Introduction . . . 15
I. Linguistic Phenomenology as the Proper Way to a Rational Weltanschauung . . . 21
Preliminaries . . . 21
Introduction: Weltanschauung and Weltanschauung discourse . . . 22
A note on the relationship “the Reality – knowledge” . . . 25
Some technical details . . . 27
Justifi cation of the linguistic-phenomenological approach to Weltanschauung . . . 28
Speaker’s knowledge of what she says . . . 33
Supplementary comments on the justifi cation of the linguistic-phenomenological approach . . . 37
An excursus . . . 40
A historical comment . . . 43
A critical comment on search for certainty: preliminaries . . . 45
Substantiation of the critique of scepticism and of search for certainty . . . 48
An additional argument against Radical Scepticism . . . 52
An additional note on cogito . . . 53
II. ‘Know that’ as the Central Relation Constituting the Reality . . . 55
The choice of the key concept . . . 55
A note on a (possible) controversy concerning the importance of the concept of knowledge . . . 58
Know, know that: preliminary observations; know that and know + Q . . . 60
Know that and know + NP . . . 62
Know that and other elements of sentences based on it . . . 64
Know that and know about _ that . . . 65
The full form of the functor ‘know that’ . . . 69
The functor ‘know that’ as a semantic prime: a general statement and its main arguments . . . 71
Certain special arguments for the primitive nature of ‘know that’ . . . 75
Primitiveness of ‘know that’: its behaviour in conditionals . . . 77
Primitiveness of ‘know that’: its relationship to ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’. The main statements . . . 79
Supplementary statements on the hierarchy: ‘know that’ − ‘falsity’ − ‘truth’ . . . 82
‘Knowledge that p’ is not “ability to use the fact that p as a reason in one’s acts” . . . . 86
The problem of “justifi cation of belief” in knowledge . . . 90
Provability of the primitive character of ‘know that’ . . . 93
Instantiation of ‘know that’ and the phenomenon of «iteration of ‘know that’» or of ‘knowing that someone knows that such and such’ . . . 98
A note on the relationship between ‘knowing that’ and ‘experience’ . . . 100
Iteration of ‘know that’ and “accessibility of other minds” . . . 102
Non-coreferentiality in (immediate) iteration of ‘know that’ and single self-embedding of know that with one subject: preliminaries . . . 104
Knowledge of one’s ignorance and ignorance of one’s ignorance . . . 108
Non-coreferentiality in (immediate) iteration of ‘know that’ and single self-embedding of know that with one subject: a solution . . . 110
Iteration of ‘know that’ and non-uniqueness of subjects of states of ‘knowing that’ . . . 115
A summary of the basic properties of ‘know that’ . . . 118
A note on “universals” and “particulars” . . . 122
Supplementary comments on the basic properties of ‘know that’: “aboutness” . . . 124
Supplementary comments on the basic properties of ‘know that’: contrast . . . 125
An application of the distinction a does not know that vs. it is not the case that a knows that . . . 128
An additional comment on contrast . . . 131
Supplementary comments on the basic properties of ‘know that’: infi nity and fi niteness aspects of knowledge . . . 132
‘Know that’ and logical constants . . . 136
III. Necessary Existence of Referents of the Prime ‘know that’ and Its Relationship to Other Concepts . . . 140
The appearance of the relation ‘know that’ in all sentences: preliminary observations; the “synthetic a priori” . . . 140
Some reservations . . . 143
An excursus on sentences with the prefi x for all I know / as far as I know . . . 145
Necessary existence of the relation ‘know that’: some further clues . . . 147
The appearance of the relation ‘know that’ in all sentences: proof [ϕ ⇒ ∃x Kϕx] . . . . 153
The appearance of the relation ‘know that’ in all sentences: proofs associated with Fitch’s paradox, or the Paradox of Knowability. Preliminaries . . . 154
On what is knowable being known. The main statement . . . 157
On what is knowable being known. Supplementary remarks . . . 161
Substantiation of the reduction of ‘existence’ to ‘know that’: the effect of coreferential iteration of ‘know that’ . . . 163
Necessary existence of the relation ‘know that’: necessary existence of true sentences 165
An excursus on the Liar Paradox . . . 169
Necessary existence of the relation ‘know that’: proofs of the impossibility of ‘no one knows anything’ . . . 171
Knowledge and existence; their relationship to necessity . . . 174
An additional note on necessity of existence . . . 178
Necessity: its nature and its varieties . . . 181
Knowledge and speech: the non-necessary nature of language and speech . . . 185
Knowledge, speech, existence: supplementary remarks . . . 187
A note on ‘feel’ as a variety of ‘know that’ . . . 191
IV. Multiplicity Based on the Relations ‘know that’ and ‘did’ as Constitutive for the Reality. Subjects and Attributes . . . 194
Introduction . . . 194
Multiplicity of epistemic subjects . . . 195
Conclusion . . . 199
The problem of differentiation of epistemic subjects . . . 200
Multiplicity of attributes: ‘know that’, ‘did’ . . . 202
A note on the relationship between ‘did’ and ‘causation’ . . . 204
‘Did’ and ‘know that’ in their mutual relationship: preliminaries . . . 206
Knowledge as “gift” . . . 210
Preliminaries for a discussion of ‘did’: problems of proportion . . . 212
Preliminaries for a discussion of ‘did’: implications of proportions; hierarchy of states of affairs . . . 215
Some linguistic clues for “multiplicity of subjects” and “hierarchy of states of affairs” . . . 218
Irreducibility of ‘did’, or its nature of a primitive concept . . . 221
Irreducibility of ‘did’: some further tests . . . 224
Remarks on irreducibility of ‘did’ continued. Its radically non-spatial nature . . . 225
Some further properties of ‘did’ . . . 229
A note on the structure of exponents of ‘did’ . . . 231
The importance of the category of action for the multiplicity aspect of the Reality . . . 233
The constitutive role of ‘did’ in the realisation of multiplicity of epistemic subjects and objects. Preliminaries . . . 236
An account of proper names. Guidelines . . . 240
An account of agentive proper names. Fundamentals . . . 242
An account of agentive proper names continued: some details of non-rhematisability of proper names . . . 246
An additional note on the fundamentals of the adopted account of proper names . . . 248
The formula for proper names of animate entities . . . 250
Proper names and their shapes . . . 253
Residual remarks on proper names and their shapes . . . 257
Additional remarks on agentive proper names and on their present analysis . . . 260
On some ramifi cations of usage in the fi eld of agentive proper names . . . 264
Proper names and personal identity . . . 266
Closing statements on agentive proper names . . . 271
Proper names of animate and inanimate objects . . . 272
The formula for proper names of inanimate objects; residual comments on their category . . . 274
A note on ascriptive onomastic nomenclature . . . 276
V. Multiplicity Based on the Relations ‘know that’ and ‘did’ as Constitutive for the Reality. Inanimate Objects . . . 279
Introduction . . . 279
The fundamental pronouns: ‘someone’, ‘something’. Dualism vs. monism . . . 281
More on the properties of the pronouns ‘someone’, ‘something’ . . . 284
The contradistinction of ‘someone’ : ‘something’ as a genuine semantic phenomenon; its irreducibility to infl ectional facts . . . 287
Pluralism within the domain of inanimate objects: general remarks . . . 291
Some conceptual details concerning multiplicity of inanimate objects . . . 293
Main spatial relations of inanimate objects. Contact, distance . . . 296
Main spatial relations of inanimate objects. Movement . . . 299
Part - whole relation . . . 301
VI. A Summarising Outline of the Basic Structure of the Reality. Theism . . . 305
The schema of the basic structure of the Reality . . . 305
A preliminary statement of theism . . . 308
Theism: a note on the relevant arguments and counterarguments . . . 310
Theism as an analytic claim based on the properties of ‘know that’ . . . 312
An excursus on the so-called ontological theistic argument . . . 315
A closing statement on the ontological argument . . . 319
Impossibility of the whole of knowledge being distributed among knowers/ignorants . 321 A note on states of affairs that are problematic objects of anyone’s knowledge. Counterfactuals . . . 324
A global account of conditionals . . . 326
Subjunctive conditionals, or counterfactuals, vs. indicative conditionals . . . 330
A supplementary note on indicative conditionals . . . 334
Deductions concerning the solution of the alternative of theism and atheism as an analytic support for the theistic claim: preliminaries . . . 337
A deduction concerning the alternative of theism and atheism as allegedly having no known solution . . . 339
A deduction concerning the alternative of theism and atheism as allegedly having the atheistic solution . . . 341
Remarks on the controversy between atheism and theism continued. The issue of the Law of Excluded Middle. Conclusion . . . 343
Analysis of ‘believe in’ as involving the idea of the Omniscient Being . . . 347
VII. Selected Theological Issues . . . 351
God and the schema of the basic structure of the Reality . . . 351
God and the multiplicity / proportion requirement . . . 355
Substantiation of the multiplicity of God’s patients continued . . . 356
The necessary multiplicity of universes; God’s creativity . . . 360
The problem of the Trinity. The Pythagorean τετρακτύς . . . 362
Immortality of mortals . . . 367
Theism as a “way of paradox” . . . 369
A comment on alternatives to theism . . . 371
The problem of “theodicy” . . . 376
VIII. Language . . . 381
Introduction . . . 381
“Mapping” as the essence of language . . . 383
The role of knowledge in linguistic epistemic mapping . . . 386
In search for suffi cient conditions for linguistic mapping . . . 389
Ascriptions and propositional functions as epistemic objects . . . 390
A note on certain conjectures concerning the distinctive features of language . . . 393
Representation of ignorance . . . 396
Additional remarks on how ignorance is represented . . . 399
The essence of language and differentiation of expressions . . . 401
Naturalistic and non-naturalistic, or supernaturalistic, interpretations of language. Introduction . . . 402
The problem of emergence of language . . . 405
Creationism: introduction . . . 407
Creationism: lack of a natural suffi cient condition of language . . . 410
Creationism: lack of a natural suffi cient condition of language, continued . . . 413
Creationism: supplementary remarks . . . 416
A caveat on compositionality . . . 418
IX. The Concept ‘say that’ . . . 423
Introduction . . . 423
‘Saying that’ and cognate structures: preliminaries . . . 427
‘Saying:_’ in its contradistinction to ‘saying that’ . . . 429
More on reports of non-declarative utterances; ‘letting know’ . . . 430
The nature of ‘say that’: general statements . . . 433
Objectivity of situations qualifying for the status of ‘saying that’ . . . 437
Notes on objectivity of situations qualifying for the status of ‘saying that’ continued: referents of ‘say that’, or about-objects in say (about) ... that ... . . . 439
The defi nition of ‘say that’ [(DIXIT)] . . . 444
Substantive comments on the defi nition of ‘say that’ . . . 447
An auxiliary gloss on the defi nition of ‘say that’ . . . 451
Why is it necessary to accept the existence of the separate and irreducible functors of ‘saying’: the functors ‘say that’ and ‘say: _’? Preliminaries . . . 452
Absence of an operation transforming the quotative functor into ‘say that’. Inadmissibility of say as a semantic primitive . . . 454
Absence of an operation transforming‘say that’ into the quotative functor . . . 455
Residual comments on possible operations affecting say and on non-primitiveness of say . . . 459
Central consequences of (DIXIT). Prospects of a substantiation of the defi nition . . . 460
The fi rst central consequence of (DIXIT): “(a said that p) → (p ∨ ~ p)” . . . 461
The second central consequence of (DIXIT): “no saying without another saying” . . . 464
The central kind of metautterances; saying that p as a consequence of one’s saying that one says that p . . . 467
‘Saying that’ and ‘doing’ . . . 469
‘Saying that’ and the level of informedness of the interlocutors. General facts . . . 473
‘Saying that’ and the level of informedness of the interlocutors. Addressee’s knowledge or ignorance of the truth / falsity of the ascriptions used . . . 478
‘Saying that’ and addressee’s possible antecedent knowledge . . . 480
The problem of so called “inner speech”, or soliloquy. Introduction . . . 483
A note on misconceptions concerning “inner speech” and their source . . . 487
Problematic aspects of the concept of “inner speech” . . . 489
A positive general interpretation of “inner speech” . . . 494
The main expressions representing varieties of “inner speech” . . . 497
Residual remarks on the main kinds of “inner speach” . . . 500
Other selected expressions representing varieties of “inner speech” . . . 502
“Inner speech”: conclusion . . . 505
X. Language, Logic, Valuation. Preliminaries . . . 507
Introduction . . . 507
Relativism and absolutism . . . 509
Aspects of valuation to be considered . . . 512
XI. Moral valuation . . . 514
The main concepts relevant to morality . . . 514
The concept ‘want’ . . . 517
The object of necessary universal disapproval . . . 520
Prosoponomy . . . 523
Prosoponomy and morality at large . . . 526
On a certain kind of logically motivated, i.e. universal, evaluative hierarchy in morality . . . 529
More on logical aspects of moral choices . . . 534
Closing remarks on Kant . . . 537
On the proper ontological treatment of moral valuation . . . 540
A remark on the origin of morality . . . 541
A note on the concepts ‘good’, ‘bad’ . . . 543
A summarising statement . . . 546
XII. Aesthetic valuation . . . 547
Preliminaries . . . 547
Features targeted in aesthetic judgements: introduction . . . 550
Features targeted in aesthetic judgements: continued . . . 552
Ontological basis of aesthetic valuation: the key role of negentropy . . . 554
Relationship between the ontological basis of aesthetic phenomena and contingent circumstances . . . 557
Aesthetic valuation and the pleasant . . . 560
Aesthetic valuation and the good . . . 562
More on the interface between moral / practical and aesthetic valuation . . . 566
The problem of mutual embeddings of aesthetic and non-aesthetic values . . . 569
Relativistic aspects of aesthetic valuation . . . 572
XIII. Knowledge in Valuation. Valuation of Knowledge . . . 576
Evaluative knowledge and its relation to knowledge as an epistemic object . . . 576
Aspects of immunity of knowledge to evaluation: linguistic clues . . . 578
Valuation of knowledge and non-factive propositional attitudes . . . 581
Reservations . . . 583
Concluding remarks . . . 584
Bibliography . . . 589
Appendix. The author’s publications relevant to the scope of the book . . . 601
Name Index . . . 608
