Concepts of modal meanings

The view of a modal meaning that will be utilized in my study draws inspiration from COATES (1983). It seems that COATES (1983) once and for good does away with the notion, which is entertained by LYONS (1977) and PALMER (1974; 1979) for example, that modal meanings are discrete. As she

empirically shows, a feasible way of representing the meaning of a PDE modal is to show that it is structured like a fuzzy set, the concept of fuzzy sets being lifted from ZADEH (1965; 1970; 1971; 1972). What a fuzzy set implies is that a modal meaning has its center (“core”), transitional area (“skirt”) and borderline area (“periphery”). The occurrences of the verb emblematic of the core are describable in terms of a number of features which define the core.

The further away from the core an occurrence is, the smaller number of the features are conformed to. Understandably, peripheral examples share the smallest number of features with the core and, hence, they may be subject to interpretation as indeterminate between this and another meaning. The discrepancy between the nature of the core and periphery needs emphasizing:

the core membership is contingent upon the fulfillment of strict conditions.

Failure to comply with one or two of such conditions pushes an occurrence away from the core. The periphery, on the other hand, is blurred. The periphery of one meaning may resemble the periphery of another meaning, hence the overlapping of fuzzy modal meanings. The skirt is understood to be filled with occurrences of the modal not eligible for the core any more yet too obvious for the periphery at the same time. The range of the degrees of the fuzziness, with the core and periphery as the two opposite poles, receives the label “gradience” (COATES1983: 13, see also LEECH and COATES 1980).

In COATES’S (1983: 21) view, fuzziness does discriminate between non-epistemic and epistemic meanings. The occurrences of any PDE modal form a cline of subjectivity yet a modal with non-epistemic semantics additionally forms a gradient of modal strength. The modal strength of an example depends on its positioning in relation to the core, the core examples being strong and the peripheral examples being weak. It also bears remarking that COATES (1983) chooses, following HOFMANN (1976) and other scholars such as NEY (1978) for example, to handle all the non-epistemic modality under the collective heading “root modality.” The justification of her choice rests on the argument that the meaning of a particular modal often cuts across the deontic/dynamic division. Thus the term “root modality” helps “capture the fact that all the meanings of non-Epistemic MUST (for example) are related and can be shown to lie on a cline extending from strong »Obligation« (the core) to cases at the periphery where the sense of »Obligation« is extremely weak (where a more appropriate paraphrase would be »it is important that...«)”

(COATES 1983: 21). Importantly, the adoption of the alternative nomenclature is far from implying that the concept of modality is essentially different. Quite the opposite, COATES (1995) makes it clear that, in much the same mode as LYONS (1977) or PALMER (1986; 2001), modality is based on the notions of possibility and necessity extending through the root and epistemic domain. For the purposes of this study, however, the root/epistemic distinction is not sufficient. Since I seek to integrate the diachronic aspects into the description

of the obligation expressions in Old English, a more detailed division within the sphere of non-epistemic modality will be called for. The notation adopted will be explained presently.

Another perspective that has a bearing on the present study is TALMY’S

(1985; 2000) treatment of force dynamics as a category that underpins an understanding of a large portion of semantics, including modality. It is made explicit, however, that the force dynamic framework, as developed by TALMY

(2000), applies primarily to deontic modality. Thus in compliance with the pivotal premises of force dynamics, a given deontic modal meaning is a scene of the clash of two opposite forces. The forces are brought into existence by two participants, called Antagonist and Agonist, who are indelibly etched in the deontic context. In example (2.8)

(2.8) John can’t go out of the house.

(example taken from TALMY 2000: 412) John, the person subjected to the force of prohibition, would be the Agonist and he is understood to be willing to leave the house. The presence of the Antagonist, the other participant, although prototypically not shown overtly in the sentence with a modal, can be inferred from the context. The Antagonist might be John’s father who insists on the boy’s staying home. Inevitably, the opposite inclinations of the participants clash thereby producing a result dependent on the strength of the two forces. In the context of can’t of prohibition, the implication is that the force of the Antagonist prevails, that is to say, in (2.8) John stays home. Also, TALMY (2000) integrates instances of internal necessity, as with must or need, into his scheme. In such cases, the force opposition is played out within the subject’s self, one part of the self, the Antagonist, pressing the subject to act in a particular way and the other part, i.e. the Agonist, being determined not to act. TALMY (2000: 431) refers to such a situation as “the self divided.”

While TALMY (2000) generalizes the operation of force opposition over deontic contexts, it is SWEETSER (1990) who takes the theory one step forward and claims that it spills over epistemic modality as well. Concurring with TALMY’S (2000) idea of force opposition underlying deontic modality, SWEETSER (1990) believes that the operation of forces in language has a metaphorical basis. Just as the operation of physical forces is metaphorically extended to the social interaction (deontic modality), so are the social forces, such as permission or obligation, subsequently projected upon the world of reasoning (epistemic modality). This point is explained using the example of may of permission and may of epistemic possibility:

Given that the epistemic world is understood in terms of the socio-physical world, we can see why general sociosocio-physical potentiality, and specifically social permission, should be the sociophysical modality chosen as analogous to possibility in the world of reasoning. May is an absent potential barrier in the sociophysical world, and the epistemic may is the force-dynamically parallel case in the world of reasoning.

The meaning of epistemic may would thus be that there is no barrier to the speaker’s process of reasoning from the available premises to the conclusion expressed in the sentence qualified by may. My claim, then, is that an epistemic modality is metaphorically viewed as that real-world modality which is its closest parallel in force-dynamic structure. (SWEETSER 1990: 59)

While I will return to the issue of the significance of metaphor in the change of modal meanings in 2.5.3, at this point I should remark that a force-dynamic reading of deontic modality will figure significantly in my research. It is also of importance that the presence of an intentionally generated force “that has an interest in the event either occurring or not occurring” has been noticed outside cognitive linguistics by HEINE (1995: 29) and COATES

(1995). Curiously enough, in HEINE’S (1995) view, the operation of the force is what helps distinguish between deontic modality (his agent-oriented modality), where the force is actively present, and epistemic modality, which is free from it. Although I consider SWEETSER’S (1990) force-dynamic treatment of epistemic modality sound reasoning, which in its own right has inspired further research (cf. LOUREIRO-PORTO 2003; 2005), epistemic modality falls largely outside the scope of this monograph and will be dealt with only marginally.

Another theoretical ingredient of the present study is DE HAAN’S (1997:

47—54) “continuum model.” According to this line of reasoning, which goes back to HENGEVELD (1987) and SIEWIERSKA (1991), modal meanings form a continuum, separately in the deontic and epistemic domains. Obviously, it is the deontic continuum that is of interest here. The deontic continuum which stretches from weak modality to strong modality is made up by three notions:

permission, weak obligation, strong obligation. The modal system of the PDE modals, when confronted with the deontic continuum, yields the following sketch:

————————————————————————————————————————————

Weak Strong

may should must

(permission) (weak obligation) (strong obligation) Figure 1.The continuum of deontic modality (based on DEHAAN1997: 49)

DEHAAN(1997: 15) digresses that, say, may on the weak end of the continuum is used to represent the notion of permission rather than instantiate any particular occurrence of the verb. Hence the absence of can or ought. The position of the three notions on the continuum depends on the intensity of these notions. “The analysis relies on the fact that there is a gradual difference in intensity among the modals. For instance in [Present-Day] English, must is stronger in intensity than may and can” (DE HAAN 1997: 48). Although DE

HAAN(1997) does not specify exactly what is meant by this intensity, I suggest that we view the intensity of permission and obligation through a force-dynamic perspective. Permission is less intensive than obligation in the sense that it involves a force which the Agonist perceives as favorable. The attitude of the Antagonist, which SWEETSER (1990) sees as a barrier withheld, does not restrict the Agonist’s freedom of choice, rather, it leaves the Agonist carte blanche to act as they wish. In a context of obligation, be it weak or strong, there is a force generated by the Antagonist that significantly impinges on the Agonist’s freedom to act. Consequently, the force is prototypically considered unpleasant by the Agonist. Weak obligation, as in the ease of should, is less intensive than strong obligation in that the Agonist is in a position to oppose it much more efficiently than in the case of strong obligation. The fact that obligation ranges from weak to strong depends, then, on the strength of the force exerted by the Antagonist. The fuzziness of the modal meanings guarantees that the borderlines between the meanings on the continuum are blurred, so we can expect some amount of indeterminacy. In other words, it may not always be clear what kind of a force, weak or strong, favorable or unfavorable, is involved in a particular case.

Armed with this model of modality, I can finally unveil the nomenclature and the details of the division of non-epistemic modality to be used in the present study. For the purposes of this research, which are both synchronic and diachronic in nature, I have selected the theory of modality formulated by van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN (1998). The theory divides the field of modality in the way shown in Figure 2.

Essentially, van der AUWERA and PLUNGIAN’S (1998) division is a recasting of LYONS’S (1977) notion that modality pivots on possibility and necessity. The novelty of the approach can be seen in the treatment of non-epistemic possibility and necessity. The major split within non-epistemic modality occurs between two domains described as participant-internal and participant-external.

Witness that these terms have a special compatibility with the force dynamic view of modality. Thus there are four types of non-epistemic modality:

1. Participant-internal possibility (henceforth PI possibility) is taken here to involve an agent whose physical, mental and psychological characteristics act as the Antagonist while some part of the agent’s

self is the Agonist. The Antagonist generates a force of “positive enablement” (SWEETSER 1990: 53) which makes it possible for the agent to proceed in a given situation. The decision whether to proceed or not depends on the Agonist.

2. Participant-external possibility (henceforth PE possibility) casts two different entities in the roles of the Antagonist and Agonist. When the Antagonist is circumstantial, we have to do with non-deontic possibility or general PE possibility. In the case of the Antagonist being a person or some other institutional or doctrinal body, we speak about deontic possibility. Deontic possibility is logically equated with permission. The force of possibility, seen as a barrier withheld by the Antagonist, prototypically coincides with the Agonist’s desires and is viewed as favorable.

3. Participant-internal necessity (henceforth PI necessity) covers the contexts of the self divided. One part of the Agent’s self considers an action necessary and is determined to impose its inclination upon the other part of the self. In other words, PI necessity is concerned with an agent’s internal needs.

4. Participant-external necessity (henceforth PE necessity) again has the Antagonist and Agonist incarnated as two different participants.

As with possibility, depending on whether the Antagonist is to be linked with objective external reality or a particular person, including the speaker, a code of law, etc., two types of necessity come into play: general PE (non-deontic) and deontic. Since the transition from PE necessity to deontic necessity rests on the specification of the Antagonist, deontic necessity is subsumed under PE necessity. With both kinds of necessity, the force exerted by the Antagonist stands in strong opposition to that of the Agonist.

Possibility

Figure 2.Types of modality according to van der AUWERAand PLUNGIAN(1998: 82) and van der AUWERA(1999: 55)

When set against the background of the continuum of deontic modality shown in Figure 1, the notion of permission gravitates toward the weak end as it contains a rather non-intensive non-restrictive force generated by the Antagonist. The middle and upper stretches of the continuum are taken up by the necessity-based types of modality. General PE necessity and weak deontic necessity, as typically indicative of less restrictive forces, take up the middle area of the continuum.

Strongly subjective, performative contexts of deontic necessity which contain highly restrictive forces indicate the strong end. Needless to say, the idea of the continuum allows a whole range of intermediate cases. To explore the verbal means of expressing the necessity part of the continuum in Old English is a primary objective of this research. I seek to identify the location of OE verbs of necessity and permission on the continuum of deontic modality.