Can the Search for Social Values be Supported by Science?

Aleksander Gella (Poland)

CAN THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL VALUES BE SUPPORTED BY SCIENCE? *

I assume th a t all kinds of political, social and other group (as w ell as individual) conflicts arise not only on the basis of d ifferen t m aterial conditions and needs b ut above all because people and nations are a t variance about m oral principles. These are alw ays determ ined by social conditions and by m a n ’s (more o r less rational) understanding of his life situation. This does not m ean th a t I neglect th e m aterialistic causes of conflict. I only w ish to state fran k ly th a t all other th a n value conflicts can be resolved peacefully only w hen th ere is consensus about m oral values.

M odern philosophies have rejected th e hope of discovering some u n i­ versally accepted values. Consequently, nobody can state th a t he knows how a given state ought to be organized, or w hich type of political be­ haviour, as w ell as individual behaviour, is the m ost valuable in term s of m orality.

Before coming to the m ain subject of this discussion, I w ish to em ­ phasize th a t being aw are of the im portance of definitions in intellectual discussions I also know th e lim itations of using them. I am su re th a t in our social reality (as w ell as in th e n atu ra l sciences) th ere are prob­ lems w hich can be discussed by em ploying only in tellectual intu itio n (common a t a given time) ra th e r th an precise definition. Thus, th e defi­ nition of value w hich I w ill quote in this p ap er is, at least for me, of tentative significance only. Sim ilarly, I w ould like to avoid an in term i­ nable discussion of hum an nature, not because it is m eaningless b u t be­ cause I do not feel relu c tan t to use scientifically undefined term s or notions to be able to move forw ard. And it seems to me th a t such a pro­

* I do not intend to give a conclusive answ er to th e problem which is taken up in th e paper. Only a sketch is presented here of a complex subject m atter which seems to be of growing significance to our age.

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cedure is common for all sciences despite th e ir tendency to precision. The problem is v ery deep and linked w ith the very n atu re of language. But let us tu rn back to values.

In th e case of values, definitional problem s are especially serious. The philosophical discussion of values is as long as th e intellectual tr a ­ dition of m ankind.

Depending upon our subjective or objective standpoint we tre a t va­ lues as a content of our sensation or as th e object of o u r cognition. But th e fu rth e r im plications of these two view -points have caused a discu­ ssion th a t has been going on for tw enty-five centuries. I do not w ish to be involved in p urely philosophical problem s of values. I prefer to approach the problem from a sociological point of view, because it treats values as social facts w hich exist and have a decisive influence on our life w ithout our philosophical understanding of them.

In order to be able to deal w ith them in such a way, it seems nece­ ssary to add an adjective before the term “value”. It is easier to discuss problems of “technical values”, “economic values”, “organizational”, “m edical”, “sp o rt” values and m any o th e r kinds of values than w ithout these qualifications. Here I w ould like to consider social values.

These can be divided into two basic categories: m aterial and m oral values. Sim ultaneously, both categories can be divided into instru m en tal and intrinsic values. This category is the most controversial. But w hen we deal w ith m oral values w ithin a social fram e of reference th e pro­ blem becomes a little m ore com prehensive for sociologists. Thus, w hen using the te rm “social v alu e” I m ean m oral values living in society; va­ lues w hich can be denied by individuals but never by society as a whole. The value-orientation in th e m odern w orld is based upon the idea of “cu ltu ral relativism ”. I t w ants to show us the evolution of ethical principles; th a t th e social values w hich are of im portance for the su rv i­ val of a prim itive trib e do not play th e same role in a complex society. For exam ple, the duty of helping the w eak and the old m ay have to be p itted against the d uty of preserving th e prim itive tribe. In the more advanced societies th e principle of individual charity for th e weak and the poor became the first principle of m oral life. However, in the affluent societies of o u r time, w here th e abolition of poverty has become highly organized, “individual charity m ight again be deprecated as w eakening the drive to hasten the full em ergence of th e w elfare state.” 1 It is easy to show th a t th e social values are very relative w hen we tre a t the hum an being only on the cultural level, and w hen we neglect the organic m etabolism as th e basis for culture. It seems th a t only a holism w hich will join the biological aspect of life w ith the cultural and social aspects can help us in a search for universal social values.

In the holistic approach to the problem , it is v ery easy to realize th a t obligations are also those behaviours w hich condition our existence and w hich sim ultaneously are dependent upon our own volition. For in stan ­ ce, “to e a t” is a necessity and, a t the same time, an obligation. It is only an obligation because we can resist this necessity because this action is dependent upon our will, although such resistance w ould push us beyond the boundaries of life. Thus, the descriptive sentence “m an has to e a t” is also a norm ative sentence “man ought to e a t”. Of course, it could be said: “this is nonsense, because he who does not w an t to live w ill not eat and this does not change obligation into necessity”. This is tru e, b u t not w hen considered from a social point of view. This is tru e for th e in ­ dividual, but not for society, to the extent th at it wishes to be a sub­ ject of sociological ra th e r th an archaeological study.

Again, if I tre a t hum an life as a value, one can say: “life is of value to you bu t I ’m going to commit suicide” ; and he is rig h t — from an in ­ dividual standpoint, even life cannot be assum ed to be a „universal va­ lu e”. However, w hen we look upon individual life from th e social point of view, hum an life appears as a value in both cases because society needs live m em bers and because life for society as w ell as for an indi­ vidual is th e only platform for the discussion of social problem s. And w hoever pu ts him self beyond its boundaries excludes him self from the discussion.

It is well known th a t no other p art of the body of em pirical studies is so deeply im m ersed in th e problem of values and evaluation as are the social sciences. G unnar M yrdal wrote: “Scientific term s become v a­ lue-loaded because society is made up of hum an beings following p u r­ poses. A disinterested social science is, from this viewpoint, p ure nonsen­ se. It never existed, and never w ill exist. We can m ake out thinking strictly rational in spite of this, but only by facing th e valuations, not by avoiding them .” 2

T here exists a strong im pression th a t our valuation depends only on our will. This is tru e for the individual only. We can p refer things w hich are commonly disapproved and damned, b u t it is d ifferen t in th e case of social values. Each society accepts values w hich are recognized as enforcing its social w elfare. Of course, social w elfare could be diffe­ ren tly understood, b ut th ere is always a set of basic goals desired by people, goals w hich are necessary in th e stru ctu re of any society. I call them universal social values.

1 w an t to present here the problem of social values treated from th e point of view of th e sociology of knowledge. In order to do this, I should explain in w hat particu lar sense I use the “value” . I think it w ould not be w rong to say th a t it approxim ates the M arxian point of view, re ­ presented by T. H. Tawney. Namely, a standard of values “m ust be based

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on some conception of th e requirem ents of hum an n atu re as a whole, to w hich the satisfaction of economic needs is evidently vital, b u t w hich dem ands the satisfaction of other needs as well, and w hich can organize its activities on a ratio n al system only insofar as it has a clear appre­ hension of th e ir relative significance.” 3 If the acceptance of this point of view is a choice w hich contains certain valuations, I would like to see a pure scientist w ho never evaluates. As for me, I am compelled to m ake a choice. And, still worse, I am sure th a t it is impossible to m ake an analysis of facts w ithout the guidance of some accepted values. This is tru e of both n a tu ra l and social sciences. The difference between the form er and the la tte r in regard to intrinsic and instru m en tal value premises lies only in th e fact th a t they are characterized by different relationships betw een these tw o kinds of premises. C learly separated in the n atu ral sciences, in the social sciences they are obscured to such a degree th a t in th e process of carrying out social research we are sometimes unable to distinguish betw een them . N atu ral scientists m ust deal w ith intrinsic values only w hen th ey decide upon the selection of particu lar problem s for research, but social scientists always deal w ith aspects of hum an activity w hich cannot be set free from intrinsic va­ lues. However, in both fields we use value prem ises in m aking scienti­ fic observations aind later in the analysis of facts. Ju st as the Cartesian “cogito ergo su m ” is v ery tru e on the cognitive level of experience, on the practical level of everyday eNistence I th ink this to be true: “I choose ergo I am .”

H ere I ought to add th a t I consciously m ix up values, valuations and choice. They are so closely linked th a t for our sociological and non-philosophical discussion we can om it th e problem .

The idea of excluding the consideration of values from scientific activity sometimes leads to a conflict betw een the needs of society and the behaviour of scientists, as is clearly shown in the following example recorded by H oward Selsam d uring the Roosevelt adm inistration. The U.S. D epartm ent of A griculture organized a series of conferences to solve certain problem s of th e national society and of ru ra l life w ith a participation of representatives of all branches of th e social sciences. However, these specialists w ere w illing to discuss questions concerning the selection of desirable social objectives because, th ey m aintained, they w ere com petent to discuss only m a tters of fact, not of value, w hich lie w ithin th e dom ain of philosophy and religion. In resu lt of this situ a­ tion, the D epartm ent of A griculture rallied together philosophers and religious leaders to resolve ag ricultural problems. Therefore, Selsam asked: “How can philosophers aind religious leaders determ ine ’the desi­ rable objectives of our national society or our ru ra l life?’ They m ust do

so by deduction from some ab stract principles concerning eith er m an ’s ultim ate good in this w orld or the prerequisites for his salvation in the next, or else they m ust become social scientists and seek to do th e job th a t those who are technically b etter train ed and equipped have so w oefully neglected.” 4

There is a feed-back relationship betw een science and values. In other words, th ere is th e im pact of science on values as w ell as th e im ­ pact of values on science. B ut here I w ill focus on the im pact of science on values ra th e r th a n on th e inverse one.

People are interested in th e value-problem not only for p u rely in te ­ llectual reasons. O ur conscious or unconscious hierarchies of values de­ signate our norm s of behaviour. And in everyday life we have m uch more to do w ith norm s th an w ith values.

It is necessary to point out th a t social life is impossible w ithout norms; it begins w ith the creation of norm s. In order to pass over from certain values to certain norm s we usually base our valuation or our value opinions and prem ises on th e judgm ents about facts; and th e re ­ fore science has always a stronger or deeper im pact on our system s of norms th a n is commonly assumed.

It seems to be possible to say: th e deeper our em pirical knowledge of a given reality and the greater th e prestige of this knowledge, the greater th e im pact of it on our system of norm s and social values.

I suppose th a t we can seek them by w ay of em pirical research. We cannot discuss social values w itho ut certain conceptions of hum an nature, b u t in ord er to avoid an endless discussion about “hum an n a tu re ”, I tre a t this term as a conventional one, w here deeper analysis is unnece­ ssary. For m y purposes it will be sufficient to say th a t ap art from m e­ tabolic processes, common to all people, we can find certain hum an cravings expressed in different w ays and degrees, b u t common at least to th e peoples of all complex and know n civilizations.

Before discussing this point, I w ant to m ention the historical process which W. S tark calls “an evolution of science and an involution of re ­ ligion.” 5

In all so-called “sacred ” societies the hierarchy of values has been determ ined by religious or quasi-religious beliefs. But the religious universalism of th e C hristian world, as well as of others has been des­ troyed by the grow th of national pow ers w ith th e ir own local m orali­ ties and by the developm ent of m odern science, w hich has influenced m any spheres of the psychic and social life of man. Religion is becoming more and m ore a phenom enon in its own field, or, following A. N. W hite­ head’s thought, religion is w hat one does w ith his solitude. U nder th e

4 H. Selsam, Socialism and Ethics, New York 1943, p. 100.

5 W. Stark, ’’The Sociology of Knowledge and th e Problem of Ethics,” T ran­ sactions of the Fourth W orld Congress of Sociology, Vol. IV, 1959, p. 85.

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im pact of scientific knowledge religious m orality has given w ay to a wide extent to lay m orality. U nfortunately, lay m orality linked w ith neo-positivist ideology has lacked universality by definition.

The reason seems to be not only th e lack of a stable point of referen ­ ce, w hich religious m oralities have usually had in th e idea of God. Ah im portant role is played by the fact th a t for th e last th ree centures, philosophers have agreed w ith D. H um e’s statem ent th a t th ere does not exist any logical transition betw een facts and values. T hat is, of course, true. B ut the sociology of knowledge rem inds us th a t logic is not only a m ethod or m easurem ent of our correct, reasonable thinking. It is also a separate discipline of great prestige, and this prestige sometimes has an overw helm ing im pact on our conceptions of reality. Thus, even scientists are inclined to forget th a t th ere exist m any other ties and links w hich are not illogical but extra-logical, th a t could be a basis at least for suggestions for th e reasonable selection of values and above all “social values”.

David Hume, being a follower of the subjective conception of values, also wrote: “W hen you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you m ean nothing, bu t th a t from the constitution of your n atu re you have a sentim ent or feeling of blame from the contem plation of it.” 6

H um e’s m oral philosophy was of great significance. It liberated the developm ent of m odern science from religious and ideological burdens. His point of view became generally accepted in European philosophy. A fter him, another B ritish thinker, Edm und Burke, expressed the same idea in these words: ’’N othing universal can rationally be affirm ed of any m oral or any political subject.”

C ontem porary followers of the objective value theory can easily challenge these opinions. Statem ents such as “a beautiful thing is th a t which I like” and “a good thing is th a t w hich I crave fo r” — are sim pli­ fications only. The adjectives “b eau tiful”, “tru e ”, “good”, and “b ad”, are, on the morphological level, sim ilar to predictors, b u t on the level of syntax th ey are som ething else. Maybe it will be more com prehensible if I add th a t such term s as necessity, beauty, goodness, possibility, are not the characteristics of a given subject, b ut th ey belong to the sub­ jects as their designations which can be certified in modal senten­ ces. However, these statem ents w hich I have borrow ed from a Polish philosopher (Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz), are only of m arginal significance for the present discussion.

Due to the developm ent of the sociology of knowledge and science, we know th a t science is conditioned by the values accepted in society. The question is to w hat ex ten t can em pirical science be a source of th e propositions of values, or to w hat ex ten t can it be a platform for the selection and acceptance of values?

I am afraid to be accused of advocating “m oral totalitarisn ism ” or an ideal social order of the “Brave-N ew -W orld” type. Therefore, I have to emphasize th a t I only hope th a t in this age, w hich is often said to have w itnessed “the end of ideology”, a set of ideals w hich received scientific support could play an im p o rtan t social role. It is also nece­ ssary to point out th a t the same ideals could be arran g ed in different hierarchies in particu lar societies. The discovery of a t least a few of those values w hich are not tem porally or spatially determ ined m ay be of great im portance for m odern social life, w hich is increasingly in flu ­ enced by th e value-free n atu ral sciences and technology.

At the present tim e we have to keep in m ind L. von B ertalan ffy ’s w arning: “M ilitary hardw are, including the most advanced superbombs, will not save us w hen the w ill to live, the guiding ideas or values of life, have subsided.” 7

Is it not a paradox th a t despite this situation, w hich m ankind is now facing, science, the most integrating factor of m odern civilization, is not interested in seeking common social values and universal value goals? Today, even among n atu ral scientists, we can h ear m any voices in favour of value-goals research: “... in hum an behaviour goal-seeking and purposiveness cannot be overlooked, even if we accept a strictly behaviouristic standpoint.” 8

Despite the fact th a t all values are of extra-scientific origin by th e ir very nature, it seems th a t the social sciences ought to in teg rate th e ir efforts on this problem in order to assist those social and political p ro ­ cesses in w hich social value goals are chosen a rb itra rily by irresponsi­ ble people m otivated by emotion.

Turning to the above m entioned cravings, I w ould like to recall th a t just tw en ty years ago R. Lynd pointed to nine hum an cravings on th e level of personality w hich he defined as synonym ous w ith values. Let me recall them in abbreviated form:

“I. The hum an personality craves to live not too far from its own physical and emotional tempo and rhythm . ... As a p art of this craving to m aintain a tempo and rh y th m n a tu ral to it, the personality craves periods of latency and private recoil during w hich tim e space and other p er­ sons can be taken on its own term s w ithout coercion.

2. The hum an personality craves the sense of grow th of realization of personal powers and it suffers in an environm ent th a t denies growth, or fru strate s it erratically or for reasons other th an sim ilar needs for grow th in others.

3. The hum an personality craves to do things involving the felt sense of fairly im m ediate meaning.

7 L. von B ertalanffy, ’’World of Values and W orld of Science,” Teachers College Record, 6, 65, M arch 1964.

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4. The hum an personality craves physical and psychological secu­ rity (peace of mind, ability to ‘account a n ’ life’s continuities, and so on). 5. B ut hum an personality is active and cherishes, in varying degrees, the rig h t to exercise these optional insecurities. It craves novelty. It cra­ ves risk as exhilarating—w hen it is exhilarating.

6. As a corollary of the preceding, the hum an personality craves the expression of its capabilities through rivalry and competition; w ith resulting recognition of status.

7. B ut if riv alry and th e status it yields provide some of the arpeg­ gios of living, th e m ore continuous m elody is the craving of the perso­ n ality for hum an m utuality, sharpening of purposes, feelings, and actions w ith others. The personality craves to belong to others richly and confidently and to have them belong, in tu rn , to it.

8. The hum an personality craves coherence in th e direction and m aning of the behaviour to which it en tru sts itself in the same or d if­ feren t areas of its experience.

9. B ut th e hum an personality also craves a sense of freedom and diversity th a t gives expression to its m any areas of spontaneity w ithout sacrificing unduly its corresponding need for a basic integration of continuities.” 9

These cravings are sim ilar to the “four w ishes”—for security, expe­ rience, recognition and em otional response—originally set fo rth by W. J. Thomas and F. Znaniecki in the “Methodological N ote” to Polish Peasant in Europe and Am erica, w hich Lynd m entions in a footnote.

It seems to me th a t such kinds of personal cravings are actually synonym ous w ith values, b u t th ere is no equation m ark between them . I assume only th a t certain carefully selected cravings on the level of hum an personality could lead us to certain “social values”.

I use the te rm “social values” m ainly for two reasons:

1. I w ould like to distinguish as “social” values only those w hich can fulfill th e function of guideposts in social behaviour.

2. Some of them are attainable only in society, as a result of given relations among people.

One typical social value of universal extent seems to be solidarity. People not only cannot live alone, by definition, th ey struggle for exi­ stence in groups. One value, and at least one norm (as derivative from this value) is founded upon this fact. The value is th a t of solidarity, w hich is expressed by the norm “do not b etray th e group.” Obviously, no group can exist w ithout this norm. Of course, one can argue th a t this is ta u to ­ logical, because the idea of fidelity is included in th e v ery notion of group. However, the logical status of such a statem ent cannot change reality. All groups at all tim es and places have to accept this norm in order to exist.

Knowing how complex and difficult the problem of value is in its philosophical aspect I th in k th a t we ought to take into account ju st such a sense of values if we deal w ith them for practical goals.

O n the other hand, we ought to be especially careful w ith th e tro u ­ blesome relation betw een common sense language and th e language of our scientific stru ctu res if the system atic deliberation on social va­ lues is to have some practical m e a n in g .10

The problem is not only a scientific one. If science w ere to select some set of basic values accepted in all know n societies and a t all tim es—th at w ould be its most in tegrating idea for th e social life of our world.

The history of science allows th e recognition of an in terestin g p ro ­ cess: changes in the scientific approach to the problem of valuation. De­ pending upon the changing composition of the basic factors of a given civilization, in the span of ages scientists are more or less included to m ake up the problem of values and evaluation.

B ut we know b etter now th an before th a t in a sim ilar w ay as the so­ cial sciences all other branches of hum an endeavour arc conditioned by va­ lues dom inated in a given tim e and place. Therefore, the following opi­ nion of M yrdal published nine years ago is becoming more and more valid: “The most im portant thing is to m ake this unavoidable condition­ ing a conscious and deliberate situation, to change an uncontrolled general bias into a set of explicit and specific view points.”11

It seems to me th a t th ere is only one w ay to fu lfill this program : to revise our intellectual trad itio n dom inated by the positivistic con­ ception of science w ith its deeply rooted idea of the unavoidable gap betw een the w orld of science and the w orld of values. F u rth e r it is necessary to begin a serious holistic investigation of the social values among w hich exists—as most of us instinctively feel regardless of our scientific viewpoint—a set of undiscovered universal values.

Those who do not like to assume th a t rejection of th e idea of looking for universal values is only a result of th e p articu lar developm ent of science and a reaction against m any religious ideologies, m ust be rem inded th a t differen t hierarchies of values w ere created and ac­ cepted in differen t and separated cultures. Now, for the first tim e in history, m ankind is becoming an unseparated whole, and m odern mass media create a basis for a fu tu re universal culture. A basis w hich is being established today in th e ugly form of th e so-called mass culture.

The search for universal social values seems to be in Toynbee’s term s, th e very “response” to the “challenge” w hich our civilization is facing now.

10 H. G arnfinkel, ’’Some Contributions of Dynamic Psychology to th e Sociology of Knowledge,” Transactions of the Fourth World Congress..., pp. 67-84.