From the Critique of Scholasticism to the Critique of Antiquity

O R G A N O N 4(1967) _{L ’ANTIQUITÉ CLASSIQUE}

ET LES DÉBUTS

DE LA SCIENCE MODERNE

Gerhard Harig (German Democratic Republic)

FROM THE CRITIQUE OF SCHOLASTICISM TO THE CRITIQUE OF ANTIQUITY

Suppose we agree w ith George Sarton 1 and M arie Boas H a ll2 th a t the revival of n atu ra l sciences began in the m iddle of the 15th century, th a t is at a tim e when, according to K arl M arx, the M anufakturperiode 3 started or, in other words, in a period w hen feudalism in Europe was already doomed and its significance in the economy, politics and thinking gradually declined, and when first form s of capitalism w ere discernible due to the emergence of commercial and m anufacturing capital. This, then, was the time of a rapid grow th of production and w ith it an expansion of trade and handicraft. I t is rem arkable th a t the classes of the population th a t participated in this expansion repudiated the recent past as gloomy, “gothic”, meaning barbaric, and tu rn ed in th e ir thinking from life of the h ereafter to earth ly thoughts. This tren d can be noticed in all countries experiencing this grow th of production and trade, and this novel outlook on life found its expression in hum anism and in the Renaissance, th a t is, in the reb irth and restoration of the philosophy, science, a rt and literatu re of antiquity.

A more involved cause was the reason for going back to antiquity. The philosophy prevailing in those times, th a t is the au th o ritativ e science of feudalism as established in the 13th century by Thomas Aquinas, presented a combination of C hristian tenets and ancient philosophy, and served as a philosophical basis for C hristian theological teachings. The (genuine or assumed) works of A ristotle and the works of his com­ m entators w ere acknowledged as beyond question or doubt, ju st as the

1 George Sarton, The appreciation of ancient an d m e d iev a l science during

the Renaissance (1450— 1600), Philadelphia 1955, p. 1.

2 Marie Boas, Die Renaissance der N atu rwissenschaften 1450— 1630, Gütersloh 1965.

3 Karl Marx, Das Kapita l, vol. I, ch. 12, in: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels,

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Bible and the w ritings of the F ath ers of th e Church. Especially in secular problems, antique philosophy and science enjoyed great and even th e greatest regard. Y et it was precisely in these w orldly things th a t the lim itations became ap parently in h eren t in actual cognition and prevailing ideas, and th a t one became conscious in regard to the contrast betw een the new ly discovered conception of life and the old traditional way of the world. It seems understandable that, as long as notions of eternal and not replaceable values w ere n o t only dom inant but at the sam e tim e linked to the belief in an u ltim ate autho rity as origin of all knowledge, an urge grew up to look fo r b etter and more profound knowledge at those sources w hich h itherto had been exclusively supplying this knowledge. Deeply rooted and commonly accepted—augm ented by the C hristian doctrine of original sin and by antique concepts dated from Hesiod and Hom er—was the belief, th a t the “golden era” should be looked for in the past. This explains, w hy even Simon Stevin (1548— 1620) m entions in his w ritings the p ast era of wisdom in which m an w as supposed to have known all of n a tu re ’s w o nd ers,4 and w hy Francis Bacon b u ilt up his theory asserting th a t prior to the original sin m an ruled over natu re, and th a t this rule could and should be recaptured by labour, industry, and the developm ent of a new science surpassing th a t of th e antique. 5

However, it was palpably necessary first to investigate and m aster the antique science, in order to associate the belief in a golden era of the past w ith the endeavour and the confidence of eclipsing the antique. This intensified study of the antique brought, a t the outset, tw o striking surprises. It came to light, in th e first place, th a t the traditions from the antique th a t w ere a t hand contained inaccuracies, distortions and outright errors and, at the same time, th a t in all its domains including philosophy and sciences, life in the antique was much more abundant and variated and not a t all as monotonous and single- -m inded as was commonly thought. Thus it appeared from tw o different points of view, th a t the “restitution of th e an tiq u e” was indeed ap t to satisfy the new demands: on the one hand by releasing tradition from the fetters of distortions and errors and, on the other, by enriching it w ith new ly discovered source m aterial. Today we may freely adm it th a t antique science had indeed possessed much m ore knowledge and deep thinking than was perceived a t those times.

Both these discoveries contained, a t th e same time, seeds for a cri­ tique of antique philosophy and science. W herever contradictions and omissions occurred, even in philosophically incontestable texts, sh o rt­

4 George Sarton, On the h istory of Science, Cambridge (Mass.) 1962, pp. 164— 165.

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comings of this kind w ere not chargeable against ignorant com m entators of la ter periods. Indeed, there w ere instances w hen in m atters of essential im portance am biguities w ere discovered betw een the opinions of two authors of th e antique; b u t in th e ir contem poraneous argum entations each was able to have recourse to au th o rs from antiquity-—and in this w ay th e trustw orthiness of an tiq u ity suffered severe damage, so th a t here th e intensified study of an tiquity became the seed for its loss of credit.

Thus, as early as in the Q uattrocento th e re can be seen, parallel w ith each other, adm iration of an tiq u ity m anifested by the hum anists in th eir copying antique images, which today is occasionally term ed classicism, on the one hand, and on the other one sees the first steps tow ards overthrow ing antiquity, expressed by giving equal ran k to contemporaneous tim es and to an tiq u e eminence, and by refusing to adm it a gradual decline of the w orld following w h at was called the “golden age.” 6 In consistence w ith G. S arton one can distinguish, from the very beginning, two groups am ong the representatives of the Renaissance: the im itators of th e antique, belonging to the educated classes and pursuing philology and archeology, and the “rebels”—as they are called by S arton—whose m ind was set on actual perform ance, independent creators who w ere outdistancing th e antique. 7 Both these groups w ere united in th eir struggle against scholasticism, and each contributed its share tow ards overcoming this philosophy.

In the 15th century, th e hum anists undoubtedly took first place as far as th e evolution of new thinking and the new science w as concerned; Sarton speaks b lu n tly of a predom inance of philosophy over all other sciences. 8 However, w hile initially both groups w ere com plem enting each other, the 16th and 17th centuries—w ith th e ir intensification of the class struggle betw een th e followers of the declining old social order and th e representatives of th e new ly em erging one—brought w ith increasing clarity to light the differences betw een th e philologers and the rebels. The hum anists, vel classicists, k ep t off the revolutionary tendencies and from th e people at large. Even w hen opposing schola­ sticism, they lost them selves in a sophistry of literary insinuations understood only by a narrow circle of educated people; th ey failed to appreciate the value of practical experience and proved incapable of complying w ith th e new dem ands imposed by science in connection w ith th e fu rth e r evolution of productive vigour. In this m anner they lost

6 Leon B attista A lberti (1404— 1472), a hum anist and architect, dedicated h is book on painting to Filippo Brunelleschi (1377—1446) because, in his opinion, the Florentine cathedral built by Brunelleschi surpassed the science of antiquity, and because this m asterpiece had vanquished his own regret about nature h aving grown old tired and unable to produce again giants in body and spirit.

7 G eorge Sarton, The appreciation..., pp. 2—3. 8 Ibid., pp. 169, 171.

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th e ir leading role in science and in culture, and th eir place was taken by the rebels who w ere enjoying the support of m erchants, bankers and m anufacturers as w ell as of th e new aristocracy; this group, consisting of artejici, virtuosi and curiosi who, in p art, had evolved from th e above supporters, w ent ahead w ith its own independent research.

U nder these conditions th e rebels, champions of the practical application of science, m anaged to a tta in gradually the upper hand in the m ore profound knowledge m ade accessible by the hum anists: p a rt of the hum anist school changed over from studying antique litera­ tu re to investigation of nature, and th is activity increased the am ount of scientific literatu re published in a variety of languages.

W ithin the various domains of science, this change-over from hum anistic studies to th e study of n a tu re proceeded a t a different rate, altern ately in league and in conflict w ith the hum anists and artificers, depending on the significance of a given domain in w orld outlook and in practical life, and on the attain m en t previously reached in antique science. A t any rate, this transition constituted not only the release from the despotic rule of philology as claimed by Sarton, 9 but, a t the same time, the full liberation from th e autocracy of theology—a fact overlooked by Sarton—and from reliance upon the auth o rity of bygone time.

Here, on the one hand, it was th e question of reconciling w ith the tendencies held thus far, which the new knowledge derived from antique sources or gained from practical experience; this w as a step ahead which in botany, anatom y, geography, mining and m etallurgy, th a t is, in the whole of n atu ra l science and in technical attainm ents w ent beyond a m ere increase and enrichm ent of knowledge and a defeat of antique science. On the other hand, it was im p o rtant to com prehend the failure of n atu ral science and n atu ra l philosophy of those tim es in clarifying or, even, appraising practical problem s and in discovering new solutions— a failure which, taking astronom y, mechanics and the atomistic theory as example, brought about revolutionary transform ations in fundam ental beliefs and th us developed into an entirely new n a tu ra l science.

The resuscitation of antiq uity was significant in a twofold sense. It supplem ented and enriched ex tan t knowledge and, a t th e same time, it supplied footholds for th e critical exam ination of existing doctrines by referring back to those ancient w riters or publications th a t had been unknow n to, or overlooked by, routine philosophy, or which so fa r had been deliberately disavowed in conform ity w ith acknowledged authorities of antique times.

In consideration of these interrelations, historiographers of philosophy and science have pointed out the significance of Platonism and Neo­

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platonism as a coun tercurren t to th e Thomistic philosophy, and they have investigated th e effect of this developm ent upon Copernicus, K epler and other scientists of th e 16th and 17th centuries. 10 However, let us not confine ourselves to philosophical reflexions, b u t ra th e r illu s tra te these events by indicating a most im p o rtan t change in the history of science: th e history of astronom y or, to be exact, of th e astronom ic w orld systems.

D uring the 15th century, astronom y was v ery backw ard. I t was unable or, rath er, not able any more to satisfy practical demands, n eith er in the construction of the calendar nor the com putation of th e position of th e sun, the moon and the planets—thu s n eith er for astrological purposes nor for establishing th e position of ships on the high seas. U nder these conditions tw o prom inent astronom ers, Georg Feuerbach (1423— 1461) and Johannes Regiom ontanus (1436— 1476), living in hum anistic surroundings a t Vienna, tried first to ascribe the difficulties encountered by astronom y to erroneous tran slatio ns and to o u tright falsehood in Ptolem y’s chief works. A ided by the bibliophile and collector of books, C ardinal Bessarion (1395— 1472), they m anaged by th e ir m any years’ strenuous w ork to prepare from a G reek copy of the Alm agest a carefully executed sum m ary in Latin. 11 The resu lt however, was, th a t even the genuine Ptolem y failed to throw lig h t on th e existing difficulties.

The n ext chapter in the acquisition of antique astronom ical knowledge was w ritten by Copernicus. This scientist, an ard en t ad m irer of Ptolem y, had studied the A lm agest as given in Regiom ontanus’ epitom e and arranged his principal book in th e sam e order as Ptolem y had done. How­ ever, taking into account th e shortcom mings of astronom y of those times, he made bold to criticize Ptolem y from a P lato n ist’s point of view and, being a hum anist, he attem p ted to> find more profound knowledge in earlier antiquity. As Copernicus him self stresses in the w ell-know n Preface to his principal book, he had taken pain to study th e w orks of all the philosophers: om nium philosophorum —obviously th is could only m ean all philosophers of past times— “to seek out w h eth er any of them had ever supposed th a t the m otions of the spheres w ere other than those dem anded by the m athem atical schools”, and in this way Copernicus discovered the ancient opinion on th e heliocentric system . 12 The commonly held concept of th e universe was, therefore, radically criticized by him on the basis of a resuscitation of an tiqu e trad itio n and, a t the same time, this critical attitu d e w as in tu rn supported by this

10 A. Koyre, From the closed w o r ld to the infinite Universe, B altim ore 1957, and the sam e author: La revolu tion astronomique, Paris 1961.

11 Epitome in Cl. Pto le m aei m agn am compositionem, V en ice 1496. T his work appeared after R egiom ontanus’ death. The G reek m anuscript in R egiom ontanus’ possession w as printed in Basel in 1538. Cf. G. Sarton, The appreciation..., pp. 146—147.

12 Nicolaus Copernicus, Die K reisb e w e g u n g en der H im m elskörper, 1. Buch, zw eisprachige Ausgabe, Berlin 1959, pp. 10— 11.

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reference to antiquity. Copernicus developed h is new concepts during the first decade of th e 16th century. Only half a century a fte r the beginning of the Renaissance, all relev an t antique works had been tran s­ lated anew by hum anists. Copernicus w rote his own Preface in 1542 or 1543.

When, barely fo rty years later, Tycho B rahe (1546—1601) divulged his own system of the universe, he concealed the fact, th a t in antiquity there had been precursors of this system also. Like Copernicus, in disproving Ptolem y he made reference only to astronom ical, physical and theological argum ents; he may even not have looked for a con­ firm ation of his theory in ancient w ritings. Astronom y had become self-reliant, undertaking research of its own.

A fterw ards it was Galilei, who m ade the n ext momentous step forw ard by his declaring w ar on antique science. In his famous Dialogue

Concerning the Tw o Chief World System s, Galilei b lu ntly emphasized

m any times, th a t now more valuable knowledge could be attained than an tiq uity had known and th a t even A ristotle himself, w ere he then living, w ould change his opinions. The pedantic bookworms w ho con­ sidered A ristotle’s au th oritativ e reputation indispensable, were dismissed by G alilei w ith the advice: everyone should use his own e y e s .13 In this m anner, the critique of th e scholastic philosophy by the use of diverse antique teachings had tu rn ed into a critique of antique science on the basis of G alilei’s own new discoveries and reflexions.

In th e above I have presented in some d etail the evolution of astronom y, because I consider it rem arkably typical. The same p a tte rn was repeated in the 17th century in the theory of the stru ctu re of m atter, by th e resum ption of antique atom istics and of th e w orks of L ucretius and Epicurus. Modified, w e again m eet this p a tte rn in statics and hydro­ statics in consequence of the revival of A rchim edes’ scriptures; in dyna­ mics this process presents a different aspect, because A ristotle’s doctrine on motion—a doctrine upon which the "im petus theory” of the P aris term inists was founded—was never followed in antique science by a second theory on motion. In the evolution of th e new dynam ics the antique science was, therefore, unable to serve as means of criticizing the peripatetic doctrine of motion; yet, it fulfilled its task inasm uch as G alilei’s known allegation, th a t the Book of N atu re was w ritten in m athem atical la n g u ag e ,14 also contained contemporaneous Neoplatonic reasoning.

In this context we note the historical and logical vindication, w hy the new mechanics developed not in the initial stage, w hen judgm ent w as being pronounced upon the philosophy of the feudal schools, th a t is,

13 Le opere di Galileo Galilei. Edizione nazionale, VII, Firenze 1897, p. 138. 14 Ibid., VI, p. 232.

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in the Renaissance, b u t only afte r this critique had resulted in th e defeat of the peripatetic doctrines and of the belief in au th o rity in other domains also.

W hile in 1609 P ierre Camus, bishop of Bellay, still asserted in his

D iversités: “Thus, in any dissertation, au th o rity is the sam e as

foundations to a building or roots to a tree; lacking au th o rity no dis­ sertation can abide”, 15 there dates back from the same tim e to Francis Bacon the dictum : “P lato harm ed n atu ra l philosophy by his theology as much as did A ristotle by his logic.” 16

Thus initiated, th e radical break w ith the belief in au th o rity and the suprem acy of philosophy was ultim ately accomplished by René D escartes (1596— 1650) in his w ork Discours de la M éthode, w hich he addressed, in F rench language, to all those who—as he p u t it— “p ro fit solely by th e ir n a tu ra l p ure in tellect” and refuse to “have faith m erely in th e ancient books” 17 (unfortunately w itho ut contrasting au th o rity w ith experience and experim ent). An anecdote reports Descartes to have said to Queen C hristine of Sweden: “I am surprised to see Y our M ajesty engaged in such nonentities,” w hen she was given lessons in G reek by th e fam ous D utch hum anist Vossius (1577— 1649). 18

Towards the end of the 17th century (1687—8), th e feud betw een hum anists and philologers as cham pions of the au th o rity and th e im portance of antiquity, on the one hand, and the follow ers of the new science and of D escartes’ philosophical teachings on the other, occasio­ ned in the literary-philological domain of France a dram atic finale in the famous “Q uerelle des anciens et des m odernes.” Released by a con­ troversy, w hether th e inscriptions on the “Arc de Triom phe” in Paris, intended to glorify th e achievem ents of Louis XIV, should be given in L atin or French, th ere developed a discussion on th e argum ent w h eth er or not the age of Louis XIV excelled th a t of Rome’s A ugustus. The decision in favour of m odem times, of F rance and th e French language, constituted not m erely the victory of a national state and absolutism but, a t the same time, a declaration in favour of progress, based to a high degree also on th e achievem ents of the new sciences and upon th e hopes m aintained for a more auspicious f u tu r e .19 W hile in France discourses continued throughout the 18th century on the am biguous question of th e superiority of one or th e oth er language, lite ra tu re and literary style, m atters took an altogether different tu rn

15 Hubert Gillot, La querelle des anciens et des m odernes en France, N ancy 1914, p. 282.

16 Francis Bacon, The W orks, ed. by J. Speeding et al., VIII, p. 569. 17 Rene D escartes, Abhandlung über die Methode, Leipzig 1948, p. 64. 18 Hubert Gillot, op. cit., p. 289.

19 In his w ritings, Fontenelle proclaim ed th e la w of continuous and n eces­ sary progress in scien ce and attem pted to prove th e valid ity of this law in th e domain of language and literature as veil. Cf. ibid., pp. 494— 496.

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in England: here, interested in the new sciences, the em erging bour­ geoisie, th a t in 1662 had established w h at was to be called the Royal Society, adopted a m uch more realistic attitude. In 1667, i.e. 20 years prio r to the rise of the “Q uerelles des anciens et des m odernes,” Thomas S p rat (1634— 1713) in his H istory of the Royal Society con­ cluded his dissertation on th e m erits of an tiq u ity and philologers by a comparison w hich shall also be the final accent of m y recital: “It seems to me, th a t th e wisdom they (the philologers) recovered from the ashes of the dead, is of about th e same n a tu re as ashes are. When concentrated in heaps, it is useless; w hen spread out over living soil, however, it renders it fertile so as to yield the most variegated kinds of fru it.” 20

20 Thom as Sprat, The h istory of the Royal S ocie ty of London for the im ­