The Problem of Cognition as an Ontological Question

A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FOLIA P H IlOSOPHICA 6, 1480

Ba rb a ra Tuchariska

THE PROBLEM OF COGNITION AS AN ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION

The b e l i e f t h a t c o g n i t i o n s t i l l demands p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e f l e c ­ t i o n s e r v e s as a s t a r t i n g p o in t f o r my s tu d y . K a n t ' s tra n sc e n d e n ­ t a l i s m arid the p h i l o s o p h i e s of F i c h t e , H e g el, Marx, N i e t z s c h e , H u s s e r l , and H eidegger, which d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y o r i g i n a t e in i t , determin e the t h e o r e t i c a l f i e l d in which the q u e s tio n of c o ­ g n i t i o n i5 asked in a new way, no lo ng e r n a t u r a l i s t i c or psycholo- g i s t i c . Due to the n o t i o n a l c o n ten t of t h i s f i e l d and the s t y l e of p h i l o s o p h i s i n g e la b o r a t e d in i t , the problem of c o g n i t i o n chan­ ges in to an o n t o l o g i c a l i s s u e , i . e . , i t becomes p o s s i b l e ask about the o n t i c s t r u c t u r e of c o n g n i t i o n .

I ._ On t o b j g i с a 1 С a tego r i e s of P ost-Kant.ian P h i l o soptvy

K a n tia n tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m q u estion ed the n o t i o n a l b a s i s of tra­ d i t i o n a l e p istem ology and i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mode of c o n c e p t u a l ­ i z i n g c o g n i t i o n ( e . g . m e c h a n i s t ic mode), c a n c e le d i t s q u e s ti o n s , and in tro d u c e d in t h e i r p la c e i t s own ta s k s and problems.

The task of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c r i t i q u e - as Kant h im s e lf saw i t - was to c l e a r human c o g n i t i o n , i . e . , to demonstrate how c o g n i t i o n , r e a l i z e d by a s e n s u a l and t h i n k i n g i n d i v i d u a l , became p o s s i b l e p r e c i s e l y as c o g n i t i o n , in i t s p u r e ly e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n , and not in p r a c t i c a l , s o c i a l , e t c . ones. The problem r a i s e d by Kant was m od ifie d in the subsequent t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s . I t was accepted t h a t co n s c io u sn e ss i s from i t s v e r y n a tu r e i n t e n ­ t i o n a l , t h a t i t o p e r a t e s , as c o n s c io u s r .c s s , o n ly w i t h i n the i n t e r n a l l y o p p o s i t i o n a l s u b j e c i t v e - o b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y . Hence, o b j e c t i v i t y does not have to be w a rra n te d c o g n i t i o n through trans- c e n d e n t a l i s t c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . B e s i d e s , in p o s t - K a n t ia n p h ilo s o p h y the " o n t o l o g i z a t i o n " o f c o g n i t i o n was r e a l i z e d .

F i c h t e ' s going beyond K a n t 's p o s i t i o n r e s o l v e s i t s e l f e s s e n t ­ i a l l y - as I t h in k - i n t o t h e - s t a t i n g t h a t i t i s not enough to r e ­ duce, as Kant did i t , the f o rm a t iv e a c t i v i t y of human c o n s c io u s ­ ness to p u r e ly c o g n i t i v e c r e a t i v i t y , which i s a c o n s t i t u t i n g an o b j e c t as a phenomenon r e l a t i v i z e d to human s e n s u a l i t y and r a t i o ­ n al mind. I n such a s i t u a t i o n , n o n - r e l a t i v i z e d .and a u t h e n t i c a l l y

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r e a l e x is t e n c e should have to b e . a t t r i b u t e d to the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . Whereas a c c o rd in g to F i c h t e , the id ea of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f can­ not be r e c o n c i l e d w it h tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m which demands suspending a l l . o n t o l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . As a consequence of t h i s , F i c h t e a s ­ sumes t h a t the pure I c r e a t e s tlie o b j e c t not only as the o b j e c t of c o g n i t i o n but as being because the pure I i s in i t s e l f a u n i t y of being and s e l f - t h o u g h t . This pure I can be e m p i r i c a l l y compre­ hended as the g e n e ra l human I , and c o g n i t i o n - as a c o n s t i t u e n t of a c t i v i t y of humanity. I t i s p r a c t i c a l , e t h i c a l a c t i v i t y and g i v e s sense both to i t s s u b j e c t s and i t s o b j e c t s . I n t h i s way, the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y a c q u i r e s e t h i c a l c o n t e n t , y e t i s s t i l l t r e a t e d by F i c h t e on the p u r e l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ground. I t was on ly S c h e l l i n g and Hegel who o n to lo g iz e d the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y by in t r o d u c i n g the m eta p h y s ic a l id ea of t o t a l , s e l f - c r e ­ a t i v e a c t i v i t y , i . e . , the idea of h i s t o r i c a l being which c r e a t e s i t s e l f through o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y .

I t h in k t h a t e x a c t l y such a s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y i s c o n s id e rd i n . c e r t a i n p o s t- K a n tia n p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s , though c o n c e p t u a liz e d in d i f f e r e n t ways. What I have i n mind here are the p h i lo s o p h ie s of H ugei, Marx, N i e t z s c h e , H u s s e r l , and Heidegger. What i s more, I t h in k t h a t one cou ld f i n d in these t h e o r i e s a s e t of common to a l l of them fundamental q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of the t o t a l ­

ity!. Of c o u rs e , these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s have v a r i e d c o n t e n t s , and a re formed i n t o d i f f e r e n t h i e r a r c h i c a l system s; but one can s t i l l see a c e r t a i n fundamental c o n te n t of these c a t e g o r i e s which they a l l s h a r e . In p h ilo s o p h y o f H e g e l such a fundamental q u a l i ­ f i c a t i o n of the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y i s i t s h i s t o ­ r i c i t y ; M a r x c o n s id e r s s o c i a l n a t u r e of the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y ; N i e t z s c h e a n a ly s e s i,ts a x i o l o g i . c a l n a t u r e ; H u s s e r l c o n c e n t r a t e s upon t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c io u s n e s s , which i s the base f o r c r e a t i n g a „ s u b j e c t i v e - o h j e c i t v e e m p i r i c a l whole,- and e s s e n t i a l l y i t s i n- t e r s u b j . e c t i v i t y ; and in H e id e g g e r 's p h ilo s o p h y ,

Da-s e i n , i . e . , s p e c i f i c a l l y understood human being which i s a s u ­ b j e c t o f e x i s t e n c e , i s c o n s id e re d as a source of a s e n s i b l e u n i t y of man and h i s w o rld . I cannot show here in a more d e t a i l e d way t h a t the p h i lo s o p h ie s which I have i n v e s t i g a t e d a r e - lo c a t e d in one n o t i o n a l f i e l d , which they p e n e t r a t e and express in d i f f e r e n t ways, but I am p o s i t i v e th?i- the above-mentioned no­ t i o n s are the main c a t e g o r i e s of these t h e o r i e s . A c l o s e r ana­ l y s i s should show a l s o t h a t in a l l of them, fundamental c a t e g o r i e s were accompanied by b a s i c a l l y the same, y e t d i f f e r e n t l y expressed

t h e i d e 9 o f t h e s e l f - c r e a t i v e c h a ­

r a c t e r o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e

t o t a l i t y . The t o t a l i t y i s t r e a t e d th e re not s u b s t a n t i a l l y but d y n a m ic a lly , i . e . , as the s a l f - c r e a t i o n , the o b j e c t i v i z a l i o n s of which a re s u b s t a n t i a l s u b j e c t i v i t y and f a c t u a l i t y . Such i s the c h a r a c t e r of H e g elia n becoming as the u n i t y of Being and N o th in ­ gness; such i s the n a tu re of s o c i a l p r a x i s in p h ilo s o p h y of Marx; human c r e a t i v i t y in N i e t z s c h e 's c o n c e p tio n ; t ra n s c e n d e n ta l con­ s c io u s n e s s in H u s s e r l ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; arid E x i s t e n c e in H eid e­ g g e r ' s p h ilo s o p h y .

Thanks to these t h e o r i e s we o b t a in the t h e o r e t i c a l sphere, the dim ensions of which a re the above-mentioned c a t e g o r i e s of h i ­ s t o r i c i t y , of what i s s o c i e t a l , a x i o l o g i c a l , and of in te r - s u b je c ­ t i v i t y and " e x i s t e n t i a l s u b j e c t i v i t y " . ' I n s i d e t h i s sp he re , cognit­ ion can be understood as an o n t i c phenomenon, as an event or a p ro c e ss e s s e n t i a l l y c o n t r i b u t i n g to the human world which i s t r e a t e d here as an o n t i c p r i m o r d i a l i t y . C o g n it io n , understood in t h i s way, appears to be a c o n s t i t u t i v e element of the s e l f - c r e a ­ t i v e s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y .

I I . C o g n itio n as an Ont i c Phenomenon

The r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s an element of the s e l f - c r e a t i o n o f the o n t i c t o t a l i t y , may - though not n e c e s s ­ a r i l y - leo'l to an u nd e rstan d in g of c o g n i t i o n as the p ro c e ss of s e l f - c r e a t i o n . I t does not have to le a d to t h i s s in c e the assumpt­

ion t h a t p a r t s have the samé q u a l i t i e s as the whole to which *. iey belong i s not a n e c e s s a ry p r e r e q u i s i t e . T r e a tin g c o g n i t i o n in such a way seems, however, i n d is p e n s a b le i f the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n

f a

G

of c o g n i t i o n as an o n t l c phenomenon i s to be p o s s i b l e . The c o n d i­ t i o n s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o g n it io n can be found in the o n t i c s t r u c t u r e of c o g n it io n i t s e l f .

I n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , which uses the term of pur.é con sciou sn ess and pure c o g n i t i o n ,

t h e i d e a o f t h e a u t o d y n a m i c a n d .

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3 e 1 f" - c r e a t i . v e c h a r a c t e r o f c o g n i -t i o n m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n t r e a t i n g t h e l a t t e r a s s e l f - c o g n i t i o n r e a l i ­ z e d b y t h e p o w e r s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .

I t i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in which - in b r i e f - the form of the p rocess ( i t s h i s t o r i c i t y and autodynamics) i s i d e n t i f i e d w ith i t s c o n ten t understood as s e l f - c o g n i t i o n . Such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s e- v id e n t in the p h i lo s o p h ie s which - as H e g e lia n - express e p i ­ s t e m o l o g i c a l o n t o l o g y , i . e . , in those in which being becomes i d e n t i f i e d w ith thought, or i s t r e a t e d as r e d u c ta b le to i t , and the s e l f - c r e a t i o n of being becomes i d e n t i f i e d w ith c o ­ g n i t i o n , which - as the r e s u l t of the sameness of being and thought - has to be understood as s e l f - c o g n i t i o n . In such an o n t o lo g y , the n o t io n s of t r a d i t i o n a l epistem ology a re t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y p u r i f i e d , and p la y the r o l e of fundamental o n t o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s .

L e t us, however, d e p a rt from c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g c o g n i t i o n in H e g e lia n manner, as s e l f - c o g n i t i o n , and c o n c e n t r a t e on the h i s ­

t o r i c i t y of c o g n i t i o n as i t s formal a s p e c t , l e a v i n g f o r a moment the problem of what c o g n it io n , r e a l l y i s .

I f we t r e a t c o g n i t i o n as s e l f - c r e a t i v e , we prejudge o n ly i t s a u t o d y n a m i c h i s t o r i c i t y . I t means t h a t we t r e a t i t as a h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s , whose p a r t i c u l a r e v e n ts and s t a ­ ges of, development f o l l o w the p rec e d in g e v e n t s , and are caused by h i s t o r i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . The f a c t t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s autodynamic h i s t o r i c i t y means, however, something more. I f i t i s an autodyna­ mic p r o c e s s , then not o n ly h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s , s ta g e s of d e v e lo p ­ ment, or c o n c r e te t ra n s f o r m a t io n s a re produced in i t , but a ls o

the v e ry r e g u l a r i t i e s , the p r i n c i p l e s of these t r a n s f o r m a t io n s . The l o g i c of the p rocess i s not e x t e r n a l to i t , nor a t t r i b u t e d to i t as a sense, an aim, or a programme to be made i n c a r n a t e . The l o g i c of an autodynamic p rocess i s i t s h i s t o r i c a l l y c r e a t e d s t r u ­ c t u r e .

ion i s autodynamic, i t must a ls o be accepted that t h e

e s s e n c e o f t h e p r o c e s s o f c o g n i ­

t i o n i s t h e c r e a t i o n o f i t s b e i n g

a c o g n i t i o n , i . e . , the a t t r i b u t i n g to i t s e l f the sense of c o g n i t i o n . This assumption i s a n ec e s sa ry consequence of t r e a ­ t i n g c ô g n i t i o n as autodynamic, s in c e the f a c t t h a t i t i s i t s own product means t h a t i t c r e a t e s i t s e l f p r e c i s e l y as c o g n i t i o n . The sense of i t s being c o g n i t i o n i s not a t t r i b u t e d to i t from the o u t s id e by any human or non-human a u t h o r i t y . C o g n itio n a t t r i b u t e s the sense of c o g n i t i o n to i t s e l f t a k in g on r e a l i t y in i t s own p a r ­ t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l shapes, in d ep e n d en tly - one could add - of where the c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y d i r e c t s i t s e l f . In the course of o b je c t iv iz a - t i o n c o g n i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s i t s sense as an o n t i c f a c t , and not a c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y d i r e c t s i t s e l f . In the course of o b j e c t i v i z a - t i o n c o g n i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s i t s sense as an o n t i c f a c t , and not a c o g n i t i v e one. I t becomes a c o g n i t i v e f a c t only when th e re appear e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which g iv e the d e f i n i t i o n of c o g n i­ t i o n . Undoubtedly, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n a ls o c o n t r i b u t e s to the o n t i c form a tion of the sense of c o g n i t i o n , s i n c e i t i s a p a r t of c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y . I t does not mean, however, that by formu­ l a t i n g e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l statem e nts i t c o n s t i t u t e s the sense as an o n t i c f a c t , nor t h a t i t re c o g n iz e t h i s sense a d e q u a t e ly . Ep istem o­ l o g i c a l a s c e r ta in m e n t s are in each case on ly h is to ry - b o u n d a r t i c u ­ l a t i o n s of the sense which i s c r e a t e d by a g iven h i s t o r i c a l co­ g n i t i o n . T h e re fo re , t h e i r f u n c t io n i s to tu rn t h i s r e a l sense i n t o a c o g n i t i v e f a c t .

L e t us tu rn towards the problem of the o n t i c s t r u c t u r e of cog­ n i t i o n , t a k in g once ag ain tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m as our p o i n t of de­ p a r t u r e .

Tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m broke the t r a d i t i o n a l , n a t u r a l i s t i c and p s y c h o l o g i s t i c , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c o g n i t i o n . I t d i f f e r e n t i a t e d be­ tween c o g n i t i o n as the s u b j e c t of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s tio n and the p s y c h ic a c t s s tu d ie d by p s yc h o lo g y . I t a l s o in tro d u c e d the of pure, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c io u s n e s s , i . e . , such a con­ s c io u s n e s s which i s n e i t h e r the immanent con s c io u sn e ss of the e m p i r i c a l s u b j e c t , nor the co n s c io u sn e ss which tra n sc e n d s i t ^nd i s g iven to the e m p i r i c a l s u b j e c t s o l e l y through o b j e c t i v e mani­ f e s t a t i o n s . This t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c io u sn e ss was t r e a t e d as a c o n d i t i o n f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x i s t e n c e of e m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n

w it h i t s s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e c o r r e l a t i v e s . Tra n sce n d e n ta lism , however, p ro b le m atiz ed , as H&ldegger n o t i c e d , n e i t h e r c o g n i t i o n nor the t r a n s c e n d e n ta l co n scio u sn e ss i t s e l f . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t i c p h ilo s o p h y d is c o v e r e d t h a t in order to •a void the dangers of indi­ v i d u a l i s t i c s u b j e c t i v i s m , one has to ask about the dangers of i n ­ d i v i d u a l i s t i c s u b j e c t i v i s m , one has to ask about the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o g n i t i o n , a s s u m i n g t h e m u l - t i p l i ' c i t y o f c o g n i t i v e s u b j e c t s . But tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m d id not t r y to r e f o r m u la t e the t r a d i t i o n a l i n d i ­ v i d u a l i s t i c n o tio n of the c o g n i t i v e s u b j e c t in a way t h a t would le a d to the concept of c o g n i t i o n adequate to the s i t u a t i o n in which the m u l t i p l i c i t y of e m p i r i c a l s u b j e c t s a p p ears. The i n t r o d u ­ c t i o n of the n o tio n of tr a n s c e n d e n ta l con sciou sn e ss as something u n i v e r s a l does not mean c r e a t i n g a /iew concept of s u b j e c t i v i t y , but only m odifying the t r a d i t i o n a l one. The e f f e c t s of the s h o r t ­ comings w i t h i n tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m can be seen in p o s t- K a n tia n meta­ p h y s i c s ; t h e r e i s no on tolog y of c o g n i t i o n in i t , no attempt to f i l l the pure e p is t e m o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s w ith o n t o l o g i c a l c o n t e n t.

Heidegger attempted o n t o l o g l z a t i o n of c o g n i t i o n , y e t h i s going beyond tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m and m eta p h y s ic s , to g e th e r w ith h i s attem pts to b u i l d o n t o l o g i c a l epistem ology w i t h i n the l i m i t s of what hs h im s e lf c a l l e d the fundamental ontolog y of the f i n i t e b e in g , cannot be t r e a t e d as f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . When the n o tio n of t r u t h appears in h i s c o n c e p tio n , the weaknesses of H e id e g g e r 's attempt become con sp icuo us. T ru th , o n t o l o g i c a l l y understood as the openness of b e in g , has no n orm ative c h a r a c t e r , i ? n e i t h e r a v a lu e nor a c r i t e r i o n f o r e v a l u a t i n g the patency of b e in g . An attempt to o n t o lo g iz e c o g n i t i o n was made a ls o by Gadamer. In h i s herm eneutics c o g n i t i o n i s a c o n s t i t u e n t of b e in g . H i s t o r i c i t y and language a re both fundamental c o n d i t i o n s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o g n i t i o n and i t s s t r u c t u r a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s as w e l l . And t. jugh f o r Gadamer language r e a l l y e x i s t s o n ly in c o n v e r s a t i o n , t h i s b e l i e f does not e n t a i l any raodifi<-atlons o f 'the n o tio n of cog­ n i t i o n w i t h i n h i s t h e o r y . I t remains f o r him, as i t d id f o r H eid eg g e r, a r e l a t i o n j o i n i n g s u b j e c t w ith o b j e c t , and not the one between s u b j e c t s . I t seems, however, t h a t what demands pro- b l e m a t i z a t i o n i s the v e ry b e l i e f t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s a s u b je c t- - o b je c t r e l a t i o n . I t has to be p rob le m atiz ed i f the tra n s c e n d e n ­ t a l i s t i c assumption of the m u l t i - s u b j e c t i v i t y of c o g n i t i v e s i t u a ­

t i o n i s to be t r e a t e d as the fundamental premise of the on tolog y of c o g n i t i o n . Such a p r o b le m a t iz a t io n becomes p o s s i b l e only w ith the h elp of the n o tio n of the s o c i a l n a tu re of the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y .

G e n e r a l l y , on the b a s i s of the concept of what i s s o c i e t a l , s o c i a l w orld i s the fundamental r e a l i t y in which man e x i s t s . I t i s then a human w o rld , but not in the sense of being a c o r r e l a t i v e of i n r l i v i d u a l c o n s c io u s n e s s , such as e . g . , the C a r t e s i a n sense. The substance of which human world i s made are s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s and r e l a t i o n s . They c o n d i t i o n each o th e r and form a h i s t o r i c a l as w e l l as autodynamic t o t a l i t y . This t o t a l i t y , seen in the p e r ­ s p e c t i v e of the a c t i v i t i e s which c o n s t i t u t e i t , i s a t the same time c o l l e c t i v e s u b j e c t and s o c i a l o b j e c t i v i t y . In both a s p e c t s , the i n d i v i d u a l man, whose e x i s t e n c e i s b e i n g - i n - s o c i a l - w o r l d . He ex­ is ts in t h i s world inasmuch as he i s s o c i a l l y formed, i n c o r p o r a t ­ ed i n t o the network of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , and a c t s in s o c i a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d manner w i t h i n the l i m i t s of these r e l a t i o n s and i n ­ s t i t u t i o n s c r c a t e d on them. Man e x i s t s i n the s o c i a l world so f a r as h i s a c t i v i t y i s the p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the a c t i v i t y of s supra- - i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t , and h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y , which i s the c o n d i t i o n f o r h i s being the perform er of o n t i c a c t i v i t y , i s a p a r t i c u l a r and i n d i v i d u a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n of a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l , s o c i a l subject­ i v i t y . Man, understood in t h i s way, shows hims’e l f as having been " t h r u s t " i n t o the s o c i a l w o r ld , and doomed, in o n t i c se n s e , f o r acting in i t . And t h i s i s to be the a c t i v i t y of the e n t i r e man.

As a whole, man i s s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - a c t i n g

which i n c lu d e s s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - c o g n i t i o n , i . e . , h i s sensual and i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment. From now on, I w i l l d i f f e r e n t i a t e in t h i s paper between s u b j c c t i v i t y - i n - a c t i n g and sub­ j e c t ! v i t y - i n - c o g n i t i o n . Man's s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - a c t i n g i s both the

c o d i t i o n f o r and a product o f s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . I t means th a t sub­ j e c t i v i t y , to g e th e r w i t h h i s usage, i s s o c i a l i z e d in a h i s t o r i ­ c a l l y p a r t i c u l a r way. The s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r of human a c t i v i t i e s means not o n ly t h a t a c t i v i t i e s are done w i t h i n the l i m i t s of so­ c i a l r e l a t i o n s and a c c o rd in g to s o c i a l p a t t e r n s but - in f a c t - t h a t a c t i v i t i e s a re alw ays r e l a t i o n s which bind man w it h o th e r p e o p le , even when he i s d i r e c t e d at t h i n g s . Human a c t i v i t i e s remain alw ays - e s s e n t i a l l y - s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s , and t h i s g i v e s them an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r : they e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t between i n d i v i ­

dual s u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i t i o n . The c o n d i t i o n and the product at the same time of these i n t e r a c t i o n s , seen from the p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , i s s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l , i n t e r p e r s o n a l con­ s c io u s n e s s .

Having accepted the n o tio n of what i s s o c i a l as the c o n s t i ­ t u t i v e c a te g o ry of the on tolog y of c o g n i t i o n , we must agree th a t c o g n i t i o n i s - in i t s o n t i c s t r u c t u r e - a . s o c i a l phenomenon,- and t h a t i t has i n t e r a c t i o n a l , d i a l o g i c a l form. I t i s a d i a lo g u e , and not in such a m e ta p h o ric a l und erstan d in g a cco rd in g to which w h ile e x p lo r in g n atu re we ask q u e s tio n s and n atu re answers us. C o g n itio n i s a d ia lo g u e in a l i t e r a l , human, sense. S t r i c t l y speaking one

can say t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s i n i t s o n t i c

s t r u c t u r e a s y s t e m o f s o c i a l i n t e r ­

a c t i o n s w h i c h t a k e p l a c e a m o n g t h e

i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i *

t i о n. The system i s a u t o d y n a m ic a lly h i s t o r i c a l and forms the o n t i c s t r u c t u r e of the s e l f - c r e a t i n g c o g n i t i o n .

The c o g n i t i v e a c t , understood as s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , can be thus d e s c r ib e d , to use H e g e lia n e x p r e s s io n , as " s u b j e c t i v i t y d i ­ r e c t e d a g a in s t s u b j e c t i v i t y " . S u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i t i o n which d i r e c t them selves to each o th e r or a g a i n s t each o t h e r are not their own c r e a t i o n s in the sense of being g iv e n to them selves in the a c t of the in n e r- c o n s c io u s n e s s as pure se lf- k n o w le d g e . They are so­ c i a l l y c r e a t e d .

The idea of the i n t e r a c t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of c o g n i t i o n a llo w s us to p ro b le m a tiz e the seem ingly obvious c o n v i c t i o n t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s a r e l a t i o n between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , and shows in a new l i g h t the o ld t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t i c p r o b l e m o f t h e o b j e ­ c t i v i t y o f c o g n i t i o n . I t i s the problem of the c o n d i t i o n s which enab le human con s c io u sn e ss to go beyond i t s e l f towards the t r a n s c e n d e n t. F i r s t of a l l , two n o n - i d e n t i c a l is su e s can be n o t i c e d : the problem of an i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - c u g n i - t i o n going towards anoth er s u b j e c t i v i t y , and the problem o f a s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - c o g n i t i o n tra n s c e n d in g towards what i s o b j e c t i v e - - i n - c o g n i t i c n .

I n r e l a t i o n to the f i r s t problem, one can say t h a t the tenden­ cy to tra n sc e n d e n t towards o th er s u b j e c t i v i t i e s i s the c o n d i t i o n f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the c o g n i t i v e a c t s which a re s o c i a l i n ­ t e r a c t i o n s , and t h a t t h i s tendency i s an in d is p e n s a b l e o n t i c

qua-l i t y of human s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - c o g n i t i o n . S in c e i n d i v i d u a l con­ s c io u sn e ss i s o n ly a p a r t i c u l a r a c t u a l i z a t i o n and an element of i n t e r p r e s o n a l c o n s c io u s n e s s , then the going towards the o th er pe­ o p l e ' s s u b j e c t i v i t y , i s a movement which tak e p la c e w i t h i n a s o c i a l s u b j e c t i v i t y , i . e . , w i t h i n the g iv e n , h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n c r e te s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t of s o c i a l l i f e . The same a p p l i e s to the tendency to a s s i m i l a t e the o b j e c t i v i z e d c o n t e n ts of o th e r subje- c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i t i o n . The t ra n s c e n d in g towards o th er s u b j e c t i v i ­ t i e s and the a s s i m i l a t i n g the c o n te n t of s o c i a l c on sciou sn e ss are c o n s t i t u e n t p ro c e ss e s of c o g n i t i o n . They occure f o r such i s the very n a tu re of c o g n i t i o n as a s o c i a l p r o c e s s .

The tendency to tra n sce n d e n t towards o th e r s u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - - c o g n i tio n cannot be t r e a t e d as a p ro o f t h a t c o g n i t i o n r e f e r s i t - s é l f to t h in g s . T h e - p r o b l e m ' o f t h e f a c t u. a 1 v a l i d i t y o f c o g n i t i o n demands s e p a r a te i n q u i r y . Tne is s u e of the f a c t u a l v a l i d i t y of c o g n i t i o n becomes the q u e s tio n of p rim ary importance f o r these t h e o r i e s which t r e a t c o g n i t i o n аз s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n . I n the l i g h t of what was s a id here about the autodynamic c h a r a c t e r of c o g n i t i o n , such a treatm ent i s n e i t h e r the o n ly p o s s i b l e nor the o n ly e x i s t i n g one in p h ilo s o p h y . I t i s j u s t one of the forms in which c o g n i t i o n con- s t i t u e s i t s e l f as c o g n i t i o n and rec o g n iz e s I t s own a c t i v i t y in e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s . In order to see the h i s t o r i c a l l y l i m i t e d c h a r a c t e r of the idea t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s l e a r n i n g about f a c t u a l i t y ( t h i n g n e s s ) , i t i s enough to remind us of those t h e o r i e s of the p re - K a n tia n epistem ology in which c o g n i t i o n was understood аз a r e l a t i o n between human s u b j e c t i v i t y , human mind and ( d i v i n e ) obje- c i t v e knowledge. In these t h e o r i e s , i n t e r n a l i z i n g r a t h e r than tra n s c e n d in g was p r o b le m a tiz e d . Q u estion s were asked about the c o n d i t i o n s in which human s u b j e c t can a c q u i r e o b j e c t i v e knowledge r a t h e r than about the c o d i t i o n s in which human con sciou sn ess or knowledge would r e f e r to o b j e c t i v i t y , f a c t u a l i t y . .

Can we s a y , however, t h a t the r e c o g n i t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s of the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e c o n c e p tio n of c o g n i t i o n en a b le s us to c a n c e l the problem of o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y of cog ­ n i t i o n in a v e r s i o n prop er f o r t h i s c o n c e p t i o n ? I t h in k we c a n ­ n o t, because t h i s v e r s i o n of the problem i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the modern r e f l e c t i o n on c o g n i t i o n . A l l the c u r r e n t e p i s t e m o l o g i ­ c a l i n q u i r e s ought t o ta k e t h i s c o n c e p tio n as t h e i r o b l i g a t o r y

p o in t of r e f e r e n c e , they have to take i n t o account i t s problems end s e t t l e m e n t s , i f only to overcome them. O th e rw ise , th e re i s a dan­ ger t h a t they may be recognized as i n q u i r i e s c o n c e rn in g c o g n i t i o n only and e x c l u s i v e l y from t h e i r own p o i n t of view .

L e t us then a n a ly s e the problem how the q u e s tio n about the o b j e c t i v i t y of c o g n it io n and i t s f a c t u a l v a l i d i t y , can be askedуon the ground of the suggested u nderstanding of c o g n i t i o n .

When we ask about the o b j e c t i v i t y of a c o g n i t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n , we want to understand how i t i s p o s s i b l e th a t th e re e x i s t s a r e ­ l a t i o n between c o g n i t i o n and what i s e x t e r n a l to the s u b j e c t i v i - t i e s - i n - a c t i n g . When asking about the f a c t u a l v a l i d i t y of c o g n i­ ti o n we want to le a r n how i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t th in g s i n t e r f e r e in the i n t e r a c t i o n s between s u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i t i o n . In o th er words, what seems s tra n g e from the p o i n t of view suggested here and what r e q u i r e s e x p l i c a t i o n i s the f a c t t h a t i n t e r a c t i o n s among s u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i t i o n are not c lo s e d in the m se lve s, th a t they are open to what i s s o c i a l l y o b j e c t i v e , and t h a t t h in g s take p a r t in human d ia lo g u e and become o b j e c t s to which s u b j e c t i v i t i e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the i n t e r a c t i o n s d i r e c t them selves i n t e n t i o n a l l y .

In ord er to answer these q u e s t i o n s , one has to s t a r t w ith

a

statem ent t h a t on the ground of the accepted i here o n t o l o g i c a l assumptions, c o g n i t i o n cannot be co n s id e re d as the a c t i v i t y which c o n s t i t u t e s by i t s e l f what i s f a c t u a l . Man's c o n t a c t w ith what is e x t e r n a l to him cannot be reduced to the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - c o g n i t i o n . The p ro ce ss of c o n s t i t u t i n g human r e a l i t y i s i t s e l f an o n t i q p r o c e s s , in which man p a r t i c i p a t e s as a whole, and i s engaged w ith a l l h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - a c t i n g . I n t h i s p rocess t h a t which i s o b j e c t i v e to man, i . e . , what i s the o b j e c t of h i s i n t e r e s t , lo n g in g s , o p e r a t i o n s , e t c . , i s being f o r ­ med. The r e a l i t y , the th in g n e s s which o b j e c t i v i z e s i t s e l f to man

i s alw ays human f a c t u a l i t y . I t i s a l r e a d y s o c i a l i z e d and e x i o l o g i - c a l in the sense t h a t i t has o n t i c r e le v a n c e f o r man and c o n c re te s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l wholes, th a t i t can be valu ed from the p o i n t of view of s o c i a l being . Hence, the v e r y

s o G i a l

_{c r e a t i o n of the} human w orld g iv e s c o g n i t i o n i t s f a c t u a l v a l i d i t y and makes i t r e f e r to t h in g s . Things i n t e r f e r e in c o g n i t i o n , they become i t s o b j e c t s . Thanks to them, c o g n i t i o n i s the co g n itio n - o f- s o m e th in g because c o g n it io n i s an element of human s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y , and cannot be e x t r a c t e d from i t . In o th er words, c o g n i t ­

io n i s r e l a t e d to what i s o b j e c t i v e and becomes p o s s i b l e as f a c t u ­ a l l y v a l i d so f a r as i t i s determined by the e n t i r e s o c i a l l i f e to which i t b e longs. I f t o t a l a u to n o m ira tio n of c o g n i t i o n were pos­ s i b l e , i t would be pure, d i r e c t i n t e r a c t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t i e s , i . e . , such an i n t e r a c t i o n in which no t h in g s would m ediate, and s u b j e c t i v i t i e s would in no way be determined or l i m i t e d by the n e c e s s i t y of r e f e r r i n g to t h in g s .

The d e v elo p in g human a c t i v i t y which g iv e s c o g n i t i o n i t s f a c t u ­ a l v a l i d i t y , makes i t a v a l u e . I t r e l a t i v i z e s i t s e l f to c o g n i­ t i o n , i t makes c o g n i t i o n the c o n d it io n f o r i t s own c r e a t i v e c h a r a ­ c t e r . To the degree t h a t t h i s s o c i a l a c t i v i t y r e f e r s to t h i n g s , i . e . , as f a r as i t a f f e c t s t h in g s , i t r e l a t i v i z e s i t s e l f to know­ ledge about t h i n g s , and whether i t tran sform s or c r e a t e s r e a l i ­ t i e s , or r u l e s over them, depends on i t s knowing them. One could say t h a t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n on the c o n d i t i o n s of f a c t u a l v a l i d i t y of c o g n i t i o n i s j u s t an a r t i c u l a t i o n of such a f a c t u a l fu n c t i o n i n g of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y . S o c i a l a c t i v i t y has a f a c t u a l na­ ture when i t e s t a b l i s h e s the i d e n t i t y of o b j e c t i v i t y and f a c t u a l i ­ t y , t h in g n e s s , adding v a lu e to the l a t t e r . E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l con­ s i d e r a t i o n s express j u s t the s i t u a t i o n ir, which t h in g s become the p o i n t of r e f e r e n c e f o r e v a l u a t i n g both the c o n c r e te o p e r a t i o n , which i s e v a lu a t e d a cco rd in g to how i t a f f e c t s t h in g s , and the c o g n i t i v e a c t , which i s e v a lu a t e d in re s p e c t of how i t r e f e r s to t h in g s .

To . r e c a p i t u l a t e , c o g n i t i o n i s an element of s o c i a l r e a l i t y and has the s t r u c t u r e of a d ia lo g u e . C on se q ue n tly, i t tak es p la c e in the specc among i n d i v i d u a l s , and not w i t h i n human mindSj although the l a t t e r are i t s n e c e s sa ry c o r r e l a t i v e s . C o g n itio n i s a h i ­ s t o r i c a l whole, s i n c e i t i s , in i t s o n t i c s t r u c t u r e , the a utod y­ namic system o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s . I n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v i t y p a r ­ t i c i p a t i n g in c o g n i t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n s becomes a s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - - c o g n i t i o n , has a s o c i a l l y c r e a t e d n a t u r e , and i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the tendency to tra n sc e n d e n t towards o t h e r s u b j e c t i v i t i e3-in- - c o g n i t io n and to i n t e r n a l i z e trie c o n te n ts of an i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n s c io u s n e s s . Such a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l con s c io u sn e ss i s co-crea- ted (.preserved, m o d ifie d in some frag m en ts, e t c . ) by c o n c r e t e co­ g n i t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n s , and i s in the same time a c o n d i t i o n of ^ach of these i n t e r a c t i o n s . What i s o b j e c t i v e to i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v i ­ t i e s , i . e . , what i s the o b j e c t of c o g n i t i o n and a c t i n g p a r t i c i ­ p a te s in c o g n i t i o n because c o g n i t i o n i s an element of the e n t i r e

a c t i v i t y of human b e in g s . The way in which o b j e c t i v i t y p a r t i c i p a t e s in c o g n i t i o n i s proper f o r the g iv e n , h i s t o r i c a l l y determined manner of s o c i a l s e l f - c r e a t i o n . P a r t i c u l a r y , o b j e c t i v i t y p a r t i c i ­ p a te s in c o g n i t i o n as th in g n e s ę . C o g n itio n g ains i t s a x i o l o g i c a l a s p e c t , becomes a v a lu e through p a r t i c i p a t i n g in s o c i a l c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y .

The above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may r a i s e the f e e l i n g of i n s u f f i c e n s y . One might say th a t they do not answer the q u e s tio n what co ­ g n i t i o n r e a l l y i s . To q u a l i f y c o g n i t i o n as the autodynamic h i s t o ­ r i c i t y , which in i t s o n t i c s t r u c t u r e i s the system of s o c i a l i n ­ t e r a c t i o n s , may appear u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and - e s s e n t i a l l y - non- - e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l . However, one has to remember t h a t c r e a t i n g an o n t o l o g i c a l c on cep tion of c o g n i t i o n in the sense suggested here means changing the whole s t y l e of ask in g about c o g n i t i o n and qua­ l i f y i n g i t . One cannot q u a l i f y c o g n i t i o n by d e f i n i n g i t , s in c e t h i s procedure must lead e i t h e r to n a t u r a l i s t i c or p s y c h o l o g i s t i c c o n c e p tio n s ; or to the m eth od olo g ica l c o n c e p tio n s in which c o g n i­ t i o n tu rn s out to be a c o r r e l a t i v e of some m eth o d o lo g ic a l r u l e s ; or i t ends up w ith b u i l d i n g e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l m etaphysics in which c o g n i t i o n i s not p rob le m atiz ed a t a l l . I f one wants to a void these p o s i t i o n s , t h e re remains o n ly one s o l u t i o n - to look f o r the answer to the q u es tio n of what c o g n i t i o n i s , by p e n e t r a t i n g the realm in which i t c o n s t i t u t e s i t s e l f in the forms of c o n c r e t e h i ­ s t o r i c a l c o g n i t i o n s . Th is realm i s the h i s t o r i c a l world of s o c i a l s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y . .

C h a ir of P h ilo s o p h y U n i v e r s i t y of Łódź

B a rb a ra Tuchańska

PROBLEM POZNANIA JAKO PYTANIE ONTOLOGICZNE .

Punktem w y j ś c i a moich rozważań j e s t p rze k o n a n ie, że poznanie nadal wymaga f i l o z o f i c z n e g o namysłu. Kantow'ski t r a n s c e n d e n ta liz m i w y r a s t a j ą c e z niego bezpośrednio lub p ośred n io - f i l i z o f i e F ic h - tego, H egla, Marksa, N ie tz s c h e g o , H u s s e r la i Heideggera wyznacza­ j ą obszar t e o r e t y c z n y , w którym p y t a n i e o poznanie s ta w ia n e j e s t w nowy sposób, juź n i e w s z a c i e n a t u r a l i s t y c z n e j czy p o s y c h o lo g is- tyczne^. Ze względu na zaw arto ść p ojęciow ą tego obszaru i

wypraco-wany w nim sposób f i l o z o f o w a n i a , problem poznania s t a j e s i ę w nim zagadnieniem ontolog icznym , tzn. możliwe s t a j e s i ę p y t a n i e o to, j a k a j e s t ontyczna s t r u k t u r a poznania. Odpowiedzi na to p y ta n ie mogą być o c z y w iś c ie różnorodne. W a r t y k u l e przedstawipna j e s t j e d ­ na z n i c h . Fundamentalną k a t e g o r ią .p o ję c io w ą proponowanej koncep- t u a l i z a é j i , poznania jako fenomenu ontycznego j e s t p o j ę c i e u s p o łe ­ c z n i e n i a . W p e rs p e k tyw ie t e j k a t e g o r i i poznanie ja w i s i ę jak o auto- dynamiczna h i s t o r y c z n o ś ć , k tó r a ma s t r u k t u r ę i n t e r a k c j i s p o ł e c z ­ nych włączonych w c a ł o ś ć l u d z k i e j d z i a ł a l n o ś c i . D z ię k i u w z g lęd nie­ niu szerszego k o ntek stu ontycznego, w którym r e a l i z u j e s i ę pozna­ n i e , możliwe j e s t w y j a ś n i e n i e sposobu u c z e s t n i c z e n i a w poznaniu przedmiotów.