The eruption of World War II, beginning with the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, shook and ultimately dismantled the Versailles order created in 1919. For Poland and its people, the invasion and subsequent occupation unleashed a terror the likes of which no one had yet experienced.
Even though Polish-Ukrainian attitudes were taxed prior to the outbreak of war, the invasion prompted legal Ukrainian political parties to side with the Polish state with a desire to ultimately prevent the suffering that the population was now vulnerable to. An August 24, 1939 UNDO platform declared: “Ukrainian society will fulfill its civic duty…superimposed by the fact of belonging to the Polish state.” During a Sejm session of September 2, UNDO leader Vasyl’ Mudryi, while accepting the August memorandum, further underscored Ukrainian desires to fulfill their civic responsibilities including the ultimate sacrifice for the state as the abandonment of the Carpatho Ukrainian question as well as the German-Soviet pact created disappointment toward German plans for Ukrainians and a necessity to side with a contending force.160
The defense of Poland included Ukrainian citizens activated or called-up for army service during the delayed general mobilization in late August and September.161 Prior to the
160 Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (PISM) London, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych (MSW), folder A.9/V.32, Deklaracja Narodniego Komitetu UNDO, 24 August 1939; Mychajło Szwahulak, “Stanowisko i udział Ukraińców w niemiecko-polskiej kampanii 1939 roku” in Polska-Ukraina: trudne pytania, vol. 4 (Warszawa: Światowy Związek Armii Krajowej – Związek Ukraińców w Polsce, 1999), 51-52; Mirosław Czech and Mirosław Sycz, “Sprawy polsko-ukraińskie w czasie II wojny światowej. Rozmowa z docentem Ryszardem Torzeckim.” Zustriczi no. 3-4 (1990), 104.
161 The overall Ukrainian mindset towards service in the Polish army during the interwar period had been split following the March 1923 Conference of Ambassadors decision to include Eastern Galicia into the borders of the Second Polish Republic which gave legal precedent for recruitment of soldiers from this territory. During a debate in the Sejm, a Ukrainian member of parliament stated that the territorial position the Ukrainians found themselves in was against their will while service in the armed forces was equated to “the most tragic,
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outbreak of war, out of 156 thousand citizens actively serving in the armed forces, Ukrainians comprised 10 percent (15,729). Mobilization and war included a large number of reservists.
The Polish military planned to mobilize a total of 1.5 million Poles. In actuality, between 950 thousand – 1 million successfully mobilized between September 9 and 14. The actual number of Ukrainians who served in the Polish army during the September campaign ranged. Some estimated between 106 and 111 thousand Ukrainians fought while others proposed a broad estimate of 100 to 200 thousand. It can be safely assumed that no more than 120 thousand Ukrainians served in the Polish Army. Similarly, the number of Ukrainian prisoners of war ranged. One estimate suggested 60 thousand men found themselves in German captivity with no more than 20 thousand in Soviet captivity. Others proposed between 110 and 120 thousand Ukrainians in German captivity and over 42 thousand taken by the Soviets.162
Regardless of the actual numbers, Ukrainian military service at all levels was overall good. Ukrainians fought on the frontlines against the advancing Wehrmacht throughout western Poland. Others assisted in the defense of Warsaw and Lwów. While Ukrainian officers were in the minority, some, like Luka Pavlyshyn, were taken prisoner; only to later escape and eventually join the OUN. Others like Colonel Pavlo Shandruk, through his service during combat in the Zamość region, gained recognition for heroism and bravery. A contract officer of the Polish Army during the interwar period, he later reminisced of his moral obligation to fight: “It was unthinkable to be wearing the uniform of a Polish soldier and to take it off at a time of Poland’s calamity – in any case I never even considered it, and most of our contract officers stayed in the armed forces and conducted their duty honorably.”163 In a letter sent to him, General Władysław Sikorski lauded the honor which the Ukrainian soldier preserved in accordance with the affirmation made by the Ukrainian representation during the last session of parliament on September 2.164
The destabilization of Poland led to the release of many Ukrainians imprisoned by the prewar government just prior to war's outbreak in Siedlce, Brześć on the Bug or in the infamous Bereza Kartuska prison.165 As early as September 5, the government ordered the release of political prisoners with sentences of 10 years or less; by September 9 and 10,
unbearable burden” particularly since a part of the Ukrainians were forming their own nation and a subsequent part was forced to strengthen a “foreign nation.” Conversely, Ukrainian nationalist organizations saw service in the army as a benefit for their militaristic causes; they emphasized the necessity of officer training. Waldemar Rezmer, “Stanowisko i udział Ukraińców w niemiecko-polskiej kampanii 1939 roku” in Polska-Ukraina: trudne pytania vol. 4 (Warszawa: Światowy Związek Armii Krajowej – Związek Ukraińców w Polsce, 1999), 16-17.
162 Tadeusz Antoni Kowalski, Mniejszości narodow w siłach zbrojnych Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1918-1939 (Torun: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1999), 120; Rezmer, “Stanowisko i udział Ukraińców...,” 24; Szwahulak, “Stanowisko i udział Ukraińców ...,” 56-57.
163 Vasyl’ Shehliuk, “Iak rosa na sontsi:” Politychnyi roman-khronika, napysanyi na osnovi spohadiv kolyshn’oho diiacha OUN-UPA L.S. Pavlyshyna (L’viv: Feniks, 1992), 37-38; Pavlo Shandruk, Arms of Valor trans. Roman Olesnicki (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1959), 169. As Shandruk noted, the stipulations of the Ukrainian contract officers agreed upon with the Polish state included one which allowed the officers the right to terminate their contracts, particularly in the event of war against Germany.
164 Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy..., 24-25.
165 Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939, 1013. For a Ukrainian perspective of the Bereza Kartuska detention facilities, see for example the memoirs of Volodymyr Makar, Bereza Kartuz’ka: Spominyny z 1934-35 rr. (Toronto: Liga Vyzvolennia Ukraїny, 1956).
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political prisoners and criminals were released throughout central and eastern Poland with explicit orders to head east. Among them were OUN activists Mykola Lebed, Mykola Klymyshyn and Stepan Bandera – men who would later assume leadership roles within the Banderite fraction of the OUN. Bandera fled to Lwów but, due to the Soviet advance, was forced to take a detour and stop in Rawa Ruska.166
On September 3, 1939 Mel’nyk met with the eastern department head of the foreign office in Berlin. The OUN vozhd’ was told in no uncertain terms that Ukrainian armed involvement against Poland lay neither in Ukrainian or German interests. That early in the war, the foreign office believed all of Poland would fall to Germany. As such, he urged Mel’nyk to reserve his forces for the future.167 Immediately following the invasion, Wehrmacht Group South reported of anti-Polish moods along the Polish-Hungarian border:
“Sabotage acts are piling up, the Ukrainians are terrorized by the Polish side.”168 As of September 10, when Wehrmacht Group South reached Przemyśl – and the Soviet sphere of influence – General Walter Walimont prepared a call to the Ukrainians. In his service diary, Abwehr officer Helmuth Groscurth noted under September 10 that western Ukrainian territories were to fall within the Soviet sphere of interest. In this way, Groscurth wrote, “we gave up the Ukraine for the third time!” Several hours later, he wrote: “Release the Bergbauernhilfe from police duties!” He was undoubtedly aware of instances in which BBH-men were used for guard or police duties.169
Certainly, the German decision of whether or not to unleash a Ukrainian nationalist-inspired uprising behind their offensive lines vacillated during the first weeks of war; plans changing by the day or even by the hour. Here, it is necessary to remember that Berlin treated the Ukrainian matter as their “ace in the hole,” i.e. a concerted form of pressure to induce Moscow to attack Poland as quickly as possible. Failure to do so equated to the possibility of new state entities forming on the Soviet’s doorstep. Since the Nazi-Soviet pact failed to thwart Poland’s western allies from intervening in the conflict as Hitler had envisioned, albeit only formally at the moment, the Germans needed to alleviate military forces in the east to defend their western borders from a possible British-French attack. The Reich began pressuring its ally into fulfilling its end of the pact as early as September 4.170
166 Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy…, 27; Mykola Klymyshyn, V Pokhodi do Voli vol. 1 (Toronto: 1975), 266.
Klymyshyn estimated that, apart from Bandera, some 15 thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were freed from Polish prisons.
167 Knysh, Pered pokhodom na skhid vol. 1, 100.
168 BA-MA, RW 5/352, Nr. 037/39g Ausl. I: Außen- und militärpolitische Nachriten, September 5, 1939, p. 35.
The report also mentioned Hungarian propaganda agitating Galician Ukrainians to join their side.
169 Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher einer Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), 202-203; Knysh, Pered pokhodom na skhid vol. 1, 112.
170 Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskwą..., 107-110; 117-118. The Ukrainian matter was not the means by which the Germans attempted to induce the Soviet Union into attacking Poland. Ribbentrop approached the Hungarians with propositions of granting them Polish territory near Subcarpathian Rus (including the cities of Sambor and Turka). Even though the Hungarians refused to take-up German offers, had they done so, it would have come at the expense of the stipulated Soviet sphere of influence. In a similar way, the Germans also flirted with the Lithuanians; proposing them the annexation of the Vilnius region. Sławomir Dębski correctly noted
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On September 11, the Wehrmacht telephoned the foreign office, calling to trigger an uprising on Ukrainian territory in southeastern Poland. Groscurth noted this was declined temporarily by the foreign office with “great confusion” abounding over the situation.
Several hours later, Hitler decided to postpone the uprising as, once unleashed, he envisioned it turning against both Poland and the Soviet Union.171 The next day, Canaris and Lahousen met with Hitler on his personal train in Upper Silesia. Various options for Poland were discussed: a new partition along the demarcation line agreed upon with the USSR, the creation of a quasi-autonomous rump Polish state (Reststaat) or the subdivision of what remained to create an independent west Ukrainian state from Galicia; something along the lines of the ethnic dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.172 Canaris received orders to make preparations with the Mel’nyk group for a revolt in Eastern Galicia in case a final decision was reached for an independent Ukrainian state “which has as its goal the destruction of everything Polish and the Jews.” However, in no way could it politically expand toward Soviet Ukraine.173
Mel’nyk then met with Canaris in Vienna. The intelligence chief congratulated him on “the successful resolution to the western Ukrainian question.” It was to become independent. However, Lahousen warned Mel’nyk not to get his hopes up quite yet as the matter still remained indefinite. Regardless, Mel’nyk and the OUN executive hastily set to work on a coalition government led by Omelian Senyk and consisting of OUN and Galician nationalists. The Germans also agreed to transmit radio propaganda to Ukrainians in Poland.
According to Groscurth, Mel’nyk broadcast from a military radio station in Vienna to Ukrainians in Poland, calling on them to welcome Wehrmacht troops as they came “as a friend of the Ukrainians.” A radio station in the Slovak city of Prešov was also left to the OUN’s disposal. On September 12, Groscurth noted in his journal that the Abwehr ordered the Ukrainian BBH battalions to begin activity.174 Several days later, Canaris gave concrete
that both incidents showed the uncertainty among Reich officials of whether or not the Soviet would fulfill their promises during the first week of the war.
171 BA-MA, RW 5/499, Das Tagebuch von Erwin Lahousen, p. 15; Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939, 999; Groscurth, Tagebücher einer Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940, 203.
172 Norber Müller, et al. Das Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, 2007), 129-131. After the Soviet invasion of Poland, former German ambassador to Poland Hans von Moltke was ordere to prepare a memorandum concerning the eventual creation of some sort of Polish state under German protection. He believed this was possible only after also gaining some eastern territory occupied by the Soviets; he envisioned an eastern border running along the Grodno-Przemyśl line. Only in this case did he believe the Germans could win-over Poles to their side. He envisioned some 12-15 million inhabitants in this
“Polish state;” what he saw as a buffer between the Reich and USSR. Moltke believed creating a “Polish state”
strictly on Reich-occupied territory was impossible. On September 25, 1939 the German ambassador in Berlin was told in no uncertain terms by Stalin that no remnants could be left from Poland. After this, Stalin proposed exchanging Lithuanian territory for the Soviet-occupied Lublin region. Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskwą…, 126-127.
173 Mueller, Canaris: The Life and Death of Hitler’s Spymaster, 164; Groscurth, Tagebücher einer Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940, 357-359; Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939, 1001.
174 Groscurth, Tagebücher einer Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940, 268; Knysh, Pered pokhodom na skhid vol. 1, 100.
The draft constitution draw-up by Stibors’kyi envisioned an authoritarian-totalitarian state led by a vozhd’ who would be accountable only to God, nation and conscience. Other articles stipulated a Ukraine for Ukrainians. A Melnykite “state planning commission” was organized in 1939/1940 to deliberate other legislation for the future
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orders: the Ukrainian military staff was to immediately contact Wehrmacht Group South while Mel’nyk was to be at his disposal. To discuss the issue with Ukrainians, Canaris ordered Iaryi leave Kraków and meet with him.175
On the ground, the nationalists ordered Ukrainians to prepare for what they thought would be eventual Polish repressions or anti-Ukrainian manifestations. Following the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939, Ukrainians engaged retreating Poles or even advancing Soviets. These occurrences varied from aversion toward the Polish army (expressed for example in the reluctance or refusal by some Ukrainians to feed soldiers) to armed skirmishes or attacks on them and civilians. In some towns, Ukrainians formed ad hoc militias, wearing blue and yellow armbands and even arming themselves from leftover weapons following Polish-German battles. In the southeastern borderland city of Przemyśl for instance, members of the quickly formed Ukrainian civil guard briefly captured it following the Polish retreat. In response, the Polish police conducted raids or manhunts on OUN members as was the case in parts of Eastern Galicia.176
Between September 10 and 15, battles erupted in parts of Eastern Galicia; what could be described as provocative-offensive subversive acts. The impetus for this may have been the Wehrmacht occupation of Sambor on September 11. In Stryj, Ukrainian nationalists succeeded in running out the remnants of the local police before retreating Polish soldiers removed them.177 Incidents occurred in which innocent civilians fleeing the Germans were the target of attacks; either robbed or murdered. Settlers and landowners were also the target of Ukrainian revenge against the old Poland. Polish historians cautiously suggest that as many as 2 thousand Poles fleeing the German invasion east fell victim to Ukrainian attacks in two counties of the Stanisławów and Tarnopol voivodships.178 OUN historiography also recalls the battles against retreating Polish policemen or soldiers. According to one
‘insurgent,’ attacking retreating Poles was the best way to capture valuable weapons. Knysh claimed some apprehended Poles were turned over to the oncoming Soviets in parts of Eastern Galicia.179
state. This included land reform, giving the state the right to confiscate land from all those deemed “foreigners.”
Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth…,” 324.
175 BA-MA, RW 5/499, Das Tagebuch von Erwin Lahousen, p. 17.
176 Sowa, Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie..., 77; 80; Chinciński, Forpoczta Hitlera..., 306. The topic of Ukrainian anti-Polish occurences and attacks in southeastern Poland during the September campaign has yet to gain the scholarly attention it deserves. Concerning the question of who may have instigated the occurences and how.
Aside from Ukrainian nationalists and the Germans, Sowa also believes that Soviet conspirators and diversionaries may have contributed to provoking local people against the crumbing Polish state so as to cause havoc and disorganization behind an eventual Polish-Soviet front line.
177 Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy…, 27-29; Bolianovs’kyi, Ukraїns’ki viis’kovi formuvannia…, 37; Knysh, Pered pokhodom na skhid vol. 1, 128. The “trophies” of the Ukrainian Legion for September 1939 included: 7 cannons, 34 heavy cannons and machine guns, 80 light machine guns, 14,850 grenades, trains and 54 mechanized vehicles.
178 Struve, Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt..., 109-117; Sowa, Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie..., 84-88.
179 Mirchuk, Narys istoriї OUN vol. 1, 586-587; Knysh, Pered pokhodom na skhid vol. 1, 128; Stepan Goliash,
“Perekhid cherez kordon pidpil’nykiv z Berezhanshchyny” in Volodymyr Makar (ed), Boiovi druzy. Spomyny vol. 1 (Toronto: Ukrainian Echo, 1980), 323-324.
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Sushko, Baranovs’kyi, Boidunyk and their driver Kost’ Meln’yk reached Sambor on September 15 where they set-up temporary headquarters with the purpose of moving to Lwów as soon as possible. Andrii Mel’nyk accompanied them. In Sambor, Drohobycz and Stryj, the two confiscated Polish police and starosta archives.180 BBH-men quickly organized Ukrainian administrations in villages along the Polish-Slovak border. New administrators swore an oath of loyalty to a non-existent Ukraine. Perceived colonists, i.e. non-autochthons of the region – teachers, priests, or administrators – sent to strengthen Polish elements were arrested. Tell-tale symbols of the “new authority” in these regions were Ukrainian flags hung from churches and public buildings. As Knysh described, every OUN member knew what was expected of him: to grasp authority in their hands, to destroy all enemies and to instill a Ukrainian character throughout their territories.181 In other words, this was Ukrainian nationalist revenge for twenty years of Polish marginalization and anti-Ukrainian policies boiling over. The German attack on Poland combined with the state of panic and chaos caused by it proved the opportune time for the OUN to right those wrongs.
Moreover, attacks on Poles and the swift ukrainization of village administrators in southeastern Poland combined OUN doctrines. It echoed Kolodzyns’kyi’s vision of building a state “from the first village” while beginning Stsibors’kyi’s 1939 plan for national revolution. The process envisioned ethnically cleaning Soviet Ukraine, Galicia and Volhynia of “foreign parasitic growth” by first killing off “[a] large part of the Russian, Polish and other immigrants.” The rest would be removed by legislative and administrative means. After concluding treaties, the nationalist Ukrainian government would demand non-Ukrainians be repatriated.182 For the OUN, stage one of their national revolution was underway as they sought to “liberate” Ukrainians from what remained of Poland.
Ukrainian nationalists viewed the uprising as their liberation from Polish rule. In total, the OUN counted a total of 7,729 insurgents participating in combat operations in 183 locations throughout 20 Eastern Galician and Volhynian counties between September 1 and 23.183 Knysh claimed the Soviets had no one to liberate as Ukrainians freed themselves with the help of the OUN.184 As Kai Struve astutely concluded, the use of Ukrainians in this fashion by the Germans – creating a military unit and causing disturbances behind enemy lines – was a successful test-case; parallels from which would be drawn from and repeated by them later in preparations for their invasion of the USSR.185 For their part, both Berlin and
180 Mel’nyk, “Kindrat-Sych. Polk. Roman Sushko” in Orhanizatsiia Ukraїns’kykh Natsionalistiv 1929-1954, 39;
Boidunyk, Na perelomi, 47-48. Boidunyk recalled that Sushko made some sort of contact with the German command and that he “quickly exploited this for Ukrainian matters and Ukrainians,” this relates to his role in saving the lives of two local Ukrainians who were sentenced to death by an ad hoc German military “court” for
Boidunyk, Na perelomi, 47-48. Boidunyk recalled that Sushko made some sort of contact with the German command and that he “quickly exploited this for Ukrainian matters and Ukrainians,” this relates to his role in saving the lives of two local Ukrainians who were sentenced to death by an ad hoc German military “court” for