BEZPIECZNY
BEZPIECZNY
SAFE BANK
ϐ ǡ Ǥ
EDITORIAL OFFICE
Ǥ Ñ Ȃ
ǤÏ Ǧ
Ǥ Ñ
Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ÑǦÏ
ĂÑȂ
SCIENTIFIC AND PROGRAMME COUNCIL
Ȃ ¦
Ǥ
ǤǦ
Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ǤÏ
Ï
ǤÏ
Dz dzǤ
ϐ
EDITOR
PUBLISHER
ǤǤ Ͷ ͲͲǦͷͶ
SECRETARY
ĂÑ
ǣʹʹͷͺ͵Ͳͺͺ
ǦǣǤ̷Ǥ
ͳ͵
ǣͳͲǤʹ͵ͷͶȀǤͺǤʹǤͳǤʹͲͳͺ
Radosław Kałużny
*ǯǫ
ǯ ǡǦ
Abstract
Ǧ
ǤǦ Ǥ
Ǥ
ǯ Ǥ
Ǥ ǡϐ Ǧ
Ǧ ȋȌǯ
Ǥ ǡ ǯ
ǦǤ
ϐ ǯǤ
Ǧ
Ǧ ǡ
ȋȌǡ
ͳǡʹͲͲͻ ͵ͳǡʹͲͳ͵Ǥ
Key wordsǣǡǦ ǡ ǡϐ ǡ
1. Introduction
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ
ȗ ÏÏǡ
Ǥ
ͳ͵ͺ
ͳǤǡ
Ǥ
Ǧϐ Ǥ
ϐ
ǡ
Ǥ ϐ
Ǥ
ǯ ϐ
ϐ truthǤǡ
ǡ
Dzϐ true and fair viewϐ ǡϐ
ǡ ϐ ǡ
ȋ Ȍdz
ʹǤ
ȋȌ
͵Ǥǡǯ
ǯ
Ǧ ǡ ȋȌǡ
ǯ
ͶǤ
Ǧ ǡ Ͷϐ
ǡ ǯ
ȋǦ Ȍϐ Ǥ
Ͷ
ǦǤǡ
ͳ ǤÏĂǡPomiar ryzyka kredytowego banku: aspekty ϔinansowe i rachunkoweǡ Ǧ
ǡʹͲͲͻǡǤʹͻȂ͵ͲǤ
ʹ ͳͳǤͲͷǤʹͲͳÏ ǡϐ Ǧ
ǡǤǤʹͲͳǤǤͳͲͺͻǤ
͵ ǤǤǡ‘True and Fair View’ versus ‘Present Fairly in Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principlesǡ ǡ ʹͲͺǡʹͲͲͳǢǤǡ
The truth, the who truth and nothing but the truth in ϔinancial reportingǡ Ǣ
ʹ͵ǡǤͳǡʹͲͲ͵ǡǤͷȂͷͺǢǤǡǤǡǤǡTo tell the truth: A discussion of issues concerning truth and ethics in accountingǡ ǡ ͵ǡʹͲͳͳǡ
ǤͳͲͻȂͳʹͶǢǤÏĂǡǤ ǦÏĂǡCensoring as an aspect of truth in ϔinancial statements of insurance companies. Case of PolandǡʹͲͳͺǡ Ǥ
Ͷ ǤǡAuditor independence, audit qualiϔications and the provision of non-audit services: A noteǤ
Ǥ͵ͶȋͳȌǡͳͻͻͶǡǤͷȂͺǢǤǡǤǡAn examination of the effects of type of engagements, materiality, and structure on CPA consulting engagements with audit clientsǡ Ǧ ǡǤͳͲȋͶȌǡͳͻͻǡ͵ʹȂͷʹǢǤǡ ǤǡProfessionalism vs commercialism:
The association between non-audit services (NAS) and audit independenceǡ
Ƭ ǡ Ȁ ʹͲͲͳǡǤͷͻͷȂʹͻǢǤǡǤ ǡAuditor Independence and Non- Audit Services: A Literature Reviewǡ ǡʹͲͲʹǢǤ ǡ
Ǥ ǡǤǡ Non-audit Services and the Auditor Independence: A Review of the Literatureǡ
ǡǤʹͷǡʹͲͲǡǤͳͻȂʹͳͳǢǤǡǤǡAuditor independence: a re- view of literatureǡ ǡǤͷǡǤͳǡʹͲͳͶǡǤʹȂͶǤ
ͳ͵ͻ
Ǥ
ϐ ȋʹͲͲȌ ȋʹͲͲͲȂʹͲͲͳȌ
Ǥ
Ǧ
ǯȋ
Ǧ Ȍǡϐ ǯ
Ǥ
ϐ ǡ
ͷǤϐ ȋ
Ȍǡ
Ǥ
ȋ Ȍ ȋ Ȍ
Dz ϐ
ϐ
ǡ
dz
Ǥ
ϐ
ͺǤ
ͻǤ
Ǥ
ǯ
ͳͲǤ ǡ
ͳͳǤ ǡ
Ǧ
Ǥǯ
ǯ ϐ
ϐ Ǧ ϐ
ͳʹ
Ԙͷ ǤǡǤǡAccounting theory. 5th EditionǡǡͳͻͻʹǤ
Ԙ ǡ ǤͳǡǮObjectives of Financial Reporting by Business EnterprisesǯǡͳͻͺǤ
Ԙ ǡThe Conceptual Framework for Financial ReportingǡʹͲͳͲǤ
Ԙͺ ǤǡThe System of Professionsǡ ǡ ǡͳͻͺͺǤ
Ԙͻ ǤǡǤǡThe Philosophy of Auditingǡ ǡǡ ǡͳͻͳǢ
ǤǡCorporate Audit TheoryǡƬǡǡǡͳͻͻ͵ǢǤ ǡPhilosophy and Princi- ples of Auditing – An Introductionǡ ǡͳͻͺͺǤ
ͳͲ Ǥ ǡǤ ǡTheory of the ϔirm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structureǡ
͵ǡͳͻǡǤ͵ͲͷȂ͵ͲǤ
ͳͳ Ǥ ǡIndependence is in the eye of the beholderǡ ǡ ʹͲͳ͵Ǥ
ͳʹ Ǥ ǤǡDeterminants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprisesǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ͵͵ǡ
ʹͲͳǡǤͻǤ
ͳͶͲ
ϐ
Ǥ ϐ
ͳ͵Ǥǡ
Ǥ
ǯ
Ǥ
Ǯ ǯǡ
ǤǡǮ
ǯ
Ǥ ϐ
ͳͶǤ ϐ ǡ
ǡ
ǡǯ
ͳͷǤ
ͳͻͲ
ϐ
ͳǤ
ϐǡ
ȋ ȌǤǡǯ
ǯ
ǯ ǯ Ǥ Ǧ
ϐ
ϐǤ ϐ ǡ
ϐ ǯ
Ǥǡ
ϐ ǡ ǯ
ͳǤǡǦ
ȋ ȌǦ
ϐ ǯ
Ǥ ϐ ǡ
ͳ͵ Ǥ ǡ ǤǡA reϔlective analysis of the “new audit” and the public interest: The revolutiona- ry innovation that never cameǡ ƬǡǤǡ͵ǡʹͲͳͲǡ
Ǥ͵ͲͲȂ͵ʹͻǤ
ͳͶ Ǥ ǡǤǡǤǡǤǡǤ ǡA Framework for Auditor Independenceǡ
ǡ ʹͲͲͳǤ
ͳͷ ǡInternational Standard on Auditing 200, Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with International Standards on AuditingǡʹͲͲͻǤ
ͳ Ǥ ǡ ǤǡA reϔlective analysis of the “new audit” and the public interest: The revolutiona- ry innovation that never cameǡ ƬǡǤǡ͵ǡʹͲͳͲǡ
Ǥ͵ͲͲȂ͵ʹͻǤ
ͳ ǤǡǤǡAuditor independence, executive pay and ϔirm performanceǡ
ǡͶͺȋʹͲͲͺȌǡǤʹͷͻȂʹͺǤ
ͳͶͳ
ͳͺǤ
ϐ ȋ Ȍǡ
ǡ
ǯ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
ͳͻǤ
ǯ ǡ
ϐ ǯ
ȋ ǯȌǤǡ
ϐ ǯǡ ȋ
Ȍ
ʹͲǤ ǡ
ǡ Ǧ Ǥ
ϐ
ϐ Ǥ
ǯ ǡ
ǯ Ǧ
ʹͳǤ Ǧ Ǥ
ǡ
ʹʹǤ
ʹ͵
Ǧ ǡ ǯ
Ǥ Ǥ ȋͳȌ
Ǧ
ȋ
ϐ Ȍ Ǥ
ǡȋʹȌ ǡ
ϐ Ǥ ȋ͵Ȍ Ǧ
ͳͺ ǤǡǤǡRegulatory Oversight and Auditor Market Shareǡ Ƭ Ǧ
ȋ ȌǡǤ͵ǡǤʹǡʹͲͳǡǤʹʹȂʹͺǤ
ͳͻ ǤǡAuditing standards, legal liability, and auditor wealthǡ Ǧ
ͳͲͳȋͷȌǡͳͻͻ͵ǡǤͺͺȂͻͳͶǤ ǡThe pricing of audit services: Theory and evidenceǡ
ǡǤͳͺǡǤͳǡͳͻͺͲǡǤͳͳȂͳͻͲǤ
ʹͲ ǤǡǤYǡTo be or not to be – auditors’ ability to signal going concern problemsǡ
ƬǡǤͳͳǡʹǡʹͲͳͷǡǤͳͷȂͳͻʹǢǤ ǡǤǡGoing- -concern audit opinions for bankrupt companies – impact of credit ratingǡ ǡ
ǤʹͺͶǡʹͲͳ͵ǡǤ͵ͶͷȂ͵͵Ǥ
ʹͳ Ǥ ǡǤǡGoing-concern audit opinions for bankrupt companies – impact of credit ratingǡ
ǡǤʹͺǡͶǡʹͲͳ͵ǡǤ͵ͶͷȂ͵͵Ǣ Ǧ
ǡInternational Standard on Auditing 570, Going ConcernǡʹͲͲͻǤ
ʹʹ ǡ International Standard on Auditing 570, Going Concernǡ
ʹͲͲͻǤ
ʹ͵ ǡ International Standard on Auditing 570, Going Concernǡ
ʹͲͲͻǤ
ͳͶʹ
ǡ Ȁ
Ǥ ȋͶȌ ϐ
ǡȋͷȌǦ
ʹͶǤ
ǯ
ǡϐ ϐ
ǡ Ǥǡǯ
ϐ ǡǯ
ʹͷǤ ǯ
Ǧ Ǥ
ǡǯȋȌ
ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǯ
Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
ǯǦ
ǯǤ
ϐ
ʹǤ
ǯ Ǯ
ǯ ϐ
ǯ
ʹǤ
ϐ ȋ
Ȍ
Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ
Ǧ
ǤǡǦ Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ ǡ ǡ
ʹͶ ǡ International Standard on Auditing 570, Going Concernǡ
ʹͲͲͻǤ
ʹͷ IbidemǤ
ʹ ǤǡǤǡThe Efϔicacy of Auditors’ Going-Concern Opinions Compared with a Temporal and an Atemporal Bankruptcy Risk Model: Analysing U.S Trade and Service Industry Failures 1974–
1988ǡ ϐ ȂǤͳǡǤͳǡʹͲͲͶǡǤ͵Ȃ͵Ǥ
ʹ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ The Expectation Gap Auditing Standardsǡ ǡ
ǤͳͷǡͶǡͳͻͻͺǡǤ͵ȂͶǤ
ͳͶ͵
ʹͺǡ
Ǥ ϐ ȋ ϐ
ͷͲΨ ǯȌ
ʹͻǯ
Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
ǡϐ ϐ
ǯ Ǥǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ Ǥϐ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
2. Auditor accuracy, independence and its inϐluence on going-concern warnings
ǡ
ȋȌ
ϐ Ǥ ϐ ǯ ϐ
ǡ
Ǧ Ǥ ǡ
Ǧ ǯ
Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
ϐ ϐ
ǤȋǦ
Ȍ ϐ ǯ
Ǥǡǡ
ϐ
Ǥ
Ǧ
Ȁϐ ϐ Ǥ
Ǥǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
ʹͺ ʹͺǤͲʹǤʹͲͲ͵Ïä ǡǤǤʹͲͳǤǤʹ͵ͶͶǤ
ʹͻ ͳͷǤͲͻǤʹͲͲͲ×Ï ǡǤǤʹͲͳǤǤͳͷǤ
ͳͶͶ
Ǧ Ǥ
ǮǯǤǦ
ǮǯǤ
͵ͲǤ
ȋϐ
ͳʹ Ȍ ǯ
ϐ
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
ǡϐ
Ǥ
ȋ ȌǤ
ǡ
ǯ Ǥ ϐǡ
ǯϐ ϐ Ǥ
ǯ Ǥ
ǡ ǯǡ
ϐ ǯǡ ϐ
Ǧ Ǥ ǯ
͵ͳǤ
͵ʹǤ
Ǧ ϐ
ǡ
͵͵Ǥ ǡ
ϐǤ
͵ͶǤ
ǡ ϐǤ
Ǥ
ǯ
͵ͷǤ ǡ
ϐ ǡ
ȋȌ
ϐ Ǣ
͵Ͳ ǤǦǤ ǡ Audit Opinion and Disclosure of Audit Feesǡ ǡ Ƭ ǡ
ǤʹͶǡͳǡʹͲͲͻǡǤͻͳȂͳͳͶǤ
͵ͳ IbidemǤ
͵ʹ ʹͻǤͲͻǤͳͻͻͶ ä ǡǤǤʹͲͳͺǤǤ͵ͻͷǤ
͵͵ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ϐǡ Ǥ ǡ The going-concern market anomalyǡ ǡ
ǤͶǡǤͳǡʹͲͲͻǡǤʹͳ͵Ȃʹ͵ͻǤ
͵Ͷ Ǥ ǡAuditor‘s Perceptions of the Going-Concern Opinion Decisionǡǣ Ǧ ƬǡǤ͵ǡʹǡͳͻͺͶǡǤͳȂ͵ͲǤ
͵ͷ Ǥ ǡǤǡThe Relationship Between Audit Technology, Client Risk Proϔiles, and the Going- -Concern Opinion Decisionǡ ƬǡǤͻǡǤ͵ǡͳͻͻͲǡǤ͵ͻȂͷͶǤ
ͳͶͷ
Ǧ Ǥϐ
Ȃ ȋȌ
Ǥǡ ϐ
Ǥ
ϐǡ
͵Ǥ
ǡ
Ǧ Ǥ
ǡǦ ȋϐȌ
Ǧ Ǥ
Ǧ
Ǥ
ȋ Ȍ
ϐ ǡǡǡ
Ǥ ϐ
ȋ ȌǦ
ϐ
ϐ
͵
Ǥ Ǧ
ϐ ǯ
ǣ H1: There is a relationship between continuity problems evidenced by bankruptcies and going-concern warnings (GCW) errors (Type II) in most recent audit opinion.
H2: There is a signiϔicant relationship between GCW in audit opinion and non-audit fee existence.
3. Method, results
ǡ ϐ
ǯ Ǧ ǯǤ
ǯ
ͳǡʹͲͲͻ ͵ͳǡʹͲͳ͵Ǥ
ȋȌ
ϐ Ǥ ϐ
ǡ
͵ ǤǡThe auditor’s going concern decision and Types I and II errors: The Coase Theorem, transacti- on costs, bargaining power and attempts to misleadǡ ǡǤʹ͵ǡ
ǡʹͲͲͶǡǤͶͳͷȂͶͶͲǤ
͵ ǤǡAn empirical comparison of non-Big 4 and Big 4 auditors’ perceptions of auditor independenceǡ
ǡǤʹ͵ǡͻǡʹͲͲͺǡǤͻͳȂͻ͵ͶǤ
ͳͶ
Ǥ
ͷͻ
ͳǡʹͲͲͻ ͵ͳǡʹͲͳ͵ȋͳȌǤ
Table 1. Final sample of companies which management boards’ submitted request for bankrupt- cy to the court register extended from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2013
No. Name
Date of request for bankruptcy to the court register
Date of most recent ϐinancial statement
ͳ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͳͲǦͳͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͳͲǦͲͻ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͳͲǦͲͻ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͳͲǦͲͳ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͻǦ͵Ͳ
ͷ Ƭ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͻǦʹ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͺǦͳͶ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͺǦͳ͵ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͺ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲǦ͵ͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͻ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͺǦͲͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳͲ Ǧ Ï ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲǦʹͻ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳͳ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲǦͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳʹ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲǦʹͺ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳ͵ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲǦʹͷ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳͶ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͶǦͲ͵ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳͷ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͳǦ͵ͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳ Ƭ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͳǦ͵Ͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳ ʹͲͳ͵ǦͲͳǦͲͻ ʹͲͳʹǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳͺ ʹͲͳʹǦͳͳǦʹͻ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͺǦ͵ͳ
ͳͻ ʹͲͳʹǦͳͳǦʹͻ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͲ ʹͲͳʹǦͳͳǦʹͺ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͳͳǦʹͺ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹʹ Ă× ʹͲͳʹǦͳͳǦʹ͵ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹ͵ ʹ ʹͲͳʹǦͳͳǦͳͷ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͶ ʹͲͳʹǦͳͳǦͳͶ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͷ ʹͲͳʹǦͳͲǦʹ͵ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹ Ï ʹͲͳʹǦͲͻǦʹͺ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͳͶ
No. Name
Date of request for bankruptcy to the court register
Date of most recent ϐinancial statement
ʹ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͻǦʹͺ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͺ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͻǦʹͷ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ʹͻ Ǥ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͻǦʹͳ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵Ͳ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͻǦͳͺ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ͳ ĂǦÏ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͺǦͳͲ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ʹ ʹͲͳʹǦͲǦͳͻ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵͵ ʹͲͳʹǦͲǦͳͲ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵Ͷ ʹͲͳʹǦͲǦʹͻ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ͷ ʹͲͳʹǦͲǦͲͶ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ ʹͲͳʹǦͲǦͲͶ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ ä¦ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͶǦͲ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ͺ ʹͲͳʹǦͲͶǦͲ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
͵ͻ ʹͲͳʹǦͲ͵Ǧ͵Ͳ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͶͲ Ǧͷ ʹͲͳͳǦͳʹǦ͵Ͳ ʹͲͳͲǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷͳ ʹͲͳͳǦͳͲǦͳͶ ʹͲͳͲǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷʹ ʹͲͳͳǦͳͳǦͲʹ ʹͲͳͲǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷ͵ ʹͲͳͳǦͳͲǦͲʹ ʹͲͳͲǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͶͶ ʹͲͳͳǦͲǦʹ ʹͲͳͲǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷͷ Ï ʹͲͳͲǦͲͻǦͳ ʹͲͲͻǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷ ʹͲͳͲǦͲͺǦͳͻ ʹͲͲͻǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷ ʹͲͳͲǦͲǦͲ ʹͲͲͻǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷͺ ¸ ʹͲͳͲǦͲͷǦͳͻ ʹͲͲͻǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Ͷͻ Ï ʹͲͳͲǦͲͷǦʹ ʹͲͲͻǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷͲ ʹͲͳͲǦͲ͵Ǧͳͳ ʹͲͲͻǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷͳ ʹͲͲͻǦͳͲǦͳͷ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷʹ Ï
O ʹͲͲͻǦͲǦͳͻ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷ͵ ʹͲͲͻǦͲͷǦʹ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷͶ ʹͲͲͻǦͲͷǦͳͻ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷͷ ʹͲͲͻǦͲͷǦͲͺ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷ ¸ ʹͲͲͻǦͲ͵Ǧʹͷ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
Table 1 – continued
ͳͶͺ
No. Name
Date of request for bankruptcy to the court register
Date of most recent ϐinancial statement
ͷ äÑÏ ʹͲͲͻǦͲʹǦͲͳ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷͺ ϐ ʹͲͲͻǦͲʹǦͳ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ͷͻ ʹͲͲͻǦͲͳǦͳ ʹͲͲͺǦͳʹǦ͵ͳ
ǣǡȋȌǤ
ϐǡ ǯϐ
ǯǤ
ǯ ǯǡ
Ȁ ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ ǡ
ͷͶǯϐ
ʹͷ Ǧ ȋͳʹȌǤ
Graph 1. Number of auditors’ opinions with / without going-concern warnings on companies declared bankruptcy
With GCW 29 Without GCW 25
ǣǤ
Graph 2. Percentage share of auditors’ opinions with / without going-concern warnings on companies declared bankruptcy
With GCW 54%
Without GCW 46%
ǣǤ Table 1 – continued
ͳͶͻ
ϐ ȋ
Ǧ Ȍ
ϐ
ϐ Ǥ
ǣ
Ȉ ǯ ǡ
Ȉ ͷͲΨ ǯ
ȋϐϐ ȌǤ
ϐ ϐ Ǥǡ
ǡ
͵ͺǤ
ǯ ϐ ϐ
ǯ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ
ȋ
Ǥ
ͷͲΨ ǯȋϐϐ Ȍǡϐ
ǯ
Ǥ
ȋ ǡ ǡǡ
Ȍ ϐ ͷͲΨ
ǯ Ǧǯ
Ǥ
ʹͷ Ǧ
ǣ
Ȉ ͵ ϐ Ǧ
Ȉ ͳͷ
ǣ
Ȃ
Ǥ
͵ͶǤ
ͳͷ ʹ ͵
Ǥ
ϐ ǦͶϐȋǡǡǡȌǤ
͵ͺ ǤǡǤǡǤǡThe Auditor’s Going-Concern Opinion as a Communication of Riskǡǣ
ƬǡǤ͵ͲǡǤʹǡʹͲͳͳǡǤͻȂͺͳǤ