SCIENCE ET LOGIQUE
M. G. Y aroshevsky (U .S .S .R .)
ON THE CONCRETE HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE
Logic is one of the most im p o rtan t sciences studying science itself. Dealing w ith the stru ctu re of thought, w ith its laws laws and forms, logic has from the most ancient time touched th e very core of science as a system of knowledge and the m ethods of its increase.
The developm ent of logic is a specific reflection of th e achievem ents of science in its scientific, social, technological fields. The successes of antique science m ade possible the logical concepts of A ristotle. Bacon’s inductive logic was generated by the requirem ents of th e em pirical science of th e new epoch. The em ergence of m athem atical logic is in separably connected w ith th e revolutionary changes in m odern science w ith its general tren d tow ards m athem atization and form alization of the apparatus of cognition.
The m odern scientific and technological revolution sets up new tasks for logic. The progress of cybernetictics (which is p art and parcel of m athem atical logic), the rapidly increasing possibilities to endow electro nic devices w ith those intellectual functions w hich have form erly been regarded as peculiar to the hum an spirit exclusively, actualized the need to cognize the creative aspects of intellectual activity w hich so far cannot be reproduced by machines. It is hoped th a t new logical m e thods of discovery of the “sufficiently crazy” ideas, will be suggested, by w hich some fundam ental notions and principles of sciences can be changed.
Here we find strong evidence of the in h eren t connections betw een the studies in logic and the progress of science. No doubt any science which studies the stru ctu re and process of th in kin g is d irectly related w ith the field of scientific cognition. However, th e problem of th e re lations betw een logic and science has acquired another aspect and be came a subject of discussion. This is connected w ith the grow th of th e
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science of science w hich is a new direction of th e complex studies aim ing a t a discovery of the regularities inh erent in science as a specific system of intellectual production, as a form of hum an activity, and as a social institution. This tre n d arose at a ju n ctu re of num erous scienti fic disciplines, each of w hich has its own specific problem s and methodic apparatus and develops its own historical tradition, b u t each of them deals w ith different aspects of the same subject, i.e. science.
Logic was n atu ra lly among the disciplines contributing to the science of science. It is by no means accidental th a t logic has from its very beginning apprehended the achievem ents of science and elaborated methods of deducting knowledge, analysing the m ental activity and indicating its tru e or false steps.
The im portance of the logical analysis of science has been long re cognized; th ere is no w ant of such experience. However, doubts arose concerning th e possibility to speak of a peculiar character of the logical study of scientific cognition w ithin the fram ew ork of th e science of science. The prevailing opinion is th a t th e logical analysis of knowledge w hich aims at the discovery of the regularities traceable in science pos sesses certain pecularities, and it is suggested 1) th a t such analysis be introduced into a new context to realize a synthesis of logic w ith the history of science, and 2) th a t sociological, psychological and other factors affecting scientific advance be considered. However, there exists another opinion according to w hich traditional logic suffices to cover the problem s of the science of science, at least in th eir principal aspects.
Considering the increasing interest of theoretical thought in science and in the logical, sociological and other studies of its results, P. V. Kop- nin says: “Among other disciplines logic is of specific value because it emerges as a form of the science of science.” 1
W hat is science if considered in its logical aspect? On the one hand, it is a system of knowledge, an aggregate of theories describing and explaining a certain phenom enon; on the other, science embraces defi nite methods of acquisition of these theories and knowledge. The study of both the form er and th e la tte r elem ents is carried out by means of the term s of reference of logic. If so, is it necessary to speak of a certain “science of science” logic? Provided th a t the science of science is as ancient as logic, is it necessary to introduce new disciplines instead of developing the existing ones? To answ er the question we shall take into account the historical evidence—first of all, the developm ent of logic as such. It is possible to consider the logic of A ristotle, Bacon, Boole—or, generally, any logical system th a t can be actually operating in th e pro cess of thinking—as a theory of the developm ent of science, as a doctri ne of the regularities in scientific cognition in the same sense as the
nascent science of science speaks of th e logic of science? We have al ready noted th a t all logical concepts correlated th e ir data w ith science, “w orked” for it. B ut no such concept attem pted to analyse the ways, m echanisms, regularities of scientific cognition in the actual historical process. No doubt, A ristotle’s doctrine of categories expressed in logical term s the stru ctu re of thinking (comprising scientific thinking) of its time. But, em ploying this doctrine we cannot actually trace the evolu tion of antique n atu ra l science, even if we reg ard this evolution inde pendently of historical fortuities. We need other m ethods, another lan guage, another direction of study to reveal regularities in the develop m ent of the logical stru ctu re of science in an tiq u ity (as w ell as in any other period).
Otherwise, we are forced to believe th a t a key-point to the study of th e regularities of science lies in th e corresponding trea tm e n t of the history of logic as a branch of philosophy. To avoid m isunderstanding we m ust be aw are of th e am biguity of .the te rm “logic”. Logic as a d i rection of philosophy should not be lum ped together w ith th e logic of the very process of scientific cognition, ju st as th e hum an psychology is not identical w ith th e psychological doctrines of th e time.
Developing historical psychology (the science of hum an feelings, thoughts, desires at different stages of social history) we do not con stru ct it from books on the history of psychology b ut from other sour ces. Sim ilarly, th e objective historical logic of the progress of scientific thought can be ex tracted exclusively from its actual developm ent r a th er th an from the reverberations of this developm ent preserved in the h istory of logical doctrines.
It can be objected th a t a restriction of the sphere of logic to its basic themes, i.e. the theory of deduction and the th eo ry of induction (in th eir interrelation) and even to th e doctrine of dialectic synthesis of categories, is by no m eans enforced by the n atu re of the subject of lo gic; one can state th a t this sphere m ay become im m ensely w ider if analyses of any m anifestations and form s of thinking are included. If we adopt such broadening conform ably to the logic of scientific cognition studied to reveal certain historical (“phylogenetic”) regularities in its development, we en ter a new field w hich has not previously been ex plored by any “science of science” and w hich cannot be principally co ped w ith unless we employ other th an the existing m eans of logic. The task can be solved only by a co-operative effort of logic and of th e history of science. B ut this logic is thus “an o th er” logic, if compared w ith the traditional directions of this discipline — nam ely, this logic is a dom ain of the science of science.
Entering the science of science we face a v ariety of complex p ro blems. The correlation between the general regularities in th e develop m ent of scientific thinking (its general stru ctu re) and the realization of
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these regularities and stru c tu ra l features in constructing a knowledge of definite spheres of reality in definite historical epochs is one of th e most im portant problem s of the field.
This is an unusual approach for trad itio nal logic and a necessary one for the “science of science”, i.e. objective historical logic. The unity of science as a system does not in th e least signify either th e homoge neity of all stru ctu ra l and functional components of its complex “orga nism ”, or the synchronism of the developm ent of these components. Therefore, th e advance of the objective historical logic suggests th e con struction of some categorial schemes, or—to use th e term introduced by Th. K uhn—paradigm s, specific for each domain of knowledge, and the elaboration of methodological principles. This does not signify a break-up of the fabric of scientific cognition, b u t a specification of the “th re a d s” woven into it. It is impossible to reproduce the logical param eters peculiar to th e w ork of any m ind a t a certain stage of scien tific thinking before the logic of the developm ent of concrete domains of knowledge, i.e. the p articu la r sciences, has been generalized.
H ere we encounter another new facet of logic, unusual for th e tr a ditional variety bu t definitely obligarory for logic as a p art of the science of science. In this connection we m ust cite an essential distinc tion betw een the philosophic orientation of the logical analysis of cogni tion and its “science of science” orientation; this distinction has been noted by S. R. Mjikulinsky and N. I. Rondyi. 2 In th e first instance, the stru ctu re of science, its achievem ents and tendencies are analysed from the standpoint of philosophic (outlook and gnoseological) problems; in the second case, the analysis provides for the solution of such problem s as the ways of developm ent of the respective sciences, the rise of scien tific productivity etc. Correspondingly, logic as a philosophic discipline and logic as a domain of the “science of science” perform specific tasks and follow divergent directions.
An objective historical analysis of a concrete science enables the scholar to establish some general stru ctu ra l characteristics peculiar neither to scientific knowledge as a whole nor generally to the science under study, bu t to the d ifferent stages of the form ation of this science. To p ut it differently, we note a phasic character of the historical con struction of the knowledge of certain specific objects.
Evidently, this phasic character cannot be established by specula tive philosophic deduction of the kind w hich helped Hegel to construct his m ajestic system. It can be revealed exclusively if we trace knowledge in the making.
The principles of historical approach and phasic development laid down by Hegel m ust be purged of th e ir m etaphysical and idealistic in
2 Cf. th e collection Problems of the history and m ethodology of science, Moscow (in print).
terp retation. As a general approach th ey can be realized in a form con sistent w ith m odern scientific values, w hen the actual progress of th o ught in a concrete objective content is deciphered by help of them .
The assim ilation of the whole historical w ealth of a given science is now a necessary condition of any fru itfu l w ork in th e logic of science. Thus, it becomes evident th a t th e study of the logical stru ctu re of scien ce by means of th e science of science im plies a sim ultaneous stu d y of th e history of science.
However, this is not a traditional bu t a specialized historico-scienti- fic study. It sets out to reveal the specific features of the categorial stru ctu re of thought peculiar to a definite historical epoch. N aturally, the very concept of “epoch” acquires w ith this approach a definitely new sense it com pared to the m eaning of the concept in h isto ry gene rally and in the history of science in p articular. Traditional periodi zations have been guided by criteria d ifferen t from those from w hich proceed studies on the logic of science.
H istorians of science adopt first and forem ost sociological criteria. This is justified in so far as science exists and develops as a function of social life. A logician of science is no more free to ignore the social and historical natu re of cognition than a sociologist or a historian of science. Nonetheless, the correlation between the logical-scientific and th e socio- -historical elem ents is n eith er simple nor uniform . A complex system of m ediatory factors intervenes. We shall try to dem onstrate th e im por tance of this system taking the exam ple of th e h isto ry of the categorial “netw ork” specific for a special science—th a t of psychology.
Proceeding from the specific n atu re of the psyche, w hich is not an independent entity bu t a derivative of the interaction of m aterial factors, we shall attem p t to trace the em ergence and developm ent of the principle of “k no ts” in th e discovery of the dependence of th e psy che on w hat is not psychic, i.e. the realization of the principle of d eter minism.
It is known th a t the notion of determ inism is not uniform . Som eti mes it is called fo rth to designate only the “h a rd ” casual stipulation. In this case the term “determ inism ” is preserved for the “classical” form s of causal explanation vs. the regularities of probability.
We designate by this term the determ inational dependence of psychic phenom ena on differen t system s of m aterial influences. In the history of psychological knowledge the principle of determ inism has been reali zing w ith a certain regularity; tracing back this reg u larity we can ex trac t the logic of th e developm ent of psychology as a science.
F irst of all, we can easily distinguish two periods in th e developm ent of psychology: the pre-m echanical and the mechanical periods. Up to the 17th century th e categorial stru c tu re of thinking on the psychic phenom ena was conditioned by pre-m echanical determ inism prevailing
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in different form s in the A ncient East, Greece, in A rabic philosophy and science as w ell as in the Renaissance. We can distinguish a num ber of successive steps w ithin this period. B ut here we are in terested in the general principle only. This principle was m anifested in a doctrine attrib u tin g th e difference in sensations, memory, tem peram ent and other item s of psychic life to the m erging and th e displacem ent of the particles from w hich all bodies of n atu re are built. The initial form of causal explanation was only a preparato ry stage tow ards a more p er fect determ inistic system, w hich evolved about the 17th century and explained organism as a machine set in action by ex tern al forces un- d estructible u nder their coercion.
The new concept of organism enabled to in terp ret its functions, in cluding the psychic function, as resulting from the im pact of external stim uli upon in tern al organization (“the m achine of the body”).
The possibility of a uniform prediction of th e behaviour of physical systems, w hich had been acquired owing to th e categories of new m e chanics, inspired an analogous approach tow ards hum an behaviour. Its obvious qualitative peculiarities w ere also deduced from mechanical causes; th ere was no other road to be taken for the determ inists of th a t time.
The principal psychological theories of the new tim e: th e doctrine of the reflexes, the so-called “causal” theory of perception and the doctrine of association w ere modelled afte r the m echanical picture of nature. Descartes was the fo reru n n er of all these research trends. But he was also the forerun ner of th e introspective concept of consiousness w hich was the ever-lasting bulw ark of indeterm inism in psychology. The ability of self-regulation and self-control in h eren t to th e higher forms of hum an behaviour was regarded as the suprem e fact of psychic activity w hich could explain everything bu t needed no explanation itself. Thus th e two poles em erged: organism, guided by general laws of n atu re and m echanically interacting w ith other bodies, and concious- ness placed outside of nature. Between these poles scientific thought had been developing u n til th e middle decades of the 19th century. The contradiction betw een mechanical determ inism and th e progress of bio logy had determ ined the developm ent of scientific notions of behaviour for two centuries (from Descartes to Darwin).
The need to elucidate th e principle of determ ination acting in systems of a higher—as com pared w ith the mechanical—order w as urgent. Me chanical determ inism was substituted by th e general biological d eter minism. The champions of th e causal interp retatio n of the psyche up held the biological ra th e r th a n the m ehanical interaction of m aterial bodies; th e laws of this type of interaction discovered by D arvin seemed to be as indisputable as G alileo’s laws. The new concept of organism and its place in natu re became as necessary a step tow ards scientific
psychology as mechanics had been in its tim e w ith respect to biology. It m ust be stressed th a t the transform ation occurred in th e general cha racte r of psychological thinking, in its categorial basis.
W hatever psychological problem we approach, we perceive decisive shifts in the m ethods of argum entation for the causes and m echanism of behaviour and consciousness. The reflectory chord tu rn s form a rigid, morphologically hardened form ation into a dynam ic characteristic to m eet the adaptive dem ands of organism. In n ate features are sub stitu ted by those acquired in the struggle for survival in the in terp reta tio n of the activity of the sensory systems. The very innate features prove to be a product of adaptation of a species to the conditions of existence.
The new scheme also transform s one of the principal psychological categories—the notion of association. R egarded form erly as a linking of phenom ena w ithin consciousness (or brain), it is now in terp rete d as a linking betw een extern al and in tern al relations, w hich is in fact a m a nifestation of objective behaviour (the contact of an individual w ith extern al conditions not only by m eans of m etabolism and o th er biolo gical processes bu t also by m eans of special organs procuring inform a tion on the ex tern al phenom ena and realizing control over adaptive actions in conform ity w ith th e inform ation gained).
Elem ents of a new approach th a t could explain the specific features of psychic regulation of behaviour in accordance w ith th e principles of n atu ra l science are discernible in th e system of categories peculiar to general biological determ inism .
New transform ations occur in such basic psychological notions (ca tegories) as reflex, sensitivity association etc. The v ersality of reflex is treated not only as a consequence of the plasticity (adaptability) of th e nervous system bu t also of its dependence upon a psychic component,
e.g. sensitivity. This sensitivity, form erly viewed among th e facts of
consciousness open for self-observation, is now placed into th e category of signals owing to w hich the function of distinction of th e conditions of behaviour and of its governm ent is realized. Association acquires an objectively m eaningful character being converted from an elem ent of the mechanical or pu rely biological connection into “an elem ent of th o u g h t” etc.
A new level of explanation of the determ ination of psychic pheno m ena becomes evident. I. M. Setchenov was among th e first scientists to give theoretical foundations to the new level.
A brief consideration of th e developm ent of a science—in th is case, psychology—enables to discover the phasic character of its historical advance. Decisive shifts in th e general stru c tu re of scientific knowledge are characteristic of each phase. These shifts occur in the w hole system of psychological notions, models, theories ra th e r th an only in a definite group of such notions etc. focused on certain problem s.
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Historical analysis reveals a reg u larity m anifested in a succession of the most general principles and forms of cognition of concrete pheno mena. The universal character of the discovered regularity, characterizing the stru c tu re of thought and defining m ethods of construction and transform ation of knowledge on the basis of em pirical data, m ethods of investigation, principles of modelling certain processes etc., proves its hom ogeneity w ith the regularities operating in the field designated as logic.
Consequently, the logic of science m ust em brace not only th e doctrine of stru ctu res (and origin, if we adopt the view of certain a u thors) of the theoretical, scientifically deducible knowledge in its most general forms. The doctrine of structures, form s and m ethods of cogni tive activity in d ifferent objective spheres a t d ifferent stages of the developm ent of science m ust also be included into th e logic of science.
L et us designate this field the objective historical logic. It is this logic w hich form s a constituting direction of the science of science. S tu dies in this field are ju st beginning, th e re are num erous problem s to discuss; first and foremost, these are such problem s as the connection of the objective historical logic w ith philosophical logic (from which it m ust borrow and to w hich contribute something), w ith the history of science as a whole and of the special sciences in particular. A specialist in a scientific dom ain is n atu ra lly in terested p rim arily in the logic of the developm ent and th e extension of “his” science. The instance of psy chophysiology cited above proves, however, th a t th e advance of a special science depends on the general scientific progress. The interaction of different, sometimes distant, sciences is not an exclusive value of the present century. Though less intensive and distinct, it can be traced at earlier stages. The objective historical logic of the developm ent of spe cial sciences cannot, therefore, be grasped independently of a conside ration of other sciences. Such approach promises inform ation of p ra gmatic value in cases w hen we face an outstripping developm ent of the logical stru ctu re of some sciences as compared to other domains.
Then the shifts occurring in the form er sciences m ight, to a cerain extent, indicate those to be expected in th e latter. The elaboration of the objective historical logic provides for the tru e strateg y of science, it presents no speculative, but historically proved suggestions as to where, not only whence, we are coming. It is thus contributing to the m ain task of th e science of science; its solution is vitally im portant for a variety of practical issues concerning scientific planning and orga nisation, training of scientific personnel etc.
On the whole, the objective historical in terp retatio n of the logic of the developm ent of cognition appears as the most im portant component of scientific approach to th e “big science” and its functions in a com plex social reality at present.
