Tolerance in law

Paweł Polaczuk

Tolerance in law

Studia Prawnoustrojowe nr 25, 113-125

2014

P aw eł Polaczuk

K a te d ra Teorii i Filozofii P ra w a i P a ń s tw a W ydział P ra w a i A d m in istracji UWM

Tolerance in law

In tr o d u c tio n

T h is a rtic le d iscu sses th e co n tro v e rsy su rro u n d in g sam e-sex civil p a r t ­ n e rsh ip s. T he key concept in th is d e b a te w ill be to le ra n c e - c u r re n t p ractice d e m o n stra te s t h a t a n a ly se s o f leg al re g u la tio n s re la tin g to sam e-sex p a r tn e r ­ sh ip s sh o u ld focus on th e p rob lem of d iscrim in atio n . D iscim in atio n is one of th e p rin c ip a l a rg u m e n ts u se d by th e p ro p o n e n ts of sam e-sex p a r tn e rs h ip s to defend th e ir case. F o r th is re a so n , to lera n ce, a concept t h a t is asy m m e tric a l to d isc rim in a tio n , sh o u ld be ex a m in e d in g re a te r d e ta il to e s ta b lis h a clear a n d objective b ac k g ro u n d for discussion. C o n tra ry to a p p e a ra n c e s , th e notio n of to le ra n c e s u p p o rts a d e b a te in b ro a d e r p ersp ectiv e w h ich is d e te rm in e d by social, p olitical a n d leg al n o rm s t h a t a re th e b u ild in g blocks of lib e ra l d em o­ cracy. I f th e concept of d is c rim in a tio n w ere th e p iv o tal p o in t o f th is d iscu s­ sion, th e m a in focus w ould be a u to m a tic a lly sh ifted to leg al a sp e cts of th e problem , th u s - a t le a s t from th e p o in t of v iew o f th o se w ho oppose sam e-sex p a r tn e rs h ip s - p re ju d g in g th e co n te n t of social a n d political no rm s. T he second re m a rk re la te s to th e w ay to le ra n c e is u n d e rsto o d in th is article. V arious d efin itio n s of th e concept w ill be d iscu ssed, b u t its lexical defin itions w ill be d is re g a rd e d 1. As re g a rd s d ic tio n a ry d efin itio n s of to lera n ce, it sho uld be n o ted t h a t to le ra n c e took on a specific m e a n in g w h ich ex te n d s beyond th e re a lm o f re lig io n a n d m a n ife sts o u r a ttitu d e s to w a rd s d iffe ren t ph ilosop hical view s, cu sto m s, lifestyles, in te re s ts , e s th e tic p referen ces, etc.2

T h ere a re s e v e ra l re a so n s w hy d ic tio n a ry d efin itio n s o f th e concept sh o­ u ld b e ab a n d o n ed in th is d eb ate. Above all, o u r u n d e r s ta n d in g of to lera n ce

1 T. Grabińska, U źródeł dyskusji o tolerancji, „Archeus” 2005, no. 6, p. 48-49.

2 A. Podsiadło, Z. Więckowski, M ały słow nik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych dla stu d iu ją ­ cych filozofię chrześcijańską, Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, Warszawa 1983, p. 399; T. Grabińska, op. cit., p. 49.

h a s ch a n g ed d y n am ica lly over th e y e a rs. P ro fe sso r L eg utko rig h tly n otes t h a t to le ra n c e h a s a grow ing d e m a n d for itself. T h e above o b serv atio n r e la ­ te s to n e g a tiv e co n n o tatio n s of to lera n ce (risk o f ab so lu tizatio n ), b u t it a d e ­ q u a te ly illu s tr a te s th is d y n am ic ch a n g e p rocess w h ich is m a n ife ste d by a s im u lta n e o u s in c re a se in to le ra n t p ra c tic e s as w ell as in to le ra n t b ehav iors. W h en th e m e a n in g of to lera n ce is th u s n a rro w e d down, it escapes d ictio n ary definition. I t sh o u ld also be n o ted t h a t th e d yn am ics of th e d iscu ssed concept does n o t h av e a n u n a m b ig u o u s d efinition. A ccording to L eg utko , its ju s tific a ­ tio n c a n be a source of n eg a tiv e e v a lu a tio n s of social b eh a v io rs. In o th e r w ords, th is n e g a tiv e e v a lu a tio n e m a n a te s from th e ju s tific a tio n of th e d y n a ­ m ic n a tu r e of to le ra n c e r a th e r th a n from th e concept itself. L eg utko ad d s t h a t co n tem p o rary societies d e m a n d to le ra n c e for every id ea, d o ctrin e or belief. P ro p o n e n ts of a giv en view a re re le a se d from th e o b lig atio n to p re s e n t th e i r a r g u m e n ts b e c a u se ev e ry d e m a n d for ju s tif ic a tio n is re g a rd e d as a m a n ife sta tio n of in to le ra n c e on b e h a lf o f th o se w ho p u t fo rw ard su ch d em an d s. A ccording to L egutko, su ch a ttitu d e s im p ly ig n o ran c e of in te lle c tu ­ a l a n d m o ra l costs a sso c ia te d w ith th is cu rio u s h egem on y o f c a te g o riz a tio n 3. T h e above a u th o r a rg u e s t h a t ig n o ran c e c a n give ris e to a m e c h a n ism w hich h e describ es as grow ing d e m a n d for self-to lerance. T his p h e n o m en o n is m a ­ n ife ste d by a s im u lta n e o u s in c re a se in to le ra n t p ra c tic e s as w ell as in to le ­ r a n t b e h a v io rs4.

T h e p re ced in g sectio n ex p lain s th e lim ita tio n s t h a t ap p ly to th e p re s e n ­ te d a rg u m e n ts. T he objective of th e d iscu ssio n re m a in s to be specified in g re a te r d etail. T he concept of to lera n ce w ill be th e sp rin g b o a rd for th e d e b a te on leg al re g u la tio n s app licab le to sam e-sex civil p a rtn e rs h ip s . A t­ te m p ts w ill be m ad e to d e m o n s tra te t h a t a n e x is te n tia l a n d axiological a p ­ p ro a ch m ore effectively id en tifies social co n tro v ersies. In o th e r w ords, a n e x is te n tia l a n d axiological a p p ro a c h b rin g s th e d efin itio n of to lera n ce closer to th e n a tu r e of to le ra n c e -re la te d conflicts.

1. P r e lim in a r y rem a rk s a b o u t a n e x is te n tia l

a n d a x io lo g ic a l a p p ro a ch

L e t m e b eg in w ith se v e ra l re m a rk s t h a t c h a ra c te riz e th e e x is te n tia l a n d axiological ap p ro ach . R eferences w ill be m ad e to th e p rev io u s re m a rk s ab o u t th e concept of to leran ce. As m e n tio n e d ea rlier, social p ra c tic e s re la tin g to to le ra n c e ch a n g e dynam ically. F o r th is re aso n , th e lexical n u c le u s of th e concept sh o u ld be id e n tifie d b a s e d on th e fu n d a m e n ta l te n e ts of lib e ra l dem ocracy. B asic p rin cip les c a n be re c o n s tru c te d from lib e ra l ideology, b u t

3 R. Legutko, E tyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte, Arcana, Kraków 1994, 2005, p. 156. 4 Ibidem.

th is p ra ctice m ay be q u e stio n e d by its opp o n en ts. T h e u se of ideological fu n d a m e n ta ls of lib e ra lis m w ould pro b ab ly also defy th e d y n am ic n a tu r e of social p ra c tic e s re la tin g to to lera n ce. I t sh o u ld be n o ted t h a t th e o pp o n en ts of sam e-sex civil u n io n s re fe r to th e d efin itio n of to le ra n c e w hich is ro o ted in lib e ra l ideology. F o r th o se re a so n s, a d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tio n key sh o u ld be found. Ideally, th e proposed a p p ro a c h sh o u ld su p p o rt a d e b a te t h a t is n o t confined to th e re a lm of lib e ra l ideology. S u ch a p o ssib ility is offered by th e e x iste n tia l a n d axiological a p p ro a c h w hich u n d e rp in s lib e ra l dem ocracies - from th e p o in t o f view o f th o se sy ste m s’ real-life fu n d a m e n ta ls. T hey ca n n o t be assig n e d to lib e ra l ideology or q u e stio n e d w ith o u t n e g a tin g th e re a lity of lib e ra l d em ocratic sta te s.

2. Two j u s tific a tio n s fo r to le r a n c e

L et m e b eg in w ith a n o b serv atio n re la tin g to ju s tific a tio n o f to leran ce. Two m odels a re possible. T he firs t ju stifie s to le ra n c e by d esc rib in g th e a c tu a l s itu a tio n . T h is a p p ro a c h w as pro posed by Locke. T he a c tu a l s itu a tio n is describ ed by facts su ch a s v a ria b le goals (goods) p u rs u e d by people an d d iffe ren t opinions ab o u t th e tr u t h s p re a c h e d by religion. T he re s u ltin g te n ­ sion c o n trib u te s to th e ris k of social conflict (w ar), th e re fo re th e p o s tu la te of to le ra n c e m ay be see n a s a w a r d e te r r e n t5. M arcin K ról, who fo rm u la te d th e above o b serv atio n s, a rg u e s t h a t in th is ap p ro ach , to le ra n c e is a conflict re so lu tio n tool. T olerance p re v e n ts violence (coercion). A ccording to th e above au th o r, th is d efin itio n of to le ra n c e is stro n g ly ro o ted in lib e ra l th e o ry an d p ra c tic e 6. T he second ju s tific a tio n m ak es a re fere n ce to th e id ea o f freedom . M ill’s fo rm u la w hich p o s tu la te s in d iv id u a l freed om w ith o u t h a rm in g o th e rs is a n eg a tiv e a p p ro a c h to freedom w h ich d en o tes th e freed om “from ”. I n te r e ­ stingly, th is n e g a tiv e concept of freedom co rresp o n d s to to le ra n c e in a p o s iti­ ve sense. In o th e r w ords, freed om from o p p re ssio n a n d freed om from th e d o m in a n t role of public opinion b re e d s to le ra n c e for all social n o rm s, v alu es a n d b eh av io rs. A ccording to K ról, th e above m e c h a n ism im p lies t h a t th e m ore we focus on p ro te c tin g o u r in d iv id u a l freed om s a g a in s t e x te rn a l in te ­ rv e n tio n , th e m ore w e em p ow er o th e rs to do th e sam e, a n d consequently, we to le ra te th e ir b e h a v io r7. T herefo re, we to le ra te d iffe re n t p o in ts of view in fe a r o f th e consequences of in to le ra n c e , w h ich im p lies t h a t th e significance of in d iv id u a l freedom logically lead s to to le ra n c e 8.

5 M. Król, Tolerancja w teorii i praktyce liberalizm u, [in:] I. Jakubowska-Branicka (ed.),

O tolerancji we współczesnej demokracji liberalnej, TRIO, Warszawa 2010, p. 42. 6 Ibidem.

7 Ibidem, p. 44. 8 Ibidem.

In the above context, Król examines the tolerance of homosexuality in a negative and positive sense. In the first approach, tolerance stems from fears surrounding the possibility of debate about the nature of homosexuali­ ty (natural laws, religious norms) which cannot be unambiguously resolved. The same approach is used to interpret opposition to homophobia. This line of argument (negative tolerance, justification of tolerance by making a refe­ rence to anticipated facts) is adopted by the opponents of same-sex civil partnerships. In a parliamentary debate, the opponents argued that same- sex partnerships defy the laws of nature (Krystyna Pawłowicz, MP). Similar slogans were used during street protests, including “Not secular, not rainbow colored, but Catholic Poland”, “Poland free of deviant behavior”, “Man is born normal, not homosexual”, and in official statements made by “public” opponents of same-sex civil partnerships. The organizer of the protest march held on 5 May 2013, Anna Kołakowska of the Rosary Crusade for Poland, told the Polish Press Agency: “Normal behavior is prosecuted in contempora­ ry Poland. We are not allowed to live like our ancestors, we are forced to be modern. Modern implies being open to all sorts of deviances, it means rejec­ ting all values or concluding that all values are relative”9.

The correspondence between justification of negative tolerance and the arguments put forward by opponents of same-sex civil partnerships is bro­ ken when we delve into their interpretation of Locke’s logic. The logic based on arguments that justify tolerance is also interpreted as an argument aga­ inst classifying tolerance as a key social and legal principle10. Legutko sear­ ches for clues in Locke’s proclamation of tolerance that would restore the concept’s original significance. The above author observes that for Locke, the need for tolerance was justified by the need to humbly succumb to the truth. Locke challenged the king, who was empowered to prosecute false religions and protect the only true religion, to display tolerance in his actions. Depri­ ved of the ability to arrive at positive solutions or resolve religious conflicts in a rational manner, the king had to turn the antagonists’ attention to the fact that seemingly righteous views, judgments, norms and ideas can be transformed into political instruments. The king should not give preferential treatment to any of the conflicted parties11. Similarly to Król, Legutko reco­ gnizes that the above concept exemplifies negative tolerance. It is negative not because tolerance can prevent social tension, but because this approach does not expound or promote the truth, nor does it contribute intellectually to its achievement12. The place of tolerance is determined by the so called

9 Zob. [online] <www.tvn24.pl/maszerowali-w-obrome-rodzmy-i-wartosci-katolickich-stop- homodyktatowi,323413,s.html>.

10 R. Legutko, E tyka absolutna..., p. 155. 11 Ibidem, p. 160.

“u ltim a te s ta n d a r d s ” (th e tru th ). O n acco u n t o f th o se s ta n d a r d s , view s, opi­ nio n s or id eas sh o u ld n o t be tra n s fo rm e d in to p olitical in s tru m e n ts . T o leran ­ ce e n d s w h e n th o se view s a re co n fro n ted w ith th e “u ltim a te s ta n d a r d s ”. The essence of th o se s ta n d a r d s , how ever, is n o t ex p lain ed . We c a n only in fe r th a t th e y im ply tra d itio n s , cu sto m s a n d religiou s beliefs w hich, w ith o u t a b a n on th e p o liticiz atio n o f n ew id eas, w ould be re g a rd e d as d e trim e n ta l to social d ev e lo p m e n t13. L egutko q u o tes Locke w ho d rew a p a ra lle l b e tw e e n to leran ce a n d th e b e lie f in th e leg itim a cy of h is religion, a s w ell as V oltaire w hose concept o f to lera n ce, id e n tifie d a s d e p re c ia tio n o f th e sa c re d s ta tu s o f c e rta in beliefs a n d opinions, could be reconciled w ith th e fact t h a t som e societies a re d o m in a te d by one re lig io n 14.

In th e cited in te rp re ta tio n s , to le ra n c e im p lies a b a n on tra n s fo rm in g view s, ju d g m e n ts, n o rm s a n d id eas t h a t differ from th e “u ltim a te s ta n d a r d s ” in to political tools. A lth o u g h Locke ad v o c ated im p a rtia l tr e a tm e n t of p a rtie s to th e conflict, he w as convinced of th e v a lid ity o f only one religion. T h erefo ­ re, th e only “tr u e ” a rg u m e n t in th is a p p ro a c h to to lera n ce is th e fe a r t h a t cognitive fu n ctio n s o f fa ith could be n eg a te d . In th is con tex t, to to le ra te m e a n s to accept th e epistem ological v a lu e o f re lig io n a n d to p ro te c t relig io n by p ro h ib itin g th e p o liticiz atio n of id eas or n o rm s w hich a re in c o n siste n t w ith relig io u s te n e ts. In sim p le te rm s, to to le ra te m e a n s to p ro te c t th e v e ra c ity of fa ith by b a n n in g th e tr a n s f e r of d isc o rd a n t view s, n o rm s an d id eas to p ub lic life. T he above in te rp re ta tio n gives ris e to oversim plified beliefs ab o u t th e p ro p o n e n ts of to lera n ce. A ccording to th is lin e of th o u g h t, in th e ir deep re g a rd for re a s o n a n d ra tio n a lity , th e p ro p o n e n ts of to lera n ce alleg edly claim t h a t social a n d political life w ould becom e sa fe r if re a s o n re p la c e d fa ith a s th e b asic cognitive tool, becom ing th e source o f o u r know - led g e15.

I n te r p re ta tio n s o f Locke’s p hilosophy t h a t re ly on th e b e lie f in relig iou s rig h te o u s n e ss also e x p la in th e m e a n in g o f a rg u m e n ts b a se d on th e opposing concepts of n o rm a lity a n d deviance. T he k now ledge of n o rm s a n d d ev iatio n s from th e n o rm u n d e rp in s a rg u m e n ts w h e re th e concept o f n a tu r a l law is b a se d on th e p erceiv ed conform ity o f know ledge a n d re v elatio n . R easo n is only a m e d iu m for discovering th e re v e a le d tr u th . I t could seem t h a t th e above w ould lim it tr a d itio n a l relig io u s claim s to th e e x te n t w hich is a c c e p ta ­ ble by th e o p p o n en ts of sam e-sex civil p a r tn e rs h ip s , a n d m in im ize th e d isso ­ n an c e b e tw e e n know ledge a n d f a ith 16. T h is is n o t th e case, how ever. E v en if th e d o m ain s of re a so n a n d fa ith a re in te rre la te d on th e a s s u m p tio n t h a t

13 Ibidem. 14 Ibidem.

15 R. Legutko, Tolerancja. Rzecz o surowym państwie, prawie natury, miłości i sum ieniu,

Kraków 1997, p. 63. 16 Ibidem, p. 66.

certain fragments of the revealed truth can be subjected to rational, discour­ sive cognition, this approach fails to explain the laws of nature, and it does not distinguish between good and evil17. Any measures that allow for disco­ ursive cognition are classified as anti-religious in nature.

In the negative approach towards tolerance, the discussed concept is degraded to a non-intrinsic value. In this sense, tolerance is associated with attributes, attitudes and emotions that have been named in contemporary culture. A tolerant approach implies generosity, gentility, good will, good manners, knowledge, sense of justice, openness and respect for others. Tole­ rance aggregates all of those features, but when evaluated separately from those attitudes, attributes and emotions, it becomes an empty concept18. In the author’s opinion, the advancement of tolerance without the promotion of other forms of moral behavior is harmful. At best, it is an ethical speculation, and at worst, the propagation of pure tolerance jeopardizes the rules of social conduct. Tolerance becomes an abstract, arbitrary social principle which is unrelated to experience and which is imposed on others on the assumption that it will contribute to social harmony and peace19.

The concept of positive tolerance has been mentioned in previous sec­ tions of this paper. The arguments raised by the opponents of same-sex civil partnerships invalidate the justification that makes a reference to greater individual freedoms because the cited postulates rely on or a rooted in the “ultimate standards”. The proponents of negative tolerance do not put for­ ward arguments regarding same-sex parenting. In a sense, they are doomed to the arguments justifying positive tolerance. Those arguments play a very important role in the debate on the legalization of same-sex civil partner­ ships and same-sex couples’ rights to adopt children. The arguments raised in the positive approach oppose same-sex parenting. The proponents of posi­ tive tolerance maintain that homosexual practices do not limit other people’s freedoms and that positive tolerance of homosexuality expands civil liberties. When it comes to adoption, those freedoms are restricted on account of public reactions20. This is an important point. The arguments formulated by protesters who rallied against the legalization of same-sex partnerships on 5 May 2013 also concerned children raised by homosexual couples: “Don’t harm our children” or “Fighting for our children”21. Paradoxically, the argu­ ments raised by the opponents of same-sex civil partnerships can be defen­ ded from the point of view of one of the discussed justifications of tolerance.

17 Ibidem, p. 65.

18 R. Legutko, E tyka absolutna..., p. 157. 19 Ibidem.

20 M. Król, op. cit., p. 46.

21 Zob. [online] <www.tvn24.pl/maszerowali-w-obronie-rodzmy-i-wartosci-katolickich-stop- homodyktatowi,323413,s.html>.

3. P r o b le m a tic a r g u m e n ts in P o lis h d e b a te

T he a rg u m e n t p ro m o ted by, am o n g o th e rs, K ry sty n a Paw łow icz, MP, is m o st p ro b lem atic. In a p a r lia m e n ta ry d eb a te , Paw łow icz s ta te d t h a t th e d ra ft a c t leg alizin g sam e-sex civil u n io n s is h a rm fu l a n d u n ju s t a n d t h a t it v io lates th e P o lish C o n s titu tio n , th e p rin cip le of e q u a lity a n d th e rig h t to intim acy. I t s u p p o rts e x h ib itio n istic m a n ife sta tio n s o f sex u a l p re fere n ces in th e p ublic a r e n a w h ich v io lates th e e s th e tic a n d m o ral p rin cip les of m o st P o lish people.

Two issu e s sh o u ld be ex a m in e d in g re a te r d etail. T h e firs t concerns th e v a lu e s t h a t a re p ro te c te d u n d e r th e law. T he q u e stio n a ris e s as to w h e th e r conflicts su rro u n d in g to le ra n c e ca n be resolved th ro u g h referen ce to core v a lu e s su c h as ju s tic e a n d equality. T he o p p o n en ts o f sam e-sex p a r tn e rs h ip s seem to th in k t h a t th is is possible. A sim ila r a p p ro a c h h a s b ee n a d o p ted by P ro fe sso r L eg u tk o w ho q u o tes th e case of J e a n C alas, a P r o te s ta n t w ho w as se n te n c e d to d e a th for k illin g h is C ath o lic son. L egu tk o a sk s rh e to ric ally w h e th e r C alas w as se n te n c e d to d e a th b ec au se th e F re n c h leg al sy ste m h a d b ee n ineffective (F ra n c e w as n o t a law -ab id in g co u n try ) or b ec au se F re n c h C atho lics w ere in to le ra n t22. T h is q u e stio n w ill be d iscu ssed in fu r th e r sec­ tio n s o f th is paper. A ccording to L egutko , th e en fo rce m e n t of leg ally p ro te c ­ te d v a lu e s is a tr u e m e a s u re of to lera n ce. T he logic ad o p ted by th e cited m em b er of th e P o lish p a r lia m e n t defies th e above, even we w h e n acco u n t for th e fa ct t h a t th e a rg u m e n t b a c k ed by th e case of J e a n C alas concerns p u n i­ s h m e n t for m u rd er, w h e re a s th e p u rp o rte d v io latio n o f ju s tic e a n d e q u a lity claim ed by K ry sty n a P aw łow icz re la te s to th e le g a liz a tio n of sam e-sex p a r t ­ n e rsh ip s. In th e case of J e a n C alas, h is d isc rim in a tin g fe a tu re , n a m e ly re li­ gious d en o m in atio n , sh o u ld n o t be ta k e n in to acco u n t in ju ris d ic tio n b ec au se th e law p ro te c ts e q u a lity a n d ju stic e . In th e a rg u m e n t p u t fo rw ard by P aw ło ­ wicz, sam e-sex a ttra c tio n is n o t a n o bstacle t h a t dep riv es a p e rso n of leg al protectio n . A g u a r a n te e of p ro tec tio n m odeled on th e in s titu tio n o f m a rria g e is u n ju s t a n d in c o n siste n t w ith th e p rin cip le o f equality. L eg islato rs h av e o b serv ed on n u m e ro u s occasions t h a t th e prop o sed level o f p ro tec tio n offered to sam e-sex civil p a r tn e rs h ip s is b y fa r m ore lim ite d th a n t h a t w hich is s ta tu to rily g ra n te d to h e te ro se x u a l m a rria g e s.

T he above problem w ill be d iscu ssed a t g re a te r le n g th in successive p a r ts of th is artic le . L e t m e firs t an a ly z e th e alleg ed v io latio n o f e s th e tic an d m o ral p rin cip les. T his is a difficult a rg u m e n t b ec au se it a d d re ss e s th e n eed for a reliab le m e a s u re in a discu ssio n a b o u t th e in frin g e m e n t o f in d iv id u a l lib erties. A ccording to M arcin K ról, th e re a re no re lia b le m e a s u re s for id e n ti­ fying v io latio n s of p e rso n a l freedom s. H e ex em plifies h is a rg u m e n t w ith

e s th e tic ju d g m e n ts a n d n o tes t h a t w h e re a s ju d g m e n ts a n d o pinions ch an g e over tim e , th e p rin c ip a l te n e ts of h u m a n e sth e tic s re m a in c o n stan t.

T h e re s u ltin g d ilem m a c a n be n a rro w e d dow n to a case in w h ich fre ­ edom of e x p ressio n does n o t in frin g e u p o n o th e r peo ple’s freedom s, b u t v io lates th e ir dignity. T he above is th e c e n tra l cru x of th e s ta te m e n t t h a t a sam e-sex couple is a n “e sth e tic a lly u n p le a s a n t” sig h t. I w ill d is re g a rd th e fa ct t h a t th is is a w e ak a rg u m e n t in a d e b a te on th e le g a liz a tio n of sam e-sex civil p a rtn e rs h ip s . I w ill also ignore p o te n tia l conflicts of in te r e s t b ecau se I fin d su ch conflicts difficult to id en tify in th e d iscu ssed co n tex t (in th e N e th e rla n d s , p ro te s ts in itia te d a g a in s t sam e-sex couples liv ing in th e n e ig h ­ borhood a re ex p ressio n s of p e rso n a l freedom , th e y a re sta g e d to m a in ta in a sen se o f se c u rity a n d w ell-being, a n d th e y a re n o t m a n ife sta tio n s o f in to le ­ ra n ce. P ro te s ts w h ich a re devoid of su ch objectives a re in d ic a to rs of in to le ­ r a n t a ttitu d e s ). C onflicts b e tw e e n in d iv id u a l rig h ts vs. collective rig h ts w ill n o t be d iscu ssed eith er. A rg u m e n ts of th e ty p e a re difficult to id en tify in K ry sty n a Paw low icz’s h ig h ly em o tio n al speech, ev en if w e a s s u m e t h a t she spoke on b e h a lf of th e m ajority.

T h e p roblem w ith th e d iscu ssed M P ’s a rg u m e n t is t h a t ev eryon e h a s th e r ig h t to d ig n ity a n d freedom in th e p ublic a re n a . P e rso n a l d ig n ity is v io lated by c re a tin g stim u li w h ich a re ta rg e te d a g a in s t s e n sitiv e a re a s su c h as fa ith , sa c re d v a lu e s a n d beliefs. A v io latio n of p e rso n a l freed om m ay involve a b re a c h of th e freedom to choose a n en v iro n m e n t in w h ich sac red v a lu e s a n d d ig n ity re m a in in ta c t. T he d iscu ssed p ro blem m o st com m only su rfa ces in conflicts su rro u n d in g th e freedom of a r tis tic ex p ressio n , b u t n o t only. M a n i­ fe sta tio n s of p e rso n a l beliefs ca n also be p ro b lem a tic b e c au se th e y le a d to p o te n tia l conflicts b e tw e e n one p a r ty ’s p e rs o n a l freedo m a n d a n o th e r p a r ty ’s p e rso n a l d ig n ity 23.

4. E x is te n tia l a n d a x io lo g ic a l r e fle c tio n

T h e above o b serv atio n s of p e rso n a l dignity, freedo m of e x p ressio n in th e p ublic d o m ain a n d possible conflicts h av e b ee n fo rm u la te d by P ro fe sso r H a n ­ n a Sw ida-Z iem ba. T he p re s e n te d a p p ro a c h to th e p ro b lem ex te n d s beyond th e d iscu ssed ju s tific a tio n of n eg a tiv e a n d p ositive to leran ce. It is deriv ed from a d e e p e r re flectio n t h a t h a s b e e n fo rm u la te d in th e in tro d u c tio n to g e­ t h e r w ith th e e x is te n tia l a n d axiological re flectio n w h ich w ill be d iscu ssed in th e fin a l sectio n of th e article.

23 H. Swida-Ziemba, D ylem aty m iędzy wolnością w spólnota w dem okracji liberalnej, [in:] I. Jakubowska-Branicka (ed.), O tolerancji we współczesnej dem okracji liberalnej, TRIO, War­ szawa 2010, p. 121-122.

In a p e rso n a l re flectio n on th e sub ject of to lera n ce, S w ida-Z iem ba arg u es t h a t th e s ta tu s o f to le ra n c e c a n n o t be clarified w ith o u t an a ly z in g axiological a n d e x is te n tia l a s su m p tio n s t h a t lie a t th e h e a r t of lib e ra l dem ocracy. Accor­ ding to th e cited au th o r, lib e ra l dem ocracy is b u ilt u p o n e x is te n tia l t r u th s ab o u t th e n a tu r e of th e h u m a n w orld a n d th e w orld c re a te d by m a n 24. H e r th e o ry re lie s on th e fu n d a m e n ta l p re m ise t h a t a n in d iv id u a l is th e source of e v e ry th in g in th e w orld25. E v e ry th in g b eg in s w ith a n in d iv id u a l life process, w h e re a s id eas, “b in d in g u n iv e rs a ls ”, a re u n re a l objects, h y p o sta se s, h u m a n im a g in a tio n s w hose ex isten ce c a n be a ttr ib u te d to th e fact t h a t h u m a n s h av e th e n ee d a n d th e ab ility to co m m u n icate a n d sh a re in sig h ts, a n d t h a t th is ex c hange c re a te s a b s tra c t id eas a n d com m on beliefs26. T he in d iv id u a l is th e source of e v e ry th in g , b u t som e people believ e in h y p o sta se s as m a n ife s ta ­ tio n s of a su p re m e ex isten c e27.

A ccording to th e p rin cip les of lib e ra l dem ocracy, ev eryone h a s e q u a l rig h ts to freedom , d ig n ity a n d ex pression. A v io latio n of p e rso n a l freedom on acco u n t of a n in d iv id u a l’s d isc o rd a n t view s a n d op inions w ould be a n a n t i ­ th e s is of th e above28. S w ida-Z iem ba em p h a siz e s th e significance of citiz e n s’ “axiological a ttitu d e s ”. T he concern for th e te n e ts o f lib e ra l d em ocracy is th u s m a n ife ste d by th e conviction t h a t n o t only m y freedo m a n d dignity, b u t also th e freedom a n d d ig n ity of ev e ry in d iv id u a l a re th e m o st im p o rta n t v alu es. T he above re flectio n is ro o ted in th e g e n e ra lly acknow ledged an d u n d is p u ta b le o b se rv a tio n t h a t m a n is a social being. T he v ery n e e d for social coexistence is w h a t m a k e s th is conviction difficult to embody. O u r freedom of e x p ressio n n ee d s to be c u rta ile d to g u a r a n te e th e freed om a n d d ig n ity of o th e rs 29. T he above c o n sid e ra tio n p u ts a lid on p e rso n a l freedom . T he so u r­ ces o f in d iv id u a l e x p ressio n c a n le a d to d isa g re e m e n t. P eople h a rb o r diffe­ re n t n o tio n s a b o u t th e w orld, th e ir ow n lives or th e com m unity. Sw ida- Z iem ba re lie s on th e above ex am p les to illu s tr a te differences in ex p ressio n a n d a rg u e s t h a t freedom of ex p ressio n im p lies m ore th a n su b jectiv e need s a n d self-beliefs. In te r-in d iv id u a l differences e x te n d beyond a n a rro w lis t of sources of ex p ressio n , a n d th e y a re also m a n ife ste d in th e p u blic s p h e re of life30. In th e p ublic a re n a , u n lim ite d e x p ressio n c a n le a d to conflicts an d u n re so lv a b le d isp u te s over th e leg itim acy o f d iffe ren t n o tio n s ab o u t th e w orld a n d th e com m unity. P eople w ho h av e fixed p ercep tio n s ab o u t th e “a p p ro p ria te n o rm s ” t h a t d e te rm in e th e b e h a v io r of a ll co m m u n ity m em b ers

24 Ibidem, p. 107. 25 Ibidem, p. 108. 26 Ibidem. 27 Ibidem, p. 109. 28 Ibidem. 29 Ibidem, p. 110. 30 Ibidem, p. 111-112.

w ill look to d iffe re n t lifesty le choices as facto rs t h a t lim it th e ir p erso n al e x p ressio n , in h ib it th e ir n a tu r a l re a c tio n s, d is to rt th e m e a n in g of th e ir lives, th e ir d rive for self-fulfillm ent, le a d to su b ju g a tio n a n d e n sla v e m e n t31. Accor­ d in g to S w ida-Z iem ba, th o se in d iv id u a ls expect t h a t th e ir v a lu e s a n d no rm s, w h ich m ay be sh a re d b y m a n y o th e rs, sh o u ld be observ ed by all m em b ers of th e co m m u n ity 32. T he d iscu ssed p ro b lem also su rfa ces w h e n d iffe re n t b u t le g itim a te lifesty les coexist, a n d in d iv id u a ls hope to p rom o te th e p re fe rre d lifesty le m odel w hich will com pete a g a in s t o th e r m od els33. T h e above a u th o r exem plifies h e r a rg u m e n t by ju x ta p o s in g th e m odels of a lib e ra te d w om an a n d a housew ife. T he co m p etitio n b e tw e e n opposing m odels, p rov id ed th a t th e y a re s u p p o rte d by selected social g rou ps, ca n le a d to a tte m p ts to im pose a g iven lifesty le on o th e rs, it b re e d s conflict a n d p re v e n ts in d iv id u a ls from consciously choosing th e m ost a p p ro p ria te lifesty le34.

T h e q u e stio n of w hose p e rso n a l freedo m s sh o u ld b e lim ite d a n d w h e n to avoid a b re a c h of o th e r people’s so v ereig n ty is, th e re fo re , o f essence. Sw ida- Z iem ba a rg u e s t h a t c e rta in lim ita tio n s sh o u ld be im posed on th e legislator. In a lib e ra l dem ocracy, th e le g isla to r ab id es by th e su p re m e p rin cip le of re s p e c t for p e rs o n a l a u to n o m y 35. A d e m o c ra tic a lly ch o se n le g is la to r is a g u a r a n to r of p e rso n a l freedom a n d dignity. H e is n o t allow ed to enforce his ow n id eas if th e ir im p le m e n ta tio n could v io late p e rso n a l freedom , d ig n ity a n d th e rig h t to se lf-re a liz a tio n 36. T h e le g isla to r is u n d e r o b lig atio n to re g u ­ la te th e social life of d iv erse co m m u n itie s ev en i f th e ad o p ted ru le s w ere to lim it a n in d iv id u a l’s rig h t to u n in h ib ite d self-expression. T he le g isla to r m e ­ re ly re p re s e n ts citizen s w ho do n o t e n te r ta in id e n tic a l beliefs a b o u t life, th e c o m m u n ity o r th e w orld. T he law sh o u ld be c o n stru e d in a w ay t h a t does not in frin g e on in d iv id u a l rig h ts , b u t also p ro te c ts p e rso n a l freed om s a n d cre a te s a n objective e n v iro n m e n t for th e p u r s u it of d iffe re n t lifesty les37. T h e law sh o u ld be c h a ra c te riz e d by to lera n ce of d iffe ren t in d iv id u a l lifestyles.

A ccording to S w ida-Z iem ba, to le ra n c e in law sh o u ld n o t im p ly t h a t th e le g isla to r is p assiv e o r in d iffe re n t to a lte r n a tiv e lifesty les38. E v e n if th is d efin itio n of to le ra n c e ru n s p a ra lle l w ith p o p u la r social belief, to le ra n c e does n o t im p ly indifference. T h is is em p h asiz ed by th e cited a u th o r in a d isc u s­ sion ab o u t th e p rin cip le of re sp e c t for p e rso n a l so v ereig n ty a n d th e re s u ltin g lim ita tio n s for th e legislator. T he le g isla to r’s p ro activ e sta n c e is lim ite d by th e axiological n e u tr a lity of law. S w ida-Z iem ba a rg u e s t h a t th e concept of

31 Ibidem, p. 113. 32 Ibidem. 33 Ibidem, p. 115. 34 Ibidem, p. 114. 35 Ibidem, p. 115. 36 Ibidem, p. 116. 37 Ibidem, p. 115. 38 Ibidem, p. 117-118.

lib e ra l dem ocracy is s u s ta in e d w h e n everyone h a s e q u a l rig h t to p u rs u e d iffe ren t lifesty les39.

In conclusion, I w ill lis t th e m in im u m to le ra n c e re q u ire m e n ts fo rm u la ­ te d by S w ida-Z iem ba in th e re a lm of social p ra ctice r a th e r th a n law. N e v er­ th e le ss, th e y co rresp o n d to th e re q u ire m e n ts o f th e axiological n e u tr a lity of law, n a m e ly th e leg al b a n on p re fe re n tia l tr e a tm e n t to w a rd s a specific life­ style. T hose re q u ire m e n ts are:

• F irstly , p h y sical coercion in a n y sh a p e o r form m ay n o t b e a p p lie d to defend one’s lifestyle.

• Secondly, a ll a tte m p ts to leg itim ize a g iv en s e t of beliefs w h ich lim it an in d iv id u a l’s freedom to choose th e p re fe rre d lifesty le sh o u ld be legally b a n n e d . T hose re s tric tio n s sh o u ld also ap p ly w h e n th o se beliefs a re sh a re d by th e m ajority.

• Thirdly, iso lated individuals m ay n o t be subjected to public d iscrim inatio n by w hich th e m ajority subjects a w eaker m inority to psychological coercion40.

T he above re q u ire m e n ts e x te n d beyond th e n ee d to enforce a n d p ro tec t lib e ra l v a lu e s su c h as e q u a lity a n d ju stic e . C o n tra ry a ssu m p tio n s w ere m ade by P ro fe sso r L egutko a n d K ry sty n a Paw łow icz. T he d isso n an ce b e tw e e n th e above view s a n d th e re q u ire m e n ts fo rm u la te d b y S w ida-Z iem ba, in clu d in g th e re s u ltin g p o stu la te s of axiological n e u tr a lity of la w (to lera n ce in law), ste m s from th e fa ct t h a t th e proposed re q u ire m e n ts d ra w u p o n in d iv id u a l rig h ts to equality, ju s tic e , freedom a n d dignity. T he n ee d for to le ra n c e in law, a p ra g m a tic v a lu e re p re s e n te d b y th e axiological n e u tr a lity of law, is re v e ­ aled only w h e n th e above p o s tu la te s a re com bined in th e process o f e x is te n ­ tia l a n d axiological reflection. In th is con tex t, a n a d d itio n a l fa cto r sh o u ld be ta k e n in to c o n sid e ra tio n in th e d iscu ssio n a b o u t to leran ce. M y prev io u s c la ­ im t h a t e x is te n tia l a n d axiological re flectio n c a n define to le ra n c e w ith o u t th e n ee d for fu r th e r ideological d e b a te w as a ss e rte d . O p p o n e n ts o f to le ra n c e w ill n o t subscrib e to th is opinion a n d w ill arg u e t h a t in th e c o n te m p o ra ry w orld, to lera n ce h a s ac q u ire d th e s ta tu s of a n e a rly “sa c re d ” concept. T h is a r g u ­ m e n t is ro o ted in th e p re m ise t h a t to le ra n c e enjoys w id e sp re a d social s u p ­ p o rt, a n d it is m ore th a n ap p ro v ed in co n tem p o rary lifestyle. Tolerance a sp ire s to th e ra n k of a concept t h a t em bodies th e lib e ra l philosophy. In th is philosophy, to le ra n c e is a n im p o rta n t o r th e exclusive c rite rio n for m o ral e v a lu a tio n 41. T h is lim ita tio n sh o u ld be ta k e n in to c o n sid e ra tio n in a n a p p ro ­ ach t h a t is b a se d on axiological a n d e x is te n tia l reflection . O p p o n e n ts of to lera n ce w ill alw ays favor epistem olog ical a n d e th ic a l re flectio n w h e re th e t r u t h a b o u t m a n a n d th e c r ite ria for m o ral e v a lu a tio n h av e a single, e x te rn a l

39 Ibidem. 40 Ibidem, p. 121.

source ( t r u th o f divine re v elatio n ). T he re flectio n fo rm u la te d by Sw ida-Ziem - b a to u ch es u p o n th e n a tu r e of th e c o n te m p o ra ry m a n , a n d it is criticized for th is v ery re aso n . It does n o t e x te n d beyond th e ab so lu te m e a su re of accep­ ta n c e for ap p ro ach e s o th e r th a n epistem olog ical a n d e th ic a l reflectio n, n a m e ­ ly th e conviction t h a t to le ra n c e is a c rite rio n for m o ral e v a lu a tio n . In Sw ida- -Z iem ba’s ap p ro ach , th is c rite rio n ca n be re p re s e n te d by a v a rie ty of o th e r v a lu e s, su ch as dignity. T he p ro te c tio n of d ig n ity lies a t th e v ery h e a r t o f th e pre v io u sly d iscu ssed a rg u m e n t on e s th e tic p re fere n ces. T he cited a u th o r concludes t h a t m u tu a l lim ita tio n s on in d iv id u a l freedo m s h av e to be n e g o tia ­ te d to achieve a com prom ise (gay p a ra d e s , in clu d in g for o p p o n en ts of p o s iti­ ve d isc rim in a tio n , e lim in a tio n o f obscene c o n te n t w h ich does n o t in te rfe re w ith th e p ro te c tio n of in d iv id u a l rig h ts )42.

R e su m en

L a to le ra n c ia en e l desecho

Palabras clave: tolerancia, Derecho, uniones civiles del mismo sexo.

E s te artic u lo ab o rd a la polem ica e n to rn o a las u n io n es civiles del m ism o sexo. E l concepto clave e n e ste d e b a te s e ra la to le ra n c ia desde la b a se de la ju s tific a tio n tra d ic io n a l de la to le ra n c ia . E n p a rtic u la r, el p rim e r lu g a r se ju s tific a la to le ra n c ia m e d ia n te la d e sc rip tio n de la s itu a tio n re a l, e ste enfo- q u e fue p ro p u e sto p o r Locke; e n segun do lug ar, la ju s tific a tio n v ien e de la m an o de la id e a de lib e rta d , e n p a rtic u la r, se u s a la fo rm u la de M ill que p o stu la la lib e rta d in d iv id u a l s in p e rju d ic a r a los d em as es u n a a c titu d n e g a tiv a h a c ia la d e n o m in a d a “lib e rta d de”. A m bos conceptos de to le ra n c ia s e r a n el p u n to de p a r tid a p a r a el d e b a te sobre las n o rm a s leg ales ap licab les a la s p e rso n a s del m ism o sexo e n el caso de u n io n es civiles. Se in te n ta r a d e m o s tra r q u e u n enfoque ex iste n c ia l y axiologico id e n tific a las co n tro v e rsias sociales de m a n e r a m a s efectiva.

S tr e s z c z e n ie

Tolerancja w p r a w ie

Słowa kluczowe: tolerancja, prawo, związki jednopłciowe.

A u to r a r ty k u ł u o m a w ia k o n tro w e rs je to w a rz y s z ą c e je d n o p łc io w y m zw iązkom p a rtn e rs k im . O pisuje d w a tra d y c y jn e u z a s a d n ie n ia d la to leran cji. P ie rw sz e z nich, zapro p o n o w an e p rzez J o h n a Locke’a, u z a s a d n ia to leran cję przez p ry z m a t obecnej sytuacji. D ru g ie odnosi się do idei wolności. F o rm u ła J.S . M illa - p o stu lu ją c a w olność o so b istą bez k rz y w d zen ia in n y ch - je s t b lisk a w olności n eg a ty w n ej. O bie koncepcje to le ra n c ji m ogą być p u n k te m w yjścia w debacie n a te m a t p ra w n y c h re g u la cji dotyczących zw iązków p a r t ­ n e rs k ic h osób tej sam ej płci. A u to r p ró b u je w y k azać, że eg z y ste n c ja ln e i aksjologiczne podejście do p ro b lem u je s t b ard ziej efek ty w n e w id en ty fik o ­ w a n iu społecznych kontro w ersji.