• In A m erica we see th e disappearance of a sm all scientific com m unity o f stro ng ly individualistic character, considering them selves as an
élite. The n ew scientists are m ore “n o rm al”,' w ith g reater appreciation of natio nal politics, m ore content w ith “team research ” a n d a ll th a t implies. W hen the la st of th e “old g u ard ” re tire s w ith in a decade, th e n ew lead ers of th e scientific com m unity w ill be of this new type. W hat changes can w e expect? C ertainly, a m ore n a tu ra l cooperation b etw een
the scientific com m unity an d th e o th e r institu tio n s of society.
However, it seem s likely th a t th e re w ill ailiso be losses. F or one thing, stan d ard s of scientific m o rality can be expected to decline, as personal p rid e becomes less im p o rtan t as a m otivation fo r research. Also, it seem s th a t the scientist w ho attacks a difficult p roblem and sticks to it fo r years, is passing aw ay. The new m en w ill be less .inclined to risk valuable years of theiir career on such things. We m ay ask w h eth er in th is new c u ltu ra l situation, creative science will continue to flourish in th e sam e form as heretofore.
R. S. Cohen
Science is a social phenom enon. To u n d erstan d th e histo ry of the social relations of science is itself a scientific problem , to be in v estig ated in history, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, psychol ogy, a n d o th er social a n d cu ltu ral sciences. The social ord er and science have been re la te d in m u tu al an d complex w ays, a n d I shall co ncen trate - o n one aspect: th e im pact of th e social ord er upon th e developm ent of
science. We w an t to e x p l a i n th e ch aracteristics of science as th e consequences of o th e r aspects of h u m an culture, so fa r as possible. This is a concern w ith th e ex tern al h isto ry of science a n d it m u st be distinguished from th e in te rn a l historical developm ent b y w hich science has generated its own progress. Indeed, it is an open question w hether, a n d to w h a t extent, a n external sociological explanation is possible, b ut enough evidence is know n to ju stify th is discussion and to propose certain research problem s.
W hat a re the p rin cip al questions to be answ ered b y an ad eq u ate understanding of th e social relatio n s of science?
1) W hy do scientists h av e a c ertain ro le and sta tu s in a given society? Here, by th e te rm “scientist”, we m ean broadly those persons w ho engage in logical thinking, o r experim ental investigation, or ev en sys tem atic technological development, w hatever th e ir m otivation.
2) W hy does the science at a given time have a ce rta in in te rn a l social organization, as, for exam ple, the q u an tity and v a rie ty of ta len t, th e p articu la r m eans o r lack of communication, th e ways of educating both
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new scientists an d th e public, the institutio nal form s of professiorial societies an d relations to other in stitu tio n s such a;s universities?
3) W hy a re certain problem s deailt 'with?
4) W hy are certain solutions, w h eth er p ractical or conceptual, o f f e r - e d to those problems?
5) W hy are certain solutions a c c e p t e d , a n d o th ers r e j e c t e d ? 6) W hy is a 'particular m ode of explanation, a philosophical principle of know ing, accepted? Can such an epistem oiogicai characteristic p re
scribe th e judgm ent of a man, a school, an epoch, even, perhaps, an e n tire civiiliiization?
A nsw ers to these questions m ay d iffer greatly. It is evident th a t th e sources of problem s generally w ill be distinguished from th e sources of answ ers an d solutions to those problem s. It is perhaps less evident th a t w e m u st distinguish th e h i s t o r i c a l conditions of scientific thought from the 1 o g i c al conditions of an teced en t theories a n d accu m u lated factual knowledge. L ater these logical conditions m ay be seen to entail, or provide probability, to th e new thoughts; how ever, in h isto r ical stud ies w e should be p a rticu la rly careful to rem em ber th a t causal explanation is not only a m atter of logical im plication.
P erhaps th e logical factors w ill have th eir historical reference in a genuinely com plete in te rn a l h isto ry of science, w henever a n in n er dialectic can be discerned, but alw ays th e historian should begin w ith em pirical d ata and hypothetically form ulated historical explanations.. A nd w e m ust also distinguish the psychology of th e know ing process from th e 'sources a n d conditions of knowledge. 'Only la te r can th e histo rian an d psychologist hope to o ffer a n u n d erstanding of th e specific thought-processes of individual scientists, in rela tio n to th e historical sociology of science.
Now we m u st be extrem ely careful to' recognize th a t the com plexities of society h ave enabled us to o ffer strong support for whalt m ay ap pear to be conflicting theories of th e genesis a n d developm ent of science. F irs t let us lisrt some m ajor social factors whose influences upon p articu lar stages, aspects, or incidents of science have been dem onstrated. In each case, nam es of a few scholars are given, who have w ritten on th e h isto ry of science w ith th e rele v an t m aterial.
1) R e l i g i o n , and religious in stitu tio n s a n d attitudes, w h eth er of positive o r negative influence upon th e developm ent of science: M erton on Puritanism , N eedham on Taoism and Confucianism, Pagel on X V Ith centu ry mysticism, W eber on P ro testa n t-cap italist ideology, A. D. W hite on the church^science conflicts, etc.
2) A r t : Ivins on geom etry, Read on th e relatio n of icon to- idea,. W hyte on form s in a rt an d science, H auser on general histo ry of a r t and culture, M. Raphael on prehistoric technology and art, E. Fischer o n cognitive ro le of art, etc.
3) P o l i t i c a l p h e n o m e n a a n d associated social in stitu tio n s: Veblen on science a n d industrial! institutions, Taiton an d G uerlac on th e F rench revolution, G ranet on Chinese thought in its social setting, B. S tern on A m erican m edical science, etc.
4) P h i l o s o p h y , w h eth er explicit o r im plicit: B u rtt, Koyre, Cas sirer, M eyersan, M aritain, Nef, N orthrop on th e origins of m o dern
science, etc. I
5) E c o n o m i c p r a c t i c e a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s , w ith th e ir m ilitary, ideological, and -social accom panim ents: M arx a n d Engels, B or- ken au and H. G rossm ann on X V IIth centu ry , F arrin g to n on classical Greece, Strong on X V Ith centu ry craft techniques, Zilsel on com p arativ e sociology of science a n d scientific ideas, B. H essen on th e economic
sources of N ew ton’s w ork, etc. <
6) S o c i a l i m a g e r y projected upon n a tu re : Durikheim o n p rim itive thought, K elsen on genesis an d developm ent of ideas of causality, etc. '
7) P l a y a n d g a m e s : Huizinga on general theory, Ore o n th e developm ent of probability theory, etc.
8) T e c h n o l o g y , considered as d istinct from science: M um ford on th e developm ent of u rb an civilization, Giedion, D ijksterhuis a n d B uk h arin on m echanization of practice and thought, etc.
9) I n s t i n c t u a l o r o t h e r p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s w hich determ ine, stim ulate, lim it, o r o th erw ise condition thought: F reu d on psychological factors in c u ltu ra l history, H. Sachs on attitu d es to w ard n a tu re in classical Greece an d X V IIth cen tu ry Europe, B achelard on psychic genesis of scientific ideas, H usserl on th e u tilitarian project of scientific epistemology, Sim m el on th e ratio n al-irratio n a l thought procedures of bourgeois practice, N. O. B row n an d H. M arcuse on sociological an d philosophical im plications of irratio n al factors in th e psychological stru ctu re , F euer on th e com parative psychology o f scientific intellectuals, etc.
We m ust asik for com parative analysis of these, a n d perhaps o th er social factors in th e causal explanation of science. A nd w hich are dom inant? Which factors, if any, develop in th e ir own, in d ep end en t way? U nder w hat conditions? W hat are th e ir dialectical relations; of rela tiv e conflict a n d harm ony? It seems th a t w e m ust in vestig ate th e sep arate -history of th ese several f actors if w e w ish to m ak e o u r ex p lan a tions of th e history of science m ore complete, for we know th a t th e re are d i r e c t influences but w e are only a t th e beginning of a n u n d er standing of the netw o rk o f i n d i r e c t influences upon science.
Even th e ra th e r specific hypothesis of historical m aterialism m u st confront th e m ultiplicity of social factors w hen it d eals w ith a sin g le hum an activity of such im portance as science. O ur goal is to locate th e factor, o r factors, w hich have a self-developing natu re, a n d hence w h ich
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m ay be considered to be th e u ltim ate causal explanation of science as well as of the rem aining aspects of civilization. (Put briefly, a n d in M arxist language, we n eed to establish th e base a n d th e sup erstru ctu re. B ut th e em pirical evidence w hich is relevant to h isto ry of science leaves open, th us far, w hat is th e character o f th e base 1.
We recognize th e n th re e stages in th e social influencing of scientific ideas. F irst, th e re lis th e social origin of th e problem w hich is attacked, p erh aps a direct stim ulus, perhaps indirect or even rem ote. This first s ta g e includes the question of r e a l i z a t i o n : social 'practice m ay be negative as well as positive. Society m ay isolate and crucially inhibit th e developm ent of science by failu re to p u t scientific a n d technological achievem ents to use.
Second, th e social sources of th e techniques an d concepts w hich are brought to b e a r upon th e problem . Third, the philosophical principle of verification, w hich th e given -stage of cu lture provides to distinguish nonsense from meainingfuiness a n d w h at is found to be false from w h at is found to be tr u e o r m erely probable. A t every stag e of develop m ent, scientists w ork a n d th in k w ithin th e given environm ent. This is personal and biographical but it is also social. O n ly b y personal and social self-criticism can scientists tran scen d th e lim itations of th e ir socio- cen tric predicam ent, a n d indeed such transcending of the historically relative position of know ledge is a p ath tow ard 'greater objectivity.
The th ird stage of social in fluence upon scientific knowledge, th e historical career of th e conceptions of m eaning a n d tru th , deserves care fu l investigation b y historians and sociologists as w ell as by philosophers. Indeed, the sociology of epistemology w ould be a fru itfu l m eeting ground for research by philosophers of science and historians of science. Science has been 'constricted b y epistem ological req uirem en ts ju st as thoroughly as it has been distorted by social determ ination of ideas and im pover ished by social d eterm ination of problem s.
It is a fair hope th a t these questions are also of considerable practical in terest. It m ay be possible to free our ow n tim es of some present bounds upon th o u g h t a n d hum an pow ers b y cultivation of historical a n d psychological research in th e sociology of science.
A. Gella
Being moved by Professor Z vorykine’s opinion on technological de term inism , w hich is now o ften conceded by m any W estern thinkers, usually un der the im pression of present successes of cybernetics, I would
1 See, lor example, the careful summary of the several factors which may be responsible for the scientific revolution of the XVIIth century in Western Europe'in the third volume, section 19k, of Joseph Needham’s Science and C ivili zation in China.
