Between tradition and modernity : Chinese political elites in the process of modernization

(1)

Jagiellonian University, Kraków

Between tradition and modernity – Chinese political elites in the process of modernization

The main aim of this article is to analyze some aspects of the process of contemporary Chinese modernization by using the concept of the modernization fostered and directed by charismatic groups or personalities. Such theory was presented by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. His model appears to be useful for describing the modernization process in the People’s Republic of China not only because of the characteristics of the political system but also because of the size of the country and its society. What is also characteristic for that theoretical model, the changes in social, economical and political spheres are not concurrent. Furthermore, also some traditional and modern elements may coexist. In contemporary China, still on its way to modernity, elements of the Confucian heritage and some Western values, socialism and capitalism, Leninism and East Asian authoritarianism occur at the same time.

The process of modernization initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 wasn’t the first attempt to modernization in China, but it was the first really effective one. First attempts to modernization were done during the reign of Qianlong, when the diplomatic mission from England came to the Emperor. However then, in the end of the 18th century, as well as later in the 19th century, Chinese government was not interested in the development according to the Western patterns. The effect of such an attitude was the backwardness of the Middle Kingdom and its defeat in the wars not only against West- ern powers but also against Japan, previously not even perceived as an equivalent country. The first internal attempts of modernization came much later, in the second half of 19th century. Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhong proposed strengthening China according to the rule zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong, that means keeping the Chinese core but using Western technology. The second initiative came from Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and the period of those changes was called Hundred Days’ Reform. They demanded social and institutional changes and constitu- tional monarchy in particular. Those early attempts to modernity were not successful.

The third modernization, wider known in Western historiography, is connected with Sun Yatsen. The fourth was begun by Mao Zedong in a totally different political at- mosphere, after the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. His ideas of cre- ating the modern industrial country, initially based on the Soviet example, were unre- alistic and brought China on the edge of the catastrophe (Fairbank, 1998; Rodziński, 1992). After Mao’s death new models of modernization became possible and those processes are the objects of the present study.

Confucian thought concerns the power hierarchy. In Eisenstadt’s theory, similarly, the elite is the main force to provide any changes. At the level of political culture Chi-

(2)

nese communist leaders show affinity with the Confucian cultural inclination towards elite rule and state intervention in the name of maintaining stability and national interests (Zhang, 1996). But CPC itself is not homogenous and some elements of tradition (in this case communist hardheaded are treated as “tradition” – the remnants of the starting point of modernization) as well as some elements of modernity (here: technocrats and pragmatists) are present in it. The patterns of coexistence of those two powers will be shown later on.

Elements of the modernization theory

The analysis must start in the very beginning – describing the society in which the process of modernization begins. The starting point of modernization has a great influence on the whole process. That specific point may be a society of any stage of development. Modernization may start in primitive society (like tribal group) as well as in different types of peasant societies, and in societies with different degrees and types of prior urbanization. Modernization may be also implemented in few stages, as it was in China. In this article the last stage of the modernization in China is being analyzed, the process of modernization initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Therefore the starting point of modernization is communist society or, more precisely, what left of it after the decade of Cultural Revolution.

“Traditional societies,” which are the starting points of modernization, have various appearances, but they all share the acceptance of tradition. That doesn’t mean that traditional society is constant. On the contrary, it is continuously changing. In order to keep control over the whole process of change the traditional elites provide limits of innovation and change. It can be observed in maintaining the control not only over power distribution but also the extension of information and even knowledge.

As for the final point of the modernization, it is not necessarily for the modern social system to appear as an effect of the whole process. There are four possible solu- tions. Firstly, innovation may be fully eliminated, which is almost an impossible way.

Secondary, innovation may be adopted to the traditional model. Another possibility is to create a niche in which the society may preserve some elements of the old structure.

At least, there is a possibility of total disintegration, or absorbing by bigger social system – in that case society would loose its identity (Parsons, 1966). As a result, even modern societies are not identical – they differ not only in the effectiveness of the whole process of modernization, but also in domestic traditional culture. It is impossible to determine how the effect of the Chinese modernization would look like.

There are three levels of change recognized by Eisenstadt (1973): small-scale changes, partial institutional changes and overall changes in the central frameworks of the society. Small-scale changes affect some details of membership and the structure of roles and organization of various social groups. The effect of this kind of change is very limited with regard to overall social structure. Partial institutional changes take place in limited institutional sphere, like economy or administration, and create new opportunities for some groups. However, those changes are isolated from the core of

(3)

society. The most far-reaching level is change of overall social framework and concerns central institutional core. This type of change is usually connected with the creation of new contours of the whole society. It creates new levels of differentiation, social complexity, and stratification.

All those levels of change, and especially social framework changes, are most effective when they are initiated by the elites. The process of change may be of two main types. One is gradual, sometimes even imperceptible change – more characteristic of small-scale and partial institutional changes. The other one is more dramatic change of the framework of society.

Process of modernization is understood as the power to destroy the tradition and traditional power legitimization in particular. But after some time the reconstruction of some aspects of tradition may happen. It may be the answer to new problems appearing in the society as the result of the destroying of the tradition. In the history there are examples of the possibility of the effective modernization with keeping some elements of tradition as symbols or even traditional elites. That happened for instance in Japan during the Meiji, Ethiopia, and Great Britain. In those countries, despite the modernization and changes of the social framework, the monarchy kept its symbolic meaning and symbolic power. Also another process is possible – the modernizing groups, initially being opposed to tradition, after some time find elements of tradition as useful and try to revive them. Paradoxically, traditional symbols may be used as tools to strengthen the modernization. To make that adaptation of old elements to new patterns possible, tradition itself must change the negative attitude towards modernity as well.

Therefore, according to the modern concepts of modernization and contrary to the expectations of the first theoreticians, the process of modernization does not exclude keeping some elements of tradition. That kind of approach wouldn’t be possible in the classical paradigm of modernization, describing it as a linear process (Paluch, 1976;

Wehler, 2001).

In the classical paradigm, processes of modernization of the various spheres – economic, political, cultural and social, tended to go together and in quite similar patterns.

Some changes in one part of the system caused changes in others. According to this approach, modernization while once begun would be continued until the final success. But in reality, it seems that the process of modernization doesn’t have to be coincidental in all dimensions. For instance, historically first types of modernization (as in England) took place in the situation in which the modernizing groups were active in economic and cultural sphere long before they could be active in political sphere. Opposite situation could be found in many societies of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa or Asia.

Seymour Martin Lipset and Francis Fukuyama also described the connection between political and economical development. Lipset believes that the main economical rates (like industrialization, urbanization, education, and wealth) could be treated as one single rate. In his analysis, he found the correlation between this rate and democracy – in the democratic societies those rates are higher. He also pointed that the aver- age level of education may have the influence on the political change. Higher education increases ability to make rational decisions during elections, and prevents from supporting radical doctrines (Lipset, 1998).

(4)

Francis Fukuyama’s main presumption was the Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government and the historical inevability. He concluded that all the countries at some point of economic development became similar to each other and become modern liberal democracies. This way was chosen by most of the countries in the process of modernization. Along with the successful modernization in the economical field citizens will demand changes in the political sphere. From Fukuyama’s point of view, the stable existence of the modern economic system without political modernization was impossible (Fukuyama, 1992). That presumption is crucial for the advocates of the “fourth modernization” in China.

On the opposite side we can find Walter Galenson, the economist. He believed that democracy may have negative influence on economical development. The more democratic the government was, the easier it would be to force it to move the resources from investment to consumption. That leads to the deduction that if the economically under- developed country become a democracy, it may suppress it from the further modernization of economy (Galenson, 1959). The opponents of the democratization of the Peoples Republic of China would probably accept this concept.

The societies in the process of modernization may meet many problems, such as excessive social expectations and demands. They may be found in various fields (Eisenstadt, 1973). First are the aspirations of the elites for the creation and mainte- nance of new political framework, and hope for fulfilling the demands of the masses.

Second are the demands of various social groups, like for economic modernization.

Society expects redefinitions of the boundaries and symbols of the collectivity, and more active participation in the political process. They demand new principles of distribution of resources, wealth and prestige. The demands for concrete benefits are based on many factors, such as the level of urbanization or access to education. In the first stages of modernity most social tensions and conflict evolve around the participation in the process of change and access to resources. Later, when many of these goals may have been attained, new problems and tensions may arise, and various groups start to develop their particular goals, values, and aspirations. It is the result of growing specialization and stratification in modern societies. There are also new problems connected with agriculture change, labor relations, imbalanced development of various parts of the society, problems of the integration of the national community and identity, relation to different parts of historian tradition, changes in educational system, social and occupational mobility and so on. In the transitional period social-structural changes and dislocations create a series of structural and cultural discontinuities. The most important are those between the family and the educational and occupational spheres;

between the productive and the consumer roles; between the values and orientations inculcated in the family and in the educational institutions; and between old and new social symbols. All the problems may cause the growth of the social apathy or even the aversion to the whole process of modernization (Eisenstadt, 1973).

In the early stages of modernization regimes are ruled by relatively small oligar- chies and political participation is limited. Therefore the eruptions of social unrest are on the forms of unorganized movements that are oriented at the attainment of immedi- ate needs or to obtainment of political rights or just access to the political system.

Later, many social movements and interests groups are developed, they are better or-

(5)

ganized and articulate their interests in various way. Social conflicts and crisis are very likely to appear and they may threaten the legitimization of the government. The growing intensity of the conflicts means that the social system and the society lost their ability of absorption of the change. That would mean the end of the process of modernization.

There are also potential problems connected with westernization. Western societies were the first modernized and their modern culture is believed to be the most developed. The concept of modernization became popular after the Second World War, and have been used to describe the processes starting in the post-colonial countries. Those processes were also called westernization, but that word has a scent of discrimination by suggestion that there is only one pattern of modernization for all the societies. As the societies take similar models of development, they are more and more alike. More intensive exchange of thoughts, culture and technology also leads to unification. But there is more than one model of the reaction to the impact of the Western culture. Sam- uel Huntington mentioned three models: rejection of both modernization and westernization; acceptance of both modernization and westernization; acceptance of modernization and rejection of westernization. The first model is difficult to imagine in contemporary world, but describes the politics of China as later as in the 19thcentury. The second model is called Kemalism, from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who believed that modernization is beneficial for the country but it is impossible with the old, traditional culture, therefore the processes of modernization and westernization must be parallel.

The last option was named reformism and may describe the situation of Japan during Meiji Restoration period. Reformism accepts the modernization but also protects the core of the traditional culture (Huntington, 1993). Huntington noticed that in early stages of modernization the westernization supports the whole process, but later the westernization is being rejected and traditional local culture is reborn. In the social dimension the modernization increases the economical, military and political strength of the society as a whole, as well as the trust in its own culture. In the individual dimension however, modernization creates the alienation and anomia, when traditional social ties and relations are destroyed. The conclusion would be that non-Western countries during westernization must find their own way, based on local tradition, institutions and value system. Many believe that Confucianism could be used in that role in the process of Chinese modernization.

As Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt noticed, the patterns of modernization and absorption of the social and political change in the one-party political systems are different from those in the multi-party systems (Eisenstadt, 1973). In those systems political, social and economic changes are deliberately initiated and directed by the political elite. On the other hand, the same elite attempts to minimize the autonomous political expression of various social groups, among it also their political reaction to the changes fostered by the elite. Usually, elite is interested in limiting the change to industrialization, and modernization in technical and military fields.

There appears the question, who is the elite? In the single-party system, political elite is composed of the party, party leadership, and to some extend the bureaucracy.

The legislature performs rather ritual functions and the executive plays secondary role (as distinct from the party leadership). The party leaders usually serve as the major

(6)

centers of innovation and active manipulation and mobilization of political support.

Bureaucracy helps in maintaining the continuity of administration in the new condi- tions generated by the change.

The continuity of such fostered change and the regime’s legitimization depends on the successful incorporating various interest groups and social movements (if they exist) into the monolithic party framework. Those groups and social movements are often suppressed and their attempts to public debate or presentation of their demands are restricted as potentially dangerous for the party monopoly. The stability of the regime is connected with its ability to maintain a balance between the repressive measures against the autonomous political expression and the flexibility to aggregate any demands into the framework of the party. In that way the party tends to remain the only one able to form political expression. Those regimes may be threatened by usurpational tendencies of their own organization – those may be the army, secret police or some parts of bureaucracy.

Eisenstadt’s text was written in the seventies and the author admitted that he couldn’t find any examples of internal systematic changes of one-party systems except those defeated in war. Nowadays, however, the process of modernization in China, although not finished yet, may be a new field for analysis.

The Communist Party of China as the modernizing force – between reformers and hardheaded

Deng Xiaoping was the author of Chinese modernization but that process wouldn’t be possible without the support of the Communist Party of China. The party, however, is not homogenous and some forces opposing the modernization can be found in it.

How it was possible that the party not long ago focused on the class struggle became the advocate of modernization, which pushed the whole country in the direction of market economy and forced the party to evolve? The reasons for that should be searched for three dimensions: political, economical and social.

Political explanations are connected with the characteristics of the new party elite.

During the Cultural Revolution many party members, even though very devoted to the party, were condemned. They lost their social positions, and very often also their health and life. When Deng Xiaoping, previously also condemned, came to power, those people were finally politically rehabilitated. Deng announced that as technicians and engi- neers take part in the process of production, they were the part of the proletariat. Hu Yaobang successfully struggled for changing the negative connotation of the word

“intellectualist” – gradually they weren’t associated as arrogant, inexperienced and political naïve. The new leaders were better prepared for the new times. They intro- duced the new economical aims – instead of revolution and class struggle. During the Cultural Revolution they were sent to the villages to work with peasants, and where they could observe the reality of the peasants’ life. As a result of that, they fully recognized the importance of economical modernization on one hand and the need for change of the party on the other hand. Prior leaders of the party were too hardheaded

(7)

and undereducated to accomplish new goals. Rehabilitated party members usually were better educated and were indispensable for modernization. Therefore they were promoted in the party structure. But firstly, some places in the party structure had to be vacated.

The old generation of revolutionaries were offered very profitable retirement plan. After some time the previous victims of the party gained opportunity to take the control over the CPC. They weren’t that much revolutionaries as competent technocrats.

After Mao’s death there were a problem of lack of the power legitimization. The idea of class struggle wasn’t that attractive and the society was tired of political campaigns. What more, all the PRC founding fathers, representing the first generation of Chinese communist leaders, passed away: Liu Shaoqi in 1969, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976. That was a huge challenge for the new elite – to find a new source of legitimization. And they found it: initiating economic development and modernization, and maintaining high economic growth. Those party members understood the importance of the changes fostered by Deng Xiaoping, and at the same moment they could and wanted to participate in them.

Beside the political reasons, also the economical ones must not be forgotten. Re- formers recognized that the distance between China and the economical powers was huge and still increasing. Even today many Chinese believe that Cultural Revolution cost China twenty years of economical development because during that period much economic activity was halted. Anyway, right after Mao’s death and arrestment of the Gang of Four in 1976 the introduction of the new economic model wasn’t assured.

Admittedly, Mao’s first successor Hua Guofeng intended to reverse the damage of the Cultural Revolution but he also wanted to move the Chinese economic and political system towards the Soviet-style planning of the early 1950s. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Congress in 1978 was the landmark for the reform policy. Mao’s most trusted supporters, Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng, were criticized. Hua’s “Two Whatevers” were announced wrong. Two years later Deng Xiaoping managed to seize the highest positions in the country for his supporters: Hu Yaobang became General- -Secretary of CCP and Zhao Ziyang took place of Hua as the new Premier. Deng Xia- oping never held office as the head of state but served as de facto leader of the CCP and China (Dreyer, 2000; Hutchings, 2001; Spence, 1999). The replacement of the elite meant the beginning of the reform era. In 1978, during the above-mentioned Congress, Deng Xiaoping announced the official launch of the Four Modernization (Chi, 2000;

Sławiński, 1997). That was the first step to join the club of the most powerful countries in the world. That certainly wasn’t the new aim for People’s Republic in China, but until Deng’s era it was beyond its reach – Mao Zedong tried to reach it by unsuccessful economic experiments like the Great Leap Forward.

The demographic factor was also very significant. During thirty years starting from 1949 the population of the country was doubled, and in 1982 reached one billion (Maryański and Halimarski, 1990). Mao Zedong believed that a strong country should have big population, but later that became a problem. Chinese crop production couldn’t fulfill all needs, and there was a real threat of famine (Dziak and Burdelski, 1997).

The new elite was studying the international situation as well. They noticed that in those socialist countries in which governments allowed some elements of market economy, like Yugoslavia or Hungary, the overall situation was much better than in the

(8)

orthodox socialist economies. The nearer examples were the East Asian Tigers. Tai- wan, Singapore and Hong Kong were interesting because many of their inhabitants were of Chinese roots. What more, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore were very inspiring for them because of their authoritarian regimes. Those economies experi- enced rapid economic transformation, and along with it there were no political liberalization. Taiwanese nationalistic and authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomin- dang) controlled the government for few decades and the transformation to a multi- party democracy wasn’t possible before eighties. As for the other example, the Peo- ple’s Action Party has controlled Singaporean politics since the first election in 1959 and this kind of government has seemed to be suitable for the economic development (Leifer, 1996).

One last idiom shouldn’t be omitted. The elite could anticipate potential direct ma- terial benefits, connected with the enfranchisement of the nomenklatura. Many rela- tives of the high party officials became involved in profitable market activity. That is was closely connected with the traditional obligation to support family members by that one who was successful and with the guanxi rule. As the result, as sinologist Jean- -Luc Domenach noticed, China is controlled by the local cliques related to party and business. He estimated that political elite might consume even one percentage point of the economic growth (Domenach, 2003). Indeed, that could be a very persuasive argu- ment for supporting the economic transformation.

Modernizing tendencies in the party were significant from the end of seventies but they met some internal opposition. Earlier, during the Cultural Revolution period, the party was brought to the chaos, and thanks to that Deng Xiaoping didn’t meet fossil- ized party officials, as Mikhail Gorbachev did. But there was more than that. Deng Xiaoping himself said that modernization might be conducted only in specific fields:

agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defense. There is vivid lack of the “fifth modernization,” that is democratization. The process of modernization doesn’t have to be coincidental in all dimensions, in this exemplification economical and political.

As soon as in 1979 Deng Xiaoping decided to set a limit on political liberalization by advancing the Four Cardinal Principles. These were: 1) the principle of upholding the socialist path, 2) the principle of upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, 3) the principle of upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and 4) the principle of upholding Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought (Selected Works 1984). Those principles were called “four sticks for punishing liberals” (Zhang, 1996, p. 29). That ideological framework should have made easier for Deng to win the support of conservatives for the modernization.

Nevertheless, even so limited modernization caused some opposition of hardheaded members of the party. The Four Cardinal Principles gave some opportunities to conservatives, who were trying to set the reforms back in the name of defending that ideological framework. The clear manifestations of the party internal fight were ideological campaigns in eighties (the First Campaign Against Bourgeois Liberalization 1980–

–1981, the Campaign Against Spiritual Pollution 1983 and the Second Campaign Against Bourgeois Liberalization 1986–1987). They were relatively similar in style to early Maoist’s campaigns, but their scale was limited. For all of them it was typical that

(9)

they had a Deng’s support in the early stage, as they were protecting the leading role of the party. But later on, when those campaigns had started to endanger the whole process of modernization, Deng stopped them. They shouldn’t be forgotten though. Deng’s reaction to the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 was also according to the above model. The final failure of those three campaigns of eighties showed that the reformers were determined to finish the process of modernization. The scheme of them proved as well, that the fifth modernization was still impossible.

The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 caused the most serious crisis in the party since the Cultural Revolution. The demonstrations led by students, intellectuals and labor activists started because of the general discontentment of the reforms’ effects, inflation, corruption, and the way of holding the power by the party officials, including Deng Xiaoping. The reformers’ fraction of the party was diminished, as Hu Yaobang passed away, and Zhao Ziyang was kept in house detention. The orthodox Maoists assumed the offensive. They claimed that the reforms were too rapid and if they were continued, they would lead to destroy the communist framework of the whole system.

So, they appealed for the revival of the political and ideological fight and come back of the state-controlled economy. Indeed, right after the Tiananmen Square Protests, radical come back of the hardheaded was noticed. Deng Xiaoping felt that not only his own power, but also his whole reform program were threatened by the political disorder.

And there is nothing more dangerous for Chinese leaders than disorder and chaos.

Facing those menaces, he strongly supported conservative leaders and that shift towards liberalization observed in previous political campaigns appeared much later.

The most conservative leaders opted for a large-scale campaign against “peaceful evolution.” This phase is attributed to John Foster Dulles, ex-Secretary of State under president Dwight D. Eisenhower in the fifties. He claimed that Western powers should encourage the peaceful evolution of socialist countries to capitalism. He placed the hope for change on the youth from those countries. The party conservatives were afraid that the Tiananmen Square Protests were the sign of that evolution. During the campaign three subjects were most important: reaffirming the leading role of the party in all fields, condemnation Western countries for plotting against China’s socialist system, and blaming market-oriented reform for China’s social problems. The rapid changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union convinced conservative leaders about the struggle against “peaceful evolution.” The same events, however, made Deng Xia- oping more determined to carry on the four modernizations. He believed that the failure of the Soviet Union and the expected success of China would be an opportunity to demonstrate to the world the efficacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In 1991 Deng announced that China should rely on economic development. Two years after Tiananmen events, in contrary to expectations of many Western commentators, China was coming back to the economic reforms – but not the political ones. The economic success was preceived as a demonstration of the superiority of socialism (Zhang, 1996). In the spring of 1992 Deng made his famous tour of Southern China, called nanxun (the term used for inspections carried out by the emperors). During the tour he made many speeches on the importance of economic construction in China. He said that some areas might get rich before others (coastal regions before inland), and the wealth from them will eventually be transferred to the rest of the country. That state-

(10)

ment was a huge ideological modification that shocked conservatives. Nevertheless Deng Xiaoping, formally retired, was still the highest authority on the Chinese political scene.

During the Fourteen Party Congress in 1992 “Deng Xiaoping’s theory on building socialism with Chinese characteristics” was codified. The main concept in Deng’s theory was “socialist market economy.” Deng stated that market forces are value- -neutral mechanisms that can be used by both capitalism and socialism. The Congress was a success for the party reformers. Two young technocrats were invited to the Polit- buro Standing Committee: Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao. Many other reform supporters, especially from Shanghai, were promoted to high government positions. Deng wanted to reassert his economic policy, and he needed any political liberalization for that aim.

In 1993 Jiang Zemin was elected to the Presidency. Earlier, from 1989 he served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Mili- tary Commission. At the very beginning he wasn’t identified with the reformers nor with hardheaded in the party, but he was believed to have a neo-conservative slant.

Soon, he began to initiate radical changes in many fields. He strongly supported Deng’s opening policy (Gawlikowski, 2001). Zhu Rongji, the new premier from 1998, was believed to be more liberal than Jiang. They enacted tough macroeconomic control measures, struggled to modernize State-owned enterprises and state administration (by redundancy program), they also enacted direct election of local governments.

Very significant change in the CPC ideology was incorporated into Jiang’s Theory of Three Represents, which became his ideological legacy and has been codified into both the State and Party constitutions alongside Mao Zedong Though and Deng Xia- oping Theory. It changed the founding ideology of the CPC from protection of the peasantry and workers to that of the “overwhelming majority of the people,” a euphe- mism aimed at including the growing business class. It justified the incorporation of the new capitalist business class into the party. Jiang’s aim was to discourage the new entrepreneurial class against use their economical power and organize themselves and act against the party.

The booming Chinese economy had created a new class of rich and middle class, who wanted protection of their own property. The Constitution of the People’s Repub- lic of China has been changed to meet their needs, but those changes were gradual. In 1988 in the 11th Article of the Constitution a new paragraph was included. It reads:

“The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy” (Amendment One, 1988). In 1999 Zhu Rongji enforced more changes. It was written, inter alia, “Individual, private and other non-public economies that exist within the limits prescribed by law are major components of the socialist market economy.” “The State protects the lawful rights and interests of individual and private economies, and guides, supervises and administers individual and private economies” (Amendment Three, 1999). On March 14, 2004, the Constitution was amended to include guarantees regarding legally obtained private property (Amendment Four, 2004).

(11)

* * *

In July 2008 the Communist Party of China will celebrate its 80th Anniversary. It became a new party, a party that has changed because China has changed. If CPC still wants to maintain its power, it must find legitimization based on something different from communism. The party has begun to increasingly invoke Chinese nationalism as a new legitimizing principle. The revival of Confucian tradition could also be attractive.

Chinese leaders defended the concept of “Asian values” which incorporated some principles of Confucian social philosophy with the paternalistic form of governance, like that proposed by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore or by Mohamad Mahathir in Malaysia.

In 2003 the CPC’s “fourth generation” of leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen Jia- bao came to power. It was 25 years after the beginning of the modernization. Chinese economy growth spurt has led to a remarkable rise in people’s living standards. On the other hand, the insistent focusing almost exclusively on economic growth has led to serious social problems, as rural-urban disparity and the wealth gap, lack of pension system, corruption, environment pollution, just to name few of them. Hu Jintao at- tempted reversing that trend by bringing forth an integrated ideology that tackled both social and economic concerns – that is Harmonious Society. So far, however, the Chi- nese society is far from being harmonious. The same can be said about the Chinese modernization. However, according to modern concepts, in the process of modernization changes in social, economical and political spheres don’t have to be concurrent. It is possible that those changes will meet in some point in future and create harmonious modern Chinese society.

Bibliography

Amendment Four (2004), [at] http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html Amendment Three (1999), [at] http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html Amendment Two (1988) [at] http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html Chi Fulin (2000), Reform Determines Future of China, Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

Domenach Jean-Luc (2003), “Pewnego dnia przyjdzie wolność,” Gazeta Wyborcza, November 10–11.

Dziak Waldemar, Burdelski Marceli (1997), Chiny u progu XXI wieku, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

Dreyer June Teufel (2000), China’s Political System. Modernization and Tradition, Miami: Longman.

Eisenstadt Shmuel Noah (1973), Tradition, Change, Modernity, New York, London, Sydney, To- ronto: John Wiley & Sons.

Fairbank John King (1998), China: A New History, Cambridge, Massachusettes: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Fukuyama Francis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Praeger.

Gawlikowski Krzysztof (2001), „Jiang Zemin,” Azja–Pacyfik. t. 4, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

Galenson Walter (ed.) (1959), Labor and Economic Development: One of a Series of Books from the Research Program of the Institute of Industrial Relations, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Hutchings Graham (2001), Modern China. A Companion to a Rising Power, London: Penguin Books.

Huntington Samuel P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon and Schuster.

Leifer Michael (1996), Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, London, New York:

Routledge.

(12)

Lipset Seymour Martin (1998), Homo politicus. Społeczne podstawy polityki, Warszawa: Wydaw- nictwo Naukowe PWN.

Maryański Andrzej, Halimarski Andrzej (1990), Chiny, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Na- ukowe.

Paluch Andrzej K. (1976), Konflikt, modernizacja i zmiana społeczna. Analiza i krytyka teorii funk- cjonalnej, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Parsons Talcott (1966), Societies. Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Rodziński Witold (1992), Historia Chin, Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich.

Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982) (1984), Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Sławiński Roman (1997), Teoria i praktyka reformy gospodarczej w ocenie ekonomistów chińskich, Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia, Kultura i gospodarka, nr 11, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe ASKON.

Smelser Neil J. (1960), Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. An Application of Theory to the Lancashire Cotton Industry 1770–1840, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Spence Johnathan D. (1999), The Search for Modern China, New York, London: W. W. Norton &

Company.

Wang Ke-wen (ed.) (1998), Modern China. An Encyclopedia of History, Culture and Nationalism, New York, London: Garland Publishing, Inc.

Wehler Hans-Ulrich (2001), Modernizacja, nacjonalizm, społeczeństwo. Eseje i artykuły, Warszawa:

Wiedza Powszechna.

Zhang Wei-Wei (1996), Ideology and Economic Reform Under Deng Xiaoping 1978–1993, London and New York: Kegan Paul International.