20 m e m o r y a n d p l a c e
Wojciech Kalaga
Memory, Interpretation, Identity
D O I :i 0 .l 8 3 l 8 / t d . 2 0 l 6 .e n . 1 .3
T
he three te rm s foregrounded in the title o f th is e s sa y refer to q u estion s so fu n d am en tal for co n tem p o rary culture th at th e y h ave b ecom e a lm o st cliches.M uch critical w ritin g has been devoted to each o f those term s individually and - notably in the case o f m em ory and id en tity - to the relations b etw een their pairs. In m y opinion, how ever, not enough attention has been paid - especially in theoretical term s - to the interrelationships am ongst all three o f them , and particularly to the role of in terp retatio n w ith resp ect to the relatio n o f m e m o ry and identity. It is on those co-d ep en d en cies that I w ish to focus on in the follow ing discussion. In order to narrow the subject down, I w ill consider the sphere o f id en tity as an area w here the rem aining tw o protagonists o f this e s
say - m em ory and interpretation - m eet and cooperate.
I am aw are, o f course, that b y evoking the category of identity, I sim u ltaneously evoke w id e-ran gin g m od ern ist and p ostm od ern ist debates con cerning questions o f the sub ject and subjectivity. H ow ever, w e do n o t need to enter th ese debates here b ecause, irrespective o f our stance, the heart o f the m atter rem ains the sam e: w h eth er w e un d erstand id en tity as an in dependently existing core (C artesian subject), or as a coherent, chronologically and p lo t-w ise ordered narrative (Paul R icoeur), or - as
Wojciech Kalaga - Profesoremeritus of Literary Theory and English Literature, and former Director o f the Institute of English Cultures and Literatures at the University of Silesia. He lectured and conducted research a t different universities, including Yale University and Murdoch University, where he was Chair of English and Comparative Literature. His books include The Mental Landscape, The Literary Sign, and Nebulae o f Discourse:
Interpretation, Textuality and the Subject as well as numerous articles on literary/cultural theory and semiotics.
Presently, he is Vice-chair o f the Com m ittee on Literature Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and General Editor o f the Literary and Cultural Theory series (Lang Verlag).
M E M O R Y , I D E N T I T Y A N D P O L I T i C S O F M E M O R Y WOJCIECH KALAGA M E M O R Y , I N T E R P R E T A T I O N , I D E N T I T Y 21
Bergson w ou ld have it - as a snow ball, w h ich grow s bigger and bigger and changes its shape w hile tum b lin g dow n, b uilding up n e w layers o f itself, or as a nebula, or a cracked, fragm en tary conglom erate o f heterogeneous and som etim es even contradictory tendencies and m om ents, w e can agree that m em ory and interpretation - in their various senses - continue to partake in identity. O f course, a certain concept of the subject w ill emerge in effect o f this discussion o f the involvem ent o f m em ory and interpretation in the construc
tio n o f identity, but rather as an end result than as a prelim in ary assum ption.
Interpretation
I w ill begin w ith a statem ent w hich constitutes the fundam ental prem ise of this argum ent: in terpretation is a m ode o f our existence. H ow ever, I do not m ean som eone else's interpretation, w here w e - as a discursive construct, or a product o f different technologies o f power, know ledge and discourse - are interpreted from the outside b y people surrounding us, or b y a system o f cul
ture “interpreting” our place, role and m eaning. Obviously, such interpretation grants us social existence, but it does not constitute - at least not directly - our internal self. W hen talking about interpretation as a m ode of hum an exist
ence, I m ean w hat Charles Taylor expressed b y calling m an, m aybe in a slightly oxym oronic way, a self-interpreting anim al:1 w hat sets hum an existence apart from other m odes o f being is the continuous interpretation o f o n eself and of our involvem ent in w hat surrounds us. It is interpretation construed in this w ay that constitutes the essence o f our existence.
We could support and ju stify the above statem ent b y referring to M artin Heidegger, w ho - beginning w ith the ontico-ontological difference - situates understanding, and hence also in terpretation,2 am ong the so -called existen- tials, or the conditions o f authentic existence o f Dasein. U nderstanding and in terpretation, n ext to attun em en t (or rather state-o f-m in d , Befindlichkeit) and speech (Rede), con stitute the fu n d am en tal o n tological con d ition s for h u m an existence in the w orld . “To exist,” claim s H eidegger, “is essentially, even if not only, to understand,”3 and hence also to interpret. The interpreting
1 C h arles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, (Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1985), 45.
2 ” In it [interpretation, Auslegung] un derstan din g appropriates un derstandingly th at which is un derstood by it.” Martin H eidegger, Being and Time, trans. John M acquarrie and Ed
w ard Robinson (Oxford and C am bridge: Blackw ell, 1993), 188.
3 M artin H eidegger, The Basic Problem s o f Phenom enology, trans. A. H ofstad ter (Bloom ing
ton: Indiana U niversity Press, 1982), 276. S e e also "U n derstan d in g is th e Existential Being o f Dasein's ow n P o ten tiality-for-B ein g [...].” H eidegger, Being and Time, 184.
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understanding is the foundation for the existential constitution o f the hum an being: any structure o f m eaning “is rooted in the existential constitution o f Dasein - that is, in the un derstanding w hich interprets.” 4
One could also follow som ew hat sim ilar, ye t less travelled paths o f H ans- G eorg G adam er and Paul Ricoeur, each o f w hom - in his ow n w a y - expands the ontological dim en sio n o f in terp retation b y su pplem en tin g it w ith the epistem ological dim ension, or rather, after the radical H eideggerian turn, re stores that epistem ological dim ension to the realm o f interpretation, sim ulta
neously subduing it to ontology: the interpretation of not only w hat is internal and closest to us, but also o f w h a t is extern al - esp ecially in terpretation o f cultural texts - becom es a road to self-con sciou sn ess. G adam er historicizes interpretation and links it w ith the herm eneutics o f texts, w hile Ricoeur pro
poses a “detour” through m eth odology and the practice o f in terpretation in order to eventually reach the final telos w hich is self-un derstanding.5 For both o f them , however, interpretation ultim ately rem ains a m ode o f existence.
We could also follow an entirely different path, that o f Charles Peirce, who identifies m an w ith the signs m an em ploys to learn about the w orld and h im self: “the w ord or sign w hich the m an uses is the m an h im self” - “m y language is the sum total o f m yself.” 6 A nd since all thought and cognition can exist only in signs, the hum an m ind for Peirce, as w ell as hum an beings them selves, are com plex signs. He expressed that conviction verbatim: “m ind is a sign devel
oping according to the law s o f in feren ce,”7 and “m an is a sig n.” 8 A n d since
4 H eidegger, Being and Time, 195.
5 ”To u n derstan d o n e s e lf is to u n derstan d o n e s e lf a s on e co n fro n ts th e te x t and to receive from it th e con dition s for a s e lf oth er than th a t w hich first u n d ertakes th e readin g” (Paul Ricouer ”On In terpretation,” in A fter Philosophy: End or Transformation?, ed. Kenneth Baynes, Jam e s Bohm an, T ho m as M cC arth y (C am bridge M ass., London: MIT Press, 1989), 376); ” [...] in terpretation in th e tech n ical s e n se o f th e interpretation o f te x ts, is but the d evelo p m en t, th e m aking explicit o f th is on tological un derstan din g, an un derstan d in g alw ays in separab le from a being th a t h as initially b een throw n into th e w o rld ” (ibid., 373);
"There is a s h o rt path [chosen by H eidegger], and a longer one, w hich I propose. [...] The longer path [...] h as am bitio ns o f placing reflection s on th e level o f o n tology.” Paul Ricoeur
"E gzysten cja i h erm en eu tyk a,” tran s. Karol Tarnowski, in Egzystencja i hermeneutyka.
Rozprawy o m etodzie, ed. S tan isła w Cichow icz (W arszawa: Pax, 1985), 185.
6 Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. 1-6, ed. Charles H artshorne and Paul W eiss; vol.
7-8, ed. Arthur W. Burks, (C am bridge M ass.: Harvard U niversity Press, 19 31-19 58). In all of th e q u o tes from Collected Papers by Charles Peirce (CP) first digit sta n d s for th e volum e, th e seco n d digit for th e paragraph; CP 5.314.
7 CP 5.313.
8 CP 5.314.
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w e consider m an as a m ultidim en sional sign, interpretation, structurally as it w ere and necessarily, inscribes itse lf into his or her b eing as a m ode o f ex
istence o f every sign, in clu d in g th at o f h u m an person . I w ill return to this question later on.
Regardless o f the source w e choose, and w h at w e w ould like to stress, in terpretation em erges as a builder o f our identity. A t the sam e tim e, however, as m ode o f existence, it cannot be an em pty process - a pure ontological cat
egory; on the contrary, it is alw ays filled w ith cognitive as w ell as axiological content - w hile granting us existence, it sim ultaneously fills it w ith sense and m ean in gfu l value. The aw areness o f oneself, o f w h o one is, o f w h at one ab sorbs from the surrounding w orld and from others, ethical choices, hierarchies o f valu es - all th ese resu lt from in terp retation con stituting an ontological condition for hum an existence.
Iden tity and Interpretation
W hat w e have said about interpretation, how ever - th at it is a m ode o f our existence - can also be said about m em ory: it is in an equal m easure a con
dition o f our id entity. B arb ara Skarga, referrin g to H eidegger, affirm s that the past cannot be tossed aw ay like any old coat.9 Every present m om ent of our id en tity is rooted in the m atter o f m em ory: “M e m o ry is a m ode o f m y existence, it belongs to its structure;”10 “M y past is m yself.”11 Noticeably, the k ey role o f m e m o ry as a fu n d am en tal com p on en t o f id en tity is also used, w ith rem arkable intuition, b y popular culture: loss or lack o f m em ory m eans, in truth, a loss o f identity, or even n egation o f one's h um an ity; let it suffice to recall a fe w m ovies: Total Recall by Paul Verhoeven, Bourne’s Identity b y Doug Lim an, or Blade Runner b y R idley Scott.
However, there is a fundam ental difference b etw een the ontological role o f interpretation and the role played b y m em ory. If, as w e have affirm ed, o n going interpretation and self-in terpretation are b u i l d e r s o f i d e n t i t y , then m em ory is its b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l - both the realm o f m em ory that reaches far b ack into our childhood, teenage y e a rs and the en tire ty o f our life, and those m ost recent m em ories from just few days, m inutes, or seconds ago. It is so b ecause, seem ingly, w e in terpret every p resen t m o m en t o f the surrounding w o rld as w e ll as ourselves in th at w orld, but in fact th ose m o m ents are m erely an illusory present, as Bergson would say, since they become
9 Barbara Skarga, Tożsam ość i różnica. Eseje m etafizyczne (Kraków: Znak, 1997), 222.
10 Ibid., 223.
11 Ibid., 222.
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p ast already at the m om ent o f their in stan tiation and m ove into the sphere o f m em ory. It is not the p resen t that is an essence o f id en tity - the present is m erely a flash o f experience; it is the past and m em ory that constitute the m atter o f our “I.” H eidegger, once again, put it aptly w h en he w rote: “Dasein, in existing, can never establish itse lf as a fact w h ich is p resen t-at-h an d [...]
it constantly i s as having been. The prim ary existential m eaning o f facticity lies in the character o f h a v i n g b e e n.”12
We should also add - and here things becom e a little com plicated - that this b uilding m aterial o f m em ory is not only a m atter o f our individual self, not sim ply a result o f our actions. A s unique individuals, w e are also a part of society, in m any w ays participating in collective m em ory: local and national m em ory as w ell as the m em ory o f civilization. This heterogeneity, however, is not lim ited only to m em ory. Just as m em ory, as building m aterial, is a result o f collective and individual experience, interpretation is our personal activ
ity, conditioned, how ever, by rules o f the interpretative universe in w hich we function. A d iscu ssion concerned w ith the relations b etw een m em o ry and interpretation, therefore, has to take into account both the individual and the collective.
Let us, how ever, go back to the m ain question: the relationsh ip b etw een in terp retatio n and m em ory, b etw e e n the b uilder and the b u ild in g m a te rial, b rings to m in d at le ast one obvious conclusion, w h ich I w ill - for now - pose as a h yp oth esis, nam ely, th at there is n othing like objective m e m ory, a recollection fo ssilized in to an ideal, objective form . M e m o ry alw ays w ears the clothes o f in terpretation. R egardless o f w h ether w e recall so m e th in g d elib erately - b rin gin g up a rem em b rance on purpose - or i f re c o l
lections com e to our m in d b y them selves, they alw ays enter our con sciou s
n ess as alread y in terpreted and - w ith the p assin g o f tim e and the gradual grow th o f the “sn ow ball” o f id en tity - as reinterpreted over and over again.
“Each m o m en t o f tim e,” w rite s Skarga, “b rin gs som eth in g n e w th at m e rg es w ith m y existen ce, cau sin g a change to occur w ith in it,’”13 re in te rp re t
in g in th is w a y old m ean in gs w ith in m e m o ry and creatin g n e w ones, w e should add.
A t this point, however, w e encounter a significant problem : the w ay m em ory is construed or m etaphorized in our culture causes difficulties in estab lishing a relation betw een m em ory and interpretation or, to put it in a more radical w ay: the concept o f m em ory dom inant in the W estern culture in fact excludes interpretation.
12 H eidegger, Being and Time, 376.
13 Skarga, Tożsam ości różnica, 219.
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Archive
The m odel o f m em ory generally recognized and accepted in the W est is based on the m etaphor o f an archive as a storage space for rem em b ran ces. T his m odel takes on tw o form s: either - m ore literally - that o f an archival space in w hich p ast events are placed and stored, or that o f an im m aculate surface on w hich our m em ories are im pressed.
If w e look at w ritin gs concerned w ith m em ory - from Plato, through A r istotle and Locke to the present day - w e notice that, in its essence, this a r
chival m odel rem ains unchanged. In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates speaks o f the w a x tab let in our soul - a g ift from goddess M n em osyn e - onto w h ich our reflection s and thoughts are im p ressed like a se a l/ 14 Likew ise, A risto tle (in De memoria et reminescentia) ,15 Cicero and Q uintilianus w rite about m em ory as a w a x tab let. In Institutio oratoria, the latter claim s that the “m in d accepts c ertain im p re ssio n s, an alo g o u s to th o se m ade b y a se a l p re sse d again st w ax.”i6 W hile con versing w ith the sp irit o f h is father, Sh akespeare's H am let assu res the gh o st th at he w ill w ip e all the crude n o tes o ff o f the table o f his m em ory. 17 A n d if w e look into the poem entitled M emory b y W illiam B utler Yeats, w e w ill fin d the sam e m etaphor as u sed b y the ancients, w ith the exception th at the im p ressio n in w a x is replaced b y an im p ressio n left in grass.
John Locke, on the other hand, p ictu res m e m o ry as an e m p ty cab in et w here w e store our ideas w hich, later on, can be taken out and “perceived” :
The senses at first let in particular i d e a s and furnish the y et em pty cabinet; and the m ind b y degrees grow ing fam iliar w ith som e of them, they are lodged in the m e m o ry ...if there be any i d e a s , any i d e a s
14 "S o c rate s: A ssu m e , for th e sake o f our debate, th a t th ere is a w ax ta b le t in our souls.
S o m e have it bigger, o th ers sm aller, so m e h ave it clean, w hile th at o f o th ers m ight be thicker, or greasy, and so m e have it ju st ab o u t right. T h e ae te tu s: I do.”
Platon, Parm enides. Teajtet, trans. W ład ysław W itwicki (Kęty: Antyk, 2002), a cce sse d July 19, 2016, http://pracow nicy.u w m .edu.pl/jstrzelecki/biblio/platon .pdf
15 "The p ro ce ss o f m o v em e n t (sen so ry stim ulation) involved in th e a c t o f perception sta m p s in, a s it w ere , a s o rt o f im pression o f th e percep t, ju st a s p erson s do w h o m ake an im pression w ith a sea l.” A ristotle, On M em ory and Rem iniscence, trans. John I. Beare, eB o o k s@ A d ela id e 2007, a c c e ss e d N ovem ber 30, 20 11, h ttp://eb ooks.ad elaid e.ed u .au/a/
aristotle/m em ory/
16 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, s e e also Am elia F. Yates, Sztuka p a m ięci (W arszawa:
P ań stw o w y In stytu t W ydaw niczy, 1977), 48.
17 „Yea, from th e ta b le o f m y m em ory/ I'll w ip e a w a y all trivial fond records” William S h a k e speare, Hamlet, a ct I, scen e V, 98-99, in The Tragedies o f Shakespeare (London: 1931), 650.
26 m e m o r y a n d p l a c e
in the m ind w hich the m ind does not actually think on, they m ust be lodged in the m em ory and from thence m ust be brought into view by remembrance.18
R em em b erin g ap p ears here as a form o f perception o f som eth in g th at has been stored in an archive (in the cabinet). Prior to Locke, St. A ugustine p o r
trayed m em ory w ith a clo sed -sp ace m etaph or - a palace - a storage space for m em ories: “A n d I com e to the fields and spacious palaces o f m y m em ory, w here are the treasures o f innum erable im ages, brought into it from things o f all sorts perceived b y the sen ses. There is stored up, w h atso ever besides w e think [...] and w hatever else hath b een com m itted and laid up.”i9 St. A u gustine com pletes the im age w ith an im portant m etaphor o f reaching to the archive and retrievin g m em o ries: “A ll th ese doth th at gre a t harb our o f the m em ory receive in her num berless secret and in expressible w in dings, to be forthcom ing, and brought out at need; each entering in b y his ow n gate, and there laid u p.”20 C abinet, or the palace, could be replaced w ith a library, w ith an archive containing cim elium s,2i or w ith a filing cabinet,22 but the concept o f an archival space rem ains intact.
I w ill n o w quote tw o sh o rt fragm en ts w h ich v e ry w e ll g rasp the id ea o f m em ory as archive: the form er tells us that „m em ory is the firm retention in the m ind o f the m atter, w ords, and arrangem ent,’^3 w hile the latter says that
“m em ory en com passes acquisition, storing and p reservin g in form ation.”24 Both quotation s carry alm o st e x actly the sam e idea, an d th ere is nothing extrao rd in ary ab out them , except for the fact th a t th e y are sep arated by tw o th o u san d y e ars. T he fo rm er com es from an an on ym ou s L atin te x t A d
18 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Hum an Understanding (London: Dent, 1976) (1690), 11, 27.
19 St. A ugustin e, Confessions, trans. Edward Bouverie P usey (Edward Bouverie), acce ssed M arch 15, 2016, w w w .gu ten b erg .o rg/files/329 6/329 6-h /3296 -h .h tm # lin k2H _ 4 _ o oo1 20 Ibid.
21 Skarga, T ożsam ości różnica, 231.
22 S e e Steven Rose, The M aking ofM em ory. From M olecules to M ind (London: Bantam Books, 1992), 78.
23 [Cicero] Ad C. Herennium de ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium ), w ith an English translation by Harry Caplan (London: H einem ann, 1964), 7; „M em oria e s t firm a animi rerum e t verb orum e t disposition is p ercep tio.” 6. Cicero a p p ea rs a s a su p p o sed author;
curren tly th e auth or is con sidered to rem ain anonym ous.
24 Rom Harre and Roger Lamb, The D ictionary o f Ethology and Anim al Learning (Cam bridge M ass.: MIT P ress, 1986), 99.
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Herennium from the eighties o f the 1s t century B.C. (8 6 -8 2 B.C.), and the la t
ter com es from a contem porary Dictionary o f Ethology and Animal Learning, also published in the eighties, but in the 20th century. It w ould be difficult to find a better confirm ation o f the hegem ony and persistence o f the archival m odel o f m em ory in our (Western) culture; also, m ost likely for the m ajority o f read
ers this m odel o f the archive and o f recollection as retrieval from the archive w ill sound fam iliar and natural.
A s I have alread y m entioned, how ever, the concept o f m em ory as an a r
chive creates a problem because it does not leave any room for interpretation as an integral m om ent o f rem em bering; at best, it pushes interpretation out
side itse lf - outside the archive - thus constituting it as an activity external to m em ory (first, w e retrieve a recollection, and only th en perhaps interpret it). Things m ight fade aw ay a little in the archive, they might get old and som e - w h at faint, b ut th ey w ill still rem ain un changed in their character. The text o f m em o ry retrieved from the archive, a text im p ressed w ith the se a l o f an event - even if a little covered in dust - rem ains the sam e, petrified text. This unchanging sam eness is in fact the reason w h y the archival m odel of memory, even though prevalent, is entirely useless for a discussion o f the collaboration and interdependence b etw een m em ory and interpretation.
Bergson/D eleuze
A t the opposite end from the archival m o d el stan ds H enri B ergson's co n cept o f m em ory presented in Matière et mémoire (18 9 6), and developed in an in spiring w ay b y G illes D eleuze in his little b ook Le Bergsonisme (1966). This conception is w orth recalling at this juncture not only because it is fascinating in itself, but also because it overcom es som e o f the difficulties posed b y the idea o f archival m em ory.
Bergson b ased his th eory on a surprising assum ption w h ich underm ines the concept o f m em ory as an archive, naturalized in the W estern con scious
ness. He believes that - to begin w ith - the question about w here m em ories are stored is fu n d am en tally ill-p o se d , since it assu m es th at m em o rie s are stored som ew here at all (for exam ple, in a kind o f archive or on a w ax tablet).
Instead, B ergson pro po ses an eq u ally su rp risin g th e sis: according to him , recollections - as som ething that belongs to the past - are stored in them - selves.25 But h ow is that possible?
25 Henri B ergson, The Creative Mind, trans. M abelle L. Andison (N ew York: Philosophical Li
brary, 1946), 87. S e e also Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlison, Barbara Ha- beriam (N ew York: Zone Books, 1991), 54: "R ecollection is preserved in itself,” a s belonging to th e past, th e e s s e n c e o f w hich is to last in itself. Deleuze explains th e ontological ch ar
28 m e m o r y a n d p l a c e
W ithou t goin g into all the com plex details o f B ergson's theory, b u t fo l
low in g his path, w e have to reform ulate the generally accepted id eas about the relation sh ip b etw e e n the p re se n t and the p ast. A ccord in g to B ergson, w hat really exists (and w hat is equal to being) is the past, w hile w hat in fact does n o t exist is the present: “N othing i s less th an the p resen t m om ent, if yo u u n d erstan d b y it th at in d ivisib le lim it w h ich divides the p ast from the future. W hen w e think this present as going to be, it exists not yet; and w hen w e th in k it as existin g, it is alread y p ast.”26 T h at relatio n o f the p a st to the p resent - or w hat D eleuze calls “the m ost profound paradox o f m em ory” - is b ased on the fact that “the past is ‘contem poraneous' w ith the present that it h a s b e e n .” 2 Unlike in com m on understanding, the past does not follow the p resent - it is not a relationship o f succession - but, on the contrary, the past coexists w ith every m om ent o f the present, and is tem porally parallel w ith it.
M ore specifically, all the m om ents o f the present pass through a continuously existing past:
The past and the present do not denote tw o successive m om ents, but tw o elem ents w hich coexist. One is the present, w h ich does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through w hich all presents p a s s... The p ast does not follow the present, but on the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure condition w ithout w hich it would not pass.28
T his all-em b racin g past, “the p a st in general,” as B ergson calls it, is p re cisely the virtu al space o f m em ory - eternal and ontological M em ory, where
a cte r o f th e p a st in th e follow in g w ay: ”We have g re a t difficulty in un d erstan din g a sur
vival o f th e p a st in itse lf b e c a u se w e believe th a t th e p a st is no longer, th a t it has ceased to be. We have th u s co n fu sed Being w ith b ein g-p resen t. N ev e rth eless, th e p resen t is not;
rather, it is pure b ecom ing, alw a ys o u tsid e itself. It is not, b u t it a cts. Its proper elem en t is not being but th e a ctiv e or th e useful. The past, on th e o th er hand, h as ce a se d to act or to be useful. But it h as not ce ase d to be. U seless and inactive, im passive, it IS, in the full s e n se o f th e w ord: It is identical w ith being in itself. [...] o f th e p re se n t w e m u st say a t e v e ry in stan t th a t it 'w as,' and o f th e past, th a t it 'is,' th at it is eternally, for all tim e.”
Ibid., 55.
26 Henri B ergson, M atter and Memory, trans. N ancy M. Paul, W. S c o tt Palm er (London: G. Al
len & Co., 1929), 193. Further Bergson con tin u es: ” [...] e v e ry perception is already m em ory.
Practically w e perceive only th e past, th e pure p re se n t bein g th e invisible p ro g ress o f the p a st gn aw in g into th e future.” (194).
27 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 58.
28 Ibid., 59.
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all the m om ents o f the passed present, and all the “recollections” virtually co
exist; it is “a past that is eternal and for all tim e, the condition o f the ‘passage' o f every p articular presen t. It is the p ast in gen eral th at m akes p ossib le all pasts.”29 It is a truly virtual space, having nothing in com m on w ith psychology or individual consciousness - it exists outside o f any singular m ind. It is only our im m ersion into that virtu al space that is an act o f our psyche - Bergson calls it a “leap into ontology,” a leap into b eing itse lf - and only then does the recollection pass “from the virtu al state [...] into the actual.”30 Our personal rem em b rance, a specific in d ivid u al recollection , is an actu alization o f that om nipresent virtuality.
Even th at b rillian t and fascin atin g m od el o f m em ory proposed b y B erg
son, h ow ever, does n o t leave ro om for in terpretation. Even though there is an interpretative m om ent w ith in that m odel, it pertains only to the density o f virtu al m em ory that w e actualize. To be precise, B ergson presents virtual m em ory in the shape o f a cone, in w hich all the m om ents o f the past coexist.31 W henever w e enter that virtuality, w e alw ays enter into its totality, into the p ast as an existing, passive globality. A t the sam e tim e, how ever, w e alw ays enter it on som e specific level o f particularity: depending on w hether w e “leap into ontology,” or “e n ter” the cone closer to its b roader or sh arp er end, w e can actualize that sam e m om ent o f virtu al m em ory in an extensive, detailed way, or even expand the tim e o f rem em bering w ith respect to the tim e o f the event (as does the protagonist in M arcel Proust's novel), or w e can condense a lon g-lastin g event into a single, com pact fact.32 A s I have m entioned before, however, this kind o f actualization relates to the density o f a recollection, and not to its sem antic interpretation.
Still, the B erg so n ian m o d el h as one v ita l advan tage over the archival m odel. W hile the concept o f m em ory as an archive, or im print, concerns in dividual m e m o ry only, the con cept o f m e m o ry as a virtu al space m akes it possible to theoretically ju stify the existence o f collective m em ory: w e reach into the com m on, virtu al space and only after b eing granted access - to use the con tem porary jargon - w e actualize a recollection as an in d ivid u al e x perien ce. B ut h ere too, w h en w e rem em b er (or actualize a v irtu al entity), w e arrive at so m ethin g th at is a lread y there, in its un ch an geab le virtu al state.
29 Ibid., 56-57.
30 B ergson, M atter and Memory, 171.
31 Ibid., 211; S e e Deleuze, Bergsonism, 60.
32 Bergson calls it expan sion and con traction.
30 m e m o r y a n d p l a c e
Peirce
N either o f these m odels o f m em ory - w hether the archival m odel or Bergso- n ian virtu al space - allow for a theoretical explanation o f the close relation betw een m em ory and interpretation. I w ould like to propose another m odel, related to Bergson's, but referring back to the p an -sem io tic visio n o f Charles Sanders Peirce, the father of pragm atism and A m erican sem iotics. Peirce h im se lf w rote very little about m em ory and did not have any developed concep
tion o f it, but his idea o f sem iosis - a process that incessantly occurs betw een signs and am ong signs - provides a foundation for a productive reconsidera
tion o f the relationship betw een m em ory and interpretation.
Let us begin w ith the prerequisite theoretical background b y recapitulat
in g the essence o f Peirce's sem iotic vision . From our perspective, the m o st im p o rtan t elem en t o f th at v isio n is the v e ry w a y in w h ich the sign exists.
A sign does not n ecessarily have to exist in a m aterial way, since it can be an idea, a thought, a fiction, a quality or a feeling; so it is not the properties o f the vehicle o f m eaning that are decisive o f the m ode o f sign's existence - on the w hole, th ey are irrelevant. To clarify this and m ake it m ore accessible, it w ill be useful to recall the b asic structure o f Peirce's sign: it is com posed o f three codependent and necessarily connected correlates: the represen tam en (the sign vehicle), the object (called the im m ediate object) w h ich is a represen ta
tio n w ith in the sign o f the extern al re a lity w h ich the sign rep resen ts (the so-called dynam ical object), and the interpretant w hich is the m eaning o f the sign - the elem ent m ost crucial to our discussion. The interpretant not only explains the sign, it is not only the m eaning o f the sign, but it is also a sign in its ow n right, and as such it has its ow n interpretant w hich, being a sign, has its ow n interpretant, “the interpretant becom ing in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum."33
The sign, therefore, exists not b ecau se som eone is actually u sin g or d e coding it, but because it is interpreted b y other sign s; and it is in that in te r
pretation th at the sign's existence is rooted : “No sign can fu nction as such except so far as it is interpreted in another s i g n . W hat I m ean is that w hen there is a sign there w i l l b e an in terp retation in anoth er sig n.”34 “A sign is n o t a sign u n less it tran slates its e lf into anoth er sig n.” 35 The ontological dom ain o f the sign, therefore, is thought construed in a n on -m en talistic w ay through the category of T h i r d n e s s , and the fundam ental m ode o f existence o f the sign is its interpretation in and through other signs, w ith the im portant
33 CP 2.303.
34 CP 8.225, footn ote.
35 CP 5.594.
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reservatio n again th at in terpretation is not u n derstood here as an activity o f a subject perform ed on signs, but as an activity o f the signs th em selves.36 In other w ords, sign s are not separate entities, b ut on the contrary, th ey are anchored in one another p recisely because one interprets the other, and so on into infinity. Interpretation - w h ich w ill be im portant for our subsequent discussion o f m em ory and identity - appears here as a category w hich is both ontological and epistem ological: it sim u ltan eously w arran ts cognition and existence: “c o g n i z a b i l i t y (in its w idest sense) and b e i n g are not m erely m etaphysically the sam e, but are synonym ous term s.”37
W hat is im portant - and here w e find a certain analogy w ith Bergsonian eternal m em ory - is that the process o f m utual in terpretation am ong signs does not occur in any individual mind, or any particular act of thought; it takes place am ong sign s th em selves, in the entire un iverse o f sign s, the universe o f a “p otential M ind.”38 We m ight im agine that un iverse - even though it is a sim p lifyin g an alo g y - as a vast, spatial and all-en co m p assin g dictionary, in w hich every w ord is interpreted (i. e., explained) by w ords from that sam e dictionary, and th ese in tu rn are explain ed b y y e t d ifferent w o rd s from the sam e dictionary, and so on w ithout end.
O f course, w e too p articipate in that process o f sign interpretation w h e n ever w e think, read, speak, observe reality or, m ore generally, w h enever our consciousness is active. This, however, is only secondary and incidental w ith resp ect to the virtu al in terp retation occurrin g am o n gst sign s outside our m inds.39 Our specific interpretative activity is m erely a realization o f virtual possib ilities, a choice and subsequent follow ing o f one am ong m an y p o ssi
ble virtu al interpretative paths (although, w h en I u se the w ord “choice,” I do not n e cessarily m ean a con scious choice, b u t rather an intuitive activity o f our consciousness). To pursue the analogy w ith the dictionary further: such a con flu en ce o f en d less in terp retatio n s o f sign s b y other sign s continues
36 S e e Hanna B uczyń ska-G arew icz, "Sign and continuity,” in A rsSem eiotica 2 (1978): 3-15.
37 CP 2.57.
38 A sign "d eterm in es so m e actual or potential mind, th e determ in ation w h e re o f I term th e In terp retan t created by th e Sign.” (CP 8.177)
39 In te rm s o f tech n ical ca te g o rie s o f Peirce's sem io tics, I have explained th a t differen ce b efore, in M gławice dyskursu [Nebulae o f Discourse]: "The relation b etw een actu ality and possib ility (or m ore broadly speakin g, potentiality) could be com pared to th e relation b etw een Peirce's dynam ic interpretant and im m ediate interpretant: th e form er o ccu rs in a particular co gn itive a c t in th e mind o f a particular person, w hile th e latter is a bundle of m eaningful relation s (a sign) in th e so-called quasi-m ind, or in o th er w o rds, in th e sem i- otic un iverse not related directly to any particular mind or brain, in th e sem io tic co sm o s.”
(Kraków: U niversitas, 2001) 225-226, fo o tn o te 47.
3 2 m e m o r y a n d p l a c e
independently o f w hether w e actually brow se through the dictionary or not.
A nd w hen w e do, w e actualize only a fraction of the options offered by the d ic
tionary. We should note a N ietzschean m om ent at this juncture, even though derived from sem iotics: b ecau se the sign alw ays rep resen ts and interprets reality from a certain perspective, exposing som e o f its qualities and om itting others, our perception o f the w orld through signs is by necessity perspectival - there is no such thing as an objective interpretation o f reality.
Let us n ow refer this p an -sem io tic im age o f the universe to the question o f m em ory, both in d ivid u al and collective. Like in B ergson's theory, w e are presented w ith a virtual space o f “general m em ory” but now already filled w ith signs and an infinitely dense netw ork o f interpretive relations or “interpretive paths.” Each event, h aving h ad its present occurrence - w hether a p erson al experience or a socially experienced fact - enters the virtu al space as a sign o f the past, links up w ith a n etw ork o f sign s already p resen t w ith in it, sub - jects itse lf to their interpretation, w h ile sim ultaneously, to a certain degree, m odifying the netw ork itself.
N iches and P ortals: M em ory and Interpretation
This general, pan-universum of m em ory is not, of course, accessible to everyone in its entirety: it en co m p asses local u n iverses, i.e., nich es ch aracteristic o f specific com m unities and cultures in w hich tradition has shaped hierarchies and corresponding interpretations in their collective m em ory. A n d likewise, in the case o f individual, person al m em ory, the accessib ility o f p ast exp eri
ences is lim ited to the experiencing subject. Ju st like any local com m unity, every one o f us has carved out in th at general space his or her ow n niche of virtual m em ories. Individual mem ory, therefore, is in an obvious w ay h etero
geneou s: every one o f us p articipates in th at fragm ent o f the pan-universum w hich constitutes a collective m em ory o f his or her com m unity, as w ell as in one w hich is lim ited to our private realm , inaccessible to others.
So h o w d oes one reach th o se n ich e s o f v i r t u a l m e m o r y ? One could sim p ly an sw e r: th rou gh sign s or, m ore poetically, th rou gh “traces o f m em ory.”40 Personally, h ow ever, I w ou ld prefer to use the m etap h or o f a p o r t a l , w hich grants access to the virtu al space, and w hich in stigates its actualization. In other w ords, a portal is a threshold b etw een the virtu ality o f m em ory and the actu ality o f our recollection s.41 A n y object can becom e
40 Paul Ricoeur, O sobie sam ym jako innym, trans. Bogdan C h ełsto w ski (W arszawa: PWN, 2003), 221.
41 Let us add a s a side n ote th a t from th e on tological p e rsp e ctive , a portal is an extrem ely in terestin g o b ject, sin ce it co m b in es m ateriality w ith virtuality.
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such a sign -portal: a cookie, as in Proust's w ork, a photograph, a m onum ent, a tom bstone, a dried flower, an old toy, but also a scent, a piece o f melody, and often a single thought that opens gates to the past. A ll o f us surely experience som etim es a condition, w hen an unexpected sign, w h ich w e stum ble upon - a portal that tells us to go dow n m em ory lane - recalls som ething seem ingly forgotten. Let us note, how ever, that the sam e sign -p o rtal can open different interpretive paths at different m om ents in our lives as it reappears in co n stantly reinterpreted contexts o f n ew events and experiences.
In the m odel of m em ory as a virtual space perfused w ith signs, w hich I p ro
pose here, rem em bering is no longer a sim ple act o f reaching into the archive and retrieving from it a piece o f perm anent and unchangeable text. It is not a “leap into ontology,” or im m ersing into the uninterpreted space o f B ergso- nian eternal m em ory. Here, the act o f rem em bering is sim ultaneously an act o f in terpretation - a choice o f this rather th an another interpretative path, this rather than another perspective - w hile sim ultaneously it is also a form o f forgetting, o f om itting other perspectives and other potential in terpreta
tions. O f course, w e should n ot assum e th at fo llow ing interpretive paths is o f the nature o f a logical inference. On the contrary, as logicians w ould say, it is enthym em atic, i.e., fragm entary, containing gaps, fissures, and om issions.
However, this fragm entary nature o f reading signs o f m em ory does not in any w ay change its interpretive character.
R em em bering and interpreting, therefore, are in fact tw o inseparable a s pects o f the sam e activity. There is no m em ory w ith ou t interpretation, and, likew ise, there is no h istory w ithout interpretation, w hich H ayden W hite ex pounded several decades ago. H ere, how ever, an ethical reflection im poses itself: w hile h istory could be deceitful, it w ould appear that m em ory escapes an ethical judgm ent. A t this point, how ever, w e have to differentiate betw een in dividual and collective m em ory.
In the case of individual memory, follow ing paths of m em ory is not, in fact, a “choice,” although I did em ploy this w ord for convenience; it is not a choice m ade con sciously b etw een in terpretations, but rather a process affected by m ultiple factors independent o f our decisions: personality, experience, cu l
tural conditioning, p sychological state, physiology. A fter all, w e do not say:
I w ill rem em ber this, but I w ill forget that (even a w ish like “I w ant to forget all about it” proves to be an un successful interpretation o f m em ory). Because of this involuntary character o f individual m em ory, it does not in principle fall under ethical qualifications. In the case o f collective m em ory, the situation looks different, since it can be an easy realm o f interpretative m anipulation.
It is e a sy to foreground and im p ose in terpretive p ath s here, it is also e asy to forget. C ollective forgetting is oftentim es a conscious effort to w ipe out or to push into oblivion those interpretations w hich, w ith in the local universe,
34 m e m o r y a n d p l a c e
should constitute an im portant elem ent o f identity, but w h ich m ay turn out to be pain ful or destructive to that very identity. In his fam ous essay, Ernest R enan observes th at forgettin g is a con dition for the id en tity o f a n ation ,“
and w e can add: o f a n ation, o f a local com m unity, or a group. Such fo rget
tin g is nothing but an in terpretation subject to m oral judgm ent, the kind of interpretation w hose m ain m echanism is silencing.
Identity
Let us finally return to the question w ith w hich w e started, i. e., to the relation
ship b etw een m em ory, in terpretation and identity. C ollab oration b etw een m em o ry and in terpretation resolves, in m y opinion, the con tradiction b e tw een rem aining the sam e w hile at the sam e tim e b eing subject to change. If w e w ere to treat id en tity in the w ay Hume did - as som ething unchangeable, or as an ongoing “b eing the sam e” - then, as Paul Ricouer observes, w e would fall into an aporia, or a conviction that a person's id en tity is an illusion. It is this kind o f identity that is im plied in the archival m odel of memory,"0 a model w hich does not com prise interpretation. One could risk a th esis, w hich h o w ever I w ill n o t develop here, th at this m odel has its deeper u n derpinning in the distinction b etw een the cognized object and the cognizing subject, w hich is deeply rooted in the W estern thought.
O nly b y estab lish in g an in dissolub le con nection b etw een m e m o ry and in terpretation in term s o f Peirce's th eo ry o f signs (w hich overcom es, b y the way, the above m entioned split) can w e elaborate a consistent, theoretically grounded explanation of identity based on the dialectic of the sam e and of the changing. One could form ulate that dialectic as a paradox: “w hat's identical is changeable,” w hich, however, w ould m erely be a seem ing paradox. Identity is contained w ith in a netw ork o f interrelated, unbreakable connections and traces o f the sign s o f m em ory, in h eren tly con taining in terpretations, re in terpretations and reinterpretations o f those reinterpretations. R ather than p erceivin g id e n tity as the B ergso n ian “sn ow b all,” one sh ould see it as an ongoing process o f sem iosis, or an extrem ely com plex sign, subject to p e r
m anent changes. H ence, if w e w ere to treat m em ory as a text - as it is done
42 "F o rgettin g, I w ould even go so far a s to sa y historical error, is a crucial fa cto r in th e c re a tion o f a n ation.” E rn est Renan, "W hat is a nation?,” tran s. M artin Thom , in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 11.
43 This n ee d s a certain clarification: this kind o f iden tity is ch an g eab le to th e d e g ree in w hich it g ro w s w ith n ew e x p e rien ce s-m em o ries. H owever, w h a te v e r is already in the
"m em o ry co n tain er” - th a t building m aterial o f identity - rem ains u n ch an geable since it is no longer su b ject to interpretation.
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som etim es44 - then it w ould have to be a text im m ersed in in cessan t activity, an u n stab le text, accessib le on ly through in terp retation and devoid o f any essence that w ould be independent from interpretation.
Let us fin ally return to our original m etaphor: if m em ory is the building substance o f id en tity and interpretation is the builder, th en th ey do not a p pear as, on the one hand, prearranged m aterial - m em ory - and, on the other hand, the subject w hich shapes it (our interpretation), but as indissoluble and sim ultaneous m olding o f that m aterial in the always already interpreted form.
The outcome of that process of building - and here is where the concept of the subject construed as a result o f collaboration o f m em ory and interpretation em erges - is not a stable edifice, but a constantly shifting labyrinth, a la b y rinth w here som e paths sw itch places, others disappear, and still others make room for the n ew ones.
Translation: Jan Pytalski
44 For exam p le Barbara Skarga, Tożsam ości różnica, 229.
