An inside-out analysis of the impact of migration

The impact of migration on Poland occurs mostly through links that migra-tion creates between individual Poles and foreign countries. A contrasting view of Poland as an isolated entity, suffering mostly loss as a result of mass emigration, does not reflect the lived reality of Polish people today.

Large numbers of Poles resident in Poland have at one time lived abroad.

Their past experiences and continuing social networks abroad help shape their lives after return from foreign countries. Moreover, the major-ity of Polish people, those ‘stayers’ who have never lived abroad, have

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contacts with Polish migrants. When these migrants are close relatives, both the stayers and the migrants find their thoughts constantly straying across nation-state borders. Iwona, for example, interviewed by White in 2016, had close family and friends in Italy. When asked what new habits her family in Lublin had adopted thanks to frequent visits to Italy, she said, ‘How we remind each other “But in Italy! It was like that! Do you remember?” ’ Wanda, a pensioner interviewed after her English- language class in Wrocław, described how she and her daughter, living near London, swapped packets of flower seeds, a botanical exchange that to Wanda symbolised the intertwining of Polish and English culture in their two lives. Family members of circular migrants in particular can find that they participate vicariously in the ‘half-and-half’ lives of their family members. When the latter spend time resting in Poland they seem to continue to half-live in the country where they work, frequently talking about the foreign country and drawing comparisons.

The story of migration’s impact on Poland should also include Poles abroad, even those who feel fairly settled. They often maintain close ties to Poland, so should be considered part of Polish society. Many other Poles come and go, changing their main country of residence more than once. Nowadays, it is impossible to draw a distinct line between Poles in Poland and a Polish ‘diaspora’ or ‘community’ abroad (known to Poles as

‘Polonia’). We prefer the term ‘Polish society abroad’. This concept indi-cates the existence of strong social relations among Poles, irrespective of the country in which they happen to be based. Rather than viewing migrants as members of no society at all, as is commonly assumed, it makes better sense to see certain migrants as simultaneously members of two societies. This is particularly true of mobile EU citizens, who have congregated in large numbers and represent a kind of microcosm of Poland in other member states  –  for example, Poles in the United Kingdom.

Social change in Poland is therefore connected to social change abroad. Of course, every migrant has their unique set of ties to Poland and feels connected to varying extents in different times and places. Some-times, the connection is hardly perceptible. In other cases, Poles deliber-ately try to achieve social change through activism across borders. Change probably occurs more often not through activism but as a process of mutual cultural influence. Sometimes this is unconscious, sometimes deliberate, when migrants and stayers try to persuade one another to change their habits, values or beliefs about diverse matters, from eating habits to racism. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, these are ‘social remit-tances’, which travel back and forth between the two societies, Polish

society abroad and Polish society in Poland. They often reinforce wider (particularly US) cultural influences.

In short, everyone in Poland is touched to some extent by migration and lives within the transnational social space. However, migration influ-ences some stayers more than others. Obviously, close family members are the most emotionally affected. However, in other respects the impact of migration is greatest in the lives and livelihoods of certain parts of soci-ety, especially Poles who are poorer financially, or less well-educated, or retired or resident in small towns and villages, or a combination of two or more of these. Social change in Poland is generally most observable in big cities and among more educated and younger Poles, partly because these sections of the population have the most exposure to a range of outside influences. Migration is not so important for them, since their lives are changing already for other reasons. It is more important for people who are less exposed to other influences.

Migration influences society by reinforcing or, in some cases, coun-teracting trends that are already occurring for other reasons. An example of counteraction would be its damaging effect on levels of belief that ‘most people can be trusted’. In common with other CEE countries, Poland, as it becomes more prosperous, is also more trusting than in the 1990s. How-ever, this is an uneven process, and young people exhibit high levels of mistrust. A discourse of hostility among economic migrants about other Poles, who supposedly let one another down and ‘act like wolves towards one another’, amplifies a mistrust of strangers that is already considera-ble in poorer parts of Poland that have high volumes of international migration.

Migration’s role in bolstering trends is apparent with regard to the drops in unemployment and poverty mentioned earlier in this chapter, but this is most marked at a subnational level. Registered unemployment in Poland declined from around 20 per cent in 2004 to around 6 per cent in 2008, and has remained low, while employment growth has been almost steady. The labour market, formerly characterised by a permanent over-supply of labour, is now marked by growing competition for workers (Roszkowska et al. 2017). Wages, both nominal and real, have risen con-siderably (see figure 5.1). Chapter 5 discusses the extent to which those developments are attributable to migration. On a national level, Kacz-marczyk concludes that the influence of migration is small but generally positive. On a subnational level, however, migration can have more visi-ble impact. In particular, the impressive level of job creation since 2004, which is linked to Poland’s healthy annual GDP growth (averaging 3.6 per cent, 2004–16) has not occurred everywhere, particularly in rural regions,

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which are characterised by small family farms and limited economic devel-opment. In such places, migration plays a clear role in driving down unemployment.

Although different ways of measuring poverty produce different figures, and the extent of poverty reduction can be disputed, Eurostat data suggest that the percentage of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion more than halved, from 45.3 per cent in 2005 to 21.9 per cent in 2016.¹⁸ Reasons include falling unemployment, rising wages and – very recently – more generous welfare provision. Money sent home by migrants as ‘economic remittances’ also plays a part.

According to World Bank data (World Bank 2016), the value of remittances increased from around 2.28 billion USD in 2003 to over 10 billion in 2007 and around 6.8 billion in 2015 (i.e. from less than 1 per cent to 1.3 per cent of GDP). Barbone, Pięńtka-Kosińska and Topińska (2012, 3) estimate that in 2008 remittances decreased the poverty rate by about 2 percentage points overall, although remittances varied con-siderably from region to region. In 2008, 1 per cent of households in Mazowieckie received remittances, compared with highs of 6 per cent, 4 per cent and 4 per cent in Opole, Pomerania and Podkarpacie respec-tively. They made a substantial difference to households who received them, where they constituted an average of 62 per cent of income.

Barbone, Pięńtka-Kosińska and Topińska also note a corresponding slight decrease in income disparities in Poland thanks to remittances.

Migrants’ ability to send remittances, and the capacity of remittances to reduce poverty, depend, however, on many factors, including the migrants’ positions in the receiving country labour markets, their migra-tion strategies and whether they return to settle in Poland. For instance, if they are working in poorly paid jobs abroad, migrants may not be able to save enough to remit; on the other hand, migrants with better jobs may wish to settle in the destination location and invest in the receiving coun-try rather than send money back home. As in other countries, studies on remittances sent home by Polish migrants document that most remitters use the money to cover costs of everyday consumption (around 60 per cent of all respondents), to improve their housing conditions (30 per cent, ren-ovation and purchase combined), to pay debts (15 per cent), to invest in children’s education (10 per cent) or simply to increase their savings (20 per cent). These patterns differ, however, not only between Polish regions but also according to the migrants’ countries of residence (Chmielewska 2015). Even if, in aggregate terms, the scale of remittances to Poland is not very high, it is commonly assessed as having significant and positive impacts on the Polish economy.

Qualitative research tends to support this conclusion, as illustrated above in the references to the strategies of ex-bootleg miners (Rakowski 2016) and former smugglers (Łukowski, Bojar and Jałowiecki 2009).

Heads of leading institutions interviewed across 64 locations in Poland in 2007 agreed that ‘the material situation was improving as a conse-quence of economic growth, income from abroad and agricultural subsi-dies’ (Gorzelak 2008b, 20). White (2016b) finds that poor, long-term unemployed people in Limanowa and Grajewo were migrating abroad, but not always very successfully. However, sociologists of poverty do not always identify migration as a livelihood strategy for the poorest people, and this may be quite place specific. Warszywoda-Kruszyńska and Jankowski, writing about enclaves of poverty in the city of Łódź, do not discuss migration, but they do argue that poor people are becoming dependent on shadow banks and constitute a precariat doomed to perpetual social exclusion unless the government intervenes (2013, 109–10).

Travel abroad is increasing among all sections of the Polish popula-tion; this includes retired people, even if they travel less than younger age groups. In 2009 only 7 per cent of Polish pensioners, when asked how they spent their free time, said they travelled outside Poland. By 2016 the fig-ure had risen to 22 per cent (Kolbowska 2009, 11; Omyła-Rudzka 2016a, 5). To some extent, this testifies to the increased prosperity of a section of the Polish population, who can afford to enjoy their leisure time in new ways. However, it also links to migration. Survey respondents aged over 55 are more likely than other age groups to mention visits to family and friends as reasons to travel abroad (Boguszewski 2016, 10).

For many older Poles, this is a significant new opportunity. For example, in Wrocław, Ewa commented, ‘We can get to see the world, learn English at first hand. . . . Otherwise I never would. Because we’re not from such a rich family and aren’t so well-off we could afford to go as tourists.’

Of course, this is not just a phenomenon among older people; there are Poles of all ages who would not be able to afford a foreign holiday but who now visit migrants abroad. For example, Malwina, a housewife, married to a manual worker, described in 2009 inviting a string of visitors from her small town near Ukraine to Bristol:

My sister and her husband have been twice, our friends have been, and now we have Mum. And we invite everybody who wants to come, let them come and see! They haven’t been abroad before, they didn’t have the opportunity, and now they have the chance to come and look. . . . They come just for a week or two. To see things, to go shopping.

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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, more Poles have been acquiring higher education thanks to its greater availability since 1989. Poles are also becoming more educated and skilled in other ways. In particular, knowledge of some foreign languages has spread. So too have transfera-ble ‘soft’ skills – though not to an extent commensurate with the needs of Polish employers.

In 1996, only 14 per cent of Polish people aged 17–21 declared they could make themselves understood in English (Grabowska and Kalka 2014, 133, 135). By 2005, 73 per cent of under-25s claimed some knowl-edge of English (Panek, Czapiński and Kotowska 2005, 41). The introduc-tion of mandatory English classes at school helps explain why this generation so readily migrated to Ireland and the United Kingdom. Since 2004 there is evidence, however, that not only does language knowledge facilitate migration from Poland, but also the reverse: migration is sup-porting better language knowledge within Poland. From 2009 onwards, survey evidence shows that the 25–34-year-old age group knew English better than any section of the adult population, even under-25s, whom one might expect to be the most confident, since they were currently study-ing languages. This suggests that many of those 25–34-year-olds had pre-viously used English at work abroad. Surveys of return migrants show that most consider language skills to be a significant gain from migration.

Return labour migrants to Małopolska in 2010 claimed they had learned much more by using their languages abroad than they had in formal edu-cation in Poland (CDS 2010a, 151–2). In surveys in Lower Silesia and Silesia, 87 per cent and 90 per cent of return migrants said they had learned or improved their language skills abroad (CDS 2010b and CDS 2011).

Polish employers indicate the importance today of competences such as independence, entrepreneurship, teamwork and communication skills.

However, they also complain that such skills are possessed insufficiently by workers in Poland (Religa 2014, 23–4, 42). It seems that return migra-tion helps address this deficit. Analysis of the Human Capital in Poland survey (2010–14) shows that the workers with the highest level of social skills are disproportionately well-represented among people who had engaged at some time in international migration, or had higher or second-ary education, or had lived in cities, or were aged 19–44, or were employed or owned their own businesses.

Although people working in their field of expertise can hone profes-sional skills abroad, even simple manual jobs provide opportunities for learning social skills. Obviously, workplaces vary. If workers interact with one another and customers, this provides opportunities for learning soft skills less easily acquired in other settings – for example, in a fish-freezing

factory, where migrants wear protective clothing and cannot speak to one another. Nonetheless, a migrant in any workplace can find points of difference with their Polish experience that prompt ‘aha’ moments of sud-den understanding (Grabowska 2017). The more transferable and uni-versal the skills and competences, the more they can be applied within a Polish workplace after the migrant returns. By contrast, this is not always the case for technical qualifications.

One such competence is entrepreneurship, often associated with return migration across the world. Poland is already a country of small businesses (Tarnawa et al. 2015); migrants help maintain the phenome-non. According to the Human Capital in Poland survey (2010–14), 13 per cent of return migrants, as compared with 11 per cent of stayers, ran their own business. Although there are many reasons why return migrants become entrepreneurs, it is also the case that returnees everywhere report that migration has enhanced their self-confidence. This self-confidence induces many to try their hand at setting up a business. As in other coun-tries, their ideas are often not original: yet another second-hand clothes shop or small building firm does not change the commercial landscape.

Sometimes, however, returnees fill gaps in the market. For example, among our interviewees and their relatives, a builder gave up his job abroad to pursue his passion for motorcycles, becoming a successful dealer in for-eign motorcycle parts; a former forester in Germany worked as a guide for Germans on hunting trips; and an investment banker from the United States opened the first quality restaurant in her small home town. Migrants on holidays back in Poland also patronise local shops and services and help keep them afloat.

A growth in entrepreneurial attitudes within society connects to increasing individualisation, understood as the greater sense of auton-omy and opportunity to shape one’s own life that has been present in post-communist societies since the 1990s. This individualisation contrasts with communist-era collectivism, even if collectivism never reached the levels in Poland that it did, for example, in the neighbouring German Democratic Republic. In the twenty-first century, individualisation is linked to the opportunities offered by more wealth in Polish society and EU-enhanced mobility.

The European Values Survey measures individualism by asking respondents to choose how far they consider themselves ‘autonomous individuals’. The data shows a 2.5 percentage point increase among Poles between 2005 and 2012.¹⁹ This increase must be linked partly to educa-tion and income, but must also derive from respondents having had con-fidence-building experiences such as migration. Garapich (2016c, 159)

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describes an ‘emphasis on self-determination’ among migrants from Sokółka, and Leśniak-Moczuk (2015, 155) similarly claims that return migrants to south-east Poland have become more independent. Our own interviewees mentioned developing a sense of independence through migration. For example, Lucyna, a returnee whom economic hardship had forced (in her view) to go abroad in the midst of her Polish university studies, commented:

Many people who aren’t planted in one place don’t have narrow views about society being uniform. That because I was brought up in this country I have to do the same as everyone else. Isn’t that true? I’ll fol-low the same path as the rest. No, the fact that you can simply have your own opinion, you should think things out for yourself, and so on, that’s how it [working abroad] gave me so much. I really grew up.

Religiosity is an area of Polish life where individualisation seems to be proceeding apace. Although the number of Poles believing in God dropped by only four percentage points in the first ten years after EU acces-sion (from 96 per cent in 2005 to 92 per cent in 2014 (Boguszewski 2015a, 37), attendance at weekly mass has fallen below 50 per cent, and many more Poles have begun to consider their faith to be their own affair.

In 2014, 52 per cent claimed that ‘I am a believer in my own way’, an increase of 20 percentage points since 2005. In 2005, the most popular response (66 per cent) had been ‘I am a believer and I adhere to the Church’s teachings’, but by 2014 only 39 per cent of respondents chose this answer (Boguszewski 2015a, 40). Although there are various reasons why Poles might be feeling less close to the Catholic Church as an institu-tion, such as the association of part of the hierarchy with extreme con-servative views, and the death of John Paul II, migration also seems to play a role. There is no evidence that migration is turning Poles into atheists.

However, it does seem to dent weekly attendance at mass, which is 10 per cent or less among Polish parishioners abroad. The falling-off partly seems linked to practical impediments, but migration also reinforces the idea that religion is a personal choice, as Poles become more familiar with other faiths or different variants of Roman Catholicism, and as part of the

However, it does seem to dent weekly attendance at mass, which is 10 per cent or less among Polish parishioners abroad. The falling-off partly seems linked to practical impediments, but migration also reinforces the idea that religion is a personal choice, as Poles become more familiar with other faiths or different variants of Roman Catholicism, and as part of the