Affirmative action in the United States versus positive action in the European Union : comparative analysis

Tereza Skarková

Affirmative action in the United

States versus positive action in the

European Union : comparative

analysis

Studia Prawnoustrojowe nr 16, 211-226

2012

Tereza Skarkova

D ep artm en t of C onstitutional and Public In te rn atio n a l Law Palacky U niversity in Olomouc

Affirmative action in the United States

versus positive action in the European Union

- comparative analysis*

D e fin in g a ffir m a tiv e / p o s itiv e a c tio n o n th e b a sis o f th e m o d e l o f e q u a lity a p p lie d

The concept of affirm ative/ positive action is w ithout question a very controversial issue, w hich can be evidenced by p e rsiste n t debates as to its m erits both in legal and political circles. It is widely know n th a t affirm ative action originated in th e U nited S tates in a reaction to the deep racial divi­ sions caused by th e centuries of system ic discrim ination of Black Am ericans. Therefore th e response to such stru c tu ra lly ingrained racial discrim ination had to be adequately strong, as it was clear th a t th e situ a tio n can be am elio­ rate d only th roug h bold, system ic m ea su res1. However, not surprisingly, affirm ative action plans becam e im m ediately confronted w ith th e principles of equal tre a tm e n t and non-discrim ination, therefore it did not tak e long before th ey appeared in front of th e Suprem e Court of th e U nited States.

B ut before I tu rn to th e concept of affirm ative/positive action or legal grounds and case-law rela tin g to th is area, I consider it useful to point out th a t the perception of th is concept differs significantly depending on w hat approach to eq u ality we take. T here are several ways how to differentiate betw een th e models of equality, b u t for the purposes of th is article I will follow th e stru c tu re used by Olivier De S ch u tter2. Firstly, we can disting uish th e concept of form al equality, w hich basically am ounts to a rig h t not to be discrim inated against. However, equal tre a tm e n t by definition does not im ­

* T h is a rtic le w a s c re a te d a s a p a r t o f u n iv e rs ity s tu d e n t p ro ject “A n ti-d is c rim in a tio n law a n d th e m a rg in o f a p p re c ia tio n d o c trin e ” (PF_2011_002).

1 M.A. D ru m b l, J.D .R . C ra ig , A ffir m a tiv e A c tio n in Q uestion: A C oherent Theory fo r S ec ­

pose an obligation to ensu re a proportionate rep re sen ta tio n of the different segm ents of th e population. Secondly, th e prohibition of discrim ination m ay extend to a model of equality which involves th e prohibition of d isp arate im pact discrim ination (also know n as indirect discrim ination). In th is case, m easures w hich disproportionately an d negatively im pact on already u n d e r­ rep re sen te d groups should be revised, u nless they are found to pu rsu e a legitim ate aim by app ro priate and necessary m eans. Only th e n we arrive to a th ird model, th a t of affirm ative equality, whose aim is to improve the rep re sen ta tio n of c e rtain groups in th e areas or a t th e levels w here they are u n d errep resen ted. Only u n d er th is model we go beyond th e situ a tio n w here discrim inatory rules, policies or practices are “m erely” outlaw ed, and m ore­ over seek a fair share of social goods am ong th e diverse groups composing society3.

This distinction is closely connected w ith the aim of th e respective body of law. It needs to be answ ered w h eth er it m ainly seeks to protect all individuals from being d iscrim inated against, or w h eth er it r a th e r seeks to en su re an equal rep re sen ta tio n of th e diverse social groups in different sectors of society, w hich m ay finally lead to a roughly equal d istribution of all social goods am ong those groups4. In oth er words, th ere is a n a ltern ativ e betw een form al and substantive equality. Moreover, w ith reg ard to employ­ m ent, for instance, choice h as to be m ade also betw een in sistin g on equal tre a tm e n t in th e recru itm en t process, so th a t th e chances of all are equal (equality of opportunities) and in sistin g on equal tre a tm e n t in th e allocation of jobs, so th a t all groups are roughly rep resen ted in each sector (equality of resu lts)5. L ast b u t not least, th e above m entioned models of equality differ in th e visibility or invisibility of th e “suspect” characteristics of individuals, w hich m ay give rise to discrim inatory tre a tm e n t. According to De Schutter, th e choice to tak e th ese tra its into account m ay be justified by th e desire to move from a negative approach to equality to a positive approach. The negative approach is to be understood as a prohibition to commit acts of discrim ination, w hereas th e positive approach should be seen as an obliga­ tion to affirm atively prom ote equality, which can be done in various forms th ro u g h different m easu res6.

Defining affirm ative/positive action itse lf is not easy, especially tak in g into account th a t even in th e U nited S tates, i.e. th e cradle of th e concept, th ere exists no uniform definition of affirm ative action. However, thro u gh

2 O. De S chutter, Three M odels o f E q u a lity a n d E uropean A n ti-d isc rim in a tio n L a w , “N o rth e rn I r e la n d L egal Q u a rte rly ” 2006, no 1(57).

3 Ib id em , p. 4. 4 Ib id em , p. 1. 5 Ib id em , p. 2. 6 Ib id em , pp. 2 -3 .

alm ost forty years of actions by th e Congress, th e courts, and num erous p residents, it has generally come to be understood as “voluntary an d m an d a ­ tory efforts u n d e rta k e n by the federal, sta te , an d local governm ents, private employers, and schools to combat discrim ination and to prom ote equal oppor­ tu n ity in education and em ploym ent for all”7. Or in oth er words, it can be said th a t in th e U n ited S ta te s th e te rm affirm ative action desig nates “a special kind of an tid iscrim in atio n policies, which involves preferen tial tre a tm e n t of persons belonging to disadvantaged groups or women in hiring, adm issions to universities or governm ent contracting”8.

Likewise, th e E uropean U nion also does not have one official definition of positive action, however it can be derived e.g. from th e original Equal T reatm ent D irective9 th a t “th e concept of positive action em braces all m e­ asures which aim to counter th e effects of p a st discrim ination, to elim inate existing discrim ination and to prom ote equality of opportunity”10. A ltern a ti­ vely, the term positive action defines “proportionate m easures u n d e rta k en w ith th e purpose of achieving full an d effective equality in practice for m em ­ bers of groups th a t are socially or economically disadvantaged, or otherwise face the consequences of p ast or p resent discrim ination or disadvan tag e”11.

F u rth erm o re, positive action comes in m any forms. From th e legal point of view, a m ain distinction lies betw een forms of positive action w hich do not pose a risk of discrim ination ag ain st th e m em bers of th e group which the action does not benefit, and th e forms w hich do create such a ris k 12. In general, the term positive action includes program s designed to counteract th e effects of p a st discrim ination an d to en su re equal opportunities, such as recru itm en t policies which ensu re th a t job advertisem ents reach potential ethnic m inority candidates (e.g. advertising in m other-tongue publications of p a rticu la r m inority groups)13. According to De Schutter, “such m easures,

7 L. J e n n in g s , C o m p a riso n o f A ffir m a tiv e A c tio n in the E u ro p e a n U nion a n d U nited

S ta te s , “M u ltic u ltu ra lis m P a p e r ” M ay 2005, p. 1, a t <h ttp ://w w w .to leran ce.c z/co u rses/m u lticu l-

tu ra lis m /e s s a y s /la u re e n .d o c >.

8 J . R in g elh e im , D iv er sity a n d E q u a lity : A n A m b ig u o u s R e la tio n s h ip . R eflectio n s on the

U S C ase L a w on A ffir m a tiv e A ctio n in H ig h e r E d u c a tio n , “E u ro p e a n D iv e rsity a n d A uto n o m y

P a p e r s ” 2006, no 4, p. 2, a t <h ttp ://w w w .e u ra c .e d u /e n /re se a rc h /in s titu te s/im r/a c tiv itie s /B o o k s e - ries /e d ap /D o c u m en ts/2 0 0 6 _ e d ap 0 4 .p d f>.

9 C ouncil D irectiv e 76/207/E E C o f 9 .02.1976 on th e im p le m e n ta tio n of th e p rin cip le of e q u a l t r e a tm e n t for m e n a n d w o m en a s re g a rd s access to e m p lo y m en t, v o c atio n al tr a in in g a n d p ro m o tio n , a n d w o rk in g co nditions.

10 L. J e n n in g s , op. cit., p. 1.

11 E u ro p e a n C om m ission, In te r n a tio n a l P erspectives on P o sitive A ctio n M ea su res - A C o m ­

p a r a tiv e A n a ly s is in th e E u ro p ea n U nion, C a n a d a , the U n ited S ta te s a n d S o u th A fric a , 2009, p.

6, a t <h t tp : / /e c .e u r o p a .e u / s o c i a l / m a i n .j s p ? c a t I d = 7 3 8 & l a n g I d = e n & p u b I d = 1 8 0 & f u r t h e r - P u b s = y e s>.

12 O. De S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 33.

13 E u ro p e a n N e tw o rk A g a in s t R acism , F a ct S h e e t 3 5 - P o sitive A ctio n , 2008, p. 5, a t <h ttp ://c m s.h o ru s.b e /files/9 9 9 3 5 /M ed iaA rch iv e/p d f/F S 3 5 % 2 0 -% 2 0 P o sitiv e % 2 0 ac tio n .p d f>.

although they d em onstrate a w illingness to go beyond a non-discrim ination policy in order to achieve a b e tte r balance w ithin th e workforce, are not forms of »preferential treatm en t« w hich m ay be construed as a derogation from the req u irem en t of form al equ ality ”14. However, th e practice of quotas or set-asides, w h ether rigid15 or flexible16, or tak in g into account group m em bership as p a rt of diversity plans by settin g certain targ e ts to be achie­ ved, m ay be seen as con stitu tin g such a derogation17. It is th is m ost contro­ v ersial m ethod used w hich becam e eq u ated w ith th e term “affirm ative ac­ tion”, m ore commonly used in th e U nited S tates, an d which evokes ra th e r negative connotations (“reverse” or “positive” discrim ination). N evertheless, as well as positive action in th e E uro pean Union, affirm ative action in the U nited S tates utilizes a range of m ethods and is not lim ited to q u o tas18.

Indeed, th e objective p u rsu ed u n d e r th e model of affirm ative equality m ay be inconsistent w ith th e objective of non-discrim ination. T h a t is because affirm ative equality tak es into account cases w here the application of n e u ­ tra l rules or procedures does not fulfill the objective of en suring a fair d istrib u tio n of social goods am ong different groups of the population. Then th e full realization of equality req u ires fu rth e r steps, w hich m ay imply tr e ­ atin g differently individuals due to th e ir m em bership in certain groups defi­ n ed by “suspect” ch aracteristics they p re se n t19. Critics of th is concept, as for in stance A m erican scholar M orris Abram, argue th a t it is a m istake to abandon th e m erit principle in favor of a system w hich allocates social goods according to personal ch aracteristics such as race. In A bram ’s view, th e laws sim ply cannot be in te rp re te d to support both color-blindness for some citi­ zens an d color-consciousness for others as th e two approaches are m utually exclusive20. On th e contrary, o th er au th o rs argue th a t equal tre a tm e n t of those w ith differential levels of ad vantage can cem ent and reinforce inequ­ ality. Therefore they consider it necessary th a t th e conceptual u n d erstan d in g of equality and non-discrim ination moves to recognize stru c tu ra l or in s titu ­ tional forms of discrim ination, w hich are usually not covered by trad itio n al prohibitions and require more proactive tools including positive action21.

A ffirm ative/ positive action is especially brought into th e discussion be­ cause of the fact th a t it can place th e b u rden on th e S tate, r a th e r th a n the

14 O. D e S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 33.

15 T he re s e rv a tio n o f a specified p e rc e n ta g e o f p lac es to th e m em b e rs o f u n d e rre p re s e n te d gro u p s.

16 P r e fe re n tia l t r e a tm e n t of a c a n d id a te b e lo n g in g to th e u n d e r-re p re s e n te d categ o ry w h e re th e c o m p e tin g c a n d id a te s a re e q u a lly q u alified .

17 O. D e S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 33.

18 E u ro p e a n N e tw o rk A g a in s t R acism , F a ct S h e e t 35..., p. 5. 19 O. D e S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 4.

20 M.A. D ru m b l, J.D .R . C ra ig , op. cit., pp. 8 6 -8 7 .

individual to tak e a proactive approach and prev ent discrim ination (“for­ ward-looking” ratio nale)2 2. U nder this model affirm ative action serves as a tool to prom ote diversity or proportionate rep resen tatio n , both in sectors and a t levels w here it is suitable th a t all th e sub-groups of th e com m unity are fairly represented. This ratio n ale is cu rren tly followed e.g. by th e U.S. Suprem e Court. However, w ith reg ard to its (in)com patibility w ith th e req u ­ irem en ts of th e principle of equal tre a tm e n t affirm ative action policies m ay be introduced in an oth er two ways. “Backward-looking” ratio n ale considers affirm ative action to be a com pensatory m easure, w hich is designed to over­ come th e legacy of some p a st discrim ination. An exam ple of th is approach includes e.g. th e original concept of A m erican affirm ative action w hich reac­ ted to the legacy of slavery. The last rationale focuses on th e presen t and tak es into account (un)conscious prejudice or stereotypes which work to the disadvantage of th e m em bers of a c e rtain group2 3. Recent judg m en ts of the E uropean C ourt of Ju stic e24 show th a t it is predom inantly th is model which is used w ithin the EU to estab lish “equality in fact”.

L ast b u t not least, perception of affirm ative action e ith e r as a m eans to achieve equal tre a tm e n t, which com plem ents th e req u irem en t of form al equ­ ality as non-discrim ination, or as a m ere derogation to th a t principle fu rth e r relates to th e level of scrutiny applied in p a rticu la r cases. However, w heth er a strict or a looser form of scru tin y will be used m ay also depend on th e more or less suspect ch a ra c te r of th e tra it on w hich th e affirm ative action policy is based. Therefore race or ethnic origin m ay be considered highly suspect criteria while sex m ay be considered less suspect2 5. The sam e applies to the are a of application of th e affirm ative action m easures (e.g. public or private employment). The respective legislation or courts m ay n a tu ra lly tak e diffe­ re n t stand p oints reg ard ing th is issue, w hich will be addressed in subsequent p arts.

L eg a l b a s is fo r a ffir m a tiv e a c tio n in th e U .S. a n d r e la te d S u p r em e C ou rt c a se -la w

As it was already m entioned above, affirm ative action originated in th e U nited S tates in th e e ra of th e Civil Rights M ovement. The first affirm ative action program was introduced by P resid en t Jo h n F. K ennedy in 1961. Exe­ cutive O rder 10925 required certain federal contractors to tak e “affirm ative action” in order to ensure th a t individuals were not discrim inated ag ain st

22 Ibidem .

23 O. De S c h u tte r, op. cit., pp. 3 3 -3 4 .

24 T h is a b b re v ia tio n o f th e c u r re n t n a m e C o u rt o f J u s tic e of th e E u ro p e a n U n io n w ill be u se d in th e te x t, to g e th e r w ith o th e rs (E C J or th e C ourt).

w ith reg ard to race, creed, color, or n atio nal origin. This action was followed four years la te r by P resid en t Lyndon B. Johnson, whose Executive Order 11246 required federal contractors w ith contracts of $ 50,000 or more to in itia te affirm ative action program s in order to recru it and h ire m inority em ployees2 6. In 1967 P re sid e n t Jo h nson expanded th e Executive O rder w hich from th e n on included also affirm ative action requ irem en ts to benefit wom en2 7.

Since these beginnings th e legal system of th e U nited S tates has grown to contain a wide v ariety of affirm ative action provisions not only a t federal, b u t also a t s ta te an d local level. F u rth er, distinction has to be m ade betw een th e involuntary or court-ordered affirm ative action plans an d th e v oluntary ones as th ey are subject to sim ilar b u t different criteria. Also the level of scrutiny requ ired by th e courts differs based on w h ether th e affirm ative action plans are applied in th e public or private sector (strict versus in te rm e ­ diate scrutiny). Similarly, private en tities are “m erely” subject to sta tu to ry restrictio ns (e.g. 1964 Civil R ights Act), while public en tities fall also under th e scope of th e F o u rte e n th A m endm ent of th e U.S. C onstitution (Equal Protection Clause). The m ajor role in the developm ent of th e affirm ative action can be w ithout a doubt ascribed to th e courts, especially to th e U.S. Suprem e Court, even though m any doubts an d u n certain ties regarding th e lim its of the affirm ative action program s still rem ain2 8. I will now introduce th e relev ant case-law of th e Court rela tin g to specific areas an d sum m arize th e c u rre n t developm ent of th e affirm ative action in the U nited States.

In th e U nited S tates, affirm ative action becam e a widely debated issue especially w ith reg ard to some forms of so called “benign discrim ination” in u n iversity adm issions. The field of university adm issions firstly involves the general constitutional scrutiny u n d e r th e Equal Protection Clause, which read s th a t “no S ta te shall [...] deny to any person w ithin its jurisdictio n the equal protection of th e law s”. And secondly, it involves Title VI of th e 1964 Civil Rights Act, w hich prohibits discrim ination on the basis of race, color an d n ation al origin in program s and activities receiving federal assistan ce2 9.

There are two m ajor Suprem e C ourt decisions rela tin g to th is area. In

B a kke30 (1978) th e C ourt rejected an adm issions procedure th a t reserved

a quota of seats in each en terin g class for disadvantaged m inority students. This 5 -4 decision h as been widely debated for decades nevertheless it has

25 O. D e S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 34.

26 M.A. D ru m b l, J.D .R . C ra ig , op. cit., pp. 8 6 -8 7 .

27 M. S ykes, T h e O rig in s o f A ffir m a tiv e A c tio n , “N a tio n a l N O W T im e s” 1995, a t <h ttp :// w w w .n o w .o rg /n n t/0 8 -9 5 /a ffirm h s.h tm l>.

28 M. D e Vos, B ey o n d F o rm a l E q u a lity - P o sitive A c tio n u n d e r D irectives 2 0 0 0 / 4 3 /E C a n d

2 0 0 0 /7 8 /E C , 2007, p. 62, a t <h ttp ://e c .e u ro p a.eu /so c ial/B lo b S erv let? d o cId = 1 6 7 9 & la n g Id = e n >.

29 Ib id em .

eventually become to be believed th a t th e Suprem e Court chose to subm it any racial or eth nic classification, regardless of its “benign” purpose, to strict scrutiny. U nder th is level of scrutiny only those affirm ative action program s th a t correspond to a “compelling governm ental in te re st” and whose m easu­ res are “narrow ly tailored” to fu rth e r th a t in te re st are allowed31. However, in B akke Ju stic e Powell held th a t even though th ere generally exists the rig h t of univ ersities “to select those stu d en ts who will contribute th e m ost to th e »robust exchange of ideas«” (a diverse stu d e n t body), w hich constitutes a countervailing co n stitutional in terest, the program established in th is case was not a necessary m eans to th a t end32.

A fter decades of u n certain ty in academ ia and th e courts about th e diver­ sity arg u m en t an d th e level of scrutiny applied, th e Suprem e Court m a in ta ­ ined th e ru lin g in B akke an d fu rth e r clarified it in th e cases of G rutter33 and

G ratz34 in 2003. The C ourt faced th e issue in w hich it had to decide to w hat

exten t could th e U niversity of M ichigan Law School constitutionally use race to en su re a “critical m ass” of u n d errep resen ted m inority stu den ts. Initially, th e C ourt subjected b oth cases to strict scrutin y and distinguished th e scho­ ol’s p lan from actu al quotas. F u rth e r it held th a t in higher education diversi­ ty p resen ts a compelling in te re st and th a t in order to achieve the educatio­ nal benefits th a t flow from a diverse stu d e n t body race can be used as one of a num ber of factors. The Court also held the required compelling in terest is not lim ited to the correction of prior discrim ination by the sam e institution35.

The p resen t stance of th e U.S. Suprem e C ourt is, therefore, th a t diversi­ ty does co nstitute a compelling sta te in te re st justifying race-conscious adm is­ sion program s in h igher education in stitu tio n s36. To sum m arize th e m eans th a t are regarded as narrow ly tailored in th is field of application of the affirm ative action program s, it is clear th a t first, racial quotas are by defini­ tion u nconstitutional. Second, adm issions or tra n sfe r policies th a t assign a fixed nu m b er of points based solely on race are conclusively u n constitu tio­ nal. And th ird , m ultip le-tier adm issions or tra n sfe r policies based on race are presum ptively un constitutional. However, “beyond these ra th e r ru d im en tary points of law, th e field rem ain s wide open”37.

A nother field w here affirm ative action plans can be applied is private sector employm ent. The essen tial federal s ta tu te governing th e a re a of em ­ ploym ent discrim ination is Title VII of th e 1964 Civil Rights Act. According

31 M. D e Vos, op. cit., p. 62. 32 J . R in g elh eim , op. cit.

33 G ru tte r v. Bollinger, 539 U .S. 306, 2003. 34 G ra tz v. B o llin g e r, 539 U .S. 244, 2003. 35 M. D e Vos, op. cit., pp. 6 2 -6 3 . 36 J . R in g elh eim , op. cit., p. 5. 37 M. D e Vos, op. cit., p. 63.

to its provisions, it is i.a. unlaw ful “to discrim inate a g ain st any individual [...] because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or n atio n al origin”. B ased on both phraseology and draftin g history of th is piece of legislature, n e u tra lity from th e employer, so called “color-blindness”, is req uired un der Title VII. N evertheless, s ta rtin g w ith Weber38 (1979), th e Suprem e Court ad m itted th a t Title VII’s prohibition of racial discrim ination does not con­ dem n all private, voluntary, race-conscious action p lans3 9.

Moreover, th e level of scrutiny req uired by th e C ourts in cases of such p lans is only of an in term ed iary n atu re. T h a t essentially m eans th a t racial classification th a t serves an “im p o rtan t governm ental in te re s t” w ith “sub ­ sta n tia lly rela te d ” m easures is condoned by the Court. F u rth erm ore, th e C ourt held in Johnson v. Transportation Agency40 (1987) th a t an employer

need not poin t to his own p rio r d iscrim in ato ry practices, b u t only to a “conspicuous im balance in trad itio n ally segregated job categories”. In this sphere of application it is believed th a t the essential purpose of affirm ative action is to b rea k down old p a tte rn s of segregation and hierarchy. N ev erthe­ less, affirm ative action should not “u nnecessarily tram m el th e in te rests of th e w hite employees” (Weber). Therefore the absence of an absolute b a r or rigid quotas, eventually th e tem porary d u ratio n of affirm ative action or its periodic review are elem ents ta k e n into account by th e courts in th e ir deci­ sion m aking process4 1.

W ith reg ard to th e provisions pointing tow ards n e u tra lity an d the fact th a t th ere is no provision endorsing positive action, the flexibility of the A m erican courts tow ards affirm ative action is, according to De Vos, quite rem arkable. Especially since th e W eber te s t was eventually extended beyond th e historical issue of race, for exam ple in gender cases. However, it should be rem inded th a t th e Weber te s t applies only to voluntary affirm ative action plans in p rivate sector employm ent. As it w as already m entioned the scope for court ordered affirm ative action is m uch n arrow er and th e E qual Protec­ tion Clause imposes stricte r scrutiny for affirm ative action in public sector em ploym ent4 2. This is of course in line w ith th e general strict scrutiny applicable to governm ent affirm ative action, which will be discussed in su b ­ sequent section.

The field of governm ent program s is th e la s t a re a in which affirm ative action program s are used in th e U nited States. A fter hesitation s in several Suprem e C ourt decisions, it is now clear th a t all affirm ative action plans w hich are enacted th ro u g h governm ent, irrespective of its level (local, sta te

38 U n ited S teelw o rk ers o f A m e ric a v. Weber, 443 U .S. 193, 1979. 39 M. D e Vos, op. cit., p. 63.

40 Jo h n so n v. T ra n sportation A gency o f S a n ta C lara County, C alifornia, 480 U .S. 616, 1987. 41 M. D e Vos, op. cit., p. 63.

or federal) and th e position in w hich it functions (as a contractor, regulator or public employer), are subjected to strict scrutiny w henever they en tail some form of “benign discrim ination”, especially race bias. Therefore, as in th e case of university adm issions, a compelling governm ent in te re st to which th e disputed affirm ative action m u st be narrow ly tailored is req uired4 3.

However, th ere is a difference in respect of the conditions u n d e r which th e common sta n d a rd of scrutiny is m et. In case of affirm ative action in university adm issions, th e scrutiny generally recognizes th e unique role played by un iversities in fostering th e free exchange of ideas and accepts the so called diversity argum ent. On th e oth er hand, affirm ative action by go­ v ernm en t will have to be narrow ly tailored to th e realities of th e specific governm ent program , w hich e.g. en tails express findings of p a st or persisting governm ent or social discrim ination in th e field for which th e affirm ative action is designed. Therefore it is not clear w h ether th e purpose of diversity can be considered sufficient to constitute a compelling in te re st also in case of governm ent affirm ative action4 4.

L eg a l b a s is fo r p o s itiv e a c tio n in th e E u r o p e a n U n io n a n d r e la te d E C J c a se -la w

As was already m entioned above, w ithin th e E u ropean U nion th e term m ost frequently used to describe m easures designed to com pensate for p re ­ sen t and p a st disadvantages caused by discrim ination is positive action. Even though th e term itse lf does not ap p ear in any of th e EU legally binding docum ents4 5, it is clear th a t th e EU decided to tak e more pro-active appro­ ach to equality as th e u ltim ate goal of positive action m easures is now to achieve full equality in practice (see e.g. Article 157 (4) TFEU, form er Article 141(4) TEC)4 6. However first m ention of th is concept can be found in the E qual T reatm ent D irective from 19764 7, which sta te d in Article 2 (4) th a t the Directive “shall be w ithout prejudice to m easures to prom ote equal opportu­ nity for m en and women, in p a rticu la r by rem oving existing inequalities which affect women’s opportunities”. Since th e n th e EU anti-discrim ination goals could be achieved also by positive action, w hich operates as derogation from th e principle of equality.

43 Ib id em , p. 63. 44 Ib id em , pp. 6 3 -6 4 .

45 H ow ever, th e te r m w a s u se d e.g. in C ouncil R e co m m en d a tio n 84/635/E E C o f 13.12.1984 on th e p ro m o tio n of p o sitiv e a c tio n for w om en.

46 E u ro p e a n R om a In fo rm a tio n Office, P o sitive A c tio n - G uide book fo r R o m a A c tiv ists, 2008, p. 9, a t <h ttp ://w w w .e rio n e t.o rg /site /b a sic 1 0 0 1 3 9 .h tm l>.

47 C ouncil D irectiv e 76/207/E E C o f 9.02.1976 o n th e im p le m e n ta tio n of th e p rin cip le of e q u a l t r e a tm e n t for m e n a n d w o m en a s re g a rd s access to e m p lo y m en t, v o c atio n al tr a in in g a n d p ro m o tio n a n d w o rk in g conditions.

Originally, the E uropean Com m unity h ad powers to act only in relation to sex equality and n atio n ality discrim ination. However since 1997, w ith the adoption of Article 13 of th e T reaty of A m sterdam (now Article 19 TFEU), it can fu rth e r operate in the field of discrim ination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. A fter th e T reaty of A m sterdam came into force in 1999, several directives th a t include positive action provisions have been enacted in the area of anti-discri­ m ination. Among these are the Racial E quality Directive48 and the Employ­ m ent E quality Directive4 9, both from 2000, th e recast E qual T reatm en t Di­ rective50 (2006) and th e 2004 Directive im plem enting the principle of equal tre a tm e n t betw een m en and women in the access to and supply of goods and services5 1. Provisions which relate to positive action generally provide th a t “w ith a view to en suring full equality in practice, th e principle of equal tre a tm e n t shall not preven t any M em ber S ta te from m ain tain in g or adopting specific m easures to p rev en t or com pensate for disadvantages linked to [a protected ground]”5 2. Despite the new prohibited grounds of discrimination the case-law of the European Court of Justice on the question of positive action has so far arisen only in the context of equal treatm en t between m en and women. Still, as it will be shown below, th e case-law is not fully consistent5 3.

The above m entioned Directives’ provisions essentially copy Article 157 (4) T FEU (form er Article 141(4) TEC), which is cu rren tly th e only Treaty provi­ sion which covers th e a rea of positive action m easures. It provides th a t “w ith a view to en su rin g full equality in practice betw een m en and women in w orking life, the principle of equal tre a tm e n t shall not prevent any M ember S tate from m ain tain in g or adopting m easures providing for specific a d v a n ta ­ ges in order to m ake it easier for th e u n d e rre p re se n te d sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prev ent or com pensate for disadvantages in profes­ sional careers”. Even though these provisions only encourage, b u t do not require M em ber S ta te s to tak e positive action m easures, th ey allow more room for th e ir application th a n Article 2 (4) of the original E qual T reatm ent Directive. N evertheless, not even Article 157 (4) TFEU (form er Article 141(4) TEC) has yet been used by th e E C J to w iden th a t scope5 4.

48 C ouncil D irectiv e 2000/43/E C of 29.06.2000 im p le m e n tin g th e p rin cip le o f e q u a l t r e a t ­ m e n t b e tw e e n p e rso n s irre s p e c tiv e of ra c ia l o r e th n ic origin.

49 C ouncil D ire ctiv e 2000/78/E C o f 27.11.2000 e s ta b lis h in g a g e n e ra l fram e w o rk for eq u al tr e a tm e n t in em p lo y m en t a n d occupation.

50 D irectiv e 2006/54/E C o f th e E u ro p e a n P a r lia m e n t a n d o f th e C ouncil o f 5.07.2006 on th e im p le m e n ta tio n of th e p rin cip le of e q u a l o p p o rtu n itie s a n d e q u a l tr e a tm e n t of m e n a n d w o m en in m a tte r s o f e m p lo y m e n t a n d o ccu p atio n (recast).

51 C ouncil D irectiv e 2004/113/E C o f 13.12.2004 im p le m e n tin g th e p rin c ip le of e q u a l t r e a t ­ m e n t b e tw e e n m e n a n d w o m en in th e acc ess to a n d su p p ly o f goods a n d services.

52 E u ro p e a n N e tw o rk A g a in s t R acism , F a ct S h e e t 35..., p. 6. 53 O. D e S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 35.

F irst ju dgm en t on the issue of positive action w ith reg ard to the princi­ ple of equal tre a tm e n t for m en an d women was delivered by th e E uropean Court of Ju stic e in 1995. The K alanke55 case dealt w ith B rem en law provi­ sion w hich sta te d th a t women who have th e sam e qualifications as m en applying for the sam e post are to be given priority in sectors w here they are u n d errep resen ted, both in case of appointm ent and promotion. However, the E C J came to th e conclusion th a t such autom atic preference goes beyond prom oting equal opportunities an d oversteps th e lim its of th e exception in Article 2 (4) of th e E qual T reatm en t Directive. It fu rth e r sta te d th a t because th e B rem en law sought to achieve equal rep re sen ta tio n of m en and women in all grades and levels w ithin a d ep artm ent, it su b stitu te d th e equality of opportunity by th e equality of resu lts, which is not covered by th e scope of th is article56.

Two y ears later, th e C ourt d istinguished K alanke in its second positive action case, M arsh a ll57. The basis for th is was a “savings clause” (in G erm an “O ffnungsklausel”), which form ed a p a rt of th e challenged provision and which provided th a t women are to be given priority in prom otion unless specific individual circum stances do not tilt the balance in a m ale can didate’s favor. Conditions th a t h a d to be otherw ise m et included the fact th a t th ere are fewer women th a n m en in th e p a rticu la r higher grade post an d th a t they are of equal suitability, competence and professional perform ance58. F in ­ dings from th ese two judg m en ts were confirmed by th e Court in th e 2000 case of Badeck a nd others59. However, th e C ourt added several specifications to th e criteria. Absolute preference is therefore not considered discrim inatory w hen it is based on an “actual fact” such as th e proportion of m en and women am ong persons w ith certain qualification. Also w hen th e p referential tre a tm e n t of women regards th e access to c e rtain opportunities (e.g. vocatio­ nal train in g , calls to job interview s), it will be considered w ith less severity, i.e. even w hen absolute, such p referen tial tre a tm e n t will not am ount to prohibited discrim ination60.

N evertheless, positive action th a t m ight equal to some form of reverse or positive discrim ination is still regarded as an exception to the principle of form al equality in sex discrim ination law. The scope of th is exception has been estab lish ed by th e E uropean C ourt of Ju stic e th ro u g h its sta n d a rd test of proportionality. Nowadays, th e following guidelines can be draw n from the

55 C a se C -450/93, K a la n k e v F reie H a n s e s ta d t B re m en [1995] E C R I-3051. 56 O. De S c h u tte r, op. cit., pp. 3 5 -3 6 .

57 C a se C -409/95, M a r s h a ll v L a n d N o rd rh ein -W e stfa le n , 1997, E C R I-6363.

58 T h is h a s b e e n f u r th e r co n firm ed e.g. in A b r a h a m s s o n , C a se C-407/98, A b ra h a m s s o n

a n d A n d er so n v F ogelq vist, 2000, E C R I-5539.

59 C a se C -158/97, B a d ec k a n d others, 2000, E C R I-1875. 60 Ib id em , p. 44.

existing E C J case-law. F irst, any p referential tre a tm e n t should serve a legi­ tim ate aim and p resen t a m easure th a t is appro priate and necessary in o rder to achieve th a t aim. Second, m easures including group ch aracteristics th a t resu lt in individual positive discrim ination m ay be justified if they have th e correct aim, which m akes th e req u irem en t for individual h a rm re d u n ­ dant. Third, positive action m easures should rely on objective and tra n s p a ­ re n t criteria and objectively serve th e sta te d aim. L ast, as was already sta te d above, selection is not proportional w hen th e preferential tre a tm e n t is autom atic and unconditional an d does not objectively assess all personal circum stances of all th e can didates61.

Indeed, the required legitim ate aim m ay vary w ith regard to th e context an d th e groups concerned. As far as th e em ploym ent of women is concerned, th e aim should be “to elim inate an d correct th e causes of reduced opportuni­ ties of access to em ploym ent an d careers and to improve th e ability of the u n d errep resen ted sex to compete on th e labor m ark e t an d p ursue a career on an equal footing, th u s rem edying a proven im balance betw een th e se- xes”62. However, it is not clear from th e C ourt’s case-law w h at level of im balance is req u ired to justify p referen tial tre a tm e n t or if and how the effectiveness an d cost/benefit im pact of such tre a tm e n t should be assessed63. Moreover, th e E C J has not yet considered the whole range of possible positi­ ve action m easu res64 or the case w hen th e M em ber S tates would be required to adopt such m easures in order to im plem ent th e principle of equal treat- m en t65.

C o n c lu d in g rem a rk s o n a ffir m a tiv e /p o s itiv e a c tio n in th e U .S. a n d in th e EU

In com paring affirm ative/positive action in the U nited S tates and in the E uro pean Union, it becomes ap p aren t th a t even thought the genesis of affir­ m ative action occurred in th e U.S., th is is also w here its im plem entation has stirred the m ost controversy66. Since th e affirm ative action is not expressly covered eith er by the constitution or, to a g reat extent, by statu to ry law, it is therefore highly scrutinized, especially in the public sector and governm ent contracting. In contrast, the issue w ith positive action in th e EU is not w he­ th e r it actually is allowed u n d e r the concept of form al equality a t all b ut

61 M. D e Vos, op. cit., p. 68. 62 Ibidem .

63 Ibidem .

64 E u ro p e a n N e tw o rk A g a in s t R acism , F a ct S h e e t 35... 65 O. D e S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 46.

r a th e r w h at kinds of positive action m easures fall w ithin th e scope of respec­ tive EU law provisions. On th e o th er hand, distinction betw een equality of opportunities and equality of resu lts as known in th e sphere of th e EU law has not developed in the Am erican jurisprudence. Therefore perm issible affir­ m ative action in th e U nited S tates can be as well broader th a n in th e Europe­ an Union, because program s conferring actual jobs or contracts on m em bers of disadvantaged groups are allowed in the U.S. as rem edial m easures6 7.

In the U nited S tates, case-law developed by the Suprem e C ourt in the are a of affirm ative action relates alm ost exclusively to one prohibited ground of discrim ination and th a t is race. Except in case of p rivate em ploym ent the scrutiny req uired by th e C ourt w ith reg ard to affirm ative action program s is strict, therefore only th e m easures th a t correspond to a compelling sta te in te re st and th a t are narrow ly tailored to th a t end m eet th is requirem ent. However, th e compelling sta te in te re st c riteria are not alw ays easy to satisfy. For instance, in case of university adm issions th e only arg u m en t th a t is cu rrently accepted by th e Suprem e C ourt is th e diversity argum ent. O ther justifications for affirm ative action m easures in th is area, i.a. rem edying the effects of p a st social discrim ination, en su ring distributive justice for certain d isadvantaged groups in th e p resen t (B a kke ), or providing role models for m em bers of d isadvantaged m inorities (Wygant v. Jackson Board o f E d u ca­

tion6 8), were progressively invalid ated by the Suprem e C ourt6 9. In th is sense th e U.S. affirm ative action concept is n arrow er as th e E C J ap pears to prefer a deferential approach to affirm ative action program s th a t prom ote equality of o pportunity7 0.

The E uro pean C ourt of Ju stic e developed its case-law on positive action solely in th e a rea of equal tre a tm e n t betw een m en and women, especially w ith reg ard to Article 2 (4) of th e original E qual T reatm ent Directive. T here­ fore positive action m easures designed to level th e playing field for women in th e a re a of em ploym ent, specifically in h iring or prom otion opportunities were th e m easures m ost frequently subjected to th e E C J proportionality test. In consequence, typical exam ple from this a re a would p resen t a positive action p lan w hich aim s to increase th e nu m b er of women in the com pany’s senior m anagem ent team . F irs t it would have to be objectively shown th a t th ere is a low num ber of women in th e team , second th a t th e m easure chosen will actually lead to a h igher num ber of women, and finally th a t the m easure is proportionate to th a t aim and th a t it does not involve absolute or autom atic preferences7 1.

67 Ib id em , p. 113.

68 W ygant v. J a c k so n B o a rd o f E d u c a tio n , 476 U .S. 267, 1986. 69 J . R in g elh eim , op. cit., p. 5.

70 M.A. D ru m b l, J.D .R . C ra ig , op. cit., p. 113.

However, the ex ten t to which th e approach tak e n in th e field of gender m ay or will be applied to th e o th er grounds of discrim ination rem ain s uncer­ tain . Some views suggest th a t “th e sta te of th e law delineating th e scope for positive action in gender can an d should [...] serve as a point of d e p a rtu re for in te rp re tin g the positive action provisions in the Race and Fram ew ork Direc- tives”72. On th e o th er hand, it can as well be assum ed th a t th e increase in protected grounds and in m aterial scope of the EU equality law will lead to m ore an d various acceptable aim s for positive action, i.e. th a t the flexible n a tu re of th e proportionality te s t will produce more leniency tow ards positi­ ve action in th e fu tu re ju dg m en ts of th e E C J73. Some point to th e existence of quotas for disabled people in m any E uropean countries and also to the fact th a t p referen tial tre a tm e n t is less controversial w hen th ere is strong evidence of severe ineq uality (compare e.g. th e legacy of racial segregation in th e U.S. w ith th e entren ch ed inequalities faced by th e Roma in Europe today)74. A lternatively, w ith reg ard to th e fact th a t positive action is req u ­ ired u n d e r in te rn atio n a l h u m an rig h ts law rela te d to racial discrim ination an d m inority righ ts, “it m ay even be easier to justify c e rtain affirm ative action m easures benefiting racial or ethnic m inorities th a n it has been to justify sim ilar m easures adopted in order to prom ote th e professional in te ­ g ratio n of wom en”75.

Moreover, it has yet to be shown w h ether th e case-law developed by th e E C J in th e field of em ploym ent m ay or will be applied also to other dom ains, e.g. in th e access to and supply of goods and services76. However, as De Schutter points out, the use of positive action m easures th a t m ay be acceptable in a particular sphere may nevertheless be excluded in another sphere because of the need to ensure the allocation of another scarce social good. Therefore, for instance, a positive action plan acceptable at the recruitm ent stage could be less acceptable in th e layoff procedures (see e.g. th e U.S. case Wygant v. Jackson

Board o f Education). It follows th a t it is extrem ely difficult to estab lish ad ­

m issibility c riteria of affirm ative/positive action th a t can claim general vali­ dity. T h at is tru e not only w ith regard to different level of scrutiny based on the prohibited ground of discrim ination in question, b u t also w ith regard to different criteria applied in p articu lar sphere (e.g. em ploym ent or education). Moreover, general c riteria would be all th e more difficult to identify in the situ atio ns w here social goods are often d istrib u ted according to a com bina­ tion of c riteria (e.g. in th e allocation of scholarships or social housing)77.

72 M. D e Vos, op. cit., p. 68. 73 Ibidem .

74 E u ro p e a n N e tw o rk A g a in s t R acism , F a c t S h e e t 35..., p. 7 -8 . 75 O. D e S c h u tte r, op. cit., p. 4 8 -4 9 .

76 Ib id em , p. 49. 77 Ib id em , p. 5 0 -5 1 .

In respect of th e fu tu re developm ent of th e U.S. Suprem e C ourt case- law, both professionals an d laym en im p atiently aw ait fu rth e r judgm ents as some S tates have passed law s or co n stitutional am endm ents ban n in g affir­ m ative action w ithin th e ir respective territo rie s in alm ost every field (e.g. California, W ashington, F lorida or Michigan). It will be especially in terestin g w ith reg ard to th e univ ersity adm issions in M ichigan as th e law was passed in 2006, i.e. after the widely know n G rutter and Gratz decisions. On the other hand, m any propose th a t th e U.S. affirm ative action should re tu rn to its sim pler roots. However w h eth er th is will exclude application of a ffirm ati­ ve action in “new” spheres or “new ” prohibited grounds of discrim ination or w h eth er th e C ourt will tak e a different, more pro-active standpoint, rem ains an open question.

In case of the E uropean C ourt of Ju stic e we aw ait w h ether it will conti­ nue to accept positive action m easures only in situations w here “actual in equ alities” are shown to exist, or w h ether it will redefine th e c riteria which are usually relied upon in order to allocate social goods, depending on th e n a tu re of these goods. Because as De S ch u tter suggests, “ju s t like »quali­ fications« m ay be redefined to tak e into account th e experience w hich m ay have been acquired by looking after children [...] or th e specific »female life experience«, they m ay be reth o u g h t in order to tak e into account th e specific value, both in p riv ate business an d in the public sector, of including more m inorities, in order to be more responsive to th e needs of th e clients or of the public”7 8. However, m ajor shift from equality of opportunities to equality of resu lts is probably m ore th a n can be expected.

S tr e s z c z e n ie

A k c ja a firm a ty w n a w S ta n a c h Z jednoczonych k o n tra p o zytyw n e d z ia ła n ia w U nii E u ro p ejsk iej - a n a liz a p o ró w n a w cza

S łow a kluczow e: a k c ja a firm a ty w n a , ró w n e tra k to w a n ie , d y s k ry m in ac ja, rów ne tra k to w a n ie . Koncepcja akcji afirm atyw nej pow stała w 1961 r., aby promować równe praw a mniejszości w w ielu dziedzinach, szczególnie za tru d n ie n ia i edukacji. Podstaw ę do tych działań m ożna znaleźć m .in. w am erykańskiej ustaw ie o praw ach obyw atelskich z 1964 r., jed n a k ich zakres został określony głów­ nie przez Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych. W U nii Europejskiej term in „pozytywne d ziałania” pojaw ia się przy definiow aniu środków proporcjonal­ nych, podjętych w celu osiągnięcia pełnej i rzeczywistej równości grup, które są społecznie i ekonomicznie upośledzone. Podczas gdy większość pozytyw­

nych planów działania w S tan ach Zjednoczonych wiąże się z praw am i m niej­ szości rasowych, pozytywne działania w U nii Europejskiej przede wszystkim odnoszą się do równych praw kobiet. Zarówno w Ameryce, ja k i Europie działania pozytywne/ potw ierdzające należą do tem atów dyskusyjnych. Au­ to rk a a rty k u łu podjęła próbę porów nania pozytywnych działań w USA i UE, zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do orzecznictwa Sądu Najwyższego Stanów Zjedno­ czonych i Trybunału Sprawiedliwości U nii Europejskiej.