The influence of environmental in's and out's on the reliability of diesel equipped installations

DES MACHINES A COMBUSTION

20th INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMBUSTION ENGINES

THE INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL

IN'S AND OUTS ON THE RELIABILITY OF

DIESEL EQUIPPED INSTALLATIONS

by

P Kloppenburg

Techno Fysica by, The Netherlands

ON COMBUSTION ENGINES

LONDON 1993

© CIMAC 1993

THE INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IN'S AND OUT'S ON THE RELIABILITY OF DIESEL EQUIPPED INSTALLATIONS

P. KLOPPENBURG General Manager Techno Fysica by

Barendrecht, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT

In _{15 years of experience in the field of trouble}

shooting it became clear that installations, equipped _with

in itself totally reliable components, can get a reputation

of unreliability due to environmental influences _totally

out of reach of the manufacturers.

These boundary conditions may concern governing of the installation, _{exceptional operating conditions, vibratory}

behaviour or matching of the components of the driveline to

eachother.

Often these boundary conditions lead to premature

failure of components in the driveline for which the engine

manufacturer gets the blame because it is the engine

produ-cing the power and therefore the forces and _vibrations.

Many of these mismatches can be prevented by creating

an intensive exchange of information between the

manufactu-rers of different components that add up to form the final installation.

However, in most cases these coordinating task _{rests with}

the yard who often doesn't have the time or the knowledge

necessary to cope with this task.

An independent expert engineering company is often rejected due to high cost and annoying interference.

commissioning or in service caused by off-design operating

conditions, mismatch of

components, insufficient

knowledge

of

installation's

dynamic behaviour, no communication

between separate

component

manufacturers and lack of

know-how concerning real operating conditions in practice.

RESUME

kendant 15 annees d'experience dans la domaine de

problemes

concernant

des installations maritimes c'est evident pie des installations avec des pieces qui sont en

soi completement fiable peut obtenir une reputation

ties

mauvais, par suite de

circonstances

completement en dehors

de la sphere d'influence du fabricant.

Ces

circonstances

peut s'agir de la regulation, des condi-tions operationels extraordinaires, des vibracondi-tions ou dela cooperation imparfait entre des composantes.

Tres souvent ces

circonstances

ont abouti

a

manquer

prema-ture des composantes pour lesquels le fabricant est impute .parce que c'est son moteur qui produit la puissance et par

consequent des forces et des vibrations.

Beaucoup de ces problemes peut etre prevenir par order uhe

atmosphere de l'echange

d'information

entre les fabricants

des composantes qui foment

l'installation

entier.

Normalement le chantier est le responsable pour ca coordi-nation mais le chantier n'as ni du temps, ni lmexpertise pour remplir ca tache.

Un expert independant est souvent refuse a cause des frals

hauts et de la peine ennuyeux.

Dans ma

presentation

ja veux donner des exemples pratiques

de tous les jours par rapport a des installations avec des

problemes pendant les epreuves maritimes ou durant l'usage, cause par une gestion extraordinaire, connaissance

insuffi-sante de la conduite dynamique, manque de la

communication

entre fabricants et manque de la

connaissance

de la

-3-INTRODUCTION

In spite of total quality control programs, as ISO 9000, being introduced more and more with manufacturers and in spite of all the rules set and supervised by the classi-fication societies lots of

installations

are far from being perfect.

This often results in problems which sometimes manifest

themselves already during the first seatrials or might lead to reduced lifetime of components which becomes clear after

a certain amount of

running

_{hours, much shorter than}

expec-ted.

Often these problems could have been prevented by

appropriate measures during the engineering-, the completi-on- and the trial stage by the responsible parties.

However, "responsible party" seems to have a flexible meaning when problems arise during commissioning or in the guarantee period.

The attitude the authors are often confronted with _during

trouble shooting is one of _{selfprotection where every}

manufacturer only attempts to prove that his

_component

is

not the cause of the problem instead of trying _{to find a}

solution by combining the efforts.

The shipyard, usually the main responsible for the

entire installation, shelters itself behind the fact that

everything has been constructed according _{to- and checked}

by the classification societies.

As classification societies will undoubtedly confirm,

following their rules to the letter is no guarantee for an

unproblematic installation; sound engineering _{judgment by}

qualified personnel is needed just as well.

However, appointing somebody, be it a project engineer of

the yard, the engine manufacturer _{or an independent party}

to perform the system engineering will cost time and money. They will ask lots of time consuming questions, _{will demand} additional calculations to be carried out, _especially

concerning interaction between

_components,

_{and will insist}

that extra measurements are performed during _an

already-chock-full trial program.

Therefore appointing _{system engineers is often eagerly}

avoided.

In the following some practical _{examples out of many}

with different causes will be _{presented of installations}

that revealed unexpected problems _{which,in most cases,}

could have been prevented.

The authors hope to convince the maritime _{industry of the}

need for system engineers to decrease _{our number of bad}

PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF PROBLEMATIC INSTALLATIONS

Off-design operating conditions

The authors were involved in the following case:

A pipe laying barge was equipped with six 16-cylinder

generatorsets providing the necessary power to the barge. The time between overhaul of the exhaust valves was reduced to 3000 hours which means that every year 384 valves had to be renewed because inlet valves were renewed at the same time.

This leads to a considerable increase in maintenance cost.

Daring the investigation it became clear that there were heavy deposits present on the valves and that the

valve heads were bent.

Also the inlet- and exhaust ducts were fully covered with a thick layer of deposits.

It was decided to measure several parameters which

influence air exchange and combustion under realistic operating conditions.

From the measurements it followed that the operating profi-le of the barge was as follows:

During welding of the pipes the barge is stationed and

the positioning winches are stalled which means the

generatorsets only deliver power for welding, hydrau-lic power and lights resulting in only 30% load on the engines.

If the pipe is eased off the barge is pulled forward by the winches which requires 60% load on the engines.

This load is also required under adverse weather

conditions to keep the necessary tension on the pipe to prevent buckling.

This kind

of

load is called "Spiking" and results in

block loads on the engines from 30% to 60% load.

As this installation is about 20 years old the transient

response on block loads, especially from low load, is poor. It became clear that the engines were constantly fouling under low load and were suffering from an enormous lack of air during transients resulting in high temperatures and an even worse amount of soot deposits.

Also the engine speeddip was high and response slow with

the risk of tripping the engine on low frequency (Fig. 1). From discussions with the crew it became clear that in

the old days they shared the load over less engines but

they decided to use more engines to diminish the risk of a black-out due to engines tripping.

But in practice the risk of an engine tripping was just as high because of the low load and the slow response.

The authors advised to run the least amount of engines,

possible to increase base-load, which was met with much

opposition from the crew, and to install air-injection

triggered by the fuel rack to increase transient behaviour. These advices were observed which resulted in a decrease of response speed to 40% (fig. 1) and after a season of pipe laying no problems were encountered and valves were in good condition.

This was not purely an engine problem but an operatio-nal problem.

Just analysing the problem logically instead of acting

according to intuition could have saved the company about

2000 valves.

Mismatch of components

The authors were asked to perform shaftpower

measure-ments on a twin screw patrol boat which was designed to

achieve 21 knots at an output of 4860 kW .

The vessel only achieved 19 knots on deep water at design draught.

Usually this is the point were the yard blames the

engine manufacturer that the engines don't deliver the

desired horsepower, the engine manufacturer blames the _yard

for building a boat which is to heavy or is calculated to.

enthousiastically and the propeller manufacturer is accused

of having provided propellers with not enough pitch.

Simple shp measurements showed that the engines

deli-vered 115% of rated output at rated enginespeed (fig. 2).

This showed that the design of the vessel with calculated speed was to optimistic.

If the engines had only been capable of delivering _rated

power the speed would have been even lower.

The vessel was equipped with extra trimming devices,

resul-ting in 20.7 knots at rated engine _{power and -speed.}

Suitable calculations and model tests would have prevented this problem.

Another example of mismatch was found during

measure-ments on a bow thruster that didn't deliver _{the desired}

thrust.

From power measurements it was concluded that the propeller was slipping over the shaft (fig. 3).

The propeller manufacturer didn't believe this and changed over to another type of propeller (3 instead of 4-bladed)

which resulted in even lower power and thrust.

Carefully studying results of _{measurements and}

trus-ting in experts would have lead to better _results.

-5-Lack of communication between suppliers

On a number of containerships repeated damages occurred on each of the three dieselgeneratorsets.

The damages ranged from broken ancillaries like filters, pipes, braces, pumps and coolers to broken down main bea-rings.

The diesel, together with the generator, was mounted on a skidframe which was connected to the ship structure through rubber mounts.

The manufacturer had calculated natural frequencies for the resilient mounting and concluded that no natural frequency of the set-up would be excited by engine generated frequen-cies near nominal speed.

The engine ran at 750 rpm resulting in 1st order vibrations of 12.5 Hz and ½th order vibrations of 6.25 Hz (Misfiring).

The most important natural frequency was 8 Hz which is

about /2 removed from both exciting frequencies.

During commissioning with only the generatorsets running the vibration levels were well within limits.

However, during measurements by the authors it was

concluded that the 30000 kW main propulsion plant, running at 95 rpm, created a frequency of 7.9 Hz at a considerable amplitude through the 5 bladed propeller (Fig. 4).

As this frequency coincided with the vertical natural

frequency of the generatorsets this resulted in vibration levels upto 80 mm/s on

running

as well as stopped engines.

This was especially detrimental on stopped engines because these had no oilfilm between main bearings and

crankshaft, resulting in hammering and consequential dama-ge.

Checking the generated frequencies

on

board from other sources than their own diesels would have prevented damage.

Lack of knowledge of real operating conditions

On several Dutch fishing cutters in the power range

from 1500 to 2000 kW a reduced service life of the elastic

couplings between engine and reduction gearbox was

expe-rienced down to 30 or 20% of usual values.

According to calculations and measurements the torsio-nal vibratory load on the rubber elements only amounted to

25 to 40% of the continuous allowable level.

During misfiring however, the vibratory torque amounted to 175% of the allowable level and heat load to 340% (Fig.5).

For this reason a barred speed range was imposed if misfit

The manufacturers of engine and coupling believed that misfiring was a rare thing to occur and that, if it would occur, the fishermen would observe the barred speed range. According to the experience of the authors, based on measu-rements of approximately 150 cutters, the load on the engi-nes is very heavy at all times.

The fishermen use 100% power and if possible 120% which

often leads to burnt- or sticking valves or injectors.

Most of them do not respect barred speed ranges under the motto: less power means less fish.

this implies that sailing under misfiring conditions with overloaded elastic couplings occurs during longer periods in practice, destroying the rubber elements.

Based on this experience it was decided by the coupling

manufacturer to advice a coupling type which would _also

under continuous misfiring not be overloaded.

Example 2: A luxury yacht of 28 m, equipped with two

16 cylinder engines turning out 1080 kW a piece at 2300 rpm

experienced heavy vibrations on the engines and _{in the}

accomodation after the _{cardanshafts between engine and}

gearbox had been removed and reinstalled _{on the flywheel.}

The vibrations were so severe that complete ceiling _panels

fell down which is annoying, especially _{on a yacht.}

The suspicion rose that unbalance could be the _cause

al-though all parts had been balanced and _{were fitted in}

exactly the same position as before.

Vibration measurements confirmed that the high

vibra-tion level was caused by _{an unbalance, resulting in an}

additional vibration level of 63 mm/s (o-peak).

However, only a small amount of weight had to _{be added to}

reduce the unbalance vibration component to 4 mm/s.

The main cause _{for the excessive response of the}

engine to a small unbalance was the location of a resonance

frequency (yawing) of the engine _{on its elastic mounts of}

38 Hz which exactly coincided with the first order

excita-tion frequency caused by unbalance at _{nominal speed.}

The designer of the elastic supports _{knew this frequency}

was existing but presumed the shafts fitted to the _flywheel

would be well balanced and would _{retain the same degree of}

balance when being dismounted and _refitted.

Judging of the calculated resonance frequencies by a vibra-tion expert with practical experience would have resulted

in an advice to shift this _{frequency away from the first}

order at nominal speed.

Figure 6 shows the vibration _{response as}

_a

_{function of}

engine speed before and after _balancing.

-7-Insufficient knowledge

of

system dynamic behaviour

A series of vessels was equipped with a main engine

coupled to a reduction gearbox equipped with a PTO genera-tor.

During manoeuvring this 200 kW generator was only used to

power the bow thruster which was of a constant pitch and

constant speed design.

In service the rubber couplings between gearbox and

PTO generator tended to deteriorate much faster than expec-ted: the usefull lifetime amounted to around 1 year.

The electric circuitry between generator and thruster motor operated as follows:

When the thruster is started the PTO generator

cur-rent, and consequently torque, rises rapidly.

If a preset adjustable current level is reached an

adjustable shunt resistor is connected, resulting in a decrease in current to a lower, constant level.

The current setting determines peak torque, the shunt resistor determines mean torque during acceleration. In this phase the thruster speed increases.

After a certain time span, set by an adjustable time relais, the resistor is disconnected.

At this point the full torque is available to further accelerate the thruster.

The peak torque at this stage depends on the speed the thruster reached during the preceding phase.

All these settings are interrelated, determine rate of acceleration of the thruster and torque levels on the PTO elastic couplings.

The actual effect of the settings on absolute torque- and acceleration levels, however, was totally unknown to the installer of the system.

During commissioning several elastic couplings

ruptu-red within minutes while changing settings by trial and

error only brought small improvements.

The authors measured PTO input torque and speed,

bowthrus-ter speed and main engine fuel rack during normal operating conditions.

Dynamic- as well as peak torque overload was found (Fig.7). Also the setting on different ships showed big differences.

Based on these measurement results optimal settings

could be established to ensure acceptable acceleration and thrust and keep torque levels within limits.

Measuring during first trials would have saved a lot

of

-9--Interaction between governors and vibratory behaviour

In the last five years the authors were confronted

with a large number of problems, often with extensive

damage to components, caused by unwanted interaction

be-tween electronic governors and vibratory behaviour of

propulsion systems.

Electronic governors are often regarded as wonders of technology, suited to govern every installation regardless of complexity due to its versatility and the possibility to

adjust dynamic characteristic to almost every process.

However, this multitude of possibilities at the same time

requires very painstaking studies of the interaction

be-tween governor, system and environment as will be clear

from the following three examples.

Example 1: A straddlecarrier, used to transport

con-tainers around a depot, showed vehement dynamic behaviour

of the power plant which made

it _{almost impossible to}

operate.

The engine, equipped with an electronic governor, was

coupled to a generator with additional flywheel through a

rubber coupling.

The inertia of the generator with flywheel was 12 times _as

high as the engine inertia.

The governor used two speed pick-ups: one for the overspeed

function located at the generator flywheel and one for

governing which was located on the engine flywheel.

From measurements

_{it became clear that due to the}

relatively high inertia of the generator compared to the

engine every loadchange of the generator resulted in

exces-sive torsional amplitudes at the engine flywheel.

This excited the first node torsional frequency which _the

governor tries to compensate.

The system was improved by putting the governor

pick-up on the generator which showed much _{smaller dynamic}

amplitudes than

the engine.

The governor therefore measured much smaller

speedvariati-ons and reacted less vehement as seen from figure 8.

Example 2: _{A vessel was equipped with three diesel}

generatorsets, two of 3200 kW and one of 4200 kW, providing all power necessary.

The engines were equipped with state of the art electronic governors and a newly developed sophisticated power manage-ment system.

During the official seatrial with _{80 people on board two}

flexible couplings were torn apart within _{less than a}

During testtrials suddenly, without any clear reason, two engines started to develop torsional vibrations with dyna-mic torques that exceeded allowable levels by 500%.

This could only be stopped by manual shutdown of the engi-nes.

After extensive measurements it was concluded that

electric interference on the supply voltage to the gover-nors caused the fuelrack to be reduced to zero within 0.03

seconds (Fig. 9).

This immediately excited the first node resonance frequency for torsion resulting in high alternating speed variations of the engine flywheel of 3.5 Hz.

The governor, with speed pick-ups on the flywheel, tried to compensate, leading to an undamped situation.

Another phenomenon was that immediately after the fuel

rack of one engine had zeroed another engine followed

because of the master-slave

configuration.

The system has improved dramatically by using a stabi-lised galvanically separated supply voltage for the gover-nors to prevent interference.

At the same time the speed pick-up was mounted on the

generatorside where possible angular irregularities due to torsional vibrations are 5 times lower than on the flywheel

resulting in a less vigorous governor action.

Example 3: A tugboat with two propulsion plants had

two resilliently mounted engines coupled to gearboxes through highly flexible couplings.

The engines tended to show visually high amplitude

move-ments which were unacceptable to the owner.

These movements started at arbitrary engine speeds with

declutched engines and could only be stopped by

manual

shutdown (Figure 10).

They didn't seem to be related to a specific engine order. After measurements of engine movement, torque,

gover-nor vibration and fuelrack the following was established:

The engine had a natural rolling frequency on the rubber mounts of 6.3 Hz which was noted in all measured

parame-ters.

This frequency caused rotation of the engine crankcase

(with governor pick-ups) around the crankshaft centerline.

Because the crankshaft was rotating fairly uniformly the

governor, experienced speedvariations of the pick-up relati-ve to the flywheel and compensated for it which wasn't to difficult due to the 200 pulses per revolution.

This caused a resonance, resulting in the engine movements

This could also be seen from the movement of the

fuelrod relative to the governor housing: as soon as the engine started vibrating the fuelrod moved in antiphase with its housing but as soon as the engine was shut down

the fuel rod moved in phase with the housing.

The problem was cured by mounting the engines rigidly to the ship foundation which was fairly radical.

It prevents engine movement but introduces vibrations into the ship which is unwanted.

Instead the pick-ups should have been relocated to a shaft-part with uniform rotational speed.

CONCLUSIONS

Although rules and quality assurance programs have

become more widely spread for

_components

this is not the

case for entire systems.

No clearly defined rules by classification societies

exist concerning interactions between

_governing

behaviour

and dynamic response of systems, including influences from

the

environment.

This often results in problems and damage during trials or

in reduced lifecycle of installations.

To improve the present situation, the end-responsible

for the entire system, mostly the yard, should appoint a

system engineer who speciffically deals with interactions between separate systems.

At the same time the classification societies should try to

compose rules giving clearly defined requirements to be

fulfilled to prove the acceptability of the design _{from a}

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