D iscussion 37 J. Sulow ski
Professor SuchodoM d in h is re p o rt so m uch appreciated 'by everybody of us said: “If to th e science belong science o f m an a n d society, th e la tte r m ust beilong, too, in th e sam e degree to th e h isto ry of science”. Now I am n o t in terested in th e obvious sense of th is sentence. I w ould like to call your atten tion to an o th er m eaning of these words. W hat m u st be the rela tio n betw een th e h isto ry o f philosophy a n d th e histo ry of science?
I t is a general tru ism th a t philosophy is in terested in everything. Till th e m om ent When th e developm ent of th e h isto ry of science has started, its field h ad b een covered b y th e h isto ry of philosophy. The history of philosophy w as in terested n ot only in th e ideological develop m en t of h u m an concepts, b u t also in everything concerning th e in tel lectu al activity of m an.
M any of the studies on th e h isto ry of philosophy belong r a th e r to th e history of science in its today’s m eaning. For instance, one of m y articles on th e history of philosophy 1 concerns one of th e m ediaeval scientists and even evolutionists from th e School of C h artre s th a t had sta rte d a naturalistic tre a tm e n t o f n a tu ra l phenom ena not o n ly before F rancis Bacon, b u t also before Roger Bacon ju st a t th e beginning of th e X H th centu ry , nam ely W illiam ^ie Conches (f 1154).
So we can im agine th a t th e h isto ry of philosophy is fu ll o f d ata w hich deal w ith th e history of science. Now th e question arises: w h at m ust be th e relatio n betw een th e h isto ry of science an d th e h isto ry of philosophy w hich in th e M iddle Ages w as “a q u een ” of h u m a n sciences a fte r theology? If th e position of philosophical “im perialism ” is not acceptable n o r possible to p u t in practice, th e re a re some o th er possibi lities to realize. One m ay suppose:
1) th a t th e h istory of philosophy is one th in g an d th e h isto ry of science ano th er one; w e m ight stu d y th e la tte r as having nothing to do w ith the form er;
2) th a t all previous accom plishm ents of th e historians of philosophy belong to the h isto ry o f science if th e y concern th e area of p a rtic u la r sciences; so w e ap p rop riate them w ith o u t saying even “th a n k y ou” ;
3) th a t all the investigations o f th e historians of philosophy a re w orthless for th e h isto ry of science and a s such Should be b ro ught together an d p u t in to th e d u st of libraries;
4) if no one of th e above1 possibilities its reall, we suggest to consider th e h isto ry of philosophy an ollder siste r of th e h isto ry o f science th a t can help g reatly th e la tte r in d ifferen t subjects, in logic and g eneral
1 J. S u l o w s k i , Filozofia Wilhelma z Conches i pierw ociny m etody przyrod niczej. “Studia Filozoficzne”, N. 4/1962.
38 O b je t e t pro b lèm es de l’h isto ire de la science
m ethodology of science; to consider th e h isto ry of philosophy a m istress an d a guide in th e jungle of m eanings of ideas' a n d a source of different data concerning th e developm ent of sciences in th e ir historical aspects. The lalst point, of course, could n o t be accepted wiithout d etailed analysis nor criticism.
Professor Voise discussed th e notion of “science”. S uch an occupation is philosophical par excellence. In 1964, to r instance, th e re will be held in Ita ly a n In tern ation al Congress of M ediaeval Philosophy devoted to the m eaning of the term “n a tu re ” (natura). My own standpoint is th a t w e n eed philosophy in all w e do. R everting to o ur su b ject w e m u st Say th a t th e relatio n betw een th e h isto ry of science a n d th e history of philo sophy m u st be frien dly as th a t betw een two branches of th e same tree— the hu m an activity. They n ev e r m ust divorce from eaCh other.
L. N o vy
Le professeur Suchodolski nous a esquissé u n tableau bien large des thèm es que l ’h isto ire des sciences devrait étudier. S a conception accuse certains tra its qui d iffèren t de la conception habituelle. D’ap rès mon opinion le ptlus im po rtant de ces tra ite c’est la tendance de créer u n domaine uniq u e e t homogène des recherches destiné à étu d ier te déve loppem ent d e to u tes les sciences, c’est-à-'dire des sciences appelées- p a r trad itio n n atu re lle s e n com mun avec les sciences appelées sociales.
A vant d ’aborder c e tte ' tendance im p o rtan te je voudrais souligner que je ne considère n u llem ent les sciences sociales comme inférieures aux sciences n atu re lle s d u point de v u e scientifique. En langue tchèque, o n emploie la m êm e expression pour désigner to u s ces domaines: le mot “vëda” aussi bien pour ^h isto ire q u e p o u r la physique.
L ’exposé d u professeur Suchodolski nous a apporté de nom breux argum ents pour soutenir ladite conception de l ’histoire des sciences. Ils so nt basés s u r le fait q u ’à n o tre époque lè s points dé contact en tre les sciences classées p arm i les sciences n atu re lle s d’une p a r t e t les sciences sociales d e l ’aultre deviennent de plus en plus nom breux. On p o u rrait déployer encore davantage ce tte argum entation. C ependant, si on v eut sou ten ir une conception, on doit consacrer son a tte n tio n en prem ier lieu aux argum ents contraires, a u x argu m ents opposés à la conception soutenue.
D ans le cadre de la science m oderne, et, av an t tout, dans le cadre de la science contem poraine d eu x tendances opposées se m anifestent: u n e d ’elles aboutit à u n e spécialisation to u jo u rs p lu s étroite, à la création des domaines de plus en plus lim ités e t restrein ts; la deuxièm e force la naissance des pointe de vue plus larges o u d ’u n usage in atten d u des
