ROCZNIKI HUMANISTYCZNE Tom LXI, zeszyt 5 – 2013
JOANNA KLARA TESKE *
THE METHODOLOGY OF ART (CRITICAL/RATIONALIST AESTHETICS): PROJECT OF A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINE
A b s t r a c t. This essay presents a project of a new discipline — the methodology of art. By ana-logy with the methodoana-logy of science, the task of the new discipline would be to investigate art as a cognitive activity, in particular, art’s cognitive method. The justification and closer description of the project takes the form of a table comparing the four types of cognition — the exact sciences (interpreted along the Popperian model), the humanities, the methodology of art and art — in terms of their object, method, format of knowledge, relation to truth, ways of justifying beliefs, the possibility of constructing experiments and the like. In the conclusion the essay offers some com-ments on the “artistic” mode of cognition. The main thesis of the article concerns the need and possibility of rational reflection upon art conceived of as a non-scientific mode of exploration of the human psyche.
The present paper outlines a project of a new philosophical discipline — the methodology of art alias critical/rationalist aesthetics. The former name indicates an analogy between the new discipline and the methodology of science, the latter expresses the project’s indebtedness to the philosophy of Karl R. Popper, for whom the two adjectives — “critical” and “rationalist” — were synonymous and defined the essential characteristic of all scientific investigation.
A scientific (or philosophical) discipline is defined in the first place by its sub-ject (including the aspect by which the subsub-ject is examined), method and purpose. The methodology of art would have art, in so far as art is a cognitive phenome-non, for its subject. In particular, it would be occupied with the “artistic” method of cognition. Its status would be that of a philosophical discipline, offering reflection on art conceived of as a mode of cognition (hence it would enjoy the
Dr. JOANNA KLARA TESKE— Department of English Literature and Culture in the Institute of English Studies at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; address for correspondence: Al. Raceawickie 14, PL 20-950 Lublin; e-mail: jteske@kul.pl
JOANNA KLARA TESKE
312
status of a meta-cognitive discipline). The method of the methodology of art would in principle be the method of philosophy: critical discussion of various stances and arguments (reconstructing their hidden assumptions, explicating their implications, examining their logical coherence, but also, whenever feasible, con-fronting them with “empirical data”). Its aim would be to explore the cognitive aspect of art in a systematic way, also, possibly, to formulate in this respect some guidelines for artists, art recipients or scholars.1
Among the specific issues which the discipline might explore, one might enumerate the object of artistic exploration (e.g. internal vs external reality), the status (e.g. certain, hypothetical, probable) and format of knowledge obtained via art (e.g. conceptual, propositional, experiential; subjective insight vs objective model of reality), justification of this knowledge (e.g. falsification or confirmation with reference to the personal life experience of a recipient of art or the aesthetic experience itself), the quality of “artistic” cognition (e.g. rational, empirical, gene-ral), an artwork’s affinity to scientific experiment, applicability of the concept of truth to art, the phenomenon of interpretation (its aims, rules, possibility in the light of art’s notoriously ambiguous and contradictory nature), aesthetic categories (e.g. beauty, harmony, ugliness) and their contribution to cognition obtained via art, the presence of cognitive progress in art (e.g. accumulation of “artistic” knowledge, evolution of the “artistic” method, keener self-awareness of the recipients of art), the creative process (viewed as a cognitive process in terms of interaction between the mind of the artist and the work of art) as well as the act of reception (viewed as a cognitive process in terms of interaction between the mind of the recipient and the work of art), the categories of art that should be distinguished with reference to art’s cognitive function (e.g. verbal and non-verbal, representational and non-representational, fictional and factual). Some of these issues are briefly discussed further down in the paper, while the list is obviously not intended as complete.
As regards the distinction between the methodology of art, the humanities and art criticism, basically, examining the same object, they would approach it in diverse ways. In particular, the methodology of art would not comprise either interpretation or evaluation of any specific works of art or the record of their
1
As regards its contribution to humanistic scholarship (e.g. literary studies), the methodology of art might provide certain interpretative guidelines (e.g. contradiction located within an interpretative hypothesis falsifies it unless it can be demonstrated that the contradiction derives from a contra-diction located within the artwork; a work of art should be viewed together with the responses it has generated; the significance of a work of art should be assessed with reference to the insight into the human mind that it has occasioned).
THE METHODOLOGY OF ART 313
reception. The task of describing, evaluating and presenting the work of art to the public belongs in the first place to art criticism (literary, theatrical, musical and the like). As for the humanities, they might comprise (apart from disciplines such as history or linguistics) a general theory of art2 as well as all sub-disciplines examining in detail specific forms of art (e.g. narratology, prosody or the theory of counterpoint), supplemented with critical (in the Popperian sense of the word) descriptions and interpretations of individual works of art (even though the scholarly status of interpretations might be doubtful, the exclusion of any con-sideration of meaning would in effect render all studies of art nonsensical), and, finally, supplemented with the history of art: an attempt to describe systematically and to comprehend art’s evolution, the current state of affairs included (without passing any moral or aesthetic verdicts, the humanities might note certain regu-larities, such as the rise of art’s “self-consciousness” in postmodernism). Neither art criticism, nor the humanities need in their investigation of art be limited to art’s cognitive aspect, to the exclusion of art’s decorative, therapeutic, com-municative, entertaining, commercial or any other aspects. In contrast with the methodology of art, their approach is comprehensive. One might also note here that, provided that one accepts the idea that art need not be limited to a collection of works of art but should be perceived in broader terms as works of art taken together with the processes of their creation and reception, both art criticism and the humanities (i.e. the disciplines concerned with art) should be viewed also as part of art; their status, in other words, would be dual: part scholarly, part artistic.
The proper scholarly environment for the new discipline would further be con-stituted by the methodology of science (the two might perhaps cooperate when investigating the methods of art and science, e.g. their use of experiment), co-gnitive studies on consciousness, psychology, anthropology, evolutionary theory of the mind, naturalistic theory of art and possibly many others.
Last but not least, one should consider the possible threat that the methodology of art might pose for the freedom of art. The methodology of science does not seem to have affected science badly, so the risk should not perhaps be exagge-rated. Alternatively, to prevent any undesirable effects of that kind, one might deliberately resign from the normative approach within the discipline. Some inter-action between the methodology of art and art might at the same time be inevi-table. Nota bene, according to Popper, art (together with other objectified products
2
Alternatively, this general theory of art might be viewed as a prerogative of aesthetics — a traditional philosophical discipline (not to be confused with the critical/rationalist aesthetics pro-posed here).
JOANNA KLARA TESKE
314
of the human mind, which constitute world 3) may be used by man in the process of self-creation, since it not only helps man develop his/her mental faculties, but has also helped man become a self-conscious being (Knowledge and the Body-Mind
Problem... 140-142; Unended Quest 229-230). This property of art invites the
question whether critical aesthetics should only monitor or also try to control the transformation of human mentality that may be achieved via art; whether this kind of control would be feasible (world 3 being to a large extent autonomous, it might make little sense to try and predict, let alone direct its future course), desirable/ ethical (and if so, what values should be selected as fundamental for the pro-gramme of such control).
The present paper is written in the form of an annotated table which compares and contrasts four cognitive enterprises: natural science (the 1st column), the humanities (the 2nd column; both natural science and the humanities are presented by and large along the Popperian model of science),3 the methodology of art, i.e. the postulated discipline (the 3rd column), and art itself (the 4th column), discussed here above all as a mode of cognition (i.e. in the way in which art might be studied by the methodology of art). The table is followed by a couple of closing remarks concerning art as a mode of cognition.
3
The presentation of natural science and the humanities is based on my discussion of the possibility of adopting the Popperian model of science in the disciplines concerned with culture, cf. Teske “The Methodology of the Humanities...”. Also when discussing art, I will rely on Popper’s approach (which I tried to reconstruct in the same article), whereby a work of art is conceived of as an empirical (real) though essentially immaterial object belonging to world 3 or, more precisely, as an objectified product of the human psyche.
THE HUMANITIES, CRTICAL/RATIONALIS T AESTHETICS AND ART — A PO PPERIAN APPROACH DI SC IP LI N E i N A TU R A L SC IE N CE H U M A N IT IE S R A TI O N A LI ST A ES TH ET IC S A R T a m od el o f s ci en tif ic in ve st ig at io n, ta ke n as a p oi nt o f r ef er en ce fo r t he pr es en ta tio n of th e hu m an iti es , ae st he tic s a nd a rt — al l o f w hi ch a re di sc us se d he re a s c og ni tiv e en te rp ris es co m pr is in g a nu m be r o f d is ci pl in es , su ch a s h is to ry (p ol iti ca l a nd c ul tu ra l, hi st or y of sc ie nc e) , l in gu is tic s, b ut a ls o th e di sc ip lin es c on ce rn ed w ith a rt (history of art, literary studies, m us ic ol og y, e tc .) co nc ei ve d of a s a m et ho do lo gy o f a rt (a philosophical di sc ip lin e an al og ou s to th e m et ho do lo gy o f s ci en ce , c on -st ru ct ed o n th e as su m pt io n th at a rt a s a m od e of c og ni tio n m ay b e vi ew ed a s analogous to science) co nc ei ve d of a s a c og ni tiv e ac tiv ity , w ith ou t i m pl yi ng th at c og ni tio n ex ha us ts a rt ’s n at ur e; a rt ’s o rig in , i n pa rt ic ul ar , m ig ht b e su bo rd in at e to th e ru le s o f s ex ua l a nd n at ur al se le ct io n, its o rig in al a im b ei ng re la te d to su rv iv al a nd re pr od uc tio n (o f in di vi du al s a nd sp ec ie s o r g en es ); st ill ar t a pp ea rs to h av e ev ol ve d an d ca n no w sa tis fy v ar io us h um an n ee ds , t he ne ed fo r c og ni tio n in cl ud ed ST AT U S EM PI RI CA L SC IE N CE EM PI RI CA L SC IE N CE /A RT (t he st at us o f t he d is ci pl in es c on ce rn ed w ith a rt is d ua l: sc ho la rly a nd a rt is tic ) ii PH IL OS OP H Y (h av in g an e m pi ric al o bj ec t, cr iti ca l ae st he tic s c on ta in s a t t he sa m e tim e el em en ts o f e m pi ric al sc ie nc e) AR T DE M AR CA TI ON C RI TE RI ON (w hi ch le gi tim iz es th e cl as si fic at io n of a gi ve n co gn iti ve a ct iv ity a s S CI EN CE , PH IL OS OP H Y OR A RT , A S RE LE VA N T) FA LS IF IA BI LI TY (e m pi ric al fa ls ifi ab ili ty ) pa rt ly F AL SI FI AB IL IT Y (e m pi ric al a nd lo gi ca l f al si fia bi lit y) , pa rt ly R AT IO N AL IT Y OF D IS CO U RS E (a lo os er c on st ra in t a pp lic ab le to in te rp re ta tio n) – th es e he lp c er tif y th e hu m an iti es a s s ch ol ar sh ip ; t o ce rt ify th e di sc ip lin es c on ce rn ed w ith a rt a s art the demarcation criterion is their be in g a re sp on se to a rt FA LS IF IA BI LI TY (e m pi ric al a nd lo gi ca l f al si fia bi lit y) OR IG IN AL U SE O F AE ST H ET IC F OR M T O EX AM IN E/ C ON VE Y M EA N IN G an d VA LU ES a s r eg ar ds w or ks o f a rt ; RE LE VA N CE (i .e . b ei ng e ss en tia lly re la te d to a w or k of a rt ) a s r eg ar ds th e pr oc es se s o f t he ir cr ea tio n an d re ce pt io n
DI SC IP LI N E i N A TU R A L SC IE N CE H U M A N IT IE S R A TI O N A LI ST A ES TH ET IC S A R T AIM(S) ii i CO GN IT IO N , vi ew ed a ls o in te rm s o f p ro bl em so lv in g, a nd p ra ct ic al a im s: technological progress, improving m an ’s li vi ng c on di tio ns , e tc . CO GN IT IO N ; ot he r, m or e pr ac tic al , a im s p os si bl e (e .g . i n ap pl ie d lin gu is tic s) b ut un ty pi ca l CO GN IT IO N (p er fe ct in g ar t a s a m od e of c og ni tio n po ss ib ly in cl ud ed ) M U LT IP LE A IM S: C OG N IT IO N A S W EL L AS M OD IF IC AT IO N O F H U M AN CO N SC IO U SN ES S, D EC OR AT IO N , CO M M U N IC AT IO N , T H ER AP Y, S OC IA L IN TE GR AT IO N , E N TE RT AI N M EN T, e tc . OBJECT OF CO GNITION THE NATURAL WORLD (world 1, in Po pp er ’s te rm s) ; i nc lu di ng m an a s p ar t of n at ur e CU LT U RE iv (w or ld 3 ) a nd m an a s di st in ct fr om n at ur e (t ra ns ce nd in g it) an d cr ea tin g cu ltu re (A s r eg ar ds st ud ie s o f a rt , t he re co m m en de d ap pr oa ch sh ou ld b e ho lis tic , i nc lu di ng e xa m in at io n no t on ly o f i nd iv id ua l w or ks o f a rt b ut a ls o th ei r c re at io n an d re ce pt io n, ta ki ng in to a cc ou nt a ll po ss ib le a sp ec ts , n ot on ly th e co gn iti ve o ne ). AR T AS A C OG N IT IV E AC TI VI TY (i .e . a n as pe ct o f a n el em en t o f w or ld 3 ) TH E H U M AN M IN D (w or ld 2 ) f irs t o f a ll, bu t a ls o th e m in d’ s i nt er ac tio n w ith th e en vi ro nm en t — th e ex te rn al w or ld (i n pa rt ic ul ar , i ts so ci al a nd cultural aspects) M ET H OD o f a ss es si ng th e va lu e of h y-po th es es (j us tif ic at io n of c on vi ct io ns ) (A cc or di ng to P op pe r, it is th e m et ho d of ju st ify in g hy po th es es th at m at te rs , th e m et ho ds o f t he ir fo rm ul at io n being by and large uncircumscribed). CR IT IC IS M ; TR IA L AN D ER RO R IN G EN ER AL a nd in particular the procedure of FALSIFI-CA TI ON : H YP OT H ES ES D ER IV ED F RO M TH EO RY T ES TE D IN E XP ER IM EN TS , T H E RE SU LT S of w hi ch a re P RE SE N TE D IN M AT H EM AT IC AL L AN GU AG E; CO RR OB OR AT IO N , as w el l a s a ss es sm en t o f t he re la tiv e va lu e of h yp ot he se s i n te rm s o f t he ir ex pl an at or y po w er , s im pl ic ity , e tc . CR TI CI SM ; TR IA L AN D ER RO R, CR IT IC AL D IS CU SS IO N O F H YP OT H ES ES ; si nc e ex pe rim en ts a re p os si bl e (e sp . th ou gh t e xp er im en ts ) b ut u nt yp ic al o f th e hu m an iti es , T H E PR OC ED U RE O F FA LS IF IC AT IO N c on si st s m os tly in ch ec ki ng w he th er a g iv en th eo ry co rr es po nd s w el l w ith th e av ai la bl e “e m pi ric al d at a” a nd w he th er it s ar gu m en ta tio n is lo gically correct CR IT IC IS M ; TR IA L AN D ER RO R, CR IT IC AL D IS CU SS IO N O F H YP OT H ES ES ; si nc e ex pe rim en ts (e sp . t ho ug ht ex pe rim en ts ) a re p os si bl e bu t un ty pi ca l o f p hi lo so ph y, T H E PR OC ED U RE O F FA LS IF IC AT IO N c on si st s m os tly in c he ck in g w he th er a g iv en th eo ry c or re sp on ds w el l w ith th e av ai la bl e “e m pi ric al d at a” a nd w he th er it s a rg um en ta tio n is lo gi ca lly co rr ec t IT IS D EB AT AB LE W H ET H ER T H E M ET H OD O F AR T IN CL U DE S TH E CR IT IC AL E LE M EN T Es se nt ia lly , a rt o ffe rs o pp or tu ni tie s f or ne w e xp er ie nc es a nd u se s f or th is purpose original aesthetic form in highly im aginative w ays. Reactions art pr ov ok es a re su bj ec tiv e an d ho lis tic (e m ot io na l, pe rc ep tiv e an d in te lle ct ua l, al l a t o nc e) . Th ey m ay have cognitive sign ific ance. The ele-m en t o f j us tif ic at io n m ig ht b e lo ca te d
DI SC IP LI N E i N A TU R A L SC IE N CE H U M A N IT IE S R A TI O N A LI ST A ES TH ET IC S A R T ei th er in th e pr oc es se s o f a rt c re at io n an d re ce pt io n (c f. th e m od ifi ca tio ns in tr od uc ed in to th e or ig in al p ro je ct b y th e ar tis t o r t he in iti al in te rp re tiv e hy po th es es re je ct ed la te r b y th e re ci pi -en t o f a rt ), or b ey on d ar t p ro pe r, in m an ’s d et ac he d, c on sc io us re fle ct io n on a es th et ic e xp er ie nc e. T he re is n o ne ed to p re ju dg e th is is su e he re . ( Se e al so th e cl os in g re m ar ks ). RELATION TO TRUTH (t ru th is d ef in ed h er e in te rm s o f t he cl as si ca l c or re sp on de nc e th eo ry ) TR U TH (a bo ut n at ur e) IS T H E ID EA L AI M o f s ci en tif ic c og ni tio n bu t, as P op -per states, there being no c rit er io n of tr ut h, sc ie nc e, e ve n if it fin ds tr ut h, ca nn ot k no w it (w ha t s ci en ce c an kn ow is th at it is m ov in g to w ar ds tr ut h) v TR U TH (a bo ut c ul tu re ) I S TH E ID EA L AI M o f s ch ol ar ly c og ni tio n bu t, as P op pe r s ta te s, th er e be in g no cr ite rio n of tr ut h, th e hu m an iti es , e ve n if th ey fi nd tr ut h, c an no t k no w it (w ha t th ey c an k no w is th at th ey a re m ov in g to w ar ds tr ut h) TR U TH (a bo ut th e m et ho d of a rt /a rt ta ke n as a m od e of co gn iti on ) I S TH E ID EA L AI M o f c og ni tio n in th is di sc ip lin e bu t, th er e be in g no cr ite rio n of tr ut h, cr iti ca l a es th et ic s, e ve n if it fin ds tr ut h, ca nn ot k no w it (w ha t a es th et ic s c an kn ow is th at it is m ov in g to w ar ds tr ut h) As a d is ci pl in e co nc er ne d w ith m et ho do lo gy , a es th et ic s d es cr ib es , an al yz es , t rie s t o ju st ify th e m et ho d of ar t; it m ig ht a ls o tr y to im pr ov e th is m et ho d an d th us a ls o re la te to tr ut h. TR U TH (a bo ut th e hu m an p sy ch e) IS TH E ID EA L AI M o f a rt is tic c og ni tio n Th is tr ut h is , b y an d la rg e, p er so na l. vi N o cr ite rio n of tr ut h se em s a va ila bl e he re , a s e ls ew he re . Ar t ( ta ke n as a st or e of k no w le dg e, n ot a m od e of c og ni tio n) m ay so m et im es of fe r a n ill us io n of tr ut h. E rr or s m ay ha pp en in a ll co gn iti ve a ct iv iti es b ut , ar t b ei ng p ar tly ir ra tio na l, th is k in d of de ce pt io n m ig ht b e m or e fr eq ue nt a nd m or e di ffi cu lt to d is cl os e. Ar t m ay a ls o be (i nt en tio na lly ) a bu se d to m an ip ul at e pe op le (c f. ki ts ch , pr op ag an di st o r p op a rt ), m or e ea si ly th an e .g . s ci en ce , b ut th e ph en om en on o f a bu se is e nd em ic in hu m an c ul tu re , n ot sp ec ifi c to a rt .
DI SC IP LI N E i N A TU R A L SC IE N CE H U M A N IT IE S R A TI O N A LI ST A ES TH ET IC S A R T FO RM AT O F KN OW LE DG E OB TA IN ED Th e co nc ep t o f “ kn ow le dg e” is h er e ta ke n no t i n th e st ric t m ea ni ng o f t ru e an d ju st ifi ed b el ie fs (t he re b ei ng n o cr ite rio n of tr ut h an d no fo ol pr oo f m et ho d of e ith er v er ifi ca tio n or fa ls ifi ca tio n of a ny h yp ot he se s, kn ow le dg e in th e st ric t s en se d oe s n ot se em a va ila bl e) . A M OD EL O F RE AL IT Y co m bi ni ng de sc rip tio n an d ex pl an at io n; m or e sp ec ifi ca lly , s ci en tif ic k no w le dg e ta ke s th e fo rm o f u ni ve rs al (o r s ta tis tic al ) LA W S no tin g re gu la rit ie s i n na tu ra l ph en om en a an d of fe rin g ca us al ex pl an at io n th er eo f A M OD EL O F RE AL IT Y co m bi ni ng de sc rip tio n an d in te rp re ta tio n (“ ex pl ic at io n” o f m ea ni ng ); m or e specifically, humanistic kn ow le dg e ta ke s t he m ul tip le fo rm vi i of 1 ) a C OR PU S OF ID IO GR AP H IC IN FO RM AT IO N , i nc lu di ng IN TE RP RE -TA TI VE H YP OT H ES ES (t he sc ie nt ifi c st at us o f t hi s c om po ne nt o f t he hu m an iti es se em s d eb at ab le ), an d 2) a se t o f P RO PO SI TI ON S de fin in g RE GU LA RI TI ES (t he se n ee d no t b e un iv er sa l l aw s) o bs er va bl e in c ul tu ra l ph en om en a an d of fe rin g, w he re po ss ib le , i nt en tio na l ( po ss ib ly a ls o fu nc tio na l) vi ii e xp la na tio n th er eo f A M OD EL O F RE AL IT Y co m bi ni ng de sc rip tio n an d ex pl an at io n (a nd , i n ad di tio n, p os si bl y al so n or m at iv e pr e-sc rip tio ns ); m or e specifically, kn ow le dg e in c rit ic al a es th et ic s m ig ht ta ke th e du al fo rm o f 1 ) t he or y of a rt ta ke n as a m od e of c og ni tio n, e nt ai lin g in te nt io na l ( po ss ib ly a ls o fu nc tio na l) ex pl an at io n (s ee e nd no te v iii ) a nd 2) GUIDE LINES for artists and art re ci pi en ts (i f t he d is ci pl in e is tr ea te d as al so n or m at iv e) TH E FO RM AT O F KN OW LE DG E IN A RT IS M U LT IP LE : 1 ) m os t t yp ic al se em s N ON -PR OP OS IT IO N AL , E XP ER IE N TI AL , KN OW LE DG E, p er so na l I N SI GH T ga in ed through experience of art (either in an ac t o f c re at io n or re ce pt io n of a rt ); th is kn ow le dg e/ in si gh t m ig ht b e pa rt ly tr an sl at ab le in to p ro po si tio na l kn ow le dg e; 2) so m e ki nd s o f a rt m ay a ls o be u se d to tr an sm it pr op os iti on al k no w le dg e (historical experience of a given community, scientific information ta ke n fr om sc ie nc e, m or al b el ie fs , e tc .) pr es en te d as e xp lic it (e .g . v er ba liz ed ) id ea s o r t ra ns la te d in to th e w or k’ s fo rm (s tr ic tly sp ea ki ng , t hi s i s a rt u se d to c om m un ic at e id ea s r at he r t ha n ex pl or e re al ity , t ho ug h fr om th e po in t of v ie w o f a n ar t r ec ip ie nt th e di ffe r-en ce in so m e ca se s m ig ht b e ne gl ig ib le ). Cf . t he c lo si ng re m ar ks o n ar t a s a m od e of c og ni tio n. ST AT U S OF K N OW LE DG E H YP OT H ET IC AL , C OR RO BO RA TE D ix H YP OT H ET IC AL , C RI TI CA LL Y EX AM IN ED H YP OT H ET IC AL , C RI TI CA LL Y EX AM IN ED H YP OT H ET IC AL , m os tly P ER SO N AL , PO SS IB LY U N JU ST IF IE D M OD E: R AT IO N AL V S IR RA TI ON AL ; EMPIRICAL VS THEORETICAL MOSTLY RATIONAL (but not exclusively so w he n it co m es to fo rm ul at in g hy -po th es es ); x E M PI RI CA L MOSTLY RATIONAL (but not exclusively so w he n it co m es to fo rm ul at in g hy po th es es ); EM PI RI CA L (t ho ug h th e MOSTLY RATIONAL (but not exclusively so w he n it co m es to fo rm ul at in g hy po th es es ); PA RT LY E M PI RI CA L BO TH R AT IO N AL A N D IR RA TI ON AL , B U T N OT A N TI RA TI ON AL , i .e . n ot d ire ct ed against reason; (art is irrational in so
DI SC IP LI N E i N A TU R A L SC IE N CE H U M A N IT IE S R A TI O N A LI ST A ES TH ET IC S A R T (“ ra tio na l” m ea ns h er e po ss es si ng a n in-built critical mechanism; “e m pi ric al ” m ea ns h er e “d ea lin g di re ct ly w ith a n el em en t o f r ea lit y” an d m ay b e co nt ra st ed w ith th e sp ec ul at iv e or d ed uc tiv e ap pr oa ch o f e. g. m et ap hy si cs o r l og ic a nd m at he m at ic s, re sp ec tiv el y) em pi ric al m at er ia l c on si st s i n th e m ai n of m ea ni ng s a nd v al ue s a nd is in it s es se nc e no t d ire ct ly a cc es si bl e to th e se ns es ) (philosophy is not in it s entirety em pi ric al b ut th e m et ho do lo gi es o f sc ie nc e an d ar t s ee m e xc ep tio na l a s ea ch h as a n em pi ric al o bj ec t, sc ie nc e an d ar t, re sp ec tiv el y) fa r a s a w or k of a rt is in p rin ci pl e un ci r-cu m sc rib ed b y th e ru le s o f l og ic o r a ny ot he r r ul es , e .g . t he ru le o f v er is im ili -tu de ; f ur th er , i t i s n ot o bv io us th at a rt ha s a n in -b ui lt cr iti ca l m ec ha ni sm ; s til l it m ig ht b e ar gu ed th at a n el em en t o f cr iti ci sm is in fa ct p re se nt in th e pr o-ce ss es o f c re at io n an d re ce pt io n of a rt an d th at th is ju st ifi es a rt ’s c la im to ra tio na lit y; a ls o, a rt b ro ad en s m an ’s experience of life supplementing it w ith a es th et ic e xp er ie nc e an d in th e case of fictional, representational art al so w ith v ic ar io us li fe e xp er ie nc e, a nd w ith in fo rm at io n ab ou t o th er p eo pl e’ s as well as one’s own mind, further-m or e it of fe rs a ll ki nd s o f i de as fo r re fle ct io n, a s s uc h it do es a pp ea r a rational cognit ive project); EMPIRICAL (a rt a s a c og ni tiv e ve nt ur e ha s a n em -pi ric al , t ho ug h im m at er ia l, ob je ct , i .e . w or ld 2 ) ( It m ig ht a ls o be im po rt an t t o re m em be r i n th is c on te xt th at a rt b ot h ex am in es a nd tr an sf or m s h um an consciousness; this kind of in teraction m ig ht p os si bl y be le ss ty pi ca l o f o th er cognitive activities).
DI SC IP LI N E i N A TU R A L SC IE N CE H U M A N IT IE S R A TI O N A LI ST A ES TH ET IC S A R T EX PE RI M EN T (t ak en b ro ad ly a s c re at in g ei th er a n artificial situat ion or an artefact for co gn iti ve p ur po se s, i. e. w ith a v ie w to br oa de ni ng e xp er ie nc e av ai la bl e in na tu ra l, m at te r-of -c ou rs e ci rc um st an ce s) CR U CI AL E LE M EN T OF R ES EA RC H , PL AN N ED T O TE ST (A N D DE TE RM IN ED BY ) A H YP OT H ES IS , P AR T OF T H E PROCEDURE OF FALSIFICATION (S ci en tif ic e xp er im en t c on si st s i n cr ea tin g ar tif ic ia l c on di tio ns in w hi ch a ph en om en on u nd er in ve st ig at io n m ay be re du ce d to a n um be r o f f ac to rs th at ca n be re la tiv el y ea si ly m an ip ul at ed an d ex am in ed ). (T H OU GH T) E XP ER IM EN TS P OS SI BL E BU T U N TY PI CA L of th e st an da rd sc ho la rly p ro ce du re In the discip lines concerned with art th e ai m is to e xa m in e th e ex is tin g ar te fa ct s ( as w el l a s t he p ro ce ss o f th ei r c re at io n an d re ce pt io n) . I t d oe s no t s ee m p os si bl e w ith re fe re nc e to a rt to m ak e pr ed ic tio ns to b e te st ed in ex pe rim en ts , o r r ed uc e th e co m pl ex ph en om en on o f a rt to is ol at ed fa ct or s ar tif ic ia lly c on tr ol le d in th e la bo ra to ry . EX PE RI M EN TS P OS SI BL E Es pe ci al ly w he n ex am in in g th e pr oc es s of th e re ce pt io n of w or ks o f a rt a nd fo rm ul at in g m et ho do lo gi ca l gu id el in es , e xp er im en ts m ig ht th eo -re tic al ly b e po ss ib le , t ho ug h by an al og y w ith th e m et ho do lo gy o f s ci -en ce m os t a rg um en ts w ill p ro ba bl y be ba se d on h is to ric al m at er ia l. IM PO RT AN T EL EM EN T OF A RT IS TI C EX PL OR AT IO N : W OR KS O F AR T AR E EX PE RI M EN TS xi W H OS E M EA N IN G IS R EV EA LE D W H EN TH EY A RE E XP ER IE N CE D IN T H E PE RS ON AL C RE AT IV E AC T OF T H E AR TI ST a nd P ER SO N AL R ES PO N SE S TO AR T OF A RT ’S R EC IP IE N TS U nl ik e th e sc ie nt ifi c e xp er im en t, th e ar tis tic o ne is sp on ta ne ou s ( no t fo rm al ly su bo rd in at e to a p rio r h yp o-th es is ), xi i p ro du ce d in th e pr oc es s o f in te ra ct io n be tw ee n m an a nd th e w or k of a rt (a s w el l a s o th er e le m en ts of re al ity ). xi ii Th e pr ob le m o f C ON TR AD IC TI ON The pr ob le m is d ua l a nd c on ce rn s t he ap pe ar an ce o f c on tr ad ic tio ns in a n ob je ct u nd er in ve st ig at io n an d w ith in co gn iti ve d is ci pl in es . T he p os si bl e pr es en ce o f c on tr ad ic tio n in a n ob je ct un de r i nv es tig at io n m ay c om pl ic at e th e pr oc ed ur e of fa ls ifi ca tio n. xi v AB SE N T FR OM T H E OB JE CT E XA M IN ED BY S CI EN CE , h en ce if it a pp ea rs in a th eo ry /t he si s o r b et w ee n a th eo ry a nd “e m pi ric al d at a” (a n ob se rv at io na l re po rt , t o be p re ci se ), it IS A S IG N O F AN E RR OR W IT H IN T H E TH EO RY (t hu s i t is a n im po rt an t e le m en t o f t he p ro ce -du re o f f al si fic at io n) DE PE N DI N G ON T H E DI SC IP LI N E EI TH ER AB SE N T FR OM O R PO SS IB LY P RE SE N T IN T H E OB JE CT U N DE R EX AM IN AT IO N IN S TU DI ES O F AR T, IN P AR TI CU LA R, CO N TR AD IC TI ON M AY A PP EA R IN T H E OB JE CT U N DE R EX AM IN AT IO N ; A TH EO RY W H IC H IS S H OW N T O CO N TA IN A CO N TR AD IC TI ON S HO U LD B E TR EA TE D AS F AL SI FI ED O N LY W H EN IT IS P RO VE D TH AT T H E CO N TR AD IC TI ON DO ES N OT S IM PL Y RE FL EC T A CONTRADICTION INHE RENT IN AN AR TW OR K (t hu s t he p ro ce du re o f fa ls ifi ca tio n is c om pl ic at ed ) BA SI CA LL Y AB SE N T FR OM T H E OB JE CT U N DE R EX AM IN AT IO N (T H E M ET H OD OF A RT ), he nc e if it ap pe ar s i n a th eo ry /t he si s, o r b et w ee n a th eo ry a nd “e m pi ric al d at a, ” it IS A S IG N O F ER RO R IN T H E TH EO RY MAY BE FOUND IN THE OBJECT UNDER EX AM IN AT IO N (i n th e co nt en ts o f t he hu m an m in d, n ot in th e m in d as su ch xv); PO SS IB LE IN A RT IT SE LF In so m e va rie tie s o f a es th et ic s ( ar tis tic st yl es ) hi gh ly p op ul ar (i n po st m od er ni st a rt , for instance, comparable with the ae st he tic p rin ci pl e of h ar m on y in th e cl as si ca l s ty le ). Co nt ra di ct io ns p re se nt in a rt (w or ks o f ar t) , u nl ik e th os e in sc ie nc e, n ee d no t be tr ea te d as si gn s o f e rr or ; t he y m ay w el l b e pa rt o f a rt ’s m et ho d (a sk in g
DI SC IP LI N E i N A TU R A L SC IE N CE H U M A N IT IE S R A TI O N A LI ST A ES TH ET IC S A R T qu es tio ns , g en er at in g ne w ex pe rie nc es , r ep re se nt in g th e co nt ra di ct or y na tu re o f h um an ex pe rie nc e, e tc .). As re ga rd s t he p ro ce du re o f fa ls ifi ca tio n ta ki ng p la ce in th e pr oc es s of th e re ce pt io n of a w or k of a rt , t he most important is the contradiction be tw ee n th e in te rp re ta tio n of li fe of fe re d in th e w or k an d th e re ci pi en t’s vi ew o f t he m at te r. PR OG RE SS TH ER E IS M U CH P RO GR ES S in EX PL AN AT IO N S OF N AT U RE o ff er ed b y sc ie nc e, w itn es s t he e ve r m or e ac cu ra te p re di ct io ns in p hy si cs , gr ow in g un ifi ca tio n of th e sc ie nc es , advanced technology. TH ER E IS P RO GR ES S in th e hu m an iti es : DE EP ER U N DE RS TA N DI N G of la ng ua ge , hi st or y, a rt (b ut th er e is li tt le o bv io us ev id en ce o f t hi s p ro gr es s u nl ik e in th e na tu ra l s ci en ce s; th e is su e m ay b e pe rc ei ve d as c on tr ov er si al ) th e di sc ip lin e po st ul at ed h er e do es n ot ex is t; th er e is n o pr og re ss to b e no te d he re y et TH ER E IS P RO GR ES S: G RO W IN G SE LF -AWARENESS of man, of individual cr ea to rs a nd re ci pi en ts o f a rt , t ha t m ig ht a ls o be so m eh ow re fle ct ed in th e st at e of th e w ho le c iv ili za tio n (t he re is n o ob vi ou s e vi de nc e to support this statemen t and it may be pe rc ei ve d as c on tr ov er si al ) !
JOANNA KLARA TESKE
322 i
The list of disciplines is not supposed to be exhaustive (there are other basic kinds of science, such as mathematics and logic or the social sciences; there are also many other philosophical disci-plines such as metaphysics, the theory of cognition or the methodology of science). I juxtapose only the four selected disciplines so as to bring out certain cognitive elements that art and the humanities appear to share with science (indicating also the relevant differences between them), and so as to explain why the methodology of art, conceived of as a philosophical discipline (complementary with the methodology of science), might help define the proper domain and method of art, art criti-cism and the humanities.
ii
The humanities should best be perceived as empirical disciplines investigating the realm of culture. The artistic status of the disciplines concerned with art, a consequence of their being a re-sponse to art, hence also (if one accepts the broad definition of art) part of it, cannot, I think, be de-nied. Even though elements of philosophy can probably also be found in the humanities, I am un-willing to recognize them officially as part of the humanities so as to keep the distinctions, in so far as this is possible, clear.
iii
One might note here a certain difference between the aims of art and of the other cognitive enterprises under discussion, in which results obtained in the process of research may find practical application, i.e. in which aims other than cognitive have traditionally been dependent on the primary cognitive aim (this might apply also to the methodology of art postulated here). In art, by contrast, non-cognitive aims are realized independently of the cognitive aim. It might further be noted that quite possibly cognition is not in its original essence an impractical activity undertaken in the name of the idealistic search for truth but one of the strategies serving genes — their survival and dissemi-nation (or else the survival and propagation of individuals and species in the more traditional variant of the evolutionary theory; cf. the theory of Konrad Lorenz), which, however, does not preclude the possibility that rational and free creatures might transcend this early biological determination of cognitive activities.
iv
According to Popper’s view of the humanities, they should examine objects of world 3 as, first and foremost, objects of world 3 and not as objects that might provide us with some insight into world 2 (In Search of a Better World 165). This seems reasonable: world 2 (human consciousness) is examined scientifically by psychology (one of the social sciences) and artistically (by art). At the same time, however, it does not seem possible to totally ignore the human mind in the humanities: if art is a mode of exploration of the human psyche, then investigation of art will obviously need to re-fer to the human psyche as well.
v
Attempts have been made to replace the abstract ideal of truth (defined in classical terms as correspondence between the content of a proposition and a state of affairs) with a more modest, test-able and servicetest-able concept requiring correspondence between ideas and observtest-able reality. How-ever, such attempts might close scientific investigation in a vicious circle, the concept of ob-servability being determined by theory (cf. the discussion of Van Fraassen’s concept of “empirical adequacy,” which obtains when all consequences of a theory referring to directly observable objects are true, in GROBLER 294-7).
vi
Personal does not mean here “less true” or “entirely relative to the individual artist or art recipient.” It merely indicate that the aesthetic experience and hence also the knowledge gained in contact with art (but not the meaning inherent in the work of art) may vary and be relevant to a particular individual (and not to others). The distinction between the meaning inherent in a work of art and the meaning experienced by an individual in contact with the work is problematic, and this is not the right place to analyze it in detail. Here I merely wish to emphasize that the aesthetic
THE METHODOLOGY OF ART 323 experience though highly individual may be discussed in terms of truth. Consider, for example, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s individual (subjective) response to the music of J. S. Bach. The poet said that listening to this music, he felt as if inside himself “the eternal harmonies were conversing with each other, as this might have happened in God’s bosom short before the creation of the world” (cf. “die ewige Harmonie sich mit sich selbst unterhielte, wie sich’s etwa in Gottes Busen, kurz vor der Weltschöpfung, möchte zugetragen haben,” qtd in KLEßMANN 91). Some people might find in these words an adequate description of their own response to Bach’s music; others might not. The point is that the words constitute either a true or false description of Goethe’s own experience and that they are true or false (as the case may be) in an objective (absolute) way.
vii
In fact, the format of knowledge obtainable in natural sciences need not be homogenous either, but compared with the humanities specific distinctions seem less significant there. In the humanities, where general laws are few and far between, it seems more important to emphasize the collection of specific information about works of art (each of which is in principle highly individual) as well as the distinct sphere of interpretations (hypotheses concerning the meaning of artworks), to which the procedure of falsification may not easily be applied, whose scholarly status therefore is uncertain.
viii
Following Grobler (249-250), I employ here the approach and terminology offered by Den-nett in his book Kinds of Mind. The author distinguishes three stances: physical, design and inten-tional, which offer causal, functional and intentional explanations, respectively. All three are justi-fied and their choice should be dictated by the circumstances. With reference to art the most obvious kind of explanation is intentional (referring to the artist’s intentions), however, also functional explanation might be useful (i.e. an explanation which assumes that the object in question has a design and its operations may be predicted on this basis, DENNETT 27-29).
ix
When discussing the format of knowledge, justification of knowledge and its status, it is im-portant to remember that in the Popperian model no theory/thesis may be conclusively verified (proved to be true). The critics of the Popperian model point out that for a different reason (meth-odological rather than logical) no theory/thesis may be conclusively falsified either (cf. chapter 6 in Chalmers). This, however, is not to say that their value is therefore unspecified; there are various criteria that help compare competitive theories/theses such as their explanatory power, simplicity, testability. Theories/theses which are accepted into the corpus of knowledge are those that have been corroborated, i.e. critically examined, subjected to various tests and, though in principle falsifi-able, not falsified in the process (not proved to be wrong).
x
Cf. Popper’s opinion about the irrationality of science as regards the context of discovery: “... my view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method of hav-ing new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by sayhav-ing that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element,’ or ‘a creative intuition,’ in Bergson’s sense. In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws . . . from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. There is no logical path,’ he says, ‘leading to these . . . laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (‘Ein-fühlung’) of the objects of experience” (The Logic of Scientific Discovery 8-9).
xi
Alternatively, one might refer to artworks as “tools,” though the word seems less adequate, in-viting associations with repairs (specific problems to be solved, defects to be removed) and standard procedures (tools are rarely of unique design, to be used once only), whereas art is imaginative, un-predictable in its effects and uncircumscribed in its construction, i.e. it displays features which seem to be nicely captured by the word “experiment.” (Another option is to speak of art as a means of cognition and thus not to prejudge the possible analogy between science and art).
JOANNA KLARA TESKE
324 xii
Artistic experiments are devised by artists, conducted by art recipients on themselves and commented upon by critics. Though they do not in principle seem subordinate to any prior hypothe-sis (in particular, one that would be consciously and explicitly formulated), one might note, espe-cially in modern art, for example in contemporary British literature, a growing cooperation between theory and artistic practice, i.e. between scholarship and art (cf. also dodecaphony, a slightly differ-ent case — the academy not being involved — in which the theory formulated by composers clearly preceded their musical compositions).
xiii
Artistic experiment might perhaps be comprehended as a “controlled” occurrence of an un-usual phenomenon that prompts a search for a theory capable of explaining it as more or less natural and, if the theory be found, justifies it (the theory); i.e. with reference to the abductive procedure formulated by Peirce as alternative to inductive and deductive reasoning (cf. GROBLER 102). The concept might apply to art’s method as 1) art seems to confront the recipient with unusual phenom-ena (cf. the artistic requirement of originality), 2) artistic experiments do not seem subordinate to any prior hypotheses (this, however, might be mere appearance).
xiv
A detailed discussion devoted to the question of contradiction in art, art’s cognitive function and the humanities can be found in my essay “Poznawcza koncepcja sztuki i metodologia nauk hu-manistycznych wobec sprzecznorci w dziele sztuki.”
xv This matter does not seem obvious, though. One may definitely experience simultaneously
various polar emotions (love and hate, for instance), but this does not count as contradiction (cf. Popper’s examples of contradiction in nature, Conjectures and Refutations... 329). In the Popperian interpretation of contradiction (one object exemplifying and at the same time not exemplifying a certain property), contradiction cannot be found in the human mind as such: one may not both suffer from a mirage and not suffer from it. However, in the content of human conscious experience, especially of someone under stress or suffering from mental disorder, this may well be the case, e.g. one may both consider oneself guilty of a crime and not guilty of a crime.
THE METHODOLOGY OF ART 325
ART AS A MODE OF COGNITION — CLOSING REMARKS
Art, taken as a cognitive activity, is ultimately concerned with truth, not with beauty or any other traditional aesthetic categories such as ugliness, tragedy, humour, intricacy and the like, though these might be relevant as qualities which may evoke certain reactions (such as elation, repulsion, desolation, amusement, puzzlement or catharsis). When approaching any cognitive activity, it is helpful to distinguish the context of discovery and the context of justification. As regards art, the context of discovery might perhaps be defined in terms of six basic artistic modes of operation, which in various periods of our civilization might have gained or lost in their relative importance:
1. Adventure of self-exploration: this category seems most relevant and per-ennial, and consists in art’s ability to offer infinite opportunities for extending one’s real life experience. Artistic experiments challenge one’s habitual view of reality by confronting one with man-made objects (artefacts), some of which (i.e. works of fiction) additionally offer vicarious life experience. By registering and reflecting upon one’s reaction (perceptual, intellectual, emotional) to the work of art, one gains self-knowledge; example: The Life of Pi by Yann Martel (the novel which tests the reader’s credulity) or The Sleeping Beauty project by Taras Pola-taiko (which tested the recipient’s readiness to risk an obligation of marital rela-tionship with a stranger).
2. Stimulation: a phenomenon characteristic especially of the present times, art which aims merely to provoke the recipient (this mode might be classified as a variant of the former “adventure of self-exploration mode” with the aesthetic component either absent or radically minimized); example: Merda d’Artista by Piero Manzoni or 4’33’’ by John Cage.
3. Personal testimony: ever since the ancient times art has been used as an aesthetic expression of the artist’s first-hand experience (imaginative experience included). The expression might entail documentation of social environment, yet the most precious seems the presentation of intimate emotional and perceptual ex-periences, either direct (e.g. in autobiographical fiction, self-portrait), or, more often, indirect (as when the artist’s experience is attributed to a character or trans-lated into the theme of the fugue). The artist’s testimony, if accepted as reliable, adds to the recipient’s knowledge of other human beings and of oneself (as one is naturally tempted to compare the artist’s experience with one’s own); example:
Treny by Jan Kochanowski (as regards the sorrow of a bereaved father) or Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit by Jeanette Winterson (as regards the discovery of one’s
JOANNA KLARA TESKE
326
4. Store of knowledge: some kinds of art may present beliefs (not necessarily true and justified – the word “knowledge” may, therefore, be misleading) on any subject whatsoever for the recipient’s reflection; example: Waterland by Graham Swift as a source of information about eels or The Union Street by Pat Barker as a source of information about working class women in the Britain of the mid ‘70s.
5. Instruction/edification: the category seems relatively outdated nowadays but in the past the artist was often presumed to know the truth or speak on behalf of someone (or some institution, the authorities) that claimed to know the truth, often so as to persuade the recipient to act in a specific way (didactic, religiously or politically committed artworks belong to this category); example: Everyman (instructing the audience about the wrongness of sinful life) or The Trilogy by Henryk Sienkiewicz (a lesson in patriotism). Incidentally, this use of art has little to do with cognition, though it may affect the recipient’s state of awareness; in fact, it may well verge on manipulation and be considered abusive.
6. Alteration in the forms of cognition: certain genres of art may permanently affect our perception of reality by modifying our “categories of knowledge” (John 338-339; it is worth noting that John voices certain scepticism as to whether the process should really be regarded as cognitive); example: films which have taught their audience that uneventful scenes full of vivid objects may be full of meaning (Hollander, qtd in John 338-9) or fiction which, by describing in a highly plau-sible manner thoughts and emotions of characters, has taught readers new standards as regards knowing another human being (Cohn, qtd in John 339).
Not all kinds of art may operate in the six modes enumerated above (some of the modes might be available only to representational or/and verbal art). Con-versely, one work of art may simultaneously employ more than one of the modes, and definite distinctions between them may sometimes be difficult to draw (esp. with reference to modes 1 and 2, or modes 3, 4 and 5). Out of the six modes only those discussed in points 1-3 truly refer to “artistic” exploration of reality, i.e. cognition; points 4-5 are concerned with transmission of information (i.e. with education rather than exploration), though admittedly they contribute to the change in the recipient’s image of the world (i.e. the change they effect is of a cognitive character). Finally, as regards ideas that can be part of a work of art, these may either be formulated explicitly (as propositions) or translated into the presented world (the fictional world acting as a model of empirical reality) or else expressed by means of the form of the work (cf. Teske, Philosophy in Fiction 21-22, 52-53). The three kinds of expression might be employed in various cognitive modes (1-5).
THE METHODOLOGY OF ART 327
The above discussion concentrates on the methods in which new (emotional, intellectual or sensual) perception of reality, new insights, ideas, etc. can be gained as a result of contact with art. However, for this kind of experience to count as truly cognitive (aiming at truth), it needs some kind of critical evaluation (though not necessarily one so strict and systematic as that demanded by science), and this is where the context of justification comes into the foreground. The question is whether there are (internal to the work of art) any means of justification of the cognitive content either inherent in the work of art or available to the artist and the art recipient in the process of interaction with the work. Popper, whose philosophy of science and art constitutes the framework of the present considerations, refused to concede that art might perform the critical function (though he insisted that it should not be reduced to expressive or communicative functions, performing also the descriptive function; cf. Teske, “The Methodology of the Humanities...” 290-292). Indeed, one may argue that the aesthetic experience, in order to be cognitively productive, should sub-sequently be subjected to reflection. In other words, although the change in awareness may happen without man’s awareness, it might not under such circum-stances merit the epithet “cognitive” (cf. John’s suggestion that we should distin-guish between “learning from art and the more inclusive category of being influenced or changed by art,” 330). In other words, the aesthetic experience may need to be supplemented by critical reflection external to the aesthetic experience. Alternatively, one might say that the problem is one of definition. If one defines art as a body of artworks, then indeed there is little space in art for epistemic criticism. If, however, one agrees on a broader definition, one which includes not only works of art but also the creative and receptive processes, and in particular the responses that artworks generate (in laymen, other artists, art critics and scholars), then perhaps the element of criticism might be located in art criticism and scholarship (which in this approach should be viewed as internal to art). Finally, one may also try to situate the element of justification in the aesthetic process interpreted along the more conventional lines, i.e. as limited to the work of art and the aesthetic experience. In her essay “Art and Knowledge” John suggests that while the knowledge that might be obtained via art cannot easily be justified by reference to the artist’s authority, as suggested by some authors, the aesthetic experience gained in contact with an artwork and the personal know-ledge of the recipient of art might well serve this purpose (333-335). Though personal in character, this kind of assessment could perhaps count as an intuitive form of falsification. It definitely involves critical examination of ideas and rejection of those that have failed the test. An element of criticism might also be
JOANNA KLARA TESKE
328
found in Popper’s interpretation of the process of artistic creation, in which the artist examines critically the work s/he creates with reference to the original project, which itself undergoes various modifications (cf. Teske, “The Methodo-logy of the Humanities...” 292-294).
This brief discussion of art taken as a mode of cognition complements, I hope, the cursory and often fragmentary information on the subject presented in the table. Even so, it remains merely a sketch, documenting a need for a more systematic research on art that might be conducted within the methodology of art.
WORKS CITED
CHALMERS, Alan. Czym jest to, co zwiemy naukQ? RozwaSania o naturze, statusie i metodach nauki. Wprowadzenie do wspóVczesnej filozofii nauki. Trans. Adam Chmielewski. Wroceaw: Sied-mioróg, 1993. What Is This Thing Called Science?
DENNETT, Daniel C. Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books, 1996.
GROBLER, Adam. Metodologia nauk. Kraków: Aureus and Znak, 2006.
JOHN, Eileen. “Art and Knowledge.” Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. Ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIves Lopes. London: Routledge, 2001. 329-340.
KLESSMANN, Eckart (ed.). Über Bach. Von Musikern, Dichtern und Liebhabern. Eine Anthologie. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. Stuttgart, 1992.
POPPER, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Rout-ledge, 1969.
POPPER, Karl. In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years. Trans. Laura J. Bennett. London: Routledge, 1992.
POPPER, Karl. Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction. London: Rout-ledge, 1994.
POPPER, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge, 2002.
POPPER, Karl. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. London: Routledge, 2002.
TESKE, Joanna Klara. “The Methodology of the Humanities and Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science and Art.” Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia. Supplementary Volume, English Edition (2012): 275-301.
TESKE, Joanna Klara. Philosophy in Fiction. Lublin: UMCS, 2008.
TESKE, Joanna Klara. “Poznawcza koncepcja sztuki i metodologia nauk humanistycznych wobec sprzecznorci w dziele sztuki.” PrzeglQd Filozoficzny 3.83 (2012): 59-80.
THE METHODOLOGY OF ART 329 METODOLOGIA SZTUKI (ESTETYKA KRYTYCZNA/RACJONALISTYCZNA):
PROJEKT NOWEJ DYSCYPLINY FILOZOFICZNEJ
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Artykue przedstawia projekt nowej dyscypliny – metodologii sztuki. Jej zadaniem, przez ana-logit do metodologii nauk, byeoby badanie sztuki jako aktywnorci poznawczej, w tym przede wszystkim poznawczej metody sztuki. Próbu uzasadnienia i blivszym opisem tego projektu jest zestawienie w postaci tabeli czterech typów poznania: nauk rciseych (przedstawionych tu zgodnie z modelem Popperowskim), humanistycznych, metodologii sztuki i sztuki. Zostaey one porównane pod kutem m.in. przedmiotu, metody, formatu uzyskiwanej wiedzy, relacji do prawdy, trybu uza-sadniania przekonaw czy movliworci stosowania eksperymentu. Artykue kowczu uwagi na temat trybu poznania, jakim poseuguje sit sztuka. Geównu tezu artykueu jest potrzeba i movliworx racjo-nalnej refleksji nad sztuku pojttu jako nienaukowa forma badania rwiata psychiki.
Stre\ciVa Joanna Klara Teske
Key words: art, cognition, methodology, science. S.owa kluczowe: sztuka, poznanie, metodologia, nauka.
