first G erm an R epublic (19 18 ). The h is toric significance o f “9 N ovem ber” w as thus huge. A t the tim e, as an observer o f the G erm an process, I thought it w ould be in teresting if G erm an y w ould chose just such a date as its m ost im portant, but in the end the G erm ans set the holiday at 3 October, w hich carries a positive m essage: “G erm ans are once again united.” D ebate concluded w ith a to p -d o w n decision w hich, although criticized, has becom e w id e ly accepted; today, no one boycotts 3 O ctober as a national holiday in Germ any.

T h is h o lid ay con tain s w ith in it s e lf a certain stra te g y to b uild G erm an identity, and in its shared celebration, G erm ans are supposed to g ain a sense o f un iversality and have an em otional relationship tow ards the event. A fter all, em otion is a condition on w hich the living an n iversary depends, so that it is n o t reduced to a m ere m ilita ry parad e decreed from above, b u t rather rem ains som ething in w hich society/the n ation w ants to participate. Bastille Day (14 July) in France does not end w ith the parade on the C h am ps-Élysées;

festivities take place in every tow n, even the sm allest ones, w here people e n jo y them selves. O f course, the starting point is the parade, but w h at follows am ounts to a folk festival. Thus, identification w ith the holiday is increased.

M arek Beylin, like British historian Eric H obsbawm , recognizes tw o m odels - the G erm an and French - as the b est in constructing “national unity,” though m y im pression is that both m odels are outdated and diverge from the reality o f the tw e n ty-first century. 24

A fter W orld W ar I, the “founding m yth” o f the n ew Poland w as the victori

ous w ar against the Bolsheviks in 1920; it united the nation, previously broken into three partition s for over 10 0 y e ars. B ut after the fall o f co m m u n ism in 19 8 9 w e also h ad gre at dates to choose from , w h ich w e p ro bab ly continue to h ave: 3 1 A u g u st 19 8 0 and 4 June 19 8 9 /rh ese are, in m y opin ion , tw o key dates. The question rem ains, w hich one o f th em to choose. The fact that we have not already m ade this choice represents a loss for all Poles, and n ow the issue h as becom e part o f a debate that is no longer so m uch p olitical as it is a m atter o f stubborn, in ter-p arty rivalry. No one h as a visio n o f h ow to build that “som ething” for the com m unity o f Polish citizens (including those Poles too you n g to have experienced the breakthrough events o f 1989), that “som e

th in g” that w ould provide a positive m essage for the future. We do not really

24 M arek Beylin, "Polski św ir w ięk sz o ścio w y ,” Gazeta Wyborcza, M arch 21-22, 2009.

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argue w h ether or n o t 4 June 19 8 9 (the date on w h ich electio n s took place paving the w ay for the creation of Tadeusz M azowiecki's n on-com m unist gov

ernm ent), or the A u g u st A g reem en ts o f 3 1 A u g u st 19 8 0 (b etw een w orkers in G d ań sk and the PR L leadership), or the R ound Table Talks (betw een the com m unists and Lech W ałęsa's Solidarity, w hich led to the 4 June elections), are fo u n d ation al civic dates for the Polish nation, and th ere is no dispute over the strategy for building such an anniversary. The dram atic question is:

do w e really w an t to celebrate the rebirth o f a sovereign Poland after 1989?

The alternative is to com pletely reject these anniversaries and build a n e g a tive m essage about the T hird R epu blic (w hich is largely w h a t advocates o f a Fourth R epublic do). It is sad that, after the fall o f com m u nism in Poland, there has not b een the political w ill - or perhaps the political im agination - to build not only a new, free m arket society, but also a foundation m yth that establishes a n ew social id en tity in the w ake o f the great transform ations of 19 89 . N o political force h as m ade the effort, and that is too bad, because the em otion al con nection w ith the breakthrough events o f 19 8 9 has loosened, and its u n iv ersal d im en sio n h as b een lost. Today, one m u st b eg in the co n struction o f a “living date” ann iversary practically from scratch. Perhaps only the grandchildren o f this peacefu l revolution w ill m ake such a “com m u nal”

choice.

P o st-co m m u n ist Poland's m a in h olid ays fall on 1 1 N ovem ber (m arking Poland's regained independence in 19 18) and on 3 M ay (M ay 3rd Constitution Day), b ut at the b egin n in g o f the in terw ar Second Republic, “1 1 N ovem ber”

did not exist as a holiday. It w as celebrated for the first tim e in 1937, and its existence w a s n o t an e a sy one. A fter the F irst W orld W ar, v ario u s p olitical groups, w ith differing ideologies, w ere involved in building the new Poland:

There w ere the generally leftist follow ers o f Józef Piłsudski; the conservative- C atholic N ation al D em ocrats (know n in Poland as the “endecja’ and led b y Piłsudski's rival, R om an D m ow ski); the radical left (soldiers and w orkers so viets), w h ich had “its” holiday; and the Polish S o cialist P a rty -L e ft (P P S-L ), w hich had “its” holiday, n am ely 7 Novem ber, w h en in 19 18 the governm ent o f Ignacy D aszyński w as created in Lublin. Each political p arty w a s looking for

“its” ow n holiday, and each o f th em expected that “its” sym bolic date w ould becom e a un iversal celebration. The dispute continued until 19 37.25

Regarding id en tity construction on the individual level, I present in su b sequent chapters one sketch on M arcel R eich -R an icki and one on Peter/Pi

otr L achm an n . H ere, I w ill m en tion a third n am e th at is perh aps the m o st

25 S e e "R ocznice n asze i w a s z e ” [Patrycja Bukalska talks w ith Robert Traba], Tygodnik Powszechny, M ay 31, 2009. Special su p p lem e n t "Polska roczn icow a,” ed. W ojciech Pięciak and Patrycja Bukalska.

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M E M O R Y , i D E N T i T Y A N D P O L i T i C S O F M E M O R Y ROBERT TRABA T W O D I M E N S I O N S O F H I S T O R Y ..

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spectacular, n am e ly H ouston Ste w art C h am berlain, the c h ie f ideologue o f nineteenth-century racism and anti-Sem itism . Born in England, raised partly in France and educated b y a Prussian tutor, he could have becom e - according to the D utch w riter and lecturer, Ian Burum a - the perfect cosm opolitan, but he despised France, G reat Britain and the U nited States because citizenship there w as a question o f rights, not blood. He m arried the daughter o f Richard W agner and “becam e not only G erm an, but also a h erald o f the lo fty virtues o f the G erm an nation.”26 It is difficult to find a m ore perverse - and, at the sam e tim e, convincing - exam ple of the construction of individual identity. In schools, and as part o f the broader public education, it m ight be w orth refer

ring to - instead o f com plicated theories - precisely such exam ples to explain the intricate processes o f id en tity and m em ory construction.

Dim ension Two: H istory a s M ethod, or On th e N eed fo r Im agination and In

terdisciplinarity

1. H istoriography

The “discourse on the historiography of the Third and Fourth Republics” called forth b y M arek C zyżew ski is, in m y opinion, a m etaph orical m isap p ro p ria

tio n that is attractive, b u t superficial. It blurs the real tran sform ation s ta k in g place in m odern Polish historiography^7 and condem ns historiograph y to a role that is secondary to politics, one in w hich history becom es an object in the gam e o f p o litics - th at is, in a d im en sio n w h ere p o litics determ ines history. A m ore natural process, on the other hand, is one in w hich historians from each gen eration research, describe and in terpret h isto ry in th eir ow n w ay (of course, this applies not just to historians, but also to scholars in the hum anities and social sciences in general). G iven the w ay Polish h istoriogra

phy has developed over the last tw o decades, it is difficult - if not im possible - to place m any distinguished Polish historians (who have been, at the same tim e, active participan ts in public debates about the past) into either one of the tw o cam p s: W ik to ria S liw o w sk a,28 H en ryk S am so n o w icz^ 9 K rzysztof

26 Ian Burum a, "K osm opolici,” Gazeta Wyborcza, D ecem b er 2 0 - 2 1 , 2008.

27 C zyżew ski, "D ebata na te m a t Jed w ab n e g o,” 13 5 - 13 6 .

28 S e e th e recen t publication w ritten in cooperation w ith Rene Śliw ow ski, Rosja - nasza m iłość (W arszaw a: Iskry, 2008), w hich w on th e "KLIO” prize.

29 Henryk Sam so n o w icz, O "historii prawdziw ej."M ity, le g e n d y i p odan ia jako źródło historyc

zne (Gdańsk: N ovus Orbis, 1997); s e e also Andrzej S o w a, H enryk Sam son o w icz - św iad ek epoki. W ywiad rzeka (W arszaw a: Bellona, 2009).

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Pom ian,30 Jerzy Jedlicki,31 Janusz Tazbir,^ Jerzy Borejsza,33 Jerzy Holzer,3* R o m an W apiński, K arol M odzelew ski35 and Tom asz Szarota,36 along w ith (from the younger generation) M arcin Kula and A n n a W olff-Pow ęska.37 It is difficult to apply the proposed dichotom y to such m id dle-generation researchers as A ndrzej C h w alb a,38 W łodzim ierz Borodziej, R a fa ł Stobiecki, D ariusz Stola, P aw eł M achcew icz, Grzegorz M otyka, Jan M .P isk o rsk i,39 D ariusz Libionka and R afał Wnuk. It is true that, in the public debate, m ore or less all o f them have criticized the “n ew p olitics o f the past,” but their research horizons and im aginations reach w ell beyond the scope o f the “Third Republic d iscourse;”

they have b een shaped not so m uch b y that discourse as b y their variou s a r

eas o f research, b y their m entors (who som etim es have com pletely different fram es of reference than their students), and by their differing m ethodologies.

I th in k a m ore appropriate w a y to d escribe the lin e s o f dispute in t o day's historiography w ould be to use the term s “n ational h o m ogen eity” and

30 K rzysztof Pom ian, Historia. Nauka w o b ec p a m ię c i (Lublin: UM CS, 2006).

31 Jerzy Jedlicki, Św ia t zw yrodniały. Lęki i wyroki krytyków now oczesności (W arszaw a: Sic!, 2000).

32 S e e Janusz Tazbir, Polska na zakrętach dziejów (W arszaw a: Sic!, 1997) and, by th e sam e author, W p og o n i za Europą (W arszaw a: Sic!, 1998).

33 From all his w orks, I m ention ju st one: Jerzy W. Borejsza, Śm ieszn e sto m ilionów Słow ian..., (W arszaw a: W ydaw nictw o Nerito, In stytu t Historii PAN, 2006).

34 For on e o f th e m o st in terestin g historical e s s a y s o f rec en t y ears, s e e Jerzy Holzer, Polska i Europa. "W Polsce czyli n igdzie?" (W arszaw a: W ydaw ca O ficyna W ydaw nicza RYTM, 2008);

se e also Holzer's Europejska tragedia XX w ie k u .!! w ojna św iatow a (W arszaw a: W ydaw ca O ficyna W ydaw nicza RYTM, 2005) and his stu d y Europa w ojen 19 14 -19 4 5 (W arszaw a: Św iat książki, 2008).

35 Karol M odzelew ski, Barbarzyńska Europa (W arszaw a: Iskry, 2004).

36 S e e Tom asz Szarota, Karuzela na placu Krasińskich (W arszaw a: O ficyna W ydaw nicza RYTM, 2007). A g ain st th e backdrop o f research on th e Seco n d World War, this stu d y is exceptio n al: Szarota, U progu Zagłady. Zajścia antyżydow skie i p o g ro m y w o ku pow an ej Eu

ropie (W arszaw a: Sic!, 2000).

37 For exam ple, Anna W olff-P ow ęska, Oswojona rew olucja: Europa Środkow o - Wschodnia w p ro cesie dem okracji (Poznań: In stytu t Zachodni, 1998), and another by th e sa m e author, A bliźniego sw eg o : K ościoły w N iem czech w o b e c "problem u żydo w sk iego " (Poznań: In stytut Zachodni, 2003).

38 Andrzej Chw alba, !!! R zeczpospolita - raport sp ecja ln y (Kraków: W yd aw nictw o Literackie M iejsce, 2005).

39 Jan M. Piskorski, P olacy i Niem cy. Czy przeszłość m usi być przeszkodą (Poznań: W yd aw nict

w o Poznańskie, 2004), 32

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57

“heroization o f h istory” versus “re-n egotiation” and “broadened perspectives.”

I w ill leave it to historians o f historiography to decide h ow m uch these term s represent continuation, or h o w m uch th ey represent som ething new, in the long trad itio n o f Polish deb ates over h isto ry (personally, I see both co n ti

n u ity and d iscontin uity). In an y case, at the h eart o f debate today is a co n frontation b etw een those w ho support trad itio n al m ethods and categories o f research and those w ho su p p ort n e w ly defined m eth ods and categories (and n ew w ays o f applying th em in research). It is about the re-n egotiation and introduction o f n e w m eanings for such concepts as “nation,” “identity,”

“cultural gender,” “cultural m em ory,” etc. B roadening the research perspective m ean s the en richm ent o f the h istorian's in stru m en tariu m in the extended search for tran s-d isciplinary or in ter-disciplinary contexts. We see these new tren ds represen ted far too seld om in Polish h isto rical d iscu ssion s, in both public and classroom settings. They are, however, becom ing m ore pronounced in the academ ic com m unity, though it w ould be a m istake to thoughtlessly place th em into the category o f p ostm od ern historiography. I w ou ld argue that, at the level w here historical research is being conducted in Poland today, there is no w e ll-d evelo p ed “p ostm odern historiography,” let alone one that is “dogm atic,”“ un less w e regard such w orks as postm odern: Jacek B anaszkiew icz's studies dem ythologizing the origins o f the Polish state,M or works from the field o f m ethodology o f h isto ry developed m ain ly in Poznań, Łódź and Lublin b y such historians as Jan Pom orski, Ew a D om ańska and W ojciech W rzosek. Somehow, I doubt that any o f these scholars w ould view them selves as b eing in the m ain stream o f “dogm atic postm odernism .”

A t the center o f research tren d s in Poland today, th ere rem ain s a solid, w orkshop-oriented, traditional, and p ositivist historiography (m ainly event history), w hich defends itself by the integrity o f its analysis and its diversified source base; the latter virtue allows the research instrum entarium to m odern

ize and to avoid the trap of narrating only “how it w as in fact.” The w ork of “IPN historians,” prom oted so w id ely b y the m edia, fits nicely into this traditional vein, b roadly defined. In the opin ion o f m an y o f its represen tatives, “access to the files” designates the only correct w ay to learn about the past. The m in d

less prom otion of the “folder/teczka” fetish leads to a sim plified claim that only

“secret” sources, not accessible to ordinary m ortals, m ark o ff the paradigm of

“objective truth.” The difference betw een serious study o f event h istory and the false ly con ceived m issio n to find “objective tru th ” w a s presen ted in an

40 Ibid., 139.

41 Se e, am o n g oth ers, Jace k B anaszkiew icz, Podanie o Piaście i Popielu (W arszaw a: PWN, 1986) and, by th e sa m e author, Polskie dzieje b ajeczn e Mistrza W incentego Kadłubka (W rocław : Fundacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej, 2002), seco n d edition.