A. J. Kukuła, Chances for the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy (2010-2020),
"Roczniki Nauk Społecznych"["Annals of Social Sciences", ISSN 0137-4176], T. 9(45):
2017, vol. 3, pp. 19-38.
Artur Jan Kukuła, Ph.D.
Institute of Political Sciences and International Affairs The John Paul Catholic University of Lublin
Chances for the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy (2010-2020)
Introduction
The failure of the Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010) and problems caused by the global financial and economic crisis in 2007-2010 forced the European Union (EU) to review its previous development policy and to prepare another development strategy responding to new challenges faced by the Community and the economies of its Member States. A new strategy for socio-economic development, Europe 2020 (Europe 2020) was prepared and launched as a result of the actions taken by the EU. Implemented since 2010, Europe 2020 refers in many places to LS, the failure of which shattered for some time the hopes to build a highly innovative and competitive economy in the EU that could compete with the economies of the most developed countries in the world. The failure of LS forced EU decision-makers to reformulate the Community’s development goals and to improve the mechanisms for their attainment.
Especially during the initial years of Europe 2020 strategy implementation its pursuit fell on the exceptionally unfavourable time of strong impact of the global financial crisis and economic problems caused by it in many countries of the world, including the EU Member States. They found themselves in conditions extremely unfavourable for the implementation of a new and ambitious development strategy. Europe 2020 has been pursued for seven years now. This is a long enough period to look at the effects of its implementation and to estimate the chances of the overall implementation of this development plan in the time horizon envisaged for it. Setting the directions of EU development and influencing the implementation of the most important Community policies regarding cohesion, energy and environmental protection, Europe 2020 is of great importance for the development and future of the
Community. The strategy also tests the organisational and management capabilities of the EU and the solidarity of its member countries. The EU urgently needs the success connected with the implementation of Europe 2020, not only for economic reasons, but also for political and image reasons, given the above mentioned failure of LS pursued with miserable effects in the previous decade and the problems of the functioning of the euro area and the common European currency.
The aim of this study is to present selected effects of the current implementation of Europe 2020 development strategy which is of key importance for the development of the EU, as well as the prospects for its implementation in the time horizon provided for it. The basis for the study were documents and data collected by EU institutions and national institutions pertaining to the Community’s economic policy, the implementation of the EU development strategies until now (LS, Europe 2020), as well as studies related to the European and economic issues outlined above. The research methods of a descriptive, statistical and comparative analysis were used in the work.
1. Conditions of the implementation of Europe 2020
Europe 2020 is the subject of numerous, both informative and scientific studies, and therefore, taking into account the limited volume of the study, it cannot be presented exhaustively. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth1, referred to as the Europe 2020 strategy, was presented by the European Commission (EC) on 3 March 2010. In the intention of the EC it was to build solid foundations for the development of the EU. Three priorities2 related to smart growth, sustainable growth and inclusive growth are the foundation of development policy contained in Europe 2020.3 These priorities correspond to five headline targets assumed in Europe 2020 and connected with: employment4, research and development5, climate and energy6, education7 and social inclusion8, the attainment of which
1See Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Brussels, 3.3.2010, COM (2010);
http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/1_PL_ACT_part1_v1.pdf (accessed 1.04.2017).
2See Europe 2020.
3See Europe 2020.
4Achieving the employment rate in the EU of people aged 20-64 at the level of min. 75% by increasing the employment of young people, the elderly and low-skilled workers and the effective integration of legal immigrants.
5Improving the conditions for conducting research and development activity aimed at achieving a total level of public and private investment in this sector at the level of 3% of Community GDP.
6Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, while increasing the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption to 20% and increasing the energy efficiency of the economy by 20%.
7Raising the education level of EU citizens, esp. by reducing the percentage of early school leavers to below 10%, and by increasing proportion of people aged 30-34 with a tertiary degree to at least 40%.
is supported in the EU Member States by seven flagship initiatives.9 The targets related to the achievement of the overarching objectives of Europe 2020 were established with the participation of the EC and individual Member States. The idea was to facilitate individual EU countries the effective, adapted to their capabilities implementation of the strategy.10 Additional support in the implementation of Europe 2020 have been national strategies for action in areas related to the most important Community policies, regarding the sustainability of public finances, optimising support for research and development (R&D) and innovation, better use of resources, as well as decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, reducing unemployment, promoting employment quality or social inclusion and combating poverty.11
Europe 2020 is, as it was in the case of LS, a complicated pro-development action plan addressed to the EU and its Member States, covering various areas of their functioning. When the implementation of LS was launched in 2000, the Community was in an incomparably better macroeconomic situation than it was at the start of Europe 2020 in 2010.12 The differences concerned not only the value of EU GDP to the disadvantage of 2010, but above all the situation on financial markets and economic trends which, with the outbreak of the global financial crisis, have radically changed the conditions for the functioning of European economies and ruined the chances for their spectacular development after 2007. The effects of the global financial and economic crisis are still felt today by the economies and societies of European countries. Thus, the implementation of Europe 2020 fell on a time unfavourable to costly organisational and modernisation activities, placing the Community’s managing bodies and the authorities of the EU Member States in a difficult situation, which they have been trying to handle with better or worse results in various areas covered by Europe 2020 provisions.
8 Supporting so-called social inclusion by reducing poverty and lifting out of it and from the condition of social exclusion of at least 20 million EU citizens.
9The initiatives: Innovation Union, Youth on the move, A digital agenda for Europe, Resource efficient Europe, An industrial policy for the globalisation era, An agenda for new skills and jobs and European platform against poverty, see National Reform Programme – Europe 2020. Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Warszawa 2010; http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/1_PL_ACT_part1_v1.pdf (accessed 1.04.2017).
10 See data on national targets for achieving the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, Europe 2020 targets (national targets), European Commission; http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/targets_en.pdf (accessed 10.04.2017).
11 In comparison with LS their number was reduced from 24 to 10, see Europe 2020. Integrated guidelines for the economic and employment Policies of the Member States, part I and II, Brussels, 27.4.2010 SEC(2010) 488 final {COM (2010) 193 final}; http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/brochure_integrated_guidelines.pdf (accessed 5.03.2017).
12 It is illustrated, for example, by the level of Community GDP in 2000-2010, see data of the statistical office of the European Union – Eurostat concerning Community GDP in the indicated period, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat.
The effective implementation of a development strategy envisaged for a group of states requires full involvement of all its members and absolute consistency in undertaken activities. As noted, one of the main reasons for the LS failure was the insufficient and uneven involvement of all EU Member States in its implementation.13 In the case of the Europe 2020 we are interested in, we can observe a similar situation, despite the Member States’
declarations of support for the assumptions and objectives of the strategy and in spite of taking legal and organisational actions aimed at their implementation.14 The EU Member States’ insufficient support for the research and development sphere, which is crucial not only for Europe 2020, but generally for the development and future of the Community, can serve as an example.15
Europe 2020 facilitated the adaptation of its objectives to the potential and development opportunities of individual EU Member States. It was a realistic assumption, seeming to be the best approach when implementing the strategy at the level of individual Member States, very diverse in terms of socio-economic development, but in practice it was a permission to relax the discipline in achieving the ambitious EU development goals set down in Europe 2020. As some authors have noted, “we are dealing here with a soft way of influencing (...), greater importance is attached to the objective economic and financial capabilities of each country, which creates a significant incentive for them to act, however (...) this does not eliminate the problem of the difficulty in meeting the set EU objectives at the national level”.16 In some countries the conditions created by the global financial crisis and the resulting economic problems in the EU Member States have justified the resignation from determination in the pursuit of modernisation of the Community and the fight for its greater innovativeness and competitiveness. The imposition on the EU Member States of budget spending discipline and debt control and reduction resulting from the Stability and Growth Pact (1997) and the Fiscal Pact introduced in 2013 has led to the situation in which the
13 See Delivering Lisbon. Reforms for the Enlarged Union, COM (2004) 29 final, Brussels, 20.02 2004; Cf. also Facing the Challenge. The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment, Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, November 2004; https://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/archive/fp6-evidence- base/evaluation_studies_and_reports/evaluation_studies_and_reports_2004/the_lisbon_strategy_for_growth_and _employment__report_from_the_high_level_group.pdf (accessed 3.04.2017).
14 One of the areas of concern in some countries, e.g. in Poland are stringent environmental standards for economic development (e.g. limiting emissions of industry and power industry), expensive and very difficult to achieve for technologically less developed and less affluent countries.
15 The adopted targets for financing of the R&D sphere are targets which do not allow for a major return that might result in a significant increase in the innovativeness of the EU and its economy in the near future, Cf.
Commission Report Highlights Slow Progress on Lisbon Strategy, EurActiv;
http://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/commission-report-highlights-slow-progress-on-lisbon- strategy/ (accessed 23.03.2017).
16 J. Ząbkowicz, Strategia Europa 2020 -Ambitna, ale czy wykonalna?, "Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach", No. 269(2016), p. 253.
financial, budget interest of the Member States have become a priority, especially in the face of problems generated by the long-term financial and economic crisis, while pushing pro- development activities to the background, which has further dissuaded some of the Member States of the Community from investing in ambitious development plans set down in Europe 2020. This mobilizes EU Members first of all to take care of their own finances and to seek funds for budget implementation and debt service.
We cannot forget that the EU is a collection of countries which are very diverse in terms of their economic and technological potential, as well as in terms of their socio- economic development. These differences have been augmented by the negligence connected with the previously implemented LS and Community development programmes, as a result of which “due to basing – Europe 2020, the author’s annotation – on soft instruments, in the current crisis situation the Union seems unsteerable. It can achieve successes, but only partial ones and only in some countries”.17 It is clearly visible on the example of the implementation of Europe 2020. The strategy implemented with difficulty seems to fit more multi-speed Europe, currently openly proposed by the leaders of the EU, than the coherent EU working in the same directions from a few years ago, when the implementation of the current development strategy started. Multi-speed Europe is a disastrous proposal of European leaders, which – hopefully – will not become the official “development strategy” of the Community in the future. It will not solve fundamental problems of the EU as a whole, and will not remove imperfections and barriers to the integration process in Europe. When it comes to Europe 2020 that interests us, it can lead not only to its spectacular failure, but it can initiate a process of slow economic and political disintegration of the Community.
2. Analysis of selected indicators of Europe 2020 realisation
Considering the chances of the successful implementation of Europe 2020 should be directly connected with the analysis of the indicators of its current implementation. The author of the study has chosen three, in his opinion basic, indicators of the implementation of Europe 2020 referring to the postulates set in the document – raising the employment rate of people aged 20-64, an increase in the number of people with higher education in the 30-34 age group and an increase in expenditure on research and development activities in the EU Member States during the period of the strategy implementation to date, more precisely in 2010-2016 for which statistical data are available.
17 Idem, ibidem, p. 254.
In the case of the first indicator related to increasing the employment rate of people aged 20-64, the horizontal objective of the strategy is to increase employment in all EU Member States and reach the 75% employment rate at the Community level. At present18 the highest level of employment in the age range we are interested in is recorded in Sweden (80.5%), with a gradual improvement in the situation observed since the beginning of the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy. In the case of other countries leading in employment, such as Germany (78%), the United Kingdom (76.8), Denmark (76.5%), Estonia (76.5%) and the Netherlands (76.4%), only in the last of these countries a slight breakdown in the upward trend (↓0,4%), which seems to be incidental, momentary, can be observed in the years 2010-2014. Apart from the above-mentioned ranking leaders who can boast of a high level of employment, the situation in individual EU Member States is very varied in this respect, i.e. from the lowest employment rate of 54.9% in Greece, through 60.5% in Italy, 67.8% in Poland, 74.8% in the Czech Republic, to the already mentioned countries with the highest employment rates reaching 80% of people in the age range we are interested in.
When it comes to the analysed employment rate, it is important to note the growth and decline trends that can be observed in individual EU Member States in the period of interest (2010-2015). The trends and their diversity do not give us an opportunity for optimism. They stem to a great extent from the deterioration of the economic situation and the situation on domestic labour markets resulting from the impact of the global financial and economic crisis after 2007. Analysing statistical data in the period of interest, we note that the percentage of employed people in the 20-64 age bracket in many countries decreased since the start of the implementation of Europe 2020, i.e. since 2010. In the total number of 28 EU Member States, 10 of them recorded a decline in employment in the years 2010-2015. These declines are varied. From small ones, as in the case of Belgium (down from 67.6 to 67.2% over 5 years), through percentage declines, as in the case of Croatia (down from 62.1 to 60.5%), to a few and even a dozen percent declines, as exemplified by Greece (down from 63.8 to 54.9%, that is by 8,9%) and Cyprus (down from 75.0 to 67.9%, or 22.9%).19 Achieving the targets set in
18 Eurostat data for 2015.
19 As regards Greece, in its current economic, financial and social situation it can be regarded as a bankrupt state funded by other states, including EU countries, due to political reasons, as well as in order to minimise the losses of its creditors and investors. Given the current political crisis in the EU, constant uncertainty about the future of the Euro zone and the disastrous financial and social consequences of the migration problem, there is absolutely no chance for the Greek economic situation, including the situation on the labour market, and the state of its public finances to improve. There is also no chance for this state to achieve the goals of Europe 2020 related to, among others, the labour market or R&D funding. According to Eurostat data, the lowest employment rate in the
individual EU Member States for the level of employment of people in the age range we are interested in will be an extremely difficult task considering the economic and social problems of the EU Member States. In view of the above, it seems unlikely that in the 2020 perspective it will be possible to achieve in the EU the employment rate of persons aged 20-64 at the level not less than 75%, as set in Europe 2020.
Table 1. Employment of people aged 20-64 in European Union countries during the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy, 2010-2015 (% of the population)
Sn. UE State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 ↑/↓
1 Austria 73.9 74.2 74.4 74.6 74.2 74.3 ↑0.4%
2. Belgium 67.6 67.3 67.2 67.2 67.3 67.2 ↓0.4%
3. Bulgaria 64.7(b) 62.9(b) 63.0 63.5 65.1 67.1 ↑2.4%
4. Croatia 62.1 59.8 58.1 57.2 59.2 60.5 ↓1.6%
5. Cyprus 75.0 73.4 70.2 67.2 67.6 67.9 ↓7.1%
6. Czech Republic
70.4 70.9(b) 71.5 72.5 73.5 74.8 ↑4.4%
7. Denmark 75.8 75.7 75.4 75.6 75.9 76.5 ↑0.7%
8. Estonia 66.8 70.6 72.2 73.3 74.3 76.5 ↑9.7%
9. Finland 73.0 73.8 74.0 73.3 73.1 72.9 ↓0.1%
10. France * * * * 69.3 69.5 ↑
11. Greece 63.8 59.6 55 52.9 53.3 54.9 ↓8.9%
12. Spain 62.8 62.0 59.6 58.6 59.9 62.0 ↓0.8%
13. Netherlands 76.8(b) 76.4(b) 76.6 75.9 75.4 76.4 ↓0.4%
14. Ireland 64.6 63.8 63.7 65.5 67.0 68.7 ↑4.1%
15. Lithuania 64.3 66.9 68.5 69.9 71.8 73.3 ↑9%
16. Luxembourg 70.7 70.1 71.4 71.1 72.1 70.9(b) ↑0.2%
17. Latvia 64.3 66.3 68.1 69.7 70.7 72.5 ↑8.2%
18. Malta 60.1 61.6 63.1 64.8 66.4 67.8 ↑0.4%
19. Germany 75.0(b) 76.5(b) 76.9 77.3 77.7 78.1 ↓0.4%
20. Poland 64.3(b) 64.5 64.7 64.9 66.5 67.8 ↑2.4%
21. Portugal 70.3 68.8(b) 66.3 65.4 67.6 69.1 ↓1.6%
22. Romania 64.8(b) 63.8 64.8 64.7 65.7 66.0 ↓7.1%
23. Slovakia 64.6 65.0(b) 65.1 65.0 65.9 67.7 ↑4.4%
24. Slovenia 70.3 68.4 68.3 67.2 67.7 69.1 ↑0.7%
25. Sweden 78.1 79.4 79.4 79.8 80.0 80.5 ↑9.7%
26. Hungary 59.9 60.4 61.6 63.0 66.7 68.9 ↓0.1%
27. Great Britain 73.5 73.5 74.1 74.8 76.2 76.8 ↑
28. Italy 61.0 61.0 60.9 59.7 59.9 60.5 ↓8.9%
- UE 27 68.6 68.6 68.5 68.5 69.3 70.1 ↓0.8%
20-64 age group is recorded in Greece. In 2015, it fluctuated around 54.9%, see statistical data provided by the EC; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Employment_statistics (accessed 10.03.2017).
- UE 28 68.6 68.6 68.4 68.4 69.2 70.1 ↓0.4%
Source: Own study on the basis of Eurostat data (accessed 21.02.2017:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=t2020_10&plugin=1)
* lack of data; b-break in time series;↑-increase; ↓-decrease
As for the index related to expenditures on research and development activity, constituting one of the foundations of building a modern and innovative economy of the Community assumed in Europe 2020, statistics show unfavourable diversification of the level of this financing in the EU Member States. The achievement of the horizontal objective of the strategy in terms of financing the research and development (R&D) sphere in the EU set at 3% of Community GDP depends directly on the improvement of financing of this sphere in individual Member States of the Community. The situation in the EU in this respect is not promising and shows strengthening of a certain negative trend, i.e. a high level of funding for research and development in some countries, the most developed countries of the Community, and disregard for R&D financing in remaining EU Member States. It is clearly reflected in statistical data and studies.
At present, the highest level of R&D funding is in Sweden (3.26% of GDP), Denmark (3.03% of GDP) and Germany (2.87% of GDP). At the other extreme there are countries such as Cyprus (0.46% of GDP), Latvia (0.63% of GDP) and Bulgaria (0.96% of GDP). As you can see the differences between the indicated countries within the EU 28 are considerable!
This situation is highly unfavourable for the economic and technological development of individual Member States as well as the entire Community and its cohesion. In the case of this Europe 2020 implementation indicator, the related trends in individual countries are also important. Starting from 2010 we can observe a gradual increase in financing of the research and development sphere in most EU Member States. This is a positive fact, but it should be noted that these increases in individual countries are usually small and it can be said insufficient to change the situation in the field of interest either in individual countries or in the whole Community. There are, of course, exceptions, some countries set a good example and in recent years, during the implementation of Europe 2020, they were trying to significantly increase R&D funding (2010-2015). We should point here first of all to Denmark (increase by ↑0.9% of GDP), Finland (↑0.83%), Estonia (↑0.8%) and the Czech Republic (0.61%). In the case of most countries, the above-mentioned increases in financing of the research and development sphere in the years of Europe 2020 implementation were symbolic, as in the case of, for example, France (↑0.05%), Romania (↑0.04%) or Sweden
(↑0.04%, although this country is a leader in the EU when it comes to financing R&D (3.26%).
Desiring to fundamentally improve innovativeness, and thus the competitiveness of the EU and its economy, the EU decided to increase R&D funding in Europe 2020, raising the level of expenditure in this field to 3% of Community GDP. In the case of individual Member States individually set targets in this area were a similar challenge as for the entire EU, for which the R&D financing ratio in the first five years of the Europe 2020 strategy implementation increased by only 0.1% of EU GDP (in 2015 it amounted to 2.03% in the EU). Everything points to the fact that the Community will have a serious problem with achieving by 2020 a 3% target for financing the R&D sphere which is crucial for the development of a modern, knowledge-based economy. In view of the above, in the face of economic, social and political problems in the EU, the achievement of the Community indicator of R&D financing at the level of 3% of EU GDP, as set in Europe 2020, seems unlikely in the next few years. However, in the current conditions shaped by globalisation, there is no chance for the EU to achieve economic success on a global scale and to become a leader in innovation and competitiveness without a high level of R&D funding.
Table 2. Expenditure on research and development activity in European Union countries during the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy, 2010-2015 (% of GDP)
Sn. UE State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 ↑/↓
1 Austria 2.74 (e) 2.68 2.93(e) 2.97 3.06 (e) 3.07 (ep) ↑0.33%
2. Belgium 2.05 2.16 2.36 2.44 2.46(e) 2.45(p) ↑0.4
3. Bulgaria 0.56 0.53 0.6 0.63 0.79 0.96(p) ↑0.4%
4. Croatia 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.85 ↑0.11%
5. Cyprus 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.46(p) ↑0.01%
6. Czech Republic
1.34 1.56 1.78 1.9 1.97 1.95(p) ↑0.61%
7. Denmark 2.94 2.97 3.0 3.01 3.02 3.03(e) ↑0.9%
8. Estonia 1.58 2.31 2.12 1.73 1.45 1.5(p) ↓0.8%
9. Finland 3.73 3.64 3.42 3.29 3.17 2.9 ↓0.83%
10. France 2.18 (b) 2.19 2.23 2.24 2.24 2.23(p) ↑0.05%
11. Greece 0.6 0.67 0.7 0.81 0.84 0.96 ↑0.36%
12. Spain 1.35 1.33 1.29 1.27 1.24 1.22 ↓0.13%
13. Netherlands 1.72 1.9 (b) 1.94(b) 1.95 2 2.01(p) ↑0.29%
14. Ireland 1.6(e) 1.54(e) 1.56(e) 1.56(e) 1.51(e) * ↓0.09%
15. Lithuania 0.78 0.9 0.89 0.95 1.03 1.04(p) ↑0.26%
16. Luxembourg 1.51 1.47 1.28 (b) 1.31 1.28 1.31(p) ↓0.2%
17. Latvia 0.61 0.7 0.67 0.61 0.69 0.63(p) ↑0.02%
18. Malta 0.62 0.67 0.83 0.77 0.75 0.77(p) ↑0.15%
19. Germany 2.71 2.8 2.87 2.82 2.89 2.87(ep) ↑0.16%
20. Poland 0.72 0.75 0.88 0.87 0.94 1 ↑0.28%
21. Portugal 1.53 1.46 1.38 1.33 1.29 1.28(p) ↓0.25%
22. Romania 0.45 0.49(b) 0.48 0.39 0.38 0.49 ↑0.04%
23. Slovakia 0.62 0.66 0.80 0.82 0.88 1.18 ↑0.56%
24. Slovenia 2.06 2.42(b) 2.58 2.6 2.38 2.21(p) ↑0.15%
25. Sweden 3.22(e) 3.25 3.28(e) 3.31(e) 3.15(e) 3.26(p) ↑0.04%
26. Hungary 1.15 1.19 1.27 1.39 1.36 1.38 ↑0.23%
27. Great Britain 1.68(e) 1.68(b) 1.61(e) 1.66 1.68(e) 1.7(ep) ↑0.02%
28. Italy 1.22 1.21 1.27 1.31 1.38(e) 1.33(p) ↑0.11%
- UE 28 1.93 1.97 2.01 2.03 2.04 2.03 ↑0.1%
Source: Own study on the basis of Eurostat data (accessed 21.02.2017:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec320&plugin=1)
* lack of data; e-estimated; p -provisional; b-break in time series; d-definition differs (see metadata);
↑- increase; ↓- decrease
The third of the analysed indicators of Europe 2020 implementation is the indicator referring to people with higher education in the 30-34 age group in the EU Member States. In this case the EU the leaders are: Luxembourg (54.1%), Cyprus (53.8%), Ireland (52.7%) and Sweden (50.8%). The lowest level of people with higher education in the age group we are interested in is recorded in Romania (25.5%), Italy (26.3%), Malta (29.8%) and Slovakia (30.5%).20 In 2010-2016 an increase in this ratio could be observed in the vast majority of EU countries, with the exception of Finland (↓0.1%) and Spain (↓1,8%). In general, the increases in this indicator were very varied, from small ones, as was the case of, for example, Belgium (↑0.2%) or France (0.8%), to big ones, as in the case of Austria (↑16,3%) or Lithuania (↑14,5%). The attainment of the set-in-Europe 2020 rate of people aged 30-34 with higher education at the level of at least 40% seems achievable given statistical data and related trends in individual EU Member States in 2010-2016, although it can be difficult due to certain threats occurring here that may ultimately hinder the achievement of the Europe 2020 target.
They result from the fact that improving the level of education of society is a process that requires consistent and costly state policy, which in turn requires time and produces results in a longer time perspective, which we do not have given the time horizon of the strategy, i.e.
2020. Apart from that, as shown by statistical data, even in developed European countries, the percentage of people with higher education in the age group we are interested in may be insufficient and may have a limiting effect on the development of the country and its economy. In many countries such a situation can be observed for a long time, which does not hold for the future. Italy may be an example, a country that is difficult to compare to other developed European countries when it comes to the level of education of citizens in the age range we are interested in (only 26.3%, in comparison with, for example, Sweden: 50.8% or Great Britain: 47.9%). For all of these reasons, the achievement by the EU of the at least 40%
20 In Poland 44.3%.
level of people aged 30-34 with higher education within the next few years may turn out to be difficult.
Table 3. People aged 30-34 with higher education in the EU Member States during the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy, 2010-2016
Sn. UE State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 ↑/↓
1 Austria 23.4 23.6 26.1 27.1 40 (b) 38.7 39.7 (p) ↑16.3%
2. Belgium 44.4 42.6 43.9 42.7 43.8 (b) 42.7 44.6 (p) ↑0.2%
3. Bulgaria 28 (b) 27.3 26.9 29.4 30.9 (b) 32.1 33.4 (p) ↑5.4%
4. Croatia 24.5 (b) 23.9 23.1 25.6 32.2 (b) 30.9 30.5 (p) ↑6%
5. Cyprus 45.3 46.2 49.9 47.8 52.5 (b) 54.5 53.8 (p) ↑8.5%
6. Czech Republic
20.4 23.7 (b) 25.6 26.7 28.2 (b) 30.1 31.9 (p) ↑11.5%
7. Denmark 41.2 41.2 43 43.4 44.9 (b) 47.6 47.9 (bp) ↑6.7%
8. Estonia 40.2 40.2 39.5 42.5 43.2 (b) 45.3 46 (p) ↑5.8%
9. Finland 45.7 46 45.8 45.1 45.3 (b) 45.5 45.6 (p) ↓0.1%
10. France 43.2 43.1 43.3 44 (b) 43.7 (b) 45 44 (p) ↑0.8%
11. Greece 28.6 29.1 31.2 34.9 37.2 (b) 40.4 42.1 (p) ↑13.5%
12. Spain 42 41.9 41.5 42.3 42.3 (b) 40.9 40.2 (p) ↓1.8%
13. Netherlands 41.4 (b) 41.2 (b) 42.2 43.2 (b) 44.8 (b) 46.3 45.7 (p) ↑4.3%
14. Ireland 50.1 49.7 51.1 52.6 52.2 (b) 52.3 52.7 (p) ↑2.6%
15. Lithuania 43.8 45.7 48.6 51.3 53.3 (b) 57.6 58.3 (p) ↑14.5%
16. Luxembourg 32.6 35.9 37.2 40.7 39.9 (b) 41.3 41 (p) ↑8.4%
17. Latvia 46.1 48.2 49.6 52.5 52.7 (b) 52.3 (b) 54.1 (p) ↑8%
18. Malta 22.1 23.4 (b) 24.9 26 26.5 (b) 27.8 29.8 (p) ↑7.7%
19. Germany 29.7 (b) 30.6 31.8 32.9 31.4 (b) 32.3 33.3 (p) ↑3.6%
20. Poland 34.8 (b) 36.5 39.1 40.5 42.1 (b) 43.4 44.3 (p) ↑9.5%
21. Portugal 24 26.7 (b) 27.8 30 31.3 (b) 31.9 34.3 (p) ↑10.3%
22. Romania 18.3 (b) 20.3 21.7 22.9 25 (b) 25.6 25.5 (p) ↑7.2%
23. Slovakia 22.1 23.2 (b) 23.7 26.9 26.9 (b) 28.4 30.5 (p) ↑8.4%
24. Slovenia 34.8 37.9 39.2 40.1 41 (b) 43.4 43.5 (p) ↑8.7%
25. Sweden 45.3 46.8 47.9 48.3 49.9 (b) 50.2 50.8 (p) ↑5.5%
26. Hungary 26.1 28.2 29.8 32.3 34.1 (b) 34.3 32.8 (p) ↑6.7%
27. Great Britain 43.1 (b) 45.5 (b) 46.9 47.4 47.7 (b) 47.9 47.9 (p) ↑4.8%
28. Italy 19.9 20.4 21.9 22.5 23.9 (b) 25.3 26.3 (p) ↑6.4%
- UE 27 33.8 34.9 36.1 37.2 38(b) 38.8 39.1(p) ↑5.3%
- UE 28 33.8 34.8 36 37.1 37.9(b) 38.7 39(p) ↑5.2%
Source: Own study on the basis of Eurostat data (accessed 21.02.2017:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=t2020_41&plugin=1).
b-break in time series; p-provisional; ↑- increase; ↓-decrease
3. Attempts at econometric forecast of Europe 2020
When forecasting the chances of implementing Europe 2020, econometric studies monitoring the progress of the implementation of the strategy objectives in individual EU countries may be helpful. An example of such an approach is a study conducted by scientists
from the University of Economics in Katowice21, who examined the indicative effects of implementing Europe 2020 in 2010-2014 using the Hellwig method, also known as the method of the optimal choice of predicates or the information capacity indicator method.22 The aim of the study was to measure the hitherto effects of the strategy implementation using the available statistical data describing economic and social processes in the EU since the start of implementation of the strategy we are interested in. The chosen research method enabled the construction of a taxonomic measure of development expressing the degree of the strategy implementation in individual Member States of the Community in 2010-2014.23
The analysis of the progress of Europe 2020 implementation based on the change in the value of indicators allowed the authors of the study to prepare a ranking of EU Member States (EU 28) implementing the strategy, as well as to determine the dynamics of the meter changes useful for predictions about the effectiveness of strategy implementation. The subjective scope of the study covered 28 EU Member States. The authors adopted 16 indicators referring to employment, research and development, sustainable energy use, education, poverty reduction and social exclusion as crucial for monitoring the implementation of Europe 2020.24 In order to diagnose the degree of strategy implementation, the above mentioned taxonomic measure of development was determined by means of one of the methods of a multidimensional analysis, i.e. linear grouping of objects developed by Hellwig. Using one synthetic variable, the proposed measure of development describes objects (EU countries) characterised in a multidimensional space of features (variables/indicators).25 This was the basis for the preparation of the ranking of the Community Member States-objects and their division into 4 typological groups according to the level of the studied phenomena, for which average values and increments in the analysed
21 B. Kasprzyk, J. Wojnar, B. Fura, Pomiar realizacji kluczowych obszarów strategii Europa 2020 w krajach UE-28, "Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach", No. 276(2016), pp. 159-170. The study covered the years 2010-2014, with 2010 being the first year of Europe 2020 implementation, and 2014 the last year for which statistical data from Eurostat were available.
22 Zdzisław Hellwig (1925-2013) a Polish economist, creator of scientific statistics and econometrics.
23 For the needs of the study, 2010 and 2014 were selected, which were compared with each other.
24 Indicators from X1 to X16: X1-employment in the age group 20-64 in total; X2-employment in the age group 20-64, men; X3-employment in the age group 20-64, women; X4-percentage share of expenditure on R&D in GDP; X5-share of energy from renewable sources in final energy consumption; X6-greenhouse gas emissions;
X7-share of poorly educated population aged 18-24 in total; X8-share of poorly educated population aged 18-24, women; X9-share of poorly educated population aged 18-24, men; X10-share of population aged 30-34 with higher education in total; X11-share of population aged 30-34 with higher education, women; X12-share of population aged 30-34 with higher education, men; X13-share of population at risk of poverty or social exclusion; X14-share of population living in households characterised by low activity on the labour market;
X15-share of population at risk of poverty after taking into account social transfers; X16-share of population living in bad conditions.
25B. Kasprzyk, J. Wojnar, B. Fura, op. cit., p. 163.
period turned out to be significantly different.26 The ranking made it possible to compare the obtained classifications of EU member countries and to divide them into groups with a similar degree of implementation of the strategy objectives, as well as to identify the observed changes and define the chances for Europe 2020 implementation in the 2020 perspective.27 As a result of this it was possible to select countries with the greatest successes in the field of strategy implementation and to identify countries lagging behind in its implementation, which helps in forecasting the chances for the realisation of Europe 2020.
Table 4. Results of the classification of UE-28 counties in 2010 and 2014
Year 2010 Year 2014
Group Country Synthetic
measure value
Group Country Synthetic
measure value
I. Sweden
Finland Denmark Austria Slovenia
0.767 0.635 0.583 0.514 0.509
I. Sweden
Finland Austria Denmark
0.811 0.698 0.666 0.654
II. Estonia
France Germany Netherlands Czech Republic Luxembourg Belgium
0.490 0.467 0.442 0.434 0.398 0.395 0.370
II. Slovenia
France Estonia Netherlands Czech Republic Germany Lithuania Luxembourg Belgium Great Britain
0.555 0.508 0.503 0.457 0.456 0.449 0.447 0.411 0.385 0.382
III. Great Britain
Lithuania Slovakia Poland Portugal Hungary Latvia Cyprus Greece Italy Croatia
0.335 0.312 0.306 0.293 0.253 0.246 0.241 0.237 0.200 0.191 0.180
III. Poland
Latvia Cyprus Slovakia Portugal Hungary Ireland Croatia
0.373 0.368 0.343 0.319 0.298 0.273 0.241 0.230
IV. Spain
Romania Ireland Bulgaria Malta
0.158 0.158 0.141 0.123 0.056
IV. Italy Malta
Bulgaria Spain Greece Romania
0.188 0.160 0.119 0.118 0.087 0.070
Source: B. Kasprzyk, J. Wojnar, B. Fura, Pomiar realizacji kluczowych obszarów strategii Europa 2020 w krajach UE-28, "Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach", No.
276(2016), p. 167.28
26 See Tables 4 and 5.
27 See B. Kasprzyk, J. Wojnar, B. Fura, op. cit., p. 160.
28 I Group -a very good situation; II Group -good; III Group -satisfactory; IV Group -unsatisfactory.
Table 5. Average values of the synthetic measure in individual groups
Group Year 2010 Year 2014 Increment
I 0.602 0.707 0.105
II 0.428 0.455 0.027
III 0.254 0.305 0.051
IV 0.127 0.124 -0.003
Total 0.337 0.377 0.040
Source: B. Kasprzyk, J. Wojnar, B. Fura, Pomiar realizacji kluczowych obszarów strategii Europa 2020 w krajach UE-28, "Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach", No.
276(2016), p. 167.
In the analysed years the best results in the implementation of Europe 2020 were achieved by Austria, Lithuania and Latvia, while the worst – which may cause some surprise in certain cases – by the old Community countries, i.e. Greece, Spain and Italy, as well as by Romania and Bulgaria. The negative average values of the synthetic indicator for these countries (countries of the fourth group) seem particularly alarming.29
Figure 1. Change in the synthetic measure (absolute value) in 2010-2014
Source: B. Kasprzyk, J. Wojnar, B. Fura, Pomiar realizacji kluczowych obszarów strategii Europa 2020 w krajach UE-28, "Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach", No.
276(2016), p. 168.
The presented study points to a large differentiation of the effects of Europe 2020 implementation in individual EU Member States, including the deterioration of the growth rate of the synthetic measure of the most important strategy indicators in many countries. This is not optimistic, especially as it also applies to well-developed countries of the so-called old
29 See Fig. 1.
EU (for example Italy). As a result of such observations, made at the halfway point of the pursuit of the strategy we are interested in, the fears about its planned implementation are fully justified today.
Final conclusions
According to the author of this study, the conducted analysis of selected Europe 2020 implementation indicators, based on data collected over six years out of ten allocated for its implementation, as well as the observation of the current political and social situation of the EU, do not give a basis for optimism and for the assumption that the current EU development strategy will be successfully implemented in the time horizon envisaged for it. In the current conditions the chances for full Europe 2020 implementation are slender. This statement is based on, on the one hand, previous backlog in reaching the strategy goals in some of the Community countries and, on the other hand, large variation in the achievement of these goals by EU Member States.
In the current conditions in which the Community is operating the implementation of even some of the development goals assumed in Europe 2020 until 2020 seems unrealistic.
EU decision-makers should seriously consider activities that could increase the chances of Europe 2020 realisation, though rather in a longer time perspective than by 2020, perhaps focusing on supporting the implementation of only some of the goals of the strategy which are particularly important for the socio-economic development of the Community (for example, support for the R&D sphere) with a simultaneous reduction of activities in the field of decreasing the emission intensity of the economy. According to the author of the study, it may be necessary to have a “rescue plan” for Europe 2020, as it was in the case of the renewed Lisbon Strategy proposed at the halfway point of its implementation in 2005. With this approach, an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms and progress of Europe 2020 implementation would be needed, similar to Wim Kok’s report, which would indicate the causes of difficulties, provide guidelines to improve its implementation, and assess real chances to pursue the strategy in the envisaged or a longer time perspective (e.g. until 2025).30 In the author’s opinion, full chances for Europe 2020 implementation can be considered only when adjusting the previously set goals of this strategy and with an extended time horizon. If the Community and its Member States do not prepare an emergency plan for the strategy, there is a serious risk that its implementation will result in a failure similar to the LS failure.
30 See Facing the Challenge...
The analysis of the accomplishment of Community development objectives suggests that in the case of certain goals aimed at turning the EU into an avant-garde of civilizational and technological progress, for example related to its ecological policy and reducing the emission intensity of the Community economy, it seems that they are a barrier to development difficult to overcome in the nearest future. Even some countries’ (e.g. Germany’s) determination in their implementation, resulting from the desire to obtain serious profits by economic and scientific entities that are oriented towards the creation and commercialisation of new technologies that are environmentally friendly, reduce emissions and use alternative energy sources, will not help here. Similarly, the EU objective convincing about the possibility of reducing the number of citizens of the Member States of the Community living below the poverty line may turn out to be idealistic and difficult to achieve. In the present conditions and with the current financial and economic difficulties of many EU countries, also taking into account the budgetary and organisational capabilities of younger EU Members, especially Central and Eastern European countries, this is an unfeasible task, even more so in the Europe 2020 time horizon, as shown by the latest statistics on income poverty and inequality in the distribution of income in the EU.31 This is a purely idealistic postulate, detached from reality, although certainly noteworthy and deserving activities aimed at its realisation in the distant future. This shows that some of the assumptions of Europe 2020 have been unrealistic from the beginning and resulted more from the good intentions of its originators than from a realistic assessment of the Community’s potential and capabilities in some areas (e.g. strict environmental standards). Ultimately, they have exposed the EU not only to the huge costs of implementing such an ambitious development policy, but also to the risk of failure of this flagship strategy, so important for the image of the Community.
Current social and political problems have complicated the above conditions of EU development and Europe 2020 implementation. They have occurred with particular intensity since 2015 as a result of the so-called migration crisis resulting from unfortunate actions of Western countries in the Middle East and the Maghreb.32 These problems effectively absorb the attention of EU leaders, authorities of its Member States and society, pushing aside the
31 See the latest Eurostat statistics on the distribution of income in the EU; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/Income_distribution_statistics/pl (accessed 5.04.2017).
32 The author means the ill-conceived, full of political and tactical errors action of the EU and US in the indicated regions, as a result of which the fragile political and military balance in these areas has been destroyed, resulting in the weakening or disintegration of some countries (see Libya, Egypt, Syria), strengthening of Islamic terrorist organisations and the creation of the Islamic State.
necessary actions in the economic or infrastructural areas which directly translate into opportunities for Community development and the possibility of fundamentally improving the innovativeness of its economy and gaining the competitive advantage necessary in the conditions of globalisation. A good example of the signalled problems with negative consequences for the EU and its Member States, including currently implemented Europe 2020, is the migration problem resulting from the Community’s irresponsible and disastrous migration policy.33 The costs of this policy burden both the Community budget and national budgets as well as the budgets of local governments in the EU. Among others, EU Member States located in the southern part of the Old Continent, such as Greece or Italy, have become victims of the wrong decisions of European politicians. As we can see from statistics, these countries have serious financial and social problems today, including problems with achieving the fundamental goals of Europe 2020 we are interested in.
Due to the current situation of the EU and the European project there is a serious threat that the Community will not be able to take corrective and rescue actions towards Europe 2020, without which this strategy may be at risk. In the seventh year of strategy implementation it might be too late for this kind of action, especially if the EU tried to keep the 2020 time horizon at all costs. If it is recognised that the implementation of Europe 2020 is at risk, the only reasonable solution seems to be an extension of its time horizon, but with the adoption of specific legal and organisational changes and possible adjustments to the strategy itself.34 The mere extension of the time horizon of its implementation may not be sufficient, considering the political and social problems that the Community is facing. The author of the study is aware of the fact that the preparation of such a support plan for Europe 2020 is difficult due to the current political crisis in the Community and shuffles on the political scene in the most important EU Member States (Germany, France) that effectively paralyse its strategic decisions and discourage EU Members not only from fighting for the success of Europe 2020, but even from fighting to keep the Community in its current shape.
The doubts related to the implementation of the current EU development strategy, Europe 2020, which the author draws attention to in the study, perceived for some time in
33 Activities of EU leaders that began 2015, among others, consent and incentives for people coming from the destabilised areas of the Middle East to settle in the EU Member States, resulting also in the inflow of economic migrants to the EU from other poor regions of the world, burden the public finances of EU countries and fundamentally impair the security of their citizens, increasing terrorists threat and social unrest.
34 These adjustments, even if they were of a fundamental nature, in some sense compromising for the Community, would be definitely better than the situation in which the EU does not take any action and accepts the possible failure of the Community development strategy, another failure after the fiasco of LS (2000-2010).
