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Logic and History of Science

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CREATION SCIENTIFIQE;

N. I. Rodny (U.S.S.R.)

LOGIC AND HISTORY OF SCIENCE

The significance of th e history of science has of late increased conside­ rably owing to new phenom ena in science, especially to th e im m ense increase in its rate of developm ent, w hich has led to ex trao rdinary complications in “scientific m anagem ent”. And this situation has set a task of extrem e im portance: th a t of disclosing the regularities of scien­ tific developm ent and of transform ations of the stru ctu re of scientific developm ent in th e course of the h isto ry of science.

This task can be solved exclusively on a historico-scientific basis by w ay of revealing the interconnections betw een the crucial m om ents in the evolution of science and disclosing th e m echanism of the logical situations, transition w ithin science; essentially this leads to a logical generalization of the history of science.

Thus, in our view to reveal the regularities of scientific developm ent is to establish the logic of scientific developm ent. The developm ent of science is an indivisible process of a t least three “dim ensions”; evolution of science as a system of knowledge (this “dim ension” of science is characterized by m axim um dynam ism and in this respect it considerab­ ly excels th e dynam ism of other branches of hum an activity), its logical stru ctu re and, finally, its “dim ension” as a social institution, as a d efini­ te means of activity. The last “dim ension” of science comprises the system of th e relations of science to other form s and fields of h u m an activités (its “ex teral” aspect) and its “in tern al” aspect consisting of such elem ents as forms of organization of science, types of hum an re la ­ tions in science etc.; th e ir study is a prerogative of the science of science or of the sociology of science.

The concept of the in tern al logic of science comprises th e develop­ m ent of its ideological content, of its subject aspect of its logical stru c ­ ture, i. e. types of bonds betw een such components of science as hypo­ thesis, m ethod, theory, and experim ent; the m entioned components are inseparably linked together.

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42 N. I. R odny

As a rule, by the in tern al logic of the developm ent of science the following complex of its “p rop erties” are understood: 1) th a t the deve­ lopm ent of science is an autonomous process, in w hich th e affiliation of ideas is fundam ental, 2) th a t science functions as a self-registering system, and 3) consequently, th a t th e im m anent regularities clearly do­ m inate over th e im pulses of developm ent w hich science receives from outside. The acknow ledgem ent of science as an autonomous system does not preclude the acknow ledgem ent of the im m ense influence w hich science exerts upon th e form ation of th e general stru ctu re of thought and upon the developm ent of technology.

The problem of th e relation betw een the in tern al im pulses of deve­ lopm ent and the ex tern al influences in science is one of th e im portant facets of the problem of regularities.

To deny the role of th e in tern al logic in the developm ent of science is as incorrect as to ignore the significance of the “influence” of external factors upon this process.

The “action” of the internal logic of scientific developm ent is as follows:

1) The developm ent of ideological-content aspect of science, includ­ ing both the evolutionary and the revolutionary periods in th e history of science, is determ ined by th e past history, especially by the logical situation of its im m ediate period. Considering the first tw o “dim ensions” of science, i. e. the system of knowledge and th e logical stru ctu re, we thus establish the unique tren d ra th e r th an the principle of m any possibilities, operating in the developm ent of science. The situation can

be illu strated correspondingly: on a complex curve of the developm ent of science point A represents the situation characterized by K uhn as th e crisis of the old paradigm w hich has lost the ability to assim ilate new facts and produce new scientific results; in result, science has entered a revolutionary phase of its developm ent, which, in addition, is characte­ rized by the uprise of conceptual activity, acquiring a diveregent cha­ racter at the given stage (see Fig. 1).

A nother problem arises here: w h eth er the developm ent of science could have taken th e paths AC, or AD etc. (Actually it developed along AB as it is shown by retrospective analysis.)

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A reconaissance of various paths is carried out d u rin g the ch aracte­ rized period; th a t results p artly in the elaboration of concepts to be overcome com paratively soon in the course of the fu rth e r developm ent of science.

G enerally, all theoretical works done w ithin a tran sitio n period in th e developm ent of science can be divided into th ree groups: w orks being futile attem pts to adopt th e old paradigm to a new logical situ a­ tion arising in science; studies aim ing at new concepts generally in ad e­ quate in th e ir treatm en t of th e “b u rn in g ” problem s a t this stage of the h istory of science: finally, studies elaborating a new and adequate paradigm. As an exam ple of th e second group, we m ay cite the energetics of Ostwald in which attem p ts are m ade to overcome th e lim itations of th e m echanistic outlook in science ( “solve everything in m echanics” , to quote from Helmholtz); however, the resu lts did not correspond to th e intentions.

Retrospective analyses of the developm ent of science always indicate th a t the direction along w hich science has been developing is th e only possible direction of its movement, determ ined by th e whole of its previous history. N aturally, th a t does not signify th a t extrem e possibili­ ties of science are fully realized at each stage of th e history, and th a t fu rth e r achievem ents w ere not possible in conditions of th e fundam ental ideas and experim ental techniques th en existing. B ut th e sequence of th e system of ideas and th e ir developm ent is a reg u lar process; accidents are im portant to the ex ten t th a t the w ays along w hich scientists arriv e a t accidental results are “inscrutable” ; however, th e ir occurrence has the feature of inevitability in it w hich can be fu lly revealed b y an analysis of th e respective scientific events and phenom ena.

2) Hence it follows th a t each period in th e developm ent of science contains a “vector” of its fu rth e r development.

3) F u rth er, th e concept of th e in tern al logic comprises notions of the occurence (and active functioning) of in tern al im pulses in th e develop­ m ent of science.

4) Contradictions in h ere n t to science constitute these im pulses of developm ent; firstly, the “general”, all-em bracing contradiction, to be elim inated b ut still irrem ovable, reviving like Phoenix from th e ru in s— the contradiction betw een science as an open system and th e relativ ely closed n atu re of scientific theories representing a stric t system of no­ tions. The consideration of th e in tern al logic of science as a factor of great significance to its developm ent, as a factor determ ining the move­ m ent of its ideological aspect and logical stru c tu re does not in this sense signify an adherence to the views on science as a self-regulating system and on its evolution qualifications as an autonom ous process.

The developm ent of science exhibits also a social logic, w hich is de­ term ined by its connections w ith o ther social institutions; th a t d e te r­

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44 N. I. R odny

mines to some degree th e “clim ate” in w hich science exists and the n u ­ m erous consequences.

The im pact of the social logic on the developm ent process of science m anifests itself in its influence on the following aspects: a) th e rate of its developm ent, b) th e determ ination of the them es of science (setting up tasks w ith uneven possibilities of solutions and possible to be em ploy­ ed in practice); c) the determ ination of the type of connections betw een science and other social institutions. The action of “social logic” is m e­ diated by the in tern al logic of science which passes through it, “urges” it and finally gets converted into it. The view w hich ascribes the deve­ lopm ent process of science solely to its constant stim ulation w ith socio- -economic factors and underrates th e great action of th e in tern al logic is one-sided and therefore erroneous.

The internal logic of science and th e social logic of its developm ent do not occur together and are not extern al to each other; th ey are de­ finitely connected. W hat is the “o th er side” of interaction between science and society, w hich acts as th e influence of society on the deve­ lopm ent of science? This aspect of interaction is related to th e natu re of science as a social institution; th e principal function of th e la tte r is to generate systems of knowledge and certain types of ideas and to obtain certain solutions from a definite mom ent in the history of science. The value of th a t function increases and is converted into a necessary condition for the reproduction of all fields of social activity; science increasingly expands into all “pores” of social life and tu rn s into the most im portant field of activity.

The problem of regularities in th e developm ent of science includes p rim arily the problem of the relations betw een the logical and the historical. The first aspect of the la tte r problem is th a t th e logical appears as the cognition of the essence of the historical, i. e. it unfolds the principles of its development, th e regularities of its movement.

The cognition of th e actual historical advance in the developm ent of science involves its logical generalization, e. g., in th e elaboration of the universal and necessary mom ents of this advance, in th e elucidation of its actual occurrence and of its motive powers.

To reveal the logic of science m ovem ent is to unfold th e features of generality and necessity, w hich determ ine the m ovem ent of the flow of science and represent its central lines.

If history reveals the picture of the process in its whole diversity and richness of concrete forms of the development, logic clarifies the determ inant of this process and its necessity; it fu rth e r shows the tra n s­ form ation of the results of the process into th e obligatory condition of its fu rth e r development.

Thus, the logical constitutes the m ain line of the flow of developm ent in scientific thought, w hich consists of m any units; every last unit

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possessing the whole pow er of the previous developm ent and d eterm in ­ ing th e successive developm ent.

“Extending” this line means, essentially, a characterizing of the dom inant of the developm ent process in science, liberated from zigzags and fluctuations. From this point of view, th e logical appears as th e historical rectified; it represents a generalization of th e la tte r (not in th e sense of revealing th e m ost general traits, in h eren t to diverse histo­ rical phenom ena b u t in the sense of establishing the laws of th e ir m o­ vement).

The conception of the logical as th e historical rectified, as its axis in w hich all the elem ents are necessarily connected “following” from one another was advanced by M arxist classics. Engels pointed out th a t the only appropriate m ethod was logical consideration. Essentially, this m ethod was nothing b u t th e historical m ethod; however, it was lib era­ te d from its historical form and in accidence. (See:: F. Engels’ article in K. M arx’s book Z ur K ritik der politischen Ökonomie.) “A t first sight this form has a great advantage of g reater clarity, since rea l develop­ m en t is observed there; however, such a form could actually be at best only popular. H istory often takes recourse to jum ps and zigzags, and if we follow its course in the reverse order, th en —and owing to th a t—not only attention could be paid to m aterial of m uch lesser im portance bu t also the chain of thought w ould have to be v ery often broken.” 1

The problem of th e relations betw een th e logical and th e historical has another aspect: the relation betw een the role played by some scien­ tific category in the history of science and its significance and place in a certain scientific system form ed afte r the b irth of this category. The question was thus answ ered by K. M arx: “thus, it is inaccessible and erroneous to consider the economic categories in th a t sequence, in w hich th ey historically played decisive roles. On the o th er hand, th e ir sequence is determ ined by the relation in w hich th ey stand to each o th er in mo­ d ern bourgeois society, and this relation is in contradiction to w hat seems n atu ra l or corresponding to the sequence of historical develop­ m en t.” 2

The role of an individual scientific category in th e system is n a tu ­ rally determ ined not by its significance in th e past, bu t by the charac­ te r of the given system, by its totality, th e law of its m ovem ent w hich consists in the successful developm ent of its possibilities and in h eren t potentialities. The m ovem ent of a scientific system , as a rule, takes th e direction of elaboration of a more closed circuit as com pared w ith the in itial stages of this process, and th a t leads to an “explosion” of the con­ tradiction betw een this system and science as an open system.

1 K. M arx and F. Engels, Selected W orks in Tw o Volum es, Moskva 1948, pp. 332 (Russian edn.).

2 K. M arx, Zur K ritik der politischen Ö konomie, Moskva 1949, p. 221 (Russian edn.).

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46 N. I. Rodny

A determ ination of the given system in the chain of scientific deve­ lopm ent n atu ra lly presupposes th e relation betw een its most m ature form , corresponding to the stage at which it “realizes” all its potentia­ lities and liberates itself from “relics” and the whole of the previous and successive stages in the developm ent of science.

The logical m ethod in terp reted as a “corrective” to the historical research makes possible the investigation of th e subject in its most m a­ tu re form.

The subject is, Engels w rote, not the logical process solely, but the historical process, its reflection in thought and its interpretation, logi­ cally tracing its in tern al connections.3

A nother aspect of the problem of the historical and the logical is the problem of the relation betw een phylogeny and ontogenesis of h u ­ man cognition. Moreover, the la tte r problem has at least two aspects: “educational” and “scientific”. Previous to the advent of M arxist philo­ sophy the problem was set by Hegel and solved w ith a m ethod contain­ ing th e consistent principles of historism .

An individual, Hegel wrote, should in content pass the stages of the education of the mind; however, these are forms left by the mind, a well-developed, equalized path; thus, in regard of cognitions, we see th a t w hat at earlier stages occupied th e m ature m ind of m en is reduced to cognitions, exercises and even puerile plays, and the advance of teach­ ing enables us to recognize in a concise form the history of the whole w orld en lig h ten m en t.4

Thus, from this point of view, th e history of the m oral developm ent of moulding the individual also reproduces the m oral developm ent of all m ankind. In his m oral evolution a young m an m ust necessarily re ­ peat all the stages passed for long by m ankind.

The concept of th e given type of relations between ontogenesis and phylogeny received fu rth e r developm ent in th e so-called second bioge- netic law. Up to the present epoch, this is among the m ain problems faced by the pedagogical science. However, we are in terested in a diffe­ ren t aspect of the problem of th e relation betw een phylogeny and onto­ genesis, in other words—in the revealing of phylogeny, its concentra­ ted and pure reproduction w ithin the ontogenetic movem ent of know­ ledge.

Essentially Hegel speaks of this aspect when saying: science reproduces this educational m ovem ent in all its completeness and nece­ ssity.” 5

The ontogenetic m ovem ent of knowledge reflects the phylogeny of s F. Engels, S upplem ent to the th ird volume of Das Kapital: cf. K. Marx, Das Kapital, vol. Ill, p. 908 (Russian edn.).

4 K. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 15 (Russian edn.). 5 Ibid., p. 15.

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knowledge; it passes th rough a num ber of essential points in phyloge­ netic developm ent, the la tte r being points of issue for ontogenetic de­ velopment.

A study in any field of science w ith a histo ry (in th a t this is not a new ly discovered fragm ent of reality) reproduces history and repeats its most essential stages.

Let us consider, for exam ple, th e kinetics of chemical reactions. S tu ­ dies in this field pass the m utu ally connected stages, mutatis mutandis, w hich repeat definite stages of its history. Thus the startin g point of these researches is the study of the phenom enology of reactions, th a t is, the determ ination of the stechiom etrie reactions and the dependence of the reaction rate on the concentration of reacting substances. This stage of study corresponds to the first stage in th e developm ent of chem ical kinetics, w hen th e la tte r was engaged in establishing the m entioned de­ pendence and developing criteria for a kinetic classification of th e reac­ tion.

The second object of the stu dy is to establish tem p eratu re dependence on the reaction rate, w hich is an in teresting problem in itself, b u t p rin ­ cipally serves as a means to determ ine th e m ain dynam ical p aram eter of th e reacting system —the energy of activation.

The next stage is the study of the reaction m echanism, i. e. revealing the elem entary reactions w hich in their to tality postulate the given che­ mical transform ation, and the identification as w ell as the determ ination of param eters of interm ediate particles (radicals, atoms, ions etc.). The entire research w hich aims to determ ine the rate and m echanism of reac­ tions in th e ir inseparable links, included all the stages w hich we have enum erated above. Thus, the entire cycle of study in th e kinetics of reactions—from phenom enology to th e detailed study of its m echanism s by various m ethods of m odern science—repeats th e most essential stages of the developm ent of chemical kinetics, i. e. ontogenesis is necessarily reproducing th e most essential and fundam ental in phylogeny of the given branch of science.

A sim ilar relation betw een ontogenesis and phylogeny exists in other branches of chem istry, e. g. in organic chem istry. The studies in organic compounds s ta rt w ith the determ ination of th e ir elem entary composi­ tion, which at the early stages of organic chem istry w as the acme of study, and served as the most pow erful tool in th e cognition of organic compounds. D eterm ination of functional groups and radicals of this group corresponding in “ideal” relation to the last stages of p restru e- tu ra l chem istry, though considerably m ore effective and safe owing to m odern techniques, follows as the next stage.

The nex t problem to be solved is th a t of establishing the stru c tu re of this compound, i. e. th e determ ination of th e type of bonds betw een atoms in its molecule w ith the help of classical organic chem istry by

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48 N. I. Rodny

means of destructuralization of th e given molecule and identification of the fragm ents.

The investigation is closed w hen the determ ination of the m olecular geom etry is achieved, i. e. the interatom ic distances, valent angles etc. are established. In this way, th e whole history of organic chem istry w ith all its essential features is inh erent in these studies.

Thus we have generally exam ined all the aspects of the problem of relations betw een the logical and th e historical in the developm ent of scientific knowledge: 1) the logical as the historical “rectified” ; 2) the lo­ gical as the highest form in the developm ent of a given m ethod to co­ gnize the corresponding fragm ent of reality and 3) the logic of th e re­ production of the phylogenetic process by ontogenetic development.

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