• \
C I N Q U I È M E P A R T I E
\ RAPPORT GENERAL
Eugeniusz Olszeivski
PERIODIZATION
OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The problem o f periodization is a problem going deep into th e essence itself of historical processes both exam ined a n d «described by th e h i storians. It is n o t a t a ll th e question of m aking a form al division of th e historical s tu ff o r of m erely considering th e didactic advan tag es o f its presentation to th e re a d e r o r listener. The said advantages, indeed, w ill b e obtained on ly w hen th e periodization corresponds to th e in te rn a l logic of th e process 'under consideration.
I t m ay be observed in an y historical process how a great n u m b er of smaill q u an titativ e -changes, agglom erating in a c e rta in period, w h en infringing th e balance established iln th a t period leads to a m ore rap id ly ru n n in g qu alitativ e change. J u st those v ery Changes should constitute th e sta rtin g points fo r establishing th e historical periodization.
I t is both possible and necessary to ap p ly these general lines to researches in th e history of science and technology. The q u alitativ e changes are h e re in principle — as far as th e ir c h ara cter is concerned — analogous to th e changes observed by u s in th e h isto ry of o th e r domains of culture, for instance in th e history of lite ra tu re a n d of various dom ains of art. In the political a n d economic history, how ever, th e ir c h ara cter is differen t. W hile th e q ualitative ^changes as effected h ere in th e fo rm of revolutions, w ars, declines and form ations o f states, a t a certain m om ent obtain as a ru le a legal sanction in th e fo rm of a constitution, b y w ay of establishing; a new regim e o r a new form of .property, b y w ay o f concluding a peace tre a ty — in th e h isto ry of culture th e p a rtic u la r sanction like th a t does no t occur.
None th e less th e qualitative changes a re so m uch m ark e d in th e history of cu lture th a t it is q u ite easy to distinguish th em from th e q u an titativ e ones.
The reg u la rity of developm ent of th e p a rtic u la r scientific disciplines has been approached in a m ost in terestin g w ay, and th e dissim ilarities
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of both q u an titativ e a n d q ualitativ e changes w ere cleanly shown by th e professor of history of science a t th e C alifornian U niversity, T. S. K uhn, in bis recen t booik The S tru cture of Scientific Revolutions l.
The 'basis of K uh n’s conception is th e notion of paradigm introduced by him. He defines paradigm s as follows: “un iversally recognized scientific achievem ents th a t for a tim e provide model problem s and solutions to a com m unity of p ractitioners” {p. X). The following exam ples of paradigm s m ay be quoted: P tolem y’s astronom y, N ew ton’s mechanics, w ave th e o ry of light. The paradigm is composed of a w hole complex of motions em bracing the w ay of approaching the definite phenom ena, a g eneral law o r a group of scientific laws, the scope of p articu la r problem s resolvable on these grounds, th e model w ay of th e ir solution, as well as th e general featu res of th e adequate scientific instrum entation.
The form ation of a certain paradigm originates a determ ined phase of th e developm ent of th e research. K u hn calls i t th e phase of norm al science. In a given dom ain, th e paradigm th e n becom es th e foundation not only of scientific research, b u t also of education. In th e X lX th and X X th centuries, the codification of paradigm s has been dealt w ith in a series of scientific textbooks, form erly in such w orks as Almagest, N ew ton’s Principia o r Lavoisier’s Traite de chimie. Educated in th e conviction of a n absolute rig h tfu in ess of th e paradigm , th e research w orkers specialize in th e domain w here th e paradigm is a clue th a t w arran ts th e solvability of problems. Thus, for instance, on th e basis of N ew ton’is paradigm th e X V IIIth cen tu ry m echanics of heavens tried to resolve successively th e problem s of th e ; m otion of planets, th e ir moons and off comets. The accom plishm ents of th is k in d a re obviously of a q u an titativ e character.
The developm ent of norm al science, the continuous refining of research m ethods and th e ir applying to ever new er phenom ena leads, however, sooner or la te r to th e discovery of som e anom alies — of phenom ena o r problem s, th e explanation or solution of w hich on th e ground of th e prevailing paradigm is n o t realizable, tho u gh endeavours are m ade in o rd e r to articu late o r to m odify it.
In case th e n u m b er of anom alies augm ents, th e science enters into a sta te of crisis. It is th ro u g h a q u alitative change, a creation of a new paradigm , th a t th e science is draw n o u t of it. Thus, for instance, th e crisis of N ew ton’s m echanics a t th e tu r n of th e X lX th a n d X X th cen tu ries has been su rm ounted owing to th e creation b y E instein of a new paradigm . We h ave here to do w ith a q u alitativ e change w hich finds its testim ony if only in the fact th a t a ! fundam ental notions of mechanics,
P eriodization of the H isto ry of Science and T echnology 197
as time, space, mass, gravitation, have got a n ew significance, th e ir denom inations rem aining unchanged.
Owing to the q ualitative changes, norm al sciences co n structed on th e base of various coniseoutive paradigm s are logically incom m ensurable w ith each other. The change of the paradigm a lte rs th e w orld picture as it is perceived by th e science w hich begins investigating th e pheno m ena, not taken note of before o r sim ply not rem arked.
By resolving fu rth e r and fu rth e r problem s and by refin in g itself, the new paradigm gains over moire and m ore adherents, especially so w hen being confirm ed b y n ew observations o r experim ents (thus, for instance, th e m easurem ent of light w ave deflections in th e g rav itatio n field d u rin g ithe eclipse Of th e su n in 1919 Ibeoame an im p o rta n t con firm ation of Einstein’s paradigm ). As soon as th e new paradigm gets universally recognized as a base for research and education, th e re begins a n ew phase of quantitative changes, a phase of norm al science.
Sim ilar, as regard s th e structure, though obviously d ifferen t, as reg ard s th e m aterial elements, is th e r u n of developing processes in th e p articu la r domains of technology. As factors corresponding to paradigm s are h ere to be considered th e types of design a n d technology. In th e m etallu rg y of iron, for instance, th e following technologies: a n d cor responding designs of m elting p la n ts m ay ibe d istin g u ish e d 2: ancient prim itive kiln, m edieval sh a ft fu rn ace m aking u se of w ater power, blast furnace based on charcoal and w a te r energy, b la st fu rn ace based on coke an d steam o r electric energy. A n ew technology arises w hen th e precedent one has attain ed b est technical a n d economic indices, i.e. w hen it loses th e possibilities of fu rth e r devellopmemt. P erfectin g itself ever m o re b y w ay of successive q u an tita tiv e changes, th e new technology a t th e sam e tim e supplants th e form er one and pushes it o u t of the production plants, to u ltim ately come to. ex h au st its ow n possibilities, however, th is involving th e necessity of a new qu alitativ e change.
Both these m u tu ally independent analyses have one characteristic feature, nam ely th a t th e tw o kinds of changes, a s distinguished in science and technology, are quite different in character, b u t n o t in speed. A lthough th e q ualitative Changes u su ally r u n m ore sw iftly th a n th e quantitative ones, this is, however, not th e ir fundam ental featu re 3.
2 Compare: M. R a d w a n , Rudy, kuźnice i huty żelaza w Polsce. W-arSeawa 1963, p. 10 .and p. 256. The diagram drawn from another work of M. Radwan is to be found also in the work: JI. Д. Б е л ь к и н д , О. H. В е с е л о в с к и й , И. Я. К о н ф е д е р а т о в , Я. А. Ш н е й б е р г , История энергетической техники. Москва—Ленинград 1960 (L. D. В е 1 k i n d, О. N. V е s s е 1 о v s к у, I. J. К о п
-f-e d e r a t e V , J. A. S h n e y b e r g , H istory of Energetic Technology) , p . 17.
3 From Wife point of view, M. Da-utmas assertion (compare the retport for the X International 1 Congress of the History o f Science Le m ythe de la revolution
technique, printed in [Polish translation in N. 3/1963 of the “Quarterly Journal of
the History o f Science and Technology”) that the changes occurred in the tech nology o f the second h alf of the XiVtflilth c e n t u r y had not the character o f a tech nological revolution toy reason of -their relative slowness, is a /mere misunder
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The rela tiv e slow ness of th e q u alitativ e changes, rep eated ly en countered in th e h isto ry of science a n d technology, constitutes a con siderable difficulty w hen we try to base th e periodization of the said history on th is k in d of changes. In th e political history, indeed, w e got accustom ed to see th e bounds of periodization m arked in general so stro n g ly th a t th e y can b e determ ined w ith th e exactness n o t only of a year, but even of a d ay (for instance N ovem ber 7, 1917, M ay 9, 1945). This involves in tu r n a n extrapolation- tendency to sh arp en a ll th e bounds artificially, to recognize certain dates of a ra th e r symbolic ch aracter (for instance J u ly 14, 1789) a s sh a rp periodization bounds. In histo ry of science and technology, how ever, th e determ ination of any sh arp tem poral dates of th is k in d is n o t possible. Is such a date, for instance, 1687 — i.e. the publishing y e a r of Principia — for th e develop m en t of m echanics a n d of the w hole of physics? O r 18159 — the p ub li shing y ear of the Origin of Species — for biology? A fter all, both of th e paradigm s — le t us m ak e u se of T. S. K u h n ’s term inology — have th e ir -prehistory w hich fo r N ew ton’s paradigm begins; w ith G ilbert’s De m agnete, and for D arw in’s paradigm — a t least w ith Buffon’s and Erasm us D arw in’s works.
The tendency to app ly sh arp periodical bounds arises to a certain degree from th e m echanistic treatm en t of tim e as a n absolute coordinate, as a n absolute scale, by m eans of w hich th e course of a ll historical processes can be m e a su re d 4. W ith existing sh arp periodization bounds all th e events th a t occurred p rio r to a certain m om ent, are re fe rre d to an earlier epoch, an d everything th a t took place a fte r th is m om ent — to a posterior one. The border line b etw een “earlier” a n d “la te r” is, of course, th e “contem porary”. We th u s reach th e cru x o f a ll considera tions connected w ith tim e — th e notion of sim ultaneousness 5.
In N ew ton’s paradigm th e notion of sim ultaneousness suggests no theoretical do ubts — tw o events are contem porary to each o th er w hen both of th e m a re sim ultaneous w ith th e sam e m om ent of absolute tim e. Einstein — as commonly know n — had rejected the physically uncheck- able prem ise of th e existence of absolute tim e; th a t is w h at compelled him to analyse tho ro ug hly th e notion of simultaineousness an d to con sequently raise th e problem of how to synchronize tw o clocks con nected w ith tw o system s in w hich events1 subject to checking in th e aspect of simultameóusness tak e place. So, this synchronization can proceed only by m eans of sending signals, i. e. inform ation (in th e
cyber-4 “Absolute, true, and mathematical time, -of itself, and Sroim its own nature, flowis equably without relation to anything internal”. L N e iw t o n, Principia, vol. I The Motion of Bodies. Berkeley, Los Angeles ,1962, p. 6.
5 “A ll o f our judgments in which time plays its part are always judgments about simultaneous events” — says Einstein (quotation after L. I n f e l d , A lbert
P erio d iza tio n of th e H isto ry of S cience and T echn ology 199
netical sense of th is word) — w hich happens w ith a ce rta in le sser o r greater, b u t alwayis fin ite speed.
We take here, of 'course, n o in terest in th e physical an d philosophical consequences of the reasoning startin g like th a t, w hich had led to th e fall of th e m echanistic paradigm , and to its replacem ent by a new one — by th e th eory of relativity. This reasoning m ay serve, how ever, as a p a tte rn for perform ing a n analogous analysis w ith re g a rd to th e notion of historical isimulltaneoiusness, a n d consequently for idraiwing ce rta in de term ined conclusions re fe rrin g to periodization.
F rom th is point of view, le t us p ut, for instance, a question — w hen w as A m erica discovered? We d o know, of course, th a t th e sh ips of Co lum bus had m ade lan d fall a t one of th e islands connected w ith th e continent of A m erica on O ctober 12, 1492. Was this equivalent, how ever, to discovering A m erica for th e European science and European societies? W ould this date have a n y m eaning w hatsoever, if for instance a ll of th e ships had p erished on th e ir w ay back? The p roper discovery of A m erica in social, economic, politicall a n d scientific sense d id n o t s ta rt u n til five m onths la te r — on M arch 6, 1493, w h en Lisbon h ad been inform ed th a t th e re w as Hying in its vicinity the storm -beaten ship of Colum bus ju st a rriv e d stra ig h t from “In dia”. That d ay w as for Lisbon, th erefo re, from ’ th is point of view historically (but noit physically) sim ultaneous to th e day w hen Colum bus h a d reached th e isle of G uanahani.
This example, w hile illu stratin g th e problem , is n o t in itself of a n y ma(jor im portance, an d a t a n y ra te n o t so for th e periodization. It cer ta in ly m ay be said th a t th e 'historical sim ultaneousness o f events u n d er lying the periodization of politicall a n d .social h isto ry u su ally is alm ost identical w ith th e physical sim ultaneousness, as in form atio n ab ou t such events spreads in general w ith th e m axim um speed available a t th e given stag e of th e developm ent of 'communication te c h n iq u e 6.
The case is quite different w ith reg a rd to scientific and tech nological events. The analysis re q u ire s h ere the definition of th e historical sim ultaneousness to be m ade m ore precise still, As a lre ad y said a t th e outset, th e q u alitativ e changes in political and social h isto ry sw iftly get as a ru le a universally v alid form al o r at least factu al san ction. The inform ation 'about these changes is, then, an inform ation of a controlling character, i.e. it affects th e life of th e en tire population of the cou n try whose h isto ry is being considered. In science and in technology th e m a tters sta n d q u ite differently. L u th er’s o r M elanchton’s having received inform ation on th e th e o ry of Copernicus w as n o t of practical im portance, ais n eith e r th e ir b earing n o r 'convictions w ere
6 In th is scope there may occur 'deflections, however, even in our tim es as well. Thus, for instance, those Japanese detachments that during the last war went into hidiing in the jungles of New Guinea, were unaware of Japan’s capitu lation for many years and kept living on as of “during (the w ar” long after it was finished.
2 0 0 Eugeniusz O lsze w sk i
thereby influenced, and th ey w ent on living — like th e huge m ajority of th eir contem poraries did — itn th e sta te of historical sim ultaneousness w ith th e geocentric paradigm . The m etallurgical in d u stry developing on the te rrito ry of th e so-called O ld P olish Basin in th e second q u a rte r of th e n in eteen th ce n tu ry rested on w ater power a n d charcoal, a n d its technology consequently w as not historically contem poraneous w ith th a t of th e English n in eteen th cen tu ry m e tallu rg y m aking use of steam pow er a n d of coke, although the sponsors of th e Polish m etallu rg y of th e n 'indubitably w ere well inform ed about th e contem porary 'State of
the leading technology. \
Thus th e historical simultaneousmess in science and technology is not decided by a n o rd in ary inform ative signal, corresponding to those Ein stein ’s .signals thait synchronize tw o clocks, bu t b y a signal th a t tran s m its th e controlling inform ation to give now rise to an y change or form ation of convictions, now to a n y idetermined h um an action.
W hat conclusions can b e draw n from th e notion of historical sim ul taneousness for th e periodization of history of science an d of history of technology?
The periodization boundaries in these domains never are chronolo gically sharp, and the tendencies tow ards defining them by years dates (as for instance A stronom y of the Period 1517— 1727 or The Production and D istribution of Power since 1832) lead to p urely form al divisions, nmlpiKs exclusively conventional denom inations are m eant. The basis for th e division of historical m aterial in these domains, consequently, cannot be chronology, b ut th e distinguishing of successive developm ental stages of a given branch of science or technology, as e.g. succesive paradigm s or successive types of design a n d technology.
Thus historical^ an d n o t physical sim ultaneousness is to be applied w hen m aking division in tp historical periods in th e field of th e history of science and technology. According to such an approach to the problem s of, for instance, aeronautics history, Leonardo da Vinci’s ideas and experim ents in design w ould b e historically posterior to th e development of balloons and dirigibles — fro m M ontgolfier b ro th ers to the great catastrophes of dirigibles in th e th irtie s of th e tw entieth century — and historically alm ost contem porary w ith th e researches and flights of th e L ilienthal brothers.
A nother distinction is to be m ade here. W hen a certain paradigm takes shape on th e ground of phenom ena constituting a n anom aly in th e view point of th e old paradigm , this developm ent does not influence in its in itia l stage, or influences b u t slightly th e sta te of the norm al science, th a t continues holding on to th e positions of th e old paradigm . Thus, for instance, De Revolutionibus of Copernicus, a n d in p articu lar the previous inform ation about th e origin an d developm ent of his opinions (Commentariolus, Narratio prima b y Rheticus), p layed almost no role in
P eriodization of th e H isto ry of S cience and T echn ology 201
astronomy, w hich w ent on chiselling and polishing Ptolem aic epicycles and deferents. A t a certain moment, how ever, w h en en terin g a sta te of crisis, th e “norm al” science is n o longer able to ignore th e n ew paradigm — it has to ta k e th e defence against th e latter, be it by d irec tly fighting it, be it b y efforts to articu late its did paradigm in o rd e r to adapt it to solving those problem s th a t a re being successfully solved by th e new theory. N either th e Holy Office, w hile condem ning Galileo, n o r Tycho B rahe were ignoring th e w orks of Copernicus a n y m ore — th e y eith er trie d to stem th e spreading of a t le ast .some of his ideas, o r to bu ild up on the basis of the old scientific system a v aria n t th a t w ould have sim ilar values a s th e new philosophically dangerous paradigm . The defensive a ttitu d e is being m aintained to th e la s t b y th e follow ers of the re tre a tin g paradigm . W hile fighting idown th e n ew theory, th ey cannot help considering it.
It is analogically th a t th e relation s betw een th e old types of design and technology, and the new ones are developing. A t first, th e new idea is tak in g shape w ithout exerting its influence on th e developm ental processes of the older one, la ter on, how ever, the im pending com petition involves e ith e r a dow nright .struggle against th e n ew technology (it was, for instance, only a fte r prolonged opposition th a t the H ouse of Commons 'allowed the first railw ay lines to be bu ilt, fo r it w as alre ad y know n th a t th e y w ould infringe th e in terests of w aterw ay ow ners and toll tenants) o r such a p erfec tin g 'o f the old technology as to enable it to com pete economically a n d technically w ith th e new one (of such a ch aracter was, for instance, th e short-lived developm ent of th e steam buses in England in the tw enties an d th irtie s of th e X lX th century).
It is h ere th a t clearly appears the tran sitio n period betw een th e tw o developm ent stages of science and of technology. It seems, besides, th a t it is th e m om ent w hen th e n ew paradigm becam e so m uch developed as to begin influencing the old ideas, i.e. as to s ta rt being fought an d sim ultaneously becoming th e startin g p o in t for th e efforts to save th e old ideas b y m eans of th e ir articulating, th a t is to be taken, to sam e e x ten t conventionally, as th e m om ent of tra n sitio n from one p arad ig m to another, from one technology to another. This p hase of m u tu al in fluencing of these tw o ideas is to' be reckoned in th e history o f th e n ew paradigm o r new technology, th e historical sim u ltan eity of both of th em corresponding a t th a t tim e w ith physical sim ultaneity.
In th e heretofore considerations, th e geographical factor h ad not been ta k en .into account. In form er epochs th is one played a v ery essen tial role, a s in various, areas:, rem ote from each other, science a n d tech nology w ere developing to a high degree in depen d en tly fro m th e ir sta te in o th er areas a t th a t tim e. It is here, besides, n o t so m uch a question of the fact th a t the historical sim ultaneity considerably differed for d istan t areas from th e physical sim ultaneity, as the question of
discrep-202 E u gen iu sz O lsze w sk i
ancies of scientific amid technological ideas in th e ir v ery contents. So, for instance, th e Chinese scientific paradigm s w e re up to th e m odern tim es different from those o f Europe, a n d th e technology was preoc cupied w ith p artly d ifferen t problems.
I t m ay b e adm itted th a t th e re m ight have occurred an y uncoupled and independent developm ental processes w hich are, of course, to be investigated com paratively, bu t to establish a common periodization for them w ould be a n operation n early as m uch form alistic as th e im position of a te rre stria l periodization w hen analysing th e developm ent of science and technology in one of the civilizations existing, m ay be, in th e cosmos an d no t y e t know n to us.
As regards, how ever, some d eterm ined area — and th is being the w hole of o u r globe now adays — th e analysis of geographic factors am ounts to th e analysis o f th e historical sim ultaneity. The said analysis is not of essential com plexion for th e universal h isto ry of science, since th e delay in the developm ent of science and p en etratio n of scientific ideas in to some countries (for instance, th e re ta rd in 'Russia (lasting u p t o - the X V IIIth century, th e cu ltu ral regression in P o lan d in th e X V IIth century a n d in th e first h alf of th e X V IIIth cen tu ry ) did n o t visibly influence th e evolutional process o f those ideas — w hich evidently does not m ean th a t such a re ta rd atio n m ight n o t be of great im portance for the developm ent of cu lture and a t th e sam e tim e fo r th a t of th e social and economic situ ation of a given country.
It is d ifferen t in th e fielid of technology Where disturbances in th e physical sim ultaneousness cause discrepancies in developm ent processes. Thus, for instance, th e sw ift tra n sfe r of o th er countries technological achievem ents into m id-inineteenth-century G erm any o r in th e th irties of th e X X th cen tu ry in to th e Soviet Union both acted on th e contents of old achievem ents applied in th e n ew conditions, an d stim ulated fu rth e r developm ent of old ideas and creation of new ones.
Was chem istry, ta u g h t and developed in Wilno by Jędrzej Śnia decki, indeed — as h e is said to have told to N apoleon in 1812 — la chimie qu’on enseigne a Paris, th e G erm an technological revolution of m id-nineteenth cen tu ry was not to th e full ex ten t historically si m ultaneous to E ngland’s technological revolution of m id-eighteenth century. It w as n o t o n ly th a t its course w as different, b u t it led to th e rise o f n ew technological contents, as for instance to th e creation of the chemical technology, q ualitativ ely 'different from th e old ones — this becoming one of th e foundations of im perial G erm any’s industrial power.
This does n ot m ean — in sp ite of w hat P rofessor D aum as sta te s 7 — th a t th e notion of technological revolution is useless. W hile it is possible
P erio d iza tio n of th e H isto ry of Science and T ech n ology 2 0 3
to th u s define th e q u alitative changes th a t occurred in England a n d in G erm any, th e English and th e G erm an revolutions w ere y et n ot equail in th eir process, as th e wan-technological factors, a n d in p a rtic u la r th e developm ent of science a n d th e discrepancy of economic a n d social conditions, in frin g ed to a considerable e x te n t upon th e ir historical simultaneouisiness. In a sim ilar way, th e differen ce in th e social system is th e cause of the fact th a t th e process of technological developm ent in the ^Soviet U nion is different from th a t in th e 1 cap italist countries, a n d so, to som e extent, th e y are historically n o t contem porary, ev en if th e ir physicall simiultaneousness be preserved. The circum stances of th is k ind considerably com plicate th e periodization of th e h isto ry of p a rtic u la r branches of technology, th e successive transition, stages of th e ir developm ent being, due to th e aforesaid circum stances, som etim es re m ark ab ly extended.
This problem becomes even m ore com plicated w h en sw itching over from th e research concerning periodization of p articu la r (branches of science an d of technology to th e periodization of th e w hole of scientific and technological progress (both of these fields becoming so tig h tly tied w ith each other, though, th a t th ey a re to have a joint periodiza tion in the future). Allthough it is possible, w ith re g a rd to th e p a rtic u la r scientific and technological fields, to p o in t o u t qu alitativ e changes specific for each of them by applying th e aforesaid c rite ria th a t w ill be decisive for th e ir periodization th e distinguishing of q u alitativ e changes characterizing th e w hole of science and of technology is fa r m ore difficult.
The question is here of siuch changes as w ould occur in a n analogous form w ith regard to a considerable p a rt of scientific and technological branches. A lthough those changes a re n o t bound to show a physical sim ultaneousness, it would be difficult, how ever, to ta lk about th e ir historical sim ultaneousness, if the differences in tim e w ere to reach thousands of years. M athem atization, for instance, m ight be considered as such a qualitative change, b u t it cannot be used as a basis for periodization in the general history of science, as in astronom y it dates back to Babylonian times, in physics — to Galileo and Stevin, in chem istry — to th e end of th e X V IIIth century, in economics — to P etty , and in linguistics to th e m iddle of our century.
The overcom ing of difficulties m ay toe sought in tw o directions. F irstly, one can proceed along th e inductive w ay b y com paring p eriod ization in terv als in th e p articu la r branches o f science o r technology as well as in those factors tied w ith th e developm ent of science a n d technology as w ays of organizing scientific research, social in flu en ce of scientific re su lts obtained, social situation o f scientific a n d technological w orkers. P eriods in w hich condensation of q u alitativ e changes in m an y fields an d in m any aspects occurs m ay be reg ard ed as general
periodiza-204 E u gen iu sz O lszew sk i
tioai in te rv a ls 8. The character of changes in some fields of science or technology m ay he, however, idifferenit in a given p erio d from th a t in others. Thus, for instance, one certain ly m ay rem a rk th e condensation of qualitative changes in th e science of th e m id-seventeenth century, but fo r some branches of science it wild m ean th e arisin g o f the first paradigm w hile for o th e rs — a replacing o f one by another 9.
The other w ay m ay be defined as deductive. The startin g point will be in th is case th e d eterm ination of th e ch ara cter of th e qualitative changes, th a t can be recognized as th e im p o rtan t ones, fo r th e w hole developm ent of science o r technology.
Thus, for instance, it is changes in th e ways of obtaining scientific achievem ents, as changes in th e social position of scientific w orkers, in their w orking conditions, in th e organization of scientific researdh, th at a re by A. K auffeldt considered a s decisive factors for the perioidization of the history of scien c e10. An ex traord in arily interesting effort in pointing out fundam ental stages of scientific cognition w ith in the range of n atu ra l science — observational, analytical, and synthetical — is being presented a t th is Sym posium b y iProfessor K edrov 11. There w ere also
8 Compare the contribution of E. Rosen to the ipreisent Symposium and И. Я. К о н ф е д е р а т о в , К вопросу о периодизации истории техники. „Вопросы Истории Естествознания и Техники”, т. 4, 1957 (I. J. K o n f e d e r a t o m , То the
Problem of Periodization of H istory of Technology. “Problems of History of Science
and Technology”, v. 4, 1957).
9 Comjpare: E. O l s z e w s k i , Les problèm es de périodisation dans l’histoire
de la science et de la technique. Actes du IX Congrès International d ’Histoire des Sciences. Barcelona—Paris 1960, pp. 678—683, and “Archives Internationales d’Hi
stoire des Sciences”, N. 50^51/1960.
10 Comipaire: A. K a u f f e l d t , Zur Periodisierung der Geschichte der Natur -
wissenschaften, Teil I. “Wissensahafffiche Zeitschrift der Teohnisohen Hochschule
Dresden”, N. 1, Annale 1967—1958.
11 His paper iis extrâmely stimulating both for discussion and further research. The scheme presented toy him iis very attractive for 'its simplicity, (there arise however some questions and doubts:
1) The scheme does not taike account of Social ‘sciences, and this may be misleading because the interaction between social and natural science's has become strong and manifest since the X lX th century (for instance, the igreat synthesis of Dairwin has its roots 'in the erroneous ideas of Malthus).
,2) The scheme overlooks the Renaissance which is to foe regarded as a transi tion period between the 2nd period — it itself being a transitional period — and the 3rd period.
3) The nation of leading science for different periods is not sufficiently de veloped.
4) It is easy to show in the history of science a lot of deviations from В. M. Kedrov’s scheme. The observational period lasted in some branches of science for a much lorajgeir time than in Others. Some of them (e.g. astrophysics) entered at the very Imometrit of their creation into the analytical period. Some others passed from the observational period directly to the synthetical one. Thuls., for instance, the microbiology created by Leeuwenhoek in 1674, i.e. in the analytical period of science, was at that time — as it happens to sciences worked out by amateurs — typically observational and after nearly tw o hundred years of stagnation it advanced directly to the synthetical • period — in the second half of the X lXth century the great synthesis of CPasteutr was created.
АП these remarks, however, are not at all directed against the very attractive periodization of В. M. Kedrov, they only show siome topics for further discussion.
P eriodization of th e H isto ry of S cience and T echn ology 205
not infrequ en t effo rts to w ard s joining th e periodization of h isto ry o f science w ith th e periodization of th e w hole of cu ltu ral p h e n o m e n a 12; in m any of them however, those connections w ere accepted w ith o u t m ore profound argum ent, th e problem thu s getting formalised.
V arious were, besides, the -endeavours tow ard choosing factors, de cisive for th e periodization of th e h isto ry of technology. In view of th e connections — considerably tig h te r th a n in th e case of science — betw een th e developm ent of technology a n d o f economics, th e re w ere often tren d s tow ard (replacing periodization, peculiar to th e histo ry of technology, by gen eral historical periodization. Besides ev en th e M arxist scientists did not draw the proper conclusions out of th e fundam ental thesis of historical m aterialism th a t th e developm ent of production tools, and th us th e technological progress, precedes changes in economic an d social relations, th e form er being th e m ain factor to provoke those changes 13.
O ut of the periodizations based on th e analysis o f c e rta in general factors of th e developm ent o f technology th e re lis to be m entioned th e periodization originating from th e form u latio n b y M arx i(in his P overty of Philosophy on th e m argin o f his discussion w ith Proudhon about th e ro le of m achines for th e division of labour) of th e successive stages of th e developm ent of m achines o u t of th e sim ple tools 14. Thus, b y th is periodization the developm ent of tools a n d w orking m achines is con sidered as th e m ain developm ent factor of technology.
A nother tren d of m ind regards th e qualitative changes in utilizing n atu ra l energy resources by m an as th e decisive factor for th e periodiza tion of the history of technology. It is suggested by K. I. A tors to take into account as w ell — as a secondary factor — the qualitative changes in th e assortm ent of m aterials utilized in th e technology 15. R. B rittain, a t last, considers th e problem s of energy in connection w ith th e w hole of m an ’s relations to th e 'natural resources, following here to some ex ten t L. M um ford’s ideas 16.
12 Compare: e.g. J. M a y e r h o f e r , Der Begriff der Epoche in der Geschichte
der Naturwissenschaften. Actes du IX Congrès...”, pp. 674—677; and J. M a y e r
h o f e r . Die Perioden in der Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften... “Veröffent lichungen der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Geschichte der Pharmazie”, Neue Folge, Band 20. Stuttgart 1962.
13 Attention as drawn to this (matter a.o. by С. В. Ш у х а р д и н , Основы исто
рии техники. Москва 1961 (S. W. S с h о u k h а г d i n е, The Foundations of the H istory of Technology), pp. 108—109 (comp, also the German translation: S. W.
i S c h u c h a r d i n , Grundlagen der Geschichte der Technik. Leipzig 1963, p. 56); application of general historical periodization is recommended by him in spite of this, however.
14 Compare for instance the Schoukhardine’s book, p. 109 or its German trans lation, p. 56.
15 K. I. A t o n s . Periodization of the H istory of Technology, report foir the X International Congress of the History o f Science.
16 R. B r i t t a i n , R iver Technology and H istorical D evelopm ent, report for the same Congress {(Polish translation in “Kwartalnik Historii Naiuki i Technikd” — “Quarterly Journal of the History of Science and Technology”, N. 3/1963). L. M u m f o r d , Technics and Civilisation, (e.g.) London 1946.
20 6 E u geniusz O lsze w sk i
N either a d etailed analysis o f these a n d o th e r conclusions concerning the periodization of th e general history of science and th e general history of technology, n o r prom oting th e au th o r’s own. conclusions in this respect a re th e purpose of th e p resen t rep o rt. A fter all, th e h isto ry of science a n d th e h isto ry of technology seem to be still v ery young b ra n ches of knowledge and owing to that, not yet m atu re enough up to th is m om ent fo r form ing a paradigm o f th e ir own, com prising th e periodization problem s as w ell (with th e assum ption — th is being a m a tte r for discussion — th a t th e schem e suggested b y T. S. K uh n is obligatory fo r social sciences, too, an d th a t science wdill b e develop ing also in fu tu re in accordance w ith th a t scheme).
It is rig h t and ju st w hat Professor K edrov has said in his statem ent at th e p resen t Sym posium th a t w hile periodizing th e h isto ry of n atu ra l science th e in n e r logic of th e cognition process as w ell as its links w ith practice and its dependence on economic a n d social relations, a n d on th e ideology corresponding to them , are to be taken in to account. The sam e — although th e im portance of th e p articu lar factors w ill be dif feren t — can be said of th e h isto ry of social science, an d b y exchanging ties w ith practice for ties w ith science — likew ise of the history of technology or history of m edical art.
This m u ltiplicity of lin k s m akes it difficult to fix th e leading factors, a n d — a s lit seems — th e re do n o t y e t exist, so far, all th e prem ises for resolving th is problem . I t is to be stressed once more, however, th a t th e discussion on periodization of history of science and technology is to be considered as a n in teg ral p a rt of a m ore general discussion about factors of decisive valu e for th e developm ent of science and technology, w hen separated, it will! easily slip dow n to form al discussion plane.
The u ltim ate criterion o f th e advantages and draw backs of some assum ed periodization can o n ly be a n elaboration of a general h isto ry of science o r of technology m aking use of th e periodization in question. Among th e existing, b u t n o t too num erous syn th etic elaborations th ere is h a rd ly a n y one th a t m ight be recognized as satisfactory in this respect, th e m a jo rity o f them applying a form al chronological periodi zation (as for instance by c e n tu rie s)17 o r a general historical one.
This proves th a t th e h isto ry of science a n d th e h istory of technology have n o t y e t reached th e ir [synthetical stage of development, th e th ird an d u ltim ate one am ong those pointed ou t by P ro fesso r Kedrov.
17 Compare e.g. the assemblage of periodization in several history manuals in the author’s article cited in footnote 9.
