A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S
FOLIA PMILOSOPHICA 9, 1993
Jacek Juliusz Jadacki
M ISU N D E R ST A N D IN G S ABO UT U N D ER ST A N D IN G
I. A R G U M E N T S O F TH E R ELA TIO N O F U N D E R ST A N D IN G
Tw o m isunderstanding are connected w ith this m atter.
T he first m isunderstanding is that the necessary co n d itio n o f defining (and characterizing) 'u n d e rstan d in g ' is to indicate the field (sell, the do m ain and the c o u n tcrd o m ain ) o f the relation o f u nderstanding. T he second m isun d erstan -ding is th a t i.a. non-obsevablc objects (e.g. intentional objects) belong to the c o u n terd o m ain o f this relation.
F rom a n o th e r place it is the fact, th at the dom ain o f the relations o f understan d in g contains people (NB. not all, certainly), anim als, and perhaps - com puters. O n the o th er han d the co u n terd o m ain (or one o f the co u n ter-d om ains at least) is createter-d by observable objects.
T he m isunderstanding consist here in the view, th a t the w ord 'u n d e rsta n d ' according to a given context - has one o f the follow ing categories:
_ L _ , or z...As a m atter o f fact these are categories o f three various n n n z nnn functors: - x u n derstands y, n n 2. TH E SE M A N T IC CATEGORY O F ‘U N D E R S T A N D IN G ’ - í - x understan d s th a t p, n z
— - x u nderstands i. by y (i, c, x m eans у as z),
nnn 3 '
Each o f these functors refers to a certain tw o- or three-argum ent-relation. It is the full list, a p a rt from the m etaphorical contexts (e.g. o f the kind o f H eidegger’s declarations th a t the m an ... is understanding).
3. POLYSEMY OF ‘UNDERSTANDING’
‘U n d e rstan d in g ’ is the double polysem. T he polysem y peculiar to every m ental predicate characterizes, firstly, this w ord. ’U n d erstan d in g ’ as the m ental predicate can refer either to a certain disposition (habitual u n d ersta n -ding), to a certain act (actual understan-ding), o r to a certain chain o f acts (proccssual understanding). T he specific polysem y o f ‘u n d e rsta n d ’ can be call ‘polysem y o f four i-s'. F o r to understan d is, secondly, either to feel (intuitive understanding), to be conscious (idcntificative un derstanding), to justify (indulgentive understanding), o r to signify (inscriptive understanding).
It would be m isunderstanding to believe th a t the h ab itu al, actual, and processual understanding from the one hand, and th a t the intuitive, idcn-tificative, indulgentive, and inscriptive u n d erstanding from the o th er hand creates the m em bers o f two logical classifications o f the d en o tatio n of ‘understan d in g ’. These are various m e a n i n g s o f ‘un d ersta n d in g ’, and not various subsets o f one set o f understandings.
Let us add, th at intuitive u n d erstan d in g (scil. feeling) - contain in g the em pathy into o th e r’s feelings, as well as the ideation into essences o f things is a kind o f cognition. Being conscious o f som ething can be described as identificative understanding, only if the object o f consciousness is som ehow hidden from o u r sight or at least hard to be the object o f o u r consciousness on a certain account. Indulgentive u n d erstanding m otivative o r m otivati- ve-behavioral one - is o f various degrees: from ap p ro v in g a n d recognizing as right (m otives or behaviours), th ro u g h o u t consenting and perm itting, until n o n -d am n atio n and excusing. Finally inscriptive understan d in g is the three-argum ent-predicate and can be conn o tativ e o r referentive u nderstanding according to w hat is signified by som ething: connotatum o r a referent.
4. ELLIPTICITY O F ‘U N D E R S T A N D IN G ’ IN TH E ID EN TIFIC A TIV E SE N SE
T he term ‘identificative u n d erta n d in g ' ap p e ars in various elliptic contexts. T he phrase ,,x understan d y” can m ean that:
b) x is conscious o f the stru ctu re o f у (constitutional understanding); c) x is conscious o f the horizon o f у (contextual understanding); d) x is conscious o f the reason o f у (causal understanding: initial one - o f m otives, or effectual one o f aims);
c) x is conscious o f the sense o f у (conceptual understanding).
This ellipticity o f six c’s is probably the derivative o f the polysem y of ‘sense' sensu largo (‘n a tu re ’, ‘stru c tu re ’, ‘h o rizo n ’, ‘re a so n ’, an d ‘sense’ sensu stricto).
H ow ever it would be m isunderstanding to think th at cardinal, cons-titutional (i.a. syntactical), contextual (i.a. psychocontextual and psychocon- textual-behavioral), causal (i.a, pychocausal an d psychocausal-behavioral), and conceptual (i.a. verbal) u n d erstandings arc types o f understanding. F or th at reason, it is m isunderstanding also speaking (litterally) ab o u t w a y s or m e t h o d s o f understanding.
S. E X PLIC A TIO N S OF C U R R E N T U S E S O F ‘U N D E R S T A N D IN G ’
Each o f the current use o f ‘u n d erstan d in g ’ (and the derivates o f this w ord) can be p arap h rased with the aid o f the introduced here specialized term s. It w ould be, however, m isunderstanding to require the p arap h ra se o f every curren t use o f ‘understan d in g ’ with the aid o f e x a c t l y o n e o f these specialized term s.
Let us consider the follow ing context:
We are not downhearted. The only trouble is, we cannot understand what is happening to our neighbours.
Joseph Chamberlain
T he sense o f ‘u n d erstan d in g ’ oscillates here betw een the identificative and indulgentive ones. A nalogically the controversy ab o u t the question, w hether to u nderstan d music is to be conscious o f the (form al) stru ctu re o f a given w ork, or o f the psychical com poser’s acts, accom panying the creation o f this w ork, or o f the m otives o f com posing, o r perhaps o f som ething else (e.g. to react properly to this w ork in the em otional sphere) is the purposeless controversy.
6. C O N T R O V E R SIE S A BO U T U N D E R S T A N D IN G
T he diversity o f opinions in the m atter o f u n d erstanding either has its source in the confusion o f m eanings (i.e. som e o f these opinions are
m isunderstandings), o r these opinions are em pirically testable (i.e. som e o f them are sim ply false).
A good exam ple o f the first situation is the SO P H IS M O F T H E H E R M E N E U T IC ( IR C L E . T o u n d ersta n d it is supposed to understand in advance. In detail: to know why som ebody d o som ething, one should know that som ebody do this thing - an d these are to be the facts non-identificable separately. T he press ol the b u tto n by a certain person is to be (causally) u n d ersto o d only by this m an, w ho know s th at this person w anted to press the bu tto n . In fact, it is u n derstood by the m an, w ho know s th a t this person w anted (e.g.) to ring. In general, it is no t the case, that:
i f we understand a given activity o f a certain person, we know, that his person wanted to carry out just t h i s activity.
T he fact is, on the o th er hand, that:
II we understand a given activity o f a certain person, we know, that this person wanted to carry out som ething d i f f e r e n t from this activity (som ething having this activity as its cause).
T he good exam ple o f the second situation is to ad m it (with no found) to the Q U E S T IO N O F T H E C O N G E N IT A LITY O F D IS P O S IT IO N S TO U N D E R S T A N D IN G the status o f the philosophical (and not em pirical) problem .
7. R ELA TIO N S BETW EEN N O T IO N S OF ‘U N D E R S T A N D IN G ’
T he m ain m isunderstanding consists here, firstly, in the view, th at certain objects can be understood only th an k s to intuitive understanding. In fact, we do not know such a result o f this intuitive understanding, which c a n n o t be reached with the aid o f «norm al» m ethods, e.g. with the aid o f reasoning. But i s it arguable at all, th a t som ething does no t exist?
It is m isunderstanding, secondly, to consider the notion o f ‘identificative un d erstanding — o r m ore exactly o f ‘conceptual u n d ersta n d in g ’ - as the generically prim itive notion.
T hird m isunderstanding is the view, th a t the necessary condition o f the identificative understanding o f a certain object is the indulgentive u n d erstan -ding o f this object. Let us com pare the follow ing declaration:
All, everything that I understand. I understand only because I love. Leo Tolstoy
A nalogically groundless conviction is the view, th a t the necessary condition o f the psychocontextual u n d ersta n d in g is to f e e 1 (or to have the ability to feel) the p ro p er («understood») experiences. T he m ore groundless conviction is the view that one can (conceptually) understan d the u tteran ce o f a certain person b e t t e r th an this person her/him self. (It was said a b o u t T adeusz K otarbiński, th a t his sum m aries o f o th e r's papers show ed him b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n -d i n g the utterances o f the a u th o rs o f sum m arize-d p apers t h a n the au th o rs themselves).
In the extrem e case the idea would be th a t it w ould be possible to understan d (conceptually) an utterance incom prehensible to the sender. It should be add, o f course, th at the m atter is here ab o u t the p r o p e r conceptual u n d erstan d in g (i.e. the reconstruction o f the sense m eant by the sender) and not ab o u t a n y understanding (i.e. ascribing any sense).
Finally, fourth m isunderstanding is so-called T H E P R IN C IP L E O F H E R M E N E U T IC S , according to which the necessary co ndition o f inscriptive and conceptual u n d erstanding is to reach the full contextual understan d in g (o f a given interpreted utterance). W hat is m ore, such a full u n d erstan d in g is sim ply unattainable.
8. U N D E R ST A N D IN G A N D A N O TH ER M E N T A L FU N C T IO N S
We have the follow ing dependences:
1. If som ebody u nderstands som ething identifically (in the actual sense) he T H IN K S .
2. If som ebody u nderstands conceptually (in the actu al sense) the u tte -rance o f a certain person, he P E R C E IV E S this utte-rance. O f course, the thing is here o f the «understanding» perception, an d no t o f the em pty «gaping».
3. If som ebody has the ability o f S P E A K IN G , he has also the ability o f conceptual understanding. T he thing is here, also, o f speaking, and not o f «babbling».
4. If som ebody IN F O R M S a certain person o f som ething with the aids o f a certain utterance, both o f them u nderstand conceptually this utterance.
5. If som ebody understan d s conceptually the utteran ce o f a certain person, this person E X PR E SSE S som ething with the aid o f this utterance. N P . it happens th at the thing expressed differs principally from the thing undestood. H ere we have the source o f the rem ark:
Speech was given to man to disguise his thought. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand
6. If som ebody R E A C T S E M O T IO N A L L Y to a certain w ork o f a rt in the p ro p e r way, he understands it conceptually. T his dependence should be, certainly, limited to the dom ain o f the w orks o f literary art.
7. If som ebody understan d s inscriptively by a certain expression som et-hing determ ined, he C O N C E D E S the statem ent th at this determ ined tet-hing is the sense o f this expression.
8. If a certain person u nderstands inscriptively (in the habitu al sense) by a certain sign a certain object, the presentation o f this object w ith this person is A S S O C IA T E D with the p resentation o f this sign.
On the o th e r hand, it is m isunderstanding to consider u n d erstan d in g as a kind o f R E A S O N IN G . T he source o f this m isunderstanding is p ro b a b ly the confusion o f u n d ersta n d in g with the IN T E R P R E T A T IO N , i.e. com ing at understanding. T here are m any techniques o f achieving this state: expressive, aesthetic, sym bolic, herm eneutic, psychologic, hum anistic, im aginative, telc- ologic, psychoanalitic, and last but not least - logic interp retatio n . In oppo site to the in terpretation u n d erstanding (the intuitive u n d erstanding excepted) is either only a certain (potential or actual) state o r a chain o f cognitive states.
It is m isunderstanding also to think that we can consider som ething (i.e. a certain sentence) as true, and to not u nderstand it at the sam e time. It was pu t in a nutshell:
The ignorant man always adores what he cannot understand. Cesare Lom broso
Let us add th a t it is hard to im agine the m ore essential m isunderstanding th an questioning the dependence:
1Г som ebody understands som ething conceptually, the thing understood is the SE N SE F U L expression.
On the o th er han d , it is an open question, w hether one can say abo u t conceptual understanding internally co n tra d icto ry utterances.
9. DEG REES O F ID ENTIFICATIVE U N D E R ST A N D IN G
M any fact speak for the view, th at identificative understan d in g (scil. being conscious) is gradual. I think the following dependences take place:
1. T he m ore detail structure, the m ore wide horizon, and the m ore distant reasons o f an understood object are conscious by a given person, the better this person understands identificatively this object.
2. T he m ore elem ents o f the co m p o u n d expression is u n derstood concep-tually, the better this person understands this expression.
3. Let us suppose that:
a) som ebody u n d erstan d s selectively a certain expression, if he is conscious only o f a p art o f the d en o tatio n o f this expression;
b) som ebody u nderstands clearly a certain expression, if he is conscious o f the w hole d en o tatio n o f this expression;
c) som ebody u nderstands distinctly a certain expression, if he is conscious o f any c o n n o tatio n o f this expression;
d) som ebody u nderstands accurately a certain expression, if he is conscious o f the lexical co n n o ta tio n o f this expression;
e) som ebody u n d erstan d s exactly a certain expression, if he is conscious o f the essential co n n o ta tio n o f this expression.
Now, the m ore som ebody’s conceptual u n d erstanding a given expression on the scale from (a) to (c) draw s to the end (i.e. to exact understanding), the better he u nd erstand s this expression.
4. T he m ore detail p resentation is beeing conscious o f the sense o f a given expression, the better the u n d erstanding person understands (conceptually) this expression.
O n the o th er hand it is m isunderstanding to claim that the m ore distance is between the literary sense o f a given expression an d the sense beeing conscious by a certain person, the better this person u n d erstan d s (conceptually) this expression.
1«. D EFIN IT IO N OF ‘C O N C E PT U A L U N D E R S T A N D IN G ’
It would be m isunderstanding to require the reconstruction o f the norm al, equivalent definition o f „p ro p e r conceptual u n d ersta n d in g " (scil. ‘p roper com prehending’). We have only:
If it is understood inscriptively by the sign у the object z, then the person x understands properly y, if and only if x understands inscriptively by у (the object) z.
It is an o th e r m atter th a t the initial condition o f this definition is no t precision. D oes „it is u n d ersto o d " m ean: „everybody u n d ersta n d s” , „th e m ost people u n d ersta n d ” , „som ebodies u n d estan d s” , o r „(each of, the m ost of, a certain of) proficient users u n d e rsta n d ” ?
T he n orm al definition can be given only for „ a n y u n d erstan d in g ” :
The person x understands somehow the sign у if and only if x understands inscriptively anything by y.
But it w ould he m isunderstanding to identify p ro p e r co m prehending with any co m prehending (i.e. with instrumental com prehending). A nd the view, th at instrum ental com prehending a certain object is identical with being conscious o f the fact th a t this object is a sign - is still greater m isunderstanding.
II. CRITERIA O F C O N C E PT U A L U N D E R ST A N D IN G
T he basic m isunderstanding is the faith in existing the universal criterion o f com prehending and understan d in g in general such a criterion which could be the necessary as well sufficient condition. T he m isunderstanding equal to the form er is to look for any criterion sensu stricto, an absolute criterion. In fact we dispose o f criteria sensu largo, i.e. partial criteria. T hey look like these:
a) feeling correct u n d erstanding a given utterance; b) correct reproducing (i.e. q u o ttin g ) a given utterance; c) correct explaining (the sense of) a given expression; d) correct summarizing a given utterance.
T he source o f feeling o f misunderstanding a given utterance can be d isturbances o f the a tte n tio n ot the com plexity o f the objesct decribed in this utterance. T he source o f mistakes and difficulties in reproducing, explaining, a n d sum m arizing, can be defects o f intellectual dispositions o th e r than u n d erstanding-dispositions (e.g. troubles with the m em ory, m istakes in reaso-ning), o r even purely articulative defects. T he source o f improper, reaction to tak e a h oped-for stand (e.g. in the case o f lying answer).
On the o th er hand the correctness o f the respective behaviours can be result o f the incidental coexistence. O ne can find the p ro p e r definiens w ithout u n d erstan d in g it. It is very hard to m ake sure, w hether a given utterance i s the answ er for the question brought up, and w hether this utteran ce bears witness to understan d in g this - and no t a n o th e r elem ent o f the form ulated question.
12. I.IN G U A L C O M PETEN C E
W h a t does m ean to have the lingual com petence?
T w o abilities create it: the ability o f conceptual understanding utterances already heard , and the ability o f producing (or com plem enting) utteran ce - i.a. (com posed) u tterances never heard before.
W hat we genuinely understand, we can do. Raym ond Williams
The m ain m isunderstanding here is the view, th a t the necessary and sufficient condition o f such an ability is u n d erstan d in g the stru ctu re an d the sense o f elem ents o f such utterances. T he existence o f idiom s (u n d e rsto o d en bloc) and o f the ability o f creating com plex expression with the aid o f sy n catcgorem ata (n o n -u n d crsto o d very often in isolation) speaks for the faultiness o f the m entioned view.
Warsaw University Poland
J acek Julius: Jad a ck i
N IE PO R O Z U M IE N IA W OKÓŁ R O Z U MI E N I A
Punktem wyjścia rozważań są cztery hipotezy: dwie leksykalne, gramatyczna i historyczna: 1. Wyrażenie „rozumieć" jest polisemem i to podwójnie:
a) w ieloznacznością właściwą wielu predykatom mentalnym (tj. m oże mieć w szczególności sens aktualny, habitualny, sekwencyjny lub procesuálny);
b) wieloznacznością swoistą (tj. m oże w szczególności mieć sens intuicyjny, identyfikacyjny, indulgencyjny lub inskrypcyjny).
2. Wyrażenie „rozum ieć” w sensie identyfikacyjnym występuje w kontekstach eliptycznych (m oże mieć wów czas sens esencjalny, strukturalny, funkcjonalny, kauzalny, kategorialny lub konceptualny).
3. Wszelkie (niem etaforyczne) konteksty i derywaty wyrażenia „rozum ieć" dadzą się sparafrazować za pom ocą wprow adzonych rozróżnień.
4. Różnice zdań w sprawie rozumienia albo biorą się z pomieszania znaczeń, albo są empirycznie testowalne.
Przedstawione hipotezy pozwalają usunąć nieporozum ienia, dotyczące kolejno: argumentów relacji rozumienia, kategorii semantycznej „rozumienia", relacji między poszczególnym i pojęciami „rozum ienia" oraz. między rozumieniem a innymi funkcjami m entalnym i, warunkami poprawności definicji „rozum ienia konceptualnego", na koniec kryteriów kompetencji językowej.
