China's Burma policy : a strategic partner or a new colony?

Michał Lubina

China’s Burma policy : a strategic

partner or a new colony?

Pisma Humanistyczne 9, 73-87

Michał Lubina

C h in a ’s B u rm a policy.

A Stra te g ic P a rtn e r or a N e w C olo n y?

B u rm a1 occupies a critical space on China's southw estern flank out o f tw o reasons: dom estic and in ternational. The latter is that B u rm a is n ext to C h in a’s densest concentration o f ethn ic m in orities in Y un n an and p o licy tow ard s B u rm a has been dictated first and forem ost b y this province econom ical interests. M ore im portan t­ ly, however, is that B u rm a gives C h in a an access to the B ay o f B engal and there­ fore is the an sw er for "M alacca dilem m a”. Finally, u s and e u san ction s im posed on M yan m ar up to now gave C h in a a great o p p o rtu n ity to exploit the w ith d raw n o f the W est from B u rm a and in the process gain influence on India’s flank. U ntil 2 0 11 B u rm a w as not on ly C h in a’s strategic p artner but little by little, w as strid in g tow ards becom e C h in a’s colony: on ly than ks to B eijin g’s political cover could the regim e feel secure. B u rm a’s sinization w as the cost. Situation is changing, however, than ks to w hat w as bein g called "the Bu rm ese th aw ”.

Historical background

The first contacts betw een C h in a and B u rm a dates back to second cen tu ry B. C. w hen C h inese m erchants used trade routes through Burm a. C h in a’s interest, how ­ ever seem ed to have been lim ited to these routes, for traces o f any influence o f hers are hard to find2. The first p olitical influence w as m ade through non-H an kingdom o f N an zh ao3. It’s intercourse w ith B u rm a were deep, both cu ltu rally and politically:

1 The name of this country invokes many controversies. In June 1989 the State Law and Restora­ tion Council (the new junta) changed the official international designation of the country form “Burma” to “Myanmar” (“Myanmar” is the autonym of the ethnic majority since ancient times and has always been used internally). The usage of the country's name has been politically con­ troversial since then. In order to avoid involvement into this highly politicized debate, I will use both names: Burma — for the country and in general terms, whereas Myanmar — for the state and military government after 1989.

2 G. E. Harvey, History o f Burm a. From the Earliest Times to 10 M arch 18 2 4 The Beginning o f E n ­ glish Conquest, London 1967, p. 9.

the elite spoke the Burm ese-related language o f Y i and the ru lin g classes o f N an- zhao had a p ecu liar n am in g system , in w hich the last nam e o f the father becam e the first nam e o f the son — as in the latter B u rm ese kings^ In the 9th cen tu ry N an- zhao's cav a lry that n am ed itse lf “M y an m a”5, or "Stron g H orsem an ”6, invaded the Irraw addy Valley, con tributin g to the foundation o f Pagan (in 849), w hich w as to becom e the First Burm ese Em pire7. Burm ese tradition, however, instead o f harking back to C h in a refer to India8. It is im p ortan t to rem em ber that for m ost o f the past 20 0 0 years it w as India, not C hina, that enjoyed the closest con n ection s w ith B u r­ ma, and for centuries this vast area w as profoundly influenced by its connections w ith In dian civilizations, from notions o f kin gsh ip to cosm ology and literatu re9. In B u rm a C h in a w as v ery m uch in the shadow o f India, and w as bein g referred as som eth in g far away, behin d the m ountains.

This notion w as, however, rein forced w ith a sense o f the danger com in g from these m ountains. The reason for that w as sim ple: The con tinuin g in vasion s from the north. The first one had the greatest far-reach in g consequences: the M ongol in vasion that put the First Bu rm ese Em pire o f P agan to an end in 1287.

A lth ou gh P agan w as already by then in decline, the M on gol in vasion hastened the dem ise o f the kingdom i°. This in vasion should be seen w ith in the fram ew ork o f K ublai K han's continued southw estern conquests. Kublai send m ission to Pagan dem anding tribute. A s the am bassadors w ho bore this letter refused to take off their shoes sufficien tly often, the B u rm ese king, N arathihapate, ordered their im ­ m ediate execution “ . That w as a fatal m istake, for in brought an follow -up M ongol invasion, w hich descended into the valley o f Irraw addy destroying a n um ber o f stockade p osition and overru n n in g im p ortan t Bu rm ese stan d at T agaun g1 2. The cou n try w as soon in disorder, and the king, didn't w an t to w ait to see w hether the C h in ese w ere really com in g or not: he fled in pan ic and is therefore kn ow n as Tayokpyem in, “the kin g w ho fled from the C h in e se”“ . Soon N arathih ap ate w as

4 Thant Myint-U, The River o f Lost Footsteps. A Personal H istory o f B urm a , New York 2007, p. 56. 5 In Chinese mian dian

6 Ibidem.

I M. Aung-Thwin, Pagan: The Origins o f M odern B urm a, Hawaii 1986. More on Burma's history

see: D. G. E. Hall, B u rm a, London 1998; Idem, A History o f Southeast A sia , London 1981; A. Reid, Southeast A sia in the Age o f Commerce 14 5 0 -16 8 0 , Yale 1993; The Cam bridge History o f Southeast A sia, ed. N. Tarling, volume I and 11, Cambridge 1999.

8 G. E. Harvey, History o f B urm a..., op. cit., p. 6.

9 There was a time when Southeast Asian countries from Burma to Bali were known to Europeans as “Farther India” and scholars referred to the “Indianized states of Southeast Asia”, Thant My- int-U, W here China M eets India. B u rm a a n d the N e w Crossroads o f A sia, New York 2011, p. 240. 1° P. Bennett, The ‘Fa ll o f Pagan’: Continuity a n d Change in 14th Century B u rm a [in:] Conference

U nder the T am arind Tree: Three Essays in Burm ese History, ed. P. Bennett, New Heaven 1971. II G. E. Harvey, History o f B u r m a . ,op. cit., p. 64.

12 Thant Myint-U, The R iv e r ., op. cit., p. 6.

13 B. Góralczyk, Z łota ziem ia roni łzy. Esej birm ański (The Golden L a n d Sheds Tears. The Burm ese Essay) Warszawa 2010, p. 88.

China's B u rm a policy. A Strateg ic P artn er or a N ew Colony? 75

m urdered and the co u n try w as in disorder w hich allow ed the M on gols to fought their w ay dow n to Pagan, to occupy the city and receive the hom age from kingdom : "thus perished Pagan am id the blood and flam e o f the T artat Terror: here w ide dom inions w ere parceled out into Shan satrapies ow in g fealty to C h in a and Siam 14. The n ext interaction w ith the C h in ese cam e in 17 th century. In 1658 the M in g prince G ui, chasing by victoriou s Q in g fo rcesi5, fled to B u rm a w ith his seven hun ­ dred follow ers and requested refugee, w h ich w as granted!®. G u i w as not alone, however, and soon m an y thou san d C h in ese stream ed across the border som e ref­ ugees, som e band its and freebooters w ho had taken advantage o f the an archy in C h ina. They w ere seizin g and looting tow ns, b u rn in g m onasteries, takin g captives and even endangered royal city o f A va. This led to coup d'etat in Ava, and a new king, Prom e decided to get aw ay w ith the troublesom e guest and w hen the chasing Q ing arm y o f W u San gu i m arch ed into B u rm a in 16 62 and dem anded the surren ­ der o f M in g prince, Prom e hesitan tly agreed: G u i w as hanged in Y un n an and Q ing arm y w ithdraw n^.

N e x t cen tu ry saw m ore C h in ese invasion s: d u rin g years 17 6 5 -6 9 there w as "a seriou s o f m urderous in vasion s’’! 8. The official reason w as the h arassm en t of C h in ese m erch an ts b y B u rm ese m onarch, but the real one w as Burm a's rise to power. W h en Bu rm ese defeated Yunnan's region al troops, the Em peror Q ianlong h im se lf ordered a fu ll-scale in vasion under experien ced com m ander, Y an g Ying- jiu: "sortin g out the M ia n (Burm ese) w as now the m atter o f im p erial prestige”!9. The C h in ese arm y however, soon realized that there w ere tw o enem ies in Burm a: the troop s o f B u rm ese k in g and disease, the latter b ein g far the m ore terrible one — cholera, d ysen tery and m alaria stru ck dow n the C h in ese soldiers b y thou­ san ds20. M oreover, the B u rm ese laid a trap and cut o ff Y an g’s supplies and over­ w helm ed the C hinese: "the slaughter w as such that the Bu rm ese could hard ly grip their sw ords as the hilts w ere slip p ery w ith enem y b lo o d ’l l W h en new s reached Beijing, Q ian lo n g in stead o f listen in g to h is general advices, send his M an ch u elite B an nerm an : "For Em peror there w as no real choice but to press on. Im perial prestige w as at stake. This w as no longer a border dispute but a full-fled ged im p e­ rial war. The Bu rm ese now had w orld's biggest em pire m obilized again st them ”2 2. But h isto ry repeated again: the M an ch u in vasion that b egu n in 1769 w as not able

14 G. E. Harvey, History o f B u r m a ., op. cit., p. 69.

15 More about this campaign, see J. D. Spence, The Search fo r M od ern China, New York 1990,

p. 26-48.

“ G. E. Harvey, History o f B u r m a ., op. cit., p. 196-201. 17 Thant Myint-U, The R iv e r ., op. cit., p. 85-87. i* G. E. Harvey, History o f B u r m a ., op. cit., p. 253. 19 Thant Myint-U, The R iv e r ., op. cit., p. 101.

20 Ibidem.

21 G. E. Harvey, History o f B u r m a ., op. cit., p. 255. 22 Thant Myint-U, The R iv e r ., op. cit., p. 102-103.

to break the spirited Bu rm ese and the diseases m ade the rest. The Burm ese com ­ m ander, instead o f fin ish in g surroun d ed C h in ese off, drew up an agreem ent that allow ed them to w ith d raw : "b y gran tin g honorable term s the Bu rm ese gave the C h in ese Em peror a loophole to w ith d raw from a costly adventure; and although pride prevented him from acknow ledging the treaty his silence gave consent, and soon the caravan s started com in g dow n to Y un n an and the Bu rm ese w ere once m ore able to find a m arket for their cotton ”2 3(Harvey, s. 258). The m ost disastrous frontier w ar the Q ing d yn asty had ever w ag ed ” cam e to an end24.

For the n ext C h in ese in vasion the B u rm ese had to w ait tw o centuries. First o ccu rred in 1949 w hen the K uom in tan g forces lost the civil w ar w ith the com ­ m un ist in C h in a. W ith d raw in g C h ian g K ai-shek forces o f 25 thou san d straggled across the barely dem arcated border w ith B u rm a to use this cou n try as a base from w hich to regain their hom eland25. That never m aterialized: th ey stayed and start­ ed recru itin g new soldiers, im p osin g taxes and even bu ild an airp ort, via w hich w ere receivin g huge quantities o f arm s and supplies from T aiw an and c i a. Soon

the k m t took over the w hole region east o f the Salw een River, m ovin g up tow ards

K ach in h ills and dow n tow ards the upland areas controlled b y the K arens. For the Bu rm ese it w as n oth in g less th an a com bined C h in ese N ation alist and A m eric an in vasion and n oth in g could be spared in m eetin g this un exp ected threat2®. The Bu rm ese reacted in a dual way: p olitically (in u n) and m ilita ry — b y p ush in g the

k m t force out into the h ill frontier. A lth ou gh arm y under the com m andership of

N e W in defeated K uom in tan g forces, it w as unable to rem ove them en tirely from Burm a27. They settled in the h ills on the frontier and soon found a n ew source of activity: dru g trade. In the chaotic conditions o f B u rm a’s 60s, 70s and 80s, w here this cou n try "has the unenviable reputation o f having the largest num ber o f ethnic insurgencies together w ith one o f the longest-ru n nin g com m u n ist in su rgen cy o f any co u n try in the w orld ”2s as w ell as the civil w ar is "the longest- ru n n in g arm ed con flict in the w orld ’^ 9, opium and d rug trade flourished. Soon alm ost all sides

23 G. E. Harvey, History o f B u r m a ., op. cit., p. 258.

24 D. Yingcong, A Disguised Defeat: The M ya n m a r C am paign o f the Qing Dynasty, “Modern Asian Studies” vol. 38, p a rt 1, 2004, p. 145-189.

2® More about complex situation in 1950s Burma, see: R. H. Taylor, The State in M yanm ar, Singa­ pore 2009; M. Callahan, M ak in g Enem ies: W ar a n d State Bu ild in g in B urm a, Ithaca, New York

2003; A. Selt, Race a n d Resistance in B u rm a , 1942-1945, “Modern Asian Studies” vol. 20, part 3,

1986; H. Tinkler, The Union o f B u rm a: A Study o f the First Years o f Independence, London 1961; M. Smith, B urm a: Insurgency a n d the Politics o f Ethnicity, London — New Jersey 1991.

2® Thant Myint-U, The R iv e r ., op. cit., p. 273-277. 2? Ibidem.

2* A. Rajah, Ethnicity a n d C ivil W ar in B urm a. W here is the Rationality? [in:] B urm a. Prospects fo r a D em ocratic Future, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, Washington D. C. 1998, p. 135.

China's B u rm a policy. A Strateg ic P artn er or a N ew Colony? 7 7

in the con flict becam e involved and lean to dru g trad e3° w hich have disastrou s consequences for dom estic situation in Burm a.

Finally, the last C h in ese invasion, and ch ronologically the second in 20 cen­ tury, cam e from the M aoists. W h en the C u ltu ra l R evolution began to excite p as­ sions across C hina, m an y in C h in ese diasporas in B u rm a w ere also sw ept up in the excitem ent, w earin g M ao badges, shoutin g C u ltu ral R evolution slogans and m arch in g up and dow n the streets o f R angoon evoking fear and anger. A s a re­ sponse on 26 June 1967 w ith little police response, C h in ese houses and shops w ere looted, w hile C h in ese people w ere beaten up and killed by an g ry mob. A fte r that B eijing radio an n ounced “people's revolt” against N e W in “ fascist regim e” w h ere­ as the B u rm ese C o m m u n ist attacked sub urbs o f R an go on3 1. The w o rst w as to com e: on the 1 Jan u ary 1968 m ixed forces o f thou san d C hinese, border m inorities and Bu rm ese C o m m u n ists soldiers, supplied, paid and com m anded from Beijing, crossed the Bu rm ese border. Soon they crush ed the local resistan ce and endan­ gered M a n d a la y — Burm a's secon d city. The Bu rm ese arm y's n ightm are scenario o f C hinese-backed in su rgen cy along the border w as com in g tru e3 2. N e W in regim e got support from eclectic coalition o f u s a , u s s r , G erm an y and Japan and launched a successive cam p aign again st C o m m u n ists in Pegu M ou n tain s. O n the north, however, situation w as m ore com plex and b litzkrieg not possible: N e W in decid­ ed to support the opium w orlard s Lo H sin g-H an and K h u n Sa3 3. A s Thant M y- int-U su m m arized: “soon in the rem ote h ills o f n orth eastern B u rm a there w ould be little replays o f the C o m m u n ist-N atio n alist C h in ese civil w ar on a m in iscale, w ith Red G u ard s and their Bu rm ese com rades battlin g it out again st N ation alist troops o f general Li M i and their dru g-traffickin g allies’^ . This has continued until 1980s, w hen the political scene in C h in a changed and the regim e took a pragm atic stance thus leading to im p rovin g relations w ith Burm a. A n d it finished in 1989, the year B u rm a C o m m u n ist P arty forces fin ally surrendered3 5.

A s we can see in these exam ples, B u rm a didn't have con structive experiences w ith the C h inese. The m ain bu rden o f C h in a -B u rm a h isto ry is that an an xiety about C h in ese is deeply in grain ed in B u rm ese th in kin g: m em ories o f p ast in ­ vasions, defenders again st M an ch u in vasion are celebrated in son g and poetry. “There's a sense o f the dangers o f bein g n ext to an in creasin gly p ow erfu l and p o p ­ ulous nation, w hose internal w ars and politics have tim e and again spilled over to w reak havoc on the m uch sm aller co u n try to the sou th w est’“ 6

3° For a detailed description of all side's involvement into drug trade, see: W. Giełżyński, O pium o­ wa dżungla (The O pium jungle), Warszawa 1989, p. 40-63.

31 Thant Myint-U, The R iv e r ., op. cit., p. 304. 32 Ibidem, p. 306.

33 M. W. Charney, A H istory o f M od ern B urm a, Cambridge 2009, p. 188-189.

34 Thant Myint-U, The R iv e r ., op. cit., p. 307.

35 R. H. Taylor, The State in M y a n m a r ., p. 420-440. 36 Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 70-71.

China and the Western sanctions on Myanmar

China's p o licy has been about as different from the W estern p o licy o f econom ic san ction s and diplom atic condem nation as possible, and this difference is not too su rp risin g: it's h ard to see h ow p rom otin g d em o cracy w ou ld ever be v e ry high p rio rity for B eijin g (and it's also w o rth rem em b erin g that d u rin g m uch o f the C old W ar, roles had been reversed)37. C h in a started establishin g strong links w ith M yan m ar in 1988, and since that achieved the strongest linkages along all coun- tries3 8.

^ e first steps have been taken in the 1990s. In the b egin n in g o f 1990s after decades o f shut-dow n, the border trade reopened. First w as the in flu x o f cheap goods. ^ e n cam e the loggings w ith thousands o f B u rm ese forests b ein g cut and tran sp o rted to C h ina. A fte r cam e the jade m ines. A n d finally, heroin: in 2 0 10 and early 2 0 11 the sale o f Bu rm ese heroin to C h in a w as w orth m ore th an u s d 4 bil- lion3 9. In early 1990s Beijin g provided credit for m ilita ry (tanks and planes) and other p urchases estim ated at w ell over a billion o f dollars in total. O fficial figures place bilateral trade at over 2 billion u s d a year, but the real figure is doubtless far greater. B u rm ese econom y is today tied m ore closely to China's than at any other tim e in m odern h istory4 0. The figures are clear: A cco rd in g to M yanm ar, in 2 0 11 the p r c becam e the co u n try’s largest trad in g p artner and investor (overtaking ^ a i - land). In fiscal year 2 0 10 - 2 0 1 1, trade volum e w as $5.3 billion. M yan m ar data from N ovem ber 2 0 11 show s that total C h in ese in vestm en ts in M y an m ar w ere about $ 14 billion (accounting for about 35 pct. o f the foreign investm ents in M yanm ar), w hich w as greater than the f d i inflow s to M yan m ar from ^ a i l a n d ($9.5 billion), H ong K ong ($6.3 billion), South K orea ($2.9 billion), the u k ($2.6 billion) or Sin ga­ pore ($1.8 billion)4i.

^ e C h in ese b u ilt roads lin k in g Y u n n an ’s border tow ns w ith Irraw ad dy v a l­ ley — for the first tim e in h isto ry since fam ous "B u rm a ro a d ” du ring w w ii. ^ e C h in ese reversed old B ritish dream o f con n ectin g C h in a to the Bu rm ese coast4 2 by high speed railw ays so that the C h in ese product could be shipped from new factories in the C h in ese interior to the In dian O cean. B y early 2 0 10 con struction had b egu n on the oil and gas pipelin es that w ou ld co n n ect C h in a ’s sou th w est

37 Ibidem, p. 133.

38 M. W. Charney, A History o f . , op. cit., p. 187. 39 ^ a n t Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 133.

40 Ibidem.

41 J. Szczudlik-Tatar, C h in a’s Policy towards M yanm ar, Bulletin p i s m no 22 (355), February 2012,

p. 1-2.

42 Which was one of the main rationale for British colonial conquest of Burma. More on British co­ lonialism: John Furnivall, 7^e Fashioning o f the Leviathan [in:] “Journal of the Burma Research

Society”, vol. 29, no 3, 1939, pp. 1-138.; Idem, Colonial Policy a n d Practice. A Com parative Study o f B u rm a a n d the N etherlands India, New York 1956, Ni Ni Myint, B u r m a ’s Struggle Against British Im perialism (1886-1895), Rangoon 1983.

China's B u rm a policy. A Strateg ic P artn er or a N ew Colony? 79

across B u rm a to the B ay o f B engal (Burm a gas fields m ake it the 10 th largest in the w orld w ith 10 trillio n cubic m eters reserves)4 3. They w ou ld ru n from M an d alay past R uili4 4 first to Y u n n an and then onw ards to the G u a n x i A utonom ous Region and city o f C h ingqin g. A ll three places w ere targeted in W estern D evelopm ent Strategy. M oreover, m assive hydroelectric dam s are bein g b u ilt in B u rm a that w ill provide as m uch electricity as C h in a’s fam ou s Three G orges Dam . The Salw een river dam 7,1 gigaw att hydropow er station w orth 9 billion USD; another p roject in general are to produce 20 gigaw atts o f electricity (it is the am ount o f electricity consum ption o f Thailand)4 5. The pipelines along the hydroelectric pow ers w ould ensure the en ergy needed for ever faster industrialization.

The W estern san ction s on ly helped in that. The C h in ese view W estern p olicy tow ards B u rm a as h yp ocritical and self-defeating. H yp ocritical because th ey see W estern governm ents, w h en it suits their interests, propping up regim es elsewhere w hich are just as tyran n ical, i f not m ore so, and self-defeating because the W estern san ction s and boycotts have on ly rem oved w h at leverage th ey w ou ld otherw ise have4®. The reason w as sim ple: W estern politicians kn ew that b y condem ning junta th ey risk a little — as B u rm a w as not on the center o f their p olitical agenda — and th ey could w in a lot o f sup p ort from their dom estic hu m an righ ts activists47. The C h in ese — on the co n trary — didn’t care about n l d or w hether or not B u rm a w as m ovin g tow ards dem ocracy. The C h in ese "old B u rm a h an d s” centered m ore on m apping and un derstan d in g w h at w as actu ally happen in g in the co u n try and less on w o rk in g backw ard s from a specific p o licy am bitions. The C h in ese academ ics on B u rm a spoke Bu rm ese w ell and are know ledge on the n itty-g ritty o f specific issues, from the Bu rm ese arm y ’s relations w ith in divid ual m ilitias to cross-border trade. They are close to a c t io ^ 8.

This C h in ese psych ological support w as im p ortan t for the Bu rm ese generals: the m ore the B ritish and A m e ric an berated the regim e an the u n , the m ore C h i­ nese diplom ats protection becam e essential to the regim e’s foreign policy. W est­ ern san ction s had pushed the co u n try ’s ru lin g jun ta ever closer to Beijin g and had created an un usually privileged environm ent for C h inese business. For exam ple on 12 Jan u ary 20 0 7 C h in a together w ith Russia (first tim e together since 1972!) vetoed us-backed resolution in trod ucin g san ction s on B u rm a4 9. The C h in ese am bassador

43 Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 111-112.

44 Ruilli is where Yunnan makes money: two-third of Yunnan's international trade passes through Ruili.

4® Ibidem, p. 111-112. 46 Ibidem, p. 134.

4y R. H. Taylor, The State in M y a n m a r ., op. cit., p. 468. 4s Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 156.

4® Yu Bin, Russia Says “N o " to the West, a n d “Sort o f" to China, “Comparative Connections. A Qu­

arterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations”, vol. 7 (2007), no 1, <http://csis.org/files/me- dia/csis/pubs/0701qchina_russia.pdf>, [12.06.2012].

to u n W an g G u an gyu a explain ed th is stance fran kly: he said "no co u n try is per­ fect” 50. C h in a offered m ore help, m ore arm s sales (along w ith Russia) and big plans for closer relations. In general a m ix o f pragm atic considerations shaped China's B u rm a policy. There w ere the in ternal challenges for w h ich B u rm a as a bridge to the sea w as at least p art o f the answer, as w ell as a desire to exploit the w ith draw n o f the W est from B u rm a and in the process gain influence on India's flank“ 1. Two m onths after vetoin g th is sanctions, new s b egu n appear that the n ew gas pipeline w ou ld be bu ilt to C hina.

The Malacca Dilemma

China's p rincip al foreign p o licy priorities are essen tially inw ard-looking: to cre­ ate the m ost favorable extern al conditions for dom estic m odernization, to foster a benign extern al en viron m en t ("harm on ious w o rld ”) w hat w ou ld facilitate the country's m odernization. E nergy plays a vital role here. W ithout energy China's m odernization and rise as the n ext superpow er w ould grin d to a halt and the rulin g C o m m u n ist P a rty w ou ld be severely underm ined. E nergy is not an in stru m en t of geopolitical am bitions, but the principal rationale for an ever m ore assertive for­ eign policy, not a m eans o f extern al pow er projections, but a vital national n eed52. C h in a is h eavily dependent on foreign oil and approxim ately 80 pct. o f these oil cu rren tly pass th rou gh the Straits o f M alacca. O il needs are gro w in g by the day, and im p orts o f oil, from A fric a and the M iddle East, are all cu rren tly shipped via the Straits o f M alacca, w h ich w orries C h in ese strategic. The stra it is a n atural chokepoint, th rou gh w hich future enem ies could cut o ff foreign energy supplies. This applies to pirates but also in the event o f a future con flict w ith the u s or In ­ dia a few enem y w arsh ip s could easily block essential oil supplies. A n alternative route needs to be found. M yan m ar is the key and a p art o f resolvin g the M alacca D ilem m a’“ 3.

It is a strategic hedge against the Straits o f M alacca, one that m ay brin g Chinese political influence righ t up to the In dian O cean, for the first tim e in history. The C h in ese engineers have b egu n to bu ild a brand-n ew p ort on the island o f Ram ree, in A ra k a n State. The oil and gas pipelines w ill travel along the sam e route, as w ell as the railw ay lines and expressw ays that w ill follow. W ith in a few years, C h in a

50 R. Weitz, China-Russia Security Relations. Strategic Parallelism W ithout Partnership or Passion,

Lexington, k y , 2012, p. 39.

51 M. W. Charney, A History o f . , op. cit., p. 188.

52 Bobo Lo, The A x is o f Convenience. Moscow, B eijing a n d the N e w Geopolitics, London 2008, p.

4-144.

China's B u rm a policy. A Strateg ic P artn er or a N ew Colony? 81

and C h in ese influence m ay be m uch m ore present on the B ay o f B engal th an at any tim e in h isto ry5 4.

The Western Development Strategy (Xibu Dakaifa)

For the C h in ese governm ent strategic thinkers, the need to n arro w the gap b e­ tw een rich and poor, east coast and interior, w as a top priority, and lookin g at the m ap, they concluded a big reason for the sou th w est’s p overty w as its distance from the sea and lack o f easy access to internation al trade5 5. A s Thant M yin t-U su m m a­ rized: "W h at C h in a is lackin g is its C aliforn ia, another coast that w ou ld provide its rem ote interior provinces w ith an outlet to the sea”. There lies the origins o f 'Two O cean s’ p o licy w hich w as to m ake C h in a a 'b i-co astal' nation. The first O cean is Pacific. The second w ou ld be In d ian O cean. "W estern D evelopm ent S trateg y” w as officially in augurated in 1999 and related to this w as the idea o f a connection th rou gh M yan m ar to the In d ian O cean. B u rm a perhaps w as not intended as C h i­ na’s C aliforn ia, but clearly been seen as the bridge do the Bay o f Bengal and the w aters beyond5®.

A n d so the m assive developm ent — in vestm en ts in in fra stru c tu re and com ­ m erce — follow ed. P articu la rly in Y u n n an — a v e ry sen sitive p rovin ce w h ich is C h in a’s biggest concentration o f eth n ic m inorities. O ut o f 55 m illio n residence of Y un n an around 40 pct. are non-H an. M oreover, Y u n n an is im p ortan t as a source o f hydroelectricity, it’s C h in a’s biggest producer o f tobacco and flowers, as w ell as alum inum , lead, zinc and tin; its’ fam ous for its’ silver and tea57.

Therefore Y un n an ’s and B eijin g’s B u rm a p o licy has been dictated first and fore­ m ost by w hat w ill help Y un n an ’s econom y m ove forw ard. A n d there are tw o goals: the dom estic one is to m ake sure that local m in o rity groups stayed happy and felt th ey w ere benefiting from C h in a’s econom ical progress. This w ould prevent the w orst C om m u n ists P arty ’s nightm are: C h in a that goes the w ay o f the Soviet Union, sp lin tering along ethn ic lines. The an sw er to this threat w as to brin g capital and it w orked. Y un n an ’s econom y has benefited considerably, q uadruplin g in size from approxim ately $ 24 billion at the begin n in g o f the decade to $ 91billion in 200958. The extern al one w as to m ake Y un n an C h in a’s gatew ay to South A sia and Sou th­ east A sia — a n ew regional hub. It w as w ith in the fram ew ork o f "zou chu qu” (going out) p o licy5 9 that C h in a started to invest in M yan m ar. The p r c sees M yan m ar as an

54 Ibidem, p. 31-126.

55 On complex descrition of this programme, follow: <http://www.case.edu/affil/tibet/tibetanNo- mads/documents/ChinasWesternDevelopmentProgram_000.pdf>, [30.06.2012].

5® Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 29-131.

57 Yunnan Province's official website: <http://www.yn.gov.cn>, [02.06.2012]. 58 Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 131.

<http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-outlet m arket that m ay im prove the trade volum e o f Y un n an p rovince (M yan­ m ar is Y u n n an ’s largest trad in g partner)60.

M yan m ar, however, is not ju st another foreign coun try: it occupies a critical space on C h in a’s south w estern flank, righ t n ext to its densest concentration o f ethn ic m inorities. For Beijin g leaders, secu rin g m arkets near and far has been o f critical im portance. But even greater im p ortan ce has been en su rin g internal sta­ bility, in clu din g and esp ecially in ethn ic m in o rity areas. The m ost im p ortan t task regard the issue o f Y u n n an ’s developm ent w as to engage w ith the Bu rm ese junta6\

China in Myanmar’s domestic situation

A lth ou gh the dom estic situation in B u rm a w as com plex (core-periphery conflict etc.)6 2, it w as not B u rm a betw een all C h in a ’s strategic n eigh bors that troubled Beijing, but Pakistan . B u rm a’s situation although not perfect, w as m uch better. "Political lim bo has not precluded business, esp ecially cross-border business w ith C h in a and over the follow in g years jade m ines, toll roads and relentless loggings have kept p ow erful m en o f every faction equally com fortable: a new p olitical econ­ om y has em erged, w ith both sides — Burm ese and ethn ic m in orities — tied to C h i­ na’s in creasin g presen ce”6 3. R en ew ing fighting anyw here n ear new pipeline that is due to tran sp o rt 20 pct. o f C h in a’s im p orted oil, w ou ld be a disaster. C h in a kn ew better than anyone else that the situation in B u rm a is not quite stable: m uch o f the north and east o f the co u n try lay in the hand s o f arm ed groups other th an the Bu rm ese arm y. So C h in a did everyth in g to be on good term s w ith all the players in dom estic B u rm a’s conflict. A n d C h in a offered som ethin g long — i f ever nonex­ istent there: the capital. A n d it w orked. S tability pays off for everybody. The W a people exam ple is striking. W a, w hich used to be head-hunters and d rug traffickers and one o f the m ost troublesom e ethn ic m in orities for Bu rm ese junta, don’t touch C h in ese business. M oreover, m uch o f the W a zone is on the C h in ese electricity, and even its internet and m obile phone grid: blackberrys don’t w o rk in Rangoon, but the do in the W a area. The W a leaders are m ain ly C h in a-b o rn W a, th ey have C h in ese nam es and send their child ren to schools in C hina. They sp eak C h inese fluently and enjoy a close relationship w ith C h in ese officialdom . They w ill not bite the hand w hich helps them . The evolution o f the B u rm a-C h in a frontier happened

03/15/content_227686.htm>, [02.06.2012]. 60 J. Szczudlik-Tatar, C h in a ’s P o lic y ., op. cit., p. 1-2. ®i Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 131-144.

62 More on domestic situation in Burma: Ch. Fink, Living Silence in B urm a. Surviving U nder M i­ litary Role, Bangkok 2009; P. Webb, The Peacock’s Children. The Struggle fo r Freedom in Burm a 1885-Present, Bangkok 2009; D. I. Steinberg, The State o f M yanm ar, Washington DC 2001; M.

Callahan, Political Authority in B u r m a ’s Ethnic M inority States, Washington DC 2007. 63 Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 97-136.

China's B u rm a policy. A Strateg ic P artn er or a N ew Colony? 83

due to local people: there has been m ore contact and com m erce than at any tim e in recent h isto ry and this has created n ew and d yn am ic netw ork far aw ay from state control. Y un n an officials and businessm en turn ed the ethn ic areas into 'm in i-C h i­ nas': used them as footholds for their influence inside B u rm a fron tier64.

Since then approxim ately 2 m illion C h in ese m igrated into B u rm a and C h inese bu sinessm an dom inated m uch o f the econom y: ru n n in g everyth in g from sm all shops to big m in in g and con struction firm s, plantations "rent from the govern­ m en t”, som e thousand in scale (rubber, sugar cane, cassava, pineapples). C h inese invested in the developm ent o f ports, roads, bridges, and factories; C h in ese con­ sum er goods flooded Burm a's m arkets and as op p ortun ities for m ak in g m oney expanded, the presence o f C h in ese grew rapidly, p articu larly in M an d alay6 5. The form er capital o f M an d alay is sym ptom atic. It is said to be 1/3 C h in ese now: "M an ­ d alay is an unequal place w ith the n ew C h in ese im m igran ts at the top o f the p yr­ am id ”; "an outpost o f the w orld's biggest in d ustrial revolution”, a "spill-over from across the h ills (China) w as like a tidal w ave in B u rm a and in M an d a la y ”66. In flu x o f C h in ese p arallels the In dian in flu x o f greater size a cen tu ry ago, and as Indians did, the C h in ese see B u rm a as a land o f opportunities67. W ith C h in a the Burm ese ran a huge official trade deficit, im p ortin g nearly all con sum er goods from C h in a and exp o rtin g logs and jade, m uch o f this in contraband, as w ell as heroin. C h i­ na, co n trary to the W est w hich until now w as lim ited to h u m an itarian help only, w as unrestrained, in vestin g in in frastru ctu re projects, b u ild in g roads and dams, cu tting dow n teak forests, m in in g for jade and sellin g its ow n consum ers goods: "the net resu lt w as that n ew jobs w ere bein g created for local people and a m ore unequal society w as b ein g establish ed ’“ 8. There w as, however, one great obstacle in C h in ese plans: the B u rm ese nationalism .

The "Burmese thaw”

The generals are th an k fu l for the China's friendship. N evertheless, an alliance w ith C h in a w as a tactical move, not a perm an en t one sealin g in a future for B u rm a as a raw m aterial exporter to C h ina. But it w as the sam e generations o f generals who had fought nearly all their lives against C h inese-backed com m u n ist insurgents. A n d add the long-lasting an x iety about C h ina: "C hina's p icture in B u rm a has been

64 Ibidem, p. 119-141.

“ Ch. Fink, Living S ile n c e ., op. cit., p. 248. 66 Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 44.

6y The influx of Indians into Burma was to such extend that in 1927 Rangoon exceeded New York as the greatest immigration port in the world; in created an extremely negative popular unrest against Indians. In a way, nowadays Chinese migrations follows that pattern, idem, The River...

p. 185. More about Indians in colonial Burma: J. Furnivall, Colonial policy. p. 185-200. 6* Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 102.

a juggernaut, rollin g in and intent on suprem acy”; the Burm ese tend to see C h inese as colonists, eating out everyth in g — from sn ow leopards to rhinos, m arry in g to Bu rm ese w om en or traffick in g them to C h ina, tak in g aw ay their land and jobs“ . In general the C h in ese are consider bein g "m ore eq u al” — to use O rw e ll’s term7 0, due to political reaso n s7i.

The generals reacted in w hat w as b ein g called the "B u rm ese th aw ” that start­ ed in A u gu st 2 0 11 w ith the reconciliation betw een m ilita ry backed governm ent and opposition leader A u n g San Suu K yi7 2. C o n tra ry to p op ular W estern b elief seein g this case as a p ro o f o f the unavoidable process o f dem ocratization around the world, p olitical reform s in B u rm a are bein g initiated from "above.” They are elite-driven and stem from the president and progressive m em bers o f the m ili­ tary-dom inated party, the U nion S olid arity and D evelopm ent P a rty (usdp)7 3. They represent a "political th aw ”, as in the form er u s s r w ere the K h ru sh ch ev ’s in itial reform s (hence this nam e in political science)7 4. The K h ru sh ch ev ’s thaw ended in the frost: all those w ho w an ted som ethin g m ore th an superficial liftin g w ere send to m ental h o s p i t a l . W ill it be sim ilar in Burm a? O r an another com p arison w ith u s s r w ould fit? That o f perestroika: G orb ach ev also w an ted to „change everyth in g in order to keep ev ery th in g ”, but his reco n stru ction led to a fu ll failure: the cou n ­ try collapsed w ith in eth n ic lines. Therefore, the m ain question about the p olitical changes in B u rm a is w hether the generals w ould be able to control "the th aw ”: change colors, create "dem ocratic” stru ctu res (controlled b y them) and keep all the pow er or the w hole process w ould overw helm them and lead to genuine p olitical transform ation. So far option n um ber one rem ain s the answer.

The key factor in B u rm a’s tran sform ation is the arm y. O n ly the arm y has stru c­ tures, capital and ab ility to reform . O pposition has o n ly sym b olic pow er: w ith the exception o f m oral leadership o f A u n g San SuuKyi, n l d cannot offer m uch. W h atever happens, the pow er w ill rem ain in the hands o f generals, n ow in civ­ il dress. It’s as in 1989 C h in a, w hen D en g X ia o p in g argued w ith Z h a o Z iyan g. "I have the arm y ” — said Deng. "I have the people” — replied Zhao. "So you have

69 Ibidem, p. 137.

70 George Orwell started his career in Burma, with his debut novel “The Burmese Days” (1934). 71 It's a good comparison with mid-war Poland's ethnic tensions: “nasze ulice, wasze kamienice”

(“Our streets, your residences”).

72 More about beginning of the „Burmese thaw”, see: <http://www.polska-azja.pl/2011/08/28/m- -lubina-odwilz-w-birmie/>, [12.06.2012] , there this term appears for the first time in Polish. 73 M. Bünte, C. Portela, M yan m ar: The Beginning o f Reforms a n d the E n d o f Sanctions,g i g a Papers

nr 3 9 (2012), <http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/documents/uploads/pub_55_focusmyanmar.pdf>, [12.06.2012].

74 This term takes its name from Ilya Erenburg book „The thaw” (Оттепель) from 1954.

75 For more about this practices, see V. Bukovsky's book A n d the W in d Comes Back, New York 1 9 7 9.

China's B u rm a policy. A Strateg ic P artn er or a N ew Colony? 85

n oth in g” — an sw ered D eng7 6. In B u rm a it’s even w orse: the arm y has an alm ost m on opolistic p osition and w e should have no illusions about this.

So it w as the arm y w ho started "the Bu rm ese th aw ” and m ain extern al reason for that w as C h in a’s threat. The first step w as to lessen its dependence on China. The ju n ta already m ade a m ove in this direction by can cellin g the con struction o f the C h in ese supported M yitson e dam , a "B u rm ese Three G orges D am ”. M y an ­ m a r’s President, Thein Sein, announced the suspension o f this project citing public disquiet, a m otive previou sly un h eard o f in M yan m ar. Since that the jun ta started a gradual process o f liberalization. M o st o f p olitical p risoners w ere released, cen ­ sorship w as softened, cease-fire agreem ents w ith K aren s and Shans w ere achieved, and talks w ith the opposition started, w ith the cu lm in ation o f follow -up elections w on by n l d on A p ril 1. A s the political ice m elted, the W est began a cautious re-as­ sessm ent o f the p olicy o f isolation and sanctions. H ilary C lin ton s’ visit to M yan m ar in D ecem ber 2 0 11 — the first by a u s S ecretary o f State since 1955 — w as the m ost visible, follow ed by m ajority o f top W estern politicians. A n d finally, suspension o f san ction s cam e in M ay 2 0 11, a step m ostly desired b y Bu rm ese leaders , for it constitutes a p ow erfu l incentive for a leadership eager to attract foreign operators to a m arket largely dom inated by C hina. W ith W estern investm ents, For the very first tim e, the generals w ill have som ethin g they alw ays m issed: the capital. A s one bu sinessm an told m e, "it’s difficult to m ake capitalism w ith out cap ital’^ 7 Now, for the first tim e since colon ial tim es, W estern capital w ill be present in B u rm a on a large s c a ^ . A n d capital can help m ore. It can solve m an y dom estic problem s. For exam ple, the eth n ic m in orities m igh t be m ore prone to accept the status quo if th ey are bein g offered som e social projects (schools, hospitals etc).

A ll this activity should be seen w ith in the fram ew ork o f w ider political am bi­ tion to gain influence and regain it’s regional status: b y balancin g W estern and C h i­ nese influence, B u rm a w an ts to com e back to "A sian ch essb oard ”. This is happen­ ing now, w hen, for the first tim e in history, C h in a and India m ay m eet in A sia — in Burm a. A s Thant M yint-U , points, "at a tim e w h en C h in ese influence around the w orld w as sta rtin g to be felt m ore stro n gly th an ever, B u rm a w as the can a ry in the co alm in e”7 9. B u rm a than ks to its political thaw w h ich pull the co u n try out o f W estern isolation, m ay becom e a background for a new, grand geopolitical struggle betw een C h in a and the W est: a R obert K ap lan point "a n ew G reat G a m e ”8 0. I f

Bur-76 B. Góralczyk, Pekińska wiosna. Początki ruchu demokratycznego w Chinach (The Beijing Spring. The beginning o f dem ocratic movement in China) Warszawa 1999.

77 Visit in Myanmar, February 2012.

7* The colonial government improved Burma's economy significantly, but only the specific sectors needed by the British, M. Smith, Ethnic groups o f Burm a. Development, D em ocracy a n d H um an Rights, <http://www.zomilibrary.com/main/archive/files/ethnic-groups-in-burma-by-martin-

-smith_f3730oa3od.pdf>, [12.06.2012]. 7® Thant Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 113.

m a be able to com e back to the W est, it w ill becom e "a n ew crossroad o f A sia ”81, a new, em erging, region al power.

China’s reaction to the "Burmese thaw”

and it’s consequences for China-Myanmar relations

The answ er is the dual approach tow ards "B u rm ese th aw ”. The C h in ese w ou ld like to see W estern sanctions lifted, believin g that a m ore prosperous B u rm a connected to internation al m arkets, w ill help ensure stab ility and that this w ill be good in the long ru n for C h in a as well. But th ey also clearly see the huge advantage that san ction s (and related boycott cam paigns) have given to their ow n business inter­ ests by rem ovin g econom ical rivals from the scene. But w hat is m ost im p ortan t to C h in a is stability in Burm a. B u rm a is not like Sudan or Zim babw e: it is sittin g next to a n ew ly in vigorated C h in ese hin terland and any backlash in B u rm a or violence along the border w ould have serious consequences for Beijing. B u rm a sits on top o f the B ay o f B engal and w ill soon be southw estern China's access to the sea as w ell as conduit for its tw enty-first cen tu ry en ergy n eed s8 2.

^ e r e fo r e , from C h in ese perspective, i f the "B u rm ese th aw ” is to b rin g stability and peace in Burm a, even under the unpleasant condition o f having to com pete w ith W estern capital, it's w orth to sacrifice privileged position for greatest profit: Burm a's stability. But it doesn't m ean B eijin g w ill give in for free it's dom in an t p osition in B u rm a. O n the contrary, it w ill tr y to "teach the generals a lesson” for their insubordination. There's w ell know n sayin g in China, "Yelang zi da” (m eaning "Yelang th in ks too h ig h ly on itse lf”) w hich is used to refer to anyone arrogan t or conceited. Yelang w as a ancient kingdom on China's southw estern border, w hose kings had seen them selves as equals o f the H an e m p e r o ^ . So i f the generals in B u rm a fail to success in their reform s, th ey w ill have to acknow ledge C h in ese dom ination. In th is scenario, Burm a's dependence on C h in a w ill on ly deepen and the co u n try w ill tu rn into Beijing's raw m aterial colony. I f the generals succeed, however, th ey w ould be in strong position to face C hinese. O n ly then B u rm a m ight becom e China's strategic partner.

*i Term taken from ’ttant Myint-U's book, cited above. *2 ^ a n t Myint-U, W here C h in a ., op. cit., p. 220. 83 Ibidem, p. 219.

China's B u rm a policy. A Strateg ic P artn er or a N ew Colony? 87

$ ABSTRACT $

Stosu n ki chiń sko-birm ań skie, w idziane są z p ersp ek tyw y Z ach od u głów nie jako p olityczny parasol Pekinu dla krytykow an ej na św iecie ju n ty birm ańskiej, podczas gdy rzeczyw isto ść jest o w iele bardziej złożona. Z aw iera się w niej w iele kw estii, takich jak dziedzictw o historyczn e (które pozostaw iło u B irm ań czyków w yraźn y lęk przed potężnym sąsiadem z północy), kw estie gospodarcze — tak legalne (wy­ m ian a gospodarcza — ChRL głów n ym p artnerem h an d low ym Birm y), jak i n iele­ galne (handel opium) oraz polityczne, w kontekście trw ającej ostatnio w Birm ie „o d w ilży ”, której głów n ym celem jest w łaśnie w yrw a n ie się z chińskiej kurateli. Istotna jest chińska percepcja Birm y: jako z jednej strony kraju rozw iązującego „dy­ lem at M a la k k i” oraz znakom itego ry n k u zbytu dla rod zim ych tow arów , a z d ru ­ giej strony jako kraju niepew nego, targanego n iestabilnością i przez to grożącego szerszej w izji w yjścia na O cean Indyjski. Chińczycy, dzięki w yco fan iu się Z achodu z Birm y, uzyskali tam niepod zieln ą pozycję i um iejętnie ją utrzym yw ali. Jednakże dom inacja ta w y z w a ła u birm ań skich generałów lęki przed stan iem się w asalem Pekinu i p op ch n ęła ich do strategicznej decyzji o liberalizacji. Junta w yk alk u lo - w ała, że lepiej jest rozpocząć koncesjonow ane reform y i p rzez to uzyskać w sparcie Z a c h o d u — jedynej siły m ogącej zrów n ow ażyć C h in y — n iż dać się zdom inow ać Pekinow i. Podejm ując tę grę, generałow ie zaryzykow ali. Pow odzenie reform w sa­ mej Birm ie będzie m ieć decydujące znaczenie dla dalszej pozycji B irm y w relacjach z C h in am i. Jeśli otw arcie na św iat się pow iedzie, B irm a będzie w stanie zró w n o­ w ażyć swój chiń ski w ektor polityki. Jeśli nie, czeka ją n ieuchronne staczanie się w stronę chińskiej kolonii.

M ichał Lubina — Absolwent rosjoznawstwa i studiów dalekowschodnich uj, dok­ torant na Wydziale Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych uj, kilkukrotny Stypendysta Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego oraz Narodowego Cen­ trum Nauki. Ekspert w Centrum Studiów Polska — Azja oraz w Stowarzyszeniu

c t a (Closer to Asia). Wśród jego zainteresowań badawczych znajdują się przede

wszystkim stosunki rosyjsko-chińskie oraz Azja Południowo-Wschodnia, ze szcze­ gólnym uwzględnieniem Birmy, którą regularnie odwiedza. W sierpniu 2011 r. jako pierwszy analityk w kraju użył określenia „odwilż birmańska”.