P i o t r M i k i e w i c z University of Lower Silesia, Poland
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCEPT
OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
EDUCATIONAL EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
1ABSTRACT
In last two “decades” the concept of social capital became one of the most popular in social sciences and far beyond. It is proper to say it is a pervasive metaphor used in sociology as well as in political sciences, economics, history and others. It has become an important tool of social and economic policy of states and international organizations. It seems to have great importance for educational research, fi rstly because its origin is associated with analyses of functioning of educational institutions and educational performance of pupils, secondly, due to stress given to education as an important factor in creation of social capital. At the same time, however, it is unclear and multidimensional concept, and oft en research carried out with the usage of it, lead to diff erent, also contradictory, outcomes. It seems to be caused by theoretical mess and lack of proper use of social capital concept. It is often forgotten, that social capital originates from two different theoretical back-grounds.
1 Th e article was written as part of the project Social Capital and Education. Comparative
Re-search between Iceland and Poland, fi nanced by the Scholarship and Training Fund of the Foundation
for the Development of the Education System. Th e project was completed with the support granted by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway by means of co-fi nancing from the European Economic Area Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism as part of the Scholarship and Train-ing Fund.
Key words:
Th is text is an attempt to indicate these diff erent sources of ideas and the resulting conse-quences for research practice. In the fi rst part author presents an epistemological perspec-tive, embedded in the neo-pragmatism and constructivism, to emphasize the importance of theory in the investigation. Th en a summary of the theoretical roots of social capital in the theory of rational choice of James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu’s cultural structuralism is presented. In the last part, author presents briefl y diff erent hypotheses on education and its relation with social capital derived from diff erent theoretical backgrounds.
Social capital, education, social structure, theory, research, constructivism
1. Introduction
Th e concept of social capital is covering increasingly wide problem areas, from – quite obviously – economics, in which it was fi rst applied, through sociology, his-tory, to pedagogy. As some social capital researchers indicate, this concept seems to be a modern “cure for all evil”, a promise of a universal solution – in a double sense at that. First – in a theoretical sense – it is viewed as a platform for the re-unifi cation of social sciences. In this sense, the concept of social capital promises to be a theory of everything – helping to understand and explain human behaviour in all spheres of activity – from purely economic market operations to intimate psychological mechanisms. Th is reunifi cation is obviously based on economic is-sues and it may be connected with the expansion of neoliberal ideology and the “economization” (“capitalization”) of other branches of social sciences2. Secondly – in a practical sense – the concept of social capital entered the “real life”, into the sphere of social practice, and was picked up by institutions which really infl uence the functioning of societies. Th e fact that Robert D. Putnam, who is the main person behind the theory of social capital today, is an expert of the World Bank shows the persuasive force of this concept. One might risk a statement that the theory of social capital is currently becoming a third choice, apart from the Keynes and Friedman doctrines. In this sense, it promises to be the cure for all illness in the sphere of social praxis – and this view is expressly refl ected in the works of 2 For more details see: B. Fine, Social Capital vs. Social Th eory, Political Economy and Social
scholars who deal with researching, or more accurately, diagnosing the existence or lack of social capital in particular societies – starting from the works of Putnam himself3. It is also automatically assumed that social capital is:
• Something tangible and real – the quality that exists in the reality and which has been marginalized or has not been perceived so far, although it exerts a real infl uence on the functioning of societies;
• It is one quality – despite diff erent theoretical perspectives from which social capital is analysed (this will be discussed further in this text), in principle it is all about the same, but seen from diff erent angles4;
• It is a feature which is always (at least in most cases) positive – most resear-chers automatically assume that social capital is always good, that the more capital there is the better – thus, they mainly focus on diagnosing defi cits of social capital as causes of social failures and disfunctions5.
In this article, I do not intend to dispose of these assumptions/convictions. Th e view of social capital as solely a positive phenomenon has already been criticized anyway6. I would like to focus here on diff erent theoretical sources of this catego-ry as I believe it is of the utmost importance for the possibility of using this concept both in theoretical analyses and interpretations and in social practice. I will in-evitably refer to the three assumptions formulated above.
Th e aim of this theoretical analysis is to enable the application of the concept of social capital in the research on the functioning of education in contemporary societies. Educational issues seem to be an obvious correlate of research on social capital. Th ere are two reasons that justify this thesis. Firstly, the origin of the con-cept of social capital is connected with doing research on the functioning of educa-tion. Not everyone remembers that it was the sphere of education that was the original fi eld of analyses conducted in the context of social capital. Th e research done by two main theoreticians of social capital – James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu – was initially based on examining causes of diff erent results at school
3 For more details see: R.D. Putnam, Demokracja w działaniu [Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 1993], Kraków 1995; R.D. Putnam, Bowling Alone. Th e Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York 2000; P. Świaniewicz, J. Herbst, M. Lackowska,
A. Mielczarek, Szafarze darów europejskich [Dispensers of European Gift s], Warszawa 2008; D. Halp-ern, Social Capital, Cambridge 2005.
4 S. Ball, Class Strategies and the Educational Market. Th e Middle Classes and Social Advantage,
London 2003.
5 R.D. Putnam, Making…, op.cit.; R.D. Putnam, Bowling Alone…, op.cit.; D. Halpern, op.cit. 6 A. Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, “Annual Review of
and showed the connections between the functioning of the school and its social surrounding. Secondly, education is considered to be one of the key determinants of the development of social capital. It was refl ected in the work on the Social Capital Development Strategy 2011–20207. I fi rmly believe that the issues dis-cussed in this text will help to properly diagnose mutual dependencies of social capital and education. It seems that this task is important both from the point of view of scientifi c theory and from the practical perspective.
2.
Why do scholars need theories, or: On the importance of theory
in research
Let us begin with a question which precedes the discussion on the fi eld of social capital. Are theory and theoretical foundations of analyses in social research im-portant and if so, how imim-portant are they? Th is question might appear to be slight-ly trivial, and the answer seems obvious to those who are concerned with social studies. Nevertheless, all the confusion that accompanies social capital research, as well as all kinds of mistakes, misinterpretations and “odd results”, have led to me to the conviction that it would be useful to present the epistemological perspec-tive which will establish the basis of further discussion.
I take the view that might be called constructivist, or even pragmatic. I believe that science is about fi nding proper ways of doing things rather than seeking the absolute truth. It is characterized by, among other things, antirepresentationalism. “Th e antirepresentationalist approach is defi ned as the one that does not perceive cognition as a way of reconstructing reality in adequate manner, but as the acqui-sition of habits to cope with the world”. “Pragmatism attempts to replace the notion of true beliefs as the representation of the “essence of things” with viewing them as successful rules of action”8. Th e aim of cognition is to gain such knowledge of the world that will make it possible to cope with it successfully – it will help people to live better. Th is seems to be the main message of Rorty’s philosophy. Knowledge is a social fact – it belongs to a social group and is used by it. “Th erefore, if knowl-edge or cognition refl ect anything at all, it is our interests (objectives) and
cul-7
http://ks.mkidn.gov.pl/pages/strona-glowna/strategia-rozwoju-kapitalu-spolecznego/pobierz-dokument-w-pdf.php [access: 25.05.2011].
8 A. Szahaj, Ironia i miłość. Neopragmatyzm Richarda Rorty’ego w kontekście sporów o
postmod-ernizm [Irony and Love. Richard Rorty’s Neopragmatism in the Context of the Dispute over
tural ways of conceptualizing the world (means of implementing them) rather than the external world that they mirror”9. Andrzej Szahaj emphasizes that “truth is the result of social mediation and is entirely encapsulated within the sphere of every-thing that is specifi c to human community. In this sense, it is produced rather than found, being dependent on the place, time and historical interests of those who introduced it in culture”10. Hence, the only criteria of the “truthfulness” of knowl-edge are harmony and cohesion. “Th us, what is true is the things that we can eas-ily weave in the beliefs we – or, to be more precise, the cultural group we belong to – have nursed so far, in order to have them reshaped”11. Hilary Putnam ex-presses a similar view, saying that there is no external cognition, “there is no Divine Perspective, which we may understand or imagine in terms of utility. Th ere are only diff erent perspectives of real people, refl ecting diff erent interests and objec-tives that are served by their presentations and theories”12.
Th erefore, cognition, the production of new knowledge is always determined by our vocabulary and theories, which capture reality in the network of interpre-tational associations.
I do not attempt to prove here that we can say nothing about reality. Quite the opposite, we can and we do say a lot. I just want to indicate that this knowledge and presentation is never complete and disruption-free, and that there could be a multitude of stories which are not necessarily capable of being put together in a single, coherent picture. However, the ultimate criterion for the “truthfulness”, or, to be more precise, the “legitimacy” of knowledge is its pragmatic usefulness. In other words, we need to establish whether our knowledge (our truth) lets us notice something important in the world and whether this observation can be practically used. Rorty himself rejects cognitive nihilism and the “anything goes” philosophy. Th e boundary of the creation of knowledge about the world is deline-ated by this world itself, which somehow exists externally (beyond theory) and limits us. He draws on Donald Davidson’s concept here: we can only be as arbitrary as the world allows us to be. “Our cognition is the way it is because the world im-poses certain causal (general) limitations on the freedom of our notions about it (not because the world is the way it is!). However, these restrictions do not une-quivocally determine the content of our knowledge. It maintains a large degree of
9 Ibidem, p. 18. 10 Ibidem, p. 18–9. 11 Ibidem, p. 19. 12 Ibidem, p. 20.
freedom. Th is is where cultural and social factors are located. Th ey give this knowl-edge its fi nal shape, only generally limited by the world’s causal pressure13.
In turn, Andrzej Zybertowicz points out that: “the thing is that if we want to provide eff ective knowledge or, to be more precise, to make some notional knowl-edge practically eff ective, we need to adopt (or sometimes impose by force) a kind of notional network, some kind of order, on a certain area of “reality”14. Our cog-nition, both the everyday one, which is created in the processes of socialization and daily routine, and the more sophisticated, scientifi c one, is the creation of the world that cannot be known. At the same time, it does not take place in a void – we are always involved in a cognitive situation – the one that is socially and cultur-ally determined. Paraphrasing Ernst Geller, Zybertowicz indicates that we are al-lowed to think what we want about people and the world, but we cannot think with what we want. We are always pre-equipped with notional tools of our culture – in the fi eld of science it will also be the language of theory we use15.
“Worlds of diff erent languages are diff erent worlds. Th ey are not the same world with diff erent labels”. Th is paraphrase of Sapir-Whorf ’s thesis on the linguistic determinants of the functioning of diff erent cultures seems to be a perfect explana-tion why there are so many stories of a very diff erent character, which cannot be translated into each other. What is scientifi c theory aft er all? It is a system of no-tions, a conceptual map of reality. It is a dictionary imposed on the world – a set of vocabulary (concepts, categories) which the author working within the frame-work of a specifi c theory uses in order to describe the subject of his or her cogni-tion. We de facto construct this world by conceptualizing it in the way we have chosen. As a result of this construction, we perform metaphorization – we try to capture the essence of the world, which is “there outside”, by translating our feel-ings about it into the language that is comprehensible to others, those from our
group. To illustrate it better, we talk about the world in the way that makes it fi t to
the associations of our cultural community. While doing this, we use the language created in this “community of interpretations”. In science, this is the language of theory, language of concepts – language of metaphors.
We may assume that particular theories (paradigms) are organized around one “base metaphor” and a large number of auxiliary metaphors, which make the meaning of original assumptions more precise16. Th eory, founded on the base
13 Ibidem, p. 39–40.
14 A. Zybertowicz, Przemoc i poznanie [Violence and Cognition], Toruń 1995, p. 343. 15 Ibidem: 347.
16 V. Turner, Gry społeczne, pola i metafory. Symboliczne działanie w społeczeństwie [Dramas,
metaphor, organizes scientifi c cognition. Th e adopted set of metaphorical concepts reveals certain areas to be discovered, brings them to light and helps to identify and measure them. In turn, it casts a shadow on others – they disappear from our cognitive fi eld. To put it very simply – theory lets us see something, while prevent-ing us from seeprevent-ing somethprevent-ing else. Victor Turner illustrated it by referrprevent-ing to Black: each science begins with a metaphor and ends with algebra. Reality, which was initially constructed on the basis of the base metaphor, is then described in more and more detail, and fi nally it is capable of being represented in the “simple” way of mathematics (statistics).
Th eories of modern sociology may be classifi ed into two paradigm groups: structuralism and interpretivism. Structuralism may be further divided into struc-tural-functional theories and confl ict theories17. Within each of these “general approaches” we may distinguish a number of theories (of wide and medium range). Each of them is based on original metaphorics, making it more detailed in diff er-ent directions. Th e base metaphor mainly refers to ontological statements about what the social world is (or, to be more accurate: what it is like). Some of the most important notions include:
• Social world as an organism – the system is highly important (for example, Parsons theory);
• Social world as an arena of confl ict (example: Ralph Dahrendorf ’s theory); • Social world as a theatre (example: Erving Goff man’s theory);
• Social world as an interaction (example: Herbert Blumer’s theory); • Social world as a game (example: Pierre Bourdieu’s theory);
• Social world as a game of interests (example: James Coleman’s theory); • Social world as a network (example: Manuel Castells theory).
We could probably distinguish at least a few more of such persuasive metaphors, which organize thinking about society. It is easy to notice that we deal with con-stant borrowing of associations from diff erent spheres of cognitive activity. Social sciences draw their metaphors from biology and physics, which in turn are rooted in other sets of base metaphors. When choosing a branch of knowledge, we choose sets of theories that we will be using, and thus we also select dictionaries of con-cepts that organize our cognition. If we look at the area of social sciences, we will notice the internal diff erentiation of the understanding of the world. Th e choice of a paradigm is a decision (not necessarily a conscious one, but the one which is the result of a specifi c family and professional path) on the approaches concerning the ontology of social world, the qualities of the human being, people’s power and the
determinants of their actions. When we describe the world in scientifi c terms, we inevitably make complex choices. First of all, we choose a branch of knowledge (economics or sociology). Next (in this case within the framework of sociology) we choose a theory which will guide us through the world.
Th is choice (the necessity of this choice) may be associated with defi ciency – our description will never be complete. Will it be true, too? Th e choice of a para-digm and a specifi c theory results in a certain description of the world, but this description is substantially diff erent than the one produced from the perspective of another theory. Th is lack of translatability of perspective is particularly evident when we examine the diff erences between the interpretative approach and the structural one. Hence, do diff erent theories describe the same social reality, but from diff erent angles?
Th e answer must be “no” – our deliberations so far show that one theory cannot be translated into another one. We may use Karl Popper’s metaphor of refl ector’s
theory – a particular theory lets us shed light on a specifi c part of the world. In this
way we may observe this part, but the rest is covered by darkness. Remaining in the same spirit, we could fi nd that there is still something else hidden in the dark-ness, we only have to illuminate it. Zybertowicz goes even further – we cannot assume that there is something beyond the reach of our cognition that is waiting to be discovered. Only when we choose a theory (selecting a kind of refl ector), do we create this something. “We cannot assume here that there is something ready in the darkness, something that has a predetermined shape and is waiting to be drawn out of the shade. We do not obtain knowledge about entities in themselves – a kind of light shed by a refl ector is one of the factors that determine what emerges from the darkness”18.
Earlier in the text I discussed “seeking theories” or choosing. I emphasize here that scientifi c knowledge should have some pragmatic value – when we try to understand the world, we test diff erent ways of observing it. Th is creates an op-portunity, at least a hypothetical one, that we can consciously change theories, change viewpoints and describe the world using diff erent metaphors. We consist-ently create diff erent realities – every time putting diff erent cognitive apparatus on
our eyes (into our head). Does it mean that we may freely play with our cognition
and “everything can be said”?
Interdisciplinary character or theoretical triangularity has their limitations. Th eories are systems of metaphors which are internally logical. It means that they cannot be drawn out of single elements – concepts, categories, models – as they
are only relevant in a specifi c notional model. Bourdieu writes: “[…] concepts have no other defi nition than the systemic one and they are invented to function
em-pirically and in a systematic manner. Th e concepts such as habitus, fi eld and capital may be defi ned only within the theoretical system they constitute, not in isolation”19. Th us, we cannot “take out” the concept of social capital as conceptualized by Bourdieu and compare it with the concept of social capital developed by Coleman. Th ey are concepts of the same name but of diff erent denotations– they have dif-ferent meanings within the framework of their original conceptual systems.
For a researcher, it entails the need for recognizing the optics he or she uses and perform the exegesis of the meaning of each particular concept. It makes it impos-sible to pursue the strategy of a “theoretical tool kit”20. A researcher may analyse the subject of cognition from diff erent perspectives, but he or she cannot do it si-multaneously.
3.
The concepts of social capital in the light of the outlined
epistemological perspective
Th ese theoretical conditions make us reconceptualise the abovementioned as-sumptions regarding the “nature of social capital”. Th us:
1. Social capital is not something tangible and real in the sense of correspon-ding theory of truth – it is not a quality existing in reality, but it has emerged (and exists) as a result of “being invented” by theoreticians, who applied the metaphor of social capital to describing the world;
2. Social capital is not the only quality – diff erent theoretical perspectives lead to changes in its character, because the conceptual system it functions in grants them a diff erent sense;
3. It is not known whether it is always (or at least in most cases) a positive quality – its pragmatic relevance also depends on the theoretical interpre-tation; for example, in no way can we talk about “black social capital” from Coleman’s point of view, we can only do it from Bourdieu’s perspective). In such perspective it becomes necessary to show diff erent theoretical sources of social capital. Th ere are two traditions here: Pierre Bourdieu’s structural
con-19 P. Bourdieu, L. Wacquant, Zaproszenie do socjologii refl eksyjnej [An Invitation to Refl exive
Sociology, Chicago 1992], Warszawa 2001, p. 76.
structivism and James Coleman’s theory of rational choice21. Let us try to recon-struct the meaning of social capital in these two approaches.
4. Two traditions – two capitals
Social capital as a resource and a warrant of exchange – Coleman’s theory: Th e intended size of this article does not let me conduct a thorough analysis of both approaches – Pierre Bourdieu’s theory and James Coleman’s one. Th at is why I will limit myself to outlining the general structure of the analytical model used by both authors.
Th e concept of rational choice is based on the assumption derived from classi-cal economy that “people act rationally, and the objective of their action is to sat-isfy their preferences or to maximize utility”22. Th e concepts of an institution and social organization also play an important role here. However, it is a highly indi-vidualistic and individual-oriented concept.
Th e main principles of Coleman’s theory refer to eight central concepts/as-sumptions:
1. Methodological individualism – rational choice theory is a theory that se-rves to explain the functioning of social and economic systems. It refers to actions undertaken by individuals making rational decisions. Th e functio-ning of society, as well as the logic of the rational choice theory analysis, may be illustrated with the following sequence: a) the infl uence of systemic phe-nomena on actors’ attitudes – b) individual actions considered to be rational – c) a combination of these actions in a certain institutional structure, brin-ging results at a systemic level23;
2. Th e principle of maximizing, or optimizing, actors – “individuals are goal-oriented, and when they know these goals, they take such steps that will be perceived to be eff ective for the implementation of these goals”24;
3. Th e concept of social optimality – Pareto optimality – “a state of aff airs where it is not possible to improve the economic lot of some people witho-21 I purposefully exclude Putnam’s “theory” from this analysis as I believe it is a consistent
con-tinuation and application of Coleman’s assumptions – which Putnam admits himself.
22 J. Coleman, Perspektywa racjonalnego wyboru w socjologii ekonomicznej [A Rational Choice
Perspective on Economic Sociology] [in:] Współczesne teorie socjologiczne [Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton 1994], A. Jasińska-Kania et al. (eds.), Warszawa 2006, p. 145.
23 Ibidem, p. 146. 24 Ibidem, p. 147.
ut making others worse off ”25. It is a possible outcome of social actors’ action rather than a vehicle for their actions. People do not act in order to create social optimum, their actions oft en lead to upsetting this state of aff airs. Th is makes rational choice theory diff erent from functionalism, in which social effi ciency is the driving force behind people’s actions;
4. Th e concept of system equilibrium – Nash equilibrium – a stable state of aff airs, in which no individual participant can gain by a change of strategy as long as all the other participants remain unchanged. It means that no actor has an incentive to act in order to change the situation. Equilibrium is the result of the lack of incentive to change;
5. Increasing utility by giving up authority (control) – people are sometimes ready to give up their control of resources – e.g. capital or their own will – because this resignation lets them obtain benefi ts – e.g. trust towards a stock-broker’s expert knowledge, or submitting to a commander’s authority. It makes rational choice theory diff erent from neoclassical economy;
6. Social capital – “social capital is a certain aspect of non-formalized social organization, which constitutes a productive resource for one or more ac-tors. Strong social norms within a community, which draw young people away from pop-culture and direct them towards school, create social capital for parents, who are interested in their children’s school success […] A wide network of friends and acquaintances, who may help to fi nd work, is social capital for a person looking for a job”26. Social capital depends on: closure of social networks, continuity of social relations and multilateralism of relations (relations between people are multilateral when they are tied by relations in two or more activities or roles). Th us, certain variations of social structures create large social capital and others do not27;
7. Social source of laws – whether a specifi c action is rational or not in given circumstances is determined by the distribution of laws. However, laws take origin from social processes, in which;
8. Individuals act rationally in order to take care of their own interests by col-lective allocation of laws that are favourable to them. Th is entails a hierarchy of actions, in which actions at one of its levels determine laws at the next, lower level, which puts limitations on actions on this (lower) level;
25 Ibidem, p. 148. 26 Ibidem, p. 151. 27 Ibidem, p. 152.
9. Institutions –institutions play two roles in rational choice theory: 1) they form combinations of individual actions from the level of single actors to the systemic level; 2) they translate states of a system into actions (orienta-tions) of individual actors – mass-media, which specify the cognitive world of individuals, are a good example here.
Th e concept of social capital set forth by Coleman in his famous article of 198828 perfectly matches the analytical framework I have outlined here. Social capital is a quality of a group, of a structure in which entities act. Rational choice theory emphasizes clear dualism of structures and action – people act within structures, they construct, perceive and exploit them. Th ey are an external reality and they limit individual action, but this limitation is “mechanical” as it were. Unlike Bourdieu, Coleman does not claim that “structures are operated by people”. Social capital is a structure which may sometimes be used for the sake of individuals, because it creates conditions which are favourable to them.
Social capital seen from this perspective is the concept which is closely linked
with the notion of human capital. While human capital refers to those features of individuals that might be eff ectively used economically, social capital refers to the features of a structure that have their utility eff ect. In sociology, it obviously be-comes a subject of research which is not purely economic – for example education, but this will be discussed further in the article.
Social capital as a resource in the game of habituses in the fi eld – Bourdieu’s theory Bourdieu’s approach may be illustrated using a similar pattern:
1. Social action takes place within socially constructed fi elds of interaction; 2. Actors in these fi elds have been equipped with diff erent kinds of resources,
which, in specifi c conditions, may be recognized and used as capital in the game against other actors in order to gain advantage;
3. Actors recognize the fi eld and resources/capital through their habitus – so-cially learnt nature, set of dispositions and skills for interpreting the world and acting;
4. Depending on social status and biographically acquired habitus, actors cognize the fi eld diff erently and undertake diff erent kinds of action. As a re-sult, a hierarchy of infl uence and authority is formed, together with the balance of profi ts gained while playing a game in the fi eld.
Th is concept is a good example of a successful attempt to eliminate the dualism of action and structure. It does not limit the interpretation of individual action to 28 J. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, “American Journal of
the infl uence of a social structure on the one hand, and to an actor’s unique inter-pretation of the world on the other29. It shows actors as subjects of action, which are, however, structurally determined. Yet it is not mechanical determination, or simple determinism like in the case of Coleman’s theory, but “soft determination”, the result of an individual’s specifi c history, happening in particular structural conditions, through which it becomes equipped in a number of dispositions for acting – habitus. Using a synthetic approach, Bourdieu’s perspective helps to dis-cern the entirety of a social structure as a determinant of particular social occur-rences, micro-phenomena and interactions happening “here and now”. Habitus, as a social nature of a person shaped as the result of socialization in specifi c condi-tions of a social structure, makes each action taken in a given fi eld become the area of the applications of structurally determined practices. Economic, cultural and social capitals constitute a resource of actors in the fi eld, and habitus deter-mines the recognition of the meanings of the fi eld as well as of capitals and their applications.
“In analytical terms, the fi eld may be defi ned as a network or confi guration of objective relations among positions. Positions are in turn objectively defi ned on the grounds of their existence and the conditions they impose on people or institu-tions that hold them, specifying their present and potential situation in the struc-ture of distribution of diff erent kinds of authority (or capital). Having this author-ity (or capital), we gain access to specifi c benefi ts that are fought for in a given fi eld”30. Th is fi eld is objective, but actors who play there are “steered” by the sub-jectivity of habitus (relative subsub-jectivity as habitus is of a social character). It means that when we analyse fragmentary events (for example, a pupil’s behaviour at school), we need to take into consideration the elements determined by wider structures, such as: the logic of the fi eld, the actors’ habituses and capital resources they have at their disposal. Single, seemingly unimportant occurrences, which are thought to be the result of an individual’s free choice, in Bourdieu’s theory become actions which are taken at the border of objective location in a social structure and subjective position-taking, seeking one’s place specifi ed by the axes of cultural, eco-nomic and social capital31.
Capital(s) constitute(s) a very important category in Bourdieu’s analytical mod-el. Social situations are a kind of game played by its participants. Th e eff ects of this
29 For more details on the dualism of interpretation see: A. Manterys, Sytuacje społeczne [Social
Situations], Kraków 2008.
30 P. Bourdieu, L. Wacquant, op.cit., p. 78.
31 P. Bourdieu, Th e Forms of Capital [in:] Th e Routledge Falmer Reader in Sociology of Education,
game are dependent on the resources obtained by players. Th ese resources are not always identifi ed to be useful – in that case they are not capital32. Capital is some-thing that can be used and can bring us benefi ts (advantages, it helps to accomplish our goals). In other words, it can be “invested” – it brings return in the long term, either in the form of the increased level of the same kind of capital or another one. Th is is because capitals are translatable and convertible. At the same time, the pos-sibility of this translation and the “conversion rate”, i.e. the logic of exchange and variability, are dependent on the logic of the fi eld – the conditions of the game tacitly adopted by the participants in a given fi eld.
Bourdieu distinguished the following three basic forms of capital:
• Economic capital – fi nancial resources, a concept from the fi eld of econo-mics and fi nance which refers to goods (wealth, means, assets);
• Cultural capital – ideas, knowledge, skills and items of cultural value which people acquire while participating in social life. It is refl ected in an indivi-dual’s linguistic and cultural competences:
– embodied – as long-term dispositions of body and mind, particularly so called “good manners”, cultural taste, knowledge of high culture forms, cultural and social conventions;
– institutionalized – mainly in the form of formalized education, especial-ly proven by degrees obtained at prestigious universities;
– objectifi ed – as cultural goods one possesses (painting, books, machines, etc.);
– objectifi ed – as cultural goods one possesses (painting, books, machines, etc.);
• Social capital – “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. Th ese relationships may exist only in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them. Th ey may also be socially instituted and guaranteed by 32 It is also useful to distinguish resources, i.e. potential goods or competences that might become
capital provided they are exploited towards accomplishing set goals. In Polish sociology, this distinc-tion was used by Anna Giza-Poleszczuk, Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska, and Marek Ziółkowski. For more details see: B. Fedyszak-Radziejowska, Kapitał społeczny wsi – w poszukiwaniu utraconego
zau-fania [Social Capital of the Countryside – In Search of Lost Trust] [in:] Kapitał ludzki i zasoby społeczne wsi. Ludzie – społeczność lokalna – edukacja [Human Capital and Social Resources of the Countryside.
the application of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and by a whole set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them”33.
Social capital is present in social groups and networks in in the form of ex-changes of social obligations and symbols, in order to defi ne group membership,
identify borders and create affi liation. Such capital is omnipresent, but it is invested
in class-specifi c forms of social presence. Th ese forms are diff erently eff ective in specifi c fi elds and are diff erently articulated, together with economic and cultural capital. Bourdieu’s theory is based on the ways of using capital by particular indi-viduals and groups34. People are perceived as entities participating in social life, who create their status and importance using diff erent sorts of resources. Th us, Bourdieu indicates that social capital is a resource which can be exploited and ac-cumulated. However, we must remember that perception and resource exploitation are determined by social class. Moreover, the logic of the fi eld decides which re-source may become capital.
Th e “strategic” importance of capital is also important – it is something that is played and used in order to gain advantage in the fi eld. However, Bourdieu rejects the assumption of rational choice theory about a perfectly informed author, who rationally makes utilitarian decision. He criticizes this approach as being ahis-torical – which does not take into account biographical determinants of actors, who perceive the world in diff erent ways – that is why the concept of habitus which explains this diff erentiation, is so important. In this sense, Bourdieu is closer to Peter Berger and Th omas Luckman35 and their concept of the social creation of
reality rather than to Coleman’s rational choice theory. Th e only thing that may be slightly confusing here is “quite an economic” language – which relates “strategies” to rationality and full control of one’s action. If we consistently adopt Bourdieu’s perspective, we must point out that “rationality” is always situational, and it is the
fi eld that infl uences a person rather than an individual moves within the fi eld.
Th ere are diff erent ways in which social capital may be strategically played. “Th e volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can eff ectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected“36. Social capital is a network of relationships which
33 P. Bourdieu, op.cit., p. 21. 34 See: S. Ball, op.cit.
35 P. Berger, T. Luckmann, Społeczne tworzenie rzeczywistości [Th e Social Construction of Reality:
A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, New York 1966], Warszawa 1983.
facilitate access to other resources – economic, cultural and social ones. When we recognize (or, to be more accurate, sense) the logic of the fi eld, we may, depending on the situation and unrealized strategy, appeal to our network of relationships (for example, frightening somebody with one’s friends from the same district) or to use resources possessed by people we are structurally tied with (for example, asking somebody to help us train our muscles, thanks to which we will obtain specifi c embodied cultural capital). Th us, social capital becomes the basis for ac-quiring and exploiting the other forms – economic and cultural capital.
It must be emphasized once again that social capital is the result of strategic actions taken in order to build a network of mutual dependencies, which may lead to gaining access to socially useful goods. It makes this theory signifi cantly diff er-ent from Coleman’s approach – who views social capital as an unintended eff ect of intended actions. Bourdieu points out that “Th e existence of a network of connec-tions is not a natural given, or even a social given, constituted once and for all by an initial act of institution […] (it) is the product of investment strategies, indi-vidual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or repro-ducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term”37.
Coleman’s social world is fundamentally diff erent from Bourdieu’s vision. Th e diff erence lies in the analytical separation of an individual and a structure – indi-viduals are isolated entities outside structures, they construct and exploit struc-tures. Th ese structures adopt individual actions and translate them into systemic, yet separate, results. Th e human being is a fully rational entity that keeps full con-trol of his or her actions. In Bourdieu’s theory, human action is strongly deter-mined by subtle structural mechanisms. Th us, both approaches presented above show social capital from diff erent perspectives. At fi rst sight, however, we could try to fi nd some similarities.
Let us now summarize the diff erences between the two viewpoints:
Coleman Bourdieu
Social capital is a feature of structures Social capital is a resource of individuals Th e quality of social capital depends on the closure
of social networks, continuity of social relations and multilateralism of relations
Social capital depends on the quality of resources possessed by people we are connected with in a structure
Social capital is basically the result of unintended actions
Social capital is something we invest in, we make eff orts, consciously or unconsciously, to develop this network of connections
As a result, while analysing a certain community in terms of both theories, we may come to quite opposite conclusions about the quality of social capital – when Coleman believes something to be high potential of social capital through strong norms and structural closure, Bourdieu considers it to be low potential as there are not enough people in the network who may provide economic or cultural capital in the given fi eld. What is more important, however, the comprehensive analysis of a specifi c problem will be diff erent depending on which of the two perspectives is applied. Let us illustrate it with regard to education.
5. Social capital and education from different perspectives
Let us raise a social issue that is central to the discussion on educational sociology – what determines social inequalities in education? To put it more bluntly – why does Jeremy, a professor’s son, performs better at school than Jack, a farmer’s son?
Such question may be answered in a number of diff erent ways and a complete list of causes includes a wide array of causes. Th e choice of the lists of these factors is determined by the theory which we have adopted. If we pursue Bourdieu’s the-ory, we will construct the following story pattern:
School and education generally constitute a specifi c fi eld symbolically shaped by society. Its logic is driven by entities which possess authority in the fi eld, mostly rep-resentatives of upper class. Actors in this fi eld – whose interrelations are established through objective conditions of interactions – include teachers, pupils and their par-ents. In order to fully understand the effi cacy of actions of particular actors in the fi eld we need to recognize the way in which they interpret the game and how they recog-nize and apply resources they possess so as to increase eff ectiveness in the fi eld. Th e way they interpret this game is determined by habitus – socially learnt nature. Th e following hypotheses emerge:
1. As people from diff erent social classes have diff erent habitus, they recogni-ze the logic of the educational fi eld in a diff erent way;
2. People from diff erent social classes diff erently interpret what constitutes cultural and social capital in the educational fi eld and how it can be explo-ited;
3. Even if people from diff erent social classes recognized the logic of the edu-cational fi eld in the same way, they have diff erent access to capitals (cultural and social) because of their location within the structure.
In the case of Coleman’s theory, the story will be a bit diff erent:
Educational achievements are a kind of goods that individuals – particular stu-dents and their parents – compete for. Whether their eff orts are successful is deter-mined by the resources of human capital they possess – intelligence, skills acquired while doing other activities, general attitude towards learning and school – as well as structural circumstances in which the educational process takes place. At the same time, it is important how systemic expectations concerning individuals’ ac-tions are translated into the level of individual behaviours – for example, whether there is a system of institutions which inform about education and promote it, or quite the opposite, whether the system does not expect pro-educational activities. Structural conditions are the features of the social environment in which education takes place. If people in this environment know each other and there are eff ective social control mechanisms, deviation behaviours become less likely to happen and members of such an environment achieve better educational results. We also need to assume that everyone is kept informed about the value of education and aims at maximizing utility in this respect. Structural closure and multilateralism of social contracts is conducive to educational effi cacy.
Th e following hypotheses emerge:
1. Students who diff er in their school performance have diff erent degrees of human capital;
2. Students who diff er in their school performance function in structurally diff erent social environments – which are diff erent in terms of the closure of structure and multilateralism of social contacts;
3. Students who perform better at school function in social environments in which there are institutions effi ciently translating social expectations con-cerning education into individuals’ orientations, whereas there are no such institutions in the environments of worse students.
We could probably come up with a lot more of such hypotheses. Full interpre-tation of social determinants of educational results requires a longer list of them. However, even such brief enumeration of the most important conclusions regard-ing diff erences in education shows the importance of a theory adopted as the basis for interpretation. It has dual implications. First of all, in the areas of looking for the confi rmation of our hypotheses. In the case of Bourdieu, we need to focus on the way in which individuals perceive reality, interpret resources and how they strategically act in the fi eld. In the case of Coleman, we observe the environment in which individuals function. Th ere is a specifi c paradox here – a lot more
struc-turalist theory leads as to a more individual-oriented methodology. It obviously has implications for the choice of applicable methods.
6.
Implications for further analyses of the connections between
social capital and education – summary
Th e importance of social capital in these analyses is also diff erent. In the light of Bourdieu’s theory, habitus and cultural capital are more important as they are dispositions and resources directly engaged in the fi eld. Th is may be the reason for the lack of interest in this part of Bourdieu’s analytical model. Coleman’s approach focuses on the circumstances in the environment; thus, social capital, defi ned as the feature of a structure, becomes the central issue of sociologists’ attention.
Th e question which perspective is better, or more true, is pointless or at least wrongly posed. We may conduct research from both viewpoints, but we must re-member that they defi ne social capital in a diff erent way. I myself designed research projects in which I use the concept of social capital – each time I defi ned social capital diff erently and I used diff erent sets of indexes to measure its existence and use. When I did research on parents’ strategy in the educational market38, I used Bourdieu’s theory. In turn, while investigating the determinants and eff ects of the establishment of small kindergartens in rural areas, we followed Coleman’s ap-proach39. What determines the choice of one of the theories is the original research problem, which “implies” diff erent theoretical conceptualization. As a result, we construct two diff erent forms of a “story of education”.
Practical consequences of analyses conducted from the two perspectives will also diff er. Limiting ourselves to the optics of social capital, we must note that in the case of Bourdieu, educational guidelines will be focused on strengthening the potential of people connected with actors – raising the quality of cultural capital of the people we are tied with, or pursuing the strategy of consciously creating useful networks and adequately playing in the fi eld. We need to admit, however, that the level of practical application of Bourdieu’s theory is limited – as a refl exive outlook on the world it implies a change in the whole socialization process and in the formation of biography and habitus. To put it simply – it is far easier to use Bourdieu’s approach to understand something than to use it as a basis for
construct-38 Research project Social Capital in the Educational Market.
39 Research project Th e infl uence of the project “We are going to the kindergarten” on local
ing practical action. On the other hand, the pragmatic “strength” of this theory may
come from the fact that it shows how pointless, or at least diffi cult it is to change a social mechanism – this is what some radical scholars criticized it for.
Th e conclusions from the research based on Coleman’s theory show that posi-tive change is possible – social environment should be stimulated so that it would be better “exploitable” for individuals. Th is in turn makes this theory so popular and persuasive.
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