O R G A N O N 3(1966) AUTEURS ET PROBLÈMES
Leonïlla Król (Poland)
SPENCER’S MEANING OF STRUCTURE
Social sciences show recen tly a considerably increased in terest in th e te rm “stru c tu re ” . This is expressed, among others in th e great num ber of definitions w hich have been advanced for th e last fifteen years. The definitions of this “difficult and at th e same tim e v e ry a t tractive te rm ” 1 differ greatly from one a n o th e r2, w hile on th e other hand, th ey become free to a lesser or greater degree from th e influence of th e te rm ’s original m eaning. The now prevailing tendency tow ards unifying this m eaning should go along w ith th e exam ination of its genetic conditionings, th a t is to say, w ith considerations concerning the contents given to th e te rm “stru c tu re ”, especially in its first ap plications. It is, then, necessary to take S pencer’s conception of stru c tu re due to w hich th is te rm had been introduced into social vocabulary in th e second h alf of th e n ineteenth century. The task is all th e m ore im p o rtant because the term “stru c tu re ” has become fash io n ab le3 in sociology, this being p rim arily due to th e fact, th a t th e concept of stru ctu re constitutes one of th e m ain elem ents of th e theoretical foun dations of the school of functionalism in sociology, as w ell as in social and cu ltu ral anthropology. All this certainly enhances the theoretical splendour of the term and in some m easure increases its a ttra c tiv e ness.
The purpose of th e present attem p t to analyze th e m eanings given by Spencer to th e te rm “stru c tu re ” is to see how he understood th a t
1 Cf: Le concept de structure sociale. “Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie” 1955, p. 23.
2 This m ay be exem p lified by the know n controversy betw een G. G urvitch and C. L évi-S trau ss concerning th e d efinition of the term “social structure”. See also: H enri L e f è b r e : Réflexio ns sur le str ucturalism e et l’histoire. “C ahiers in ter nationaux de Sociologie” 1963, vol. 35, p. 4.
3 “The term and th e concept o f structure — says G urvitch — are fashionable now. W ith an excep tional force, th ey attract th e attention of the represen tatives o f all d isciplines”. S tructu res sociales e t sy sth èm e s de connaissances in: Notion de structure et structure de la connaissance. (Report from V in g tièm e sem ain e d e s y n thèse, 18—27. IV. 1955) Paris 1957; cf. also: A. L. K r o e b e r : A n th ropology Today. 1948, p. 325.
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term . This can be of im portance as a source of sem antic inspiration, and as an aid in th e sociological stu d y of S pencer’s synthesis or of some of its elem ents. Finaly, it may, as well, be a contribution to the histo ry of sociology.
I
Before dealing w ith th e m eanings of th e term “s tru c tu re ” borrowed by Spencer from biology, it should be emphasized th a t the concept of stru ctu re relativ e to society was already know n to Comte. In his system of positive philosophy, w orked out in 1830— 1842 and presen ted in the six volumes of his Cours de philosophie positive, the fo u n dations of sociological m ethods contained in the fam ous formula: Ordre
et Progrès, w ere set forth in two theories:
1) th e theory of social statics, th a t is to say, the theo ry of “sp onta neous order of societies”,
2) the theo ry of social dynamics, th a t is to say, the theory of “necessary and continuous grow th of m ankind”.
The first one, nam ely the theory of order (théorie de l’ordre), is based upon w h at is sometimes called “th e law of stru ctu ra l dependence of all the elem ents of society”. Comte does not use th e term “stru c tu re ”, although such a definition of th e “theory of o rd er” seems ju sti fied, since it most ap tly represents the essence of th a t theory and, indirectly, th e essence of Comte’s conception of social statics and of the m ethodology of sociology.
The purpose of scientific research, according to Comte, was not to detect th e causes of investigated phenom ena, w hich he considered to be unattainable, b ut to determ ine the law s governing them . Regarding society as an organic whole, he saw in it, first and foremost, a harm o nious union of social phenom ena governed by tw o kinds of unvariable laws; th ey determ ine the correlation of co-existent phenom ena and the unidirectional dependence of successive ones. He thought th a t sociolo gical research should include, first of all, static dependencies, expres sing th e “order of society” . In such investigations, one should be guided by th e theoretical conceptions w hich enable to handle the studied phenom ena in an em pirical and m utually-connected way. Comte, after having advanced the postulate of discerning two foundam ental aspects of social reality , nam ely: “order” and “progress”, statics and dynamics, based th e laws governing statics upon th e concept of th e whole, con sidered from th e angle of th e co-existence and m u tu al dependence of constituent elem ents; such an approach, therefore, corresponds to the stru ctu ral understanding of the subject of this research. According to Comte, society itself is an organic whole, all its elem ents are linked b y co-existence and interdependence, and th erefo re th e stru ctu ra l d e pendencies connect them together. T hat is why, although Comte does
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not use the term “s tru c tu re ” in his considerations th e v ery w ay of understanding th e laws of social statics m akes h im th e intellectual precursor of th e stru c tu ra l approach to social phenom ena. This seems to be w orth of being emphasized.
II
G u rv itch’s paper 4 rem inds of the fact th a t it was precisely Spencer who introduced the te rm “stru c tu re ” in sociology. It w as also he, who enriched the tools of sociological research by some new term s, such as “control”, “in stitu tio n ”, “function”, “evolution” . Spencer’s u n d er standing of th e te rm “stru c tu re ” is closely connected w ith his idea of evolution, w hich should be exam ined here in th e first place.
F aith ful to th e trad itio n s of English philosophy, w hich was, since th e seventeenth century, un der th e dom ination of the em pirical trend, Spencer built up his g reat system (A S ystem o f S yn th etic Philosophy, 1860— 1896) on the basis of th e results of p a rticu lar sciences, especially th e n a tu ra l ones. He expounds th e h istory of society as a m anifestation of th e action of a single g reat law of n atu re w hich governs th e whole reality. R eality is subject to changes taking place in accordance w ith th a t law, defined b y Spencer as th e law of evolution tending tow ards integration and differentiation. His form ulation of th a t law w as in fluenced, as he pointed out him self, by the biological investigations of von B aer who had found th a t the em bryonic developm ent w ith in th e vegetable and anim al w orld consists in passing from the stage of hom o geneity to the stage of heterogeneity. Spencer extended th e applica b ility of this law by stating in his th eo ry of evolution th a t it holds not only of th e organic world, b u t also of the inorganic as well, as the super-organic or social ones, th u s form ing a synthesis of all scien tific law s concerning v aria b ility in this domain.
Removing th e partition s betw een n a tu ra l sciences and hum anities, Spencer became th e first theoretician in sociology, having an evolutio- nistic and organicistic disposition. This found its expression in his monistic system of sociology, although his in terp retatio n of social p he nomena w as not devoid of psychological elem ents and he did not negate the interactions betw een the evolution of individuals, th a t of th e society regarded as a whole, and th e products of th a t evolution i.e. sp iritu al and m aterial culture.
1) The analysis of th e law of evolution in regard to society is the subject of Spencer’s three-volum e work: T he Principles o f Sociology (1876— 1896).
4 Une source oubliée des concepts de “structure sociale”, “fonction socia le”, et “in stitution”: Herbert Spencer. “Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie” 1957, vol. 23.
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Social evolution proceeds through integration of hum an aggregates. These are thu s transform ed into a new, larger, functionally differen tiated assem blage whose p arts become m ore and m ore interdependent owing to th e increasing division of labour. Such conditions foster th e advance of social organization; th e loose assemblage is transform ed into an ecological whole — organized and based upon definite in stitu tions — into a society. The subsequent evolution of society tends tow ards g reater specialization and social differentiation, combined w ith institu tio n al developm ent according to Spencer’s synthetical form ula: “T here is progress tow ards greater size, coherence, m ultiform ity, and definiteness”.
Evolution, however, does not im ply continuous progress: ’’There is no uniform ascent from low er to higher, b u t only an occasional pro duction of a form which, in v irtu e of g reater fitness for more complex conditions, becomes capable of a longer life of a m ore varied k in d ” 5; — th a t is to say, of life a t a higher stage of evolution, since v ariety and differentiation are m anifestations of th e evolutional process, in the course of w hich the species less adapted to outer conditions — perish.
In spite of this qualification, w eakening th e optim ism which could be inspired by the theory of all-em bracing evolution, Spencer closes his considerations w ith q u ite an optim istic statem ent, th a t th e process of social evolution (generally consisting in th e integration accompanied by differentiation), after giving origin to great and highly-differentia ted states, w ill bring about th eir federation; the latter, exercising suprem e authority, may, “by forbidding w ars betw een any of its con stitu e n t nations, p u t an end to the re-barbarization w hich is continual ly undoing civilization” 6.
H ere we have Spencer’s rem arkable pacifism, so characteristic of him . In connection w ith his theory of evolution, Spencer lays stress on the necessity of studying and determ ining th e law s governing social evolution; “it becomes requisite th a t th e sociologist should acquaint him self w ith the laws of m odification to which organized beings in general conform. Unless he does this he m ust continually err, both in thought and deed” 7.
2) The fundam ental cell of society is in Spencer’s system the bio- -physical unit, in contrast w ith the fam ily which constitutes such a cell in Com te’s considerations: “A valuable introduction to the study of social life is the fam iliarization w ith the tru th s of individual life” . Biology is th e most suitable introduction to th e cognition of these tru ths: “the hum an being — he says — is at once th e term inal problem
5 The Principles of Sociology. Vol. I ll, London 1904, u. 599. 6 Ibid., p. 600.
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of Biology and th e initial factor of Sociology” 8. It is, therefore, not surprising th a t in Spencer’s considerations th e problem s of th e stru ctu re of individuals are p rior to those concerning th e stru c tu re of societies. Thus, let us consider, w h at m eaning w as assigned by him to the term “s tru c tu re ”.
A. Since Spencer gave no definition of th e te rm “s tru c tu re ” its m eaning m ust be inferred from its context.
W hen Spencer w rites, th a t Schw einfurth, “describing th e s t r u c t u r e of this degraded ty p e of m an ”, says: “The superior region of th e chest is flat, and m uch contracted, b u t it w idens out below to support the huge hanging b elly ” 9 and w hen h e points out, th at: “by h is s t r u c t u r e m an w as not so w ell fitted for dealing w ith his difficulties” 10, th e term “stru c tu re ” h as only a biological or, strictly speaking, an anatom ical sense, regarding th e w hole constituted by an individual biological organism and m eaning its build. Such an u n d er standing of th e term “stru c tu re ” shows th a t Spencer, afte r having borrow ed th is te rm from biology, used it h ere in th e sense peculiar to th a t science. In biology, indeed, th e te rm “s tru c tu re ” m eans in ac cordance w ith its etym ology (struere — to build), th e build of a m a terial whole. The sam e m eaning of th e te rm “s tru c tu re ” is also applied by Spencer to m aterial objects, such as houses, ships etc. 11
A part from th is m eaning of the te rm “stru c tu re ”, we encounter another one, likew ise connected w ith biological organism s. This occurs w hen Spencer w rites: “th e various organs..., w hich alone rem ain fully alive, w hile th e s t r u c t u r e s evolved from th em lose th e ir v ita lity...” 12 or: “th e developm ent of a s t r u c t u r e bringing these m a te rials” 13. In these quotations, the m eaning of th e te rm “stru c tu re ” is different, since it concerns an organ, th a t is to say, a com plex m a te rial whole, and not its build.
B. Physical, chem ical as w ell as biological investigations, showing th e dependencies betw een the properties of constituent p a rts and those of th e wholes form ed of those parts, had led Spencer to conclusions and generalizations w hich he applied to sociological research. This was due to th e fact, th a t h e assumed an analogy betw een certain laws governing biological and social o rg an ism s.14 Such an assum ption, asto
8 Ibid., p. 336.
9 The Prin ciples of Sociology. Vol. I, op. cit., p. 45. 10 Ibid., p. 52.
11 “The late Japanese system com pletely m ilitary in origin and nature, sim i larly perm eated industry; great and sm all things — houses, ships, down even to m ats — w ere prescribed in th eir structures”. Ibid., p. 550.
12 Ibid., p. 446. 13 Ibid., p. 439.
14 This w as contrary to Hobbes, w ho drew analogies b etw een the parts of biological organism s and those o f society, and in accordance w ith Comte, w ho based his analogies on common principles concerning th e build o f biological organism and o f society.
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nishing “those who have been brought up in the belief th a t th e laws relativ e to n atu re and to society w ere qu ite d iffere n t” 15, had its roots in th e observation of such phenom ena as th e division of labour, de pendence betw een p arts and th e whole, coordination, grow th and decay, etc., w hich occur not only in biological organisms, but also in society.
In order to dem onstrate the union betw een the laws of evolution and the organization sensu largo of biological organism as w ell as of society, Spencer used a w idely developed system of analogies betw een society and organisms, applying to society th e term inology originally connected w ith biological organism . He pointed out, however, th a t those analogies, w ere of a m erely heuristic character, and he gave them up in his description of institutions, form ing the bulk of his system of sociology.
W hile draw ing parallels betw een the stru ctu re of individuals, in cluding th eir tra its of character, m ind and concepts, and th a t of a social assem blage corresponding to th e lowest stages of social evolution and determ ined as a social aggregate 16. Spencer claimed th a t a m utual dependence exists betw een those tw o kinds of structures. The said dependence consists in th a t th e properties of th e aggregate’s stru ctu re are com patible w ith those of the stru ctu res of u nits m aking up the ag g re g a te.17 Such is th e case, however, only in th e beginning: w ith fu rth e r evolution of society the situation gets changed. These very properties of th e units, to some ex ten t depending upon th e conditions of organic and inorganic environm ent, determ ine not only the stru c tu re b u t also th e grow th of the aggregate.
W hen applied to hum an assemblages, the term “stru c tu re ” used in these considerations obtains a qualification including social aspects. H ere we find such expressions as, “stru ctu re of social aggregate”, “stru c tu re of com m unity”, “stru ctu re of trib e” , w hich have an altered content as com pared w ith the above m eanings of th e term structure. This new connotation is closely connected w ith th e understanding of th e integration w ith in a social aggregate. The particular social aggre gates become integrated to a various extent, th a t is to say, th eir com ponent p a rts — th e u nits — are from the social point of view vario usly in terrelated: the aggregates corresponding to various stages of social developm ent have, consequently, differen t structures. The in
15 The S tu d y of Sociology. Op. cit., p. 50.
18 It is to be noted that Spencer som etim es uses in his w orks the term “social aggregate” not only in the sense of a rudim entary and unorganized aggre gate opposed to society, but also in th e sense of th e society itself, th e latter being then understood as an advanced aggregate. The term aggregate w as lik ew ise applied to all inorganic or organic assem blages.
17 “Thus, given the natures of the units, and the nature of the aggregate they form is predeterm ined, (...) and no com m unity h aving such traits can be formed out of individuals having other structures and in stin cts”. Ibid., p. 50.
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tegration of the social aggregate in the sense of th e earliest stage of social evolution is still insignificant: th e horde is discrete and all its units exhibit a v ery low standard of social differentiation. A certain differentiation of social roles is conditioned, at most, b y differences in biological stru ctu res of th e units, for instance, by differences existing betw een sexes. This character of th e aggregates is d eterm ined b y th e ir small size and th e undeveloped division of labour am ong th e units. Not only th e m ost prim itive hordes of nomads, b u t also th e “p rim itive trib es show no established contrasts of p arts. A t first all m en carry on th e same kinds of activities, w ith no dependence on one another, or b u t occasional dependence” 18. In those “sm all unform ed social ag gregates” 19 th e re is no settled chieftainship: beyond w artim e, for example, th e leader of a trib e keeps carrying on th e functions of an o rdinary m em ber of his com munity.
“S tru ctures of social aggregates”, refe rred to by Spencer, b u t not defined by him either, w ould be th en pre-organizational and discrete arrangem ents of units, based upon subjective intentions of parties, and not upon form al institutions of the aggregate. In such arrangem ents, th e actions of th e units are not m u tu ally-d ifferen tiated, nor fixedly coordinated in relation to social aggregates by m eans of a d ifferen tia ted and organized system of social dependences, in short, by m eans of social organization.
A t first sight, th e term “stru ctu re of social aggregate” suggests th e idea of some organized whole and of its build. A closer analysis of th e text, however, leads to th e conclusion, th a t even if the p ro p erties of th e units determ ine the properties of th e aggregate and th ere exists some connection of a biological and social character betw een them , it is not to bet understood either as th e stru ctu re in th e sense of an organized w hole or as th e w ay in which this whole is built, for th e sim ple reason th a t th e social aggregate is not a t all an organized whole. In borrow ing an exam ple from Spencer’s considerations on society, we could say, th a t a loose collection of stones, bricks and wood is not to be regarded as a w hole exhibiting new tra its in reg ard to those of th e p articu lar elem ents of th e assemblage, th a t is, a whole, about w hich one could pronounce sentences being no conjunction of those concer ning the p articu la r elem ents. The w hole w ill not arise u n til th e ele m ents have been connected in a fixed w ay as a building. A nalogically, as long as functional differentiation and social inter-dependence, toge th e r w ith the social tie rela tin g the u n its into one w hole and con stitutin g this social whole, do not appear among th e u n its m aking up the aggregate as described b y Spencer, th e whole does not appear as
Ibid., p. 331—332. 19 Ibid.
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defined along his c r ite ria .20 On the contrary, we have to do w ith an undifferentiated, unorganized assemblage of units, an assemblage based only upon direct social contacts. These v ery properties of th e assem blage — in w hich th e u n its are rank ed on the basis of th eir individual biopsychical traits, and not on th e ground of th eir social roles which could im plicate a definite organizational relationship tow ards other units — are expressed by Spencer’s term : “th e stru ctu re of social ag greg ate”. By th e la tte r he does not u nderstand a w hole nor the build of a w hole (which, afte r all, does not exist here), b u t only a discrete arrangem ent of biopsychical units.
Thus, the analysis of Spencer’s attitu d e tow ards the problem of w hen th e assemblage constitutes an organized “w hole” and w hen it is still an aggregate, leads to the conclusion that, in regard to assem blages, he uses the te rm “stru c tu re ” in various meanings. In a certain meaning, the stru ctu re of every social assemblage is determ ined by the system of relations betw een th e units, characteristic of the given as semblage. We m ay describe “the stru ctu re of social aggregate” by sta ting th a t it is discrete and th a t social roles w ithin it are only slightly differentiated. In another sense, “th e stru c tu re ” exists only in assem blage p roperly organized and composed of differentiated and in te r dependent parts. W ith time, the aggregate becomes transform ed into an assemblage characterized by a definite stru ctu re. This concept of structure, enabling us to speak of th e increase of stru ctu re in the course of society’s evolution, w ill be still discussed below.
Spencer’s in terest in the social aggregate m ay be explained by his application of the methodological rule, stating th a t research on any phenom ena should sta rt from such arrangem ents, in w hich these phe nom ena occur in th e ir sim plest form. This ru le is especially im portant for investigations of a genetic character and th a t is why, the concept of aggregate w as indispensable for Spencer’s study of stru ctu res and social functions.
This is confirm ed in Spencer’s S tu d y o f Sociology, w here speaking of the tasks of sociology, he says: “Beginning w ith types of m en who form b u t sm all and incoherent social aggregates such a science has to show in w hat w ays the individual qualities, intellectual and emotio nal, negative fu rth e r aggregation. It has to explain how slight modifi cations of individual nature, arising under notified conditions of life, m ake som ew hat larger aggregates possible” 21.
20 W ith other criteria, the social aggregate in th e narrow sense of the term can be regarded as a w hole, for instance, for the sake of psychological and spatial bonds; w ith Spencer, however, the criterion of being “a w hole” is constituted e x c lu siv e ly by an organizational bond. “That m utual dependence of parts w hich constitutes organization is thus effectu ally established. Though discrete instead of concrete (like a biological organism — L. K.), th e social aggregate is Tenderer a livin g w h o le”. The Principles of Sociology. Op. cit., p. 448.
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C. As stated above, the social aggregate evolves through integration combined w ith differentiation. Two stages m ay be distinguished in this process: the one relates to integration, the other — to d ifferen tia tion.
“The prim itive social group — says Spencer — like the prim itive group of living molecules w ith which organic evolution begins, never attains an y considerable size by simple increase” 22. This is attained by integration. As far as society is concerned, th e com bination of p a rti cular aggregates most freq uently occurs b y conquests. W ithin the com pound aggregate thus developed (sim ply compound, doubly compound, and so on) the differentiation of its constituent p a rts takes place. Along w ith the grow th of populations, occupations become differentiated, and this differentiation increases according to the grow th of the aggregate. This process, successively recurring and giving origin to large societ ie s , h as always taken place according to the form ula th a t the increase in size of societies is accompanied by th e “increase of s tru c tu re ”, th a t is, by th e differentiation of p arts m aking up a social or biological ag gregate. “As th e aggregate grows, says Spencer, its p arts become u n like: it exhibits increase of stru c tu re ” 23. H ere lies the question of an increasing heterogeneity of th e originally homogeneous aggregate, the only differentiation of which was based on th e division of labour by sex. Thus, th e te rm “stru c tu re ” is used here to express th e d ifferen tia tion of th e aggregate’s elements. Analogically: “stru ctu re d ” m eans differentiated, “u n stru ctu re d ” — undifferentiated. “The changes by which this structureless mass becomes a stru ctu red mass, having the characters and powers possessed by w hat we call an organism, are changes through which its p arts lose th eir original likenesses: and do this w hile assum ing the unlike kinds of activ ity” 24 .
Spencer am phasizes th e special character of this differentiation. “Evolution establishes in them both (i.e. biological and social orga nisms, L.K.) not differences simply, bu t definitely connected d ifferen ces — differences such th a t each m akes th e others possible” 25. This paves th e w ay for fu rth e r differentiation, whose term ination implies th e end of the process of evolution.
D. The em ergence of social organization sensu largo constitutes another stage w ithin th e developm ent of social aggregate. In the pro cess of functional differentiation of the aggregate th e re arises a m utual dependence of its differentiated p arts as a resu lt of an increased divi sion of la b o u r.26 And this interdependence constitutes not only a neces
22 The Principles of Sociology. Op. cit., vol. I, p. 454. 23 Ibid., p. 450.
24 The S tu d y of Sociology. Op. cit., p. 331. 25 The Principles of Sociology, Op. cit., p. 439.
25 “this division of labour, first dw elt on by p olitical econom ists as a social phenom enon of living bodies, w hich they called th e physiological d ivision of
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sary bu t also a sufficient condition of social co-operation due to social roles being interdependent and com plem entary. It is only the co-opera tion th a t transform s th e social aggregate, still discrete but already differentiated, into a developing whole composed of parts, m arked off but a t th e sam e tim e joined together owing to “the persistence of the arrangem ents among them throughout th e area occupied. And it is this tra it w hich yields our idea of a society, says Spencer. For w ithholding the nam e (that is the nam e “society” — L.K.) from an ever changing cluster such as prim itive m en form, we apply it only w here some con stancy in th e distribution of parts has resulted from settled life” 27. Thus, the fu rth e r evolution of a compound social aggregate, already as a concrete ecological whole, becomes possible owing to the agencies transform ing it into a society, th a t is, owing to the differentiation and m utual dependence of p arts m aking possible a v o lu n tary co-operation, w hen the satisfaction of personal goals is aimed at, or a compulsory one, w hen the ends of th e whole com m unity are m eant. It is these two phenomena, differentiation and m u tu al dependence, th a t make up th e concept of stru ctu re w henever Spencer uses th a t term in order to describe th e system of relationships w ithin th e organized aggregate, th a t is w ithin society. “S tru ctu re” is here equivalent to the organiza tion of society. We find this v ery m eaning in th e following quotation: “By com paring societies of different kinds, and societies in different stages, we m ust ascertain w hat tra its of size, stru ctu re, function, e t c . ,
are associated” 28.
E. Spencer also uses the term “stru c tu re ” to denote some characte ristic p arts of society. Thus, his expression “social stru ctu res”, is linked w ith the considerations on social evolution of society.
In Spencer’s opinion, th e developm ent of social aggregate is in fluenced not only by th e stru ctu re of its com ponent units, b u t also by the conditionings of its environm ent which codeterm ine the ag gregate’s structure, th a t is, indirectly the question w hether it w ill be th e victim of a conquest or the conqueror itself. The evolution of society, however, becomes gradually m ore and m ore independent of those conditionings, since society purposely transform s its own environ m ent. On th e other hand, this evolution continues to depend upon the structures of units, upon organization and social stru ctu res, influenced in tu rn by society as th e whole. B ut Spencer did not define th e ex pression “social stru ctu re s”, just as he did not give th e definition of the term s “stru c tu re ” and: “stru ctu res of social aggregate” .
labour, is that w hich in th e society as in the anim al, m akes a livin g w hole. Scarcely can I em phasize enough the truth that in respect of this fundam ental trait a social organism and an individual organism are en tirely alik e”. Ibid., p. 440.
2’ Ibid., p. 436. 28 Ibid., p. 431.
S p e n c e r’s M eaning o f S tr u c tu r e 2 1 1
W hat determ ines the grow th of those social stru ctu res and in w hat does th e ir im portance consist? As w e have seen, th e origin of a stru c tu re understood as the differentiation of a social aggregate w as in fluenced by integration, giving rise to the form ation of society. The grow th of social stru ctu res is linked w ith th e conditions of organiza tion sensu largo. Evolution of political organization is determ ined by the interactions of adjacent societies called by Spencer the “sup er- -organic environm ent of society”. Thus e.g. w ars have all-im p o rtan t effects in developing certain social s tru c tu re s .29 Hence it follows th a t only some structu res envolve in correlation w ith th e grow th of politi cal organization, w hile th e rem aining ones change owing to th e in du strial one. O riginally — according to Spencer — organization de pended chiefly on th e conditions of inorganic and organic environm ent, upon w hich th e evolution of th e rem aining social stru ctu res is like wise d e p e n d e n t.30
Thus, th ere is a genetic interdependence betw een organization and social structures. The organization of the society as a whole, “begins w ith a contrast betw een the division which carries on relations, h ab itu ally hostile, w ith environing societies, and the division w hich is devoted to procuring necessaries of life; and during th e earlier stages of deve lopm ent these two divisions constitute th e w hole” 31. So, w hen Spencer says, th a t according to th e law of organization d istinct functions en tail distinct structures, and th a t th e gradual d ifferentiation of functions goes along w ith a gradual differentiation of structures, it is to be p re sumed, th a t those tw o social functions, covering the relations w ith environing societies and th e satisfaction of th e society’s needs, corres pond to tw o kinds of stru ctu res whose task consists in perform ing those functions. This v ery division is shown in Spencer’s statem ent, concerning the tasks of sociology, w hich should describe the changing relations betw een th is regulative stru ctu re w hich is unproductive, and those stru ctu res which c arry on p ro d u ctio n .32 The confrontation of those two statem ents m ay lead to th e conclusion, th a t w hen Spencer refers to the “two contrasted p a rts of society”, described also as th e “regulative and operative p a rt”, and to tw o kinds of structure, nam ely the regulative and the productive one; in eith er case he m eans the same. M ore th an that, it seems th a t th e above expressions are equi valent to such ones as “fundam ental p a rts of society” and “social classes”. “W hen from low tribes en tirely undifferentiated, we pass to tribes next above them, we find classes of m asters and slaves — m asters who, as w arriors, carry on th e offensive and defensive activi
29 Ibid., p. 12. 30 Ibid., p. 462. 31 Ibid.. p. 582. 32 Ibid., p. 427.
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ties and th u s especially stand in relations to environing agencies; and slaves who carry on inner activities for th e general sustentation, p ri m arily of their m asters and secondarily of them selves”'33. Thus, Spencer gives “social stru ctu res” a meaning, according to w hich th e groups he distinguishes as social classes are to be regarded as referen ts of those structures; both expressions are, then, equivalent. Along w ith the in creasing size of society, these two interdependent classes, which w ere originally in direct contact w ith each other, lose th e ir intim ate con nection. The need for indirect contact arises, giving origin to a new, interm ediate class serving to tran sfer products and “influences” from one p a rt to th e other. (Here we use Spencer’s term “influences” which corresponds to th e word “inform ation” in cybernetics). Spencer ad- scribes p articu lar im portance to this th ird interm ediate class: “In all subsequent stages, evolution of the tw o earlier system s of structures depends on evolution of this additional system ” 34. Thus the model of society and of its functioning comprises all th ree m u tu ally connected systems, nam ely th e regulative, th e operative and the inform ative one. Since Spencer stresses, th a t th e developm ent of the first two depends on the developm ent of the third, he is aware, th a t th ere is a feedback betw een th e regulative and th e inform ative systems, and th a t is w hy his model of society m ay be trea ted as an early cybernetical model.
Spencer, as it appears, tran sferred th e respective generalizations of biological research into social sciences and, as a result, regarded society as a great organic whole. His profound knowledge of th e dynam ics of such system s found its confirm ation in m odern cybernetics, w hich shows the common principles of functioning of living organisms and social s tru c tu re s .35
The origin of such social structures is bound up w ith th e division of functions w ith regard to the whole. The perform ance of those func tions, defence and atack on the one hand, and the procurem ent of the necessaries of life on the other, is m ade possible by those v ery stru c tures, in other words, by social classes and th e organization involved. F u rth e r advance of social structures conforms to th e general law of organization: „differentiations proceed from the m ore general to the
Ibid., pp. 480—481. 34 Ibid., p. 582.
35 One could point out analogies betw een the structures conceived as parts of society and th e m eaning given by Spencer to the term “structure” when he speaks of biological organism: “As this change progresses, the nutrim ent taken up by the alim entary structures is better distributed by these vascular structures to the outer and inner organs in proportion to their n eed s” (The Principles of Sociology. vol. I, p. 482). “A lim entary structures” and “vascular structures” m ean “alim entary canal” and “blood v essels” resp ectively; both form fun ction ally connected and m utually dependent parts of an organic w hole. Term inological convergence w ith structures conceived as social classes seem s, consequently, not to be accidental; it is justified by the fact, that the term “structure” is understood in either case as the interdependent and compound parts o f a w hole — social or organic.
S p e n c e r’s M eaning o f S tr u c tu r e 2 1 3
more special” 36 — th a t is, tow ards an increasing specialization in func tion and structure.
“F irst the broad division betw een ru lin g and ruled; th en w ith in th e ruling p a rt divisions into political, religious, m ilitary, and w ithin th e ruled p a rt divisions into food-producing classes and h an d icrafts men; th en w ithin each of these divisions m inor ones, and so on” 37. The grow th of the class exercising religious control m ay serve as an exam ple: d uring th e early stage of aggregation, all th e functions requ irin g a contact w ith su p er-n atu ra l forces are perform ed by m en who are at once sorcerers, priests, diviners, exorcists, and doctors. Along w ith advance in| integration, th ere come both differences of function and differences of rank, th ere grows specialization: th e rain -m ak ers and sorcerers come from th e priests, th e p riests from th e diviners, and so forth. Finally, th e re comes a distinct sacerdotal class, w ith in w hich various categories arise: sacrificers, diviners, singers, composers of hym ns, instructors of youth; th en w ithin each of these categories th ere develops a fu rth e r specialisation.38
ill
As we have seen, Spencer uses the te rm “stru c tu re ” w ith o ut p re cising it, in intuitive meanings, th a t is, in m eanings dependent on th e context. The application of th e so-called authentic in terp retatio n w ith th e view of determ ining th e sense of th e expressions we are concerned w ith, proves to be impossible, because th e au th o r him self has not de fined the term in question. This! fact is all th e m ore em barrassing, since we have to do here w ith a term introduced by Spencer him self into the vocabulary of sociology. Consequently, one should not claim, th a t th e m eaning of this te rm is self-evident and th a t it does not call for an explicit definition.
When analyzing th e m eanings w hich Spencer gave to th e term “stru c tu re ”, we have seen th a t various concepts of stru ctu re correspond to various contexts. In the analysis in question we used im plicitly two criteria which enabled us to single out m ore easily those v arying con notations. The first m ay be described as (1) a “reistic” criterion, th e second as (2) a “relatio n al” one. The use of th e first criterion m akes us concentrate on the properties of things or phenom ena (in reg ard to w hich Spencer uses th e term “s tru c tu re ”); th e application of th e second attrac ts attention to the relationships existing betw een th e p a rts of those things or phenomena.
As far as th e “reistic” criterion is concerned we m ay say that:
36 The Principles of Sociology, op. cit.. p. 463. ” Ibid., p. 581.
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a) W hen applying the first criterion to th e analysis, for example, of “the unform ed social aggregat”, we m ay come to conclusion th a t it is composed of functionally un d ifferentiated biopsychical units and th a t it does not constitute o whole analogous to th a t form ed, say, by a biological organism, in regard to w hich th e term “stru c tu re ” m eant th e whole or the build. In th a t case, it becomes clear th a t the Spen cerian expressions “stru c tu re of social aggregate”, or “stru ctu re of trib e ” do not m ean th e whole nor th e build, th ey m ean only a discrete assem blage of u n its m aking up th e aggregate.
b) W hen Spencer speaks, for instance, of aggregated, differentiated, functionally interdependent biopsychical u nits w hich m ake up a social aggregate sensu largo, then th e term : “stru ctu re of social aggregate” pertains to a society understood as an organized ecological whole con sisting of these units, and the te rm “stru c tu re ”, in contradistinction to th e signification described in item (a), concerns th e organization of th a t whole, the organization of society.
c) W hen dealing w ith the organization of society, Spencer considers its great p arts and th eir properties, then the analyzis of th eir features leads us to the conclusion, th a t those great p arts should not be reg ar ded as ethnic, sta te or religious groups, b u t as social classes only. Such an understanding of these groups is determ ined by th e role which they play w ithin th e social division of labour, w ithin social functions con cerning defense and conservation of society, as w ell as satisfaction of its needs. Their v ery character shows th a t th ey are social groups sensu
stricto, described by Spencer in a general w ay as “social stru ctu res” .
In the second case, w hen the relations existing betw een the parts of things or phenom ena are regarded as th e criterion for distinguishing th e m eanings of th e te rm “stru c tu re ”, th e analysis of those relations enables us to grasp the differences betw een such meanings. The rela tions in question, both in reg ard to th e biological organism and to society, are of two kinds, nam ely spatial relations in literal or m eta phorical sense and dependence relations of various degrees. W hen S pencer analyzes, for instance, the biological organism from the view point of spatial relations as w ell as of functional dependences existing betw een its parts, the term “stru c tu re ”, as used in this case, means th e build of the organism. It is precisely th e spatial arrangem ent of func- tionally-correlated p a rts th a t determ ines th a t build. On th e other hand, w hen a set of co-existing elem ents bound by spatial ties, but devoid of functional dependences is considered, th e term “stru c tu re ” means in such a context a discrete arrangem ent of elements, and not the organization of a whole.
It is separately or jointly th a t these tw o criteria — properties and relationships — m ay be used for determ ining the m eanings of th e term “stru c tu re ” . The particu lar m eanings of th a t term can be singled out
S p en c er’s M eaning o f S tr u c tu r e 215
not only on the basis of a single criterion, for th e differences betw een them m ay p erta in to both criteria, w hich are often cross-ranged. Such an analysis does not exclude divergences in in terp retatio n resulting from th e lack of univocal term s in Spencer’s works.
The above analysis of contexts including th e te rm “s tru c tu re ” leads to th e conclusion, th a t in regard to biological organism Spencer uses th a t te rm in th e following meanings:
(1) of a com pound m aterial object — th e stru ctu re is an organ. (2) Of an object containing subordinate structures.
(3) In other contexts concerning th e biological organism , stru ctu re m eans the arran gem en t of p a rts or th e ir relationships, in other words, th e build of a given object.
In th e group of contexts w here the te rm “stru c tu re ” bears a social connotation, its m eaning can be the following:
(1) S tru ctu re concerns each arrangem ent of elem ents, characteristic of a given assemblage. The form er m ay be eith er (a) a lose arran g e m ent of u n d ifferentiated elem ents of social aggregate understood as a m ost eajrly stage of social developm ent, or (b) an arrang em en t of d ifferentiated elem ents bound b y ties of m u tual dependence and co- -operation, th a t is to say, an organized arrangem ent concerning th e organization of society or th e society itself.
(2) S tru ctu re concerns the differentiation of elem ents of a social assemblage.
(3) The term “stru c tu re ” is used likew ise in th e m eaning of social classes.
More th an th a t, Spencer uses th a t te rm interchangeably in place of th e concept “in stitu tio n ”, and he even som etim es indentifies it w ith rites or ru les of behaviour in society. Thus, in some m easure it is difficult to see clearly into th e m eaning of the context which, of course, should be variously understood according to th e sense ascribed to th a t m ultivocal term in various p arts of Spencer’s works.
IV
George G urvitch regards th e introduction of the te rm “s tru c tu re ” and th e p ertin en t enrichm ent of th e research tools of sociology as one of th e greatest m erits of Spencer, w hich is all th e greater, since his m eaning of th a t term is often m uch clearer th an th e one em ployed by contem porary A m erican sociologists who have introduced th a t v ery “significant and fru itfu l expression” into th e ir research w ork. In th e light of in terp retatio n al difficulties caused by th e te rm “stru c tu re ” in its present-d ay applications, th e w ords “m uch clearer” used by G. G ur vitch are not equivalent to saying th a t Spencer’s use of it is quite clear to the form er. For G urvitch adm its th a t, w ith th e above A m erican
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authors, i.e., w ith T. Parsons, R. K. M erton and their followers, one comes across th e sam e confusion of ideas and th e same difficulties as characterize th e ir source, th a t is, Spencer’s works. This confusion con sists in blending of stru ctu re s w ith procedures, rites and social regula tions, and even w ith institutions. 39
The question of logical consistence of Spencer’s conception is dealt w ith nowadays by other authors. W erner S tark charges Spencer w ith an inconsequent interp retatio n of th e concept of so ciety ;40 he points out, among others, th a t Spencer in The Principles of Sociology regards societjy as “a u n ity ra th e r th a n a p lu ra lity ”, and in T he Man Versus
the State — as “a plu rality ra th e r than a u n ity ” 41.
v
It seems necessary, in conclusion, to consider w hat is the present significance of th e Spencerian conception of structure. Such considera tions w ill be confined here to the school of functionalism which, as stated above, m akes th e concept “stru c tu re ” the centre of its theoreti cal system. A lthough th ere exist m any inspirers of functionalism who have been found out by th e historians of sociology or indicated by certain functionalists, Don M artindale, w hile describing positivist orga- nicists as “the tru e founders of functionalism ”, 42 emphasizes th a t the m^ain soujrce of inspiration for this tre n d is to be looked for in the conceptions created by th e founders of th a t science and pursued, to some ex ten t or other, by th e rep resen tativ es of differen t schools active in the n ineteenth and tw entieth centuries u n der th e influence of Comte and Spencer. T hat is w hy th e works of those continuators, especially of D urkheim , Cooley, Thom as and Pareto, are im portant, b u t only indirect links connecting positivist organicism w ith functionalism . While recognizing the position of Don M artindale and th a t of T im ash eff43 as
39 “Une source oubliée des concepts de “structure sociale”... Ibid., p. 120. 40 W. S t a r k : H erbert Spencer’s Three Sociologies. “A m erican Sociological R ev iew ” 1961, vol. 26.
41 One could say, in fact, that things are going still worse, because th e tw o contradictory and (according to Stark) irréconciliable positions, n am ely the organic and th e in dividu alistic one, appear already in th e first volum e o f The Principles of Sociology. N evertheless, Spencer w ho reconciles both positions seem s to be on ly apparently inconsequent. This is more evident if w e do not overlook the m ost significant of his positions, nam ely, the evolution al approach to society and to its organization.
, When studying society from th e evolu tion al angle, Spencer com bined the tw o follow in g aspects: on the one hand, he analyzed th e developing unity comparable w ith biological organism s and on the other, the plurality determ ining th e character o f that developm ent. Only when combined, th ese tw o aspects m ade up the proper picture o f social dynam ics.
42 Don M a r t i n d a l e : The Natu re and T yp e s of Sociological Theory. London 1961, p. 448.
43 N. S. T i m a s h e f f : Sociological Theory, its Nature and G row th. N ew York 1957, p. 221.
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reasonable, we should m ake a brief attem p t at confronting d irectly th e conceptions of Spencer w ith those of the functionalists.
From Spencer’s conceptual heritage, th e above school took over, first of all, the idea of the organic system as an explanatory model, recognizing it, as the intellectual foundation of functional theory in sociology, and perform ing a broad generalisation of th e system as com pared w ith Spencer’s ideas. This was m ade easier owing to th e fact, th a t this school had adopted as its methodological foundation th e con ception of a closed system, strictly speaking, th e conception of the p lu rality of relatively isolated systems of w hich re a lity is composed. The said conception had been proposed by Znaniecki whose book, The
Polish Peasant, passed for the first significant w ork of functionalist
trend. 44 Each of the above-m entioned “isolated system s”, “is composed of lim ited num ber of elem ents more intim ately in ter-related w ith one another than w ith any objects which do not belong to the System, and each possessing a specific in tern al stru c tu re which isolates it in certain respects from external influences”. 45 This stru ctu re is understood by Znaniecki as a “lim ited system ”, as an in tern al order, owing to w hich those interdependent elements, most in tim ately connected w ith one another, m ake up a system.
W ithin this conception of stru cture, the following theses seem to be of basic character:
1. S tru ctu re is a condition of the existence of the system conceived as a whole.
2. The relationships betw een the elem ents of th e system are those of a p articu la rly close interdependence. Thus th e isolation of th e system is not an absolute one, and it m ay be said, th a t relations of a less in tim ate dependence are form ed on the surroundings of th e system.
3. The characteristics of th e system ’s elem ents is as im p o rtan t for th e system ’s analysis as th e explanation of the principle ordering those elem ents and “building” it as a whole.
In this conception of a closed system, one can easily find th e fea tu res of the Spencerian understanding of stru ctu re in the sense of th e build of biological organisms.
In the idea of social structure, proposed by M eyer Fortes, rep resen ting th e m odern school of functionalism in social anthropology, we encounter, too, the same elem ents of the Spencerian understanding of s tru c tu re .46
44 Ibid., p. 223.
45 The M ethod of Sociology. N ew York 1934, p. 12 (quoted after D. M a r t i n - d a 1 e, op. cit., p. 468).
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On th e other hand, w hen Parsons describes th e stru ctu re of social system as its differentiation according to th e roles played by th e in teg rated units, 47 th e resem blance to one of the above-analyzed Spen cerian m eanings of th e term “s tru c tu re ” seems to be a far-reaching one, w ith th e m ere reservation th a t th e term “social system ” in P a r son’s conception m ay be, b ut need not be equivalent to th e term “society” as Spencer understood it. For, thanks to th e system ’s gene ralization we had spoken of, each whole conceptionally isolated from the reality , according to R adcliffe-B row n’s definition, constitutes a social system as conceived by functionalists. Parsons, consequently, ascribes the character of th e social system not only to the society con ceived as a whole, b ut also to every assemblage composed of in te r acting units, th a t is, to fam ilies and other social groups, to offices, enterprises, armies, political parties, universities, hospitals. They all constitute, p arts of a w ider system , th a t is, of society. In any case they concern integ rated and differentiated wholes, and th e v ery dif ferentiation of these wholes constitutes, according to Parsons, a stru c tu re in th e wide com prehension of th e term .
Social structure, according to A. Radcliffe-Brown, is “an arran ge m ent of persons in in stitu tio nally controlled or defined relationships” 48. It is not h ard to see, here, a resem blance to y et another comprehension of th e te rm “stru c tu re ” b y Spencer. We know th a t he understood the stru ctu re of social aggregate, deprived of organizational bonds, as a discrete arrang em en t of units. I t m ay be said by analogy th a t th e “stru c tu re of society” as an organized whole should have its counter p a rt in an arrangem ent of individuals characterized by institutionally controlled or defined relationships, according to th e definition of Rad cliffe-Brown.
Those exam ples show, th a t th ere are some affiliations betw een con tem porary conceptions of stru ctu re as suggested by the functionalists and Spencer’s ideas. A t the same tim e, those exam ples show th e im p o rtan t role played by Spencer in inspiring certain schools of sociology and anthropology during the tw entieth century.
47 The Social System . London 1952, p. 114.
48 A Natural Science of Society. London 1952, p. 5 (quoted after Dorothy E m m e t : Function, Purpose and Powers. London 1958, p. 23.
