Paweł Mazanka
Natural theology of Descartes and
modern secularism
Studia Philosophiae Christianae 39/1, 184-196
of accid en tal events. H arm o n y w ithin th e environm ent is a sign o f ex trao rd in ary logic and co n sequence. T h e violation of it e n ta ils defined effects. H ow ever, it seem s th a t accidental events, m en tio n ed above, invoked by h u m an in terferen ce are of relative ch aracter. This m eans th at th e ir causes, being o u t of biological system , no t always can be scientifically explained o r even u n d e r stan d ab le for a h u m an being.
T h e above examples show us th at n atu re not always takes up a dialogue with a hum an being and reveals all its secrets. Thus, n a tu re teaches m an humility.
PA W EŁ M A Z A N K A
Instytut Filozofii U K SW
NATURAL T H E O L O G Y O F D ESC A RTES AND M O D E R N SE C U L A R ISM
It is noticeable th at in the realm of faith and of religious practice an im portant change is under way at the present time. W ithin the W estern culture religion is m ore and m ore only one of many walks of social life and not, as it was in th e past, a w idespread and influ ential factor determ ining the social order. M any people, especially within th e science circles, seem to be im penetrable against religio us problem s. U ntil not so far ago a challenge against faith and reli gion to o k often the shape of open atheism . Nowadays, this shape is also un d er change. It seems as though atheism was converting itself into secularism which em erged, quite clearly, already in the X V Ith century.
A t presen t secularism is tak en to m ean a philosophy of life m a nifesting itself both in natural sciences and in politics, philosophy, m orality and arts by accepting m an, his m ind, his liberty, his e a rth ly plans as the only term of reference with th ere excluded every re ligious prospect. U n d er secularism, m an is totally concerned with himself; he not only places him self at th e center of every interest but also claims to be a principle and reason for the whole reality. Secularism is a form of naturalism excluding every reference to
G od and to transcendent realities. As a consequence, secularism aims at identifying itself with agnosticism or with a lenient form of atheism 1.
Secularism is a form of cu ltu re an d so, also its sources, in d e pen d en tly of epochs, are ro o te d in cu lture. T h e sources o f secu larism a re q u ite m ultiple; th e m ost im p o rta n t o f them are of p h i losophical, social and political, econom ic, religious n a tu re to be finally linked w ith the realm o f arts and the „mass c u ltu re ”. A closer analysis of secularism m akes it clear th at, at its b o tto m , th e re always could be perceived defin ite assum ptions o f p h ilo so phical c h a ra c te r. T he very fact th a t it occurs in strict connection w ith deism as a certain o u tlo o k on m an and th e w orld as well as th e ir relation sh ips to G od, are a n a tu ra l consequence of a p h i losophical co ncept of G od and brings an evidence th at secula rism p resu p p o ses a philosophy th a t dictates a p a rticu la r co ncept of G od.
U nderstandably, m odern philosophy includes many, m ore or less close w ith each other philosophical systems but th e central pla ce th ere com es to the philosophical system of Descartes. H e b e longs, undoubtedly, to the circle of those who laid philosophical grounds for the m o d em scientific era. H e was the m ain au th or of intellectual revolution of th e X V IIth century to open new times while departing, previously, from traditional medieval doctrines and Scholasticism renew ed in the X V th and X V Ith century. So it is no doubt th at a philosophy of such wage could not go indifferent tow ards religious phenom ena including th at of secularism develo ping within its range of influence.
T he presen t p ap er is an attem pt to reveal some aspects of D e scartes’ n atu ral philosophy which m ade a significant im pact on the m odern secularism. T here is at issue his argum ents for the existen ce of G od and his concept of divine n atu re resulting from this argu m entation.
1 Cf. R. H. Potvin, Secularism, in: E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia O f Philoso
phy, New York 1998, vol. 9, 36; R. Bush, What is secularism, Southwestern Journal of
Theology XXVI(1984) 2, 6; E. S. Waterhouse, Secularism, in: J. Hastings (ed.), Encyc
lopedia o f Religion and Ethics, New York 1955, vol. 11, 347; F. Rodé, Sécularisation et sécularisme, in: P. Poupard (ed.), Dictionnaire des religions, Paris 1984,1563; P. D eletter, Secularism, in: P. M eagher, T. O ’Brien, C. A herm e (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary o f reli gion, Washington 1979, 3241.
1. T H E R O L E O F N A T U R A L T H E O L O G Y IN T H E P H IL O S O P H Y O F D E S C A R T E S
Noticeably, D escartes w anted to overcom e, by way of his philo sophy, th ere prevailing skepticism. This tren d was quite at rise in France of X V Ith and X V IIth centuries. It is enough to m ention som e facts: in 1569 tran slated into French was th e en tire Sextus Em piricus; also inspired by G reek skeptics M ichel M ontaigne p u blished Essais, in 1580, th at is his observations over life and p e ople, as indifferent tow ards the m ost im p ortant philosophical issu es, and his co ntem porary Spanish Francois Sanchez issued, in 1581, Quod nil scitur (On the science getting no knowledge). A t the end of X V Ith century th ere was felt a certain fatigue with the Scholastic philosophy, o r even a d eep er going epistem ological cri sis to affect the then ed ucated minds of E uro p e and led the philo sophy tow ards scepticism 2.
It is only on this background (following a. o. E. Gilson, F. Cople- ston and I. D ąm bska) that the philosophy of D escartes is possible to be well understood. His philosophy was a direct response to a chal lenge raised by the scepticism of M ontaigne. It was a desperate ef fort to get rid of the M ontaigne’s scepticism; the very form of the
Discourse on M ethod is suggesting it. So the m ajor adversary of D e
scartes was not so m uch the Scholastics but rath er the scepticism. In this opposition to scepticism th ere could not but app ear reli gious problem s or, m ore precisely, the question of proving the exi stence of G od and of h um an soul. In fact, scepticism added to a re ligious confusion due, to some extent, to am biguities concerning precisely the problem of G o d ’s existence and of hum an soul. D e scartes was convinced to have found a purely rational and u n denia ble argum ents for G o d ’s existence; furtherm ore, he felt endow ed with an extraordinary mission of revealing tru th on the way of re ason. This conviction was even m ore reinforced by his spiritual gu ide, cardinal de Bärulle, being th en a high authority in France and he m otivated the philosopher to publish, as soon as possible, „the new doctrine against sceptics and atheists, if he wished to attain ul tim ately the salvation from the hand of Severe Ju d g e”3.
2 Cf. E. Gilson, T. Langan, Modem Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, New York 1963, 5-15. 3 M. J. Buckley, Hi the Origins o f Modem Atheism, New Haven - London 1987, 69.
T here spreading scepticism and religious confusion w ere not the only motives for D escartes to deal with the problem s about God. The argum ents for the existence of G od and of hum an soul app e ared within his new philosophical system containing a new concept of philosophy. T he new idea of philosophy was due to his renoun- ciation o f the existing philosophy i. e. the Scholasticism. The philo sophy of D escartes was in need, as it is known, of G od as guaran tor of itself to provide a theory explaining the world and th e m an. It is said h ere „a new o n e”, for, although it was a philosophy intended to search for tru th w hen explaining things and phenom ena through the light of reason, with no support of faith, nevertheless the point of d ep artu re of this philosophy was not the world of transcendent things, on the p a rt of hum an subject, but th e content of m ind and so the inner world.
It could be m aintained th at Descartes was involved in argum ents for th e existence of G od mainly in the view of there spreading scep ticism and religious tensions of th at tim e, as well as in o rd er to com plete his own philosophical system and, especially, his theory o f cognition so he linked the argum ents with the strict reasonable way of cognition.
2. T H E C A S E O F C A R T E S IA N A R G U M E N T S F O R T H E E X IS T E N C E O F G O D
D escartes in o rd e r to overcom e th e prevailing th e n scepticism , had conceived to search for tru th only by th e way of n a tu ra l re ason, w ith no reco u rse to faith. A certain p arado x in his p h ilo so phy or, m ore precisely, in his m etaphysics, consisted in his having to tu rn to th e id ea o f G od w hich he discovered in his m ind. As indicated above, th e p h ilo so p h er had to rebuild his relation ships to th e outside w orld being destroyed by his doubting, he had to get o u t of the so litu d e of cogito. T h e refo re, it was th e idea of G od to p rovide g u a ra n te e to th e objectivity o f ideas p rese n t in hu m an m ind.
It is assum ed th at the philosopher produced three m odes to p ro ve the existence of God: from the idea of G od possessed by hum an mind; from deficient existential autonom y of hum an person, and by analyzing th e n atu re of G od as the m ost perfect being. T he first and the second argum ent are of aposterioric character, the third one of aprioric one. T he argum ents produced in the Meditations on
the First Philosophy followed th e line of th e proofs by St. Augustine
and St. A nselm 4.
Below atten tio n will be given to the first argum ent, called by so me authors a psychological one, it is found in the third Meditation called: On God: that H e exists. T he philosopher discusses the fact of m an having the idea of G od. D escartes, in accordance with his con cept o f philosophy, thought th at the tru th th at G od exists could be defended against sceptics only by recourse m ade to th e undoubta- ble presum ption which is th e existence of ego. A t any rate, when u ndertaking th e task he d em onstrated th at the only undoubtable point is th e existence of his own conscience. T he philosopher p e r ceived th at in his own m ind m an discovers various ideas: innated, acquired and construed ones. T heir com m on feature is to be all caused in som e way. T he innated ideas e. g. colors or the sun are connected with th e sense of sight, arrive from outside. T he author of the construed ideas e. g. o f hippogriff, is m an himself, while the innated ideas like th at of substance or duration could originate on ly from an idea th at m an has about himself.
W hen explaining the presence of ideas in the m ind he invokes the principle of causality which plays a m ajor role in th e argum ent in question: „It is m anifest by th e natural light that th ere m ust be at least as m uch reality in th e efficient and total cause as in its effect (...). T h at which is m ore perfect, that is to say, which has m ore re ality within itself, cannot proceed from the less perfect”5. A n added reality p resen t in an effect and absent in its cause would have nihi lum as its cause, w hat is a pure nonsense.
The m ain question in the third Meditation is concerned with the idea of God: w here does this idea com e from ? Could it be p ro d u ced by hum an m ind? D escartes investigates first its content: „By
1 In Meditations the author gets rid of every kind of spontaneous attitude of con science, separates himself from objective truths and the conscience on the existence of other people, while going deeper to experience his own relation to Being. It reminds rather a step of religious nature where man knowing that the daily conduct, technical and practical one does not equal his own being, confronts the World o f things to ano ther World that he penetrates and which somewhat defines him. The range of m eta physical issues in the Discourse o f Method, the Meditations o f First Philosophy, and the
Principles o f Philosophy is m ore о less the same: doubting, cogito, God. Cf. F. Alquié, Kartezjusz, tłum. z franc. S. Cichowicz, Warszawa 1989, 66; 68.
5 Meditations III, in: Ch. Adam, P. Tannery, (ed.), Works o f Descartes, Paris 1897- 1913, vol. V II, 32.
the nam e of G od I understand a substance which is infinite, inde p endent, all-knowing, all-powerful and by which I myself and eve rything else, if anything else exists, have been cre a te d ”6. D escartes wanting to defend his metaphysics against even the smallest addi tion of faith has simply adm itted that the idea of Christian G od is given to every man. H e re he was explicitly m istaken, according to Gilson. F o r although all people have an idea o f deity, they not all have the idea of Christian God. „W hat a stupid question, you know it th o ug h ”7.
Descartes wrote: „All these attributes are so suprem e that the m o re attentively I consider them, the m ore impossible it seems that they could originate from myself. So imperative (...) is the conclusion that God necessarily exists”8. Such analyses led Descartes to the conclu sion that hum an mind could not acquire an imagination of God from itself. In other words: the m an as a finite substance could not have an idea of an infinite substance, if it were not coming from an existing and infinite substance. In the hum an nature there is no contained a predesign of such an idea. So the idea of God is innated to us, acqu ired from Him. But here a question could arise, w hether or not the idea o f infinity could not be conceived by man, simply by way of nega ting the idea of finitude? The philosopher thinks it is impossible since the idea of infinity has to precede in some way the idea of finitude. The point is that m an could not become aware of his finitude and li m itation, if he did not relate it to the idea of infinite and perfect be ing. M oreover, although m an does not com prehend the nature of in finity, nevertheless the idea of it is so clear and distinct for him that, so he gets convinced, it contains m ore reality than any other idea and could not be his own m ental construction. Ultimately then the Being, „touched upon by the m ind”, as Descartes says about God, „com pre hended and incom prehensible”, is revealed through an unavoidable experience to everyone who wants to think comprehensively his own ideas up to their grounds and conditionalities9.
T he m ajor weakness of this argum entation is pointed out by J. M aritain. His criticism refers to the subjective point of d eparture
6 Ibidem, 35-36.
7 E. Gilson, Bóg i filozofia, tlum z franc. M. Kochanowska, Warszawa 1961, 76. 8 Meditations III, 32.
for th e argum ent. T he argum entation begins here (like it is in the third argum ent), with th e idea of G od, and so with the content of hum an conscience. D escartes is looking for th e cause to the idea of G od in the hum an m ind. H e is not seeking to justify the existence of th e A bsolute on the ground of investigating the objective order in the world but in individual feelings and intim ate reaso ns10. T h e refore, som e authors po in t o u t that th e m ost dangerous consequ ence of the C artesian argum entation may be a suspicion to rend er the existence of G od d ep en d en t on hum an consciousness11.
In fact, D escartes faced a problem to guarantee th e reality to w hat is contained in affirm ations concerning the idea of G od. M a ny com m entators think th at within his philosophy he was not able to solve this problem adequately. It entailed significant effects that m anifested especially in the later period of m odern philoso phy. So a suspicion was alive th at even th e m ost pure idea of G od is no m ore th an an artifact of hum an conscience and thus a show of anthropom orphism , as B londel puts it, to elapse easily into ido- lolatry, w hat is equivalent to atheism . T he notorious m odern cri tics of th e Christianity like Feuerbach, Marx, Freud and Nietzsche m ade th eir attacks on theism precisely at this point: the idea of G od is no m ore th an an invention of hum an m ind, since G od does not exist really12.
A n o th er draw back of the above argum entation is its inseparable link w ith a m ind narrow proced ure far from the Revelation. It w o uld be quite futile to seek in the Meditations or in the Principles such questions as the divinity o f Jesus, resurrection, rew ard for d e eds, divine grace or G o d ’s Kingdom on earth. Instead, discussed th ere are: laws on the collision of bodies, star vorteces, com et m o vem ents, blood circulation, h eart anatom y etc. The Cartesianism had as its m ain appeal one offer: m ethod and rules for the direc tion of the mind. It advertised with one word: „the m ind”13. Such approach to the problem could lead to narrowing the concept of
10 Cf. J. M aritain, Le songe de Descartes, Paris 1932,176.
11 So thinks e. g. L. J. Elders in: Filozofia Boga. Filozoficzna teologia św. Tomasza
z Akwinu, tłum. z ang. M. Kiliszek, T Kuczyński, Warszawa 1992,19.
12 See m ore in: M. Westphal, Suspicion and faith. The religious uses o f modern athe
ism, Michigan 1993.
13 Cf. L. Kołakowski, Świadomość religijna i więź kościelna. Studia nad chrześcijań
Christian G od to m ean m erely C reato r of the world. T hat is the p o int w here „G od of philosophers” is isolated from „G od of reli gion”, the idea of the A bsolut is set apart from the idea of G od of religion. This kind of exclusion, although artificial, was eagerly ad vocated by som e m odern critics o f religion like L. Feuerbach.
3. T H E C A R T ESIA N C O N C E P T O F G O D A N D ITS S E C U L A R IS T E F F E C T S
D escartes, despite his being m ore a m athem atician, a physicist, a physician and a philosopher th an a theologian and though he let aside theological questions, nevertheless he produced, ipso facto, through his argum ents for the existence of G od, a certain concept of G o d ’s n ature. So it is justified to ask w hether the n atu re of C ar tesian G od is the sam e as th at of C hristian G od and w hat influen ce, if any, it had on the shape of m odern secularism?
A n answer to this question is far from easy, be it only for the evi d ent fact th at the philosophy of D escartes has so m any aspects. But to shed som e light on th e above problem it is worthwhile to quote one com m ent m ade by B. Pascal who died only 12 years after D e scartes: „I cannot forgive D escartes. H e would have liked, in the whole of his philosophy, to be able to by-pass God. But he could no t help m aking Him give a shove to set the world in m otion; after that, he has nothing fu rth er to do with G o d ”14. T he above com m ent, one out of m any sim ilar in content, is quoted h ere to point out th at thinkers o f th at tim e realized how risky was his m eaning of G o d ’s nature.
T he h e a rt of the problem seem s to stem from a narrow place left for G od within the whole system of D escartes, namely th at of th e highest cause of the world. In o th er words: G od appearing in this philosophy could have only one name: „C reator of the w orld”, whi le the Christian G od is far m ore than a C reator. This devise of Car- tesianism was raised a. o. by E. Gilson. H e pointed out th at G od of D escartes is only seemingly the sam e as Christian God, G od of St. Thom as. In fact, w hen St. Thom as converted the First U nm oved M over from the Physics o f A ristotle into the Christian notion of „T he O ne, W ho is”, he raised the first A ristotelian philosophical principle to the level of th e Christian concept of G od. But D
escar-14 B. Pascal, Pensées et opuscules, with an introduction and notes by L. Brunschvicg, Paris 1934, 77.
tes m ade it quite adverse: starting w ith th e sam e C hristian concept of G od, he reduced H im to the first philosophical principle i. e. the cause of the world, the source of its existence. T herefore, he consi dered only those divine attributes which brought to existence the world b u t the world had to correspond to his metaphysics i. e. to be a m echanical design w here everything is possible to be explained by geom etrical p roperties o f space and physical laws of nature.
N aturally, th e essence of th e infinite Being as understood in such a way, will be no m ore Ipsum Esse, as it was explained e. g. by St. Thom as but the very essence of C artesian G od is to be source of w orld’s existence. T herefore, the ultim ate act of G od is to be the cause for th e n atu re of the world. This transposition, as underlined by Gilson, has entailed serious consequences. „It is true that the C reator is, first of all, C hristian G od but it is also true th at G od the very essence of w hom is to be the C reator, is not at all C hristian God. The essence of true G od of the Christians is not to „create” but „to b e” („exist”). „The one, W ho exists” may also create, if he chooses to do so but he does not exist because of creating things or even by creating himself; H e may create because H e exists at the utm ost. Ostensibly then, th e C artesian G od, even as the highest philosophical cause was a failed G od (...): C hristian G od reduced to the level of phisophical principle; in one word, it was a m iserable hybrid of religious faith and of rational thought. The m ost striking character of such G od was th at his creating function did absorb to tally His essence. Since th en His nam e was to sound n ot „The One, W ho is” but „C auser of N a tu re ”. Obviously, C hristian G od was al ways „C reator o f N a tu re ” but H e has been always infinitely m ore than that, while, following D escartes, H e was doom ed to degrade to that and only to th a t” 15. So with D escartes there w ent astray and got lost the essence of G od which is the pure existence16. Descartes not only changed the concept of G o d ’s n atu re from „I am who I am ” (Ex 3,13) into the „C auser of N a tu re ” but also rem oved God from th e w orld in the sense th at though G od m aintains the world
15 E. Gilson, Jedność doświadczenia fdozoficznego, tium. z franc. Z. Wrzeszcz, War szawa 1968, 80-81.
16 That is pointed out also by John Paul II: „Descartes removed us from the philoso phy of existence and also from the traditional ways of St. Thomas. These ways lead us to God who is «the self-existence» - Ipsum esse subsistens”. Jan Pawel II, Pizekroczyć
in existence but does not intervene in it. T he world put into m otion follows its own rules i. e. the principles of m echanics. G od having designed the world, m anifestly abandoned it. T he A bsolut which filled its role could go away being of no fu rther use.
This concept of G od was influencing m ore and m ore the expe rience of G od in the religion of that tim e. So the religious rites b e cam e increasingly concentrated on G od whose essence was to cre ate, to be the first cause of the world. It is no hazard th at in the m iddle of X V II century deism em erged in W estern E u ro p e to be called a natural religion with no place left in it for the Revelation, the divinity o f Christ, and miracles. It was a purely reasonable reli gion, based precisely on the concept of G od C reator of the world and it was to replace religion grounded on R evelation17. A fo reru n ner of deism is held to be H erb ert of C herbury (+ 1648, philoso p h er and em bassador of E ngland to Paris) who stayed und er strong influence of D escartes’ rationalism 18.
It is worthwhile to look m ore closely into the ties o f C artesian philosophy with th ere em erging natural religion. W hat did D escar tes understand by philosophy? Philosophy m eans the study of wis dom, and by wisdom we understand not only „prudence in affairs but also a perfect knowledge of all things which m an can know both for th e conduct of his life and for th e conservation of his h e alth and the invention o f all a rts”19. Em phasized by the auth o r is the fundam ental role o f natural capabilities of the m ind and their usefulness in practical life. This resolved approach of D escartes to m atters of this world w ithout dwelling in the contents of the Reve lation is pointedly illustrated by an event in the life of th e philoso pher. Well, D escartes cam e to m eet, once, A nn M arie Schuurm an (+1678) who was one of th e m ost learn ed w om en of her tim es and stayed prim arily in friendly relationships with him. T he philoso pher found h er studying the Book o f Genesis in H ebrew and expressed his surprise th at a person so high capable wasted her ti me for so futile and useless things. D escartes added th at he him self
17 Cf. J. H. Hick, Philosophy o f religion, New Jersey 1990, 5.
ls Deism becam e widespread in the XVIIth century in England and France and from there went over to Germany, North America and Poland. In Poland deists were a. o. Stanisław Staszic (+1826) and Jędrzej Śniadecki (+1838).
19 Descartes, Rules fo r the Direction o f the Mind, in: Ch. Adam, P. Tannery (ed.),
once attem p ted to read th e first chapter of Genesis but could not get anything clear and distinct from the text and, instead, even gre ate r confusion occurred in his mind. So he never retu rn ed to the reading and was rath er concerned to forget it. Miss Schuurm an got so indignated by this com m ent that the m eeting ended with disrup tion of friendly ties20.
T he philosophy of D escartes, ap art from intentions of its author, w orked to w eaken the role of th e Revelation in religion; the Reve lation ceased to be a focal point of religion. Religion cam e to be m ore connected with th e reason than with th e Revelation. In the X V IIth century the W estern Christianity stood „in the face of a volcanic like eruption of C artesianism ” which with astonishing speed, during a couple o f years, altered the intellectual life of many circles. T he rapid extension o f Cartesianism was advanced a. o. due to a dynamic growth of natural sciences which, in turn, w orked that am ong those learned of th at tim e, m ore and m ore explicit was di strust concerning the Scholastic conceptual tools. T here followed a gradual lack o f interest in strictly theological problem s. M any ad m irers of D escartes’ teaching like Jo h n of B redenburg th e L u th e ran from R otterdam or H e rb u rt o f Cherbury w anted to create a ra tional deistic religion. They m aintained th at the R evelation brings nothing new or im portant to religion. In their view D escartes p ro vided sufficient argum ents for th e existence of G od following the principle o f causality. T he R evelation could only confirm or expla in that, for w hat the reason produces indisputable proofs. O n the concrete case o f Jo hn of B redenburgs one could notice not always easy to grasp connection betw een the C artesian m ethod and the n atu ral religion of deists and also with a theology of anthropocen- tric bias as suggested by that m ethod.
T he approach of some deists will be m ore and m ore radical. Fol lowing th e rationalist concept of knowledge including the C arte sian presum ption that th e cognition is true only when attaining cle ar and distinct ideas, they will becom e convinced after a tim e, th at
20 F. Copleston remarks: „It is not surprising that from time to time Descartes insi sted on the practical value of philosophy. The civilization of any nation, he says, is pro portionate to the superiority of its philosophy, and a State can have no greater good than the possession of true philosophy”. F. Copleston, A History o f Philosophy, vol. IV:
the R evelation of G od is no m ore th an a legend, a myth. They will dismiss every concept of mystery and m iracle events as well as p ro phetic predictions will be rep ud iated as a show of hum an ignorance and not G o d ’s intervention in the world. For deists G od will be like a w atchm aker or the suprem e designer o f the world m achine, as Fontenelle, Voltaire or R osseau p u t it. Deism having such ap pe aling propagators was gaining m ore and m ore wide circles not only in France and o th er E u ro p ean countries but also in N orth A m erica (It is rem arkable th at not only deism b u t also m odern pantheism takes som e inspiration from Cartesianism . W hen speaking about pantheism or identifying G od with natu re, it is not indispensable to recur to th e philosophy of B. Spinoza with his specific u n d erstan ding of God: „Deus sive n a tu ra ”. In fact, D escartes him self cam e to this conclusion when considering in th e Meditation VI, th e question of tru th concerning th e sensuous cognition as guaranteed ultim ate ly by G od him self who is not deceiver: „I conceive the nature, ge nerally taken, to be, at this m om ent, nothing else than G od him self or the o rd er of created things as established by G o d ”21.
To sum up the above considerations it has to be pointed out that the concept of God as found in the Cartesian philosophy, had rather little in comm on with G od of Christian religion and that, unfortuna tely, contributed to the rise of deism. The Cartesian G od appears to be „C reator of the world” and not „The O ne who is”. So not surpri sing is a defiance by Pascal: „The G od of the Christians is not a God who is simply the author of geometrical truths and of the order of the elements; this is a concept of the pagans and of the epicureans, (...) but the G od of Abraham , G od of Isaac, G od of Jacob; G od of Chri stians is G od of love and consolation; it is G od who fills hearts of tho se H e ownes”22. The philosophy of Descartes gradually discouraged interests in the truths of Revelation and, as a consequence, weakened the relationship of m an with the Transcendence. Unfortunately, ne ither Catholic n or Protestant theologians have been able to bring the Cartesian philosophy in line with theology. There was no repeat of what St. Thom as m ade with Aristotle. Perhaps this task would be im possible to accomplish. The very idea of Cartesian rationalism (that is the decisive role of reason and the claim to admit as true what is clear
21 Meditations VI, vol. VII, 79. 22 B. Pascal, Pensées et opuscules, 361.
and distinct) worked through its own inertia to lead its adherents into positions difficult to reconcile with supernatural faith and especially with revealed truths and, therefore, was gradually conducing to laici- zation of thinking and reinforcing m odern secularism23.
T O M A S Z S T Ę P IE Ń
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R EM A R K S ON N E O P L A T O N IS M AS A SY N TH ESIS O F A N C IE N T T H O U G H T
P R E F A C E
As we know, N eoplatonism was the last philosophical system created by ancient pagan philosophers. This system was very a t tractive to C hristian thinkers, who m ade it a basis for explaining C hristian faith. T herefore it becam e a p art of Christian philosophy of M iddle Ages. In the sam e tim e, when in E urop e falling Rom an E m pire left alm ost no culture and philosophy in the west, in the e astern lands conquered by A rabs, G reek texts w ere translated into Arabic, and the dawn of A rabic philosophy began. Writings of A ri stotle becam e the m ost popular, however A rabic philosophers read those texts in a neoplatonic way, because neoplatonic pagan philo sophers considered the thought of A ristotle as a p art o f their sys tem and in terp reted it in a specific way.
All this may seem obvious but at th e beginning I would like to show how im portant N eoplatonism is to understand both Christian and A rabic philosophy. P ro p er understanding of N eoplatonism is not a sim ple thing. Last few decades brought a lot of new studies on N eoplatonism , and it becom es clear, th at many things m ust be revised in understanding o f neoplatonic thought. Those studies h a ve shown a new vision of the last pagan system. I would like to p re sent only som e problem s of this vision, which in my opinion are of great im portance in studies on m edieval Christian and A rabic p h i losophy.
