The history of the classification of sciences

Q U A T R I E M E P A R T I E

RAPPORT GENERAL

Bonifati K edrov

THE HISTORY OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES

GENERAL REMARKS. VARIOUS PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION

The classification of sciences pictures th e m u tu a l bond betw een sciences, th a t is th e stru c tu re of th e w hole of science. Every classifica­ tio n of sciences lis based on these or o th e r principles whose prem ises show the bond betw een sciences. Such a bond iis of th e moist various kind an d is defined by: 1) th e subject of th e science a n d th e objective relations existing betw een th e subjects of various sciences; 2) th e m ethod an d th e conditions of recognition of the said science’s subject; 3) th e aim s which are th e caulse of the science’s developm ent a n d fo r w hich science is destined.

From th e point of view of gnosiology these principles a re divided into objective, w hen th e bond betw een sciences derives from the bond betw een th e objects of research, a n d subjective, w h en th e features of th e hum an m in d a re ta k e n as a base.

From th e point of view of m ethodology th ese principles are 'divided according to how the bond betw een sciences is understood as an ex tern al one w hen sciences are considered in a d efin ite o rd er o r as a n in tern al, organic one, w hen they are consistently derived a n d developed from one another. In th e first case w e have th e principle of coordination: its scheme is: A |B |C a.s.f. In th e second case we h ave the principle of subordination and its schem e is: A...B...C... a.s.f. The letters h ere rep resent the particular sciences, the vertical lines shows th e sharp division betw een sciences, a n d the dots — th e ir m u tu a l penetration.

From th e logical point of view the principles are divided in accord­ ance w ith w hat aspect of the general bond of sciences is tak en into consideration w hen the characteristic of th e original a n d of the final point of th e general row of sciences is m ade. In this w ay w e have tw o principles governing th e location of sciences in o rd er of: dim inishing generalization — from the general to the p articular, and rising concrete­ ness — from th e abstract to the concrete. In reciprocal opposition these ORGANON, 1964

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tw o principles form ed th e prem ises for th e m ost p o p u lar in the X lX th c en tu ry non-M arxist classifications of sciences w o rk ed ouit by Comte (1st principle) an d by Spencer (2nd principle). Both of th e m w ere startin g from th e principle of coordination. For th e principle of subordination on th e con trary it is o f im portance to tak e info consideration th e aspects of th e general bond betw een sciences w hich is the foundation of the principle of developm ent from a sim ple form to a complex one, from a low to a higher one, from an “undeveloped cell” to a “developed body”. C onsideration is tu rn e d here chiefly to th e fact, w hich is en tirely ignored by th e coordination principle, nam ely to th e common points and to th e m utu al p en etratio n of th e p a rtic u la r sciences.

I t is also possible to sep arate o th e r aspects of th e g eneral bond of sciences and to form ulate o th er ap p rop riate principles (for instance from an em pirical description to a theoretical ex planation o r from th eo ry to practice a.s.f.).

B ut th e essential is n o t w hat 'aspects o f th e general bond of sciences a re considered in th is o r th a t classification, b u t th e m an n er in w hich th ey are trea ted : in opposing th e sep arated aspect to a ll others, th a t is su bo rdinate to th e one Which is th e foundation of th e w hole given system , o r in th e ir m u tu al union, th e ir m u tu al dependence being d e a r ly explained: th e derivative from th e m ain ones, th e inessential from the essential a.s.f. w ith no artificial dependence of .all aspects of the univer­ sal -bond of sciences from th e one selected by th e author, w ith ou t th e ir dissolution in this one. The first case is characteristic of the form al or artificial (classifications, th e second one — of th e dialectic or n atu ra l classifications.

This last one does not separate th e various aspects of th e general m utual (bond 'between sciences, b u t exam ines th e m as a n expression of:. 1) th e progress of o ur know ledge from th e general law to its particular symptoms, o r from general law of all evolution to th e p articu lar laws of n a tu re and of society, w hich corresponds to th e principle from the general fo th e particu lar; 2) th e tran sitio n of o u r know ledge from one alspect of th e su b ject to th e e n tire ty of a ll its aspects, to 'which a cor­ responding principle is: from th e ab stract to the concrete; 3) th e reflection

in o u r m ind of th e evolution of the object from sim ple to complex, from a low er to a higher one, w hich is in accordance w ith th e law of evolution. This la st one includes also the 'progress of o ur know ledge, equally from th e general to th e p a rtic u la r as w ell as from th e ab stract to th e concrete.

The dialectic-m aterialistic principles w hich a re a t th e base of th e M arxist classification of sciences presum e th e indissolubility of th e principle of objectivity a n d of th e principle of evolution (or subordina­ tion). The gnoisiological, methodological (dialectic) a n d logical aspects of the general bonds betw een sciences a re ap p aren t here in th e ir inter-^

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nal unity, as v arious m om ents of th e w hole consideration of th is problem , w hich a re n o t contradictory, b u t a re m u tu a lly dependent. The assertion th a t th e classification of sciences reflects th e bond betw een th e objects of these sciences expresses th e fun dam en tal prem ise of th e m aterialistic th e o ry of knowledge.

The assertion th a t th e sciences go over in to one another a n d a re being developed, th e h ig h e r from th e 'lower ones, show ing th e tran sitio n a n d th e evolution of th e Objects them selves, expresses th e fundam ental prem ise of the dialectic m ethod w ith its 'principle of th e historical

development.

The logical foundations of th e coordination principle a re form ed by th e theses of form al logic, in p a rtic u la r by its: req u irem en ts th a t th e p arts of th e division exclude each other. This is possible provided th e sciences a re stric tly sep arated from each other a n d have only ex tern al com mon points.

The iloigioal foundations of th e subordination principle are th e prem ises of th e M arxist dialectic logic, w hich in th e first place tak es into consideration the evolution of ideas and th e ir tran sitio n from one into th e other, 'w here th e ideas of th e 'division betw een sciences are excluded, as well a s violent (division Mines betw een them .

The coordination principle allows for th e ex tern al ^combination of th e various aspectsr of th e general bond of sciences. The re su lt is a classifi­ cation ta b le of sciences, different from th e lineal row based o n th e consideration of o n ly one aspect oif th a t bond. Such is for in sta n t« th e C ournot system , w hich is a com bination of b o th ’th ese system s.

Some o th e r form s of classification a re also possible, especially such w here 'not tw o b u t th re e or m ore aspects of th e general bond of sciences a re taken in to 'consideration. A ll these system s are based on th e p rin cip le o f coordination.

A special case is w hen w e observe th e 'division (in two o r th ree parts) com bined w ith a ram ification of the general row of classified objects. In these conditions the lineal row as weOil as a tab le based on it cannot be applied. The «division (into A and no n A) is tak in g place allso in form al classification o f sciences, w h en th e p arts of th e division are placed in an ex tern al relation, for instance in th e tra n sitio n from m ore general notions to th e m ore p a rticu la r ones (the so called T ree of P orphyry). The division (ramification) of a row in th e dialectic classification of sciences shows the ram ification of a n u n ifo rm en tirety on contradictory aspects, form s o r developm ent trends' as is th e case in th e division of living n a tu re into plants' and animals.

A n essential role especially in n a tu ra l sciences is played by two problem s reciprocally connected: the classification of sciences When th e 'bond betw een sciences is analysed in a logical cross-section from th e point of view of th e in tern a l s tru c tu re of know ledge, of the in tern al

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relation of its com ponent p a rts and th e periodization of th e history of science, w h en th e ;bond • betw een sciences is analysed in a historical crossHsection, from th e point of view of the historical origin of know ­ ledge, of a successive form ation, one a fte r another, of its separate

domains.

The bond betw een these two problem s m ay be understood w hen we consider th a t th e M arxist dialectic logic is a generalization of th e history of th e w hole h u m an thought, th a t it brings into light th e law s of its developm ent, w hile th e classification of sciences presents only th e effects or th e re su lts attain e d by sciences them selves in th e ir m u tu al connection. To- a rriv e a t a valid resu lt from th e logical point of view of 'how are re la te d am ong them selves th e various aspects of know ledge an d in w hat o rd er th e y o u g h t to be located, it should be analysed historically how th ey cam e into being an d how th e y w ere developed one a fte r the o th er and how th e y influenced each other. Such an approach we see in d’Alemibert an d even m ore d istin ctly in Saint-Sim on and Comte in th e ir division of th e w hole history of know ledge into- th re e stages w hich a re gradually attained by various sciences and w hich a re form ing an encyclopaedic row . H ow ever in Comte especially we have m uch artificiality. Such a 'conception reached a fu ll development only in th e works, of Engels, freed by him of all artificiality and form ulated in a tru e scientific form.

W ith Engels the classification of sciences is firm ly based on pe­ riodization of th e h isto ry of sciences a n d th e logical analysis is 'done s tric tly in accordance w ith th e whole character o f th e developm ent of scientific knowledge.

The w hole history of the problem un der 'Consideration m ay be divided into th ree basic stages, w hich correspond fax 1) th e unram ified ancient science, th e Middle Ages p artly included; 2) th e differentiation of sciences in th e X V th — X V IIIth cen tu ries (an analytical ram ifaction of sciences into d ifferen t branches); 3) the beginning of th e ir integration in th e X lX th cen tury i(a syn th etic revival of a n uniform system of know ledge by m eans of uniting sciences th a t have been heretofore divided). A t each of these historical stages the problem s of th e m utu al bond betw een sciences w ere p u t and solved differently.

A t th e first stage w e have philosophy em bracing all realm s of sciences, w hich h ad n o tim e y et to acquire definite form s an d to become independent an d had to be developed u nder its patronage. A t th e second .stage w hen sciences began to be differentiated from th e previously uniform science a n d so one science afte r an other began to be separated (first cam e m athem atics, mechanics, astronomy, then physics and chem istry, fu rth e r biology a n d geology, finally came an th ro ­ pology, psychology an d social sciences). The th ird stage is characterized by a tre n d tow ards a synthesis of sciences, to th e ir integration. This

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tre n d had a dialectic character, it w as based o n the effects of th e preceding differentiation of know ledge, showing th e necessity to« b rin g th e p articu la r sciences to th e ir in tern al unity. This tre n d w as m oreover stim ulated by th e lasting process of science differentiation, beginning w ith the form ation of chemical atom ic theory and especially th ro u g h th e discovery of the .law of conservation and tran sfo rm atio n of energy.

The n ew ly «discovered dom ains of science '(the m echanical th e o ry o f heat, th e kinetic th eo ry of gases, astrophysics, physical ch em istry an d especially electrochem istry an d chem ical therm odynam ics, biochem istry, biophysics a n d m an y others) have appeared a t th e joining p o in ts of sciences th a t w ere previously sep arated '(mechanics; and p h y ­ sios, physics and astronom y, chem istry a n d physics, biology a n d chemiisitry an d physics, geology and Chem istry a.s.f.). They have filled the' ap p are n tly existing previously em pty spaces betw een sciences a n d fostered a synthetic u nio n among th e p articu lar 'disciplines in one u n ifo rm system, realizing directly th e ir synthesis. In th is w ay both co n trad i­ ctory tre n d s of scientific developm ent, th e 'differentiation of sciences an d th e ir integration have proved to be p en etratin g each o th e r a n d form ing a 'dialectic unity.

This dialectic character of th e developm ent o f science has b e e n especially ap parent in th e relation betw een philosophy and o th er p a r­ ticular sciences. In th e m iddle of th e X lX th c e n tu ry th e necessity of th e ir close contact becam e q u ite obvious, showing th e com plete baseless­ ness of th e old philosophy of n a tu re a n d popular in th a t tim e po­ sitivism. Not a dissolution of philosophy in p articu la r sciences o r vice versa, an d not a separation w as needed, b u t th e ir organic alliance: philosophy should contribute to th e p a rticu la r sciences a general m ethod of scientific knowledge, show th e ro ad to scientific research an d a general th eo ry of knowledge, an d th e p articu la r sciences sh o u ld contribute to philosophy th e concrete m aterial for th e elaboration o f the m ethod and general th eo ry of knowledge in o rd er to have th e m fu rth e r enriched.

Such synthesis o f philosophy w ith p articu lar '(natural) sciences has been advanced by H erzen showing th e road to a general synthesis o f sciences. Such a synthesis w as for th e first tim e realized b y M arx on the basis of a dialectic and historical m aterialism ; it h as been con­ cretely realized by Engels in his classification of sciences.

Philosophy h as k e p t now for itself th e sp h ere of dialectics (sciences about th e m ost general 'laws of nature, of society and of logic sciences dealing w ith th e specific law s of thinking). The re st has been absorbed by th e rem aining sciences concerning n a tu re (natural sciences) a n d society (history). Thus in the general system of knowledge the place for ph ilosop hy hals been clearly defined. This sy stem em braced

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sophy an d th e o th e r sciences. It w as in accord w ith ‘th e tre n d of know ­ ledge: from th e general (general1 law s of a ll development) to th e p articu la r (p articu lar law s th a t w e re th e subject o f o th e r separate ■sciences, n a tu ra l and social).

THE THREE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF SOIfENCE CLASSIFICATION

The th re e basic stages of scientific developm ent: the universal philo­ sophic science of antiquity; th e differen tiatio n of sciences in m odern tim es (since th e Renaissance period to th e end of th e X V IIIth century); th e ir in teg ratio n in th e X lX th an d X X th centuries, form the general background of -the problem w hich is th e subject of o u r study. This p ro ­ blem a t each of the above stages has been solved in a d ifferen t m anner. I. In th e first of th e above stages w e have as a ru le th e division of the uniform science or philosophy into different branches, whose unity 'has been defined by th e fact th a t all of -them w ere p a rts of an uniform , science.

The idea of science classification was born in the countries of the ancient East sim ultaneously w ith the birth of sciences. A ncient thinkers (A ristotle a n d others) have form ed th e em bryos of a ll subsequent clas­ sification of sciences a n d their principles, among oth ers th e division of th e w hole know ledge (according to its subject) into th re e m ain domains: n a tu re (physics), society (ethics) and thinking (ilogic), as in general in an cien t philosophy th e em bryos of all la te r aspects of philosophy were born. In the M iddle Ages th in k ers of th e n ear an d m iddle East developed fu rth e r th e ideas of A ntiquity, preserving them for fu tu re generations. O n the contrary, theology and scholasticism th a t w e re dom inating in the W est took only th e superficial form of A ristotle’s ideas, destroying its living m aterialistic content. This is w hy w hen stu dy in g the various kinds of science classification i t is insufficient to deal only w ith th eir scheme, w ith th e ir extern al expression, b u t it is necessary to -study th e ir in tern al m eaning w hich is to be found in th e p articu la r sciences and also in th e ir general grouping. The general evolution of th is problem m ay be exam ined in th e form of a -comparative analysis of th e system s of ancient th in k ers (P'lato, Demoiaritus, Epicurus an d others) w ith those of th e M iddle Ages (Avicenna, A rabian thinkers, scholastics, Roger Bacon, D avid th e Invincible a n d others).

II. The leading principle of th e second stag e is.-the coordination of sciences fu lly in conform ity w ith the general an aly tical character of the w hole science of th a t time. The problem of science classification arises because th e uniform philosophy begins to d esin teg rate into a n um ber of stric tly sep arated sciences such as: m athem atics, astronom y a.s.f. The task of bringing these sciences together, even if o n ly into a n ex tern al

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union betw een them , so as. to p reserv e th e ir uniform ity, has been aittained by having th e m included in a general system . The an aly tical m ethod th a t had been 'dom inant ait th a t tim e led to th e general ch aracter of science classification, it coulid be realised only b y m eans o f superfieiall com bina­

tion of sci|ences.

A t the beginning (in connection w ith th e developm ent o f th e idea of hum anism in th e Renaissance period) science dealing w ith m ankind an d w ith its peculiarities replaced the old m edieval scholasticism a n d in accord w ith th is tre n d we have th e o rigin of th e principle o f th e classifi­ cation of sciences, w hich in th ese conditions played a v e ry 'progressive role. It took in to account such distinctive m a rk s o f th e h u m an in tellect as m em ory '(with history as its correspondent), im agination (poetry) and in tellect (philosophy). It w as a big step fo rw ard in com parison w ith w h at w as offered b y theology a n d scholasticism w ith th e ir division of “secu lar” know ledge into th e seven “lib era l a rts”.

The subjective principle advanced by H u arte has b een developed by Francis >Bacon w ho divided th e whole 'knowledge into: 1) history, 2) poetry and 3) philosophy. An identical division has been made at th e beginning of o u r era by a Chinese lib rarian Tsin Su. Hobbes w ho system atized (Bacon's learn in g endeavoured to p u t together th e subjective principle w ith th e objective one. Being a m echanician Hobbes considered th e m athem atical m ethod 'as universal a n d p u t geom etry a t th e head of all deductive sciences w ith physics at th e h ead of a ll in ductive sci­ ences. W ith Hobbes w e see a nucleus of th e 'principle of having all sciences classified from the ab stract to th e concrete, from th e quan titativ e definition of a subject to a qualitative, w hich m ay be allegedly reduced to a q u an titativ e one.

Descartes, whose general m echanical philosophy em braced in his conception of the would some elem ents of historioism, w as developing th e principle of classification based on th e properties of 'the object of knowledge.. Deanery advanced a m etaphysical division of 'nature into th re e kingdom s ((minerals, p la n ts a n d animals) w ith a corresponding division of science. The classical division in to logic, physics and ethics (Gassendi) o r in to physics, practice an d (logic (Locke) has been restored. A tomistic ideas suggested th e possibility of degrees of com plexity of m a tte r (molecules in Gassendi, “groups” of prim itive particles in Boyle). It w as favourable to th e developm ent of a n objective principle. In the X V IIIth cen tu ry this principle has been developed fu rth e r b y Lorno- nossov and Kozielsky who came near to the G assendi’s idea.

On the con trary the French encyclopaedists (D iderot a n d d ’A lem bert) accepted th e (principles an d schem e of Bacon, changing it in some details only. The com parative ana,lysis of th e system s of Bacon a n d Hobbes and of the F rench encyclopaedists perm its us to bring to lig h t th e general evolution of th e subjective principle in th e direction of

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a Jess consistent application and combining it w ith the objective prin­ ciple (Hobbes) o r a moire consistent application (Diderot a n d d’Alembert). The division of th e w hole of know ledge into« th re e basic p arts (nature, society and thinking) is in th e XVIItih c e n tu ry replaced by a m ore detailed division.

In England Jo h n W ilkins was building a classification of sciences taking as a sta rtin g point n o t th e p articu la r sciences bu t some elem entary figures a n d notions. By combining th em (coordination) he w as form ing complex m a tters a n d notions w ith aid of special m ean s an d demon­ stra ted th e relations existing betw een notions by establishing th e ir com­ m on elem ents. In this w ay W ilkins in stead of dividing phenom ena, sep arated from each other, advanced the exposure of th e ir m u tu al alliance. His m ethod how ever in its content w as strictly analytical, based on th e coordination principle.

The tran sitio n to th e th ird stag e (the first th ree q u arters of th e X lX th century) includes two principally d ifferent tren d s:

1) The first tren d is the preservation of principles w hich appeared a n d becam e dom inant in th e preceding stage. They w ere based on th e general principle of coordination and w ere therefo re contradictory to th e m ain tre n d of th e scientific developm ent of th e X lX th century. This problem has in principle tw o solutions:

a) The firs t form al solution is based on th e coordination principle from th e general to th e p articu la r (in the o rd er of dim inishing generality). In F rance it had conditions favourable to its developm ent in th e be­ ginning and in th e m iddle of th e X lX th cen tu ry . Saint-Sim on was th e first to advance qu ite d istinctly the objective principle o f classification in accord 'with th e tran sitio n of phenom ena from m ore simple and general to m ore com plex and detailed. It corresponded to th e succession in th e research of phenom ena in th e h isto ry of sciences. The Saint-Sim on system had some elem ents of dialectic th a t w ere th e product of a m an of genius (for instance th e u h ity of th e stab ility and of changeability in n a tu re expressed in th e notions of “hard ness” and th e “liquidity of bodies”). Comte took over a n d system atized th e ideas of h is m aster, but gave th e m an exageraited and banal character. He distinguished six fundam ental (theoretical, abstract) sciences, form ing an encyclo­ paedic row of th e h ierarch y of sciences: m athem atics, astronom y, physics, chem istry, physiology, sociology (the mechanics of earth ly bodies was p u t together w ith m athem atics, an d 'psychology — w ith physiology).

Com te was u naw are of th e historical notion of natu re. According to him only th e know ledge of n a tu re b y m an b a d a 'historical character. The effect w as the connection of tw o m ethodological problem s of the classification of sciences and periodization of th e h isto ry of sciences. The Comte law of th e th ree stage developm ent of know ledge (the theological, th e m etaphysical, and th e positive) is artificial. It was

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how ever necessary 'because of th e su p erio rity of know ledge over belief, of science over religion. Thiis “law** reflects th e general v u lg ar evolutionary conception of Comte, according to Which th e tran sitio n occurs only gradually: th e second stage is an in term ed iary one betw een th e first and th e third, it effaces th e basic contradiction betw een th e in itial a n d th e final stages (theological an d scientific).

A t th e base of Comte system we have th e p rin cip le of coordination: sciences are located according to th e ir dim inishing: generality, sim plicity and m u tu al independence of the phenom ena tin d er research. A com­ p arative analysis of th e Saint-Sim on a n d Comte system s shows th e lack of originality of the second w hen com pared to« th e first,. O nly sociology, w hich was n o t considered b y S aint-Sim on as a sep arate science, got its independent place i n Comte in his ro w of sciences.

The im portance of Comte system consists in this: th e re a lly basic sciences hav e been se t a p a rt to« which correspond (w ith m athem atics excluded) e ith e r th e basic form s of m otion of m a tte r in n atu re , or a social form of m otion (it being a su b ject of sociology), a n d these sciences have been 'brought into a regular, though only a n ex tern al union betw een them selves, and have been placed in such a n o rd er in w hich th e y have been developing one a fte r -another. T hat is w hy th e Comte system w as historically an d logically a prem ise a n d a p rep aratio n for a classification of sciences based o n th e subordination principle, as analysis is a p rep aratio n and a prem ise to synthesis.

The A m pere sy stem was m uch m ore artificial. It w as based o n four points of view from w hich each su b ject m ay be exam ined. The principle of coordination is h ere developed due to th e fact th a t th ese points of view exisit th an k s to th e com bination in pairs of th e following factors: either a description of phenom ena or a search afte r th e ir laws; an exam ination of a subjept e ith e r from th e side w hich is obviously visible o r from th e side w hich is hidden.

System s th a t w ere m ore simple, m ore n ear to th e really existing sciences, especially to n atu ra l sciences, have been w o rk ed out b y Geof froy S aint-H ilaire (fils) and by d ’H,alloy. By com bining tw o d ifferen t aspects of an analysis of u n ity of science Cournot w orked o u t a ta b le of sciences w here th e principle of coordination is even m ore sh arp ly defined th a n in a lineal row : h ere th e cut-off coordinated (horizontal) reflects th e grouping of sciences according to th e m ethod o f research or to' th e use of th e subject, and th e one in th e row (the vertical coordinated) accord­ ing to th e ch aracter of th e object itself.

The grow th of im portance of th e coordination principle appears nam ely w hen th e idea of developm ent contradictory to th is principle pen etrates w ith special force into n a tu ra l sciences an d in to social sciences (the m iddle of th e X lX th century).

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w ith th e principle of -coordination as a base freon ab strac t to concrete (with abstractiveness successively dim inishing) became popular in th e m iddle of th e X lX th c e n tu ry and in th e following decades in England. H ere th e predecessors of Spencer w ere: Coleridge, th e au th o r of th e pu rely em pirical system , B entham w ho w orked out a v e ry artificial con­ struction, W hewell w ith 'his system of induction an d w ith his division of sciences in to form al (astronomy), mechamicall a n d m echanical-chem ical (physics), an aly tical (chem istry), analytical-classifying (mineralogy), classifying (botany and zoology, w hich together w ith organic sciences w ere included in biology) a n d geology. Mill an d Spencer criticizing Comte reserved a place for psychology in th e ro w of sciences. Spencer rejected th e notion of Comte th a t every science m ay be divided in two« p a rts — an abstract and a concrete, asserting th a t all sciences m ay be divided into com pletely ab stract {logic and m athem atics) an d com pletely concrete (astronomy, geology, biology, psychology and sociology), and in te r­ m ediary abstract-concrete (mechanics, physics an d chem istry).

These groups a re sh arp ly divided w h ile w ith in th ese groups we have a gradual tran sition from sciences to o th e r sciences in spirit of vulgar evolutionism. By introducing th e idea of evolution to concrete sciences Spencer reje cted it in relatio n to th e tw o rem aining groups of sciences; he did not approve either a union of sciences classification (logical factor) w ith th e history of w orld knowledge.

The external contradiction of th e Comte a n d S pencer system s (w ith th e ir common methodological base, i.e., th e prin cip le of coordination) was p a rtly d u e to th e fact th a t th e y understood d iffere n tly the abstract and the concrete ta k in g no consideration of th e ir fu ll m eaning.

Bain m ade a n endeavour to reconcile th e Comte an d Spencer system s. A dhering to th e Comte principles h e trie d to enlarge his schem e by adding logic (at the beginning of th e file) and psychology (replacing sociology). A com parative analysis o f th e system s of Mill, Bain and Spencer shows th a t they sta rte d from th e sam e basis, w ith differences in details fo r instance in such questions as: sh o u ld astronom y be se­ parated o r not, if iso, should it be placed a t th e beginning of th e row next to m athem atics (Mill, Comte) o r a fte r chem istry a n d before zoology (Spencer). S hould psychology b e set a p a rt o r n o t (Comte) and if so should it b e separated from sociology (Mill, Spencer) or should it replace sociology (Bain) ajs.f. A like a com parative analysis of th e system s of Comte and Bain dem onstrates th e ir common basis as to th e m ain division of sciences in to theoretical (abstract), descriptive a n d practical.

2) The oth er direotion for tran sitio n to th e th ird stage w as th e in au gu ratio n of an essential m odification of these principles w hich came into existence ■ during th e second stage which m eans th e beginning of th e change of coordination principle b y th e principle of subordination, which w as in accordance w ith the general character of science in the

The H isto ry of the C lassification of Sciences ₁₇₅

X lX th c e n tu ry a n d in 'accordance w ith th e idea o f developm ent a n d w ith th e universal u n ity of n a tu ra l phenom ena. H ere iwe have also two solutions:

a) The first solution has been w orked o u t by K ant, Schelling an d especially Hegel. The subordination principle was here based on a n idealistic foundation as a principle of th e evolution of sp irit (bu t n o t of nature). Instead of th e du al division w hich w as p o pular in th e fo rm al classification of sciences Hegel suggested a th reefo ld idivision w hich corresponded to th e general -trend o f his philosophical system , d iv id ed into logic, philosophy of n a tu re a n d philosophy of spirit, a n d th e second p a rt w as divided into m echanism (mechanics and astronom y), Chemism

(physics a n d chem istry), a n d organism (biology).

W ith all its artificiality th is system reflected th e idea of n a tu re ’s evolution from its low er grades to higher, tdill finally th e th in k in g sp irit has been created. The idealism of Hegel led to a vulgar distortion o f his dialectic conception.

b) The second solution of subordination developm ent w ith a n ap­ proach to a theoretical synthesis of know ledge w as reached in Russia on a m aterialistic basis by H erzen an d Tcbernyshevsky, w hile th e ir predecessors (Viellansky, Pavlov, M aksym ovitch and others) w ere not y et p re p ared to b rea k aw ay w holly from th e idealistic philosophy o f natu re.

To a rriv e a t th e realization of a synthesis o f sciences it w as in .th e m iddle of the X lX th cen tu ry absolutely necessary to rem ove the division imposed by positivists betw een philosophy and n a tu ra l sciences (this w as the w ay of Herzen) a n d to- se t aside th e division betw een n a tu ra l and hum ane sciences, especially social sciences a n d th is w as the w ay o f Tchem yshevsky. F or H erzen th e necessity an d th e possibility of a union of philosophy and n a tu ra l sciences w as derived th ro u g h th e indivisibility of th e em pirical and theoretical factors of know ledge: historicism in th e understanding of n a tu re w as for him u n ited organically w ith historicism in th e understanding of the developm ent of th e know ledge of n atu re, w hich gave a deep m ethodological foundation fo r th e realization o f a synthesis of sciences. The sam e is the case of T chernyshevsky who, as b efore him Bielimsky and la ter A ntonovitch criticized th e re stric te d notions of Comte, w hile P isarev to th e co ntrary sup po rted th e erronous historical conception of Com te an d M ikhayllovsky, a sociologist a n d populist was stu b b o rn 'in his support in Russia of th e positivism of Comte.

III. The th ird stage w as fu lly reflected in th e w orks of th e a u th o r s * of M arxist philosophy. M arx an d Engels based th e ir synthesis of sci­ ences on th e dialectic-m aterialistic m ethod th a t has been fo rm u lated by them , taking as basis a critical analysis of th e w hole valuable w ork of th e ir predecessors (Hegel, Saint-Sim on and F rench m aterialists) and

176 B on ifati K e d ro v

especially th e attem pts to realize an encyclopaedic generalisation of contem porary science. The w orks of Russian progressive thinkers w ere m o stly unlknown to M arx a n d Engels.

M arx a n d Engels overcam e the restrictio n of th e tw o extrem e con­ ceptions (Hegel’s idealism a n d Saint-Sim on’s m etaphysicism ) preserving, an d critically elaborating everything th a t h ad been th ere of value (Hegel’s dialectics, th e m aterialism of F rench thinkers). The results ■were en tirely new dialectic-m aterialistic principles of classification w hich combined organically tw o fu nd am ental factors: th e objective approach a n d th e principle o f subordination (th at is th e principle of

evolution).

M arx discovered the fundam ental principles of {materialistic dialectics a s the m ost u niversal laws of nature, of society and of thinking evolu­ tion. Thus th e foundations of a general theoretical synthesis of sciences h av e been laid. It included before all th e th ree m ain domains of know ­ ledge: those dealing w ith n atu re , w ith society a n d w ith thinking, and th e solution of tw o problem s (they w ere th e su b ject of the w ork of R ussian m aterialists of th e XlXtlh century) dealing w ith th e relatio n of philosophy to n a tu ra l sciences, an d of n a tu ra l sciences to social sciences. M arx reached a solution taking as basis th e u n ity of th e world, th a t is the m utu al union of n a tu ra l an d social phenom ena. The place for applied sciences has been defined in th e general system of know ledge; th e y are a link u nitin g n a tu ra l and social sciences, being located on th e contact point betw een them . An im portant role w as p layed h e re by historical m aterialism w hich w as th e source of a general m ethod for all social sciences.

The creation of M arxist classification of sciences by Engels was preceded by his thorough studies; on th e idiscoveries of n a tu ra l sciences in th e m iddle of th e X lX th c e n tu ry which fostered the discovery of an in tern al bond b etw een th e phenom ena of n atu re th a t is betw een sciences dealing w ith lifeless n a tu re (sciences dealing w ith energy, atomic theory) a n d w ith living n a tu re {(Darwinism, th e th eo ry of cell). B ut no- key has been found to solve th e problem s -concerning a ll domains of n atu re in general, i.e. a key dem onstrating th e un ity of n atu re living and lifeless. Among o thers iit w as due to th e fact th a t th e real tran sitio n from lifeless to living n a tu re has not y et been discovered.

The discovery of Engels w hich took place on M ay 30th, 1873, consisted in the fact th a t in one notion “th e form of m otion”, one for all domains o f n atu re, he em braced all kinds of en ergy appearing in lifeless natu re a s w ell as in life (the biological form of motion). Hence all sciences are form ing one single row : mechanics... chem istry... biology... ju st as th e forms of motion follow one afte r th e other, pass one into the other and develop — th e h ig her form s from the low er ones, the com plex from the

The H isto ry of th e C lassification of S ciences ₁₇₇

sim ple, In, th is m an n er th e notion of th e form s of m otion in Engels’ com prehension is broader th a n the notion of energy or. of life.

The original classification of sciences based on different form s of m otion of m a tte r h as b een en larged b y ■ Engels in several directions: in th e first place he h as pro v ed thait th e succession of th e form s o f mo­ tion corresponds in th e evolution of n a tu re itself a s iwelll as in h isto ry of science to the succession of b irth and of tran sitio n to higher stages of th e developm ent. The coincidence of the historical and logical factors in the knowledge of n atu re and equally in the v ery evolution of n a tu re leads to th e solution of two methodological problem s: to the classification of sciences and to th e periodization of th e history of sciences.

A fu rth e r developm ent of classification w as d irected b y Engels to th e consideration of th e m aterial bearer's (substrata) of the various form s of m otion. In a general way m otion is a fo rm of th e existence of th e m a tter, th erefo re each separate form of m otion should have a se­ parate, corresponding to th is form, specific m ateria l b earer whose m an­ n e r of existence (and of it only) is a given fo rm of m otion. More a n d m ore com plex form of m otion Should th erefo re have a corresponding ro w of no n continuous m aterial creations, th a t is th e process of m a tte r becom ing m ore com plicated from simple, low er k in d s to m ore complex, higher. T hus sciences dealing w ith energy (in th e sphere of inorganic natu re) a n d of life came in contact w ith science dealing w ith th e stru c­ tu r e of m a tte r (atom ic theory). H istorically atom ism took its origin in th e idea of th e divisibility of m a tte r and of its differentiation in to diverse mon-continuous form s of various dimensions.

In defining th e b eare rs of the p a rticu la r form s of m otion (mass for m echanical motion, p articles for physical motion, atom s for chem ical an d p ro tein s for biological) Engels obtained, as it seemed, th e to ta l con­ vergence betw een the row of th e form s of m otion of m a tte r becom ing more and m ore com plicated w ith th e general row of th e ir bearers w hich w ere coming in to being one from an o th er w hen th e division of th e original m a tte r took place.

A nd y et th e hypothesis of th e existence of “eth er particles” as those presupposed b earers of lighting a n d electrical phenom ena w as in dis­ accord w ith th e Whole system as it w as presum ed th a t these “p articles” being physical bodies should have th e ir origin in th e division of atom s into sm aller p arts. It w as therefore understood th a t if physics dealing w ith these particles w as following chem istry in th e general ro w of sciences, th e n physics of “eth er” should precede chem istry, and chem istry w ould be “encircled” by physics. This: prem ise h as been confirm ed in th e X X th centu ry due to th e new subatom s (nuclear and quantum ) physics.

A big complication in th e new schem e of classification of sciences was brought by the recognition of the division into tw o p arts of th e line KHNtT „ORGANON“ — 112

178 B o n ija ti K e d r o v

of developm ent of n atu re prim arily into lifeless and living nature. It be­ came ap p aren t as soon as Engels p u t th e question of th e existence of a constant tran sitio n 'between developed objects of one o r o th er dom ain of n atu re, for instance betw een m eteorite a n d m an.

The ra p id developm ent of n a tu ra l sciences in (the eighties of th e X lX th cen tu ry a n d th e discordance th a t came to lig ht o n m any points betw een th e accepted classification of sciences a n d th e real relatio n s in n atu re, and especially betw een a ll form s of m otion an d their m a­ terialistic bearers, the sm allest of w hich w ere not yet discovered, b ro ught Engels to th e 'conclusion th a t his w ork w as getting old.

Accepting subordination as th e basic principle (the developm ent from lower to higher, from sim ple to complex) Engels has not confined him self to -this one principle, b u t added to it o th e r figures of th e same subordination principle (evolution); so philosophy represented b y m aterialistic dialectics wais p u t b y him in th e first place of the general row of sciences, because it analyses th e most gen eral principles of a ll developm ent, w hile o th e r sciences deal only w ith such o r other d etailed principles of n atu re, society o r thinking. The princip le of su b o rdination: from general to p articu la r w as here applied. Engels p u t also m athem a­ tics before mechanics., a s i t deals not w ith a n y concrete form of m a tter motion, bu t is an abstract, separated qu antitativ e form of n atu ral phe­ nomena. Thus here th e principle of su bo rd in atio n : from ab stract to concrete has been applied.

The ideas of M arxist classification of sciences have been taken by Engels a s a foundation fo r h is w ork Dialectics of N ature, w hich how ever he did not complete. In it he foretold brillian tly th e m utual union of sciences — anticipation which was la te r confirm ed by fu rth er devel­ opm ent of science.

\ .

THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES

T urning to a n analysis of th e m odern developm ent of th is problem we m ay .distinguish tw o principal trends of th is process:

1) The non-M arxist system s at th e end of th e X lX th and in th e X X th century.

W hile th e M arxist classification of sciences becam e a n expression of th e th ird stag e of th e progressive developm ent o f th e whole problem th e non-iM arxist thought w en t a step b ack even in relatio n to th e level w hich it 'had reached in th e m iddle of th e X lX th century. It was not even able to advance any n ew generalizing id ea o r a new principle w hich w ould bring it to th e synthesis of sciences at the end of the X lX th a n d d u rin g th e X X th century. H ere w e see th e general dow nfall of th e non-M arxist theoretical tho u g h t in th e n ew historical epoch.

The H isto ry of th e C lassification of S ciences _{17 9}

A t th e en d of th e X lX th cen tu ry w e can dlearly see th e idealistic tre n d in th e w ork on itlhe classification o f sciences w hich was d irec tly bound w ith th e crisis in n atu ra l sciences th a t w as ju st beginning a n d w ith th e deepening of th e ideological stru g g le caused b y th e (transition of capitalism to im perialism . A t th e base of th e classification of sciences we still see as a ru le th e general principle of coordination a n d it is stren gth ened even m ore by th e fact th a t it is applied to com bine th e m ore detailed principles among them selves in o rd e r to com plicate still m ore the w hole system o f sciences. Such an exam ple we have in th e system of F. H. Giddings, a n A m erican sociologist. This1 system is characterized by form alism and by a peculiar “constructivism ” . From th e gnosiologieal point of view we have a 'distinct tu r n in th e d irectio n of a subjective idealism, especially in M achists. P earson in his G ram m ar of Science endeavours to deal w ith the general schem e of th e n o n - -co ntinu ity of m a tte r Which in re a lity was a real startin g p o in t in building th e classification of sciences o n a n objective foundation.

The M achist, positivistic system of sciences takes i t origin chiefly from th e Comte system . It is subject how ever to some 'criticism: from “th e r ig h t” by th e ad h erents of th e religious w orld outlook; C arp en ter tells th a t the Comte system is in p rin cip le a “vicious circle”. The sam e w e see in F rance w here th e evolution from th e Com te system to th e M achist schem e of H. Poincare, Naviilile an d others took place. N aville reje cted th e Objective principle corresponding to th e Comte sy stem a n d advances a subjective principle which is a n expression of m an ’s sp iritu a l activity. According to N aville th e subject of a science is not th e p h e­ nom ena of th e re a l world, b u t “problem s” w hich arise w h ile research dealing wdith th ese phenom ena is being done. Hence w e h ave a classi­ fication based on answ ers to' questions “wthat is re a l” (historical sciences based on facts) a n d “w h a t is good” (th e ru le s of conduct).

In G erm any system s of sciences having an eclectic a n d m ostly a positivistic c h aracter w ere advanced b y D ubring, Erdm ann, W undt an d others; in Bohemia — by M asaryk. The division o f sciences in to form al and real w as h e re advocated. W undt included in th e first — m athem atics, an d in th e second — n a tu ra l sciences a n d sciences dealing w ith spirit. Eclecticism has been m anifested in th e a ttem p ts to u n ite th e principles of Comte w ith those of Spencer. The w ork on this problem has b een done from th e position o f neokantism . W indelband a n d Rickert (th e F reiburg school) adhered to th e idealistic basis of m etaphysical 'discard betw een sciences dealing w ith n a tu re (whose phenom ena w ere su bject to -some rules) a n d dealing w ith society (the histo ry of events w as considered to b e a chaos of incidents). R ickert reje c ted th e W undt ideas th a t psychology m ay 'become such a basis for the second group of sciences, as m echanics is for n a tu ra l sciences. H. Cohen, E. Cassirer, P. Naitorp (th e Mairlburg school) gave to- th e

180 B o n ifa ti K e d ro v

classification of sciences an a priori direction: th e y considered the problem to introduce u n ity to d iv e rsity w ith th e aid of a notion con­ stru c te d m a th em a tically : hence m athem atics becam e th e m ain science. M achists and energeticists have b uilt th e ir classification of sciences on th e negation of a specifism of sociail phenom ena, considering th em only as com plex biophysical phenom ena (Avenarius, Mach) or as energetic, biophysical phenom ena (Ostwald). B y dividing all sciences according to th e principles of energeticism in to th re e classes: m athe­ m atics (fundam ental sciences), energetics (physical sciences), biology, O stw ald has b u ilt -his “py ram id of sciences”. A t its base is th e principle of coordination and O stw ald (like Tchyzov) considered transitional sciences (physical chem istry) as a n application of this principle, seeing here a sim ple com bination of tw o kinds of energy.

A -form al approach to this problem has found its expression in p u t­ ting to th e fro n t one aspect of th e general union of sciences (correspond­ ing to th e w orld phenom ena) a n d in considering i t as m ain an d deciding. Such is th e geographic direction w hich is considering as th e chief bond th e spatial bond of m a tte r a n d of phenom ena (E. Tchyzov, L. M ietchni- kov a n d L. B erg in Russia a n d A. H ettn er an d F. Ratzel in Germany).

C haracteristic tr a its of all these directions are: an evident epigonism, the backw ard step to th e stage of th e problem developm ent w hich was attained in the X lX th century: th e inab ility to include all dom ains of science from one sing le p o in t of view a n d especially th e total inability of a theoretical tho u gh t of idealists w hen th e y attem p ted to reflect the novelties offered us b y science.

If th e coordination principle has been outlived already in the middle of the X lX th cen tu ry th a n k s to th e great discoveries of n a tu ra l sciences, n o t to m ention social sciences, it becam e an obvious anachronism at the tu rn of th e X lX th and X X th centuries. And y et th e adherents of this principle m ade fu rth e r 'useless efforts to press it into th e new sciences, which req u ire d to accept th e evolution principle and could not be reconciled w ith th e coordination principle.

A nd even in th is case th e idea of evolution an d of tran sitio n of various domains of science, of one in to another, found its w ay in to th e dom ain o f classification of sciences a n d m an y authors endeavoured to reconcile it w ith th e old idea of a sh arp division betw een sciences.

The idea of coordination a n d th e principles of coordination w ere especially popular in Russia (M. Troitsky, G. G rot an d others). With G rot th e idea of evolution is reflected in th e division of sciences into: non organic, organic an d superorganic. He gives a characteristic of his schem e as a fusion of th e positivistic Comte m ethod an d th e evolutionary point of view of Spencer. Much m ore progressive an d containing some new ideas wais th e schem e of I. iPotchesky. He tried to p resent th e principle of developm ent (evolution) of n atu re a n d th e disunion

(rami-The H isto ry of th e C lassification of S ciences ₁₈₁

fication) of the developm ent line, iwlhich wals inh eren t. In accord w ith his idea h e bu ilt a “cone of sciences” w h ere n o t o n ly th e objective foundation of th e system of sciences, b u t also th e facto r of know ledge w as considered.

In connection w ith “neopositivism ” (the V ienna circle) becoming popular in th e W est a classification of sciences has been w orked o u t on a logic-positivistic foundation. A typical case is here the geom etric principle of coordination by P. G ppenheim (Germany), th e effect being th a t th e re a l union a n d th e tran sitio n b etw een m od ern sciences has no t been taken into consideration. The au th o r sta rted from several antitheses, like: n a tu re — spirit. A ccepting th e contradictions: typical-individual an d concrete-abstract th e au th o r has b u ilt on th is foundation a “sq u are of sciences” w hich w as supposed to- contain n ot o n ly a ll sciences, b u t

also all th e ir m ethodological cross-sections.

A S y rian scientist J. M ouhasscb attem p ted to- co n struct a system of sciences on th e foundation of a symbolic scheme: passing from a sim ple object (for instance a m athem atical object) to a m ore com plex one (for instance a mechanical object) we add, according to the author, a cer­ tain m agnitude (quantity) to th e startin g point, w h at perm its us to sym ­ bolize the w hole process of complications of objects (according to learning about them ) independently of their natu re.

In F rance an d in S w itzerland neopositivism in th e above dom ain is represented among others by Meyerson. P iaget startin g from th e psy­ chological tre n d an d coming near to' m aterialism trie d to develop genetic epistemology in contradiction to th e usual static point o f view ' on h u m an knowledge. H e reaches as a re su lt th e cyclical scheme, w hich takes into consideration th e tran sitio n from su b ject to object a n d vice versa. P iaget indicates th a t classification of sciences has th e tendency to a n a tu ra l conclusion, w hich in his opinion is realized in psychosocM ogy (in th e stu d y of th e su bject itself) in individual and social aspects. H is system is assum ing th e refo re th e character of a “circle of sciences”.

Ph. F ran k considers th e problem of classification w hen an alysing the m u tu a l relations betw een philosophy a n d th e p articu lar sciences. A binding lin k betw een them is “th e philosophy of science”. The w hole know ledge (including science, philosophy and com m on sense) is re p re ­ sented b y F ran k in th e form of a circle whose te arin g leads to th e form ation of two “ends”, one scientific a n d th e o th er philosophic. The startin g prem ises and th e solution itse lf of th e problem of the u n ity of sciences is given by th e author in a p u rely positivistic cross-section. Bergmamn (U.S.) considers th e sam e problem s from th e position of logical positivism; he is n o t concerned w ith broad generalisations a n d th in k s such a problem is en tirely superfluous, b u t tu rn s his w hole attention to detailed phenom ena. He dissolves th e general factor (philo­ sophy) in p articu lar sciences. A sim ilar position is ta k e n by A. J. A yer.

182 B on ifati K e d ro v

The m ost reaction ary tren d s in th e above dom ain were rep resented by philosophic c u rre n ts directly 'bound u p w ith religious ideology: holism '(Smuts, A. M eyer-Abich), meoispiritualism (A. Reymond), neo- thomiism (J. M aritain).

H olists attem p ted to p u t in th e cen tre of th e system sp irit life accord­ ing to ftheir p rin cipal idealistic conception. They denied each possibility of a redu ctio n (or a union) of th is factor from hig h er to lower and accepted a n opposite motion, from low er to higher. Their w hole system of sciences w as th erefo re built n o t on a system fro m sim ple to complex, from low er to higher, b u t ju st th e opposite. Such principle even 'before th e b irth o f holism has been criticized b y Timilriaziev as being an ti- sd en tific a n d antihistoric.

A. Reymond, a Swiss sp iritu alist h as been critical “from th e rig h t” to the e a rly subjective-idealistic system s of sciences and ais foundation he, took th e form ulation of judgem ents an d trie d to introduce h ere “the principle of functional im m u tab ility ”, w hich ap p aren tly replaced the content of a form of thinking (notions, judgem ents) reflecting th e real bonds of th e subjects o f th e e x tern al w orld. By m eans of this principle Reym ond endeavoured to break th e sh arp division betw een sciences th a t w as introduced by Comte an d trie d to express th e relativity, th e m obility of the boundaries 'between sciences, as one of - th e m ost im portant m ark s of m odern science. He attain e d on ly a p u re relativism and formalism.

J. M aritain, th e a u th o r of neothom ism started from the prem ise th a t th e re a re th ree grades of abstraction: 1) “physics” (in a broad m eaning of th is word, th a t is n a tu ra l sciences) has to do w ith the subject w hich cannot exist w ith o ut m a tter and cannot be understood w ithout it; 2) m athem atics has to do w ith subjects w hich cannot exist w ithout m atter, b u t w hich can b e understood w itho ut it; 3) su p ern atu ral know­ ledge (m etaphysics) h as to do w ith su b jects w hich m ay be understood a n d m ay exist w ith ou t m atter; w e have here th e notions “God” and “p ure sp irits” a n d o th er general ab strac t notions. O n th e basis of this differen tiatio n M aritain builds his system of sciences.

A fter th e second «world w ar th e influence of neothom ism became considerable especially on science and its system atization. In connection w ith th is influence we have an intensification of th e c u rre n t of objec­ tive idealism (together w ith its “m etaphysics” a n d w ith “ontology”) at th e cost of neopositivism and subjective idealism in general. H artm ann for instance deals from this position w ith the reciprocal relations an d bonds betw een sciences. Schneider, a W est G erm an philosopher, in his w ork Philosophy and the Particular Sciences (1955) has shown th at, ta k en th e philosophic subjectivism a n d agnosticism as basis, th e bond betw een philosophy a n d p articu lar sciences is impossible,

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The H isto ry of th e C lassification of S ciences 183

for th e ir purposes th e problem ol th e system atization of sciences. Pope P iu s X II w rote about th e th ree tools of tr u th '(science, philosophy a n d revelation), of Which rev elatio n in h is view is th e highest a n d th e tw o o th ers should be subordinated to it. The sam e has been w ritte n by neothom ists (Gilson and his pupil de W ulf for instance have b u ilt a three stage pyram id: a t the 'bottom p a rticu la r sciences, general or philosophical! am th e middle, theology a t th e (top).

A t th e XI In tern ation al Philosophic Congress (B russels 1955) th e re w ere attem p ts to su b stan tiate tlhe th e o ry of sciences to g e th er w ith th e classification of sciences from th e position of objective idealism (Ysaye) a n d neothom ism (Aebi, Brinlkmann), T rying from th e religious point of view (or approaching th e religious) to explain th e general problem of scientific m ethodology a n d th e m u tu al relatio n s b etw een then- various aspects, 'as w ell as t h e problem of th e p a rtic u la r groups of sciences (for instance m athem atical, technological an d others) Aebi b uilt a scheme of th e g en eral system of sciences w hich te rm in ated in “full life”, “san ctity ”, w hich in his view is th e final goal of m a n ’s existence,' as if -crowning th e “n a tu ra l” system of sciences.

From th e theological - position a classification o f sciences has been given by v an Laer, a D utch philosopher a n d exp ert in n a tu ra l sciences. T he auth or is dividing sciences according to th e ir “m a teria l” a n d form al objects. The firs t one includes “God” as a sep arate subject. In th is w ay th e principle, ap p are n tly “objective” is exposed in reality as p u rely artificial, subordinated to a religious ideology.

A special place is talkem by th e m athem atical-logical studies in th e dom ain of th e stru ctu re of sciences, th e stru ctu re of scientific know ledge (for instance Bertaiamffy) w hich are closely connected w ith th e classifi­ cation of sciences a n d are used for its logical foundation from th e posi­ tion of th is o r o ther philosophy. Its p urpose is to fin d o u t a n issue from th e -chaos of the v arious tre n d s wlhich a r e not included in one p o in t of view, o ften en tirely em pirical, descriptive, w hich exist in th e con­ tem porary science of th e West.

The theoretical th ou gh t how ever th a t is dom inating in th e capitalistic countries is en tirely tunable to- lead science o u t of th is chaos, w hich is devoid o-f o rd er and unity.

2) The M arxist classification of sciences subsequent to Engels. A lthough Lenin 'did no t 'study th is problem , he developed it an d enriched th e fu n dam ental prem ises of m aterialistic dialectics w hich la te r becam e th e basis of th e m odem M arxist classification of sciences. In his w ork M aterialism and Em piriocriticism L enin has' show n th e w ay in w hich th e objective principle of science should b e elaborated, a n d how th e effects of the la test revolution in n a tu ra l sciences, especially in th e domain of th e know ledge of th e s tru c tu re of m atter, should be

184 B on ifati K e d ro v

generalized. In his Philosophic Notes 1 a n d his w ork Once More A bout the Trade Unions Lenin w orked out th e principles of M arxist dialectical logic w hich can h e directly applied to th e problem of th e classification of sciences. W ith fu ll force L enin advanced th e dem and for a n objective approach, rejecting every k in d of subjectivism . O f great im portance are his suggestions as to th e necessity of preserving the u n ity betw een the historical a n d logical factors, of -taking in to consideration th e [dis­ union of th e u n ity in to con tradictory p arts, of considering th e tran sitio n an d the bond of phenom ena and th e -cooperation o f th eo ry w ith practice.

In th e first years of the Soviet ru le in Russia th e idea of M arxist classification of sciences did n o t y et come to the surface. Some system s whose auth ors w ere adhering in some -way to- th e schemes a n d principles of th e usu al form al clasBification (B. G ustchin, W. Ivanovsky and others) became popular. The w orks of Tim iriaziev w ere a n exception. They -were based on a broad historical-revolutionary principle a n d approached th e M arxist classification of sciences. In 1925 Engels’ Dialectics of Nature w as published, containing his classification of sciences.

A big stim ulus for a fu rth e r elaboration of this problem w ere L enin’s Philosophic Notes 2 published in 1930. A nd yet the first attem p ts to base ithe classification of sciences on th e ideas of M arx, Engels an d Lenin had a n u n fo rtu n a te end, a s th e authors based th e ir w orks p rac­ tically on th e position of m echanism. A characteristic exam ple we have w ith E. Somov. Q uite adversely and from a position near to H egelianism these problem s h iv e been p u t a n d solved by W- Roshitchin.

Studies of th e o rd er of th e p a rtic u la r sciences in th e general system of sciences an d th e definition of th e ir subjects preceded -the solution of the w hole problem . So fo r instance fN. Siemionov stu d ied th e boundaries betw een physics an d chem istry from th e view point of the definition of sciences iby Engels. The classification of n a tu ra l sciences has -been elaborated b y C. Shm idt, w ho -started from L enin’s assertion dealing w ith th e m ovem ent of know ledge from living observation to abstractive thought and from it to practice. S hm idt has stu d ied especially th e boundaries betw een n a tu ra l sciences and technology dem onstrating th a t these -boundaries dividing them are g rad u ally 'being effaced. The general idea of M arxist classification w as form ulated by E. B arkash and S. T uretsky.

In m any w orks w e have a -dogmatic approach to th e idea of Engels try in g to uphold bis scheme although in science m any changes have occurred. In o th er w orks how ever i(E. Koilman, M. -Rutkievich, W. Bu- kanovsky a n d others) th e necessity w as stressed to m ake some changes in th e concrete schem e of Engels, especially in th e a rt dealing w ith

1 Философские тетради. 2 Философские тетради.

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subatom ic physics, observing how ever th e general diailectical-maiterialist principles of Engels.

Some of th e authors (S trum ilin a n d others) have w orked o u t th e idea of a cyclic 'character o f th e general system of sciences. A tria l o f classification of 'sciences from th e m aterialist-dialectical position has. been u nd ertak en also by a Y ugoslav scholar N. Milonkovic.

The a u th o r of th e p resen t rep o rt is studying ev er since 1945 th e problem s here discussed in th e ir historic a n d logical crosssections. H is chief attentio n is devoted to th e M arxist elaboration of th e classification of sciences. This iis a question how ever w hich tran sg resses th e fra m e of the p resen t report.