O R G A N O N 5 (1968) PROBLEMES GENERAUX CREATION SCIENTIFIQUE;
B. Gryasnov (U.S.S.R.)
ON THE LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT “OBJECT OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION”
The purpose of the present article is to define more exactly the concept of an “object of scientific investigation” by an analysis of the explican-
dum to provide an adequate and exact concept in m odern logical theory.
The opinion th a t the definition of an “object of scientific investiga tion” is to be form ed w ithin each specific scientific research-field and pertains to the competence of specialists in th e p articu lar sciences is w idely spread.
This viewpoint seems to be the most natu ral. Indeed, who can know b etter th an the investigator him self w hat is being investigated? B ut as soon as th e n atu ralist sta rts dealing w ith this problem , he leaves the domain of his specialization and tries to solve gnosiological problem s located outside its scope.
Thus, a n aturalist, or representative of any specific science, in tr y ing to determ ine w hat is science in general, w h at is his science in p a rti cular and w hat is the object of investigation becomes a philosopher w ith all the ensuing consequences.
In th e history of the developm ent of science two extrem e absolutist viewpoints on the gnosiological process have been formed, nam ely em pi ricism and rationalism .
The representatives of experim ental and descriptive n atu ral sciences are, as a rule, more inclined tow ards empiricism, w hereas those of the theoretical lines of science are ra th e r bent for a realistic conception of scientific knowledge. At closer consideration both lines prove to tell only p art of th e tru th . Since th ey claim it to be th e whole tru th , th e y find them selves on the w rong w ay of investigation. The em piricist believes th at any concept of science is a direct reflection of perceived reality. He m aintains th a t he deals only w ith facts and tru sts only facts. An essen tial objection against the em pirical view point was expressed by Hegel.
50 A. Gryasnov
Hegel pointed out th a t in em pirical activity directly perceivable objects are transform ed either consciously or unconsciously by help of concepts and, therefore, they are not direct.
The reference to “fa ct” as a basis of scientific knowledge is no evi dence in favour of th e em pirical conception, because the problem of w hat is and w hat is not a fact is not trivial and can not be solved w ithout theoretical considerations. The history of science knows quite a num ber of instances w hen ap p aren tly firm facts proved to be illusions or errors of the investigator himself.
Thus the content of hum an knowledge is not determ ined m erely by nature. In his Dialectics of Nature Engels wrote: “N atural science, like philosophy, has hitherto en tirely neglected the influence of m en’s acti vity on th eir thought; both know only n atu re on th e one hand and thought on the other. But it is precisely the alteration of nature by men, not solely n atu re as such, w hich is th e most essential and im m ediate basis of hum an thought...” (Dialectics of Nature, Moscow 1964, p. 235).
The conception of rationalism took into account the active aspect of man. B ut activity itself was taken only as a spiritual, intellectual activi ty. This, in turn , called fo rth a special conception of the object of in vestigation. The object was understood as a rational construction, draw n from the activity of reason itself. T hat is w hy rationalism , as a rule, proved to be a form of apriorism too.
The very existence of em piricism and rationalism is to some exten t evidence of th e difference between the em pirical and the theoretical objects of investigation.
In order to analyse gnosiologically th e concept of an object of in vestigation and to state th e difference betw een the object of em pirical and theoretical investigation I have to introduce two separate concepts: the object-region of investigation and the object of investigation. Such a differentiation is not of my invention, a sim ilar conception m ay be found in philosophical literature.
I shall call the set of objects (phenomena) and th eir interrelations existing independently of hum an activity the object-region of investi gation (A special case of object-region of investigation w ill be analysed later on in this report.) In other words, th e object-region is the m aterial, objectively existing w orld or some p a rt of it. The objectively existing world contains an infinite set of properties and relations.
It is clear th at hum an activities are lim ited (in th e individual and specifically historical sense). Man is a finite being and is able to absorb only a finite volume of inform ation coming from th e external w orld through his senses. This by no means implies a scarcity of gnosiological possibilities alleged by agnosticism.
The scarcity of hum an abilities is adequate to the properties of th e objective world. No phenom enon or reality ever displays the whole in
Object of Scientific Investigation 51
finite set of its properties at any given in stan t of time. O therw ise th ere would be no changes w hatsoever in the w orld (existence in th e eleatic sense). B ut this is not the only lim itation presented to the object-region. The other one is due to the practical activity of m an which, so to say, “introduces” th e w orld to his consciousness from a specific aspect. Con sequently, the object of scientific investigation is not the object-w orld (or its fragm ent) as it is, bu t the properties and relations of this object- -w orld fixed by man.
Here th e question m ay arise w h eth er such a situation m eans a re jection of the objectiveness of scientific knowledge? Not at all, because the isolation of the object of investigation is determ ined, first, by the properties of the objective w orld itself and, next, by the peculiarities of practical activity. This guarantees th e objectiveness and value of hum an cognition.
V. I. Lenin noted th a t “a full ‘definition’ of an object m u st include th e whole of hum an experience, both as a criterion of tru th and a p racti cal indicator of its connection w ith hum an w an ts” (Collected Works, Vol. 32, Moscow 1965, p. 94).
To consider the object of scientific investigation w ithout an analysis of th e practical activity of m an is senseless, because in fact th ere is no object outside this activity.
There is no complete id entity betw een the objectively existing w orld and the object of investigation in the em pirical (experim ental) gnosio- logy, bu t a consonance between the la tte r and the form er should be se cured.
Things are much more com plicated in analysing the object of in vestigation in the field of theory. A lthough th ere is no com plete id entity betw een the object of investigation and th e object-w orld in em pirical investigations, still th e object is isolated in the process of m aterial practical activity. In theoretical investigations the object is literally constructed, created by th e investigator himself. We can find a scienti fic m aterialistic explanation of this process in M arx’ analysis of scienti fic investigation.
C haracterizing scientific thinking in contrast to everyday con sciousness, Hegel pointed out th a t the form er is concrete and system atic. The scientist is not satisfied w ith stating separate properties and rela tions of reality, his task is to reproduce all the richness of th e relations in the investigated reality and to present the w orld as a concrete whole. The concrete is un ity of m ultiform s, or, as Hegel puts it, the richness of definitions. To him the concrete seemed to be a result of the deve lopm ent of concepts. M arx showed th a t Hegel had proclaimed th e p ro cess of reproducing of the concrete in thinking to be one of creating, one of establishing the concrete. In other words, Hegel proclaim ed the specific character of theoretical thinking to be a law of reality, w he
52 A. G ryasnov
reas M arx explained th e specific character of gnosiology as proceeding from the laws of reality.
The task of scientific gnosiology is to discover laws of reality w ith a view to change it in correspondence w ith the needs of man. Reality in itself is concrete, i.e. it is a u nity of m ultiform s. In th e gnosiological process, however, it invariably appears before m an as abstract reality.
In his Critique of Political Economy, M arx says th a t w hile studying the laws of economic developm ent of society, it may appear as most n a tu ra l to begin th e study w ith say,; population, as it is th e most concrete, directly given perception. B ut this concrete reality appears to th e in vestigator in an extrem ely ab stract form, because he does not see th e un ity of m ultiform s (otherw ise scientific cognition w ould be unneces sary). The unity of m ultiform s is bound to be stated in the process of cognition. It is the stating of this un ity in the process of cognition th a t is th e reproduction of the concrete in thinking.
The reproduction of th e concrete is a reflection of reality and, as such, differs from the la tte r in being free from anything accidental or individual th a t m ay obscure th e reg u larity of the process. N evertheless, it does not cease to be concrete. Engels wrote: “The general law of the change of form of motion is m uch m ore concrete th a n any single ‘con crete’ exam ple of it” (op. cit., p. 226).
H ere it should be kept in mind th a t the laws of capitalist society discovered by M arx are th e laws of capitalism in general, and th e fo r m ulation of these laws becomes possible due to investigations of capi talism in general. Thus, capitalism is a construction of th e explorer, a concrete phenom enon reproduced in thinking, it is a reflection of the real m aterial world.
This applies also to th e developm ent of the n atu ra l sciences. For instance, elem entary particles in quantum mechanics are not individua lized. This means th a t th eo ry states laws referrin g not to em pirically discovered individuals b u t to an abstract object — a particle in general th a t can exist as an object of investigation only in the form of an ideally reproduced reality.
The prelim inary analysis of th e concept “object of scientific invest igation” enables us to approach the logical problem proper. In th e fra mes of logical analysis we shall use th e te rm “object of scientific in vestigations” only for denoting the object of theory, and th e term “logic” for form al (or symbolic) logic.
Each th eo ry functions in the form of term s and phrases constructed from these term s and interconnected according to some rules. If th e theory is m eaningful, th e construction of sensible phrases and th e in troduction of new term s into th e language of th e th eo ry is determ ined by considerations beyond th e scope of linguistics, i.e. considerations th a t overstep the fram es of the syntactical description of language.
Object of Scientific Investigation 53
If the theory is form al and is expressed as some form alized calculus, then the investigator deals w ith linguistic term s and phrases from a sy n tactical aspect.
We use “syntactical m eaning of a term (phrase)” for a set of rules, determ ining th e place of the te rm (phrase) in th e system of language and its p u rely linguistic relations w ith term s of another kind. It goes w ithout saing th a t th e problem of th e object of investigation cannot be solved by means of a syntactical analysis of form alized theory. C erta inly, one m ay ask to w hat exten t th e properties of objects investigated by this theory can be judged from th e syntactical stru c tu re of language. There is no answ er to this question in general; b u t in relation to con crete form alized theories it can be quite sensible.
As a rule, th e solution of such questions m eans overstepping th e lim its of p urely syntactical investigations. M oreover, even if th e in te r pretation of the form alized theory is given, th e question of how to distinguish by form al (syntactical) properties w h at is and w h at is not th e denotation (name) of an object in language is not triv ial and has no final logical solution.
The construction of logical systems of the ty p e of com binatory logic of C urry and Feys, w here any te rm is an object, is not likely to serve as the criterion of th e object of scientific investigations, since th e object in calculus m ust not necessarily correspond to the object of in terp retation. The same is to be said about th e calculus m aking use of the operator. C hurch’s abstraction operator is a syntactical m ethod to form an object (or ra th e r the nam e of th e new object), bu t cannot serve as a logical criterion.
Thus, the syntactical analysis cannot be sufficient, although it is in dispensable and fruitful. A more complete analysis m ay be given u tili zing sem antical means.
At present th e re exist several various sem antical theories concern ing th e m eaning of linguistic term s. There is no need for us to go into the details of these theories and to confine ourselves to one of them . We ju st w ant to point out some essential m om ents for our analysis.
L et us suppose th a t we have somehow m anaged to isolate a group presenting th e objects of scientific investigations in language from the set of the term s of language. Every of these term s m ust be considered as a name. The problem of m eaning of a term is modified into the problem of m eaning of names. In th a t case we face the difficulties al ready referred to by Leibniz (see B. S. G ryasnov, “On L eibniz’ u n d er standing of equality and synonym ism ,” Voprosi Filosofii, 6, 1965). It was form ulated by Frege as the difference betw een sense and denotation
(Sinn und Bedeutung).
It is well know n th a t it is easy to construct an exam ple w here tw o names of th e same object (thing) cannot replace each other in context
54 A. Gryasnov
w ithout losing in the volume of inform ation or changing the tru th fu l ness of the stateiment. This means th a t tw o or m ore nam es having the same denotation, i.e. nam ing the same thing, can have a different sense. The difference in sense of the term s having the same denotation can be explained as follows. The sense of the te rm fixed not th e object (thing) th a t is the denotation of a nam e but only one or more properties of the thing. Such an understanding of the sense of a name m ay be found in C hurch’s Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Since any phenomenon of reality possesses an infinite set of properties, it is n atu ra l th a t several different senses correspond to one denotation. From the gnosiological point of view it is im p ortant to point out th a t sense is not identical w ith property of the thing, as it is a reflection of property. Using Lenin’s definition, we m ay say th a t sense is the subjective picture of an objective world. The content of sense is objective, but this content has to be revealed in the object-w orld through m an’s practical activity, i.e. w ithout man and his practical activity th e re does not exist w hat we call sense. It seems to me th a t a logical analysis of m eaning of term s allows us to reveal clearly th e m eaning of the concept “object of scientific in vestigation”. Some correspondence betw een the concepts “object-region of investigation” on one hand, and the concept “denotation” and “sense” of a name, on the other, is clearly seen. The concept of sense, as cha racterized above, is in accordance w ith the statem ent of th e previous section th a t the object of scientific investigation in theory is not the
object-w orld itself or some fragm ent of it but an ab stract object ■—
a logical construction. From a logical point of view, this object is the sense of the te rm and not its denotation.
The validity of such a statem ent can be proved by means of m any
exam ples from the developm ent of science. Let us take one of them ■—
from the theory of sets. In m athem atics th e concept of “se t” is conside red to be initial and is not strictly defined. As a rule, it is believed th a t the m eaning of the term is intuitively clear and does not require addi tional elucidation. It is elucidated by exam ples of concrete sets. For in stance, it is pointed out th a t a set is a to tality of any objects of the outer world, or even of words, concepts, ideas etc.
From such an intuitive description of a set and of some of its pro perties th ere m ay arise an illusion th a t in the theory of sets they m ean the denotation of the te rm “set” w hen investigating th e properties of “sets” and operations w ith them. The developm ent of this m athem atical theory, however, refutes such a notion. As a m atter of fact, it is known th a t in the theory of sets the relation of belonging of an elem ent to a set is not transitive. This circum stance can be explained by th e fact th a t in the theory of sets the term “se t” does not m ean a totality of elem ents but a property of this totality, and this is equivalent to the
Object of Scientific Investigation 55
statem ent th a t it is th e sense th a t is dealt w ith ra th e r th an th e denota tion of th e term .
Thus, from a sem antical point of view, the object of investigation in th eo ry is the sense of th e name.
Since science, especially science in its form alized shape, enjoys a r e lative autonomousness in its development, a situation is plausible w hen theory develops w ith respect to its object (sense), b u t it rem ains unknow n w hat actually corresponds to this sense in the object-region.
The concepts of “denotation” and “sense” are strictly fixed only in a given language of science. Proceeding from w h at has been stated, we cannot suppose th a t th e denotations of term s are necessarily things or objects of the objective world, existing outside th e activity of m an, and th a t sense corresponds to the properties of these things. We m ay use term s either as nam es of such things, or else for the designation of the words them selves and so on. In the phrase, “the word ‘five’ consists of four le tte rs”, the nam e “fiv e” appears not as a nam e of th e num ber but as its own name. This is im portant for th e understanding of th e object of scientific investigation in view of the following considerations.
In th e process of scientific knowledge th e initial object is th e denota tion of a name; th en the object is changed. It is this sense th a t be comes the object. If th e sense of the term s of a th eory is form alized, it is possible to operate w ith the sense of a term as w ith a th ing of the object-world. Hence, a transition to a new level of investigation is pos sible w here the sense of the te rm expressed in calculus becomes th e object-region of investigation. In o th er words, sense becomes the deno tation of new term s. This fact is not always conspicuous enough because a sym bol-term m ay rem ain u n altered from its m aterial aspect. In fact, this is th e case w ith most term s of science th a t do not change as words, but change th e ir m eaning or the understanding of this meaning. The transform ation of sense into denotation results in the corresponding new sense of the term s.
To illu strate such a shift we m ay take th e developm ent of m ath e m atical knowledge. It is well know n th a t m athem atics had a long period of pre-scientific, pre-theoretical developm ent. From the gnosiological viewpoint, the object of investigation in th a t em pirical period of de velopm ent of m athem atical knowledge was the object-region from th e aspect of quan titativ e properties and relations and not qualitative re lations in a pure form.
The developm ent of theory became possible only w hen th e investi gation of the properties of properties began, th a t is, w hen qu an titativ e properties and relations w ere tu rn ed into an object. The la tte r became practicable at the appearance of calculus w here th e predicator “to be a n u m ber” becomes the nam e of th e object and th us th e object and thus th e object of calculus.
