Science as Object of Philosophical Reflection

ÔRGAÎStON 9 (1973) P R O B L È M E S G É N É R A U X

Stefan A m sterdam ski (Poland)

SCIENCE AS OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION

I. INTRODUCTION

It is customary to say that the theoretical considerations on science, that is, on its history, its relations w ith other spheres o f the human consciousness and activity, its developmental trends and prospects, its logical structure and methodological assumptions — are intended to get an understanding o f it. But it is all too evident that actually this even­ tual target is differently conceived of w ithin the disciplines studying science — history, sociology, psychology or m ethodology. To put it dif­ ferently, each discipline isolates one specific aspect of th e w hole phenom­ enon and tends to get an understanding of precisely this aspect. Such a specialization is normal and inescapable in the process of developing any knowledge, not only of science, and it does in fact yield a more profound knowledge of the aspect concerned.

But the adverse effects of specialization are equally w ell known. As a rule, the danger involved in specialization grows in proportion to the degree of the actual interconnection betw een the particular aspects of the phenomenon under study, that is, w hen it becomes more and more indispensable to inquire into their reciprocal relationship, also for an

understanding of each of them separately.

I think, and it is not only m y opinion, that w e face such a situation at present in the domain of the study of science. The present considera­ tions deal therefore w ith the mutual relationship betw een different disciplines having science as their common object of inquiry, primarily betw een the methodology, the history and the sociology of science. Since it is in the problem of development of science that these disciplines get into their m ost direct contacts, this problem is primarily selected to exem plify the theoretical problems that are of interest to us.

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The demarcation lines betw een the different disciplines studying the same object are as a rule conventional, arbitrary in character. They are being laid down in the course of the historical developm ent of science and o f research methods, and new achievem ents in knowledge m ay fre­ quently impose the necessity to transgress them . But conventions may imperceptibly petrify into dogmas which hinder any further develop­ ments. This m ay be a consequence either of the researchers’ habit of shunning the traditional boundaries of the aspect of reality “assigned” to them — a habit conveyed by the masters to their disciples in the course o f teaching — or of the emergence of new theories sanctioning the conventional demarcation lines.

A specific trait of specialization is that it leads to formulating def­ inite research programmes, which, as a rule, are getting increasingly nar­ row; these programmes, in turn, define the problems that m ust be solved and, moreover, im ply the criteria of accepting th e proposed solutions. In other words, th e conventional boundaries between particular disciplines studying the sam e object provide th e foundation for formulating re­ search programmes and thus predetermine the questions that w ill be asked, those that w ill be skipped as “irrelevant”, and those that w ill sim ply go unnoticed. Thus, to take up a study o f these problems it may occasionally be necessary to reconsider the previous conventional distinc­ tions betw een the “fields of competence” of different disciplines. Both the older and th e more recent history of science furnish quite a number of such situations.

In the case of studying a social phenomenon — and science is un­ questionably one — another factor comes into play: its ow n dynamics. Thus the manner of studying the phenomenon concerned must take into account ist place w ithin the framework of social life accordingly and un­ dergo changes together w ith the transformations of its object. Conse­ quently, the conventional demarcation lines between disciplines studying the same phenomenon as w ell as the research programmes that are founded on them may require some m odification also in result of cir­ cumstances that are, so to say, external w ith respect to the research pro­ cess itself. At any rate, it cannot be apriorily precluded that the develop­ mental dynamics of science in our epoch and the transformations in the sphere of its social functions w ill also require some modification of the traditional w ay of inquiry on science.

Therefore it seems worth considering how the demarcation lines bet­ w een the particular disciplines studying different aspects o f science have come to be laid down, how and in what sense they are theoretically sanctioned, and w hat are the consequences of this for th e understanding of science in general and of its particular aspects.

To arrive conveniently at answers to these questions let us turn to the philosophy of science, as it is in this domain that the demarcation

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lines have been explicitly formulated. The impact o f philosophy on the w ay of studying their research problems by other human disciplines needs no special comments.

II. THE CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY AND THE CONTEXT OF JUSTIFICATION

In his discussion of a fairly common v iew on th e subject o f philos­ ophy of science Herbert Feigl wrote: “There is a fair m easure of agreement today on how to conceive of philosophy of science as con­ trasted w ith the history, the psychology, or th e sociology of science. All these disciplines are about science, but they are 'about’ it in different ways... In th e w idely accepted term inology of Hans Reichenbach, studies of this sort pertain to the con text of discovery, whereas the analyses pursued by philosophers of science pertain to the con text of justification. It is one thing to ask how w e arrive to our scientific knowledge-claim s and w hat socio-cultural factors contribute to their acceptance or re­ jection; and it is another thing to ask w hat sort of evidence, and w hat general, objective rules and standards govern the testing, the confirmation or disconfirmation, and the acceptance or rejection of knowledge-claim s in science.” 1

What w e have here is a distinct demarcation line betw een the philosophy of science and the other disciplines studying science, a line laid down in virtue o f distinguishing betw een tw o kinds o f questions — about the origin and about the w ay o f justification, i.e. historical vs. logical ques­ tions. H. Feigl is certainly right in saying that this is a w idely accepted view on the contemporary philosophy o f science. 2

It is all too clear that the questions about how w e arrive at definite knowledge-claims or about their socio-cultural determ inants are not iden­ tical w ith the questions about their logical value or the w ay o f their justification; moreover it is obvious that if w e fail to realize this differ­ ence w e get involved in misunderstandings. As a m atter of fact, w e have here to do w ith the old Kantian distinction betw een the quid facti? and the quid juris? questions.

But it is one thing to distinguish betw een the respective m eanings of these questions, and it is a different thing to conceive this difference as a basis for a demarcation line delim iting the scope of interest of the philosophy of science, or as basis for a m ethodological directive how the study o f philosophical problems ought to be pursued.

1 H. Feigl, P hilosoph y of Science, in: R. M. Chisholm , e t al., Prentice H all, 1964, p. 472.

2 Cf. K. R. Popper, T he Logic of S cien tific D iscovery, London, 1959 (extended English translation of L ogik der Forschung, Vienna, 1935), ch. I, § 2.

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But, actually, w hy should w e stick to that demarcation line? Because it is a useful convention or perhaps because some theoretical reasons suggest it? A t any rate, from the fact that asking about the justification and asking about the origin of a knowledge-claim or proposition are two different things it does not follow that th e philosophy o f science ought in principle to study the former only. To justify such a view , it is in­ dispensable to take recourse to some additional premisses. What these premisses should indicate is that there is no relationship betw een the way of justifying propositions and the w ay of arriving at them (i.e. the socio-historical conditions of practising scientific research work), or at least that no such relationship that m ay be essential for the understand­

ing of science does exist. They should indicate that the understanding

of science is equivalent to understanding its logical structure and the logic of its development, that is, the logic of passing from one theory to another, but that the history of science and its sociology contribute nothing essential to that understanding. It is known that such premisses are furnished by a definite philosophy. But the trouble is that they are furnished together w ith the construction of a definite conception of science, which m ay not be indisputable and is certainly one-sided only.

It is obviously impossible to refuse to anyone the right to restrict his interests to the study of the problems referring to the context of jus­ tification of scientific propositions or even to call them „philosophy of science”. To put it formally, if the distinction betw een the context of discovery and the context of justification is conceived as a demarcation line delim iting the scope of problems falling w ithin the realm of philos­ ophy of science no consequences m ust result from this decision for the solution of specific problems: the problems that are located outside the area delimited would be sim ply excluded from the scope o f th e philosophy of science and turned over to some other discipline which would apply its ow n specific methods in dealing w ith them. It is of no importance to which discipline the particular problem w ill be assigned as no consequences concerning its solution follow from such assignements.

But actually the situation is different. The above distinction performs usually a different role than that o f form ally delim iting the scope of problems pertaining to the philosophy of science; what it actually does is to provide the foundation of the methodological directive indicating not which problems are to be assigned to the philosophy of science but rather how these problems, which — by some other principle or simply by tradition — are deemed to constitute its subject, ought to be studied. Now this m ust necessarily decide about the w ay in which they are to be solved and thus cannot be an irrelevant issue.

For instance, if one assumes that the philosophy of science is interested exclusively in the context of justification and sim ultaneously argues — as does Popper — that the problem of development of knowledge is not

S cience as O b je c t of P hilosoph ical R eflection _{3 9}

only a relevant but a central field of philosophical in q u ires,3 then he necessarily reduces this problem to the logical questions of developm ent of know ledge and believes that the logic of scientific discovery gives its

satisfactory solution. (The reason for italicizing the word “satisfactory”

w ill be clear in the next section.)

An excellent example of the function performed by the distinction discussed is the polem ic on the book by T. S. Kuhn on The Structure of

Scientific R e v o lu tio n s.4 The core o f th e discussion w as Kuhn’s thesis

that in order to understand science w e have to go beyond logic and methodology, to take recourse to categories of social psychology and of the sociology of scientific communities, that the m ethodological direc­ tives are by them selves insufficient “to dictate a unique substantive solu­ tion to m any sorts of scientific questions”. 5 Kuhn argues that to under­ stand the developm ent of science w e have to study the values w hich scientists adopt as their guidelines in scientific research work and th e in­ stitutions w hich manage or organize that work. He writes: “The expla­ nation must, in the final analysis, be psychological or sociological. It must, that is, be a description o f a value system , an ideology, together w ith an analysis of the institutions through w hich that system is transm itted and enforced.” 6

None of the critics of K uhn’s view argued that the problem of devel­ opment of scientific knowledge, w hich in his opinion cannot be under­ stood w ithout going beyond th e lim its of the logic of scientific discovery, falls outside th e domain of philosophy o f science. But w hat they tried to show w as that — in spite o f K uhn’s arguments — the solution of this problem w ithin the philosophy o f science restricting itself to a study o f the logic o f developm ent of konw ledge is, or at least could be, satisfac­

tory. 7

Let us incidentally remark that whether or not a solution is recog­ nized as satisfactory is largely dependent upon the programme o f philo­ sophical studies, that is, upon the opinion on w hat it is to and w h at it

3 Cf. ibid., “P reface” to the English edition.

4 T. S. K uhn, The S tru ctu re of S cien tific R evolutions, Chicago, 1962. In 1965 an international sym posium on the book by K uhn w as held in London. The pro­ ceedings of the sym posium w ere published as C riticism and G ro w th o f K n o w led g e (ed. by I. Lakatos and A. M usgrave, Cambridge U niversity Press, 1970). K uhn’s reply to his critics w as published as R eflection s on M y C ritics, in: C riticism ..., pp. 231-278 and in his “PostScript” to the second English edition of h is book (Chicago, 1970). The Polish translation of K uhn’s The S tru c tu re appeared in 1968 w ith m y “P ostscript” (cf. S tru k tu ra rew o lu cji n au kow ych , PWN, W arszawa, 1968).

5 T. S. Kuhn, The Structu re..., p. 3.

6 T. S. Kuhn, Logic of D iscovery or P sychology of Research?, in: C riticism ..., p. 21.

7 I. Lakatos justifies this v ie w in F alsification and th e M ethodology o f S cien ­ tific Research P rogram m es, in: C riticism ..., pp. 91-197. Im pressed, no doubt, by K uhn’s criticism , he m odifies in this study the m ethodological v ie w of Popper. Cf. also S. A m sterdam ski, “The D ispute over th e Conception of Progress in the D evelopm ent of S cience” (in Polish), K w a rta ln ik H istorii N auki i T echn iki, 1970, No. 3, pp. 489-506.

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can provide. Thus, a solution which is satisfactory from the point of v iew o f one programme m ay of course be unsatisfactory w ithin another, if the latter has different tasks in v iew or pursues different objectives. Therefore if w e say o f a solution that it is unsatisfactory w e m ust spec­ ify whether it fails to fulfill the requirements put up by the program­ me w ithin which it has been obtained or whether w e mean to say that w e refuse to accept that programme of research, and that not necessarily because it fails to cope w ith the problems in accordance w ith its ow n assumptions but for other reasons; for exam ple w e may regard it as being too narrow or lim ited, in that it om its a number of questions that in our opinion are essential. This is the w ell-know n dif­ ference betw een im m anent criticism and external criticism, that is criti­ cism from different standpoints.

Correspondingly, in our case w e ought to distinguish betw een the following three questions: First, w hat tasks does a philosophy of science restricting its inquiries to the study of the context of justification,

i.e. the logic of scientific discovery, put up for itself; second, whether

or not the analysis of, e.g. the problem of developm ent o f scientific knowledge in terms o f logic is satisfactory in view of these tasks imposed by th e programme on itself; and, third, whether there are any argu­ m ents supporting the v iew that even if that programme makes possible a satisfactory solution of the problems it tackles it nevertheless requires some modification (extension?) for it fails to solve problems that must necessarily be solved if any understanding of science is to be achieved Anyone bringing up such arguments would obviously think that the understanding of the development of science provided by the criticized programme is unsatisfactory, too narrow, one-sided.

Finally, it m ust be observed that the criticized programme m ay be refuted for the tw o above reasons together: both because it provides unsatisfactory (with respect to its ow n requirements) solutions of the problems tackled and because it is narow, too lim ited; it can be thought that it is precisely th e set of its programmatic assumptions that are responsible for its intrinsic difficulties and that they could be overcome only by m odifying them.

This is our view , w hich w e are going to justify below: the present text, though, w ill primarily treat about the lim itations of the mentioned programme rather than about its intrinsic difficulties.

The programmatic restriction of philosophical analysis of science to the content of justification is linked w ith a specific articulation of the object of its study. Science is treated as a set of propositions recognized (whether synchronically or diachronically) as true, complying w ith def­ inite rules of methodology, that is, as a ready product of human cogni­ tion objectivized in the form o f intersubjectiyely communicable and in- tersubjectively controllable propositions. Thus, the understanding of

S cience as O b jec t of P hilosophical R eflection 41

science, w hich is to be furnished by the philosophy of science, is an understanding of only one aspect of it, even if w e realize that it is not the only aspect which deserves analysis. W ithin the boun­ daries o f such a programme of philosophy of science it is impossible to reach an understanding of science as a definite com plex of cognitive activities in all their determinations, (not only the logical), as a specific human activity being a product of a definite culture and constituting a definite “subculture” dynamically interrelated w ith the overall cultur­ al system in which it is incorporated, as a social institution performing definite functions w ithin the given civilization and sim ultaneously sub­ jected to its reciprocal effects.

This programme deliberately abandons such an understanding of science as its task. It employs a supra-historical model of science as a product of rational cognitive activities the criteria of which remain always the same, a model of scientific activity whose only intent it is to m ultiply the data about the world and to check those obtained pre­ viously but not, e.g., any utilization of those data.

Accordingly, the task of the philosophy of science would consist in formulating rules and criteria the application of which would secure the m aximum effectiveness to the course of the process. The philosophy of

science is to be of a norm ative character; it is to speak not about how

science is being pursued but about how it ought to be pursued in order to be most rational, to secure the rapidest possible increm ent of infor­ mation and the most efficient elim ination of errors.

If, for instance, K.R. Ropper and I. Lakatos think the philosophy of science has as its task a “logical reconstruction” 8 of the developm ent of scientific knowledge in the “third world”, 9 and that this reconstruction is to be a model of a rational research procedure and as such is to serve as a frame of reference for the appraisal of the history of science, and as a normative model of research procedure in the future, then, of course, the argument that that reconstruction fails to represent the actual course of development of scientific knowledge is irrelevant from their point of view . The reconstruction was not aimed at obtaining the pic­ ture of that development, and — stil more — this is even impossible since

8 K. R. Popper, op. cit., pp. 31-32, w rote: “This reconstruction would not de­ scribe these processes as th ey actually happen: it can give only a logical skeleton of the procedure of testing. Still, this is perhaps all that is m eant by those who speak of a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the w ays in which w e gain know ledge.”

8 “The first world is that of matter, the second the world of feelings, beliefs, consciousness, the third the w orld of ob jective know ledge articulated in pro­ positions. This is an age-old and v itality im portant trichotom y; its leading con­ tem porary proponent is Popper” (I. Lakatos, H istory and, Its R ational R econ stru c­ tion s, p. 25; this study w ill appear in the neixt issue o f Boston S tu d ies in the M ethodology of Science, ed. by R. Cohen and R. Buck, in 1971. The author has kindly provided a m im eographed transcript). Cf. also K. R. Popper, E pistem ology w ith o u t a K n ow in g S u b je ct, in: P roceedings of the T h ird In tern ation al Congress of Logic, M ethodology and P hilosoph y of Science, A m sterdam , 1968, pp. 333-373.

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it is to be of norm ative nature. The only meaningful question could be whether the proposed model of research procedure is realistic (as op­ posed to utopian), whether it is practically feasible.

It may be observed, incidentally, that whereas Popper assigned to the philosophy of science the task of furnishing a model of rational research procedure to scientists and his requirement to submit scientific propo­ sitions to the possibly strongest tests of falsification is in its character a norm o f scientific ethos, Lakatos holds a more reserved view. He seems to doubt whether there are any feasible possibilities to secure success in this task. He says that the fundamental task of methodologies is not to provide models o f procedure but that “modern m ethodologies” or “logics of discovery” consist m erely o f a set of (possibly not even tightly knit, let alone mechanical) rules for the appraisal of ready, articulated th e­ ories. Often these rules, or system s of appraisal, also serve as “theories of scientific rationality”, “demarcation criteria”, or “definitions of science”. 10

What has been said so far seems to be sufficiently illustrative of the tasks assumed by a philosophy of science restricting itself to stud­ ying the context of justification and of the w ay it articulates the object of its inquiry. Since science is conceived of m erely as a ready product of intellectual inquiry and studied as a set of statements isola­ ted from the knowing subject (whether individual or collective), objecti- vized and transferred to the “third world”, then it is obvious that the “understanding” of science can be achieved m erely through a logical analysis. This is a consequence of the preliminary assumption adopted earlier. From this point of view , any requirement that philosophy of science go beyond the study of the context of justification is meaningless: for w hat m ay the psychology, history or sociology of science have to say in that “third world” of Objective knowledge articulated in statements? The result is that w e have to do not w ith a philosophy of science as a human activity but with a philosophy of science “without the knowing subject”.

I have said at the outset (p. 3) that to restrict the philosophy o f science to studying the context of justification requires moreover some other premiss in addition to distinguishing betw een the sense of questions about the origin and about the justification of know ledge-claim s; such premiss should indicate that there is no relevant relationship between the w ay of justifying statements on the one hand and the way of ar­ riving at them on the other (relevant for the understanding of science). Now, after w hat has been said above, it seems to be clear that that pre­ miss is im plicit in the assumption that the philosophy of science has its

Science as O b jec t of P h ilosoph ical R eflection _{4 3}

object in the “third w orld” of ready knowledge articulated in proposi­ tions. In fact, no such relationship exists in that world. To deny this would m ean refuting Husserl’s critique of psychologism; notwithstanding the m any differences, this critique performed an essential role in the formulation of a programme of philosophy of logical empiricism in the 1930’s. Whereas Husserl argues that the law s of logic do not refer to

how w e do think but how w e ought to thin k in order to think correctly,

logical empiricism sees th e philosophy of science reduced to logic saying not how science is practised bud how it ought to be practised in order to be practicized correctly (rationally). The fundamental difference b et­ w een Husserl’s understanding of the law s of logic as belonging to the world of ideal relations and the neopositivist conception of them as rules of language is here inessential.

But if by science w e m ean m an’s cognitive activities and not only its product, if the philosophy o f science has as its object th e actual world of cognitive activities, then on this level of analysis the distinction be­ tw een the context of justification and th e context of discovery is not a foundation for drawing a demarcation line delim iting the scope of the philosophy of science. Thus it can be said that the restriction of the tasks of philosophy of science to the analysis of the context of justifi­ cation results from the manner in w hich the object of its inquiries has been articulated.

It seems safe to say that such a lim ited understanding of science, or — most strictly — the restricting of the philosophical study of science to the afore-mentioned single aspect only, is philosophically deter­ mined by a radical constrasting or separating the sphere o f activity from the sphere of cognition. It is this lim ited understanding of science that makes the philosophy o f science treat science m erely as cognition and study it as a product of intellectual activity independent of the knowing subject. It leads to studying the cognitive activity as free from any involvem ents other than those in logic.

This is not to say that th e above procedure fails to give any under­ standing o f science or of its history; such a contention would be equiva­ len t to denying any importance of rational thought in the creation o f science, and thus a complete nonsense. But I am convinced that what w e obtain is a very one-sided understanding, for it is an understanding of science as alienated from the context of its practising and function­ ing in the actual world of human culture and civilization. Moreover, it is also a suprahistorical understanding in the sense in w hich the logical rules and methodological criteria employed in the reconstruction are supra-historical.

Nor do I think that the philosophy of science can do w ithout such an analysis. But I am convinced that the fact of confining oneself to it cannot be justified in any other w ay than by taking recourse to a def­

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inite (i.e. historically and sociologically determined, and thus not su- pra-historical) programme of philosophical inquiry and of understand­ ing science.

III. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE '

What has so far been said was intended to indicate at the lim ited character rather than at th e immanent inefficiency of a programme of philosophy of science which, by principle, should be m erely interested in the context o f justification and w hich conceives of science as m erely a world o f objective knowledge articulated in propositions. Clearly, w ith such preassumptions the philosophy of science cannot extend beyond the study of the logical structure of knowledge and of the logic of its development. Let us now consider som e consequences of that opinion.

The m ost direct contact betw een the methodology, the history, and the sociology o f science is achieved in the problem of development of knowledge. The logical reconstruction of the developm ent o f science, w hich is the aim of methodology, cannot, by definition, be a d e­ scription of actual history. As a rule, it has to turn out that neither in the past nor today scientists follow exactly the rational models of procedure elaborated by methodologists. This is caused by the fact that the model is normative and not descriptive in character.

But the question m ay arise as to w hat are th e causes of that presup­ posed discrepancy betw een th e rational model and the actual course of history. Does this discrepancy result from factors that are secondary in importance for the development of science or from such that belong to it “essence”? It depends upon th e answer to this question whether the model, which is being constructed as norm ative in character, may practically serve as a model for research procedure. For, if the discrep­ ancies result from, say, “subsidiary” causes, then there is at least the possibility that the model could serve in practice as a model of re­ search procedure and scientists could make use of the suggestions con­ tained in it. But if the discrepancies result from the “essence” of the process o f development of knowledge, then its normative usefulness is utopian.

The answer to this question is also important in view of the fact that it implies a definite view on the “nature” of science and of cogni­ tive activity:

The first answer to the above question is that the discrepancy be­ tween the model and the reality is caused by factors that are “subsi­ diary”, to science, factors that have nothing to do w ith its “nature”, specifically by metaphysics, myths, prejudices, errors or perhaps by

Science as O b jec t of P h ilosoph ical R eflection 45

peculiar historical circumstances in which science m ay be practised. In a word — by factors which are external to it, w hich distort or disturb its normal, i.e . rational course o f development.

If w e accept this answer w e also accept the view that scientific activ­ ity has always the same, supra-historical objectives to pursue, that it paves its w ay through diverse external vicissitudes, and that w ere it not for such external disturbancies it would follow precisely th e path laid down by the logic of scientific discovery as constructed by m ethod­ ology. In such a case, the history and the sociology of science are indeed irrelevant, or inessential, for the understanding of science; ines­ sential at least to the extent in which they explain not the principal line of its developm ent (which is explained by logic, whereas history can do no m ore than provide the necessary facts) but the adventitious deviations from it. Inessential to the extent in w hich th ey explain not w hat in its development is “natural”, “rational”, but w hat is “patholo­ gical” ; not w hat conditions this developm ent but w hat accounts for its disturbance, even if it is inescapable, for no one would say that science develops in a vacuum or in a “sterile” environment.

If such a conception of science is accepted it is indeed to be expected that a rational m odel of developm ent of science m ay efficiently perform its normative functions: that is, to indicate the w ay to follow for scien­ tists, to provide the “criteria of rationality”, the “criteria of demarca­ tion”, the “definitions of science” that m ay prevent them from, or warn against, sw erving from the main road of developm ent of knowledge, against th e deviations induced by the external, extra-rational (histori­ cal and sociological) conditions of practising science.

A philosophy o f science w hich restricts itself to the study of the context of justification as sufficient for the understanding of science or of its developm ent is in fact guided by that supra-historical concept of scientific activity which always and only pursues the one end of m ultiplying the valid (from the point of v iew o f th e rules formulated by it) information on the world. In accordance w ith its preliminary assumptions, such a philosophy of science assigns also the respective tasks for the other disciplines studying science. In terms of this con­ ception, the historian o f science must, on the one hand, “determ ine by what man and at w hat point in tim e each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory w as discovered or invented. On the other hand, he must describe and explain the congeries of error, m yth, and supersti­ tion that have inhibited the more rapid accumulation of the constitu­ ents of the modern science tex t.” 11 The materials provided by the his­ tory of science would in its part serve as an illustration of the logical schem e of developm ent of knowledge and w ould in part account for

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the deviations from the methodological model. The sociology of science would fulfil a similar task: it would explain the social determinants of some or other deviations from the “ideal course” of the growth of knowledge, it would explain the possible inhibitions or accelerations in its rate, etc.

The view presented above has found both express and interesting formulation in the recent works of I. Lakatos. He defends against Kuhn Popper’s idea that the logical reconstruction of the process of growth of science furnishes a satisfactory explanation of that growth. Lakatos refutes Kuhn’s contention that the logic of discovery has to be complemented by social psychology and by sociology of scientific communities. Thus he writes that “the philosophy of science provides normative m ethodologies and in terms of these the historian recon­ structs 'internal history’ and thereby provides a rational explanation of the growth o f objective knowledge.” 12 But though he adds that a ra­ tional reconstruction never exhausts all history, that “history of science is always richer than its rational reconstruction”, 13 and thus “any ra­ tional reconstruction needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio- psychological) ‘external’ history”, 14 his preliminary postulate makes him admit that the “external history is irrelevant for the understanding of science”. 15 The “internal” history, w hich he him self describes as “a history of events which are selected and interpreted in a normative w ay”, 16 explains w hat is rational in th e development of science: where­ as “external” history explains w hat cannot be included from the ac­ tual history in the rational reconstruction founded on a given logic of scientific discovery, that is, w hat in terms of that logic turns out to be “irrational” or “extra-rational”. “When history differs from its ration­ al reconstruction, 'external’ history provides an empirical explanation of w h y it differs. But the rational aspect of scientific growth is fully accounted for by one’s logic of scientific discovery.” 17 This, incidental­ ly, is obvious since this logic defines the criterion of rationality itself. Thus the circle is closed: first it is said that the logic of scientific dis­ covery determines the criterion of rationality, n ext that it constitutes the foundation for the reconstruction of internal history, and, eventu­ ally, that w hat cannot be squeezed into this reconstruction is irrelevant for the understanding o f science, for its rational aspect is w holly cov­ ered by the “internal history”. Do the words “irrational” or “extra- rational” m ean anything more in this context than “not falling w ith the model of developm ent I have adopted” ?

12 I. Lakatos, H istory..., p. 1. »* Ibid., p. 23. Ibid. is Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 27. « Ibid., p. 23-24.

Science as O b jec t of P hilosoph ical R eflection ₄₇

Lakatos is doubtlessly right in saying that every history of science is always w ritten from the point of v iew of a definite philosophy of science. He is right, for it is philosophy that furnishes $ ie ideas as to w hat is science, and w hat is its course o f development. His ow n philos­ ophy is no exception here. In this respect he gives a remarkably in­ teresting analysis of how inductionism, conventionalism and falsifica- tionism influenced the historiography o f sc ie n c e .18 I do not think, however, that his ow n conception defends itself against the arguments brought up against these theories.

Moreover, he makes an interesting point (and supports it w ith in­ teresting evidence) that w ithin the context o f different logics of discov­ ery the demarcation line betw een “external” and “internal” history of science w ill run different courses from case to case. Facts that m ay be covered by a rational reconstruction by one logic discover, m ay have to be transferred by another logic o f discovery to the “external” h is­ tory as they are “not rational and have to be explained in term s of 'external’ history”. 19

Lakatos’ ow n m ethodology of scientific research program m es,20 w hich he worked out in reply to K uhn’s critique of falsificationism , makes it no doubt possible to include in the rational reconstruction more than that of Popper. But it still fails to solve the fundam ental issue: to explain in methodological term s th e transition from one re­ search programme to another in the case of a scientific revolution. 21

No doubt both Lakatos and Popper w ould like the logical recon­ struction of the developm ent of knowledge to comprise as m any facts from actual history as possible, hence they take full account of the history of science and are outstanding experts on it. But at the same tim e neither of them accepts it as the yardstick of the proposed re­ construction. “In w ritting a historical case study [writes Lakatos] one should, I think, adopt the following procedure: (1) one gives a rational reconstruction; (2) one tries to compare this rational reconstruction w ith actual history, and to criticize both on e’s rational reconstruction for lack of rationality”. 22 But this is inconsequential, since the admis­ sible lim it of criticism o f a reconstruction for its ahistorical character is the adopted conception o f a suprahistorical developm ent of science.

It m ust be added here that both Popper and Lakatos differ essen­ tially in their view from the philosophy of science of the logical em pi­ ricism of the 1930’s, which was interested exclusively in the problem of th e logical structure o f ready knowledge and not in the logic of its

18 Cf. ibid., ch. I: “R ival M ethodologies o f S cience”. Cf. also J. A gassi, T o w a rd s an H istoriograph y of Science, Mouton, 1963.

18 I. Lakatos, H istory..., p. 21. 20 I. Lakatos, Falsification....

21 Cf. S. Am sterdam ski, op. cit., esp. p. 502. 22 I. Lakatos, Falsification..., p. 138.

48 S. A m sterd a m sk i

development, in its actual dynamics. There, history of science could be m erely a target of criticism because it did not fu lfill th e criteria of being scientific, m eaningful etc. A subject of criticism — because it used to turn out that “for rather obscure reasons” scientists in the past proceeded differently than they should have. 23 And since the criteria of research procedures are formulated in virtue of th e logical analysis of the currently reigning theories and treated as a supra-historical model of ap­ praisal of all cognitive procedures, the history of “genuine” science commences actually w ith the last revolution in the development of knowledge. To render it in some caricature, that would m ean that his­ tory of science does not exist at all: for w hat w e regard as history of science is a history of errors, misinterpretations, a history of view s that in the light o f the methodological criteria and rules of that philosophy do n ot deserve the name of science. Lakatos is right in w riting that that philosophy “has never generated a programme of historical recon­ struction. ...As an epistemological programme it has been degenerating for a long tim e; as a historiographical programme it never started.” 24 But disregarding the essential differences betw een the view s o f Pop­ per and Lakatos on the one hand, and the programmatically ahistorical versions of the philosophy of science on the other, from our point of view another fact is of interest: nam ely, that their common restriction of the interest of philosophy of science to studying the context of justi­ fication and treating scientific activity as a process essentially indepen­ dent o f the historical conditions in which it is being practised (these, as it has been said, may only disturb, accelerate or inhibit it) must necessarily lead to a “liquidation” of the actual history o f science or to splitting it into “internal” history, which fits the reconstructed logic of developm ent of knowledge, and “external” history, w hich is irrele­ vant for the understanding of science as it does not fit into the rational reconstruction.

Moreover, it is evident that if w e agree that the only task o f phi­ losophy of science is the logical reconstruction o f the development of knowledge, there are no such discrepancies between this reconstruction and the actual history that would essentially disparage this reconstruc­ tion, for it is assumed in principle that such discrepancies are inesca­ pable. Historians and sociologists m ay possibly tell us ex p o st w h y such discrepancies did occur, though in terms of a rational developm ent of

23 H. Feigl, op. cit., p. 505, w rote about the changes in the v iew s of som e representatives of that trend: “Som e thinkers lik e Rudolf Carnap, W. S. Sellars, and K. P. Feyerabend have recently concluded that the w hole story of the hier­ archical le v el structure [of scien tific theories] should be abandoned. Their new and different account deals w ith th e historical succession of la w and theories in term s Qf radical replacem ents raiher thaln in terms o f a standing hierarchy lev el.” Incidentally, this is not the only change in the view s of the “neop ositivists” from that time.

Science as O b jec t of P h ilosoph ical R eflection 4 9

science they should not have occured at all. Thus, even if a history of science is alw ays w ritten from the point of view of some philosophy, it is of no importance to the latter; more specifically, w hat cannot be explained as rational activity w ithin the context of a definite logic of scientific discovery is relegated to the “laystall” of “external” history, w hich “is irrelevant for the understanding of science as a rational ac­ tiv ity ”.

But also the reconstruction of the “internal”, “rational” history of science generated by this philosophy cannot, by definition, b e anything else than the history of ideas expounded m odo geom'etrico. As a de­ scription of actual history it is false; as a normative proposal of a ra­ tional research procedure it is utopian: neither the creation of science nor its functioning occur in the “third w orld” of pure rationality. A c­ cordingly, here w e have to do not w ith the philosophy and the history of science as a human activity in the real world — an activity condi­ tioned by a number of variable social and historical factors and inten­ ded to yield various values — but w ith a philosophy and a history of a supra-historical projection o f science into the objective world of ideas and rational thinking.

The second answer to the afore-mentioned question about the cause of the discrepancy between the models of rational research procedure constructed by m ethodology and the actual history of science is essen­ tially simple, which of course does not m ean that it involves no intrin­ sic difficulties of its own. This answer consists in refuting th e question as being incorrectly formulated, for it takes as its point of departure a false, one-sided conception of science and of cognitive activity. Pro­ vided this conception is refuted, the problem in question disappears together w ith it too. This is, I think, one of the fundamental tenets of K uhn’s book.

Let us take a closer look at this view . For, irrespective of the im ­ perfections and intrinsic difficulties pointed out by its c r itic s,25 it opens a new w ay to an untraditional understanding o f science and, accord­ ingly, to a different direction of the theoretical (including philosophi­ cal) reflection on science.

Kuhn adheres to the (now increasingly frequent) approach of those historians w ho “rather than seeking the permanent contributions o f an older science to our present vantage, attem pt to display the historical integrity of that science in its own tim e”, 26 that is, to understand it as a specific aspect of the intellectual culture of the respective epoch. That

25 Cf., e.g., the studies by J. W atkins, K. R. Popper, I. Lakatos, M. Master -m an, P. K. Feyerabend in C riticis-m ... Cf. also -my “P ostscript” to the Polish edition of The Structure... (S tru k tu ra re w o lu cji n aukow ych , PWN, W arszawa 1968, P o ­ słow ie).

28 T. S. Kuhn, The S tructure..., p. 3. 4 — Organon 9/72

50 S. A m sterd a m sk i

this approach is fruitful is attested if only by the works o f A. K o y ré,27 or by Kuhn’s previous book on the Copemican R evolu tion ,28 or per­ haps F. Jacob’s book on the history of genetic theories. 29 These histo­ rians do not ask “about the relation of G alileo’s view to those of m o­ dem science, but rather about the relationship betw een his view s and those of his group, i.e. teachers, contemporaries, and immediate suc­ cessors in the sciences. Furthermore, they insist upon studying the opi­ nion of that group and other similar ones from the view point — usually very different from that o f modern science — that gives those opinions the maxim um internal coherence and the closest possible fit to na­ ture.” 30

To expose the justification o f such an approach let us once more take recourse to a quotation: “The more carefully they study, say, Ari­ stotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current view s o f nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product o f human idio­ syncrasy than those current today. If those out-of-date beliefs are to be called m yths, then m yths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scien­ tific knowledge. If, on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite incompatible w ith the ones w e hold today. Given these alternatives, the historian must choose the latter. Out-of-date theories are not in principle unscientific because they have been discarded. That choice, however, makes it dif­ ficult to see scientific development as a process of accretion.” 31

The fundamental meaning o f this view , in which a well-conceived historicism is w ell observable, is easy to grasp. If w e approach the study of the history of science w ith an a priori supra-historical conception of what is scientific, a conception borrowed from some or other methodo­ logy, if w e study history employing the “criteria of rationality”, “the criteria of demarcation” or the “definitions of science” pertaining to that methodology, then w e attem pt to squeeze actual history into a ri­ gid mould imposed on it from outside. Then, as Lakatos puts it, “history of science is a history of events that have been selected and interpreted in a normative w a y ”. But w hen w e treat science as part of the intellec­ tual culture of an epoch, as a specific “subculture” of people creating and utilizing it, then instead of asking whether or not its development

27 A. Koyré, É tudes C allilêen nes, Paris, 1939; From Closed W orld to In finite U niverse, Baltim ore, 1957; Études d ’H istoire de la pensée ph ilosoph ique, Paris, 1961,. esp. “De l ’influence des conceptions philosophiques sur l ’évolution des théories scien tifiqu es” pp. 231-247.

28 T. S. Kuhn, The C opem ican R evolution, Harvard U niversity Press, Cam­ bridge, Mass., 1957.

29 F. Jacob, La logique du v iv a n t, Gallim ard, Paris, 1970. 30 T. S. Kuhn, The Structu re..., p. 3.

S cience as O b jec t of P h ilosoph ical R eflection 51

was in accordance w ith some rational model common to all epochs — a model w hich presupposes its permanent and unidirectional (from the view point of the values it intends to achieve) developm ent and instead of selecting from the history of science some facts, and interpreting them so as to adjust them to the rational model, w h ile relegating, to “external” history those w hich do not fit in as “irrelevant for the un­ derstanding of science”, w e attem pt to find out w hat w ere the criteria of being scientific at the given time, and w hy these criteria them selves were evolving together w ith the developm ent of knowledge.

For, it is erroneous to think — and this if of param ount im portance — that the developm ent of science means m erely the changes in the content of the accepted theories. Were this the case, the search of a lo­ gical framework upon which all those changes can be strung like beads would be justified. The developm ent of science means in an equal degree the changes in the methods, aims and m ethodological criteria that are employed by scientists. With respect to science, these are not anything external, something given once and for all by a supra-histori- cal logic o f scientific discovery. I should rather say they are part o f science itself and, together w ith it, they undergo evolution. To use a somewhat risky comparison but adequate for our purposes, w ith a cyber­ netic system . I should say that science is a system w hich in the course of its evolution not only changes and reorganizes its memory, but also, at least partly, its programme. The changes in this programme are con­ ditioned, among others, by the circumstances occurring at the “inputs” and “outputs” of the system, that is, by the social and historical con­ ditions in w hich scientific knowledge is pursued and utilized. The study of these conditions contributes essential information to the understand­ ing of science and its development. The changes are moreover condi­ tioned by the transformations occurring in the “m em ory” of th e sys­ tem, w hich w ill be touched upon latter.

If this idea is right, then the methodological criteria that w e want to employ in the reconstruction of the logic of developm ent of science must be taken out from its history itself rather than from any supra- historical normative models of rational research procedure. This also means that th e context o f discovery and the context of justification — at least on this level of analysis — cannot be absolutely separated from one another. This is w hat I meant by saying at the outset that if w e restrict ourselves to studying one aspect of science only, it m ay encum ­ ber the understanding not only of science in general but even of the se ­ lected aspect itself.

If w e treat science as a specific part of the intelectual culture of an epoch, a division of its history into „internal”, determined by a su- pra-historical logic o f discovery, and „external” history determined by adventitious, subsidary historical and sociological factors becames im­

52 S. A m sterd a m sk i

m ediately m eaningless. The “essence” of the developm ent of science in an epoch consists not only in the then reigning logic of development but also in the involvem ent in those factors and in situations that, from the view point o f logic, may be subsidiary. What from that point of v iew appears to be “pathological”, „unnatural”, “irrational”, is, if seen from this angle, conceived of as being “natural”. In a sense, m e­ taphysics, m yths, errors, prejudices are equally immanent parts of science as the facts that w e endeavour to integrate into a rational re­ construction. To use som ew hat provocative terms, the history of science comprises also the natural history of nonsense.

From this point of view , a logical model of developm ent of know­ ledge not only cannot be a description of actual history, after which, as has been said, it does not aspire at all, but it dJs not even a legitim ate system o f reference for a critical, normative appraisal of all research pro­ cedures. It does not, for it is but one of the factors of developm ent of scientific thought whereas the remaining ones are om itted by it as being external and irrelevant for the understanding of science. The view that any logic of developm ent of scientific thought is capable of furnishing a picture o f its actual history is false. But the idea that it may constitute a norm ative model o f research procedure it utopian. I say utopian, for this procedure is determ ined and m ust necessarily be determined by extra-logical factors, the influence of the latter can­ not be escaped even by the best, the m ost liberal criteria o f rationality, of demarcation, of m eaningfulness, nor the definitions furnished by the methodology. Therefore it is utopian to think that the methodological directives provided by a philosophy o f science thus conceived may lay down the solutions of any research problems encountered by scientists. One is tem pted to say that w ith criteria o f rationality thus constructed the detection of an “irrational” elem ent in the history of science is ines­ capable.

Hence derives K uhn’s thesis that the understanding of science requires that w e go beyond the logic of developm ent and beyond the m ethodology (these as parts of science are in need of explanation them ­ selves) and take recourse to the categories of the psychology and socio­ logy of scientific communities.

To paraphrase Quine’s 32 comparison, science as a w hole resembles a field of forces the boundary conditions of which are not only experience but also th e conditions o f its pursuance. Changes at the boundaries of the field would cause corresponding adjustments in its inside. A change in the appraisal o f some propositions results in a change in the appraisal

32 Cf. W. V. Q., Quine, in: From the Logical P oin t o f V iew . T w o Dogmas of E m piricism .

Science as O b jec t of P h ilosoph ical R eflection ₅₃

of others; the methodological criteria o f this appraisal being sim ply further propositions of the system, certain other elem ents of the same field.

IV. AHISTORISM AN D RELATIVISM IN THE STUDY OF SCIENCE

However, th e conception o f science and o f its developm ent presented in outline so far is not free from its ow n intrinsic difficulties. Ones of the most important difficulties seems to be the problem of its relative character. For, if th e conception of a continuous, m erely accumulative development of knowledge is refuted and if scentific revolutions are treated as radical turning-points not only in the growth of content of knowledge but also in the conceptual' framework o f science, i. e. o f the research programmes laying down the questions and the criteria of accepting their solutions, then the problem arises as to w hat relationship does exist between the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary fram e­ work. Are they in any respect comparable, commensurable? Is a reconci­ liation betw een the representatives o f the old and the new “point of view ” (paradigms — to use K uhn’s term) possible or is the victory of a new one sim ply a result of biological ageing of the unrelenting ad­ herents of the old theory and the “conversion” of the young ones to the new theory?

In his criticism of K uhn’s view Lakatos writes: “My concern is rather that Kuhn, having recognized the failure both of justificationism and falsificationism in providing rational accounts of scientific growth, seems now to fall on irrationalism.

For Popper scientific change is rational or at least rationally re­ constructible and falls in the realm o f the logic of discovery. For Kuhn scientific change — from one 'paradigm’ to another — is a m ystical con­ version w hich falls totally w ithin the realm of the (social) psychology of discovery. Scientific change is a kind of religious change.

The clash between Popper and Kuhn is not about a mere technical point in epistemology. It concerns our central intellectual values, and has implications not only for theoretical physics but also for th e under­ developed social sciences and even for moral and political philosophy. It even in science there is no other w ay of judging a theory but by assessing the number, faith and vocal energy of its supporters, then this must be even more so in the social sciences: truth lies in power. Thus K uhn’s position would vindicate, no doubt, unintentionally, the basic political credo of contemporary religious maniacs (student revolu­ tionaries).” 33

I m yself am less eager to draw that type of “political conclusions”

54 S. A m sterd a m sk i

from anyone’s view s on the development of science, but it is not what I am now concerned with. Lakatos “sharpens” the view of his adversary, w hich considerably facilitates the polemic against it. Kuhn speaks ex ­ plicitly about the partial incommensurability o f the “view points” and emphasizes that the periods of crisis are in science periods of heated discussions, both theoretical and philosophical; thus it is unfair to impute him the thesis about cutting down all rational communication between scientists in tim e of crisis. His thesis on the partial incommensurability of paradigms refers, if I understand w ell, not to the situation during the crisis w hen no n ew paradigm exists yet, but after the crisis. But the mere fact of “sharpening” the view of Kuhn enables us to get a better view at the problem in question.

First, tw o questions have to be distinguished. Suppose for a w hile that Lakatos and Popper are right, that is, that revolutions, passages from one paradigm to another, can be fully explained in terms of m e­ thodology (e. g., that scientists choose the theory that is of higher ex ­ plicative power) and therefore any recourse to categories of psychology or sociology is dispensable. Then, Kuhn would be wrong, but w h y should his view be labelled as “irrational” ? Why should the idea that the choice between tw o concurrent competitive paradigms is codetermined by psychological and sociological factors be equivalent to professing irratio­ nalism? Can the role of these factors not be explained in rational terms? At any rate Kuhn does not say anything like that, and Lakatos does not attempt to prove it; incidentally, it cannot be proved at all for that would m ean no less than the disqualification of psychology and sociology as sciences. Kuhn suggests to take up rational scientific studies of that problem and to take into account the obtained results in conside­ rations on the developm ent of science. There is no irrationalism in that; Lakatos’ charge, at any rate in such a formulation, does not contain anything besides the scheme o f reasoning presented in section 10 before. Irrationalism is w hat does not agree w ith his, Lakatos’, conception of rational developm ent of scien ce.34

But there is another face to that coin. I pointed it out in the Post­ script to the Polish edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and Popper gave it an excellent wording: “I do amit that at any moment w e are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expecta­ tions; our past experiencies; our language. But w e are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: If w e try, w e can break out our framework at any time. Admittedly, w e shall find ourselves again in a framework, but it w ill be a better and roomier one; and w e can at any m oment break out of it again.

The central point is that a critical discussion and a comparison of the