fr
NVIRONMEN
PROTECTION
Offshore North Sea 1974
Technology Conference and Exhibition
Stavanger - Norway Sept 3rd - 6th
ARCH1EF
Technische Hogeschool
SAFETY AND
Delft
7
-4-COPYRIGU:
REPRODUCTION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT WRITTEN PERMISSION FROM 0 N S-74 AND THE AUTHORS
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SECTION
S-II/1 RIG CASUALTIES
-STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS 1 - 38
J.R. Huff
Manager Engineering and Construction Western Oceanic, Inc., U.S.A.
S-II/2a SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR THE PETROLEUM
ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH SEA 1 - 10
N. Vogt
Director of Legal and Economic Dept. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Norway
S-II/2b NATIONAL EFFORTS IN DEALING WITH OIL POLLUTION IN NORWEGIAN COASTAL WATERS AND AT SEA (OFFSHORE) AND THE NORDIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN NORWAY, DENMARK,
FINLAND AND SWEDEN ON MEASURES AGAINST POLLUTION OF SEA BY OIL
E. Reichborn-Kjennerud Counsellor
Norwegian Directorate of Harbours, Norway
S-II/2c SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS APPLIED BY THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AS A PART OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR OFFSHORE INSTAL-LATIONS
A CASE STUDY FROM A SPECIFIC PLAT-FORM AREA
P. le Rest
Managing Director Elf Norge A/S, Norway
1 - 7
6
ee_-1;e5
P.T.O.
Code Title Pages
S-II/3 INFORMATION, WARNING AND RESCUE
SERVICES FOR THE NORTH SEA AREA 1 - 17 J. Hielm
Rescue Controller
Rescue CoOrdination Centre -Stavanger, Norway
S-II/4 LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 1 - 15 C.A. Fleischer
Dr. of Laws
Professor at the University of Oslo Special Consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
S-II/5 ECOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF OFFSHORE
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 1 - 23 S.F. Moore
Assistant Professor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
U.S.A.
G.R. Chírlin
Research Assistant, MIT C.J. Puccia
Research Assistant, MIT B.P. Schrader
Research Assistant, MIT
S-II/1
RIG CASUALTIES - STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS
John R. Huff
Manager Engineering and
Construction
Western Oceanic, Inc.
U. S. A.INTRODUCTION
The offshore drilling industry was started in 1949 with the
introduction of
the first mobile unit capable of drilling in 20 feet of water. In the
inter-vening 25 years, the industry has grown to an operating fleet of 249 with
an additional 140 vessels due to be in service by 1977.*
In this interval, the world has consumed
energy at a rapidly accelerated
rate going from 690 million tons a year in 1959 to the present 2120 million
tons a year.
The forecasted demand for the decade through 1980 is an
in-crease to 3500 million tons per year.
With this expanding energy need,
the marine areas of the world have become a prime exploration target for
the international oil industry. Today nearly 18% of the free world's crude
production comes from the offshore
areas.
By 1980, some experts project
that 30-35% of the production will
come from beneath the ocean.
In this build up of equipment, the offshore contractors hav e expended over
$1.9 billion with an additional $2.2 billion allocated for new equipment
presently on order. And, as in
any pioneering venture, they have had their
share of losses.
Considering casualties that caused accidents
of
approxi-mately $500,000 in estimated damages, the industry has paid out $198,500,000
in losses.
Of this amount, $38.3 million has been
for six losses in the North
Sea.
*Additional rig projection is based on number under contract for construction
as of April 1974.
Submersibles
The first mobile rig type was the submersible.
This pioneering vessel
was popular in the shallow water areas where it was floated to the drill
site and ballasted until the mat or lower support rested on the bottom. In
general, most of their problems centered around scouring of the support
structure and loss of stability during the transition of raising and lowering.
Figure 1.
Transworld RIG 40 was the first offshore mobile unit.
General Categories of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (Continued)
Floaters
Floating style rigs come in a variety of shapes and sizes.
They run the
gamut from converted barges to $30 million dynamically positioned
drill-ships.
They all have in common the classic designs of the Naval Architect
and reflect the historical lines of the ship. Major problems with these units
have been excessive motions leading to inefficient operations.
Figure 2.
The Offshore Company's DISCOVERER Class with patented
turret mooring.
General Categories of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (Continued)
Jack-ups
The jack-up rig has grown in popularity since the mid-1960's, and
cur-rently ranks as the leader in rig
types.
This rig is characterized by a
barge hull supporting the drilling
equipment and legs with some type
jack-ing mechanism capable of
elevating the hull above any anticipated wave
action.
The major worry with this type has been the movement from one
location to the next.
f'i,Lzure 3.
Western Oceanic's three-leg jaCk-up WESTERN
STAR on
location in the Gulf of Mexico.
General Categories of Mobile Offslacire Drilling Units (Continued)
Semisubiliersibles
In the last few years, the semisubnlersible has emerged as a favorite for
exploration in the deeper and more hostile environments.
This type unit
is towed or self-propelled to the location and partially ballasted to
mini-mize the motions and ancho red while drilling. Structural failures due to
environmental loadings have been the major problems associated with these
units.
Figtire 4.
Western Oceanic's sernisubmersible WESTERN PACESETTER I
on location in the North Sea.
240
220
200 -180 160 140 crw120
100-Z
80
-
60-40 20I I
NIII
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57 TABLE 1.7 58 59 GO 61 62 6364
65 66 6768
69 70 71 72 73(APRIL)74 YEARS22 20 4 2 o
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TABLE 1.8 YEARS 1955 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 6364
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 (APRIL)(9 150 140 130 120 HO 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
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1955 56
57 58 59 60 61 62 6364
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 7273
(APRL)74 TABLE 1.8.1 YEARS I ----1 ! ..'
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1955 56 57 50 59 60 61 62 6364
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 (APRIL) TABLE 1.9 YEARSn
30 _J izto
25 11-1 .4*(1 X 20 -CI w <0.- 1-M 15 - F-cn 10 -5 TABLE 1.10M
1955 56 57 58 59 60o
72 73 74 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 (APRIL) YEARSHISTORY OF CASUALTIES
Table 1.1 summarizes the number of accidents, costs, and
fatalities
associated with mobile offshore drilling units since 1955. Table 1.2
summarizes and categorizes those accidents by type.
Tables 1.3, 1.4,
1.5, and 1. 6 are comprehensive lists of casualties for
each type -
Sub-mersibles, Floaters, Jack-ups, and Semisubmersibles.
Table 1.7 presents the cumulative total of rigs operating each year.
This
information assumes all rigs were busy during the entire year.
Table 1.8
presents the approximate dollar valuations of those units for each year.
Table 1.8.1 presents in graphic form the various type rigs
operating each
year.
Table 1.9 presents the number of casualties resulting from
estimated
losses to each rig of approximately $0.5 million for each year. Table 1.10
presents the total dollar vaulations of those accidents for each year.
TABLE 1-2
SUMMARY RIG CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
S-II/1
Type
Industrial
Marine
Estimated
Cost of
Damage
MovingStorm
Submersible
22.3
Submersible
23.0
Submersible
23.6
Floater
512.2
Floater
21.7
Floater
46.7
Jack-Up
835.0
Jack-Up
2769.1
Jack-Up
7 15.1Sen-iisubmersible
26.3
AlSemisubmersible
17.5
Semis ubmersible
6 36. 0Industrial
17 Costing
$55.8
Marine
Moving32 Costing
$81.3
Storm
19 Costing
$61.4
TABLE 1 - 1
SUMMARY RIG CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
S- II /1
Tyne
Number
Accidents
Estimated.
Cost of
Damage
Number of
Fatalities
Submersible
6 $8.9
23Jack-Ups
42$119.2
26Semis ubmersible
9$ 49.8
13Floater
11$ 20.6
38 TOTALS 68$198.5
100SUBMERSIBLE RIG CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
I
Year of
Rig T_ype
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated '
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
(S Million)
I 1Description of Casualty
RigStatus
1Subm. 1955 1954
1.8
1.8
Blow Out
Salvaged
Subm. 1955 1954
2.0
1.6
Under Toy.,Salvaged
I
Subm. i 1956 1956
1.5
1.4
Moving On/Off
Salvaged
Subm. 1957 1956
2.1
2.1
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
Subm. 1961 1956
3.0
1.5
Severe Storm
Salvaged
Subm.
1972 19573.0
0.5
Blow Out
Salvaged
FLOATING RIG CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
R. g Type
Year of
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
($ Million)
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
Shipshape-Barge
1959 19591.3
1.3
Under Tow
Not Salvaged
Barge
1962 19573.0
3.0
Severe Storm
Not Salvaaed
o'
Shipshape-Catamaran
1964 19622.3
2.3
Blow Out
Not Salvaged
!
1
Shipshape
1966 19591.5
1.5
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
Tender
1969 19641.5
1.5
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
Barge
1969 19624.5
0.4
Under Tow
Salvaged
Barge
i
1969 1964
5.5
0.5
Blow Out
Salvaged
FLOATING RIG CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
1 1Rig Type
1Year of
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
$ Million)
Estimated
Damage
($ Million)
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
Barge
1970 19656.0
0.7
Normal Condition
Salvaged
Shipshape
1970 19708.6
0.6
Blow Out
Salvaged
Barge
1971 19624.5
4.5
Blow- OutNot Salvaged
Barge
1971 19704.0
4.3
Blow Out
Salvaged
JACK-UP CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
Rig Type
Year of
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
($ Million)
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
14-leg
1955 19553.0
0.3
Moving On/Off
Salvaged
8-leg
1957 19551.7
1.7
Moving On/Off
Not Salvaged
8-leg Mat
1957 19552.5
2.5
Under Tow
Not Salvaged
3-leg
1957 19551.6
1.6
Normal Condition
Not Salvaged
1958 1956
3.0
0.7
Under Tow
Salvaged
3-leg Mat
1958 19582.0
2.0
Unde r Tow
Not Salvaged
12-leg
1959 19583.2
3.2
Moving On/Off
Not Salvaged
3-leg
1959 19585.0
1.0
Blow Out
Salvaged
8-leg
1961 19563.0
1.6
Under Tow
Salvaged
JACK-UP CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
Year of
Rig Type
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
($ Million)
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
6-leg Mat
1965 19582.5
2. 5Under Tow
Salvaged
3-leg
1965 19636.0
6. 0Blow Out
Not Salvaged
3-leg
1965 19656.5
1.7
Under Tow
Salvaged
4-leg
1965 19595.0
1.5
Under Tow
Salvaged
3-leg
1965 19635.7
5.7
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
4-leg
1965 19611.5
1.5
Blow Out
Not Salvaged
10-leg
1965 19653.6
3.6
Moving On/Off
Not Salvaged
14-leg
1966 19553.0
0.2
Normal Condition
Salvaged
6-leg
1966 19657.0
7.0
Moving On/Off
Not Salvaged
JACK-UP CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
Year of
Rig Type
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
($ Million)
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
3-leg
1968 19666.5
2.0
Under Tow
Salvaged
4-leg
1968 19672.0
2.0
Normal Condition
Salvaged
3-leg
1968 19642.0
2.0
Blow OutNot Salvaged
4-leg
1969 19665.8
5.8
Under Tow
Not Salvaged
4-leg
1969 19692.5
2.0
Under Tow
Salvaged
3-leg
1969 19562.3
2.3
Under Tow
Salvaged
4-leg
1970 19699.0
0.3
Severe Storm
Salvaged
3-leg
1970 19614.0
4.0
Moving On/Off
Not Salvaged
3-leg
1970 19662.5
2.5
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
JACK-UP CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
Rig, Type,--Year of
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
($ Million
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
_
3-leg Mat
1970 19654.8
3.5
Blow Out
Salvaged
8-leg
1971 19564.0
2.8
Severe Storm
Salvaged
3-leg
1971 19658.0
1.7
Under Tow
Salvaged
3-leg
1972 19697.5
7.5
Blow Out
Not Salvaged
4-leg
1972 197110.0
5.5
Blow Out
Salvaged
3-leg Mat
1972 19698.0
8.0
Blow Out
Not Salvaged
3-leg
1972 19656.0
3.5
Moving On/Off
Salvaged
4-leg
1972 197212.0
2.0
Under Tow
Salvaged
JACK-UP CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
Iii.gpe
Accident
Year of
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
($ Million)
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
I
3-leg
1973 19728.5
4.5
Moving On/Off
Salvaged
3-leg
1973 19729.0
2.0
Moving On/Off
Salvaged
4-leg
1974 19672.0
2. 0Under Tow
Not Salvaged
SEMISUBMERSIBLE RIG CASUALTIES SINCE 1955
_
I
Estimated
Original
Estimated
Year of
Year
Cost
Damage
Rig'
Rig Type
Accident
Built
($ Million)
($ Million)
Description of Casualty
Status
i
Semi
4-Column
I 1964 19577.5
7.5
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
Semi
I
3- Colun-in 1965 1965
7.5
7.5
Under Tow
Not Salvaged
Semi
6-Column
1968 19666.7
6.7
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
Semi
6-Column
1969 19685.7
0.2
Severe Storm
Salvaged
Semi
3-Column
1969 196810.0
4.0
Blow Out
Salvaged
Semi
4-Column
1970 197010.0
0.8
Severe Storm
Salvaged
Semi
SEMISUBMERSIBLE CASUAL TIES SINCE 1955
Rig Type
Year of
Accident
Year
Built
Estimated
Original
Cost
($ Million)
Estimated
Damage
(S Million)
Description of Casualty
Rig
Status
Semi
4 - C olumn 1974 1973
20.0
20.0
Severe Storm
Not Salvaged
Semi
4-Column
1974 197010.0
0.8
Severe Storm
Salvaged
TOTALS
83.1
49.8
,
PATTERNS IN CASUALTIES
The jack-up unit has suffered the greatest number and amount of losses.
Of the total amount sustained, over 60% is attributed to the jack-ups.
Atpresent there are 125 of these units operating with an average age of 7.8
years. It is interesting to note that the average age at the time of total
loss was four years.
There are 63 floating rigs presently operating with an average age of 7.3
years.
The average age at the time of total loss was 4.7 years.
The submersible design was used 41 times with 20 rigs still active.
The
average service age is 16 years. At the time of total loss, the average
age was one year.
The current boom in semisubmersible rigs shows 48 operating.
With an
average service age of 4.9 years, it is the newest type.
The average age
at the time of total loss was 2.2 years.
From these various statistics and information, the following generalizations
emerged.
Jack-ups have the worst safety record and
are particularly vulnerable to accidents
while moving.
Submersibles have had the best safety
re-cord and have the longest average life in
service.
The 20 presently in service
re-present approximately 50% of the total
Patterns in Casualties (Continued)
number constructed. Various rigs were
converted, but qualitatively, it
appears
that a useful rig life
may be something
less than 20 years.
Service value for
rigs will probably prove to be less than
the normal operating life of cargo ships.
Floating rigs exhibited a slightly older
average age at total loss.
This may be
partially due to the fact that a ship is
more conventionally designed and
con-structed.
It is interesting, though, that
approxi-mately half the casualties related
tofloaters are the result of industrial
acci-dents.
Possibly the loss in operating
efficiency is translated to a lapse in
operating safety.
Semisubmersibles appear to be the most
subject to structural storm damage.
The
greatest dollar loss due to storms
was
re-corded in this category.
This may be
somewhat overstated, however,
consider-ing that one recent casualty accounted
for
Patterns in Casualties
(Continued)
nearly hail* the total amount.
Marine related casualties for all rig types
that resulted in no salvage showed that the
average age at the time of loss due to
moving was 2.8 years and 3.8 years due
to severe storms.
Eight out of twelve
total loss accidents to jack-ups that
occurred while moving happened within
two years of the initial operation.
Proto-type rigs have shown a higher tendency to
early losses.
The worst ratio of dollar losses occurred
in 1965 when 6.1% of the total value of all
operating units were damaged.
Discounting
1955 and 1957 because of the small number
of rigs working, 1965 was also the worst
year for the casualties loss ratio with eight
out of 115 working units or 7.0% of the total
operating fleet damaged.
The offshore drilling industry has operated
some 2583 rig-years with a total loss of 22
rigs that could not be salvaged. This also
translates roughly into one death for each
-:'Based on total rigs operating from Table 1.7 times 32 average men per
rig.
Patterns in Casualties
((.7,ontintied)300,000 man-days worked.
Accumulating all years from 1955 to the
present, the casualty ratio of number of
rigs damaged to number of rigs operating
is 3.4%.
SLnce 1964, the first year more
than 100 rigs were in ope ration, the ratio
has been 2.7%.
The average ratio of
casualty losses divided by valuation of
operating equipment has been 2. 1% from
1955 to present and 1.8% from 1964 to
present.
It seems reasonable to assume
that a casualty ratio probability of 3%
could be expected each year with estimated
damage losses each year amounting to
ap-proximately 2% of the value of the operating
fleet.
CAUSES OF CASUALTIES
From the preceeding section, we have examined the statistics
of mobile
drilling unit casualties.
From this information emerged two general
types; casualties related to the industrial nature of the business and
casualties related to the marine environment.
1.
Industrial
Thc most disastrous type industrial accident in the drilling industry is the
blowout.
This occurs when the drilling enters an area of abnormally high
pressure gas and the well cannot be shut in or contained.
The gas escaping
from the bore hole will sometimes ignite and the
drilling rig is quickly
re-duced to a burning hulk of iron. In addition, blowouts around subsea
well-heads and drive pipe are capable of aereating the water to such a point
that the water density is no longer capable of furnishing the required
buoy-ancy and the vessel may sink. Also, scouring from the escaping gas around
mats, legs, or other bottom supports can be enough to
cause foundation
failures and subsequent damage to the rigs.
An examination of the drilling and blowout rate in the Gulf of Mexico over
the period 1953-1971 reveals that during two main periods, 1956-1960 and
1964-1969, the percentage of new wells drilled by mobile units and platform
rigs resulting in blowouts was approximately 0.2%.
Causes of Casualties
(Continued)
In the future, if blowouts persist at the rate for the period 1964-1971, then
for every 10,000 new well starts, it
can be expected that there will be 22
1
well blowouts.
2
Based on having drilled 7644 offshore exploration wells from 1970-1972
resulting in eight mobile rig accidents, the above expected rate of one
blowout in every 450 wells drilled may be slightly exaggerated.
Because
of a lack of substantial information regarding
land blowouts but based on
discussions with various industry rePresentatives,
the rate for land
acci-dents would be slightly less than offshore.
Equipment vendors have designed complex underwater
blowout prevention
and control systems that cost well over $1 million. "Stacks" are getting
bigger and more massive with
some equipment weighing over 100 tons
and standing as tall as a four story building. Contractors are employing
specialists just to maintain and operate these complex systems.
In
addi-tion, operators are planning and carefully evaluating their well programs
to guard against the threats of this type accident.
Good equipment, proper
well design, sound operating policies, and especially, well trained people
will go a long way toward alleviating this type of casualty.
1
Don E. Kash, et al., Energy Under the
Oceans, University of Oklahoma
Press, Publishing Division of the University, Norman, Oklahoma, 1974.
p. 238.
2
Causes of Casualties
(Continued)
2.
Marine
The marine environment has been the
major contributor to casualty
acci-dents in the offshore drilling industry. Over 70% of the casualty losses
have been the result of damage due to storms or moving, and not even
related to the primary functions of drilling.
It has been in this area that
the industry has concentrated a great deal of recent effort in organizing
sound operational practices and utilizing
realistic design criteria.
DESICiN CRITE,RIA AND OPERA.TING STANDARDS
There has been a rapid increase
in design sophistication in the last decade.
New analysis techniques, material science innovations and life cycle
fa-tigue studies have given the designer new capabilities in the prediction of
structural adequacy and life.
Coupled with new methods
of determining
hy-drodynamic loads, offshore vessels can now be more confidently designed
to withstand the intended
environment.
In 1968, the American Bureau of Shipping issued their
first set of ''Rules
for Building and Classing Offshore Mobile Drilling Units''. These rules
were the result of a joint effort by
industry leaders and the American
Bureau of Shipping technical staff. The Det Norske Ventas
published
their "Principles for
Classification of Offshore Drilling Platforms" in
1970, and Lloyd's Register of
Shipping followed in 1972
with their "Rules
for the Construction and
Classification of Mobile
Offshore Units".
Table
1.11 indicates that after
the rules were put into effect the percent casualty
ratio has declined.
With the new rules, the offshore industry and
the insurance carriers had
agood standard of objectivity
with which to evaluate
all new designs. After
the 1965 accident rate was compiled, the insurance market hedged their
bets, and rates
across the board for all vessels
reached around 10%.
With
the subsequent decline in accident rates (and the growing number of
self-insured contractors), the insurance carriers adopted a variable rate
sche-dule based on type rig,
area, and past performance.
The rates vary from
aDesign Criteria and Operating Standards (Continued)
With the realization that a lot of the casualty losses in the offshore
busi-ness were marine in nature, contractors began special measures to
counteract this. Moving crews were specially trained to move the
jack-ups.
Surveyors were asked to advise and recommend special preparations
for long distance towages.
Jack-ups were equipped with propulsion assist
systems, and considerable attention was paid to the watertight integrity
and structural soundness of the vessels.
Contractors that operate floating units of the ship type generally have a
marine crew and a captain on board. The newest type semisubmersibles
have a barge engineer and ballast control team that has as their primary
duty a daily compilation of stability to insure that the rig is operated
with-in its design limitations.
With the advent of the self-propelled
semisub-mersible U.S. flag vessels, the United States Coast Guard has established
a new category of marine licenses that allow qualified individuals to take
comprehensive United States Coast Guard examinations for licenses as
mates, masters, and chief engineers on a restricted industrial basis.
These licenses cover operation of self-elevating and column stabilized
units under restricted conditions.
o
6 cr 5 1 o 1955 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 6364
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 7273
74 (APRIL)rAi
kb.
iiliii
1""ALA
Irk
TABLE 1.11 YEARSS-II/1
CONCLUSION
The Offshore Drilling Industry will be a major contributor toward
supply-ing the world's energy needs in the years ahead. To accomplish this in a
safe and efficient manner will require a lot of cooperation and coordination
between concerned parties.
The following guidelines are offered as
assis-tance in reducing casualty losses:
It is almost mandatory that uniform government
regulations be applied in any given operating
area.
This will be of particular importance
in the North Sea area.
Operators should be willing to exchange
informa-tion when such inforn-yainforma-tion could possibly prevent
damage to equipment or injury to personnel.
Each contractor should thoroughly familiarize
his personnel with personal safety habits.
Per-haps even more importantly each man must
understand what his actions contribute to the
overall responsibility of vessel and personnel
safety.
Well organized operating procedures should
be implemented and training begun prior to
rig delivery. Special attention should be
paid to the n-ioving aspects of the rig until
the crews are well versed in ship stability,
dynamic leg stresses in the case of jack-ups
Conclus ion ( Continued)
and overall marine safety standards.
Too often a major casualty is the result of
an overlooked hatch, or a boat too close, or
a change in circulation patterns that goes
un-noticed. A well organized and educated
op-erating team is certainly the best insurance
against casualties we can have.
4.
Designers should be continually striving to
provide the most efficient and safe designs
possible.
In this area, there should be much
more dissemination of environmental data and
other technical building blocks with which the
designer/analyst can provide safer designs.
The classification societies have done an
out-standing job in providing minimum standards
for mobile units; however, Designers and
Builders should strive to exceed these
mini-mums,and within economic limits, provide
the best structures possible.
Prototype
designs should be subjected to rigorous
analysis and testing prior to construction.
Surveyors and Underwriters should pay
close attention to the amount of proficiency
Conclusion ((ontinued)
in the design and construction of the many
vessels to be built.
There is an intricate relationship between
the principles involved in this business.
Governments are responsible to their
countryrnen to insure that adequate
petro-leum supplies are developed in a safe and
prudent manner. Operators are
responsi-ble to their shareholders to produce the
product at a reasonable profit.
Contractors
provide the drilling services to the Operator.
Underwriters, Surveyors, and Classification
Societies provide an objective forum to
evalu-ate the Contractor and his equipment.
It is imperative that contracts do not demand
an unrealistic incentive to over extend
equip-ment, that Operators and Contractors take a
responsible view toward their task, and that
government regulations take a positive and
helpful look at each situation.
There will
continue to be losses, but let us make sure
that those losses are the result of force
Conclusion (Continued)
lapses; be it the operator, designer, builder,
or rig contractor.
Safety in this business is a
complex area where the world of the
ocean and
the realm of the well bore are intermingled in
a fascinating and exciting industry.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ciaticher, Comdr. P. C., "Moving Drill Barges Safely", Oil and Gas
Journal, April 10, 1967, pp. 87-99.
Howe, Dr. Richard J., "The History and Current Status of Offshore Mobile
Drilling Units", Ocean Industry, July 1968, pp. 38-61.
Kash, Don E., et al, Energy Under the Oceans, University of Oklahoma
Press, Publishing Division of the University; Norman, Oklahoma, 1974,
p. 238.
Luck, John R., "History of Jack-up Rigs", October 1973 (unpublished).
Marsh and McLennan, "Insurance Report - Information of Underwriters
Offshore Mobile Drilling Units Physical Damage Insurance", November
1970.
Noble, Capt. W. D., "Towage, Insurance and Safety", The Royal
Institu-tion of Naval Architects Symposium on Offshore Drilling Rigs, November 26,
1970, Paper No. 6, pp. 1-15.
Zumwalt, Crane E., "Current Trends in Offshore Drilling Rigs", Marine
Technology, April 1973, pp. 172-181.
"Offshore Mobile Drilling Units Under Construction or Announced to be
Built", Offshore Rig Data Service, April 10, 1974, pp. A-J.
"Rig Lists and Listing of Mobile Rig Mishaps", The Offshore Company,
(unpublished), September 1974.
''Worldwide Rig Locations", Offshore, April 1974, December 1964-December
1973.S -II/2a
SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR THE PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH SEA
Nils Vogt
Director of Legal and Economic Department
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Norway
Is legislation necessary ?
A basic, but sometimes forgotten question when it comes to legislation is: is it really necessary ? Might it be that the people involved are able to find ways themselves to regu-late their activities without the assistance of the formal legislative apparatus so that no interest worthy of protection is harmed ?
To many of my colleagues in the legal profession such questions may sound almost blasphemous, but I think they are useful as
an introduction to my topic, i.e. that of safety regulations for the petroleum activities in the North Sea Area.
"Organizational safety legislation"
The reason might be obvious. The companies operating in the
area are themselves interested in avoiding any kind of accidents. This is not to say that they are more soft hearted and interested in protecting other peoples welfare and lives than most of us, but accidents almost invariably cost time, and time is certainly money in this highly capital intenesive industry. Accidents may also cause trouble. The West European tradition emphasizing
the value of the individual, may easily arouse public opinion if it seems that companies take the interests of their employees or third parties to lightly, and particularly the trade unions
should represent a strong private "countervailing power" if the companies do not operate within reasonable safety margins.
In a more positive way it may be argued that the companies have an experience, a day to day contact with the activities and are so involved in relevant reseach that legislators will find it difficult to compete. Their background for formulating instructions, specifications, standards and guidelines, in sum what you might call "organizational safety legislation" is therefore clearly as good and sometimes better than of the legislative apparatus proper. And they have created capable and experienced bodies for co-operation in this field in the American Petroleum Institute and the British Institute of
Petroleum a.o.
One further argument: Most of the companies operate interna-tionally and can apply their rules without regard to border lines if permitted to do so by the national authorities.
National legislators must on the other hand restrict themselves to give rules for limited geographic areas and may in the
absence of international agreement easily end up with rules that hamper desirable international exchange of people, equipment and services.
The role of the Government.
Do these arguments lead to the.conclusion that the national authorities should refrain from formulating safety regulations for the North Sea petroleum activities and control that they are abided by ? In my opinion definitely no. Most likely the large majority of people would not commit a serious crime even if we had no written law agaist it and the Government did not resort to reprisals, but we must have legislation to cover the exceptional individual whose behaviour is not up to standard. And even if it is generally true that accidents do not pay, it is equally true that dubious safety practices plus good luck often come out cheaper for the companies than the absolutely safe procedure. Most of it will be inclined to include some good luck in our planning, and we all see more easily our own interests than those of others. Legislators are expected to look for the pessimistic alternative and listen to arguments that may not come out strongly in a profit-seeking company.
The classification societies.
But even if we are convinced that we cannot rely entirely upon the companies' ability to regulate and see a key role for the
Government, we are left with quite a few questions. One is,
is there no intermediate level between companies and Government in the widest sense of this word ? The question which in most cases probably would seem meaningless, is certainly relevant
in this case, due to the existence of the classification societies, private bodies performing functions that could easily be classi-fied as public, since they lay down safety rules for others to follow and control that they are abided by. The fact that they so to say step into the Governments shoes is partly due to
safety regulators and controllers of North Sea petroleum activities together with the Government ant. the companies. The Governments authority to circumscribe their field of activity should, however, never be questioned, but should be exercised with due care as long as the societies continue to
act in their traditional responsible and efficient way.
Regulatory techniques.
Acting with or through the classification societies is one regulating technique open to the Government. But the Govern-ments arsenal is not limited to the technique or that of regu-lating by law, i.e. by a more or less detailed set of commands to be obeyed by everyone in a particular set of circumstances. The Government may also use licences permitting on particular licencee to do something on certain conditions. For our subject it is relevant that these conditions may imply a burden of proof put on the licencee that solutions to a technical problem pre-sented by him are safe and workable.
Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages for the Government as well as the companies. A precise and detailed law leaves no doubt as to where the individual stands. If it is complied with, you are in salvo. The conditioned licence introduces an element of uncertainty into the companies'
planning. On the other hand a law may easily become outdated and a hindrance to technological progress, or its solutions may not be very practical in a specific case.
I now fear that at least some in the audience may have become restless having attended this meeting to be informed of certain facts on North Sea regulations and being instead presented with a kind of legislative philosophy. My reason for approaching my subject in this way are threefold.
I would like to contribute to the uprooting of the popular misconception that if there is no law paragraph regulating a
particular aspect of safety it means necessarily that this aspect is not covered by any rule of conduct whatsoever. Media representatives, please take note.
Secondly: Reasonable men in authority may differ in their
views as to which regulating technique or mixture of techniques is the appropriate one. This goes a long way towards explaining the fact that the regulatory systems differ widely in the North Sea countries, but that this does not necessarily mean an equal difference in what is regarded as desirable practice.
Thirdly: Even if regulations in the legal sense of the word do not cover all aspects of the North Sea activities, they exist in a fairly great number, and it would be impossible to deal with them.properly in twenty minutes.
Norway.
The Norwegian Royal Decree of 25th August 1967 relating to Safe Practice etc in Exploration and Drilling for Submarine Petroleum Resources has alone 128 paragraphs. The Maritime Directorates Regulations for Mobile Drilling Platforms of 10th September 1973 with additional regulations from other regulatory agencies
involved makes up a whole volume. The newest link, the Petro-leum Directorate's drafted drilling regulations cover 40 pages.
"Fairly detailed regulation is characteristic of the Norwegians" it is stated in a recently issued U.S.study (North Sea Oil and Gas, Implications for future United States Development, Irvin L. White a.s., University of Oklahoma Press). Nevertheless, no
statutory regulations exist for the production phase, the regu-lating technique used being that of specific orders to licencees in connection with the approval of installations. To a large extent such orders have been contingent upon Det norske Ventas giving its recommandation after an inspection procedure mainly worked out by the classification society itself. The classifi-. cation society's engagement is based upon contract with the
authorities, not upon their assigning such societies a parti-cular role by regulation.
A special committee was appointed in 1970 to propose rules on the production of hydrocarbons including rules for conservation. It may well be that the Committee has been trying to cover too much ground at once that a more piecemeal approach should now be considered.
United Kingdom.
The American study, to which I referred above, maintains that "the British Regulatory philosophy is based on the notion that reasonable men will be able to reach agreement on almost any issue, and this extends to reaching agreement on what the opera-ting rules for continental shelf oil and gas resource develop-ment ought to be." This may be true, and it is a fact there is f.i. no real British equivalent to the Norwegian Royal Decree
of
1967.
Although the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations)Act of 1971 with the so called Shelf Operation Notices cover much of the same. On the other hand the U.K. has gone further
in assigning a well-defined role to the classification societies than the other North Sea countries. Under the Offshore Installa-tions (Construction and Survey) RegulaInstalla-tions
1974
which came into force on 1st May this year, every installation operating on the U.K. sector on or after 31st August 1975 shall have a valid Certificate of Fitness issued by a Certifying Authority i.e. a classification society, appointed by the Secretary of State.The Netherlands.
The Netherlands have basic regulations in the Mining Regulations for the Continental Shelf originally issued in 1967 and amended
in
1968
and1971.
Further rules have been added by some nineteen decrees. These usually are limited to a single item, such as the identification markings on installations for example. Theregulations are like the Norwegian Decree sprinkled with terms
like "safe", "suitable", "good oil field practice", and how stringent they are in practice depends to a large extent upon the practice followed by the controlling authorities.
The Federal Republic of Germany.
The German system is somewhat special in that Continental Shelf
activities in principle are governed by regulations for mining for petroleum on land, regulations that are issued by the Länder, not by the Federal Government.
Denmark.
Also the Danish system differs from that of the other countries due to the monopoly enjoyed by the Danish Undergrundskonsortium.
Co-operation in the North Sea Area.
It goes without saying that it is rather difficult to find a common denominator for taese differentapproaches. Nevertheless
it should be done for economic as well as for safety reasons. I shall not enter into the pros and cons of free trade versus protectionism, but I strongly feel that safety regulations are not the right instrument if you want to protect an industry
from foreign competition, and history tells us that it is extremely easy to fall into just that trap. You might then
stick to regulations that are inadequate or out of step with technological improvement. The forced change from one regime to another just because you cross a borderline might in itself be a safety risk when you have people well trained and used to
one particular procedure. The exchange of experience among regulators with a view to reach agreement on the best set of rules is in itself educative and may give better results than working within a purely national framework.
The London Conference.
Some of these arguments have of course more validity for mobile installations and all that goes with them than for production from fixed platforms, and in the co-operation among the North Sea countries on these matters special emphasis has been put on the mobile platforms. I refer here to the Conference on Safety and Pollution Safeguards in the Development of North West
European Offshore Mineral Resources held in London March 1973.
To cover the need for exchange of experience among regulators this conference had more the character of a seminar than is usual when Government representatives meet, but in its conclu-sions the Conference made the following recommandations:
Free exchange of information on all existing and pro-posed safety controls should be made with each of those North West Euroean countries that have or contemplate offshore operations.
Working Parties should be set ut to consider measures for the protection of the environment and aspects where Government safety requirements differ in principle, and where further study is required. In order to facilitate the freedom of movement of mobile installations and
equipment the working groups should as a matter of
priority aim at mutual recognition of national approval
schemes.
e) When the work of each of the groups has made satis-factory progress consideration should be given to including any technical recommendations in a regional agreement which might be concluded between participating
states.
d) A further conference of the countries concerned should be held in, say, 1975 to review progress and consider the subsequent steps that need to be taken.
The Working Parties referred to are three in all with the following mandates:
To examine questions relating to environmental matters that affect offshore operations, with a view to harmonisation of national requirements including the following:
measurements and procedures for collecting environmental
data,
presentation of evaluated data,
e) environmental criteria used in the design of offshore installations.
To examine existing and proposed national requirements for construction and use of offshore facilities, giving prio-rity to those applicable to mobile installations, with a view to harmonising such requirements, including the following:
monitoring of design and construction,
design strength, seaworthiness and stability of main structure and strength of integral parts,
e) equipment installed including oil/water separation equipment to operate within specified standards for maximum permissible oil content in discharged waters, d) underwater technology,
) movement of installations, f) hazards from ships.
To examine existing and proposed national requirements relating to the safety, health and welfare of personnel engaged in offshore operations with a view to harmonising
such requirements, including the following:
safety inspections and accidents - exchange of information,
accidents - standard definitions and reporting forms, ) health and welfare, accomodation, working hours,
training, medical provisions, d) drilling procedures,
) use of dagerous materials, f) safety of divers,
g) helicopter operations (sction by Civil Aviation Authorities).
Follow-up of the London recommandations.
Working Group I held its first meeting in London in April 1974 and recommended i.a. that
- each country should be responsible for collecting environmental data in its own area of the Continental Shelf. "Environmental data" is here understood to mean meteorological data, oceano-graphic data and information on the engineering properties of the sea bed.
- Each country should take steps to ensure that the standards
of instrumentation, instrument exposure an& of observations maintained by operators and others are satisfactory, that is to a standard comparable with that acceptable by national
instruc-tions.
To the maximum extent possible, Governments should ensure that environmental data is obtained free from commercial and other restrictions.
Norway, supported by Sweden, emphasised that in their view all data collected on the Continental Shelf that is relevant to the safety of men and installations should be entirely free from any commercial restriction.
A sub-group was appointed to examine the environmental data relevant to design prepared by the United Kingdom and any similar document prepared for the guidance of designers of offshore installations and to consider such changes and addi-tions as may be necessary to enable these requirements to be used to control the design of offshore installations over the whole of the Continental Shelf of Western Europe.
Also Working Group II which held its first meeting in Stavanger in February 1974 found it necessary to appoint sub-groups, four in all, who should report to the full Working Group before the end of this year. The sub-groups shall deal with:
Sub-group I Design strength including strength and size of helicopter deck.
Platform performance data. Cranes, ladders, railings etc. Drilling equipment, mechanical. Towing equipment.
Surveying systems and certificates. Sub-group II Life saving equipment.
Navigational aids.
Fire fighting equipment and fire protection. Alarm systems (signals).
Sub-group III Classification of areas.
Requirements for electrical installations in the various areas, including drilling
equipment (electrical). Emergency source of power. Emergency lighting.
Alarm system, electrical. Sub-group IV Radio-installations.
Operational requirements. Specification of equipment.
Working Group III has had no meeting up to now. Its most tricky task will probably be to deal with the question of working hours, were practices differ widely.
Conclusion.
Here and on many other items it will no doubt be difficult to reach agreement, but the contacts between the North Sea
authorities do give reason to believe that we shall come a long way towards establishing harmonized safety regulations for the petroleum activities. I underline "harmonized". We may not have a treaty with detailed obligations binding the signatories as to the means i.e. to use one specific regulatory technique, but that should hardly be necessary if
there is agreement on what results we want from our regulating activities.
S-II/2b
NATIONAL EFFORTS IN DEALING WITH OIL POLLUTION IN NORWEGIAN COASTAL WATERS AND AT SEA (OFFSHORE) AND THE NORDIC AGREE-MENT BETWEEN NORWAY, DENMARK, FINLAND AND SWEDEN ON MEASURES AGAINST POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL.
Mr. E. Reichborn-Kjennerud, Councellor, Norwegian
NATIONAL EFFORTS IN DEALING WITH OIL POLLUTION IN NORWEGIAN COASTAL WATERS AND AT SEA (OFFSHORE) AND THE NORDIC AGREE-MENT BETWEEN NORWAY, DENMARK, FINLAND AND SWEDEN ON MEASURES AGAINST POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL.
A. National Protection against Damage by Oil Pollution. 1. Introduction:
The "Torrey Canyon" disaster alerted the Norwegian authorities to the possibility of giant tankers breaking up and discharging vast quantities of oil. By Royal Decree a committee was there-for appointed in June 1967 with the mandate of assessing, among other things, the future need for a national programme concerning prevention and fighting of oil pollution. The committee presented its recommendation with a draft for an Oil Damage Protection Act in June 1968 which entered into force on December 1st-1970.
The Oil Damage Protection Act.
This is an Enabling Act which has been supplemented by regulation concerning municipal measures connected with fighting of oil
pollution and regulations regarding obligation to report oil spills and spills containing oily mixtures. Municipal interim programmes are in this connection not a requirement of the Act.
One or two ports have nevertheless drawn up provisional conting-ency plans for fighting oil spills (Oil Spill Emergconting-ency Manual).
The purpose of the Act.
The purpose of the Act, according to Section 1, is to prevent, avoid and limit damage as a result of oil pollution. This applies not only for the sea but also for inland watercourses and on land. The work of establishing an organization that is responsible for dealing with oil spillages has up to now been concentrated on the coastal municipalities and in particular on those which can be exposed to damage by crude oils.
Preventive and evasive measures.
As regards the aspects connected with spillage of oil a dis-tinction is made between preventive and evasive measures. By preventive measures are meant those which primarily aim at precluding oil spills. There are a number of provisions of a preventive character for example concerning the construction of
storage tanks or to be taken on board ship in order to preclude the discharge of oil. These measures are both of technical and nautical nature. There are also a number of international pro-visions which belong to the category of preventive measures.
In contrast to the preventive measures, the evasive measures are directed towards the risk of damage which arise once an oil
spill has occured and the purpose of these are to avoid or reduce such damage. The measures will primely be such that have to be -out into operation from shore (land).
The Maritime Directorate is secretariate for all questions pertaining to oil pollution from ships or other constructions
(devices) in the sea area.
The Directorate of Harbours is acting as secretariate for the remaining ouestions, yet in such a way that the two Directorates co-operate where their areas of competence overlap.
The preparation of regional contingency plans to deal with oil spills is assumed to be based upon a close and effective co-operation between municipality, port authority and oil companies
etc.
It is also assumed that the provincial (regional) preparedness should be organized in such a way that it can be put into effect rapidly and efficiently.
The Council on Oil Pollution.
Pursuant to Section 3 of the Oil Damage Protection Act, a
Council on Oil Pollution is to be appointed. This Council shall supervise,. plan and coordinate the national programme for
prevention and fighting of oil pollution. It shall also take steps to establish necessary regulations and bring into operation practical measures related to the prevention of damage as a
result of oil spillages.
Seventeen different Government services and private institutions are represented in the Council, which in Norwegian is called "OljevernrAdet". The Director-General of Harbours is chairman of the Council and the Director-General of Shipping and Navi-gation vice-chairman.
A working group of 5 members has been appointed and shall carry out the functions of the Council when the latter is not in
session. It is, however, the mentioned council that has the operational restionsibility for fighting all major spills at sea and in Norwegian coastal waters. The Secretariate (the Directo-rate of Harbours) is for the time being preparing a special Oil Spill Emergency Manual in this connection. Provisional instruc-tions for the mentioned Council were laid down by Royal Decree of 26th February 1971.
Regional headguarters for protection against oil pollution. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Oil Damage Protection Act, the King may issue further provisions concerning Regional headquarters which shall assist the municipalities in case the local equipment and supplies for handling of oil spills are insufficient (in-adequate). For the
present, available
resources will be devoted to one such regional headquarters, located at Horten in Oslo-fjorden. The mentioned headquarters has already been equipped with material supplies to combat moderate spills withinprovincial (regional) jurisdiction.
Municipal and intermunicipal organizations for -orotection of damage due to oil pollution.
According to Section 5 of the Oil Damage Protection Act each municipality which might be threatened by damage as a result of oil pollution is obliged to have ready for emergency action
able requirements in order to prevent such damage.
It is the Council on Oil Pollution that shall approve the muni-cipal and intermunimuni-cipal plans for the prevention and fighting of
oil pollution (Oil Spill Emergency Manuals). Municipal and inter-municipal agencies for emergency action against oil spills shall be under the leadership of a committee of 3 members. This
committee shall as a general rule consist of the Commissioner of Police, the Harbour Manager and the Fire Brigade Superintendent. The Council has the right to demand that the port authorities
and oil companies etc. shall participate in municipal or inter-municipal bodies for emergency actions. The oil companies have
already established their own organization for fighting oil pollution which later on will form part of the municipal bodies
for emergency actions.
Provisional regulations concerning municipal and intermunicipal organization for the protection against damage as a result of oil pollution were laid down by the Ministry of Fisheries on the 12th of September 1972. At the same time the Ministry approved explanatory notes as to how the regulations should be put into practice.
In brief, the regulations state that if oil or oily mixtures have been spilled that may cause substantial damage, the munici-pality threatened or afflicted shall without delay take action to prevent or limit the damage. If the municipal organization, with the help of a neighbouring municipality and regional headquarters, is unable to bring the oil spill under control the responsibility rests at the Council on Oil Pollution (Oljevernr6.det) to deal with it. The mentioned regulations also contain rules that give
the Council a legal right to requisition necessary equiDment and supplies (municipal and private) for handling of a major oil .
Chemicals (emulgent liquids) are required to be selected (chosen) with reference to their emulgent effect and minimum toxicity.
In addition dispersants and other chemical agents should only be utilized to clean up oil spills when the use of such remedies, to the best of one's judgement, is the right treatment to reduce the harmful effect of the pollution. Up to this date all
Norwegian town ports have appointed a working group (55 in all) that are responsible for preparing an Oil Spill Emergency Plan for the region.
The Fund for Protection against Oil Pollution.
According to Section 10 of the Oil Damage Protection Act, a Fund has been established in order to cover the governments ex-penditures in connection with the dealing of serious pollution arising from oil spilled for example at the sea (offshore). The resources of the fund may also be used wholly or partly to defray the cost of municipal emergency actions against oil spills.
Guide to the preparation of municipal contingency plans for fiEhting oil spills Spill Emergency Manual)
The Council on Oil Pollution has on June 50th 1972 approved a
guide to the preparation of municipal contingency plans for fighting oil spills. It is the intention that such contingency plans should be adapted to the demand of the local conditions.
In preparation of the plan it mtst also be taken into consider-ation that the Council on Oil Pollution is supposed to have the operational responsibility for fighting all major oil spills at sea and in Norwegian coastal waters.
Regulation concerning obligation to report the presence of oil pollution.
Section 9 at the Oil Damage Protection Act contains general pro-visions concerning the obligation to report the presence of oil pollution and spills containing oily mixtures. This states that in each case of oil pollution which may cause substantial damage a report should be made to the police (the nearest police autho-rity) as soon as possible. This section is supplemented by
detailed regulations of the 19th March 1973 concerning the re-port of oil pollution from ships, aircrafts and drilling plat-forms etc. A standard form for use in making such reports has also been approved by the Ministry of Fisheries. For reporting of oil pollution in the Skagerak area certain routines have already been practised, based on the Nordic Agreement between Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden on measures against
Pollution of the Sea by Oil.
11. Pollution of the sea by oil in connection with exploitation of petroleum on the NorweEian Continental Shelf.
The responsibility to put into effect measures to prevent or limit damage as a result of pollution of the sea by oil in connection with the exploitation of petroleum on the Norwegian Continental Shelf rest primarily on the companies (operators -licensees).
The pollution aspects and measures associated with fighting of oil spills in this connection are to be considered by the Council
on Oil Pollution (Oljevernradet). For the Phillips North Sea Area an Oil Spill Emergency Manual has been worked out which has been accepted by the mentioned Council as a temporary arrangement,
Contingency plans for spill control and clean up will also be obtained from the other companies that have been granted a
production license on the Norwegian Continental Shelf as soon as the production is in progress. Moreover the Secretariate (The Directorate of Harbours) has been informed that all the companies holding a production license, that is The North Sea Operators
Committee Norway, will take joint action in working out a contingency plan for oil spills.
In cases of major oil spills on the Continental Shelf which are representing a grave and imminent danger to the Norwegian coast the Council on Oil Pollution will probably take over the direc-tion of the work of preventing or limiting polludirec-tion damage.
B. The Nordic Agreement between Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden on measures against Pollution of the Sea by Oil.
In accordance with a recommendation from The Nordic Councel an agreement for co-operation in dealing with pollution of the sea by oil was made between Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The contents of the agreement are briefly as follows
-Wherever a Contracting Party is aware of a casuàlty or the presence of oil slicks that are likely to constitute a serious
threat to the coast or related interests of any Contracting State, it shall inform that other State without delay. At the same time it shall give information about the type of oil, approximate quantity, estimated extention, posttion, drift of pollution, speed etc. As a result of the examination made, it should then without delay inform the Contracting State of any action it has taken or will take in order to deal with the floating oil.
A Contracting State requirering assistance to combat oil which is treatening its coast may call on the help of the other
Con-tracting States, starting with those which also seem likely to be affected by the oil pollution. Contracting State called upon in accordance with the mentioned agreement shall use their best endeavours to bring such assistance as is within their power. On the other hand the Contracting States undertake to establish protection against extensive oil pollution and shall inform the other Contracting States about their national protection against damage by oil pollution and their experience in combatting such pollution.
S-II/2c
SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION IN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Paul Le Rest Manager
Elf Norge A/S Norway
