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Przemysław Wewiór (rev.): Adam Grzeliński, Człowiek i duch nieskończony: immaterializm George’a Berkeleya [Man and Infinite Spirit: Immaterialism of George Berkeley]

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REVIEWS–REPORTS

Przemysław Wewiór (rev.): Adam Grze liński, Człowiek i duch nieskończony: immaterial-izm George’a Berkeleya [Man and Infi nite Spirit: Immaterialism of George Berkeley], Wydawnictwo UMK, Toruń 2010, pp. 295. Th e output by the Anglican bishop and Irish philosopher George Berkeley reminds one of the famous statement by George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel saying that philosophy is upside down world. Berkeley’s fi gure has at-tracted the attention of numerous commen-tators primarily due to his thesis of imma-terialism: matter understood as the basis of phenomena and transformations in the world does not exist. The consequence which was supposed to result from this metaphysical stand – namely, solipsism that rejects the existence of real world – gener-ated outrage and a series of polemics. In spite of the fact that in his works Berkeley explicitly and frequently admitted that there are numerous spirits-substances and nature, he has been labelled a philosopher who dis-regarded the common sense of his readers. Th e opinion by Kant who wrote about “the mystical and dreamy idealism”1 is a model

1 I. Kant, Prolegomena, trans. B. Bornstein, Warszawa 1993, p. 64.

one. Th e Anglican bishop was a victim of interpretational misconceptions ever since his philosophical works were published. However, it has to be noted that, as the time passed, Berkeley’s philosophy also met with a broad positive reception of people whose point of honour was to do it justice.

Th e circle of Berkeley’s readers who are free of prejudice includes Adam Grzeliński, the author of the book: Człowiek i duch

nies-kończony: immaterializm George’a Berkleya

[Man and Infi nite Spirit: Immaterialism of George Berkeley]. In Grzeliński’s interpre-tation, the Anglican clergyman is – con-trary to popular associations – a fi gure of the main stream in the British common sense philosophy, with such representatives as, among others, Th omas Reid and Dugald Stewart. As has been pointed out by the au-thor, the common sense attitude is a way to address the world which assumes that ob-jects are not only items of cognition, but meaningful elements of human experience. According to Grzeliński, such an attitude determined the entire output by Berkeley and urged him to question the concept of matter. Metaphysical and epistemological issues were important to the Anglican cler-gyman as long as they had a practical, mor-al and religious correlation.

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Since Berkeley was first a clergyman, and then a philosopher, historical research, which may refl ect his intentions truthfully, ought to be carried out not in a problem-based manner but in a systematic one2. Th is is the approach chosen by the author of the publication reviewed. In the problem-based perspective, Berkeley’s philosophy is only a stage in the development of the more and more radical, sceptical tradition of the Brit-ish empiricism, or Cartesian criticism whose peak achievement is the concept by David Hume and transcendental idealism by Kant. Such “radicalisation” would consist in a gradual abandonment of the metaphys-ics that relies on the category of substance for the philosophy of the subject. From this perspective, Berkeley’s doctrine appears to be an internally incoherent project, since contrary to the requirements of empiricism, it assumes the existence of spirits-substanc-es. Still, as Grzeliński attempts to prove, Berkeley’s intention was the consensus of various stands: empiricism, metaphysics of religious provenance and mathematical natural history.

2 Th e problem-based, primarily focused on epistemology approach to Berkeley’s philosophy has been adopted by numerous authors. It is enough to mention here the famous criticism of idealism by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in his article

Epistemologia i semiotyka [Epistemology and

Semiotics] or the popular handbook by Jan Woleński Epistemologia: poznanie, prawda,

wied-za, realism [Epistemology: Cognition, Truth,

Knowledge, Realism]. In specialised publications on Berkeley, this interpretation tendency is par-ticularly visible in Jan Sarna’s Filozofi a George’a

Ber-keleya: idealizm czy realizm [George Berkeley’s

Philosophy: Idealism or Realism].

What are the rules according to which particular elements of philosophical system ought to be interlinked? Th e known com-mentators of Berkeley’s works – Arthur As-ton Luce and Désirée Park – have concisely and accurately presented the common sense mode in which he poses issues: “God exists, thus can matter exist?”3 or “God exists, and given this fact, what else can we claim?”4 Grzeliński attempts to provide an answer to such questions. At the same time, he shows in a systematic order how Berkeley has built not yet an edifi ce of knowledge, but a cathe-dral – a complex of statements of religious signifi cance, crucial as regards the salvation of the faithful. How this architectural un-dertaking can be completed, without em-bedding it in a fi rm base of matter, is pre-sented to the readers by the author in seven chapters, beginning with the historical background of Berkeley’s philosophy.

As a young man, the Anglican clergy-man was a careful and critical reader of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human

Under-standing, who in this work addresses the

issue inherited from Cartesianism – the du-alism of spiritual and bodily substance. Locke proposes to approach this issue in a methodological and psychological man-ner, that is to search the mind for such con-3 A.A. Luce, Berkeley’s Immaterialism, cited aft er: A. Grzeliński, Człowiek i Duch nieskończony:

immaterializm Georga Berkeleya [Man and Infi

-nite Spirit: Immaterialism of George Berkeley], Toruń 2010, p. 270

4 D. Park, Complementary Notions. A

Criti-cal Study of Berkeley’s Th eory of Concepts, cited

aft er: A. Grzeliński, Człowiek i Duch nieskończony, p. 270

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tent which has a reality of the object – it represents bodily substances. In Locke, the genetic direction of research is thus strictly dependent upon phenomenalistic investiga-tions. However, Berkeley argues that the two philosophical programs cannot be rec-onciled: if the phenomenalistic analysis is employed, no cognitively “privileged” men-tal content can be distinguished – measur-able primary qualities – nor a concept of independently existing matter be deduced from the content of experience. According to Grzeliński, Berkeley was inspired by the sceptical arguments from works by Nicolas Malebranche and Pierre Bayle. Th e former has proved that there is no rational basis to claim that any relation occurs between the thinking substance and the bodily one; the latter, though, questioned the Cartesian conviction that the God’s goodness justifi es the existence of bodies and rejected the di-vision into primary and secondary qualities. Facing those multiplying diffi culties, Berke-ley has solved the issue of dualism by re-moving one of its components – the bodily substance.

Th e above historical introduction, which describes the context of the emergence of immaterialism, is followed by Grzeliński’s presentation of particular components of Berkeley’s philosophy in a systematic order, beginning with the epistemological issues. Th e negative point of reference for theory-cognitive considerations is again Locke, in opposition to whom Berkeley proved that not all objects of our thinking may be re-duced to sensory experience and simple ideas. Th at is why, besides ideas, Berkeley

distinguished notions, that is necessary con-ditions for experience which are not sen-sory content themselves, such as spirit, God and relations. Th e very notions constitute the “first” object of thinking since what ideas are, and what their meanings are, is defi ned by relations of two kinds: relations to other ideas and reference to the subjects that perceive them. Berkeley no longer needs the category of matter as its regula-tive function is fulfi lled by the notion of spirits equipped with will and imagination which purposefully organise their own ex-perience. Th us, the objects of thinking are not representations of extra-sensory reality but the presentation of the creative activity of spirits.

Th is meaning of volitional activity of spiritual substances is the subject of the next chapter of the book. According to Grzeliński, the key to understanding it are Berkeley’s considerations on temporariness. Berkeley’s interest focuses mainly on time being lived which is a way for the subject to actively ad-dress the current experience on account of the events remembered and the expected ones. Volition which avoids unpleasant sen-sations and strives for pleasant impressions, relates itself towards the actual and the ex-pected ideas, determining their meanings. As regards this relation of the subject’s ac-tivity to time, Berkeley describes spirit as substance that wants, imagines and remem-bers various objects. Next, Grzeliński presents Berkeley’s characteristics of the powers that are responsible for these activi-ties and proves that not only perception but also volition is a positive condition for ideas

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to exist. Parallel to volition, imagination, or fancy, organises minima sensibilia (indivis-ible sens(indivis-ible points) in time and space rela-tions – experience created in this way is called by Berkeley: conception.

If one investigates the relations of co-existence of objects of our thinking, one practices natural history which is the next subject of Grzeliński’s work. In the 17th

cen-tury, corpuscular metaphysics was consid-ered a doctrine which corresponds with and well justifi es the fi ndings of the fast devel-oping natural sciences. However, Berkeley addresses the postulate by Isaac Newton

hipotesis non fi ngo: theoretical models do

not have to reflect the allegedly existing world of material bodies, and their state-ments will still be valid. Th is does not mean that the philosophy of nature ought to be eliminated. On the contrary, Berkeley con-siders it an autonomic domain and develops his immaterialist metaphysics in an unre-stricted way. Mathematical natural history is assigned an instrumental task. Science is an instrument which serves people to learn what behaviour will enable them to satisfy their vital needs.

However, the pragmatic aspect does not exhaust the experience of nature. Nature plays also the role of intermediary of God’s will who dictates fi nite spirits their moral obligations – person undergoing an aes-thetic experience recognises his/her own vocation. The fifth chapter is organised around the comparison of aesthetic concepts by Berkeley and those by Lord Shaft -esbury. Contrary to Berkeley’s severe criti-cism of Shaft esbury, Grzeliński proves that

their doctrines are fundamentally similar: both comprehend beauty and characterise aesthetic experience in the same way. Th ose two authors agree that the basic condition that enables perception of beauty is an im-partial attitude of the subject that acquires. Nature in aesthetic experience appears as a harmonious whole which we are able to understand if we refer to the notion of the purposeful activity of Creator’s will. Natural beauty may be thus comprehended as a message which is addressed to us by the infi nite Spirit. Th is message instructs that the human stop the constant chase after body pleasures and surrender to the good will of God. However, aesthetic experience can be identifi ed neither with moral experi-ence nor with the religious one. At this point, Berkeley departs from the position of Shaftesbury who did not distinguish be-tween those three types of experience, and he develops aesthetics that is independent from ethics and philosophy of religion. Fol-lowing Grzeliński, one ought to address, in the fi rst place, practical philosophy.

Berkeley developed his moral and po-litical doctrine in opposition to both the naturalistic tradition, whose representatives in Great Britain included, among others, Bernard de Mandeville, Hobbes or Locke, and the ethics by Shaft esbury. Th e former were criticised by him for reductionistic model of practical philosophy. Naturalists failed to notice the autonomic character of morality and politics – in these dimensions of activity, the objective of spirit are not per-sonal, vital benefi ts, but the interest of the general public. Th us, morality and politics

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cannot be absorbed by economy. It was well comprehended by Shaft esbury who, how-ever, selected a too fragile basis for political order – aesthetic experience and a sense of bond with other people. Contrary to both positions, Berkeley argued that moral norms are unconditionally obligatory and are determined by, common to all finite spirits, rules of the reason. Th ese rules, urg-ing people to restrict their strive for par-ticular goals, enable them to decide on their own intentions. Th e mankind’s destiny is “well-being of all people of all nations and

all times, from the beginning of the world

until its end”5. Th e realisation of this rule is guaranteed by the state to which citizens owe passive obedience.

Th e last issue addressed by Grzeliński is religious dimension of human life. Philo-sophical – theological discussions in Great Britain at the turn of the 17th and 18th cen-turies encountered certain diffi culty which was a consequence of empiricism. Locke distinguished between the actual and the potential infinity: God is infinite in the former sense. According to Locke, though, in our experience, we fail to have any idea of actual infi nity. Th eologians used to solve this issue by supporting either the fi deism or deism. Berkeley, as a clergyman, tried to avoid those positions and promote the An-glican revealed religion. Contrary to fi de-ists, he indicated rational arguments, which

5 G. Berkeley, Passive Obedience, cited aft er: A. Grzeliński, Człowiek i Duch nieskończony [Man and Infi nite Spirit: Immaterialism of George Ber-keley], p. 238.

were not, however, evidence, for the exist-ence of God, and defending the positive revealed religion against deists, he empha-sised that almost none of the aspects of hu-man life can be rationalised.

Grzeliński consequently realises the re-search postulate “let’s read Berkeley”6 in-stead of analysing his text by means of un-familiar categories. Reading Berkeley’s works in a systematic manner, the author avoids aporia which is typical of historians who focus solely on his inspirations with empiricism. Grzeliński does not repeat – like Jan Sarna in Filozofi a Georga Berkeleya:

idealizm czy realizm? [George Berkeley’s

Philosophy: Idealism or Realism] – the mis-take made by Roman Ingarden and Kazimi-erz Ajdukiewicz who imputed solipsism to Berkeley. While Sarna considered the meta-physics of the Anglican clergyman as a for-eign body in his philosophy – an interjec-tion that was supposed to save him from the religiously improper consequences of solip-sism7 – Grzeliński convincingly shows that attempts to separate Berkeley’s epistemolo-gy from its ontological bases are completely unjustifi ed. Content of experience (nature, world) – which the Irish philosopher stressed – are dependent on and shaped by volitional activities of spirits and their im-agination.

6 Cf. K. Abriszewski, Czytajmy Berkeleya,

a nie Kartezjusza [Let’s Read Berkeley, not

Des-cartes], “Ruch Filozoficzny” [“Philosophical Movement"] 2000, Vol. 42, No. 3–4, pp. 465–478.

7 Cf. Jan Sarna, Filozofi a Georga Berkeleya:

idealizm czy realizm [George Berkeley’s

Philoso-phy: Idealism or Realism], Opole 1996, p. 35, 42.

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However, it is not the eff ort of the author who aims to fulfi l the “systematic” interpre-tational directive, that is the biggest advan-tage of the book. Th is research postulate was already observed by Henryk Elzenberg8 in 1964, and realised by Stefan Sarnowski (Berkeley: zdrowy rozsądek idealizm [Berke-ley: Th e Common Sense of Idealism]) and Stanisław Kijaczko (Immaterializm:

episte-mologia i metafizyka. Próba interpretacji fi lozofi i George’a Berkeleya [Immaterialism:

Epistemology and Metaphysics. An Attempt of Interpreting George Berkeley’s Philoso-phy]). Compared to other Polish publica-tion on the Irish philosopher, the original-ity of the work by Grzeliński depends on a diff erent quality.

Th e importance of the publication is de-termined by a vast area which the author covers and the fi rmness in underlining the common sense nature of Berkeley’s philoso-phy. As regards the former issue, the scope of study in the Polish publications on the Anglican bishop used to be modest. The most developed section of his works was epistemology (to mention the detailed anal-yses by Przemysław Spryszak – the author of Filozofi a percepcji George’a Berkeleya [Th e Philosophy of Perception by George Berke-ley]); also, the interest of Sarnowski and Kijaczko was metaphysics and ethics – how-ever, it has to be noted that the analyses by

8 Cf. H. Elzenberg, Domniemany

immanen-tyzm Berkeleya w świetle analizy tekstów [Th e Al-leged Immanence of Berkeley in the Light of Texts Analysis] [in:] idem, Z historii fi lozofi i [From the History of Philosophy], Kraków 1995, pp. 312– –337.

the former author are quite casual. On the other hand, Grzeliński has also deduced from the immaterialist metaphysics the views on aesthetics, science (including the very detailed analysis of the works on op-tics), and religion; he writes a lot on the emotivistic function of language, and moral and political philosophy. Th e area the au-thor covers is extremely vast, which does not hinder its coherent, systematic presen-tation – all fragments refer to immaterialist metaphysics. Analysing each section of Ber-keley’s works, Grzeliński attempts to cap-ture the specifi city of the use of spiritual powers which causes that the same minima

sensibilia are comprehended in different

modalities, or aspects: the vital, aesthetic, moral and religious ones. It has to be noted here that the immaterialist metaphysics, as the binding point of the whole Berkeley’s philosophical system, has been presented by the author with pietism and ingeniousness. Th e asset of the monograph is even greater since Berkeley’s teaching on notions has al-ways caused the commentators the most diffi culty9 since the notions of spirit and re-lation cannot be reduced to empirical mo-tives of his philosophy. It is also evident that Berkeley does not provide his readers with suffi cient reasoning that resulted in his as-sumption of notions, nor presents any

pos-9 Th is interpretational diffi culty has been ad-mitted, for example, by Anna Hochfeldowa. Cf. A. Hochfeldwa, Kryzys teologii naturalnej: George

Berkeley [Th e Crisis of Natural Th eology: George Berkeley], “Archiwum Historii Filozofi i i Myśli Społecznej”[“Archive of the History of Philosophy and Social Th ought”] 1971, Vol. 17, pp. 202–204.

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itive content which underlies the notions of spirits and relations, addressing this crucial issue – as it is the case in Treatise concerning

the Principles of Human Knowledge – in

a rather superficial manner. However, Grzeliński suffi ciently reconstructs the im-materialist metaphysics and also takes into account the context of justifying the con-cept on spirits activity, showing why, into his system, Berkeley introduced categories irreducible to ideas and what their role is in the theoretical reconstruction of human ex-perience.

Additionally, the author bears in mind that the solutions to particular issues, based on immaterialism, are not merely Berkeley’s philosophical show – the Anglican clergy-man strove for saving the common sense cognitive attitude, the message of which is that the world is what we perceive and that

the world is meaningful to us. While other

authors, for example Kijaczko, considered this dimension of Berkeley’s works a rhe-torical trick which was supposed to protect him against criticism10, Grzeliński treats Berkeley’s beliefs seriously, which ought to be regarded another asset of the reviewed work. Th e basis for motivations which in-spired Berkeley to philosophical attempts was the observation that people of the mod-ern era experience a specifi c crisis of con-sciousness. A side eff ect of scientifi

c-tech-10 Cf. S. Kijaczko, Immaterializm:

epistemo-logia i metafizyka. Próba interpretacji filozofii George’a Berkeleya [Immaterialism: Epistemology

and Metaphysics. An Attempt of Interpreting George Berkeley’s Philosophy], Opole 2002, pp. 136–137.

nological progress is the absolutisation of the pragmatic modality of approaching ex-perience and the decline of the natural cog-nitive attitude. It is not true that the meta-phor of nature as an independently func-tioning machine, or a clock, is imposed upon our common sense with great force – aft er all, nature can be considered in the same way as language. Th e choice of techni-cal allegories is a sign that the cognitive po-sition of the modern person has already been much reduced. Berkeley’s intention was to prove that this change of conscious-ness leads to poor moral, political and reli-gious consequences. Th e attempts by Berke-ley cannot be thus called a rhetorical device: the philosopher believed that he had not lost common sense, though, he was con-cerned if his contemporaries are also of sound mind. Thus, Grzeliński is right to note that the common sense cognitive atti-tude infl uenced all philosophical achieve-ments of the Anglican bishop.

Nevertheless, one ought to pose a ques-tion: if the author has considered all conse-quences which result from such a position of Berkeley. If Berkeley is primarily a cler-gyman, and only then a philosopher, there-fore, the systematic reading of his works should take into account the objectives he strives to achieve, even if nowadays we are not willing to admit that they are strictly philosophical. Although Grzeliński admits that Berkeley’s works are apologetical, little space and attention is paid to theological is-sues – the chapter on philosophy of religion is of a lower level compared to the other sections of the book. As it has been

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men-tioned, the author mainly focuses on the dispute of the turn of the 17th and 18th

cen-turies, the sources of which ought to be found in Locke’s considerations on infi nity. However, this issue was not suffi cient for the scope of challenges set by the philo-sophical concepts of that time, which had to be addressed by the apologist for the re-vealed religion; let us list even several diffi -culties. Th e consequence of the Cartesian dualism of the spiritual and the bodily sub-stance was Locke’s and Malebranche’s scep-tical assessment of human capabilities of learning about nature, and questioning the validity of, extremely popular then, physi-cal-teleological evidence for the existence of God11. Th e formation of, if not evidence, then even rational argument for God’s exist-ence, ought to be perceived as one of the sources of Berkeley’s motivation to create new metaphysics and a new concept of na-ture. Another, quite obvious, and yet not omitted by the author, objective of Berke-ley’s apologetic eff ort was to confront he-donistic and atheistic (or pantheistic) con-sequences which derived from the positions of Baruch de Spinoza, Hobbes or the reborn Epicureanism. Beside philosophical issues, also the theological ones influenced the overall system of Berkeley. Grzeliński ob-serves only one of them – like Luce, he notes that the basis for the diff erence in Berkeley’s

11 Cf. Z.J. Czarnecki, Historyczne przesłanki

i teoretyczne cele immaterialistycznej metafi zyki Berkeleya [Historical Premises and Th eoretical Objectives of Berkeley’s Metaphysics], “Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska” 1976, Vol. 1, p. 129.

and Malebranche’s perception of matter is diff erent comprehension of the dogma on Christ’s incarnation in the Communion by the Anglicans and Catholics – but he does not explore this issue in the last chapter. A mystery has still remained Berkeley’s critical attitude to Socinianism and the in-fl uence of the specifi c position of Anglican-ism as the offi cial religion on his philosophy of politics. None of these issues was ad-dressed by Grzeliński. This shortcoming could be ignored by claiming that it refers only to one section of the book, however, in accordance with interpretational directives, which were defi ned by the author himself, Berkeley’s philosophy as a whole ought to be considered natural theology – let us ad-mit that it is an extremely original theology which is a phenomenon in the history of ideas since he uses empiricism as his weap-on. Th erefore, it is hard to note that the con-clusion, which, according to the author, was supposed to be the critical section that as-sesses the success of Berkeley’s theological-philosophical undertaking, is only three pages long and is limited to the citation of several remarks by Reid and Hume on the sceptical character of his position. To com-pare, the digression on the concept of ether is over twenty-page.

Although Grzeliński does not exploit the entire systematic and common sense potential of the interpretational key, this should not obscure the quality of his work. Since 2002 when the book by Kijaczko was published until Grzeliński’s monograph, no considerable single-thematic publication which would attempt to broaden the

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sys-tematic comprehension of Berkeley’s phi-losophy has appeared. Th e author has com-pleted such an assignment well, reconstruct-ing the almost unknown components of Berkeley’s system. Similarly to Grzeliński’s previous publications on Hume’s philoso-phy, the aesthetics by Neoplatonists of Cam-bridge or on Shaft esbury, the book Man and

Infi nite Spirit […] is a worthwhile

contribu-tion to the Polish philosophical-historical studies on the British output on ideas.

Przemysław Wewiór

(Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland)

Adam Grzeliński: Author’s Note on the Review of Człowiek i duch nieskończony: immaterializm George’a Berkeleya [Man and Infinite Spirit: Immaterialism of George Berkeley]

I would like to thank the reviewer for many positive words that he used reviewing my book – such reviews would certainly make any author blush since no one else knows all the shortcomings of their work better than the author himself. I must agree with Re-viewer that many issues raised in the book are worth a broader and more detailed anal-ysis: obviously, not only the relations be-tween Berkeley’s religious views expressed in his philosophy and the doctrine of the Anglican church, or with Socinianism, as it is suggested in the review; other issues could be added to this category as well, such as deism of John Toland and Matthew Tin-dal, Pierre Bayle’s skepticism, religious writ-ings of William King and Peter Brown (cler-gymen and opponents of Berkeley) to name

a few. As there are many topics worth a more detailed consideration, I believe they should remain such for future studies.

Nevertheless, there are some issues men-tioned in the review I feel obliged to clarify. It is the fact that Berkeley’s works are a kind of religious apologetics, although they have widely recognized philosophical value and importance. Scholars dealing with Berkeley’s thought cite not only his primary texts, such as Treatise on the Principles of Human

Know-ledge, Dialogues between Hylas and Phi-lonous, or Alciphron, but also refer, even if

marginally, to essays published in the

Guard-ian or to the sketches of his sermons. Th e religious tone of the thought should not be neglected. It is also worth mentioning that the bishop of Cloyne, as Berkeley is oft en referred to, had extensive knowledge and was deeply interested in sciences, or political and economical issues.

All these make any attempt of an overall presentation of Berkeley’s philosophy a question of choice and setting a perspec-tive from which such an attempt should be made. In case of Man and the Infi nite Spirit, it was (and such was my intention) a philo-sophical and systematic perspective. What I intended to achieve was to show the com-plexity of the philosophical system oft en abbreviated to the noun immaterialism or the famous phrase esse est percipi. Occa-sionally, it was necessary to treat some top-ics somewhat superfi cially; the theories of Th . Hobbes and of B. Mandeville were even only mentioned. But what about the rela-tion between epistemology and metaphys-ics and religious beliefs, which were

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