A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S
FOLIA PHILOSOPH ICA 9. 1993
M arek Rosiak
IS KAZIM IERZ AJDU K IEW ICZ’S CRITIQ UE OF IDEALISM CONCLUSIVE?
K azim ierz A jdukiew icz was occupicd with idealistic im plications o f epistem ology for at least 15 years and he w rote 4 com prehensive self-contained papers on this subject, no t to m ention num erous items where the subject was also touched. T his was a problem o f great im portance for him and as he w rote its analysis helped him during his period o f radical conventionalism to leave the m etaphysical crossroad and to take the way o f realism . M oreover, it is recognized (e.g. in Prof. J. W olenski’s book on Polish A nalytical P hilosop-hy) th at these A jdukiew icz’s studies are good exam ples o f so called m ethod o f p arap h rases - a p artic u la r m ethod o f philosophical analysis invented by A jdukiew icz himself. Even for those two reasons only the w orks m entioned deserve th o ro u g h investigation.
In the article w ritten in 1937 an d entitled The Problem o f Transcendental Idealism in a Sem antic Formulation Ajdukiew icz tried to use certain m etalo- gical results to criticize the epistem ological stan d p o in t o f the Baden faction o f the n eokantion school. He took in to consideration views o f H einrich Rickert - one o f the leaders o f this school. Let us reconstruct briefly A jdukiew icz’s presentation o f relevant neok an tian statem ents together with the subsequent criticism 1.
A jdukiew icz claim ed th a t in R ickert’s opinion reality is no m ore than a mere corelate o f consciousness and it has ontologically derivative character. T he p articu lar feature o f R ickert’s stan d p o in t is th at according to him the consciousness m entioned above has supraindividual ch aracter. It is - in technical term s - „Bew üsstsein ü b e rh a u p t” . W hat is m ore, the consciousness seems to be reduced to one basic function only - nam ely the function o f
1 K. A j d u k i e w i c z , Problemat transcendentalnego idealizmu и' sformułowaniu sem antycz-nym, [in:] J ęzy k i poznanie, t. 1, Warszawa 1960, p. 264 278.
judgem ent. T his function consists in the fact th a t the consciousness is the source o f certain transcendental norm s which are the criteria o f tru th for statem ents uttered by individuals. P utting the m atter otherw ise, according to R ickert existence consists in conform ity o f relevant existential statem ents with transcendental norm s. O ne can see th at R ickert chose a n o n -stan d a rd theory o f tru th , because for him veracity m eant conform ity with rules2.
As a p re p a ra tio n o f his criticism A jdukiew icz presented the m etalogical notio n o f language as a deductive system. Such system includes a decidable set o f well form ed form ulas as well as a set o f rules o f im m ediate inference. An in terp re tatio n o f all sym bols o f the language is according to Ajdukiew icz equivalent to the choice o f its rules o f im m ediate inference, so the n atural language o r the scientific language is a deductive system if its expressions have full m eaning. Ajdukiew icz th o u g h t th a t at least the language o f em pirical sciences fulfills the above condition an d th a t consequently it is a deductive system. O n the o th er hand he referred to the fact th at richer deductive systems (those containing arithm etics) are incom plete. If one is ready to accept the m etalogical principle o f excluded m iddle, one im m ediately arrives at conc-lusion th a t in the scientific language there are true statem ents that are not derivable. A ccording to A jdukiew icz the notion o f transcendental rule could be interpreted in term s o f the rules o f im m ediate inference, so we reach the negation o f the thesis o f transcendental idealism because there are true statem ents which do not conform to the transcendental rules3.
W e m ust stress th at A jdukiew icz did not state categorically th a t his in terp retatio n was an ultim ate refu tatio n o f transcendental idealism in R ickert's version. He pu t some question m arks on the end o f his p roposal but neverthless he seemed to be sure th a t the m ain p a rt o f his re fu tatio n is irrefragable. He m entioned two possible objections to this own co nstruction. Firstly, one can replace som e finitist n otions with infinitist ones, an d secondly, the acceptance o f the m etalogical law o f excluded m iddle should be som ehow justified. H ow ever, he described these d o u b ts as subtle, which p robably m eant m arginal an d he did not discuss them at all. But it seems to me th at these d o u b ts are connected with the very crucial problem o f this investigation, nam ely they are co n trib u tio n to the question how the whole procedure is justified.
Let us allow ourselves certain extravagance and going th ro u g h the looking glass q uote fam ous verses:
And as in uffish thought he stood. The Jabberwock, with eyes o f flame. Came whiffling through the tulgey w ood, And burbled as it came!
2 Ibid.. p. 271-273. 3 Ibid.. p. 273-276.
Is it possible to falsify this statem ent by saying th at Jabberw ock is the present reader o f this text and „to bu rb le” m eans to snore? If anybody claim ed th at, he w ould be im m ediately accused o f com m itting petitio principii. T he dispute ab o u t the truthfulness o f the verses above w ould change into the dispute ab o u t the justification o f the in terp retatio n proposed.
F o r balancing this exam ple let us pu t forw ard a n o th e r one. W hen Plato stated th a t a m an is a featherless biped, Diogenes show ed him a plucked chicken, crying: „T his is P la to ’s m an!" It was a conclusive falsification o f P la to ’s definition and as we know , stu b b o rn P lato m ade his definition m ore sophisticated claim ing th a t a m an is a featherless biped with fiat nails.
These exam ples show th a t one can expect conclusive falsification when o n e’s in terp re tatio n fits the m eanings o f the statem ents under consideration. G enerally speaking, an in terp retatio n is valuable if it creates sim pler problem s th a n it resolves. O f course there are a lot o f philosophical n otions th a t are vague or even com pletely deprived o f any distinguishable m eaning. Some people even think th a t the very essence o f philosophy consists in using such notions, as the definition taken from som e A m erican dictio n ary shows: „M etaphysics: highly ab stra ct speculation, n o t easy to u n d e rsta n d ” . O bscure philosophical theories c a n n o t be falsified by any single in terp retatio n . It seems to me th a t conclusiveness can be re a d ie d only by som e kind o f m etacriticism pointing ou t th a t notions un d er consideration are vague but this w ould be by no m eans the refu tatio n o f the relevant theory.
The result o f A jdukiew icz’s investigation concerning the problem o f transcendental idealism boils dow n to the statem ent th at if certain universal language o f science could be constructed and if it had the features o f a deductive system and its theses had finitist ch a rac te r and if transcendental norm s could be treated as rules o f im m ediate inference o f this system then providing th a t m etalogical rule o f excluded m iddle was accepted, the m ain theorem o f transcendental idealism w ould collapse. O ne can see how far these considerations are from being conclusive and I am convinced th a t attem p ts o f ju stifications o f the above premisses would only p ro v o k e fu rth e r questions. In
p artic u la r it is d ubious w hether one can justify the in terp re tatio n o f tran scen -dental norm s as rules o f im m ediate inference. Suspicion arises because the rules o f inference m ust concern tran sfo rm atio n s o f certain stated sym bols and as such they always have only limited extent. T ranscendental norm s on the o th er hand are universal norm s o f thinking an d thus ca n n o t be boiled dow n to any definite (even if infinite) variety o f sym bols. T he process o f thinking always uses certain sym bols but nevertheless it will alw ays transcend every p articu lar sym bolism . A n o th er objection against A jdukiew icz’s attem p t is tem porary and changeable ch a rac te r o f m eaning in the n atural language. N either the set o f well form ed form ules is closed n o r m eanings are attach ed to w ords for ever. As the n atu ra l language evolves so m ust the rules o f its
inference do. A nd one can n o t d o u b t th a t transcendental norm s d o not change in time.
Twelve years after the critique o f transcendental idealism Ajdukiew icz returned to idealistic views once again and focused on its subjective version. In the pap er entitled Epistem ology and semiotics he took into consideration bishop Berkeley's views. (It can be o f historical interest th a t in those times and circum stances positive evaluation o f the w ork o f any bishop, and Berkeley in particu lar, was a deed o f great intelectual and civil courage, precisely as today criticism o f any bishop is)4.
Ajdukiew icz investigates three-argum ent relation: language-percep- tions-reality. R elations o f referring between them are as following:
language expression
/
\
perception--- » real object
Ajdukiewicz puts stress on equivocation connected with double reference o f language expressions. It arises when one uses the sam e w ord as a nam e o f a sense d ata and as a nam e o f real thing. He claim s th at this equivocation is responsible for basic m isunderstanding hidden in subjectivistic thesis ,,esse = = percipi” . In his opinion Berkeley is right when he stresses oviousness o f this thesis, but only so far as im aginations, thoughts, im pressions and so on are concerned. All o f them ecxist only in som eone’s m ind and they constitute separate realm called „th e second w orld” by K arl P o p p er later on. But Berkeley does not stop here and goes farther, stating - in A jdukiew icz’s opinion - th a t the existence o f the w orld (P o p p er's „first w o rld ” ) has the same derivative and dependent c h a ra c te r5. Such stan d p o in t is obviously talse because in th a t case not only pink elephants bu t real ones as well w ould find a shelter in my m ind. If one is not aw are o f the equivocation show n above, one can feel th a t „esse = perci pi” is obvious but nevertheless som ehow paradoxical. ,,Esse = percipi” is self-evident but only as far as it refers to perceptions. The „realistic” part o f this thesis rem ains unproved.
Sim plicity o f the problem stated above renders the presentation o f the p re p ara to ry m etalogical p a rt o f this paper unnecessary. N evertheless, A j-dukiew icz devotes a lot o f time to these m atters, m entioning esp. T a rsk i’s p ap e r on the definition o f tru th an d he claim ed th a t m etalogical distinctions between language an d m etalanguage throw cerain light on the problem . Let us consider A jdukiew icz’s idea o f extending the notion o f m etalanguage to a language possessing nam es for objects from „th e second w orld" (so called
4 K. A j d u k i e w i c z , Epistemologia i sem iotyka, [in:] Język i poznanie, t. 2, Warszawa 1965. p. 107- 117.
introspective language). T his idea was induced by certain sim ilarity in sem antical relations in a genuine m etalanguage an d an „introspective lan-guage” . R elations o f referring are as follows:
m etalanguage -* language -> reality language -» perceptions -* reality
But sim ilarities seems to end at this point. P erceptions arc by no m eans language expressions. I ca n n o t use m y perceptions as a m eans o f co m -m unication with an o th er people w hat is a basic feature o f any language. T hus w hatsoever we arrive at with help o f this analogy, m ust rem ain dubious and unjustified.
P u ttin g this m arginal m a tte r aside let us retu rn to A jdukiew icz's claim th at the equivocation is hidden in the arg u m en tatio n o f Berkeley. F irst o f all it seems highly im probable th at such sim ple logical e rro r could rem ain undis-covered in the fou n d atio n s o f the system. Secondly, it can be clearly seen in Berkeley's text th at he accepts „ in te n tio n a l" existence o f perceptions an d o ther states ol m ind and rcjccts the claim th a t a p a rt from the know ing subject and the content o f his m ind there exists som ething else. (O bvious inconsistency in adm itting the existence o f G o d and o th e r subjects can be easily explained as an self-censorship quite understan d ab le in those tim es)6. H ow ever, A jdukiew icz’s arg u m en tatio n implies th a t such a statem ent w ould be unacceptable. A ccor-ding to him, a subjective idealist ca n n o t afford the statem en t ab o u t „real nonexistence" o f certain things sim ply because he has not the notio n o f „real existence” at his disposal. I f the only assertions th a t can be stated in the language o f subjective idealist are: ,,A exists-in-m ind” and „A does not exist-in-inind” then it is obvious th a t we are unable to say th at A does no t exist in reality. P robably th at is the way o f A jdukiew icz’s arg u m e n tatio n when he writes th at subjective idealist has only pure m etalanguage at his disposal (i.e. the language deprived o f nam es for external objects). But such argu m en tatio n is easy to refute when one rem em bers th a t a subjective idealist speaks no t only ab o u t his own perceptions but a b o u t know ing subject as well. If he can tell th at a subject exists independently, he can also say th a t o th e r things do not exist in this sense.
Let us allow ourselves to m ake a general rem ark. Berkeley’s stan d p o in t rejecting the independent existence o f the objects o f experience has u n d o u b ted -ly m etaphysical and no t sem iotical origin. T herefore all attem p ts o f its criticism from the sem iotic stan d p o in t are ill-constructed. If som eone believes o r does not believe in existence o f goblins an d dw arfs, you ca n n o t force him to
6 G. B e r k e l e y , T raktat o zasadach poznania, przel. J. Sosnow ska, § 89, Warszawa 1956 p. 97 98.
change his opinions by referring to the language he uses, unless you d em o n strate his inconsistency (and even then som e people rem ain resistent). A decisive argum ent m ust be based on som e intuition o r experience. O ne can rem ind here attem p ts ot a n o th e r o u tstan d in g Polish con tem p o rary philosopher R om an Ingarden w ho attac k ed the transcendental idealism o f Husserl. The result ol his efforts inspired by resistance to regarding the w orld as a correlate o f consciousness was his Controversy Over the E xistence o f the W orld full o f conceptual distinctions, tending to discover in the very essence o f analysed notions some factor sup p o rtin g o u r everyday's belief in the reality o f the world. T he evidence th a t Ingarden sought in vain is that the a u th o r him self left his w ork unended w ithout achieving his goal.
Even if Ajdukiew icz was right in pointing out som e inconsistencies o f Berkeley’s language and if m oreover subjective idealism could not be stated in a consistent way, a follower o f this school would be able to say with W ittgenstein th at the language was only a ladder which can be throw n out afte r reaching the upper floor (i.e. after clear recognition o f the issue in question). Even if Berkeley's stan d p o in t is served ir. epistem ological sauce, its essence has got a m etaphysical core inaccessible to epistem ological assaults. Sim ilarly, belief in the independent existence o f the objects o f external experience ca n n o t be refuted by epistem ological investigations contained in B erkeley's Treatise. A jdukiew icz’s question p u t forw ard in the beginning o f the p aper discussed, nam ely: „A re there any m etaphysical consequences o f epistem ological investigations?” can be answ ered as folows: such consequences (if a t all) could be given only by experience o r intuition and epistem ological investigation can be relevant only to the limited extent.
P erhaps Ajdukiew icz was not satisfied with his results because three years afte r the reviewed p aper he published a n o te r one entitled On the notion o f existence. This one was inspired by Lesniew ski’s ontology in turn. T he au th o r tried to show th at the stan d p o in t o f transcendental idealism cannot be presented consistently. A jdukiew icz introduced tw o different notions o f existence: intentional existence an d real existence. W ith their help he p ro -claim ed the following idealistic thesis: „T rees exist intentionally but do not exist in reality” . We rem em ber th at the tru th o f this proposition boils dow n to its conform ity with the transcendental norm s. These norm s were interpreted as rules o f im m ediate inferece in turn. T he fact th a t trees exist intentionally (the only possibility for an idealist) is equivalent to the fact th at the statem ent ab o u t the existence o f trees fulfills the transcendental norm s. But such statem ent is an em pirical statem ent which m eans th at it uses stan d ard notions o f existence the real existence. In this way - according to Ajdukiew icz - we can see the inconsistence o f an idealistic language. F o r on one hand an idealist rejected the statem ent th at trees really exist (accepting only th at they exist
intentionally) and on the o th e r han d the consequence o f this step lead him to affirm th a t nevertheless trees really exist7.
This parad o x seems to be ap p a ren t only too. T he statem en t th at trees exist intentionally only is an epistem ological statem ent o f course, because sciences do not use the notion o f the intentional existence at all. A ccording to transcendental idealists the tru th o f this statem en t depends on its conform ity with certain transcendental norm s. These norm s m ust deal with this p artic u la r type o f statem ent and not with em pirical statem ents, therefore there is no need o f assum ing th at these norm s will force us to adm it th a t trees exist in reality. Speaking otherw ise: if we bear in m ind the universal ch a racter o f tran scen d en -tal norm s, th a t they arc applicable to all kinds o f declarative sentcnccs, we m ust realize th at because epistem ological statem ents are distinct from state-m ents o f estate-m pirical sciences, relevant transcendental n o rstate-m s should be different also. A lthough the norm for the em pirical statem ent „T rees exist” could tell us to adm it that trees exist in reality, there is no need o f assum ing th at in case o f an epistcm ological statem en t „T rees exist intentionally only” because this statem ent has got a n o th e r criteria o f truthfulness.
Finally, I m ust repeat once again th a t no one o f A jdukiew icz's argum ents seems to be conclusive. If one rem em bers the im portance o f the above problem s for the philosopher, the o utcom e seems to be ra th e r depressing. N o r the m ethod o f p arap h ra se s has m anifested its m erits if 1 am right to claim th at m ajority o f argum ents could be presented w ithout a reference to the logical results. In my opinion these results could act as a possible inspiration o f certain epistem ological hypotheses ra th e r th a n as strict schemes which epistem ological statem ents m atch.
P erh ap s it is significant th a t while in his first p ap e r A jdukiew icz claim ed th a t philosophical problem s un d er consideration could be resolved easily with help o f form al logic in the second one he seemed to be m ore m odest with respect to th at claim although he still cheered him self with certain epithets addressed to idealists an d finally in the th ird one epithets as well as the im pression o f self-confidence disappeared at all. Is it possible th a t afte r long argum ents with idealism Ajdukiew icz becam e to appreciate the opposite p art o f this controversy?
Department o f Logic Łódź University Poland
Marek Rosiak
Z A G A D N I E N I E K O N K L U Z Y W N O ŚC I KRYT Y KI I DEALI Z MU PR ZEPR O W A D ZO N EJ PRZEZ KA Z I MI E R Z A AJD U K IEW 1C ZA
Ajdukiewicz podejm ował kilkakrotnie próbę analizy i krytyki m etafizycznego idealizmu zarówno w jego wersji obiektywnej, jak subiektywnej. Angażow ał do tego celu pewne pojęcia i wyniki współczesnej m etalogiki, co stan ow iło przykład zastosow ania właściwej mu metody analizy filozoficznej, zwanej m etody parafraz. Analiza Ajdukiewiczowskiej argumentacji ukazuje jej dalece niekonkluzywny charakter, jak również zdaje się wykazywać, że metoda parafraz nie znajduje tu swego efektyw nego zastosow ania. Konkluzją przedstawionych rozważań jest hipoteza, iż fundamentalne przekonania metafizyczne nie poddają się krytyce o charakterze semiotycznym.
