Purposive interaction in multi-actor decision making: Operationalizing Coleman's linear system of action for policy decision support

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Purposive Interaction

in Multi-Actor Decision Making

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Purposive Interaction

in Multi-Actor Decision Making

Operationalizing

Coleman’s Linear System of Action

for Policy Decision Support

Proefschrift

Ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Technische Universiteit Delft,

op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof.dr.ir. J.T. Fokkema, voorzitter van het College voor Promoties,

in het openbaar te verdedigen op dinsdag 6 april 2004 om 10.30 uur door

Johannes Sigfridus TIMMERMANS landbouwkundig ingenieur

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Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotor: Prof.dr.ir. W.A.H. Thissen

Samenstelling Promotiecommissie: Rector Magnificus, voorzitter

Prof.dr.ir. W.A.H. Thissen, Technische Universiteit Delft, promotor Prof.dr.ing. G.R. Teisman, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam

Prof.dr. F.N. Stokman, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Prof.mr.dr. E.F. ten Heuvelhof, Technische Universiteit Delft Prof.dr. K.W. Hipel, University of Waterloo, Canada

Prof.dr. J.P.Kahan, RAND Graduate School, USA

Dr.dipl.ing. G.E.G. Beroggi, Spring Analytica, Switzerland

Published and distributed by: Eburon Publishers P.O. Box 2867 2601 CW Delft The Netherlands info@eburon.nl / www.eburon.nl ISBN 90 5972 022 9

Keywords: Policy analysis, multi-actor policy settings, decision support, actor analysis, rational choice theory.

This research was supported financially by the Directorate-General for Public Work of the Ministry of Transport and Water management (Rijkswaterstaat) and the Cornelis Lely Foundation.

Cover design: Anima Grafische Vormgeving.

© 2004 J.S. Timmermans. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be repro-duced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, elec-tronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing from the proprietors.

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Preface

This research started out with a ball and a web, a policy domain moved by a network of actors. I was interested in maintaining the pace of the ball. I wanted to find the actors that could make the difference and support them in moving the decision-making process forward. Only after stumbling into Coleman’s Social Theory, this work took the shape of the scientific work re-ported on in this book.

I took up this research after ten years of consultancy work in water man-agement. The general focus, and my focus, on content in developing water management policies shifted to the process of decision making during that period. I was provided with the opportunity to strengthen this change in fo-cus by accepting a research position at the faculty of Technology, Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology. There I could acquire the theoretical background in decision making and policy analysis that was vir-tually absent in the water management sector. I hope this book proves that I succeeded.

The Directorate-General for Public Work of the Ministry of Transport and Water management (Rijkswaterstaat) and the Cornelis Lely Foundation sponsored this research as part of a long-term research project on the inte-grated management of the river Scheldt basin. I like to thank both sponsors for including, along with the financial means, the freedom to work on balls and webs.

The ball and web came up in discussions with Giampiero Beroggi, just after my arrival at Delft University. Giampiero guided me through the world of science and stimulated and supported me in publishing our results. I like to thank him for that. My promoter, Wil Thissen, known for his critical re-marks when it comes to ‘close reading’ of dissertations, strengthened his reputation: again his remarks were right and to the point. My friend Jan Philipsen, I like to thank for the extensive deliberations on our scientific en-deavors. Anouk and Lara kept me away from this dissertation for over a year. Their continuing attempts however did not succeed. Sorry about that.

As planned, I returned to the world of water management after leaving the university. I am now thinking and analyzing from a changed perspective. Practice, however, remained as complicated as before.

Jos Timmermans

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'Just as the forests and fields of the physical environment are being re-placed by streets and sky scrapers, the primordial institutions around which societies have developed are being re-placed by purposively constructed so-cial organizations.'

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Summary

Purposive Interaction in Multi-Actor Decision Making, Operationalizing Coleman's Linear System of Action for Policy Decision Support

Recent developments in policy science emphasize the social environment in which decisions are made. The ‘network metaphor’ is often used to describe the key role of interactions between interdependent actors involved in deci-sion making in a pluricentric environment. This provides a challenge for policy analysis to come up with analytical methods to support decision mak-ing in such environments.

This research takes up the challenge. It aims to develop analytical meth-ods that use objective information, apply scientific processes, produce replic-able results and that are rooted in the pluricentric perspective on decision making. It does this by a priori selecting a theoretical framework, Coleman’s Social Theory and its quantitative implementation, the Linear System of Ac-tion (LSA) and study their merits in developing such methods.

Many of the tools and methods of traditional policy analysis have been developed from a unicentric perspective on decision making. In the unicen-tric perspective decision making is modeled as a linear process, developing in stages. In the policy formulation stage, the decision makers or a coherent group of decision makers, make an authoritative decision, which is then im-plemented. The analytical work of the policy analysts focuses on substantive solutions and policy analysis is seen as a 'technical' discipline, in which sci-entific research is carried out to provide value-free information for the deci-sion makers.

In the pluricentric perspective, decision making is conceived of as a stra-tegic interaction process. This process is modeled as a sequence of decisions made by multiple actors. The more important decisions are referred to as the

crucial decisions, while the period between two crucial decisions is called a decision-making round. An issue area and a policy arena characterize each

deci-sion-making round. An issue area is a recognized cluster of concerns, while the policy arena is that part of the social network where interaction relating to the issue area takes place. Interdependencies, caused by the need for ac-tors to increase their means of realizing objectives, are seen as the driving force behind interactions.

A basic premise of Coleman’s Social Theory is the purposive actor. Two other components of the theory are the macro-to-micro and the micro-to-macro transition. These transitions explain how the purposive actions of individuals combine into social development and, in turn, how individual actors are in-fluenced by this development. The control of actors over and the interest of

ac-tors in issues are the principal explanatory facac-tors. Exchange of control over

issues is seen as the driving force behind social development. The Linear System of Action (LSA) is a mathematical representation of this theory.

In Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA decision making is perceived of as a negotiating process, in which agreements are reached on exchange of

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control over issues. Because of its exchange logic and the importance of in-teraction and negotiation, we call the application of Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA to policy decision making in a pluricentric environment the Transactional Approach to decision making.

Coleman assumes that exchanges of control can and do take place in practice, without specifying the social system involved. For decision making this social system is the policy arena. By using the LSA an empirically-identified policy arena can be modeled. The model can be used to support decision making, but only for the policy arena for which it was defined and only for a decision round, the limited time period between two crucial deci-sions. This is the theoretical design of the Transactional Approach. Support tools based on the Transactional Approach focus on the identification of the potential for exchange of control between actors in the policy arena.

All support tools for policy decision making based on the Transactional Approach require both a definition of the structure and a quantification of an LSA. Its actors and its issues structure the LSA. Quantifying the LSA entails the assessment of control of actors over and interest of actors in issues. The method of structuring and quantifying the LSA is called the operational de-sign of the Transactional Approach.

To identify the actors in the LSA, a DELPHI method is proposed. The method starts with short list of reputedly powerful nominees for the policy arena that is expanded by snowball cycling interviews or questionnaires. To derive the issues for a certain decision situation, we need to apply a method that can identify issues as objectives for purposive action. Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) is such a problem-structuring method. VFT includes a set of tools that can be used to articulate fundamental objectives in decision mak-ing through an interactive process of identifymak-ing, structurmak-ing, analyzmak-ing and understanding objectives. In VFT fundamental objectives are defined as ‘a

statement of something that one desires to achieve’ (Keeney, 1992). There is a

remarkable resemblance between the way Coleman describes issues in his Social Theory and the way Keeney defines fundamental objectives in VFT. Combining Coleman’s purposive action and Keeney’s fundamental objec-tives, the issues around which the LSA is structured can be described as ‘a statement of something towards the achievement of which actors act pur-posively’. This makes VFT an appropriate method to define the issues of the LSA.

Quantifying the LSA entails the elicitation of interest in and control over issues. The specific meaning of interest and control in the LSA makes it pos-sible to explain these concepts and ask assessees directly about their interest in and control over issues. Consequently, a wide range of assessment meth-ods can be used to quantify the LSA. Because these methmeth-ods are often straightforward, computer-supported and easy to implement in an interac-tive group setting, this flexibility is a great advantage in the use of the Trans-actional Approach for real-world applications.

In the experimental part of this research the question of whether and to what extend the LSA can support decision making in a policy arena is

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stud-ied. The experiment aimed to find out whether the LSA can be used to in-crease the control exchanged between actors. According to Coleman’s Social Theory, in real-world decision making, the exchange of control signals pro-gress in the decision process. In the experiment a group of decision makers is supported by three levels of LSA-based support for three different initial distributions of control. The results show that LSA support of negotiations can significantly increase the control exchanged. The influence of the initial distribution of control is small compared to the effect of LSA support and therefore not relevant in applications to real-world decision making.

In addition to the experiment, two case studies were undertaken into the operationalization of the LSA and its applicability in real-world settings. In the case study on coastal zone management in the Bay of Banten, Indonesia, the LSA is operationalized using interviews and questionnaires. The LSA model is used to analyze the policy arena. The case study showed that the actors could grasp the concepts used adequately. It also proved that actors are able and willing to complete the required questionnaires. Because the issues were not derived in an interactive setting, different actors framed the mean-ing of the issues differently. This probably resulted in a less representative LSA. We concluded that for structuring and quantifying the LSA an interac-tive approach is preferable.

In the Utrechtse Heuvelrug case study, a fully interactive approach to-wards structuring and quantifying the LSA was used. This comes close to an ideal application of the operational design of the Transactional Approach. Although defining and structuring the issues in this case study turned out to be a difficult task, it was concluded that a fully interactive VFT process was practically feasible and resulted in well-defined and clearly described issues. To quantify interest in and control over issues, the computer-supported ap-plication of Interactive Strong Preference Ordering performed satisfactorily. We concluded that the operational design of the Transactional Approach worked well in an interactive setting.

From our experiences in this case study, we also concluded that the analysis of the LSA was accepted by actors and that it is a useful input for the discussion of dependency relations. Observed changes in the perception of the policy arena and the relations between the results of the analysis and real-world experiences indicate that the use of the LSA increases actors’ un-derstanding of the policy arena in which they participate. One of the actors realized that he was trying to open locked doors, indicating that he was at-tempting to obtain support from actors who had no interest in what he had to offer. In terms of the LSA: he was interacting with actors where no poten-tial for exchange of control existed.

From the theoretical and operational design, the experiment and the case studies, we conclude that Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA could serve in developing analytical methods for the pluricentric environment. We found that Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA fit the pluricentric perspective adequately and that the resulting support methods and analysis are accept-able to real-world decision makers. Some weak points in the relation

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be-tween the Transactional Approach and the pluricentric theory can be over-come in practice by using proper methods to operationalize the LSA. In addi-tion, we found that the operational design of the Transactional Approach is applicable in an interactive setting.

Using the results of this research as a stating point, two interesting direc-tions for further research can be distinguished. First, it would be useful to do similar explorative research into other analytical methods for the pluricentric environment. A second line of research would be the evaluation and devel-opment of the Transactional Approach. This type of research could develop along a theoretical, experimental or empirical line.

Theoretically it would be advantageous to see if the LSA offers possibili-ties for evaluating alternative policies. This should be done by using the ex-tent of control exchange caused by implementing alternatives as a selection criterion. The alternative that causes the greatest exchange of control is se-lected. Further experimental research could be based on the experiment de-scribed in this book. It would be interesting to study the rationality and the decision rules used by the actors in the experiment. Experimental research could also focus on the relation between the complexity of the negotiating process and the substantive complexity. Empirical research should focus on the contribution of LSA-based support to real-world decision processes.

This work contributes to policy decision making in different ways. First, it resulted in an approach that can be used to support policy decision making. Secondly this research showed that an analytical approach towards decision processes is both feasible and promising. It appeared that actors appreciate the input of such analytical methods. Thirdly, the Transactional Approach developed in this book illustrates that combining policy management and policy analysis, process and content, has much to offer to decision making.

It appears that a general disappointment in the results of interactive pol-icy decision making has recently developed among Dutch practitioners and policy scientists. Many feel that interactive policy decision making implies endless deliberation and slow progress. There are certainly some grounds for this feeling. Interactive policy decision making is indeed often tough and inefficient. The way forward, however, is not to dismiss interactive decision making altogether, but to improve our understanding of decision processes and develop support methods accordingly.

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1 Introduction

1.1 A challenge for policy analysis

Many of the tools and methods of traditional policy analysis are developed from a unicentric perspective on decision making. In the unicentric perspec-tive, authorative decisions are made by one decision maker or by a coherent group and the process of decision making develops in accordance with the rational comprehensive method (Lindblom, 1959, p. 81). This method de-scribes decision making as a linear process, developing in stages. A typical model comprises the following stages: agenda setting, policy preparation, policy formulation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, feedback and policy termination (Jenkins Smith and Sabatier, 1993, pp. 1-4). In the policy preparation stage, policy analysts apply scientific methods and means-ends rationality to find a solution to the problem at hand and propose this to the decision maker. In the policy formulation stage the decision maker or a co-herent group of decision makers take an authoritative decision, which is then implemented.

The analytical work of the policy analysts focuses on substantive solutions and policy analysis is seen as a 'technical' discipline in which scientific re-search is carried out to provide value-free information to the decision makers (Riet, van de, 2003). The complexity encountered in the analytical process is attributed to differing values, uncertainty, ambiguity, multidimensionality and qualitative judgment (Miser and Quade, 1984). The rationality of the analytical process itself is bounded by the limited information-processing capabilities and the saticeficing rather than optimizing behavior of decision makers (Simon, 1955). Solutions are therefore ‘good enough’ and not ‘opti-mal’.

In the realization that most of the social environments in which policy decisions are made can hardly be characterized as unicentric, policy analysis needs to adapt to multi-actor settings. When rather than one decision mak-ers or a coherent group several pmak-ersons or organizations are involved, deci-sion situations become more complicated. Multi-actor settings give rise to multi-actor complexity, resulting from a diversity of problem perceptions, preferences and perceptions of reality (Riet, van de, 2003). In addition, in multi-actor decision making dependencies and power or authority become

important dimensions of the process (KØrnØv and Thissen, 2000).

Multi-actor settings therefore impose additional requirements on policy analysis. Apart from the necessity of the stakeholders trusting the analysis and the need to bridge the gap between stakeholder interests, policy analysis in multi-actor setting requires a multi-perspective research focus (Riet, van de, 2003). This means that the problem is explored from the reality perspec-tive of all stakeholders. To accommodate these additional requirements, pol-icy-analytical tools and methods have been adapted to multi-actor settings and new tools have been and are being developed. In adapting existing methods to a multi-actor setting, often the parameters used in the methods

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for a single-actor setting are specified for each actor separately or are devel-oped into some sort of shared perspective. Good examples are the incorpora-tion of methods for the aggregaincorpora-tion of preferences of multiple actors in multi-criteria decision-models and Value-Focused Thinking (Keeney, 1992), an interactive method to define a consistent set of objectives and criteria. Although these methods are adapted to a multi-actor setting, they are still rooted in the unicentric perspective on decision making. Both methods sup-port actors to find an optimal solution to a problem using means-ends ra-tionality. These methods do not deal with strategic interaction and depend-encies between actors analytically and they treat the social and analytical en-vironment as separate worlds.

The frustration of policy makers caused by decisions that appeared to be ineffective through lack of support from actors involved in the implementa-tion gave rise to the development of participative or interactive modes of

de-cision making (KØrnØv and Thissen, 2000). To structure these modes

practi-tioners developed numerous approaches. Examples from the Netherlands are Infralab, Open Planvorming, Infraplan, Wegverlichting and so on (Edelenbos, 2000). Other approaches have been developed from a policy sci-ence perspective, to manage the complex interaction processes characteriz-ing these modes of decision makcharacteriz-ing. Important examples are process man-agement (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof, 1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000) and the network constitution approach (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). Process management focuses on the rules for interaction, while the network consti-tution approach concentrates on the structure of the policy networks (Riet, van de, 2003).

Both process management and the network constitution approach use ‘network’ as a metaphor to describe forms of governance or decision making that go beyond state control and involve both public and private actors. It highlights the interdependency of and interactions between the actors in-volved. Previously other metaphors or theories have been used to criticize the unicentric perspective and the rational comprehensive method:

• Cohen, March and Olsen used the ‘garbage’ can to describe decision

making (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972).

• Lindblom concluded that ‘muddling through’ is the correct

descrip-tion for decision making (Lindblom, 1959).

• Simon partly saved rationality by reasoning that the rationality of

hu-man decision making does exist, but is bounded by huhu-man informa-tion-processing capabilities (March and Simon, 1958).

• Kingdon pointed out that decision making is the result of the

com-bined rationalities of problems, policies and politics (Kingdon 1995).

• Braybrooke, Kunreuther, Lathrop and Linnerooth came to the

conclu-sion that deciconclu-sion making can be better described with a sequential rather than a stage model (Braybrooke, 1974; Kunreuther, Lathrop and Linnerooth, 1982)

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Despite the overwhelming criticism, policy analysis for a long time retained the unicentric perspective and the rational comprehensive method as its guidelines. There are two major reasons for this commitment. First, there is the rather idealistic view that, although real-world policy decision making does not develop in accordance with the unicentric perspective and the ra-tional comprehensive method, it should do so. Second, the critical meta-phors and theories did not provide policy analysis with a theoretical frame-work that could support and direct policy-analytical frame-work. Although the metaphors used are to the point, ‘garbage cans’ and ‘muddling through’ are not exactly the phrases scientists preoccupied with rationality and analytical methods long for. The ‘network’ metaphor, however, seems to be more promising from the perspective of the policy analyst. In sociology, the appli-cation of methodologies in Social Network Analysis even seems to be ham-pered by researchers ‘who have found it difficult to come to grips with the highly

technical and mathematical language in which much discussion of these tech-niques has been cast’ (Scott, 2000); typically these are the kind of discussions

policy analysts rooted in operations research know how to deal with.

In the network or pluricentric perspective on decision making, policies are not seen as the result of a linear rational process at a central level, but as the result of strategic interaction processes between multiple interdependent actors (Teisman, 1995, p. 35). These interactions do not develop according to predefined stages, but are better modeled as a series of games that are played between the actors. In the pluricentric perspective on decision making the stage model is replaced by a sequential model (Braybrooke, 1974, 1978, Kun-reuther, Lathrop and Linnerooth, 1982) or in a similar approach by the rounds model of decision making (Teisman, 1995). We will use the rounds model, because it is the model most elaborated on in this realm and because it has gained considerable support in Dutch policy science.

The research reported on in this book starts out from the challenge laid down by critical authors who dismiss the rational comprehensive method and the unicentric perspective of policy decision making. It does so by ac-cepting the pluricentric perspective on decision making, while maintaining the analytical, rational and objective approach of traditional policy analysis. From these starting points, the question whether analytical methods can be developed to support decision making in such an environment is addressed.

This research takes up the challenge of developing methods firmly rooted in the pluricentric perspective and analytical tradition of policy analysis and by doing so extending the merits of rationality and policy analysis to the realm of pluricentric decision making. For after all, we have to acknowledge

‘… the considerable importance which rational calculation and, more generally, what might be called the ideology of rationality have acquired’ (Crozier and

Friedberg, 1980, p. 176). The overall research question of this research is:

Can analytical, rational and objective methods in the tradition of policy analysis be developed to support decision making in a pluricentric environment?

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A general outline of the ideas behind this research is presented above. In the remainder of this introduction, we will first further explore the implications of the pluricentric or network perspective on decision making. We will then discuss some characteristics of the pluricentric perspective that are problem-atic in the light of the analytical and rational roots of policy analysis. Finally, we will define the research questions and discuss the approach to answering them. This introduction concludes with a brief outline of the structure of the book.

1.2 Consequences of the pluricentric perspective

The adoption in this research of the pluricentric perspective has some perti-nent consequences for the analytical methods developed in this book. In the unicentric perspective preferences are treated as relatively stable over time, while the pluricentric perspective highlights the dynamic properties of ac-tors’ preferences. In the pluricentric perspective, preferences develop and change through interaction in the decision-making process. Although only addressed explicitly in the work of Kingdon (Kingdon, 1995), is seems that in pluricentrism the same is true for the rationality principles guiding the ac-tions of individual actors. Kingdon assumes that decisions are the result of the combined rationalities of problems, policies and politics (Kingdon 1995). How these combine into a decision depends on the situation and, according to Teisman, can only be known in hindsight (Teisman, 1995). The role of preferences and rationality principles in the pluricentric perspective is simi-lar to Popper’s situational logic (Popper, 1957, 1972, 1994). In situational logic, the rationality concept is almost empty and both preferences and ra-tionality principles are part of the situational analysis.

Because of the dynamic characteristic of both the preferences and the ra-tionality principles guiding the actions of individual actors, in the pluricen-tric perspective the decisions of a group of actors also become dependent on the social system in which they are reached. This dependency operates through the way the situational preferences and rationalities of individual actors combine into a decision that is rational from the situational logic of the individual actors. Decisions are therefore contingent to the social envi-ronment in which they are reached and if the same problem is dealt with by different actors it will result in other solutions.

A further consequence for the policy-analytical methods developed stems from the sequential or rounds model of decision making adopted in the plu-ricentric perspective. In the rounds model interaction takes place in policy arenas that exist for a limited time only and then dissolve. Analytical meth-ods developed for the pluricentric perspective should accommodate this se-quential progression of decision making and take policy arenas as their basic analytical units. Table 1.1 summarizes the foregoing discussion.

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Table 1.1 Characteristics of the unicentric and pluricentric perspectives on decision making.

The pluricentric and the unicentric perspective differ in the way prefer-ences and rationality operate, in the way the decision outcomes depend on the context and in how the decision process is modeled.

characteristic unicentric pluricentric

preferences relatively stable and independ-ent of social environmindepend-ent

developed during the process of decision making

rationality decisions based on means-ends rationality

decision based on situational logic

decision outcomes depend on the problem at hand

contingent to the problem and the social environment decision process described as developing in

stages

described as developing in rounds

Because of the importance of interaction in the pluricentric perspective, any analytical method based in this perspective on decision making should sup-port interaction in the decision-making process. Analytical methods for the pluricentric environment should not concentrate on finding the ‘best’ solu-tion for a problem, but should support strategic interacsolu-tions between parties engaged in decision making in order to come up with ‘better’ solutions.

In conclusion, policy-analytical methods for the pluricentric environment should support strategic interactions and allow for:

• preferences and rationality principles to be developed during the

deci-sion-making process;

• decision outcomes based on situational logic;

• decision outcomes to be contingent to the social environment in

which they are reached;

• policy-analytical methods to address policy arenas and be adapted to a

sequential model of decision making.

1.3 Research approach

The general research question is approached by a priori selecting a theoreti-cal framework and looking into its merits in developing analytitheoreti-cal methods to support decision making in a pluricentric environment. Although some of the characteristics and basic assumptions of traditional policy analysis are replaced by corresponding pluricentric concepts, the most important charac-teristic of traditional policy analysis, its belief in scientific information and the use of analytical methods, is maintained in this research.

The theoretical framework selected is Coleman’s Social Theory and its quantitative implementation, the Linear System of Action (Coleman, 1990). The theory is selected for our purpose because of its analytical potential, its

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focus on interaction and its pluricentric characteristics. In Coleman’s Social Theory and the Linear System of Action (LSA), decision making is perceived as a negotiating process in which agreements are reached on the exchange of

control over issues. Because of its exchange logic and the importance of

inter-action and negotiation, we will call the application of Coleman’s Social The-ory and the LSA to policy decision making in a pluricentric environment the

Transactional Approach to policy decision making. The quantitative

implemen-tation of Coleman’s Social Theory, the LSA, captures the exchange of control in a quantitative model.

This research uses an explorative and design approach. First, the theo-retical framework is selected and the research questions are formulated. To acquire a firm background in pluricentric thinking and to obtain an overview of the developments in policy analysis, the literature on the pluricentric per-spective on decision making and policy-analytical literature are studied. The explorative part of this literature study was aimed at identifying a theory that can serve as the framework for the development of analytical methods to support decision making in a pluricentric environment. The actual research consisted of three phases:

1 theoretical design of the Transactional Approach; 2 operational design of the Transactional Approach;

3 empirical evaluation of the theoretical and the operational design of the Transactional. Approach.

Phase 1: Theoretical design of the Transactional Approach

In this phase a literature study of Coleman’s Social Theory and pluricen-trism is carried out with the aim of developing the theoretical framework for this research. In this phase deductive reasoning is used to show that Cole-man’s Social Theory and the LSA are applicable to the specific case of plu-ricentric decision making. In the theoretical design of the Transactional Ap-proach, Coleman’s Social Theory and the pluricentric perspective on deci-sion making are integrated and theoretical inconsistencies are considered. In addition, the literature study is intended to bridge the gap between the theo-retical framework and its application to real-world decision making by defin-ing the empirical object to be addressed.

Phase 2: Operational design of the Transactional Approach

The second phase is an explorative study of relevant methodological litera-ture from policy analysis and sociology. This phase aims to integrate existing methods from sociology and policy analysis into an operational design for the Transactional Approach. The operational design includes both the struc-turing and the quantification of the LSA for a policy arena. The theoretical requirements as laid out in phase 1 and practical aspects relating to real-world application are important considerations.

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Phase 3: Evaluation of the theoretical and operational design of the Transactional Approach

In the last phase of this research, both the theoretical design and the opera-tional design of the Transacopera-tional Approach are tested and evaluated, using laboratory experiments and case studies. Inductive reasoning is used to dem-onstrate the applicability of the Transactional Approach to real-world pluricentric decision making.

A controlled and simplified experimental setting is used to obtain a first evaluation of the possible contribution of the theoretical design of the Trans-actional Approach to policy decision making. In the experiment, human ac-tors engage in negotiations in pairs, so as to exchange control over colored cards. In the experiment the exchanges of control are monitored for different types of LSA-based support and different initial distributions of cards. Statis-tical analysis is used to evaluate the results.

Two case studies are used to explore the applicability of the operational design of the Transactional Approach to real-world policy arenas and to pro-vide insight into the potential contribution of the Transactional Approach to real-world policy decision making. The case studies take the form of action research, as the Transactional Approach is used to intervene in existing pol-icy processes. In the case studies the acceptance of the Transactional Ap-proach by the actors is observed and the opinions of actors on the contribu-tion of the approach to the policy process are collected through interviews and group discussions.

1.4 Research questions

The general research question is whether and if so what kind of, policy-analytical methods for the pluricentric environment can be developed based on Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA. This research starts from the hy-pothesis that Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA are appropriate theoreti-cal frameworks for our purpose. To focus the research specific research questions are formulated for each of the three phases. These specific re-search questions are:

1 is the LSA, in theory, applicable to policy decision making in a pluricentric environment? (Phase 1);

2 can we operationalize the LSA for policy decision making in a pluricentric environment and if so how? (Phase 2);

3 can the LSA be used to support real-world policy decision making, how can it be used and what are the benefits of its application? (Phase 2).

The research questions emphasize our ‘engineering’ approach. We are inter-ested in the applicability of a specific social theory and will address the theo-retical soundness of our starting points, but, like engineers, we focus on the design of a method that can be applied to real-world decision making and

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that delivers useful results in practice. In the remainder of this section the research questions are discussed in more detail.

Is the LSA, in theory, applicable to policy decision making in a pluricentric envi-ronment?

The first research question is rather general. In fact the question concerns the validity of a specific social theory and its merits in explaining social de-velopment, of which policy decision making is only a small element. The discussion of social explanation is a discussion of paradigms in sociology, or social theories. Social theories come in a wide variety and they are normally rooted in one of the major sociological traditions, each with their own

per-spective and divided into numerous sub fields.1_{Our research question is}

lim-ited to the applicability of the theory to support decision making in a plu-ricentric environment. The more abstract and general validity is left to socio-logical thinking.

Can we operationalize the LSA for policy decision making in a pluricentric envi-ronment and if so how?

This research question has both theoretical and practical aspects. The use of the LSA for policy decision making requires the general model to be speci-fied for a particular policy arena. Defining the LSA for a particular policy arena requires both the specification of the model structure in terms of ac-tors and issues and the quantification of acac-tors’ interest in and control over issues. Methods used to specify the model for a policy arena should fit both the theoretical framework of the LSA and the pluricentric perspective on de-cision making. At the same time these methods should be applicable to in-teractive, real-world decision making and therefore acceptable to the actors participating. In addition, practical aspects such as time constraints have to be taken into account.

Can the LSA be used to support real-world policy decision making, how can it be used and what are the benefits of its application?

The first two research questions concentrate on the theoretical soundness and the operational aspects of applying the Transactional Approach to sup-port real-world decision making. The next question is: can the Transactional Approach be applied to real-world decision making and do the methods de-veloped indeed support, improve or speed up the process of decision mak-ing?

1 _{The major traditions in sociology, apart from the critical theories, are functionalism,}

evolutionarism, structuralism, interactionism and conflict and exchange theories (see also Turner, 1998). Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA fit into the tradition of exchange theories.

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1.5 Structure of this book

Chapters 2 and 3 of this book present the theoretical background on which this research is based. In Chapter 2 the theoretical design of the Transac-tional Approach is developed. This seeks to integrate Coleman’s Social The-ory and the LSA with a pluricentric perspective on decision making (phase 1). In Chapter 3, the operational design of the Transactional Approach is pre-sented. Chapter 3 describes an approach towards structuring and quantifying the LSA for a specific policy arena (phase 2). Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical part of the research presented in this book (phase 3).

Chapter 4 describes the result of a controlled experiment in which the LSA is used to support an idealized policy negotiating process. This chapter seeks to bridge the gap between theory and practice, by applying the Transac-tional Approach in an experimental setting.

In Chapters 5 and 6 the results of two applications of the Transactional Ap-proach to real-world decision processes are presented. In these applications different methods are used to operationalize the LSA. Chapter 5 describes a case study on coastal zone management in the Bay of Banten area, on Java, Indonesia. Here the LSA is operationalized using interviews and question-naires and mainly used to analyze the policy arena. In Chapter 6 a fully in-teractive application of the Transactional Approach is presented, concerning the recreation and tourism development policy domain of the Utrechtse Heuvelrug National Park. This case study focuses on the interactive opera-tionalization of the Transactional Approach. In addition the use of the Transactional Approach to support the interaction between decision makers is examined.

In the last chapter of this book, Chapter 7, conclusions are integrated, more general conclusions are presented and possible further research is dis-cussed. Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the structure of this book.

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Figure 1.1 Research approach and structure of this book

This research has three phases, resulting in respectively the theoretical design in Chapter 2, the operational design in Chapter 3 and an evalua-tion of the Transacevalua-tional Approach in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 7 gives the conclusions.

Phase 1

Synthesizing Cole-man’s Social Theory and pluricentrism Phase 2 Designing a method to operationalize the LSA Selection of theoreti-cal framework, re-search questions and approach.

Phase 3

Exploring the applica-bility of the Trans-actional Approach Theoretical design of the Transactional Approach Operational design of the Transactional Approach Application of the Transactional Ap-proach Chapter 1 Chapter 3 Chapter 2 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 + Conclusions

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2 A Transactional Approach to Policy Decision Making

2.1 Introduction and research questions

In this chapter a Transactional Approach to policy decision making is devel-oped. First, the theoretical concepts underlying the approach, Coleman’s So-cial Theory and the Linear System of Action (Coleman, 1990) and the Con-crete System of Action (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980) will be presented. Sec-ond, these theoretical concepts are integrated into a Transactional Approach to decision making. The relation between the Transactional Approach and the pluricentric perspective on decision making is an important aspect of this integration.

The research question addressed in this chapter is research question one:

1 Is the LSA, in theory, applicable to policy decision making in a pluricentric environment?

In answering this research question, from a theoretical perspective, two as-pects are important. First whether the LSA fits the pluricentric perspective on decision making has to be discussed. Secondly, any application of the LSA to real-world decision making requires the existence of a social envi-ronment or social system for which the LSA can be defined. We thus formu-late two specific research questions:

1.1 Do Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA fit the pluricentric perspective on decision making?

1.2 Can the LSA be applied to an empirically- existing social system?

These questions will be viewed from a theoretical perspective, but with keep-ing an eye open regardkeep-ing the application of the Transactional Approach to real-world policy decision making.

The social sciences, the policy sciences and the organizational sciences provide the basis for the concepts underlying the Transactional Approach. First Coleman's Social Theory (section 2.3) and its quantitative implementa-tion, the LSA (section 2.4) are introduced. Then the Concrete System of Ac-tion is discussed (secAc-tion 2.5). In secAc-tion 2.6, these theories are combined into a quasi-prescriptive model for decision making, the Transactional Ap-proach. Possible applications of the model to real-world decision making are presented in the final section of this chapter (section 2.7).

Before embarking on developing the Transactional Approach, the subject of explanation in the social sciences will be discussed briefly. Without wish-ing to interfere in the ongowish-ing debate on social explanation and social theo-ries, it seems valid for our purpose to explore the application of a social the-ory to policy decision making. The term applicability rather than validity is used here. It indicates that the validity question is left to sociological think-ing. We are interested in the use of the social theory developed by the

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American sociologist James S. Coleman to support decision making in a plu-ricentric environment.

2.2 Explanation in the social sciences

2.2.1 General

Theories and models in the social sciences that seek to explain the develop-ment and functioning of social systems are labeled social theories. Cole-man’s Social Theory (Coleman, 1990) is one of many such social theories. They not only differ in their methods of research and their basic assump-tions, but also in their mode of explanation. Important distinctions here con-cern the principal factors the theories use for explanation. Some theories use explanatory factors characterizing the social system as a whole. Others use processes internal to the system, involving its component parts or units at a level below the system. A good example is the case where the units are the individual members of a social system. Coleman’s Social Theory uses the second form of explanation.

An example of a social theory that remains at system-level is functional-ism (Turner, 1998). In functionalfunctional-ism structures within the system are ex-plained in terms of the function they perform for the system. According to functionalism, social structures function in order to reproduce the social sys-tem, like the organs in the human body function to contribute to the survival of the individual. In this approach the teleological principle in reasoning, e.g. explaining current states in terms of future states, operates at system-level. Although teleological reasoning is the opposite of the usual causal explana-tion in science, this is felt less severely in a systems approach, as it operates on a level below the system. In a systems approach elements of a social structure have a rationale of their own.

2.2.2 A systems approach to social explanation

A systems approach to social explanation incorporates three components. Two of these involve the relation between the system and the system units. The third component concerns the units themselves. The relations between the units and the system are twofold: first there are rules that cover the trans-fer of actions of system units into system behavior and second there are rules that explain the influence of system behavior on the actions of the units. In Coleman’s Social Theory, these relations are called respectively the micro-to-macro and the micro-to-macro-to-micro transition. The third component is called the individual-level theory of action and covers the actions of the component units. Figure 2.1 is a schematic representation of these components.

Another way of describing the three components of a systems approach to social explanation is by comparing the explanatory system to a role-play. Role-play has a set of rules for the players, including their interests or goals. A second set of rules covers the possible actions of a player in each role. A third set specifies the consequences of the actions of players for the other

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players in the game. The first set of rules reflects the individual-level theory of action, the second the macro-to-micro transition and the third set corre-sponds to the micro-to-macro transition.

Figure 2.1 Components of a systems approach to social explanation

The three components of a systems approach to social explanation. Ar-row 1 indicates the macro-to-micro transition, arAr-row 2 is the individual level theory of action and arrow 3 is the micro-to-macro transition. The upper horizontal arrow depicts a change in the system status (after Coleman, 1990).

A systems approach to social explanation has some advantages. The first is related to the availability of data for empirical research. Data are normally gathered on parameters characterizing units below system-level and data on parameters describing system-level characteristics are rare. Secondly, the level of the component parts of the system is also the level where interven-tions in the social system have to be implemented. Thirdly, it can be ex-pected that an explanation in terms of actions of system units is more stable and general, since the system’s behavior is the result of the actions of its component parts (Coleman, 1990, p. 3).

A systems approach to social explanation necessitates the definition of the proper level for the explanation. Coleman’s Social Theory uses a variant

of methodological individualism,2_{incorporating levels below system-level,}

but not requiring going down to individual level for an explanation to be sat-isfactory. Instead, Coleman uses a pragmatic criterion. According to Cole-man, the proper level for the explanation of a social system is the level at

2_{The debate on methodological individualism or holism is an ongoing debate in the}

so-cial sciences. It is closely related to the micro-macro problem, i.e. the problem of how micro level actions result in systems behavior. Functionalism applies methodological holism and remains at system level. Coleman’s Social Theory applies a variant of meth-odological individualism. Methmeth-odological individualism is sometimes also differentiated from ontological individualism, when ontological individualism refers to a systems ap-proach to explanation of social phenomena that goes beyond the level of individuals.

1 2 3 Macro Micro System development

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which the explanation generates insights on which system interventions can be based. In the next two sections both the individual-level theory of action and the macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro transitions are discussed in more detail.

2.2.3 Individual level theory of action

With the introduction of an individual-level theory of action as one of the three components of a systems approach to explanation in sociology, Cole-man touches upon the long-standing discussion on rationality in sociology. Coleman takes a pragmatic approach in defining and defending the specific form of the individual-level theory of action or Rational Action Theory (Gold-thorpe, 1998) incorporated in Social Theory. The Rational Action Theory (RAT) used by Coleman is taken from the theory of action used in Weber's classical study of the relation between Protestantism and the development of capitalism. It is the theory of action used by most people when they say they ‘understand’ the action of another person. Understand in this case means that they understand the ‘reasons’ why the person acted in a certain way, im-plying that they understand the intended goal and how the actions were seen by the actor as contributing to that goal (Coleman, 1990).

In the LSA Coleman incorporates a more rigid notion of rationality, be-cause he uses the concept of the rational actor as developed in economics. Actions of the economically rational actor are guided by the principal of util-ity maximization. From different actions with their own particular utilutil-ity, the economically-rational actor chooses the action that will maximize his utility. The individual-level theory of action used by Coleman is one of many contri-butions to rationality in social explanation. In fact, a whole family of RATs exists (Goldthorpe, 1998). In Figure 2.2, the RATs indicated with heavily dotted lines are the results of Goldthorpe’s work. Purposive action and maximizing utility as used in Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA are put in using thinly dotted lines to differentiate them from Goldthorpe’s work. The work of Goldthorpe as condensed in Figure 2.2 puts the RAT used in Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA into perspective.

According to Goldthorpe, rational action may be understood as an action of an outcome-oriented kind, in which certain requirements are met regard-ing the nature of and the relations among: actors, their beliefs relevant to the pursuit of these goals and the course of action, which, in the given circum-stances, may then follow. Goldthorpe distinguishes RATs according to whether they:

• have strong or weak rationality requirements;

• focus on situational rather than on procedural rationality;

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Figure 2.2 Varieties of Rational Action Theories

In addition to the RATs included in this graph by Goldthorpe, the LSA and Purposive Action are included. Economics is the discipline in which rationality assumptions are strongest. Economics here is treated as ‘a separate science‘ (Hausman, 1992). Other authors argue that this RAT is the appropriate theory of action in all circumstances that entail economizing. This tendency towards ‘economic imperialism’ is taken further in the work of Becker (Becker, 1976). In the RAT used in behav-ioral economics, bounded rationality (Simon, 1982), rationality is re-stricted by incomplete information and the limited information-processing capacity of actors. The RAT developed by Lindenberg and Frey (Lindenberg and Frey, 1993) and the cognitive model (Boudon, 1974) use subjective rationality based on the actor’s own definition of the situation. Purposive action belongs to this tradition of subjective ra-tionality. In situational logic (Popper, 1957) the rationality principle is almost empty, and the procedural rationality of the actor becomes part of the situational analysis (adapted from Goldthorpe, 1998).

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Have strong rather than weak rationality requirements

Rationality requirements are strongest when they extend to actors’ goals as well as to their beliefs and to the actions they take to realize their goals based on those beliefs. Most commonly in RATs, the nature of actors’ goals is re-garded as external to the theory and thus unrestricted. In this view actors’ goals are to be determined empirically and rationality requirements are lim-ited to consistency of the goals or a lack of contradiction. In the RAT used in economics this formal rationality resulted in a transitivity requirement for the empirically-determined goals. Purposive action, the RAT used in Cole-man’s Social Theory, belongs to this tradition of subjective rationality. The rationality requirements incorporated in the LSA are similar to those used in classical economics and in a sense they are stronger than those of classical economics. In the LSA the shape of the utility function is prescribed, while economics limits requirements for the utility function to the assumption of declining marginal utility.

Focus on situational rather than on procedural rationality

The RAT of mainstream economics is a good example of situational rational-ity. In economics the way to act rationally, given the preferences, is situa-tionally-constrained to an extreme degree. The actor only needs to put his preferences in order and the action that ensures that his utility is maximized follows automatically. The opposite of this is Simon’s bounded rationality, which uses procedural rationality. For Simon the human computational or information-processing capacities and the constraints that they impose are important.

On the scale from procedural to situational rationality, the RAT used in the LSA is close to that used in mainstream economics. Purposive action can be located somewhere between Popper’s situational logic and the cognitive model. It is not as procedural as Boudon’s cognitive model, as it does not specifically look for procedural rationality based on mistaken beliefs. It does, however, incorporate a purpose for action that is not situational, but part of the rationality principle. This makes purposive action more procedural than Popper’s situational logic, where the rationality principal is taken as situ-ational as well.

Claim to provide a general rather than a special theory of action

The relevant issue here is to what extent different forms of RAT recognize limits to their explanatory validity. These limitations often stem from the existence of types of domains of action for which the RAT is deemed valid. The validity of the RAT used in economic analysis is limited to actions di-rected towards the pursuit of wealth, the satisfaction of material needs and wants, or to rational action that occurs within systems of exchange based on money and markets. Purposive action and the LSA can be placed with RATs that are generally applicable to all domains of social action.

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The rigid version of purposive action incorporated in the LSA has some serious flaws. Apart from its teleological reasoning, there are other argu-ments that make the use of utility maximization as the RAT for the LSA questionable. First, it is clearly a more narrow specification of the purposive action model underlying Coleman’s Social Theory. Secondly, accepted theo-ries on how actors make decisions and empirical evidence of non-rational behavior seriously challenge the validity of utility maximization or even ra-tional action all together. In the light of these deviations from, exceptions from and objections to, either the validity of the concept of purposive action or the narrow concept of utility maximization, Coleman explains his ration-ale by addressing two questions:

• Why use a theory of purposive action at all?

• Why use utility maximization?

To answer the first question Coleman reverts to both pragmatic and philoso-phical arguments. Where as Goldthorpe presents the work of other authors on rationality as alternative models of rational action, Coleman sees these models as deviations from the theory of maximizing expected utility. He for example sees the effect of framing, which makes an individual’s choice or action highly dependent on the particular frame of reference in which it is cast (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), the work of Elster on succumbing to temptation (Elster, 1979), the work on addictive behavior (Becker and Mur-phy, 1988) and the existence of impulsive actions, that is actions without a goal in mind (Durkheim, 1951[1897]), as deviations from formal rationality.

Coleman justifies his disregard for deviations from rationality by stating that they do not substantially affect the Social Theory developed. Coleman’s explicit assumption is that the theoretical assumptions made in the Social Theory are substantially the same whether the actors are acting precisely ac-cording to rationality as commonly conceived, or deviate in the ways that have been observed (Coleman 1990, p. 506). This observation is acceptable from Coleman’s perspective, because he sees his major contribution as a systems approach to social explanation.

The more philosophical arguments Coleman uses are diverse. First, there are the systems approach and the methodological individualism on which the theory is built, to counteract the teleological argument. Second, Coleman argues that the development of a social theory not based on purposive ac-tions will reduce humans to the pawns of forces beyond their control and the description by sociologists of ‘the waves of changes that wash over us’ (Cole-man, 1990, p. 17). Furthermore, Coleman argues that a non-purposeful the-ory is a paradox, because it is itself a result of the purposeful action of the theorist.

After accepting purposive action as the theory of action for Coleman’s So-cial Theory, the question of accepting utility maximization for the quantita-tive development of the theory remains. Here again pragmatic and scientific

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arguments intertwine. First, Coleman argues that the principle of utility maximization is required for modeling and quantitative research. A further pragmatic motivation lies in the notion that for any social theory made up of three components, the micro-to-macro, macro-to-micro and individual-level theory of action, it is especially important that the RAT remains simple so as to keep the overall theory manageable. The scientific argument in this area is the notion that any teleological principle that is more specific is more power-ful in its explanation.

For the aim of this research Coleman’s arguments are acceptable. How-ever, for the remainder of this work we have to keep in mind that deviations from rationality do exist and can influence the use of the methods developed. 2.2.4 Macro-to-micro and back

In Coleman’s Social Theory the macro-level outcomes are more than just the simple aggregate of individual action. To clarify the concepts used in making the macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro transitions, two classical examples of social explanation are introduced. Both examples are cases where the micro-to-macro transitions are not properly implemented. The first draws upon the classical work of Weber on the relation between religious values and the de-velopment of capitalism (Weber, 1958 [1904]). A more contemporary in-stance of an attempt to make the micro-to-macro transition through simple aggregation of individual attitudes or orientations can be found in theories on revolutions, generally labeled frustration theories.

Max Weber and the spirit of capitalism

At one degree of detail in his work, Weber expresses a macro sociological proposition: the Protestant religious ethic, which characterized those socie-ties that became Protestant during the Reformation, contains values that fa-cilitated the growth of capitalist economic organization (Figure 2.3). This proposition exemplifies the mode of explanation that remains at system-level. To confirm this proposition, empirical evidence has to be produced that compares the economic systems in Protestant and non-Protestant socie-ties, or analyzes the economic development of societies that became Protes-tant over time. In his work, Weber uses both types of evidence to prove his proposition.

After this system-level hypothesis, Weber continues his analysis in more detail, incorporating the content of Calvinist doctrine. Here Weber touches

upon an individual-level theory of action,3 which connects the Calvinist

reli-gious value of ‘performing one’s duty in a calling’ to the development of

3 _{In how far Weber really intended to specify the proposition at an individual level is}

sub-ject to debate. Although Weber does connect ‘one’s duty in a calling’ as an individual ori-entation in Protestant ethic to the development of capitalism, his approach is not struc-tured. For example, Weber does not specify the social units involved at different levels of society.

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capitalism. This analysis requires a revision of the proposition in Figure 2.3, to include a level below the system-level for which the proposition was ini-tially set out.

Figure 2.3 System level hypotheses in Weber’s Protestant ethics

Weber’s macro-level hypothesis on the relation between religious values and economic organization of society (adapted from Coleman, 1990).

For our discussion the third connector in Figure 2.4, the micro-to-macro transition, is of most interest. It is clear that Figure 2.4 does not explain the rise of capitalism as resulting from a single individual’s attributes. Rather, some sort of combined, joint or aggregate effect of the economic behavior of many individuals has to be seen as the driving force for the development. However, what kind of combination or aggregation brought about this de-velopment? Whose economic behavior is guided by the Protestant ethic: that of individual workers or that of entrepreneurs? A proper micro-to-macro transition should in this case include a theoretical explanation of how the structure of positions constituting the organization, here a capitalist organi-zation with economic activities, comes into being. How are people who oc-cupy specific positions in this organization motivated to do so? And how is this system of individual incentives sustained? The elements of explanation missing here are exactly those elements that are addressed by the micro-to-macro transition in Coleman’s Social Theory.

In frustration theories the macro-to-micro transition takes different forms, depending on how the theory sees the frustration arising: from short-term setbacks, relative deprivation, rising expectations, or some other cause. The second relation, the individual-level theory of action, is merely a ‘frustra-tion leads to aggression’ proposi‘frustra-tion from psychology. The third rela‘frustra-tion, micro-to-macro, is a simple aggregate of individual aggression to produce a social product called revolution (Figure 2.5). Yet a revolution involves organ-ized action and interaction between the actors. The theory remains silent about how individual actors are motivated to take up specific roles within the social organization of revolution.

Religious values of a society Economic organization of a society System

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Figure 2.4 Relation between the system level hypothesis and the individual level theory of action in Weber’s Protestant ethic

Weber’s macro- and micro-level hypotheses on the relation between reli-gious values and economic organization of society (adapted from Cole-man, 1990).

In contrast to the examples above, the micro-to-macro transition in Cole-man’s Social Theory is not a simple aggregate of individual orientations. In Coleman’s Social Theory the micro-to-macro transition involves social or-ganization. It incorporates different roles, positions and responsibilities for different individuals. The role of social organization in the micro-to-macro transition is explained by the concept of interdependence of actions, which exists when actions of individuals impose changes in the macro-level struc-ture confronting other individuals.

In contrast to the examples above, the micro-to-macro transition in Coleman’s Social Theory is not a simple aggregate of individual orientations. In Coleman’s Social Theory the micro-to-macro transition involves social organization. It incorporates different roles, positions and responsibilities for different individuals. The role of social organization in the micro-to-macro transition is explained by the concept of interdependence of actions, which exists when actions of individuals impose changes in the macro-level struc-ture confronting other individuals.

Interdependence of actions can take different forms. A simple and direct case occurs when one actor’s actions impose externalities (positive or nega-tive) on others and thus change the structure of incentives confronting them. The classic ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) is a good example of such a micro-to-macro transition. The tragedy is caused by the actions of in-dividual sheep farmers, causing a detoriation of the common resource, which is neither planned nor intended by the individual farmers. A second example refers to negotiations, where the relevant parties reach an agree-ment or contract that influences individual parties’ actions when

imple-Protestant religious doctrine _Capitalism Values Economic behavior 1 2 3 Macro Micro System development

Purposive interaction in multi-actor decision making: Operationalizing Coleman's linear system of action for policy decision support

Purposive Interaction

in Multi-Actor Decision Making

Purposive Interaction

in Multi-Actor Decision Making

Operationalizing

Coleman’s Linear System of Action

for Policy Decision Support

Preface

Contents

Summary

1 Introduction

2 A Transactional Approach to Policy Decision Making