The proper use of artefacts:
a philosophical theory of the social
constitution of artefact functions
In this book, analyses of the use of artefacts, the functions of artefacts and thecommunication of artefacts all work in concert to provide an understanding of artefacts in their social context of use. It is explained that the proper functions of artefacts should be understood in a way that takes the social context of their use into account. Proper function ascription is partly justified on social grounds; proper functions can be understood as types of institutionalised use. Combining this view with the plan approach to intentional action this gives us a powerful method to understand artefact use action-theoretically and evaluate it combining standard norms of rationality with the social norms inherent in the artefacts’ proper function. Also, given the social nature of proper functions, it is explained how proper functions can be communicated by way of the physical structure of the artefact, acting as a conventional sign.
This book provides a comprehensive action theory and function theory of artefacts and their functions, understood as placed in a social world.
oper use of ar tefacts Simon S tevin S er ies in the P hilosophy of Technolog
Marcel Scheele
‘Wonder en is
gheen wonder’
M ar cel ScheeleThe proper use of artefacts: a philosophical theory of the social constitution of artefact functions
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Technische Universiteit Delft,
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. J.T. Fokkema voorzitter van het College voor Promoties,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 6 juni 2005 om 15:30 uur door Marcel SCHEELE
doctorandus in de wijsbegeerte
Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotoren: Prof. dr. ir. A.W.M. Meijers
Prof. dr. ir. P.A. Kroes
Samenstelling promotiecommissie Rector Magnificus, voorzitter
Prof. dr. ir. A.W.M. Meijers, Technische Universiteit Delft en Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Promotor
Prof. dr. ir. P.A. Kroes, Technische Universiteit Delft, Promotor Prof. dr. ir. J.L.G. Dietz, Technische Universiteit Delft
Prof. dr. mr. A.R. Mackor, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Prof. dr. B. Preston, University of Georgia (USA) Prof. dr. H. Radder, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Dr. W.N. Houkes, Technische Universiteit Delft en Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
ISBN: 90-9019521-1 ISSN: 1574-941X
Research for this thesis was made possible by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO)
Motto,
In the far and hazy future, when the old sun has shrunk to a small, dark-red disc in a purple sky, and the diminishing human race lives in few and far between villages, that echo endlessly from the aeons-past, on the silent planet earth, science is forgotten and magic begins to work...
Jack Vance, The Eyes of the Overworld
However beautiful and enticing magic is, the philosopher tries to stop her with the weapons of rationality. This thesis is a test of my capacities for doing this.
In de schimmig verre toekomst, als de oude zon gekrompen is tot een kleine donkerrode schijf in een paarse hemel, en het slinkend mensenras in enkele afgelegen dorpsgemeen-schappen woont, die eindeloos weergalmen van de aeonenlange geschiedenis, raakt op de stille planeet aarde de wetenschap vergeten en begint de magie te werken...
Jack Vance, De ogen van de Overwereld
Toch, hoe mooi en verleidelijk de magie ook is, de wijsgeer tracht haar tegen te houden met de wapenen van de ratio. Dit proefschrift is een proeve van mijn vermogen dit te doen.
Simon Stevin Series in the Philosophy of Technology Editors: Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers
Volume 1: Marcel Scheele, The Proper Use of Artefacts: A philosophical theory of the social constitution of artefact functions
© Marcel Scheele, 2005
Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uigave mag orden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen of enige andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever.
Citaten voor niet-commercieel gebruik kunnen wel zonder toestemming worden overgenomen. Scheele, M.
The proper use of artefacts: a philosophical theory of the social constitution of artefact functions. Leiden. Marcel Scheele Vierlinghlaan 186 2332 CZ Leiden E: marcel@mscheele.nl W: www.mscheele.nl ISBN: 90-9019521-1 ISSN:1574-941X
Contents - brief
Contents - brief 5
Contents - detailed 7
Acknowledgements 11
1 Introduction 13
2 The social constitution of proper functions 25
3 An institutional theory of artefact functions 65
4 A model for the communication of artefact functions 97
5 Understanding and evaluating artefact use: social and rational norms 129
6 Conclusion 167
Literature 173
Nederlandse samenvatting 179
Index - subject 187
Contents - detailed
Contents - brief 5
Contents - detailed 7
Acknowledgements 11
1 Introduction 13
1.1 Context and background of the research 14 1.2 Outline of the chapters 19 Chapter 2: The social constitution of proper functions 19 Chapter 3: An institutional theory of artefact use 20 Chapter 4: A model for the communication of artefact functions 22 Chapter 5: Understanding and evaluating artefact use:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxiSocial and rational norms 23
2 The social constitution of proper functions 25 2.1 Introduction 25 2.2 Function and use of artefacts 26 2.2.1 Proper function and use and accidental function and use 26 2.2.2 Two types of functions 29 2.3 Function theory 30 2.3.1 C-functions (Cummins- or Causal-role functions) 31 2.3.2 E-functions (etiological notion of functions) 33 2.3.3 I-functions (intentional or relativistic notion of functions) 35 2.4 Artefact functions 38 2.4.1 Preston’s pluralist notion of functions 38 2.4.2 Houkes-Vermaas; ICE: Intention, Cause, Evolution 41 2.5 Social aspects of proper functions 43 2.5.1 A token artefact changes function 44 2.5.2 An artefact type changes function 47 2.5.3 Acquisition of a social function 50 2.6 The social constitution of artefact functions 53 2.6.1 The pluralist theory revisited 53 2.6.2 The ICE theory revisited 56 2.6.3 Proper functions extended 58 2.7 A counterexample 59
2.8 Conclusion 63 3 An institutional theory of artefact functions 65 3.1 Introduction 65 3.2 The notion of institution 66 3.2.1 Action 68 3.2.2 Collective pattern of action 71 3.2.3 Social enforcement 73 3.2.4 Measure of stability 75 3.2.5 Discussion 76 3.3 An example of an institution: contracts 81 3.4 Proper use, proper functions and institutions 85 3.4.1 Normativity: institution and proper function 88 3.4.2 Function change and explanation 92 3.5 Conclusion 95 4 A model for the communication of artefact functions 97 4.1 Introduction 97 4.2 Natural and non-natural meaning 98 4.2.1 The distinction according to Grice 100 4.2.2 A continuum, rather than a dichotomy 104 4.3 Communication of artefact functions 110 4.3.1 Grice’s theory of non-natural meaning 110 4.3.2 Grice’s theory applied to artefacts 116 4.4 Designing with an explicit communicative intention 119 4.5 Conclusion 127 5 Understanding and evaluating artefact use: social and rational norms 129 5.1 Introduction 129 5.2 Plans and use plans 131 5.2.1 Plans 131 5.2.2 Use plans 136 5.2.3 Combining social and rational norms 138 5.2.4 Remark on a difference between social and rational norms 140 5.3 Levels of analysis and higher order reasons 141 5.3.1 Levels of analysis 141 5.3.2 Institutions as higher order reasons 142 5.4 Underdetermination by rationality 146 5.4.1 An example of a use plan and its social elements 149 5.5 Determination by social norms 153
5.6 Standing plans 157 5.6.1 Standing plans as socially stored plans 157 5.6.2 Collective use and standing plans 160 5.7 Conclusion 165 6 Conclusion 167 Literature 173 Nederlandse samenvatting 179 Index - subject 187 Index - persons 191
Acknowledgements
Writing a thesis is a long and individualistic enterprise. However, reaching this stage is only partly my own merit. There are many people to thank for the sup-port, encouragement and help in writing this thesis, but also in giving me, in the last 31 years the capacities and environment to complete this project. I will not give a complete list of names of people that have played a role in my studies and writing. I know those that have helped and supported me as a person and they know it as well. Especially I want to thank Ingrid de Wilde, though, who gave me invaluable help with creating the schemas and pictures in this thesis and making them understandable to the reader. What remains unclear is my responsibility, though.
With regard to this thesis, first of all go my thanks to Anthonie Meijers, my promoter and not one at a distance. He helped and stimulated me continuously during this project and didn’t mind too much my struggles with collective intentionality theory, almost none of which survived the final cut of this work.
No less thanks go to my thesis advisor, Wybo Houkes who showed himself helpful when I had problems advancing my research and critical when I thought everything to go smoothly. A better balance cannot be wished for in analytic philosophy.
In the past years I was also supported by my philosophy reading- group, the
Leiden Kreis, the members of which gave me the opportunity to discuss
philoso-phy in general and were willing to read drafts of my chapters and comment on them, comments for which I am very thankful. The members are Robin de Jong, Bert Rook and Marco Schikhof.
Also the people in the department of philosophy in Delft are to be thanked for philosophical discussions that were not necessarily directly related to my re-search, but provided a rich philosophical environment where to do research. For my research especially the members of the Dual Nature research group were important, which contain, next to Anthonie and Wybo, Peter Kroes, Maarten Franssen, Pieter Vermaas and Jeroen de Ridder.
1 Introduction
Two people are climbing a vertical mountain face. One of them leads the climb and cannot be protected from above. He carries a safety rope with him, though, which is led through several anchors in the rock down to his climbing partner. The latter holds the rope with the aid of a belaying device that applies friction to the rope to help arrest a fall. This belaying device is called a figure eight. At some point of his climb this fall occurs indeed. The climber falls some distance before the rope pulls tight, because he is only protected from below. The energy of the fall is dissipated through the system and pulls at the figure eight, which is tugged upward. This time the device is blocked in an awkward position, how-ever, and it works as a lever against the karabiner by which it is attached to his climbing partner. The system breaks and the climber falls down. But he is lucky. He only breaks his legs.
Later, a discussion ensues in the climbing community. Some argue that the climber should not have been protected by such a device. They claim that the figure eight is not a protection device, because it is only for abseiling; this is what happens when it is used wrongly. Others reply and say that accidents can happen with any belaying device and this device is no exception. This type of accident is so rare that there is little reason to deny the figure eight this function. The discussion, which may be seen as a discussion about the proper function of the device, goes back and forth. Sometimes the climbing partner is blamed, some-times the manufacturer of the failed system. This discussion may even be con-tinued in court to get a formal decision on liability; the function of the device used then will be an important argument in the case.
The notion of function, used in this short story is central in this book. The notion of function is used to help evaluate the actions of the climbers, assessing who is to be blamed for the accident. I study this notion by directly relating it to the use of artefacts. Taking account of the role of the social context of use, in whatever form this should be understood, is the main focus of my research.
Agents use artefacts, such as belaying devices, as means to further their ends. The social context of use comes about in at least two ways. The most obvious way is when several people together use a single artefact; we may call this collective use. This is the case for the use of public transport, for instance. It is also the case when an individual uses an artefact in a certain way. Such use is not inde-pendent of a social context, which might be best formulated in terms of the rules of use: many of these rules have a social component. Take, for instance, the use
of private transport: single agents use vehicles, but their use is constrained by many social rules.
Artefact use, whether individual or collective, is said to be according to a
func-tion, which is that which the artefact is for. In other words, the function of an
artefact determines what the artefact is supposed to be used for, hence the connection between function and use. Since use is embedded in a social context it is plausible to suppose that this social context relates to artefact functions as well.
The aim of this book is to understand the nature and use of artefacts within their social context in order to understand and assess the discussion and con-cepts described above. What is it to ascribe a proper function to an artefact? What is the justification for evaluations of use in relation to a proper function? What does it mean to use an artefact for a certain purpose? These are the central questions addressed in this book.
The main reasons for taking on these topics are twofold and represent the two faces of this book. In the first place there is a detached academic philosophi-cal interest in describing part of reality on an abstract or conceptual level. Ques-tions such as: “what is a proper function?” and “what is proper use?” belong to that area. In the second place there is the relatively down to earth interest in being able, as a user of artefacts myself and as a member of some society, to evaluate my own interactions and other people’s interactions with artefacts and fellow human beings. Evaluating use, for instance, is important for assigning responsibility, as we saw in the example above. Assigning responsibility is important in legal contexts, but not exclusively so. People do this routinely in the course of a day and this book might provide some of the tools for doing that sensibly and systematically. The main tool developed in this book is a precise analysis of the social determinants of the proper functions of artefacts.
1.1 Context and background of the research
The research for this book is done in the analytic philosophical tradition. This means that I concern myself with concepts and with arguments. The concepts of use, function, evaluation, the social and so on are analysed and relations between them are investigated. I argue that proper functions of artefacts should be un-derstood inclusive of social facts, rather than just in terms of historical evolu-tionary facts, which has been the main contention in philosophy in the last decades due to the focus on biological functions. I argue that artefact use is not just constrained by rational norms, as standard action theoretical approaches in philosophy concerned with a rational reconstruction of action would suggest, but
that the social norms inherent in proper functions are constraints in a similar way as rational norms.
In my conception, the method of research thus consists in using natural lan-guage, analysing terms and concepts of natural language and reasoning about them with logical rigour. This research is not empirical, but the facts of the matter are to be observed, of course. The analysis in analytic philosophy indi-cates the drive to distinguish constituent components of the concepts under investigation. In such analysis one should pay close attention to maintaining logical consistency. This can lead to the conclusion that the original concepts under investigation are ambiguous or inconsistent, which is problematic, be-cause at odds with the rules of logic. Resolving these problems by creating new definitions on the basis of the analytical components lies at the heart of the method of conceptual analysis. This means that, although the starting point of the investigation generally is natural language, the necessary revisions create a technical vocabulary, which may differ from common usage of those terms.
I will not go deeply into the methods of conceptual analysis, save for the fol-lowing remark. If I start out from terms and concepts in natural language and arrive at concepts that are at odds with natural language, then what is the status exactly of the conclusions of this book? How is the analysis justified? On my conception, I cannot justify the analysis by its similarity to the natural language.
I regard, therefore, the status of my conclusions as not so much an empirical one, but rather similar to a stipulative definition. The consequence of this idea is threefold. In the first place such definitions provide a normative framework for the concepts under consideration. This establishes a technical vocabulary within which the terms and concepts are used incorrectly if they deviate from the stipu-lated use, even if that use is correct from the point of view of natural language. In the second place use in normal linguistic contexts that deviates from the stipulated definitions is not wrong across the board, but only with regard to language use that is meant to fall within the analysis covered by the technical vocabulary. The two contexts thus need to be distinguished carefully. In the third place, and most importantly, the analysis becomes a tool, rather than a descrip-tion of language. In the present research this is a tool for understanding and evaluating artefact use. This tool can be evaluated in a way that a description cannot, because a tool simply need not be descriptively correct, but has to work; i.e. be a good means to the stated end. If the (conceptual) tool makes useful distinctions in concepts that we subsequently can use for evaluation and under-standing, the definition is justified.
One way to introduce the topic of this book is by situating it against the back-ground of the broader research programme of which the research for this book
was part: The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts.1 This project started from the
following idea. Technical artefacts, being products of human intentionality, are hybrid objects. On the one hand they are material in nature and their operation and effects can be described in physical or causal terms. On the other hand this mode of description is not complete and does not exhaust the nature of these objects. Artefacts of this kind are to be used by people; they are for something. This aspect of use is captured by the notion of function. Objects potentially have many, or even an unlimited number of functions. Not all of those are considered
the function of the artefact. The distinction between ‘mere use’ and ‘proper
function’ as this may be called depends on some agent’s intentionality or, as I argue, the intentions of some group or collective.
The dual constitution, by physical structures on the one hand and intentional relations on the other is not unique to artefacts, it has been an ongoing concern in the philosophy of mind for a long time, but it is seldom investigated in rela-tion to artefacts and their funcrela-tions. The Dual Nature project is an attempt to correct this deficiency in particular, but also to direct philosophical attention to the study of artefacts in general.
The present work concentrates on the intentional aspect of artefacts, or to be precise, the social context of artefact use. If we want to interpret conceptual analysis in terms of providing useful stipulative definitions and if definitions ideally give conditions that are each necessary and together sufficient, the main contribution of this book to a definition of function is to argue for and analyse one necessary condition for a function theory, namely the social condition and the consequences this has for understanding and evaluating artefact use. As we shall see this social condition is understood in terms of social institutions. This is not to say that I don’t work towards a more general conception of artefact functions, but the main focus is on this social condition.
Before I present the structure of this book, I want to make one point concerning an approach to technology that is explicitly concerned with its social factors within the so-called science and technology studies (STS). I do this in order to make clear what the prospective reader may expect from the argument in this book and what not. My argument is in the analytic philosophical tradition and in this tradition relatively little research has been done in technology and artefacts as such. My research concentrates on the social aspects of functions. There are approaches in STS that give social factors a prominent place in their research. The social constructivist approach is well known for this since the last decades. However, this book develops its argument within the analytic tradition and is not
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concerned explicitly with these other approaches. Although there are similarities between the topics of research and the kind of questions asked, the philosophical background and approaches differ in ways that make them also independent from each other, and warrant an independent treatment.
One important difference between my approach and constructivist ap-proaches lies in the value that is given to conceptual analysis; I have briefly described what I mean by this above. This may be contrasted with a well-known example in the constructivist approach, which is summarised in the “seamless web” thesis. This thesis states that “[t]he conceptual framework should not make a priori distinctions among, for example, the social, the technical, the scientific, and the political.” (Bijker, 1995, 13).2 Another well-known version of this
con-structivist approach is actor-network theory in Bruno Latour’s sense that incor-porates a principle of generalised symmetry: that what is human and non-human should be integrated into the same conceptual framework, both being equally analysed as ‘actants’. It can be debated whether these views actually claim that different elements in this web cannot be separated or distinguished entirely. The approach may limit this claim only to the impossibility of doing this
a priori, as the above quote literally says. This is not altogether clear, though,
because both Bijker’s and Latour’s approach can be very well read in the former, stronger way, implying a view on artefacts that suppresses explicitly the distinc-tion between material artefact and social environment (cf. Bijker, 1995, 76, Radder, 1996, 110). However this may be, we need not perform a detailed exege-sis of this point. The point I want to stress is that my approach is different in this respect in that I aim from the very beginning at conceptual distinctions and use those explicitly as an analytical tool.
Now it might be asked whether I shouldn’t discuss this approach, given the stress I give the social features of functions. Don’t I run the risk of reinventing the wheel? Or, if my approach differs strongly, is my approach a rival? And if so, shouldn’t I argue in favour of my approach and/or against the constructivist approach? The answer is that my research indeed is different, but not necessarily a rival. To a large extent the research questions and interests are of a different nature, so that both approaches, analytical and constructivist, might very well supplement each other in the end. It might be the case that there are fundamen-tal philosophical differences, but I will not discuss these, because I prefer to develop my argument in a positive vein. There are two additional differences between the respective approaches that show further in what sense I mean that we are not so much rivals, but rather interested in different questions.
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In the first place, constructivist approaches to technology are primarily inter-ested in the context of discovery, rather than a context of justification. These technology studies are primarily interested in questions concerning factors of technology development or factors of changing technology use. We may also say that they are generally concerned with empirical and descriptive research, rather than normative or evaluative questions (cf. Radder, 1996, chapter 5). Within that approach, an important point is that the actual development of artefacts cannot be understood independently from social forces determining some of the dy-namics of change as opposed, for instance, to some older views that maintained that technological development could be understood on the basis of technical factors alone. In this book, however, I do not aim to describe or explain techno-logical development as such, although at some points my analysis touches on these issues. My project of function analysis aims to answer different questions, namely questions about the way artefact use can be evaluated and justified. My research can be explicitly placed in the context of justification: given that an artefact is created in such and such a way, what kind of reasons justify a certain use or a certain evaluation of some use? In this context I add social considera-tions to a rational reconstruction. It remains a reconstruction, aiming at justifi-cation, but is not limited to considerations of rationality. In this sense, the projects are simply different projects, with some similarities, possibly only superficial similarities.
In the second place, my research concentrates on functions of artefacts and reasoning about functions. The questions in this respect differ from constructiv-ist approaches that aim at understanding technologies and technology develop-ment, often in the form of sociological or ethnographic case studies. In that approach the aim is not to analyse and explain technical functions as such. The notion of technical function generally is not an explicit, independent theme. As I said above, my project is about artefact use, but limits itself to functional aspects of use. Therefore I start out with an analysis of the notions of function that are used or can be used in understanding and evaluating artefact use. Also in this case we see that the research projects aim at different goals and are not necessar-ily rivals.
These differences do not mean there is no relation possible between the ap-proaches. Technical functions obviously are part of technology and technology development obviously has consequences for technical functions. But investigat-ing this relation in detail was not part of my research.
1.2 Outline of the chapters
Chapter 2: The social constitution of proper functions
This book analyses the functions of artefacts. Functions should be understood in close connection with the use of artefacts by human beings or intentional agents in general. We can understand and evaluate use in turn by connecting it to functions. In this chapter the relation between function and use is investigated and their common relation with the social context of use. It will be seen that a notion like collective acceptance of use is a necessary component of the under-standing of functions.
The first step in the analysis is to make a distinction between system func-tions and proper funcfunc-tions. The system function of an artefact is connected to any use that is enabled by the properties of that artefact. Any capacity that the artefact has and any goal that an intentional agent might have in relation to the use of that artefact helps define a system function; in principle there is an infi-nite amount of system functions. A screwdriver can be used to fasten screws, but can also be used to open paint cans, clean a bicycle chain and so on; the reader can add many alternative uses. System functions are connected to the objective or physical properties of the artefact in relation to the agent’s intentions. In this domain we can evaluate use by invoking the notion of rationality, primarily means-ends rationality. De usefulness of an artefact for some agent’s particular goal provides the criterion for the evaluation of the agent’s actions.
A second type of function can be called the proper function. The proper func-tion is under normal circumstances a system funcfunc-tion that is privileged: the artefact is meant to be used for the goal associated with that function. A screw-driver is meant to be used for (un)fastening screws and not for other possible applications; a chair is meant to sit on and not to stand on, although that is perfectly possible and is often done. An analysis in terms of means-ends ration-ality is insufficient to understand use that is in accordance with proper func-tions. Some components of the definition of proper function I argue for are similar to the components of system functions, because an artefact is supposed to have the capacities that enable the proper function, but these capacities are insufficient to determine the proper function. Furthermore, this context forces us to speak of “the capacities that an artefact is supposed to have”, in opposition to “the capacities that an artefact has”. An artefact can malfunction, because it is broken, which does change its system function, but not its proper function. In the case of a malfunctioning artefact we need a justification for a proper function assignment that does not refer to its actual or current capacities.
I argue that this “supposing” and “justifying” is not a purely rational process, but is partly constituted by social facts. The privilege of some property or capacity to act as the proper function is underlain by social facts. These social facts are complex and differ from case to case. In normal circumstances the designer of an artefact will play a central role in determining the proper function: he or she created the artefact for that particular goal and is an authority on that accord. For this reason, some have argued that the proper functions of artefacts are
histori-cally determined. This implies that if we know the history of creation and/or
design of an artefact, we can discover what its proper function is. This view has two advantages. The way we can understand artefact functions can easily connect to existing function theories in biology. De design history of an artefact can take over the role of Darwinian evolution in biology. Also, the evaluation of use can be grounded in objective facts of the matter, i.e. historical facts, and need not depend on current, subjective, opinions.
However, I argue that this historical determination is insufficient to under-stand proper functions. Proper functions of artefacts can change during their life span and identical artefacts with an identical design history can have different proper functions. The connection between function and use, stressed in this book, but largely left out of the traditional account, makes it possible to pose an alternative theory that connects the social acceptance of use to the proper func-tion. The advantage of this theory is that it takes the flexibility of functions into account (this helps to understand functions), but it does not take that functions are determined arbitrarily by individuals (this helps to understand how the evaluation of use can be justified).
Claim: Proper functions of artefacts are constituted socially (as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition). In other words: to evaluate artefact use with regard to their functions justifiedly, one should refer to the social context of these artefacts.
Chapter 3: An institutional theory of artefact use
In chapter 2 I argue that proper functions are partly constituted socially. I use a rough idea of collective or social acceptance of use to indicate this feature of proper functions. But a theory of functions should give a more detailed account of the nature of this social determination. To this end we need to develop a more precise view of social factors as well as a sufficiently general view. This generality is necessary, because is not obvious that any precise theory of social facts is a proper tool to account for the social aspects of artefacts, since social facts are in relevant in many different ways for the assignment of proper functions. In some cases the proper function will be based on the ascription of a function by an
authority. In other cases the proper function will be based on the beliefs of the majority of users. In yet other cases there can be a strong form of collective intentionality or we-intentionality. These different kinds of social determination have been analysed differently in the philosophical literature, but for the purpose of a general analysis of artefact functions we need a more general or covering account. This account should be open in the sense that it provides a general framework for other, more detailed accounts of social facts.
To this end I adopt in chapter 3 a version of the sociological notion of institu-tion and refine and develop it further. The noinstitu-tion I develop makes use of a notion of a collective pattern of action: this takes care of the descriptive aspect of social facts. It also makes use of a notion of the social enforcement of action: this takes care of the prescriptive aspect of social facts. The general definition I arrive at is that of a collective pattern of action that is socially enforced and has some measure of stability.
Combining the analysis of chapter 2 and chapter 3 I arrive at the following conception of proper function:
Artefact type x has the proper function F iff:
a) There is a justified belief that artefacts of type x have the capacity to F. Under normal circumstances artefacts of this type actually have the capac-ity to F, but if some tokens of x miss those capacities this can be explained partly on the basis of an understanding of the working principles of x and the reasons why some particular token a does not work, thus providing a justification for the (mistaken) belief in some instance.
b) Artefacts of type x are actually used to F.
Functions of artefacts are not just based on mental states of intentional agents, but on the actual practice of use. Not every artefact of that type is in fact used; take for instance the (as yet) unused stock in the repositories of manufactures, which have the appropriate proper function, though. c) The use of artefacts of type x as an F is institutionalised.
This means that the actual application of these artefacts is a collective pat-tern of action that is socially enforced.
This analysis of proper functions is fit for the two goals stated in this book. In the first place this view creates a framework that allows us to understand proper functions. Several conceptual components are necessary to completely under-stand functions. In the second place this view creates a framework for the evaluation of artefact use. It does this by showing how the properties of artefacts and our beliefs concerning those properties are not sufficient to view some use
as proper, but that social aspects also play a role in this assessment. Social and rational norms supplement each other.
Claim: Proper functions of artefacts imply the institutionalisation of the use that is in accordance with this proper function. In other words: the aspect of artefact functions that is social should be understood in terms of social institutions.
Chapter 4: A model for the communication of artefact functions
In this book I investigate the conceptual components of artefact functions and less so the generation of these functions. I do refer to social processes, though, because those processes create and change proper functions. That forms part of the argument in chapters 2 and 3. Whatever the exact nature of the process of proper function generation is, we can justifiably assert that an institutionally determined proper function can only be generated if some form of communica-tion about the proper way to use the artefact takes place. Such communicacommunica-tion can be explicit, implicit, verbal or non-verbal. The social relations identified in institutions not only come about with the help of communication but communi-cation also helps the continuation of institutions, because people need to know collectively what the rules of action are in order to conform to these rules and to enforce actions within some social environment.
There are many different modalities of communication possible, many of which are analysed in philosophical and other literature. One modality of com-munication that is less investigated, especially in analytic philosophy, but is very interesting in the present context, is communication by means of the artefact itself. Objects with a proper function often operate also as a medium of commu-nication about their own proper function. They carry, as it were, a symbolic representation of their own function with them and thus can be part of a com-munication process, being carriers of meaning. To understand this aspect of the communication of functions I develop a model on the basis of the pragmatic account of communicative meaning, thus going directly to the level of actual processes of communication. On the basis of that account I argue that the communicative meaning of the artefact refers directly to the artefact’s proper function. Analogously to linguistic meaning this can be the conventional mean-ing of the artefact.
The analysis also has ramifications for the evaluation of artefact use, because it is relevant that a user knows about the proper function if he or she is to be assessed on that basis. The model provides conditions of success of communica-tion that help identify under what condicommunica-tions we can ascribe this knowledge to a user.
Claim: Communication is a necessary component of the generation and con-tinuation of the proper function of an artefact. One modality of this communica-tion is via the artefact itself. The pragmatic account of meaning helps provide a model of communication by which an artefact’s communicative meaning refers directly to the artefact’s proper function.
Chapter 5: Understanding and evaluating artefact use: Social and rat onalxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxnorms
i
In the analysis up till now I have stated that proper functions are closely related to actions of users and those proper functions, in turn, are useful for the justifi-cation of evaluations with regard to those actions. Functions provide, in other words, a normative framework for the evaluation of use. In philosophical action theory, actions are generally understood from the perspective of means-ends rationality, which also provides the criteria for the evaluation of actions. The philosophical goal is to identify general constraints for reconstructions of ac-tions.
To understand the use of artefacts in relation to proper functions we can combine the standard rational norms in the reconstruction of actions with the social features identified in the analysis of proper functions. The insufficiency of rational norms for understanding use is argued for in chapter 2; chapter 5 is devoted to a more thorough analysis of the relation between these two types of norms with regard to use. The argument concentrates on extending the idea of a reconstruction in the action theoretical context to encompass social reasons alongside reasons based on instrumental rationality.
To this end, functions of artefacts are understood to be building blocks of complex series of intended actions, which form plans. Proper functions form standard components of those plans that are termed use plans in this theory. Next, it can be shown how social and rational norms play a role in this so-called plan theoretical approach to action. These roles can be understood in different ways, depending on the specific level of analysis and the specific calls for justifi-cation that are asked for in different contexts.
There are two main ways in which social norms are combined with rational norms, the difference having to do with the fact that normativity of actions can be analysed on different levels and the different ways they constrain action. In the first place, given one level of analysis, social norms can be viewed as con-straining action (or use) in general: within a particular social group social norms act as a kind of higher order norms that constrain the range of admissible means beyond what would be rationally admissible. In the second place social norms and rational norms can be viewed as filling in the gaps left due to the fact that rational norms, respectively social norms, individually underdetermine action.
As a supplement to this latter ‘filling in’ role of social norms I argue that so-cial norms contained in a use plan can be regarded as a kind of implicit or tacit social knowledge, guiding the actions of people. This can be understood by showing in what sense these norms are present in the social realm, in the form of institutions, resulting in the common knowledge of the norm, or use plan.
Claim: Artefact use should be understood as a species of intentional action. In the philosophical analysis of action, social and rational norms can be combined to create a normative framework for understanding proper functions and evalu-ating use of artefacts.
2 The social constitution of proper functions
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I argue that the notion of artefact functions is constituted, not only by the more traditional elements of a physical structure and the causal or intentional history, but also the by the social context in which the artefact nor-mally is used.1 That is to say, if the notion of function is to do interesting
evalua-tive work with regard to that use. The example that this book started out with shows that such evaluative work is relevant to our assessments of function and use. Current theories of function, general theories as well as theories designed for artefact function, will be seen to miss this social component. The view of functions that this chapter concludes with does contain such a social component. This view will not be a radical new theory of function, but rather a proposal for supplementing existing theories.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The relation between function and use, indicated briefly in the introduction, is presented in more detail in order to become clear on the work that a theory of artefact functions is supposed to do (section 2). Then I discuss some of the central approaches to functions in gen-eral, because they provide the building blocks in general function-theory and hence for artefact functions as well (section 3). Two function theories that are specifically aimed at artefacts and look promising in that domain are then dis-cussed (section 4). I will show, however, that there are artefact functions that are partly constituted socially, which are not dealt with by the theories presented. (section 5). I add a necessary condition to the existing theories, arguing that the social condition is quite general in fact. This leads to a different theory of func-tion in this respect. (secfunc-tion 6). Then I discuss a possible counterexample to the thesis that social facts are generally relevant to artefact functions (section 7).
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2.2 Function and use of artefacts
2.2.1 Prope function and use and accidental function and use r
—————————————————————————————————— Artefacts have functions, which are related to the goals of agents using them, or so it is argued in this chapter. First, however, we need to be clear about what is meant by the term ‘function’ and ‘use’ in this book and what the relations are between the concepts indicated by these terms. An agent may use an artefact in accordance with its proper function; i.e. what the artefact is meant for.2 This type of
use is proper use. The proper use of an automobile is to transport persons; this use is in accordance with the proper function of an automobile. Artefacts may have more than one proper function.
Using an artefact in accordance with its proper function is not the only way to use it effectively. Any use that the artefact physically allows (in a certain envi-ronment) can be utilised by agents; this can be called accidental or secondary use. This is use that is in accordance with a system function of the artefact.3 On this
terminology any proper use of a working artefact is use that is also in accordance with a system function. The difference lies in artefact malfunctioning. A car that has broken down is still a transport vehicle, but at that moment ‘transporting’ is not a system function of the car. A standard example of accidental use of a screwdriver is its use to open paint cans. A screwdriver allows this accidental use, we may also call it rational or effective use, and in that sense it is a system function of the screwdriver, but its not what screwdrivers are for; it is not a proper function of a screwdriver.
This terminology does not deviate radically from most standard uses in the philosophy of biology, the discipline with the most comprehensive analyses of functions, and from everyday language. The notion of function here is extended to encompass the point that artefacts are used by intentional agents in a way that biological items are not. Although organs may be useful for the creature that has them, the creature does not use them, therefore the notion of ‘function’ is ex-tended with a notion of ‘use’. In that sense the central analysandum for artefact functions is somewhat different from that for biological functions.4
2 Ruth Millikan introduced the term proper function in (Millikan, 1984). She uses the notion as a technical
term in the analysis of biosemantics. Proper functions of organs are those capacities for which the organs were selected. There is no ethical connection intended with this notion, it is simply the function of an object as opposed to other capacities it may happen to have. In this chapter the meaning of the term is intended to be similar, although the analysis will prove to deviate.
3 I use the notion of system function similar to Beth Preston. The idea of system function is captured by using
Cummins’ analysis of function, (Cummins, 1975). Preston argues, correctly in my view, that system functions and proper functions are not competitors, but are complementary (Preston, 1998).
A final terminological point concerns the notion of ‘proper’ in this book. Proper use is not necessarily beneficiary to the user or environment. In this book I generally disregard moral or other external considerations on the evaluation of use, other than those that concern the function of the artefact. So, for example, in my terminology we may use a gun properly to shoot someone with, although this may be said to be socially or morally improper. In cases where I do take such considerations into account I mention this explicitly.5
The notions of proper and accidental use and proper and system function can be employed to analyse evaluative judgements concerning artefact use, for instance with respect to assigning responsibility for failed use. Sometimes the terms are used in actual discourse; sometimes the judgements can be translated into this terminology. The following two types of cases are central for my analysis. In the first place, although an artefact may be used properly, i.e. according to its proper function, it could still fail in achieving the desired goal or even result in an accident. The fact that the artefact was used properly is prima facie reason to suppose that the artefact malfunctioned and that therefore the user should not be held responsible for this failure, barring cases of neglect of maintenance. The responsibility may be assigned to the artefact, or its retailer, manufacturer or designer.
I mention two concrete cases in which this type of prima facie reason, based on the proper use of an artefact emerges clearly. The first is in Dutch law, where we find an article concerning illicit action. It says that the user of an object that was not fit for a task that was agreed upon in a contract is responsible for the failure, if one occurs.6 “An object that is not fit for a task” may be said to contain
an implicit reference to the function of an artefact or at least to some form of proper use. A second concrete case concerns the assignment of responsibility by manufacturers of products, which are often part of guarantee. The information leaflet of a belaying device for climbers contains the following text:
‘A few examples of misuse and forbidden uses are (…) represented (…). Many other types of misuse exist and it is impossible to enumerate or even imagine all of them. You personally assume all risks and responsibilities, for all damage, injury or death which may occur during or following
incor-rect use of our products in any manner whatsoever.’ (my italics)
and
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5 For an analysis of normative judgements regarding artefacts that has a broader scope cf. (Franssen, 2005). 6 I refer here to the Dutch civil code book 6, article 77, a kind of overarching rule over the more specified laws
concerning product liability. The example is discussed in more detail in the context of my view that proper functions are a kind of institutions. Chapter 3, section 3.4.1.
‘Exclusions from the guarantee: normal wear and tear (…) or to improper or
incorrect usage.’ (my italics)7
The second central type of case that the function analysis is meant to deal with is where an artefact is used improperly, in the sense that the use is accidental or secondary. Such use may be judged rational as long as it works, i.e. is effective, or most efficient. For these cases standard considerations of rationality apply.8
However, if the actions fail to bring about the desired result or an accident occurs we have every reason to blame the user. The user may have acted irra-tionally or simply have made a mistake in assigning a system function to the artefact. The discussion in the climbing community that this book began with can be understood in terms of these two possibilities.
Evaluating use is not a matter of just looking at the proper function or just taking rational considerations into account. The social context, in whatever sense one takes this, is also relevant. This is shown immediately by the point that ethical considerations can be relevant for evaluating use, even if the use is in accordance with the proper function in my sense of the term. In this chapter I argue that even if we focus just on the notion of ‘function’ for a (partial) evalua-tion, we also cannot dispense with social facts. If this argument is correct then social considerations are internally relevant to ascriptions of proper functions. This implies that social considerations are relevant for the evaluation of proper use, also in the limited sense of the term as I use it. This, in turn, implies that social features cannot be simply regarded as external considerations with regard to artefact use, but that they enter into internal considerations, internal in the sense of being about what the functions of the artefact is.
Now, taking these points even further, some have argued that functions in general are constituted intentionally and/or socially. Searle argues that we should regard functions in general as observer relative properties. Function ascription is grounded in (collective) intentions, because this can take place only within a set of prior assignments of value. Proper functions then are constituted by collective intentions (Searle, 1995, chapter 1).
However, there are reasons for wanting the analysis of functions to be inde-pendent of such intentions. The central reasons are the following. In the first place there are next to this intentional feature of artefacts also physical properties relevant to function ascriptions, which are independent of human intentionality. In the second place, if we are able to identify proper functions as far as possible ——————————————————————————————————
7 Both citations are taken from the general information booklet, provided by climbing products of Petzl®. I do
not go into this point further because strictly seen this falls under the laws of which the earlier cited article is part, which I already discussed.
independently of current subjective or intersubjective intentions this would provide an objective basis for evaluations of artefact use, which is our current goal. In the third place, there are, in fact, objective views on functions and theories that do not depend on current users functions, which is prima facie reason to suppose that functions can be analysed in that way.
But before I assess these views, in the realm of biology and of artefacts proper, I want to introduce one more distinction to make sure that the type of function we are talking about is clear.
2.2.2 Two types of functions
The distinction between proper functions and system functions has been intro-duced above, but there is a second distinction that runs across this one and that is the distinction between technical functions and social functions. In this chapter, and in most of the book, the focus lies on what I call technical functions and not so much on social functions. So in order to be clear about what my theory is supposed to do primarily and to distinguish it from what it is only secondarily relevant for I briefly discuss the distinction.
The notion of technical function is the notion that this book concentrates on and it refers to the fact that artefacts are meant as an instrument for certain purposes. The function serves some utility. A good characterisation is the follow-ing and comes from an engineerfollow-ing textbook: ‘The function of a product is the intended and deliberately caused ability to bring about a transformation of a part of the environment of the product.’ (Roozenburg and Eekels, 1995, 56). This may not serve as a complete analysis of the notion, but it does indicate the gist of the idea.
The notion of social function has a different aim. Social functions not so much causally change (parts) of the natural environment, but rather help confer a kind of social status to the user of the artefact (important examples being: the function of a necktie, the function of the sword of an officer in the army, the function of many automobiles, cars often have next to their technical function, transportation, different sorts of social functions).
The difference is best understood in terms of the success conditions of use according to those functions, because these differ radically. Although the techni-cal function of an artefact is not itself an intrinsic property of the artefact, i.e. it depends on both physical characteristics and user’s intentions,9 the success of
achieving the desired goal is, when used correctly, dependent on their intrinsic properties together with their causal relations with the outside world. If I go through all the right motions, but still can’t get my car to move, apparently ——————————————————————————————————
something is physically wrong with the car.10 Intentionality is not relevant for an
analysis of this technical failure.
Social functions differ in this respect. Not only the function assignment, but also the successful or unsuccessful performance of social functions is consti-tuted by intentions of agents. Suppose that a particular car is supposed to give me status. This status enhancing function can be regarded as the social function of the car, alongside its technical function.11 The car might be a prime example
of its kind and normally this type of car does the desired social job. Notwith-standing this fact, if the relevant social (peer) group does not accept that car as enhancing my status, then the car fails for that purpose. It does not enhance my status, although the very same car might enhance the status of someone else, for instance someone to whom I sold the car out of disappointment.
In this book the main focus is on the technical functions, rather than these social functions. I will sometimes refer to the latter, though, because much of what is said about technical functions is also relevant to social functions and the two types are not always clearly distinguishable.
2.3 Function theory
Function theory in philosophy has been an important field of research, at least since the last three decades of the 20th century. The contemporary drive for
developing the notion of function mainly came from two directions. The first driving force were developments in the philosophy of biology. Biologists typically speak in terms of functions when they analyse organisms: the heart has the function to pump blood and although it also makes a certain sound while pump-ing blood, that is not its function. This ‘functional’ talk was in need of elucida-tion and justificaelucida-tion, because it threatens to run against certain deep-rooted metaphysical ideas that have to do with the idea that explanations in the natural sciences should only make use of natural categories. The assignment of ‘func-tion’ to one natural effect, rather than the other, in the above example, seems to have nothing to do with the natural realm, but with teleology. Teleology is not normally seen as a natural category, but has to do with intentionality. Ascribing intentions to basic natural objects is problematic and needs to be explained.12
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10 Or I am stuck in the mud, which effect still is a purely causal effect on my car.
11 It may be debated whether this social function should be regarded as a proper function as well or that we
should use an altogether different terminology for social functions.
12 Much literature can be found on this topic. One may consult standard theory of explanation, i.e. can
func-tions be included in scientific explanation; or discussions on reductionism, can (and should) funcfunc-tions be reduced to other (natural) categories, and so on.
The second driving force came from the so-called functionalist theory of the mind that faced a similar problem.13 Functionalism was devised to explain
mental phenomena, such as ‘intentionality’. But if functions (essentially) involve goals, you are explaining intentionality by assuming a form of intentionality. The challenge was to devise a notion of function that could do the explanatory job, without assuming too much.
I give a short overview of the main notions of function that arose out of these discussions. All have their strengths and weaknesses and might very well be used next to one another, depending on the particular use the researcher wishes to put them to. They form a useful starting point for the development of a notion of function for artefacts, if only because these notions are the most thoroughly developed ones.
The three basic approaches to analyse functions are the following. You can simply remove the ‘goal’ connotation by choosing your system of analysis appro-priately. In an appropriately chosen system the correct physical disposition will act as the function. The problem remains that there is no precept for individuat-ing an ‘appropriately chosen system’. This strategy results in so-called C-functions or Causal-role functions. You can also try to explain causally why a certain feature is there in the first place, and, more importantly, remains there. The explanatory mechanism points at the correct physical disposition that acts as the proper function. This results in so-called E-functions or Etiological functions. A third possibility is to preserve the full teleological connotation of functions, but are careful to locate ‘the teleology’ where it belongs: in intentional agents. In that case functions are not properties of (physical) objects, but are relative to human intentionality. This results in so-called I-functions or Intentional-functions. I discuss the three strategies subsequently.
2.3.1 C unctions (Cummins- or Causal-role functions) -f
—————————————————————————————————— This analysis of functions only refers to the causal role that a given property (or item) has within an analysis of a certain system –how the system is to be defined is left unspecified. Robert Cummins made the most thorough analysis of this type, hence the name. It can also be called a dispositional analysis, because it describes the dispositions of a part of a system to behave in a certain way in a whole system, or in a certain environment. In Cummins’ words: ‘(…)
function-13 A form of the computational view on mental processes in which low level ‘simple’ computations (or
syntac-tic manipulations) massively give rise to high level ‘complex’ mental phenomena. The complex mental phe-nomena are often said to emerge or supervene on this multitude of computations or be constituted by them. The different terms stand for different approaches to the same problem. These different approaches often do not exclude one another, but often reflect differing interests of researchers. The common core is a ‘scientifi-cally respectable’ account of the mind.
ascribing statements imply disposition statements; to attribute a function to something is, in part, to attribute a disposition to it. If the function of x in s [is] to φ, then x has a disposition to φ in s.’ (Cummins, 1975, 758).
The advantage of this view is that it stands very close to regular scientific analysis. You select a (part of a) system and investigate what causal contribution that part has to the operation of the whole system. It will be clear that this notion is in no way a kind of ‘autonomous’ notion of functions, because functions are always system relative. Cf. Walsh and Ariew: ‘According to [Cummins’] ap-proach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system.’ (Walsh and Ariew, 1996, 493) and: ‘(…) the point of ascribing a function to an object is to explain how it contributes to some overall capacity of the system of which it is a part.’ (Walsh and Ariew, 1996, 495).
C-functions are not necessarily all dispositions of a system part, biological or artificial. Cummins argues that we should analyse function ascriptions against the background of some analytical account or explanation of some capacity of the part. Functions are, therefore, relativised to the interests of some particular (scientific) explanation (Cummins, 1975, 762).
C-functions are often used in functionalist theories of the mind. Mental fea-tures are functional feafea-tures, which explains how they can be causally effective, without having to be either purely materialist, as in versions of behaviourism, or to be made of ‘ghostly stuff’, as in Cartesian materialism.TP
14
PT
Within the philosophy of biology this notion has been criticized, because it is seen to be too meagre or, for that matters, too liberal. The sound of a beating heart might be a C-function, because it is a causal effect within a certain system, e.g. the body as maker of a noise, but can we call that a function of the heart?TP
15
PT
Or, to revert to an example of an artefact: what about the sound that the fan in a computer makes, next to its cooling function. Can that sound be called a func-tion of the fan? It rather seems to be an epiphenomenon of the system.TP
16 PT —————————————————————————————————— TP 14 PT
Cf. (Block, 1980), especially the section that is devoted to functionalism (part one, pp. 171-222).
TP
15
PT
The example is debatable. You might say that whatever it is that fulfils the function of a heart, or ‘is a pump’, necessarily is a mechanical system. Mechanical systems make noise. Therefore: no noise, no heart (no pump). In that sense the noise that is made by a heart is a necessary condition for it to be a pump. So the noise is an essential feature of the heart. Also, in a medical setting there is a system in which the noise that a heart makes contributes to a desired end, namely when someone listens to the heart in order to help make a diagnosis. The heart might be said to act as an instrument for a purpose. But I will leave this consideration aside, at least for the moment. For an analysis of artefactuality in this sense cf. (Dipert, 1993).
TP
16
PT
Such a function at least does not help the writing of this book at the moment. Discussions of artefact-epiphenomenality resemble older discussions of epiphenomena in the philosophy of mind. That discussion can be traced back to the first commentaries on Descartes’ dualistic theory of mind (Descartes, 1984). This so-called substance dualism (between body and mind) would at best lead to a passive role of the mind, men-tal events being caused by material events, but themselves having no causal powers. Some philosophers
A second problem concerns disfunctionality or malfunction. Take a look at the following example. The heart has as its function to pump blood around in the body. This function seems to be analysable in terms of dispositions. The heart is, given a supply of blood, disposed to contract, which gives the blood speed so that it can flow through the veins. This analysis is relative to the bodily system that involves supplying cells with oxygen and nutrition in order to remain alive. No problem up till now.
But what do we do with the following case? Somebody is undergoing for one reason or another surgery during which the heart is stopped for a while. During this surgery the heart is, therefore, not disposed to pump blood. If functions are defined in terms of current dispositions, the heart does not have the function to pump blood at that moment. But that seems to be incorrect, intuitively at least.17
It is much more plausible to say that the ‘real’ function of the heart (pumping blood) has been interrupted. That is something different from saying that the heart hasn’t got that function (at that moment). This story is relevant for (tempo-rary) malfunctioning organs.18
Examples from the realm of artefacts are even more distressing. Machines that are (momentarily) shut off are very common. The moment I turn off my computer, the fan stops cooling. Does that mean that it is at that moment not the function of the fan to cool? No, it just means that it is not working at that mo-ment; it does not mean that it is not a cooling device. Again, the argument can be extended to broken or otherwise malfunctioning artefacts and their parts.
2.3.2 E-functions (etiological notion of functions)
Considerations like the foregoing have given rise to the idea that the notion of function should have a normative character and should refer to ‘real functions’ or
proper functions, and not to accidental functions (or properties).19 Many philoso-phers believe that we need a teleological notion of function to analyse proper functions. Functions always are associated with a certain goal. However, such analysis should not involve a proliferation of intentionality into the natural world.
Despite that he wasn’t the first with this approach, it is useful to take Larry Wright’s work as a point of departure. He created an etiological evolutionary
embrace this view for this reason, believing it an elegant solution to problems like the ‘causal competition’ between brain activity and mental activity, broadly discussed under the heading of ‘mental causation’.
17 You should at least include a mechanism that states the “right circumstances” for the disposition to hold,
thus explaining the absence of the beating of the heart at that moment, but such a specification already goes beyond the specification of a causal role function.
18 For more arguments cf.( Millikan, 1993).
analysis of functions.20 Especially Ruth Millikan and Karen Neander have
worked this out in more detail and their views stand central in many discussions about functions in philosophy.21 They argue that an etiological notion of
func-tions is the correct way to satisfy the demand for a scientifically respectable and normative notion of function.
What is this etiological notion exactly? In essence the idea is to assign a func-tion to (biological) traits that refers to goals, but not in a way that refers to inten-tionality. The function is tied to a particular evolutionary history. Such an evolu-tionary history of a trait is the causal history of that trait, thus ensuring a naturalistic account of this function (assignment). This notion does not just analyse what a specific trait does, but gives an account of why that trait or behav-iour is present in the system under analysis. The answer to such a ‘why-question’ will have to be in terms of the goal of the trait under consideration. Therefore we have to know what the trait is for (cf. Walsh and Ariew, 1996). We saw that the teleological connotation is absent in the C-function, but it is present in this etiological conception. A modern classic is Karen Neander’s definition:
‘It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which items of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s an-cestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic ex-pression, to be selected by natural selection.’ (Neander, 1991, 174)
This definition, which is tailored for biological functions, uses a historical no-tion, natural selection. A proper function of an item is a function to do some-thing, namely that what in the past was done by items of that type, which helped make the ancestors of the organism more fit. By definition, this is the ‘reason’ that the item was selected by natural selection.
This definition of proper function satisfies the requirements mentioned above: natural selection is scientifically respectable and it introduces a normative element, because it introduces a reason for the trait being there and doing what it does. This reason is not intentional in any sense but rather defines ‘normal conditions’. Under normal conditions a well functioning heart pumps blood, because that is the cause of the heart being there in the first place; that is, if biologists are right. If conditions are not normal, then the heart’s function still is pumping blood, for instance when the heart is temporarily stopped. The reason is that such a current situation does not change the causal history of the object. This satisfies the demand for normativity by only referring to natural causes.
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20 ‘Etiology’ means here ‘the science of causes’; not to be confused with ‘teleology’ (or with ‘ethology’ for that
matter). The idea is to explain certain teleological aspects using an etiology.
