John Hick's philosophy of religious pluralism - A Critical Examination

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Cracovia - Kraköw, 8: 2003, 167-182

J a n u s z S A L A M O N

J O H N HICK'S PHILOSOPHY

OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

-A CRITIC-AL EX-AMIN-ATION

The philosophical challenge that religious d i v e r s i t y poses f o r religious belief has become i n recent years the focal point of a v e r y engaging theological a n d philosophical debate. T h e debate began i n the C h r i s t i a n context a n d i t w o u l d be f a i r to say that i t s m a i n issue remains the r e l a t i o n s h i p of C h r i s t i a n i t y to other m a j o r religions. T r a d i t i o n a l l y C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s faced w i t h the fact of religious p l u r a l i t y have assumed t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y is the only w a y to salvation, a n d the t r u t h - c l a i m s of other religions can be r e f u t e d b y w a y of argument. T h i s position is described today as 'exclusivist'. J o h n H i c k ' s name has become synonymous w i t h a r a d i c a l l y different approach to the whole issue. H i c k argues t h a t a l l religious traditions m a k e contact w i t h the same U l t i m a t e R e a l i t y ('the Real'), each encountering i t t h r o u g h a v a -riety of c u l t u r a l l y shaped forms of thought a n d experience, b u t a l l offering equally effective paths to 'salvation/liberation'. H i c k ' s p l u r a -listic hypothesis, a l t h o u g h very popular i n some quarters, appears to m a n y C h r i s t i a n a n d n o n - C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s as h i g h l y controversial.

In the f o l l o w i n g paper consisting of two sections I w o u l d l i k e to have a close look at H i c k ' s f u n d a m e n t a l assertions a n d assumptions ( i n section I), a n d to point out some weaknesses of his p l u r a l i s t i c hypoth-esis ( i n section II). I w i l l attempt to show that H i c k ' s efforts to prove that adherents of different religions do not contradict themselves as f a r as essentials are concerned lead h i m to a point where he m u s t embrace the anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of religious language, otherwise h i s theory becomes inconsistent. I w i l l also d r a w attention to the fact t h a t H i c k ' s concept of salvation/liberation w h i c h he t h i n k s is common to a l l religions, as w e l l as h i s views about the extent to w h i c h religious

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language is mythological i n nature, makes his position v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t of revisionist theologians l i k e D o n C u p i t t or D . Z . P h i l i p p s .

!• A n E x a m i n a t i o n of Hick's A r g u m e n t s for Religious P l u r a l i s m J o h n H i c k d i d not begin his C h r i s t i a n l i f e as a p l u r a l i s t but as a n E v a n g e l i c a l f u n d a m e n t a l i s t f i r m l y committed to the t r u t h - c l a i m s of t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n belief.^ I n God Has Many Names H i c k , a n ordained m i n i s t e r of the U n i t e d R e f o r m e d C h u r c h , writes: / have from almost as early as I can remember had a rather strong sense of the reality of God as the personal and loving Lord of the universe.^ P a r a d o x i c a l l y i t was this t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n conviction w h i c h p r o m p t e d subsequent change of his theological views. A t a c e r t a i n point H i c k f o u n d C h r i s t i a n e x c l u s i v i s m (which he calls 'absolutism'), as expressed i n the p a t r i s t i c phrase extra ecclesiam nulla salus, contradict-i n g the most f u n d a m e n t a l C h r contradict-i s t contradict-i a n belcontradict-iefs about the contradict-i n f contradict-i n contradict-i t e goodness of G o d a n d about God's p l a n of u n i v e r s a l salvation. F o r H i c k , the logical consequence of C h r i s t i a n absolutism was t h a t most of the w o r l d is condemned, a n d t h a t he f o u n d morally unacceptable. The w e i g h t of t h i s m o r a l contradiction has d r i v e n h i m to explore other ways of u n d e r s t a n d -i n g the h u m a n rel-ig-ious s -i t u a t -i o n and to develop h-is p l u r a l -i s t -i c hypothesis.

H i c k ' s first step towards the f o r m u l a t i o n of his hypothesis was his acceptance of the principle of the c u l t u r a l r e l a t i v i t y of religious t r u t h -claims w h i c h m a i n t a i n s t h a t one's religious presuppositions are p r i m a r i l y set according to the c u l t u r a l context of one's b i r t h . A t t e n d i n g services i n synagogues, mosques a n d H i n d u temples H i c k came to the conclusion t h a t essentially the same kind ofthing is taking place in them as in a Christian church - namely, human beings opening their minds to a higher divine Reality, known as personal and good and as demand-ing righteousness and love between man and man? H i c k presumes t h a t i f one was brought up i n a C h r i s t i a n environment one is l i k e l y to grow u p w i t h the conviction t h a t any s a l v a t i o n is f o u n d i n J e s u s C h r i s t . I f one was b o r n i n S o u t h I n d i a one w i l l probably u n d e r s t a n d s a l v a t i o n i n terms of being released f r o m moksha. A g a i n i f one was b o r n i n B u d d h i s t T i b e t one w i l l grow up w i t h the religious desire to obtain bodhi. F o r

^ Hick describes his spiritual pilgrimage in some detail in the introduction to God Has Many Names, London: Macmillan, 1980.

' Ibid., p. 2. ' Ibid., p. 5.

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H i c k , to assume t h a t one has the privilege of k n o w i n g the f u l l religious t r u t h only by v i r t u e of being born into C h r i s t i a n f a m i l y is both i m m o r a l a n d i r r a t i o n a l / Instead he t h i n k s t h a t the only viable option for a r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l is to accept t h a t the great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving and living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied visions ofit.^

A t the heart of H i c k ' s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis lies his assertion that the U l t i m a t e R e a l i t y constitutes the ground for a l l religious experience a n d religious language. H e rejects n a t u r a l i s m w h i c h asserts that n a t u r e is a l l that exists a n d therefore a l l religious beliefs are delusive. Moreover, he explicitly refutes a close cousin of n a t u r a l i s m , religious non-realism, i.e. a c l a i m that although religious beliefs m a y be subjectively important, u s e f u l , a n d i n certain sense 'true', they do not denote objects w h i c h exist independently of believer's perception.^ In An Interpretation of Religion H i c k makes i t clear that he believes t h a t the objects of religious belief, w i t h a n u m b e r of qualifications, do exist independently of one's perception.^ It is important to bear this i n m i n d because i n the second section of this paper I w i l l attempt to show that i t is d i f f i c u l t for H i c k to h o l d this realist position w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g his p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis.

One of the ideas w h i c h underlies H i c k ' s theory is a s h i f t f r o m orthodoxy to orthopraxis. D e n y i n g the c r u c i a l importance of orthodoxy H i c k challenges the very basis of C h r i s t i a n e x c l u s i v i s m that is the need for a response to a specific message i n order to be saved. H e is convinced t h a t s a l v a t i o n is always achieved as f a r as one is i n proper soteriological alignment with the Real, a n d every r e l i g i o n is a true religion i n s o f a r as i t enables a person to establish such a n alignment.^ T h u s religions could be seen as c u l t u r a l l y determined sets of values for s o u l - m a k i n g a n d points of contact w i t h the R e a l . There is no need to assume. H i c k w o u l d say, that only one r e l i g i o n is a n effective m e a n of salvation, a n d therefore no need to a i m at converting those who do not share our religious conviction. T h i s is not to say that there is no place or need for a n interaction between different religious t r a d i t i o n . O n the contrary. H i c k t h i n k s t h a t h a v i n g the same u l t i m a t e goal (i.e. salva-tion/liberation) adherents of different religious traditions can e n r i c h

^ Cf. J. Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, p. 77ff. ^ J. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (later simply Interpretation), p. 235-6. ^ Cf. J. Hick, Religious Realism and Non-Realism: Defining the Issue, Is God Real?, p. 3-18.

^ Cf. Interpretation, p. 190-209. ' Ibid., p. 374.

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each other by s h a r i n g t h e i r experience w h i c h comes f r o m t h e i r o w n orthopraxis.

T h u s b e g i n n i n g w i t h the assumptions w h i c h are u n d e n i a b l y C h r i s t i a n (the G o d of love wants none to p e r i s h but a l l to be saved) H i c k arrives at a point where he refutes t r a d i t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of C h r i s t i a n i t y r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d C h r i s t as the only S a v i o u r . Instead he embraces a v i e w t h a t every religion, i n c l u d i n g C h r i s t i a n i t y , revolves a r o u n d G o d , w h i l e the y a r d s t i c k of a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d effectiveness of a n y r e l i g i o n is its soteriological a l i g n m e n t w i t h the R e a l .

These basic ideas h a d constituted a f ound ation of H i c k ' s religious p l u r a l i s m for more t h a n a quarter of a century. However, c o m p a r i n g G o d a n d the U n i v e r s e of F a i t h s (1973) w i t h An Interpretation of Religion (1989) one can observe a n i m p o r t a n t development i n the author's u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the essence of religion. W h i l e i n the previous book H i c k sees different religions as c u l t u r a l l y determined means of e s t a b l i s h i n g the r i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U l t i m a t e R e a l i t y , i n the l a t t e r he speaks about different religions as c u l t u r a l l y de t er m in ed responses to the R e a l . I n other words, the author explains somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y the source a n d n a t u r e of religious diversity. T h i s s h i f t is v e r y i m p o r t a n t as i n the final analysis i t appears to be a s h i f t towards theological a n t i - r e a l i s m , a n d makes H i c k ' s hypothesis more v u l n e r a b l e , as I w i l l attempt to show i n the second section of t h i s paper.

I n An Interpretation of Religion where the f u l l e s t development of H i c k ' s views can be f o u n d , the author gives a n epistemological f o u n d a -t i o n -to h i s v e r s i o n of religious p l u r a l i s m by b o r r o w i n g a n d r e v i s i n g K a n t ' s concepts of noumenal a n d phenomenal, as w e l l as Wittgenstein's category of 'seeing-as'. I n this book H i c k presents a comprehensive theory t h a t attempts to e x p l a i n a l l religious phenomena i n s u c h a w a y as to give a c o n v i n c i n g account of religious diversity. A c c e p t i n g K a n t ' s c l a i m t h a t one can have no pure experience of the noumenal (i.e. the w o r l d i n itself), a n d therefore our experience of the w o r l d is a l w a y s to some degree a creation of our m i n d , H i c k draws a conclusion t h a t a l l experience, i n c l u d i n g religious experience, is 'experiencing-as' (a category w h i c h H i c k owes p a r t l y to W i t t g e n s t e i n but employs i n different context). T h i s allows H i c k to say t h a t as each person's religious experience being a n u l t i m a t e source of religion is specific to h i m s e l f , t h e n one's r e l i g i o n is specific to oneself as regards the t r u t h - c l a i m s i n h e r e n t w i t h i n i t .

Acceptance of K a n t i a n i s m as the epistemological basis f o r h i s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis allows H i c k to alleviate some d i l e m m a s w h i c h its i n i t i a l f o r m u l a t i o n was p r o m p t i n g . F o r example, now he can e x p l a i n how one a n d the same R e a l can be experienced as a personal deity i n a theistic context (e.g. Y a h w e h or A l l a h ) , a n d as a non-personal r e a l i t y

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i n some other traditions (e.g. B r a h m a n ) , a n d yet be the same R e a h t y w h i c h a believer encounters i n soteriological relationship. I n the l i g h t of K a n t ' s d i s t i n c t i o n H i c k distinguishes between the Real an sich (i.e. i n itself; as i t a c t u a l l y exists) a n d the Real as variously experienced-and-thought by different human communities,^ T h u s the Real-as-experienced becomes a n e u t r a l i d e n t i f i e r w h i c h allows very different definitions depending on one's perception of the R e a l an sich. F o r H i c k , the m a i n reason w h y d i f f e r e n t religious traditions have different or even conflicting conceptions of the R e a l is t h a t none has direct access to it. R a t h e r , a l l perception of the R e a l is mediated t h r o u g h a religious t r a d i t i o n w h i c h acts as a conceptual lens. T h i s conceptual lens shapes perception of the R e a l , a n d i t can be s a i d t h a t each concrete historical divine personality - Jahweh, the heavenly Father, the Qur'anic Allah - is a joint product of the universal divine presence and a particular historically formed mode of constructive religious imagination.^^ I n short. H i c k holds t h a t religious beliefs are p a r t i a l l y f o r m e d by experi-ence of the R e a l a n d p a r t i a l l y by the believer's i m a g i n a t i o n .

T a k i n g these theoretical innovations into account one can s u m up H i c k ' s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis as c l a i m i n g the following: (1) There is one divine r e a l i t y , the R e a l , w h i c h is the u l t i m a t e source of a l l religious experience. (2) T h e R e a l transcends a l l descriptions - both negative a n d positive. (3) N o religious t r a d i t i o n has direct perception of the R e a l . E a c h religious t r a d i t i o n represents a n authentic w a y i n w h i c h the R e a l is conceived a n d experienced. D i f f e r e n t religions constitute different conceptions and perceptions of, and responses to, the Real from within the different cultural ways of being human.^^ M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , w i t h i n each of t h e m the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of h u m a n existence f r o m selfcentredness to Realityselfcentredness can take place. T h i s ' t r a n s f o r m -ation' is synonymous w i t h 'salvation/liber-ation' w h i c h for H i c k constitutes the u l t i m a t e goal of every religion (an assumption w h i c h is h i g h l y disputable, as I w i l l show i n the second section of this paper).

I n the l i g h t of t h i s new f o r m u l a t i o n of H i c k ' s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis it is s t i l l the c u l t u r a l context w h i c h is the u l t i m a t e source of religious diversity, as the d i f f e r e n t ways of experiencing the R e a l (e.g. as personal or non-personal) depend on ' v a r i a n t ways of being h u m a n ' . H i c k t h i n k s t h a t M u s l i m s , C h r i s t i a n s or J e w s experience the R e a l as a personal One because they were brought up i n the 'mode of I-Thou encounter', w h i l e B u d d h i s t s experience the R e a l as non-personal because of t h e i r

'non-' Ibid., p. 236.

J. Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, p. 159. Interpretation, p. 375-6.

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personal awareness'. W h a t u l t i m a t e l y H i c k w a n t s to assert here is t h a t d i f f e r e n t expressions of religious awareness do not contradict each other. T h i s is H i c k ' s bottom l i n e a n d he seems to be p r e p a r e d to change some of h i s e a r l i e r views only to show t h a t any such contradictions are apparent or s u p e r f i c i a l . A l s o acceptance of K a n t i a n i s m as a n epistemo-logical basis of the p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis appears to be u s e f u l i n t h i s respect. It allows H i c k to assert t h a t u l t i m a t e l y there can be no conflict between religions as f a r as t h e i r t r u t h - c l a i m s about the n a t u r e of the R e a l an sich are concerned, because there is no possibility f o r a n absolute t r u t h - c l a i m , as the R e a l is i n e f f a b l e a n d unable to be under-stood or e x p r e s s e d . H i c k does not deny that there is some correspon-dence between the R e a l an sich a n d the Real-as-experienced but i t is h a r d to see w h a t sort of correspondence i t is. Moreover, one could ask on w h a t g r o u n d H i c k asserts t h a t there exists a n y correspondence between a believer's experience a n d the R e a l an sich.

I n the final analysis w h a t we are l e f t w i t h is the c l a i m t h a t religions are not there to teach us 'truths' about the R e a l but to evoke i n us a proper soteriological response to the R e a l . T h e y do i t u s i n g m y t h i c a l language. ( H i c k defines a m y t h as a story or statement which is not literally true but which tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to its subject-matter. Thus the truth of a myth is a practical truthfulness: a true myth is one which rightly guides us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythological terms.^^) T h e only ' t r u t h f u l n e s s ' of each religion is s h o w n by its soteriological effective-ness, a n d there is no reason to suppose t h a t m a n y a n d v e r y d i f f e r e n t religions can be 'true'.

One senses t h a t there are at least two tacit assumptions here. F i r s t l y , t h a t there is a consensus about the m e a n i n g of 'salva-tion/liberation'. Secondly, t h a t s a l v a t i o n , as conceived by H i c k , is r e a l l y w h a t each w o r l d religion is a l l about. H i c k t h i n k s t h a t the best w a y of finding out the concept of s a l v a t i o n assumed i n each r e l i g i o n is a n e m p i r i c a l one. H e proposes to look at the s p i r i t u a l f r u i t s every m a j o r r e l i g i o n produces a n d arrives at a conclusion t h a t d i f f e r e n t conceptions of s a l v a t i o n are specifications of w h a t , i n a generic f o r m u l a , is the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of h u m a n existence f r o m self-centredness to non-egocentrism. I n other words, r e l i g i o n is effective (and 'true') i f i t is productive of love/compassion. A s there is no e m p i r i c a l evidence s h o w i n g t h a t a n y of the w o r l d religions has shown i t s e l f to be more productive

Cf. J . Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 88-95. Interpretation, p. 248.

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i n this respect, H i c k concludes t h a t each of the w o r l d religions is equally 'true'.^^

II. A C r i t i c a l A p p r a i s a l of Hick's Hypothesis of Religious P l u r a l i s m

There is no doubt t h a t H i c k ' s hypothesis has strong i n t u i t i v e appeal. H e presented h i s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis as something r e q u i r e d i f we are to h o l d i n tension the i d e a of a G o d of love a n d the need for salvation. It can be s a i d t h a t H i c k put into philosophical language w h a t m a n y people seem to believe, n a m e l y t h a t a l l m a j o r religions lead to the same destination. H o w e v e r , the question we are f a c i n g i n this paper is not w h e t h e r this p o p u l a r i n t u i t i o n is true or false, but whether H i c k ' s formulation of religious p l u r a l i s m is plausible. Possible weaknesses of

alternative hypotheses w h i c h provide a f r a m e w o r k by w h i c h one can c l a i m that a n y religion w h i c h positively transforms lives of its adher-ents is v a l i d , does not constitute a n argument for h o l d i n g H i c k ' s position i f i t can be demonstrated that i t is implausible.^^ I n addition, not everybody w i l l be ready to accept as easily as H i c k does t h a t exclusi-v i s m is r a t i o n a l l y unacceptable.^^ There are a n u m b e r of points of c r i t i c i s m I w o u l d l i k e to m a k e . I w i l l begin w i t h the more i m p o r t a n t ones.

The c e n t r a l c l a i m H i c k is m a k i n g is that beliefs of adherents of religions as d i f f e r e n t as C h r i s t i a n i t y , I s l a m , B u d d h i s m , or H i n d u i s m are not contradictory, a n d therefore a l l religions can be considered as authentic manifestations of the same U l t i m a t e R e a l i t y . Y e t , i t seems obvious for most believers a n d non-believers t h a t different religious traditions h o l d irreconcilable beliefs on m a n y i m p o r t a n t points. Does H i c k adequately address the problem of conflicting truth-claims?

H i c k does not deny t h a t various religious traditions disagree about f u n d a m e n t a l issues. Moreover, he is aware that this s i t u a t i o n pose an

Ibid, p. 172.

Karl Rahner's inclusivism could be considered as the middle of the road position. He maintains that Christianity is the true religion. At the same time he is confident that other religions, too, can be lawful because God, desiring that all be saved, gives people his grace through these religions. Adherents of these religions must be regarded as 'anonymous Christians' until the Gospel brings them to an explicit knowledge of God's self-revelation in Jesus. (Cf. K. Rahner, Religious Inclusivism, Philosophy of Religion, p. 503-513).

Exclusivism has such prominent adherents as Alvin Plantinga. (Cf. Plantinga A., A Defence of Religious Exclusivism, The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, p. 201-5.)

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obvious problem for the pluralistic hypothesis}^ Y e t he t h i n k s he is able to show t h a t conflicting t r u t h - c l a i m s do not f a l s i f y h i s theory because as f a r as essential religious beliefs are concerned he c a n not see contradiction between t h e m . A m o n g such essential beliefs H i c k f i n d s f i r s t of a l l 'trans-historical t r u t h claims', a n d ' d i f f e r i n g conceptions of the Real'.^^ T r a n s - h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h claims have to do w i t h questions to w h i c h there is i n p r i n c i p l e a t r u e answer, but (according to H i c k ) one w h i c h cannot be established by h i s t o r i c a l or other e m p i r i c a l evidence. C o n f l i c t i n g t r u t h - c l a i m s about the n a t u r e of the universe (eternal or temporal?, created or not?) a n d the fate of h u m a n s at death (one l i f e or many?) belong to t h i s category. I n the second category there is the even more f u n d a m e n t a l religious question of the n a t u r e of the R e a l (a perso-n a l G o d or a perso-noperso-n-persoperso-nal Reality?).

A s f a r as the n a t u r e of the universe is concerned. H i c k reasons t h a t as current scientific cosmologies are compatible w i t h either perspective, therefore belief t h a t the universe is eternal (associated more often w i t h non-theistic religions) a n d t r a d i t i o n a l l y theistic belief t h a t i t is created by G o d (and therefore temporal) are not contradictory. W h e n faced w i t h the fact t h a t E a s t e r n traditions emphasize numerous r e i n c a r n a t i o n s or r e b i r t h s f o l l o w i n g death w h i l e adherents of W e s t e r n theistic religions t e n d to believe t h a t each person lives one life followed by a j u d g e m e n t to determine a n eternal fate. H i c k gives two answers w h i c h are supposed to show t h a t this does not f a l s i f y h i s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis. O n the one h a n d , he proposes t h a t both these beliefs m a y better be understood mythologically (i.e. not l i t e r a l l y t r u e but e v o k i n g the proper soteriological response to the Real), a n d t h e n both claims m a y be 'true' at the same time. O n the other h a n d . H i c k notices t h a t i t is conceivable t h a t some people are r e i n c a r n a t e d w h i l e others are not. T h a t w o u l d m e a n t h a t both religions are p a r t l y r i g h t a n d p a r t l y w r o n g but there is no contradiction between t h e m w h i c h w o u l d endanger H i c k ' s position. O n top of these arguments H i c k makes the more i m p o r t a n t a n d h i g h l y problematic statement t h a t the resolution of the dispute about s u c h issues as the n a t u r e of the universe a n d the fate of h u m a n s at death is u n i m p o r t a n t i n the f i n a l analysis as i t cannot significantly help or hinder the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness}^ One is tempted to t h i n k t h a t H i c k tries to suggest t h a t because the d i f f e r i n g t r a n s - h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h - c l a i m s are not soteriologically v i t a l therefore even i f there were contradictions between

Interpretation, p. 362. Ibid., p. 23ff.

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t h e m i t w o u l d not be a serious blow for his hypothesis as i t operates, as i t were, on the deeper level. I n addition he seems to be ready to resort to a mythological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a l l trans-historical truth-claims w h i c h w i l l challenge h i s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis.

H e applies a s i m i l a r procedure w h e n i t comes to e x p l a i n i n g how it is possible t h a t adherents of E a s t e r n a n d W e s t e r n traditions have such different views about the n a t u r e of the R e a l (a personal G o d versus a non-personal Reality) a n d yet, as H i c k ' s hypothesis says, they a l l refer to authentic manifestations of the Real}^ A n s w e r i n g the critical question about the relationship between the R e a l i n itself a n d the v a r y i n g conceptions of the R e a l h e l d by the followers of various traditions H i c k writes: This relationship between the ultimate noumenon and its multiple phenomenal appearances, or between the limitless transcendent reality and our many partial human images of it, makes possible mythological speech about the Real, [...] a true myth is one

which rightly guides us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythological terms?^ It appears t h e n that for H i c k speech about the R e a l is always m3d:hological i n nature. I f so t h e n again he w i l l be i n c l i n e d to argue t h a t even i f beliefs about the R e a l v a r y to such extent that sometimes they appear to be contradictory, they m a y w e l l a l l be true because they evoke the appropriate soteriological response to the R e a l .

It seems t h a t every step of H i c k ' s argumentation is open to criticism a n d t h a t u l t i m a t e l y he fails to resolve the problem of conflicting t r u t h -claims w h i c h he h i m s e l f recognizes as a serious challenge to his p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis. F i r s t of a l l . H i c k seems to assume that because such disputes as t h a t about the n a t u r e of the universe, or the fate of h u m a n s at death, or the n a t u r e of the R e a l can not be settled historical-l y or empiricahistorical-lhistorical-ly, therefore confhistorical-licting behistorical-liefs about those issues do not pose a problem f o r his p l u r a l i s t i c h y p o t h e s i s . T h i s approach is totally unconvincing, as the fact t h a t one can not f u l l y determine w h i c h belief is correct does not soften the contradiction.^^ H o w can religious beliefs of a polytheist be reconciled w i t h beliefs of a theist? It is theoretically possible t h a t they both are w r o n g (if there aren't any gods or God), but how can they both be correct? It m a y be true (though i t is not obvious) that the opposing t r u t h - c l a i m s i n question cannot be adjudicated, but this does not allow one to conclude t h a t a l l those claims are true.

2« Ibid., p. 14. 2^ Ibid., p. 16. '2 Ibid., p. 365.

Cf. M. J. Adler, Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth, 19-20.

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However, i t has to be noted t h a t the problem of c o n f l i c t i n g t r u t h -c l a i m s be-comes less of a -challenge f o r a religious p l u r a l i s t i f h e u n d e r s t a n d s religious beliefs i n the anti-realist w a y . T h e r e c a n be no doubt t h a t the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y of adherents of the w o r l d religions m a k i n g religious t r u t h - c l a i m s t h i n k i n terms of a correspon-dence theory of t r u t h , i.e. i n terms of the agreement of thought w i t h r e a l i t y . I n s a y i n g t h a t G o d is a l o v i n g C r e a t o r or d e n y i n g t h a t the R e a l is a person, or c l a i m i n g t h a t there are m a n y gods, believers i n t e n d to m a k e propositions, f a c t u a l statements w h i c h describe r e a l i t y indepen-dent of t h e i r thoughts a n d as such are subject to contradiction. I n addition, they i m p l i c i t l y assume t h a t the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of entertained propositions is absolute a n d i m m u t a b l e , a n d is t o t a l l y independent of t h e i r b e i n g r i g h t or w r o n g i n e n t e r t a i n i n g these propositions. One who believes i n r e i n c a r n a t i o n w i l l not n o r m a l l y say t h a t t h i s belief m a y be t r u e for h i m b u t false for someone else. H e w i l l r a t h e r assume t h a t he can be r i g h t or w r o n g b u t the belief i t s e l f either is or is not true. T h i s epistemological position is often described as r e a l i s m , a n d is opposed to a n t i - r e a l i s m . A n t i - r e a l i s t s l i k e D o n C u p i t t or D . Z . P h i l i p s assume t h a t w h e n M u s l i m s or C h r i s t i a n s p r a y to G o d , they are not p r a y i n g to a s u p e r n a t u r a l being w h o exists independently of t h e i r perception because G o d is f o r t h e m a mere psychological projection. F o r a n a n t i -r e a l i s t a -religious p-roposition is always t-rue fo-r somebody, a n d they a-re t r u e w h e n they are 'useful', e.g. w h e n they provide the g r o u n d or f r a m e w o r k for someone's ethical convictions. F o r D o n C u p i t t religious beliefs about J e s u s C h r i s t are t r u e i n t h a t sense, b u t he does not really believe, as most o r d i n a r y C h r i s t i a n s do w h e n they p r a y to Jesus, t h a t he is alive, he is omnipresent a n d omnipotent G o d , a n d therefore he listens to t h e i r prayers. C u p i t t does not t h i n k religious language refers to independently e x i s t i n g objective reality.^^ F o r a n anti-realist there can be no r e a l conflict between religious t r u t h - c l a i m s w h i c h appear to be conflicting w h e n interpreted i n a realist way. P e r h a p s H i c k is a n anti-realist? T h i s question is c r u c i a l f o r the a p p r a i s a l of H i c k ' s hypothesis, a n d yet the answer to i t is not obvious.

H i c k ' s recent critique of the non-realist approach clearly shows t h a t he w o u l d l i k e to be seen as a realist.^^ I n the 1970s he even more firmly argued t h a t i t is v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t to m a i n t a i n the genuinely f a c t u a l character of the c e n t r a l a f f i r m a t i o n s of the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , because C h r i s t i a n i t y could not r e t a i n its i d e n t i t y i n a n y m e a n i n g f u l w a y unless the f a c t u a l character of its basic assertions was i n s i s t e d upon. H e

Cf. D. Cupitt, Anti-Realist Faith, Is God Real?, p. 48ff. Cf. Interpretation, p. 190-209.

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rejected the u t i h t a r i a n view that w h a t r e a l l y mattered was a religion's usefulness, a n d therefore religious truth-claims were irrelevant.^^ I n An Interpretation of Religion H i c k distinguishes between w h a t he calls l i t e r a l ' a n d 'mythological' t r u t h . T h e first involves correspondence to reality, w h i l e the latter evokes 'proper dispositional response to X ' . O n e could expect t h a t by m a k i n g such d i s t i n c t i o n H i c k intends to assert that among religious propositions one c a n find also f a c t u a l assertions. However, i t appears that i t is impossible to point out a n y such assertions w h i c h H i c k w o u l d recognize as such. A f t e r a l l he proposes to u n d e r s t a n d mythologically a l l p a r t i c u l a r beliefs about the n a t u r e of the R e a l , a n d not as l i t e r a l l y true descriptions of the R e a l . I n the final analysis H i c k is i n c l i n e d to hold that a n y religious belief t h a t w o u l d conflict w i t h another religious belief (and thus challenge h i s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis) m u s t be understood mythologically.^^

T h i s brings us to the m a i n critical point of this paper. It seems that H i c k has only two choices. E i t h e r he is a realist or a non-realist. I f the first is true, t h e n h i s arguments w h i c h a i m at resolving the problem of the conflicting t r u t h - c l a i m s of different religions do not work, thus m a k i n g h i s hypothesis i m p l a u s i b l e . I f H i c k is i n fact a non-realist (though he suggests he is not) a n d assumes that religions don't m a k e any t r u t h c l a i m s whatsoever, t h e n h i s position becomes i n d i s t i n g u i s h -able f r o m t h a t of anti-realist t h i n k e r s a n d w i l l be unaccept-able for the vast m a j o r i t y of the adherents of the w o r l d religions w h i c h H i c k wants to reconcile.

M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y . H i c k ' s apparent s h i f t towards a n t i - r e a l i s m makes his position t o t a l l y inconsistent. O n the one h a n d he w a n t s to assert t h a t the R e a l exists independently of the perception of believers. I n other words, he w a n t s to be a realist about the R e a l . O n the other h a n d , i n order to resolve the problem of conflicting-truth claims (and thus to save h i s hypothesis) H i c k allows v i r t u a l l y a l l religious beliefs to be interpreted mythologically. A t the same time he w o u l d l i k e to m a i n t a i n t h a t various conceptions of the R e a l are 'authentic faces' of the R e a l , a n d not mere h a l l u c i n a t i o n s . B u t how can he k n o w t h a t this is the case? If a l l p a r t i c u l a r beliefs about the R e a l are only mythologically 'true', how can H i c k k n o w w h a t is t h e i r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to the Real? H o w can he be sure that believers who t h i n k about the R e a l i n realist terms are not completely w r o n g because i n fact the R e a l does not exist independently of t h e i r perception? A n d w h a t are h i s arguments to support h i s v i e w t h a t all conceptions of the R e a l are 'authentic'? W h y

Cf. p. Badham (ed.), A John Hick Reader, p. 17-21. Cf. Interpretation, p. 371.

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not to assume t h a t some of t h e m m a y be authentic (e.g. monotheism) w h i l e some other m a y be w r o n g (e.g. polytheism)? O r perhaps some of t h e m are m u c h closer to the t r u t h about the n a t u r e of the R e a l t h a n others? W h y t h i n k t h a t a l l of t h e m are equally good?

H i c k faced w i t h such c h a l l e n g i n g questions is l i k e l y to respond b y s t a t i n g t h a t i n the final analysis a l l those r a t h e r theoretical problems are not soteriologically v i t a l , because the only t h i n g w h i c h r e a l l y m a t t e r s i n r e l i g i o n is salvation/liberation, w h i c h H i c k defines as the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness. H e makes i t clear i n the f o l l o w i n g passage: But if we ask: Is belief, or disbelief, in reincarnation essential for salvation I liberation? the answer must surely be No?^ H e r e we a r r i v e at a point where the weakness of H i c k ' s f o r m u l a t i o n of religious p l u r a l i s m becomes a g a i n apparent. One can ask on w h a t g r o u n d H i c k assumes t h a t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of s a l v a t i o n is i d e n t i c a l w i t h the one w h i c h hundreds of m i l l i o n s of M u s l i m s , C h r i s t i a n s or B u d d h i s t s i m p l i c i t l y assume? W h a t j u s t i f i e s H i c k ' s strong conviction t h a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m self-centredness to Reality-centredness is w h a t religion is a l l about? A n d w h y does H i c k t a k e for granted t h a t a l l religions have the same concept of s a l v a t i o n or a i m at the same u l t i m a t e goal? Is the B u d d h i s t concept of l i b e r a t i o n by a c h i e v i n g N i r v a n a not u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the C h r i s t i a n concept of s a l v a t i o n i n v o l v i n g our existence i n heaven i n the presence of a T r i u n e God? It is h a r d to find i n H i c k ' s w o r k s any satisfactory answers to these questions w h i c h clearly challenge h i s p l u r a l i s t hypothesis.

H e argues t h a t because a l l religions are b r i n g i n g s a l v a t i o n despite t h e i r conflicting t r u t h - c l a i m s , therefore c o n f l i c t i n g t r u t h - c l a i m s are not a p r o b l e m for h i s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis. H e r e we have yet another example of question-begging. O n w h a t ground does H i c k assume t h a t salvation/liberation is h a p p e n i n g i n a l l religious traditions? H i c k points to e m p i r i c a l evidence. B u t such a n argument can w o r k only i f s a l v a t i o n is l i m i t e d to some degree of m o r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in this life. H o w e v e r , such v e r y t e m p o r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of s a l v a t i o n w i l l be w h o l l y unaccept-able for the vast m a j o r i t y of believers of any m a j o r religion. B o t h the C h r i s t i a n a n d M u s l i m concept of s a l v a t i o n clearly refers to a l i f e beyond the grave.

There is yet another proposition w h i c h H i c k takes for granted, n a m e l y t h a t w h a t one believes about the n a t u r e of the R e a l a n d the after-life does not affect i n a n y w a y one's experience of s a l v a t i o n . H o w does he k n o w that? A d h e r e n t s of almost every r e l i g i o n seem to believe

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something contrary to H i c k ' s conviction.^^ M a n y N e w Testament authors seem to m a i n t a i n that behef i n the messianic i d e n t i t y of J e s u s is a necessary condition for salvation (cf. e.g. J o h n 1:12-14; 3:16-18; R o m a n s 3:23-38; 10:9). C o n t r a r y to H i c k , L u t h e r a n d m a n y Protestant C h r i s t i a n s w o u l d h o l d t h a t belief i n the d i v i n i t y of C h r i s t is m u c h more i m p o r t a n t for salvation, t h a n is m o r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .

T h i s brings me to one f u n d a m e n t a l conclusion concerning the w a y H i c k 'interprets' r e l i g i o n i n order to defend his f o r m u l a t i o n of religious p l u r a l i s m . I n the final analysis H i c k appears to be a t y p i c a l revisionist theologian who does not take religious beliefs as they are understood a n d h e l d by m i l l i o n s of believers, but ends w i t h t e l l i n g people w h a t a n d how they should believe, so t h a t his theory can work. T h i s approach is t y p i c a l of anti-realist authors a n d supports a hypothesis I w o u l d l i k e to conclude w i t h , t h a t the only w a y i n w h i c h H i c k can defend his position w h i l e a v o i d i n g inconsistencies is by embracing the anti-realist v i e w of religious language. T h e n he w i l l have to accept a l l the consequences of that choice, i n c l u d i n g agnosticism about the existence of the R e a l , a n d complete 'secularization' of the concept of salvation understood as the u l t i m a t e goal of r e l i g i o n . Acceptance of a n t i - r e a l i s m w i l l allow H i c k to m a i n t a i n on u t i l i t a r i a n grounds t h a t a l l religions are equally 'true' because each of t h e m can constitute a n effective means of salvation understood as the m o r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of h u m a n existence f r o m self-centredness to Reality-self-centredness. However, he w i l l not be able to assert that each religious t r a d i t i o n is a n authentic m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the R e a l because a n t i - r e a l i s m can not provide h i m w i t h any arguments to support such a c l a i m .

To s u m m a r i s e , i n order to show t h a t h i s p l u r a l i s t i c hypothesis i n its latest f o r m u l a t i o n is plausible H i c k has to resort to a n t i - r e a l i s m . T h i s m a y appear to h i m a heavy price to pay, as i t w o u l d leave h i s position h a r d l y distinguishable f r o m t h a t of D o n C u p i t t or D . Z . P h i l i p p s , a n d thus w o u l d rob h i m of his o r i g i n a l i t y .

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B a d h a m P . (ed.), A John Hick Reader, P h i l a d e l p h i a : T r i n i t y P r e s s I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1990.

C u p i t t D . , Anti-Realist Faith, Is God Real?, ed. b y J . R u n z o , L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1993.

D ' C o s t a G . , John Hick's Theology of Religions, N e w Y o r k : U n i v e r s i t y Press of A m e r i c a , 1987.

H e w i t t H . (ed.). Problems in the Philosophy of Religion: Critical Studies of the Work of John Hick, L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1991.

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H i c k J . , An Interpretation of Religion, N e w H a v e n , C o n n . : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1989.

H i c k J . , Problems of Religious Pluralism, N e w Y o r k : S t . M a r t i n ' s Press, 1985.

H i c k J . , Religious Realism and Non-Realism: Defining the Issue, Is God Real?, ed. b y J . R u n z o , N e w Y o r k : St. M a r t i n ' s Press, 1993.

P a n n e n b e r g W . , Religious Pluralism and Conflicting Truth-Claims, Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. b y G . D ' C o s t a , N e w Y o r k : O r b i s Books, 1990.

P l a n t i n g a A . , A Defence of Religious Exclusivism, The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, ed. by T . D . Senor, Ithaca, N Y : C o r n e l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1995.

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J O H N A H I C K A F I L O Z O F I A P L U R A L I Z M U R E L I G I J N E G O -O C E N A K R Y T Y C Z N A

Streszezenie

P o w y z s z y a r t y k u l jest p r o b ^ k r y t y k i popularnej tezy J o h n a H i c k a , ze w s z y s t k i e religio s^ „ a u t e n t y c z n y manifestacjy" A b s o l u t u („Rzeczywi-stosci Ostatecznej") i rownie s k u t e c z n y droga^ do z b a w i e n i a , dlatego

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