O R G A N O N 5 (1968) LE 2 5 0 e ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA MORT
DE G. W. LEIBNIZ
Peter Bollhagen (German Democratic Republic)
SOME SYSTEM-THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE WORK OF G. W. LEIBNIZ
The question concerning the contribution of G ottfried W ilhelm Leibniz to system -theory m ay appear as self-evident on the one hand, or as an artificial construction, as m odernization of his ideas, on the other. U ndoubtedly both aspects are in a sense authorized but, at th e same ti me, both include the danger of fundam ental m isinterpreting some of Leibniz’ principal ideas. B ut we think th a t this refers to all great philo sophical and scientific thinkers and the in terp reta tio n of th eir works, th e ir contribution to philosophy and science. These dangers, w hich n e cessarily p ertain to such in terp retatio n s express th e in tern al co n tra dictions of these pioneer w orks, of these pioneer ideas, m ainly the co n tra diction betw een th e ir anticipations of th e fu rth e r evolution of philosop hical and scientific thought and the im m anent (and, of course, external) lim itations of th e ir work, w hich pen etrate all th eir thoughts, dangers, w hich m ay cause th a t the in terp retatio n will be led in a false d irec
tion.
We have to ask, are th ere in th e scientific, especially in the philo sophical, work of Leibniz anticipations of aspects of sy stem -theory in the m odern sense of the word? We think th ere are. B ut we also th in k th at, generally, they are concealed in th e thought of Leibniz. Of course, if we look for the system -theoretical aspects in L eibniz’ philosophical and scientific thought it seems to be evident to begin w ith th e inv esti gation of his m etaphysical system in general, bearing in m ind th a t it is the last great m etaphysical system of 17th century p h ilo so p h y .1 B ut this m ethod w ould be fatally conducive to the above-m entioned d i lemma: the resu lt would be neither a refu ta tio n of the value of Leibniz’ ideas for m odern system -theory nor th e ir m odernization.
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B ut th ere is possibly another w ay of questioning and investigation. We exclude at first principally the possibility of a general comparison betw een the philosophical and scientific ideas of Leibniz and contempo ra ry system -theory. C onsequently we adm it only a comparison of some aspects of these theories. N ext, we try to v erify the hypothesis th a t the system -theoretical thoughts are m ostly in tertw in ed w ith o th er philo sophical and scientific term s. And, th ird ly , we try to v erify the hypo thesis th a t th ere exists a general system -theoretical aspect in th e various branches of L eibniz’ thought, w hich includes some leading ideas. Ac cordingly, we do not tr y to test how often Leibniz uses for exam ple such term s as “system ”, “stru c tu re ”, “o rd er”, “equilibrium ” and such like. This is not our direction of investigation.
B ut before setting out to explain our problem we have to explain sh ortly some specific points of th e other pole of investigation, i.e. mo dern system -theory. The la tte r is in our days still in statu nascendi, it is growing as an expansive science or groups of sciences and, in a cer tain fundam ental sense, it is one aspect of all n atu ra l and hum an scien ces, a science situated along the bordering line betw een philosophy and th e special sciences, betw een the abstract and form al and th e concrete (and historical) sciences etc. 2 Especially, th ere are such sciences as cybernetic system -theory, general system -theory, m ainly represented in the w ork of B ertalanffy and—last but not least—th e theory of social and historical system s. The la tte r is based on th e m aterialistic conception of h isto ry and m aterialistic dialectics, w hich does not only reflect the highest form of motion (historical and logical),3 but w hich therefore also includes the other system -aspects as in tegral elem ents of itself as a whole, p arts w hich express the fundam ental laws and qualities of so cial reality, of social m ovem ent and evolution. We do not discuss this question here in w ant of place; b u t we have to spell out th e fact th a t not only in non-M arxist sociology one of th e m ost influential (and the most consistent) schools is th a t of functionalism -structuralism , b u t th a t in M arxist sociology as well th e problem s of fu nction al-stru ctural analysis are m ore and more discussed as a m ethod w hich studies aspects of social life, not fully respected by th e historical m ethods of investigations, especially those w orked out and perfected by the m aterialistic con ception of history, and w hich have to com plement the historical-genetic methods. 4 And we have to consider th a t th e conception of historical system as qualitatively differen t and highest form of a system in M arxist theory consists of the socio-economic form ation. 5
2 About th e difference betw een th e ab stract-fo rm al and the concrete-historical cf. P. Bollhagen, G esetzm ässigkeit und Gesellschaft, Berlin 1967, chap. IV.
3 Cf. Bollhagen, Sociologie und Geschichte, Berlin 1966, chap. 11.
4 Cf. M. Hirszowicz, K onfrontacje socjologiczne, W arszawa 1964, chap. III. 5 Cf. P. Bollhagen, Soziologie, chap. II and VII.
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We only m ention these various aspects of system -theory, not y et u n i ted into an organic whole, because a consideration of th e theoretical and m ethodological contradictions betw een these aspects is of fundam ental im portance for an investigation of the system -theoretical aspects in Leibniz’ thought.
It seems th a t system -theory evolves in p a rtly converging, p a rtly di verging directions in close connection w ith some new and old n atu ral and hum an sciences, especially w ith cybernetics (as integral p a rt of cy bernetic system -theory), biology (as general system -theory), and in so ciology both in the form of fu n ctio n al-stru ctu ral analysis and th e o ry of historical system s (of social-economic formations). It is in terestin g th a t sociological system -theories are not only related to biology (m ainly in the concept of function and s tru c tu re ),6 b u t also to cybernetics in various fo rm s,7 and th a t both in non-M arxist and M arxist sociology (in em phasizing th e lim itations of th e applicability of cybernetics in sociology, of the qualitative difference betw een th e term s “s tru c tu re ” and “function” in biology and sociology 8 etc.).
It m ay be asked w hy we p refer the sociological standpoint? We think th a t th e validity and th e fruitfu ln ess of this procedure can ju sti fied by th e following reasons:
1) It takes into account the qualitative diversity of the d ifferen t levels of motion and evolution in th e ir unity. This problem deeply con cerns Leibniz’ philosophy.
2) Society (history of society) is a dynam ic, genetic whole and, at the sam e time, the w ork of consciously acting m an, and therefo re a self- -acting (self-acting in th a t historical individuals are its im m anent crea tors) and self-creating system of relations betw een men. Again, we come here across a central point of Leibniz’ thought: the principle of dynam ic action, w hich plays a fundam ental role not only in his m etaphysics (Mo- nadology) bu t in his m oral theories (Theodicee), too.
3) Social system s are not only th e highest form s of all existing sy stems. On th e one hand, th ey include all o th er types of moving system s as m om ents or elem ents in a dialectically negated form, because— as M arx says—the key for the anatom y of ape is the anatom y of man. 9 On other hand, as th e most evolved form of system it dem onstrates th e im m anent boundaries of system -relations in reality and therefore th e im m a n en t theoretical and methodological boundaries of system -theory. H ere we find therefore the best criteria for judging L eibniz’ contribution
• Cf. H. Stasiak, ’’Pojęcia związane z term inem «funkcja» w socjologii,” Studia Socjologiczne, 2, 1964.
7 Cf. O. Lange, Całość i rozwój w św ietle cybernetyki, W arszaw a 1962; O. L a n ge, W stąp do cybernetyki ekonom icznej, W arszaw a 1965.
8 Cf. Z. Strm iska, Soućasne teorie spolećenske stru ktu ry, P rah a 1966, pp. 23 ff. s Cf. K. Marx, Grundrisse zur K ritik der politischen Ökonomie, B erlin 1953, p. 26.
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to system -theory, because we can establish not only fruitfulness b u t also the boundaries of system -theory in th e full concrete to tality of its relations. This is valid for abstract system s w hich cannot express any concrete historical stage of system -evolution or any concrete historical form of a system (natural, social and m ental) as w ell as concrete system s th em selv es.10 This postulate also refers to a central aspect of Leibniz’ philosophical and scientific system.
The idea of activity as a fundam ental q u ality of th e whole universe is solved by Leibniz in th e form of d ifferentiating the several levels of activity as several form s of monads, w hich are created and rem ain in close relation to God as th e C entral M on ad.11 This is not only im portant for th e Monadology b u t also for the Theodicée and h ere we find (entan gled in th e theocentric idealistic philosophical system and its term s, concealed in a heteronom ous m oral view) the problem of m an as th e central point of the whole of Leibniz’ thought in the form of an ideal istic (and self-contradictory) anthropology. It is not difficult to perceive the connection betw een the idea of activity as a fundam ental quality of universe and the fact th a t anthropology is th e hidden startin g point of th e whole system ; hidden—because, on the one hand, Leibniz’ philoso phy seems to be a p u rely idealistic philosophy of n a tu re and of m athe m atics in the m ain w ork and, on th e other, this anthropology is th e w eakest p a rt of the system (in the philosophical sense). It m ust neces sarily be th e w eakest part, if we consider the historical setting, th e idea listic theocentric form of this anthropology as well as th e fact th a t social systems are th e most complex systems, th a t here we find m any non- -system atical m om ents etc. , 12 w hich have been difficult to explain and to unite into an organic theory of society not only for seventeenth century science but for th e scientific thou gh t of tw en tieth century.
One m ore difficulty has still to be rem em bered: Leibniz was the creator of the last great m ethaphysical system and at th e same tim e he did not aim a t a fully developed system . He w rites in his le tter to L es Billettes from 4/14 December 1966: “Mon systèm e do nt vous estes cu rieux, M onsieur, de sçavoir des nouvelles, n ’est pas un corps com plet de Philosophie et je n ’y prétends nullem ent de ren d re raison de to u t ce que d ’au tres ont p rétendu d ’expliquer.” 13 It is very in teresting to read th e following strokes, w here he in a popular form in terp rets some cen tral ideas of his own system as follows:
“J e crois q u ’effectivem ent to u t se fait m écaniquem ent dans la n a tu re et se peut expliquer p ar causes efficientes, mais q u ’aussi en même
10 C f. ibid, p. 10, P . B o llh a g en , G ezetzm ässigkeit... chap. IV /1.
11 Cf. Die philosophischen Schriften von G ottfried Wilhelm, Leibniz, v o l. II, B erlin 1879, p. 481.
12 Cf. P . B o llh a g en , Soziologie..., chap. IV.
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temps tou t se fait m oralem ent pour ainsi dire, et se p eu t expliquer p ar causes finales. Et que ces deux Régnés, le m oral des esprits et âmes, et le m écanique de corps se p én étren t et s ’accordent p arfaitem en t p ar le m oyen de l’au teu r des choses qui est en m êm e tem ps le p rem ier efficient et la dernière fin. Je prétends donc, comme il n ’y a point de vuide dans les corps, q u ’il n ’y en a pas non plus dans les âmes, c’est à dire q u ’il y a des âmes p ar to ut, et que les âmes qui ex isten t une fois ne sçauroient p érir. Les corps sont des m ultitudes et les âmes sont des unités, mais des unités qui exp rim ent ou rep résen ten t la m ultitud e en elles. Tout âme est un m iroir du monde to u t entier, suivant son point de veue. Mais les Esprits sont les âmes du prem ier ordre ou du genre suprêm e qui re p ré sen tent pas seulem ent le monde, mais qui rep résenten t encore Dieu dans le monde. Ainsi non seulem ent ils sont im m ortels, mais ils conservent toujours les qualités m orales comme citoyens de la République de L ’uni vers, à laquelle rien ne m anque, puisque c’est Dieu qui la governe.” 14
A lready here we see th a t the system -theoretical ideas of Leibniz cu l m inate in the Idea of U niverse as an ordered Republic, as a m oral system governed by God and moving to stab ility of this universe. But before we discuss these problem s we have to discover w h at valid con tributions to or anticipations of m odern system -theory th e re are in his hierarchization of souls (spirits, monads), since it is connected w ith biological research. This connection is form ulated by J. K am ary t and M. Rÿdl in the following w ay: “Leibniz overcomes the m echanistic sub stance by reasoning th a t it as a building elem ent, a sub strate of stru c tu re, w hich is of a dynam ic, functional n a tu re w hich is a w hole of re lationships. In the dialectical concept of substance Leibniz anticipates th e ontology of Hegel. Leibniz develops a dialectics betw een substance as p a rt and substance as whole. The stru c tu ra l concept of being negates its character as substance and, vice versa th e concept of substance ne gates the stru c tu ra l character of being. ... This double u n ity of su b stan ce and stru c tu re is th e most valid elem ent of Leibniz’ dialectics. H ere he comes close to th e notion of dialectical negation w hich he, unlike Hegel, failed to apply in th e whole of his philosophical system b u ilt up not on contradiction and negation as th e cen tral categories, b ut on th e categories of m odality and composibility. In this sense Leibniz did not get beyond the boundaries of th e m echanistic barock cen tu ry .” 15
And the direct connection of Leibniz’ th o u g h t w ith the ideas of mo dern biology, especially of general system -theory, is in terp rete d as fol lows:
“The principal difference betw een the living and the nonliving con sists, according to Leibniz, in the organic form , in th e stru ctu re .
Inorga-14 Ibid., pp. 451—2.
15 J. K am aryt, M. Rÿdl, ’’P ojeti stru k tu ry a funkce v klasické a m olekularni genetice, "Filosoficky Casopis, 6, 1964, pp. 834—5.
1 4 4 P. Bollhagen
nie bodies create an accident u n ity (unum per accidens), organic bodies create a necessary, real unity, developed from an united and common principle or elem ent, w hich has a special stru c tu re (u n u m per se). B ut by stru c tu re Leibniz does not m ean a stable in v arian t form. According to Leibniz, th e extern al objects are only th e expression of an in tern al principle, w hich not only unites morphological p arts and organs b u t also processes of exchange of m atter. In this dynam ic concept of organic stru c tu re Leibniz postulates a problem analogous to th a t postulated by the m odern theory of the organism as an open system (L. v. B erta- lanffy).” I®
It seems th a t these ideas of th e authors are im po rtan t enough to ju stify this lengthy quotation. B ut we cannot agree w ith all conclusions because they disregard the specific historical-philosophical form in w hich Leibniz develops his ideas about function, stru ctu re and system. His dialectic of substance and stru c tu re appears to be polarized betw een the universe of things and the universe of souls, spirits, monads, if the in terp retatio n of th e authors is followed. B ut monads are not only th e stru ctu re-creatin g principle but, a t the sam e time, th ey are in tern ally structuralized, th ey constitute a closed system w hich—as we have seen in th e quotation from Leibniz—represents th e universe and God as the C entral Monad. It m ust be added th a t th e authors quoted notice this difficulty as th ey criticize Leibniz’ ideas on th e relationship betw een p re form ation and epigenesis as w ell as its linkage w ith m echanistic stru c tu ralism w hich is typical of the 17th c e n tu ry ,17 b u t this criticism covers only p art of the problem.
The idea of preform ation and, consequently, of its relation to th e concept of epigenesis is one of the most fundam ental p arts of Leibniz’ m etaphysical system, p a rt of th e idea of a pre-established harm ony and belongs to th e religious elem ents in his th o u g h t and is especially con cerned w ith the conception of predeterm ination (Théodicée). Thus he w rites on his hypothesis about the un ity of body and sp irit (de l ’union de l ’Ame et du corps): “Ainsi il ne reste que mon Hypothèse, c’est à dire que la voye de l’harm onie préétablie p ar un artifice divin prévenant, lequel dès le commencement a form é chacune de ces substances d ’une m aniéré si parfaite et réglée avec ta n t d ’exactitude, q u ’en ne suivant que se propres loix, q u ’elle a reçues avec son estre, elle s ’accorde pour ta n t avec l ’au tre: to u t comme s ’il y avoit une influence m utuelle, ou comme si Dieu y m etoit tous jours la m ain au delà de son concours ge n eral.” 18
We cannot agree w ith the authors in th a t th e ideas of m odality and com posibility dem and a priori a non-dialectical interp retatio n of th e
16 Ibid., p. 835. 17 Cf. ibid.
Aspects of S y stem Theory in L eibniz’ W ork 145
world. Because a discussion of the dialectics in Leibniz’ thought is bey ond th e scope of our investigation, we shall only recall th e form ulation of V. I. Lenin th a t th e philosophy of Leibniz contains a dialectics of a special kind independently of the theological form of th is s y ste m .19 Of course, this does not m ean th a t in Leibniz’ th ought th e re are no vast p attern s of non-dialectical thinking, w hatever historical form th ey m ay have or th a t th ere are no im po rtan t elem ents of m echanistic concep tions; 20 this results from the main tre n d of the n a tu ra l sciences and philosophy of his time. B ut it seems th a t the authors quoted m ake th e m istake form ulated at the beginnig of our investigation: on th e one hand, th ey m odernize Leibniz’ thought, and, on the other, th ey do not see the in tern al boundaries of this thou gh t or else—knowing th a t th e re are boundaries—they do not look for them always in th e correct direction, th u s uniting the effect and th e boundaries (internal) only in an external form , i.e. they neglect th e dialectical un ity of both these aspects in th e philosophical and scientific system of this great th in ker. N evertheless, in m any problem s they arrive at rem arkable conclusions, especially those concerning their thesis about th e connection betw een L eibniz’ notion of substance w ith the notions of substance and stru c tu re in the m odern meaning.
It is tru e th a t the Leibniz’ conception of substance as a dynam ic principle of universe is one of th e most im p o rtan t contributions to—or, better, anticipations of—some elem ents of m odern system —theory. It is know n th a t Leibniz developed his concept of substance not only in close connection w ith the ideas of A ristotle about Entelechy, about “su b stan tial” forms, but, a t the same time, in his polemic against Des cartes’ physics and m etaphysics, especially against D escartes’ idea of bodies and motion. He w rites on the concept of substantial form s in the philosophy of A ristotle: “Certe form as substantiale (demta m ente) etiam A ristoteli non esse ens absolutum , sed ta n tu m Xoyov rationem , pro- portionem, âpifr(i.ov stru ctu ra m partiu m intim am ...” 21 These su bstan tial form s are determ ined by final causes and because substance is the principle of bodies (or bodies are com binations of substance and in this w ay only phenomenological q u asi-sub stan ces22) th ey determ ine th e causa efficientes and thus play also an im p ortant role in physics. For example, in his polemic against D escartes’ view he w rites: „Pour moy je croy les loix de la M écanique qui serv en t de fondem ent à to u t le systèlme dependent des causes finales, c’est à dire de la volonté de Dieu déterm inée a faire ce qui est le plus parfait, et que la m aterie ne prend
19 Cf. V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sotshineni, vol. 29, Moskva 1963, p. 70. 20 Cf. P. Bollhagen, ’’Teoriopoznawczy dorobek E hrenfrieda W. von Tschirn- hause i jego związki z filozofią, Spinozy i Leibniza,” K w artalnik Historii N auki i Techniki, 1—2, 1966, pp. 42 ff.
21 Die philosophischen Schriften..., vol. IV, B erlin 1880, p. 208. 22 Ibid., p. 258.
14 6 P. Bollhagen
pas toutes les form es possibles mais seulem ent les plus parfaites...” 23 And, in accordance w ith this, he w rites in an other context: “Jam feupra etiam monui, cum omnia in n a tu ra explicari dicimus Mechanice, exci- poendas esse ipsa Legum Motus retiones seu principia Mechanismi, quae non ex solis m athem aticis atque im aginationi subjectis, sed ex fonte metaphysico, scilicet ab aequalitate causae et effectus, deduci debent aliisque hujusm odi Legibus que su n t Entelechiis essentiales. Nempe u t jam dictum est, Physica per Geom etriam A rithm eticae, p er Dynamicum M etaphysicae su bo rdinatur.” 24
On this basis Leibniz form ulates in consequence th e concept of the monad. For exam ple, in his treatise “De ipsa N atura sive de Vi insita Actionibusque C reaturam , pro Dynamicis suis” one can read: „Atque hoc ipsum s u b s ta n tia l principium est, quod in viventibus anima, in aliis form a substantialis appellatur, et quatenus cum m ateria substantiam vere unam, seu unum per se constituit, id facit, quod ego Monadem appello, cum sublatis his veris et realibus unitatibus, non nisi entia per aggregationem , imo quod hinc sequitur, nulla vera entia in corporibus sint su p erfu tu ra .” 25
If we take only its philosophical aspect, this is undoubtedly pure idealism, more exactly: objective idealism. But th ere are other aspects in Leibniz’ notion of substance as substantial form, entelechy, monad. As we have already said, this notion arises in connection w ith A risto telian m etaphysics and in the polemics against C artesian metaphysics. Leibniz does not intend to disregard the m echanistic n a tu ra l science. B ut he sees in this m echanistic conception of th e w orld an in terp reta tion of phenom ena only; th e essence is hidden but, at th e same time, it represents the moving principle, active substance and therefore—and this idea is m ostly im portant—the un ity of content and form, w hich is form ulated by Leibniz as su b stantial form. And th e dynam ic evolution of universe, w hich is conditionned by th e substantial forms, realizes itself according to th e law of continuity. We th in k th a t even this law is the key to th e interp retatio n of the ideas of Leibniz anticipating mo dern system -theoretical thinking. He regards this law as “une de plus considerables que je croit avoir intro d uit le prem ier dans la Physique.” 26 We know w hat great role is played by it in th e developm ent of the dia lectical foundation of the infinitesim al m athem atics by Leibniz. 27 But this law of continuity and th e principle of uniform ity closely related to it are also im portant in his idea of pre-established harm ony in which, for example, he form ulates the following thesis: “Comme je suis to ut
23 Ibid., p. 281. 24 Ibid., p. 398. 25 Ibid., p. 511.
26 Ibid., vol. VII, p. 279.
Aspects of S ystem Theory in L eibniz’ W ork 1 4 7
à faire pour le principe de l ’U niform ité que je crois que la N ature ob serve dans le fonds des choses, pendant q u ’elle varie dans les m anières, degrés et perfections, toute mon H ypothèse rev ien t à reconnoistre dans les substances éloignées de nostre vue et observation quelque chose de proportionel à ce qui se rem arque dans celles qui sont à nostre po rtée.” 28 As we see, Leibniz form ulates this law not in the form of a th e o re ti cal principle, b ut as a methodological directive, w hich is supported by another fundam ental theoretical principle in th e philosophy of Leibniz, by the principle of pre-established harm ony. “Cette même M axim e”, he w rites to Lady M asham, “de ne supposer sans nécessité dans les C reatu res que ce qui répond à nos expériences, m ’a encore m ené à System e de l ’H arm onie préétablie. ... Les défenseurs des causes occasionelles veu lent que Dieu accommode à tou t m om ent l’âme au corps, et le corps à l ’âme. Mais cela ne pouvant estre que m iraculeux, est peu convenable à la philosophie qui doit expliquir le cours ordinaire de la N ature, car il faudroit que Dieu tro u b lât continuellem ent les loix n atu rellem en t des corps. C’est pourqois j ’ay crû q u ’il estoit in fin itim en t plus digne de l’Oeconomie de Dieu et de l ’uniform ité et ordre constant de son ouvrage de conclure q u ’il a créé d ’abord les âmes et les corps de telle sort, que chacun suivant ses propres lois se recontre avec l ’a u tre .” 29
In addition, the close connection betw een the idea of pre-established harm ony (and monadology in general) and Theodicée ought to be m en tioned, because this question in its system -theoretical aspect w ill be th e subject of special investigation. Therefore we restrict ourselves to a discussion of the notion of substance as a dynam ic substantial form, as the monad.
Leibniz form ulates his ideas attacking th e m echanistic conception and form ulating a notion of substance, w hich to a certain degree a n ti cipates th e la tter dialectic-m aterialistic theory of reality as dynam ic existence. 30 B ut this is only p a rt of the problem. In th e idealistic theory of substance he finds the foundation for reasoning for a special class of relations in reality, w hich th e pure m echanistic conception w ith its linear causality was unable to recognize or acknowledge. Leibniz uses the old philosophical term of causae finales to differen tiate th em from the m echanistic linear causality, w hich he gives th e trad ition al nam e of causae efficientes. B ut if we disregard this trad ition al form , we shall find th a t under the idealistic covering a principially new conception of the relations in and th e un ity of reality is developed. The relations he investigates are those of function and purpose in a stable system w hich moves according to some uniform laws tending not only to m aintain the system of functions and stru ctu ra l elem ents in stability b u t also
28 Die philosophischen Schriften..., vol. Ill, Leipzig 1931, p. 337. 29 Ibid., p. 341.
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being in a state of harm ony themselves. Each functional elem ent aims at the m aintenance of the stability of the system and the most im por ta n t role here is played by the C entral Monad, w hich represents th e whole system as its creator, b u t w hich is not identical this system. Each functional elem ent is a product of this system , w hich represented by th e C entral M onad as causa sui, creates the conditions for its own stability. H ere we have of course an in tern al idealistic contradiction, because the C entral Monad plays h ere th e double role of being both th e conscious creator of th e system of universe and a p a rt of the system. This is a con sequence of th e idealistic system , but nevertheless Leibniz form ulates in his notion of substance and in his monadology the fundam ental ideas of fu nction al-stru cturalist system -theory and the w eak points of his conception still persist in th e m odern theories, insofar as th ey are not treated as p a rt of general dialectics, especially of the historical-genetic conception; in spite of using a m odern philosophically “n eu tra l” term i nology, this refers to cybernetic system -theory, to general system - -theory and to functio n al-structu ralist sociology. 31
This system not only brings into harm ony its functional elements, but these elem ents them selves are autonomous stru ctu res representing in a sense the whole universe (and âmes as the highest form of monads, prim arily God as the C entral Monad). The whole system is, to use mo d ern term s, at the same tim e optimized (l’Oeconomie de Dieu et l’un i form ité et ordre constant de son ouvrage). In this connection we m ust still m ention some other system -theoretical ideas developed by Leibniz.
1) The m entioned system is not static bu t dynam ic in a double sense, because a) Leibniz knows the inner developm ent of monads and b) th ere is a h ierarch y of stages of developm ent represented by th e various ty pes of monads. To be sure, the la tte r point of view is form ulated in a static m anner, because th e C entral Monad has created th e best of all possible w orlds (the m ostly optimized system) and th e diverse stages of evolution are reflected as a constant hierarch y of monads. This is a ty pical contradiction of L eibniz’ philosophy and we th in k th a t th ere are two difficulties in following this w ay of solving th e investigated pro blems. One is the static theocentric view of the world, and the other is the fact th a t function al-stru ctural sy stem -interpretations seem to tend to conservative and static models, especially in the p attern s of society. B ut it seems th a t this is a special ra th e r th an general form in which function al-structu ral theories begin to develop, if we consider the mo dern discussions of the possibilities to overcome this conservatism w ithin the boundaries of fun ctio nal-stru ctu ral theories th em selv es.32 31 Cf. A. W. G ouldner, „Buduca kriza funkcjonalne teorije,” Socjologija, 1—2, 1966, pp. 139 ff.
32 Cf. for exam ple, N. M ayntz, „Soziologie in der Erm itage? K ritische Bem erk- ungen zum V olwurf des K onvervatism us in der Soziologie,” in: E. Topitsch (ed.), Logik der Sozialw issenschaften, Koln—Berlin 1965, pp. 527—8.
A sp e c ts of S ystem Theory in L eibniz’ W ork 149
2) We have seen th a t Leibniz linked up closely the idea of conti n u ity w ith his dynam ic notion of substance. H ere we have also to do w ith a double function of th e principle th a t he form ulates as one of the most fundam ental laws of physics. On th e one hand, it establishes th e theoretical and methodological foundations for the differen tial calculus and on the other, for the static theocentric (and, consequently, teleologi- cal) model of th e world. In m athem atics it is p a rt of the introduction of dialectics into th e science, w hereas in the m etaphysical system it seems to be p a rt of a conservative view of th e w orld w hich attacks scientific thought from reactionary positions. We say p art of a conservative of the world, because we have already indicated th a t this conservatism is only one of the aspects of Leibniz’ conception of th e system atical u n ity of the world.
We have m entioned th a t th ere are close connections betw een the Monadology and the Théodicée and th a t in the la tte r we can also find elem ents of a system -theoretical in terp retatio n . Leibniz him self very clearly expresses this connection, especially betw een the Théodicée and the idea of pre-established harm ony. Of course, the same connetion exists betw een the notion of continuity as a fundam ental law of the universe and th e hypothesis th a t God has created the best of all possible worlds as w ell as the idea th a t m oral evil exists in consequence of acci dental compositions in the w orld of m a tter th a t condition the m etaphysi cal evil. There we have—again in an idealistic and teleological form —the contradiction betw een eufunctional and disfunctional elem ents of a sy stem, an idea developed in p articu la r by Robert K. M e rto n .33 But, at th e same time, we discover here one of the most fundam ental w eaknes ses of Leibniz’ system w hich incited attacks on Leibniz’ theory of th e best of all possible worlds as an apologetic and conservative doctrine, because Leibniz m ust needs absolutize th e eufunctional properties of his system and, moreover, the harm ony is only established by th e in te r vention of God, superim posing the em pire of grace upon th e em pire of la w s .34 This is a consequence of th e w hole system, b u t a consequence w hich is contradictory to th e idea of pre-established harm ony, especial ly to the form ulation of Leibniz th a t m onads are a sort of spiritu al auto m ata. 35
N evertheless we find th a t in spite of this contradiction Leibniz deve lops a fu rth e r system -aspect w hich discovers the anthropological con tents of his work in general and especially of the system -theoretical as pects of his work. This is his idea of Civitas Dei (Cité de Dieu), w hich is one of the most im portant links betw een th e Monadology and the Théodicée. He form ulates this idea in his le tter to A rnauld from Septem
-33 Cf. R obert K. M erton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe 1957. 34 Cf. for example, Die philosophischen Schriften..., vol. VI, Leipzig 1932, p. 467. 35 Cf. for exam ple, ibid., vol. IV, p. 485, vol. IV, p. 356.
1 5 0 P. Bollhagen
ber (October) 1687: „Pour ce qui est des Esprits, c’est à dire des substan ces, qui pensent, qui sont capables de connoistre Dieu et de découvrir des vérités éternelles, je tiens que Dieu les gouverne suivant des loix différentes de celles dont il gouverne le reste de substance. ... Il prend un a u tre personnage à l ’égard des esprits qui le fait concevoir revestu de volonté et de qualités morales, puisqu’il est lu y même un esprit, et comme un d ’entre nous ju sq u’à en tre r avec nous dans une liaison de société dont il est le chef. Et c’est cette société ou République générale des Esprits sous ce souverain M onarque, qui est la plus noble partie de l’univers, composée d ’au tan t de petits Dieux sous ce grand Dieu. Car on peu t dire que les esprits crées ne differen t de Dieu que de plus à mo ins, d u fini à l ’initial. E t on p eu t asseurer véritablem ent, que tout l ’uni vers n ’a esté fait pour contribuer à l ’ornem ent et au bonheur de cette cité de Dieu. C’est pourquoy to u t est disposé en sorte que les loix de la force ou les loix p urem ent m atérielles conspirent dans to u t l’univers à executer les loix de la justice ou de l ’am our ...” 36 It is v ery rem ark a ble th a t Leibniz emphasizez in this connection th a t “les esprits devant garder leu r personnage et leur qualités m orales...” 37
In his thesis about the role of Civitas Dei Leibniz not only over comes to a certain ex tent the m entioned contradiction in his Théodicée and thu s contributes to the developm ent of philosophy of man, a correct dialectical understanding of th e relationship betw een necessity and accident, to an autonomous m orale in which th e active m an is sum m um bonum , 38 but he gives also a fundam ental contribution to the theory of th e social system, one th a t is a un ity of free functional acting (on the foundations of th e “laws of justice and love”) persons, whose conscious and free activity is a condition for the stability of the whole system. We th in k th a t this idea is the apex of all Leibniz’ work anticipating m odern system -theoretical thought. C ertainly, Leibniz is unable to over come in his idea of Civitas Dei the intern al lim itations and contradic tions of his system -theoretical ideas m entioned above. As a pioneer in this field, he succeeds in overcoming these boundaries only in his in ten tion, because th e theocentric form and the understanding of develop m ent as a static stratification m ake it difficult for him to adopt th e con sequences of this new point of view. But nevertheless th ere are valid elem ents of this new point of view th a t ju stify our attem pt to in terp ret some central ideas in Leibniz’ philosophy not only in term s of the philo sophical contradiction between m aterialism and idealism b u t also in term s of m odern system -theory.
We th in k th a t this attem pt, in w hich we obviously could only outline the boundaries of the whole complex, dem onstrates the fruitfulness of
36 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 124—5. 37 Ibid., p. 125.
Aspects of S ystem Theory in L eibniz’ W ork 151
investigation in this direction; of course, only if we observe the principle of concrete historical analysis and therefore see th a t th e theological form of L eibniz’ thought is by no m eans accidental b u t constitutes the in tern al lim itation of his ideas, th a t, on th e one hand, he w as unable to overstop this lim itation and, on the other, th a t even this historical form of his thought was a condition for opening new aspects of th in k ing, w hich the m echanistic thought was unable to see and w hich at p re sent become in a m ore correct form one of the m ost im portant p arts of contem porary scientific thinking.
